Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
If every computation is implemented everywhere anyway, this is equivalent
to the situation where every
computation exists as a platonic object, or every computation exists
implemented on some computer or
brain in a material
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
If every computation is implemented everywhere anyway, this is equivalent
to the situation where every
computation exists as a platonic object, or every computation exists
implemented on some computer
Brent Meeker wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:
[Stathis Papaioannou]
No, it follows from the idea that anything can be a computation. I think
this
is trivially obvious, like saying any string of apparently random
characters
is a translation of any
Le 02-sept.-06, à 17:26, 1Z a écrit :
Things don't become necessarily true just
because someone says so. The truths
of mathematics may be necessarily true, but
that does not make AR a s aclaim about
existence necessarily true. AR as a claim
about existence is metaphysics, and highly
Le 04-sept.-06, à 01:45, Russell Standish a écrit :
On Sun, Sep 03, 2006 at 03:03:02PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Then Maudlin reintroduces the unused parts, the Klaras, which
reintroduces the counterfactual correctness, WITHOUT ADDING any comp
relevant physical activity (if not, it would
Le 03-sept.-06, à 17:18, David Nyman a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Maudlin build first a digital machine, let us call it M, which do a
computation PI (Maudlin's name for it) which we suppose does
correspond
to a genuine consciousness experience (for example some remembering of
the
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 02-sept.-06, à 17:26, 1Z a écrit :
Things don't become necessarily true just
because someone says so. The truths
of mathematics may be necessarily true, but
that does not make AR a s aclaim about
existence necessarily true. AR as a claim
about existence is
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 04-sept.-06, à 02:56, 1Z a écrit :
Why should a belief in other minds (which I do not directly experience)
be more reasonable thant a belief in unexperienced primary matter ?
It's a question of consistency.
Attributing mind to others explains many things.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Either those *specific* physical activities are turing emulable, and we
are back to 1) and 2), or they are not, and then comp is false.
Recall we assume comp.
I don't follow. I thought Maudlin is proposing a physical machine
running the consciousness program, not a
Hi everyone:
Below is a simplified version of the approach I have been working on
for so long.
I would appreciate comments.
Thank you.
-
Definitions:
1) Object: That which has/represents/expresses a set of properties.
2) List of all properties: The list of all possible properties
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
If every computation is implemented everywhere anyway, this is equivalent to
the situation where every computation exists as a platonic object, or every
computation exists implemented on some computer or brain
David Nyman wrote:
Why talk of zombies? A zombie is a being that is supposedly conceivable
(though not to me) as being 'unconscious' despite apparently possessing
the structural/ behavioural prerequisites of consciousness. I was
referring to the issue that, if the characteristics of
Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
If every computation is implemented everywhere anyway, this is
equivalent to the situation where every
computation exists as a platonic object, or every computation exists
Peter Jones writes:
[Stathis Papaioannou]
If every computation is implemented everywhere anyway, this is equivalent
to the situation where every
computation exists as a platonic object, or every computation exists
implemented on some computer or
brain in a material multiverse.
On Mon, Sep 04, 2006 at 03:33:33PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I don't understand this, for in a Multiverse Klara is no longer an
inert system. Maudlin's argument relies on Klara being inert, or so I
thought.
You are right. But in a multiverse Klara can be made inert too. Maudlin
Brent Meeker writes:
If every computation is implemented everywhere anyway, this is equivalent
to
the situation where every computation exists as a platonic object, or
every
computation exists implemented on some computer or brain in a material
multiverse.
But if implementing
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