RE: Re: Bruno's argument

2006-07-23 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Jesse Mazer writes (quoting SP): Whatyouseemtobesuggestingisthatnotallcomputationsareequivalent: somegiverisetomind,whileothers,apparentlysimilar,donot.Isn't thissimilartothereasoningofpeoplewhosaythatacomputercould neverbeconsciousbecauseevenifitexactlyemulatedahumanbrain,itis

RE: Bruno's argument

2006-07-23 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Russell Standish writes: Torefinetheproblemalittlefurther-weseeabraininour observedrealityonwhichourmindsupervenes.Andweseeother brains,forwhichwemustassumesupervenienceofotherpersons(the nozombiesassumption). Whatisthecauseofthissupervenience?Itisasymptomofthe

Re: Bruno's argument

2006-07-23 Thread 1Z
Brent Meeker wrote: 1Z wrote: Brent Meeker wrote: In other words it is not justified, based on our limited understanding of brains, to say we'll never be able to know how another feels based on observation of their brain. We don't know how insects or amoebae feel, either.

Re: Bruno's argument

2006-07-23 Thread 1Z
Russell Standish wrote: On Sun, Jul 23, 2006 at 06:53:50PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Russell Standish writes: To refine the problem a little further - we see a brain in our observed reality on which our mind supervenes. And we see other brains, for which we must assume

Re: COMP Self-awareness

2006-07-23 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 20-juil.-06, à 21:01, Russell Standish a écrit : On Sat, Jul 22, 2006 at 04:49:04PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 20-juil.-06, à 13:46, Russell Standish a écrit : Bruno, I know in your theory that introspection is a vital component (the Goedel-like constructions), but I didn't see

Re: Bruno's argument

2006-07-23 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 22-juil.-06, à 22:02, Brent Meeker a écrit : No bigger than the assumption that other minds exists (a key assumption in comp if only through the trust to the doctor). Aren't those two propositions independent - that there are other minds and that we cannot possibly know what their

Re: This is not the roadmap

2006-07-23 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 23-juil.-06, à 02:43, 1Z a écrit : There is no reason to think numbers can describe qualia at all, so the question of the best description hardly arises. That was my point. But then I can show this is a necessary consequence of comp. Materialist who are using comp as a pretext for not

Re: COMP Self-awareness

2006-07-23 Thread Russell Standish
On Sun, Jul 23, 2006 at 04:38:01PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: Functionalism is the same as comp, except that functionalist traditionally presuppose some knowable high level of substitution (and then like materialist presuppose a physical stuffy level). So I would say comp is just the

Re: This is not the roadmap

2006-07-23 Thread 1Z
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 23-juil.-06, à 02:43, 1Z a écrit : There is no reason to think numbers can describe qualia at all, so the question of the best description hardly arises. That was my point. But then I can show this is a necessary consequence of comp. Materialist who are using

Re: Bruno's argument

2006-07-23 Thread Russell Standish
On Mon, Jul 24, 2006 at 12:35:02PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: What if we just say that there is no more to the supervenience of the mental on the physical than there is to the supervenience of a parabola on the trajectory of a projectile under gravity? The projectile doesn't create