Jesse Mazer writes (quoting SP):
Whatyouseemtobesuggestingisthatnotallcomputationsareequivalent: somegiverisetomind,whileothers,apparentlysimilar,donot.Isn't thissimilartothereasoningofpeoplewhosaythatacomputercould neverbeconsciousbecauseevenifitexactlyemulatedahumanbrain,itis
Russell Standish writes:
Torefinetheproblemalittlefurther-weseeabraininour observedrealityonwhichourmindsupervenes.Andweseeother brains,forwhichwemustassumesupervenienceofotherpersons(the nozombiesassumption). Whatisthecauseofthissupervenience?Itisasymptomofthe
Brent Meeker wrote:
1Z wrote:
Brent Meeker wrote:
In other words it is not justified, based on our limited understanding of
brains, to say we'll never
be able to know how another feels based on observation of their brain.
We don't know how insects or amoebae feel, either.
Russell Standish wrote:
On Sun, Jul 23, 2006 at 06:53:50PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Russell Standish writes:
To refine the problem a little further - we see a brain in our observed
reality on which our mind supervenes. And we see other brains, for which
we must assume
Le 20-juil.-06, à 21:01, Russell Standish a écrit :
On Sat, Jul 22, 2006 at 04:49:04PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 20-juil.-06, à 13:46, Russell Standish a écrit :
Bruno, I know in your theory that introspection is a vital component
(the Goedel-like constructions), but I didn't see
Le 22-juil.-06, à 22:02, Brent Meeker a écrit :
No bigger than the assumption that other minds exists (a key
assumption in comp if only through the trust to the doctor).
Aren't those two propositions independent - that there are other minds
and that we cannot possibly
know what their
Le 23-juil.-06, à 02:43, 1Z a écrit :
There is no reason to think numbers can describe qualia at
all, so the question of the best description hardly arises.
That was my point. But then I can show this is a necessary consequence
of comp.
Materialist who are using comp as a pretext for not
On Sun, Jul 23, 2006 at 04:38:01PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Functionalism is the same as comp, except that functionalist
traditionally presuppose some knowable high level of substitution (and
then like materialist presuppose a physical stuffy level).
So I would say comp is just the
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 23-juil.-06, à 02:43, 1Z a écrit :
There is no reason to think numbers can describe qualia at
all, so the question of the best description hardly arises.
That was my point. But then I can show this is a necessary consequence
of comp.
Materialist who are using
On Mon, Jul 24, 2006 at 12:35:02PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
What if we just say that there is no more to the supervenience of the
mental on the physical than there is to the supervenience of a
parabola on the trajectory of a projectile under gravity? The
projectile doesn't create
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