Re: Numbers

2006-03-17 Thread Georges Quénot
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Georges Quenot wrote: Norman Samish wrote: Where could the executive program have come from? Perhaps one could call it God. I can think of no possibility other than It was always there, and eternal existence is a concept I can't imagine. Are there any other

Re: UDA

2006-03-17 Thread Bruno Marchal
Hi Brent, This is quite amazing! I got only nothing there (due to the fact that ESCRIBE does no more work I guess). The step by step presentation to Joel Dobrzelewski seems to be here: http://www.mail-archive.com/everything-list@eskimo.com/msg01274.html See also for the sequel:

Re: Numbers

2006-03-17 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 17-mars-06, à 00:10, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : Dualism says there are two really existing realms or substances. This is Descartes' dualism between mind and body. Saying the physical realm is concrete and real and the mathematical realm is abstract and unreal is not dualism. Well,

Re: Numbers

2006-03-17 Thread Quentin Anciaux
To brent... (sorry I do not have the mail in my mailbox to reply to it). So reality is what kicks back... Ok, but that was not the question (really), I want to know what distinction you do between abstract thing and real thing ? You would say real things are things when throw at you, hurt you

Re: Numbers

2006-03-17 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 17-mars-06, à 00:14, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : The argument does not show the the physical universe can only emerge on an infinity of overlapping computations, as such. It might show this given a series of assumptions-- that we are nothing but hardwareless computations, that the

Re: Numbers

2006-03-17 Thread John M
to more recent posts: 1. do we have a REAL argument against solipsism? (Our stupidity may allow also all the bad things that happen.) 2. Is reasonable or rational thinking exclusive for ONLY those, who live in a 'numbers' obsession? or is it an elitist heaughtiness to look down to all, who do

Re: reductionism: please explain

2006-03-17 Thread John M
--- Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Bruno Marchal writes: Le 11-mars-06, à 10:59, Georges Quénot wrote (to John): snip Yes also and indeed, the way of thinking I presented fits within a reductionist framework. Nobody is required to adhere to such a framework

Re: Numbers

2006-03-17 Thread Georges Quenot
John M a écrit : to more recent posts: 1. do we have a REAL argument against solipsism? I am not sure to understand what you mean by REAL here. There are arguments against solipsism. Wittgenstein for instance produced some. None of them is lilkey to be decisive. They may work with some

Re: Numbers

2006-03-17 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 16-mars-06, à 22:52, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : Is isomorphism or a one-to-one correspondence a mathematical concept or a metamathematical (or metaphysical? another complication in the discussion) concept? I take them as mathematical concepts, so that speculating about isomorphisms of

Re: Numbers

2006-03-17 Thread Georges Quenot
John M wrote: to more recent posts: 1. do we have a REAL argument against solipsism? (Our stupidity may allow also all the bad things that happen.) 2. Is reasonable or rational thinking exclusive for ONLY those, who live in a 'numbers' obsession? or is it an elitist heaughtiness to

Re: Numbers

2006-03-17 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 16-mars-06, à 23:46, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : is it ? we might be able to ground meaning in causal interactions, for instance, but can we ground causal interactions in the timeless world of maths ? I think Hal Finney just gave a nice answer through the notion of block universe. I do

Re: Numbers

2006-03-17 Thread peterdjones
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 16-mars-06, à 23:46, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : is it ? we might be able to ground meaning in causal interactions, for instance, but can we ground causal interactions in the timeless world of maths ? I think Hal Finney just gave a nice answer through the

Re: Numbers

2006-03-17 Thread peterdjones
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 16-mars-06, à 22:52, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : Is isomorphism or a one-to-one correspondence a mathematical concept or a metamathematical (or metaphysical? another complication in the discussion) concept? I take them as mathematical concepts, so that

Re: Numbers

2006-03-17 Thread peterdjones
Georges Quénot wrote: [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Georges Quenot wrote: [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Georges wrote: - The multiverse is isomorphic to a mathematical object, This has to be saying simply that the multiverse IS a mathematical object. Otherwise

Re: Numbers

2006-03-17 Thread peterdjones
Bruno Marchal wrote: This means you miss the point. The only assumption is comp by which I mean the yes doctor hypothesis together with Church's thesis and a minimal amount of arithmetical realism (AR: just the idea that elementary arithmetical truth is independent of me, you ...This is

Re: reductionism: please explain

2006-03-17 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 17-mars-06, à 06:47, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : Bruno Marchal writes: Le 11-mars-06, à 10:59, Georges Quénot wrote (to John): snip Yes also and indeed, the way of thinking I presented fits within a reductionist framework. Nobody is required to adhere to such a framework (and

Re: Numbers

2006-03-17 Thread peterdjones
Hal Finney wrote: The first is that numbers are really far more complex than they seem. When we think of numbers, we tend to think of simple ones, like 2, or 7. But they are not really typical of numbers. Even restricting ourselves to the integers, the information content of the average

Re: Numbers

2006-03-17 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 17-mars-06, à 06:48, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : Yes, I was assuming that the descriptions lose information, or generalize, just as mammal is a generalization, and just as Bruno's duplication loses information.  Otherwise, I would call it a re-representation of *ALL* the details of something,

Re: Numbers

2006-03-17 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 17-mars-06, à 13:42, John M a écrit : to more recent posts: 1. do we have a REAL argument against solipsism? (Our stupidity may allow also all the bad things that happen.) There is no REAL argument against solipsism. Nevertheless it is false, imo. So solipsism is false but

Re: Numbers

2006-03-17 Thread peterdjones
Georges Quénot wrote: [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Georges Quenot wrote: Norman Samish wrote: Where could the executive program have come from? Perhaps one could call it God. I can think of no possibility other than It was always there, and eternal existence is a concept I

Solipsism (was: Numbers)

2006-03-17 Thread Hal Finney
John M writes: 1. do we have a REAL argument against solipsism? Let me express how solipsism can be analyzed in the model where physical reality is part of mathematical reality. Let us adopt Bruno's UDA perspective: the Universal Dovetailer (UD) is an abstract machine that runs all possible

Re: Numbers

2006-03-17 Thread Brent Meeker
Quentin Anciaux wrote: To brent... (sorry I do not have the mail in my mailbox to reply to it). So reality is what kicks back... Ok, but that was not the question (really), I want to know what distinction you do between abstract thing and real thing ? You would say real things are

Re: Numbers

2006-03-17 Thread Brent Meeker
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 17-mars-06, à 01:31, Brent Meeker a écrit : Hmmm... okay, so last questions what is an abstract thing ? what does it means to be abstract ? what render a thing real ? what does it means for it to be real ? what does it means to be real ? If you kick it, it kicks

Re: Numbers

2006-03-17 Thread John M
--- Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Le 17-mars-06, à 13:42, John M a écrit : to more recent posts: 1. do we have a REAL argument against solipsism? (Our stupidity may allow also all the bad things that happen.) There is no REAL argument against solipsism.

Re: Numbers

2006-03-17 Thread John M
--- Georges Quenot [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: John M a écrit : to more recent posts: 1. do we have a REAL argument against solipsism? I am not sure to understand what you mean by REAL hereSKIP... Arguments are just arguments. (See my post to Bruno: I don't hold Wittgenstein

Fw: Numbers

2006-03-17 Thread Norman Samish
[EMAIL PROTECTED]wrote: "Hal Finney" wrote: The first is that numbers are really far more complex than they seem. When we think of numbers, we tend to think of simple ones, like 2, or 7. But they are not really typical of numbers. Even restricting ourselves to the integers, the

Re: Numbers

2006-03-17 Thread Georges Quénot
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Georges Quénot wrote: [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Georges Quenot wrote: That [The universe] has real existence, as opposed to the other mathematical objects which are only abstract. is what I called a dualist view. Dualism says there are two really existing

Re: Numbers

2006-03-17 Thread Georges Quénot
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Since I don't adopt the premise that everything is mathematical, I would like to clarify just that point. I understood that you do not adopt it (and whatever your reasons I have to respect the fact). By the way I am not sure I really :-) adopt it either. But can you

Re: Numbers

2006-03-17 Thread Georges Quénot
John M wrote: [...] Don't be a sourpus, I was not attacking YOU. Well. I do not know exactly why I felt concerned. I probably missed your point. [...] By George! (not Georges) don't you imply such things into my mind after my decade under nazis and two under commis, now 3+ in the

Re: Numbers

2006-03-17 Thread Brent Meeker
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: ... Errmm..but if the universe is the set of all real things, then they all share the property of realness. Perhaps you mean: what is the difference between real things and unreal things? Well, the difference is that real things have properties and unreal things

Re: Numbers

2006-03-17 Thread peterdjones
Georges Quénot wrote: [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Since I don't adopt the premise that everything is mathematical, I would like to clarify just that point. I understood that you do not adopt it (and whatever your reasons I have to respect the fact). By the way I am not sure I really :-)

Re: Numbers

2006-03-17 Thread peterdjones
Brent Meeker wrote: [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: ... Errmm..but if the universe is the set of all real things, then they all share the property of realness. Perhaps you mean: what is the difference between real things and unreal things? Well, the difference is that real things have

Re: Numbers

2006-03-17 Thread peterdjones
Georges Quénot wrote: [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Quentin Anciaux wrote: What properties of the multiverse would render only one mathematical object real and others abstract... A non-mathematical property. Hence mathematics alone is not sufficient to explain the world. QED. This

Re: Numbers

2006-03-17 Thread Brent Meeker
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Georges Quénot wrote: [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Quentin Anciaux wrote: What properties of the multiverse would render only one mathematical object real and others abstract... A non-mathematical property. Hence mathematics alone is not sufficient to explain the