Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
I'm not necessarily talking about every possible computation being
implemented by
every physical system, just (at least) the subset of finite
computations implemented by
a physical computer or brain. I
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
I'm not necessarily talking about every possible computation being
implemented by every physical system, just (at least) the subset of finite
computations implemented by a physical
Peter Jones writes:
Physical determinism is the idea that the
future is genrated form the persent by rigid physical
laws. As opposed to the idea that the future is fixed
becasue it is already there, like the end of a movie
which is already in the can , and need not bear any logical
Peter Jones writes:
But is there any sense in which we as humans are any more free than
billiard
balls or dice beyond the fact that we *feel* we are free?
There may be. For instance, freedom might be a combination of
indeterminism and rational self-control.
I have a strong feeling
Le 31-août-06, à 12:59, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
But is there any sense in which we as humans are any more free than
billiard
balls or dice beyond the fact that we *feel* we are free? I have a
strong feeling
that my free will is not randomness and not determinism: is there
Le 31-août-06, à 22:20, 1Z a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 29-août-06, à 20:45, 1Z a écrit :
The version of AR that is supported by comp
only makes a commitment about mind-independent *truth*. The idea
that the mind-independent truth of mathematical propositions
entails the
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Please I have never said that primary matter is impossible. Just that I
have no idea what it is, no idea what use can it have, nor any idea how
it could helps to explain quanta or qualia.
So I am happy that with comp it has necessarily no purpose, and we can
abandon
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
The requirement that computations require counterfactuals isn't
ad hoc, it comes from the observation that computer programmes
include if-then statements.
The idea that
1Z wrote:
Necessary truth doesn't entail necessary existence unless
the claims in question are claims about existence.
If one claims (which I don't BTW) that something is 'necessarily true'
*independent of contingent existence* then I think for this to be in
any way coherent, one must be
David Nyman wrote:
1Z wrote:
Necessary truth doesn't entail necessary existence unless
the claims in question are claims about existence.
If one claims (which I don't BTW) that something is 'necessarily true'
*independent of contingent existence* then I think for this to be in
any way
1Z wrote:
Statements, concepts and beliefs must
be contingently instantiated. That doesn't
mean that their truths-values are logially
contingent.
I'm not sure that in a world of strictly contingent existence one can
establish a 'logical necessity' that is independent of 'contingent
David Nyman wrote:
1Z wrote:
Statements, concepts and beliefs must
be contingently instantiated. That doesn't
mean that their truths-values are logially
contingent.
I'm not sure that in a world of strictly contingent existence one can
establish a 'logical necessity' that is
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1Z wrote:
Why should the *truth* of a statement be dependent on
the *existence* of an instance of it ?
What I mean is that - for a 'thoroughgoing contingentist' -
'statements', 'concepts', 'truths', 'referents' and anything else
whatsoever can exist solely in virtue of their actual contingent
David Nyman wrote:
1Z wrote:
Why should the *truth* of a statement be dependent on
the *existence* of an instance of it
What I mean is that - for a 'thoroughgoing contingentist' -
'statements', 'concepts', 'truths', 'referents' and anything else
whatsoever can exist solely in virtue of
1Z wrote:
Indeed, but the contingentist doesn't have to regard truth
as something that exists.
Fair enough, but even the contingentist needs to express herself
intelligibly without recourse to a constant blizzard of scare quotes.
So she still needs something that FAPP corresponds to
Brent Meeker writes:
[Stathis Papaioannou]
No, it follows from the idea that anything can be a computation. I think
this
is trivially obvious, like saying any string of apparently random
characters
is a translation of any English sentence of similar or shorter length,
and if
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