Peter Jones writes (quoting David Nyman):
The key aspect is that the structure of each OM is inherently what
might be termed a perceiver-percept dyad - that is, it must contain
whatever process or structure is involved both in *representing* the
available information and *responding*
1Z wrote:
I don't see why. Are you saying they are still closed
even if their information content is similar? Why should that be?
How can I fail to have similar information content
to myself five minutes form now? Why doesn't it apply
spatially? Why doensnt each neuron have its own
Le 25-oct.-06, à 13:57, 1Z a écrit :
Brent Meeker wrote:
It's even more than seeing where axioms and rules of inference lead.
Given some axioms and rules of inference the only truths you can
reach are those of the form It is true that axioms = theorems.
For formalists, all
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
(b) can't be right. However many copies of you there are, you only experience
being one at
a time.
Stathis, I concur with this view, and for the reasons you give.
However, much as I hate to complicate this issue further, I wonder if
you have a view on the
Le 23-oct.-06, à 00:12, 1Z a écrit :
Huh? Computationalism is no more able to account for
qualia than physicalism.
Computationalism (the standard one) through my work (don't hesitate to
criticize it) gives a precise account of qualia.
It is even a refutable theory of both quanta and
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 25-oct.-06, à 13:57, 1Z a écrit :
Brent Meeker wrote:
It's even more than seeing where axioms and rules of inference lead.
Given some axioms and rules of inference the only truths you can
reach are those of the form It is true that axioms = theorems.
For
David Nyman writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
(b) can't be right. However many copies of you there are, you only
experience being one at
a time.
Stathis, I concur with this view, and for the reasons you give.
However, much as I hate to complicate this issue further, I wonder if
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
I don't see how a physical multiverse would be distinguishable from a
virtual
reality or a mathematical reality (assuming the latter is possible,
for the sake
of this part of the argument). The successive moments of your
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
As for memory being encoded in or accessible to an OM, that is an unnecessary
complication.
As you said previously, the OM's are related solely by their information
content. If the seconds
of your life were sliced up, shuffled and thrown to the wind, (t1)
David Nyman wrote:
1Z wrote:
I don't see why. Are you saying they are still closed
even if their information content is similar? Why should that be?
How can I fail to have similar information content
to myself five minutes form now? Why doesn't it apply
spatially? Why doensnt each
David Nyman wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
As for memory being encoded in or accessible to an OM, that is an
unnecessary complication.
As you said previously, the OM's are related solely by their information
content. If the seconds
of your life were sliced up, shuffled and
Le 23-oct.-06, à 14:29, 1Z a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 20-oct.-06, à 17:04, 1Z a écrit :
As usual, the truth of a mathematical existence-claim does not
prove Platonism.
By Platonism, or better arithmetical realism I just mean the belief
by many mathematician in the non
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 23-oct.-06, à 14:29, 1Z a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 20-oct.-06, à 17:04, 1Z a écrit :
As usual, the truth of a mathematical existence-claim does not
prove Platonism.
By Platonism, or better arithmetical realism I just mean the belief
by many
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
But c breaks down into:
c1) I experience something coherent that obeys the laws of
physics
and
c2) I experience wild and crazy harry Potter stuff.
The memory-traces corresponding to c2 are a possible
configuration of matter, and so must exist in Platonia.
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
...
Suppose God took Platonia, in all its richness, and made it physical. What
would expect to
experience in the next moment?
(a) nothing
(b) everything
(c) something
(a) can't be right. Although in the vast majority of universes in the next
moment your
1Z wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 25-oct.-06, à 13:57, 1Z a écrit :
Brent Meeker wrote:
It's even more than seeing where axioms and rules of inference lead.
Given some axioms and rules of inference the only truths you can
reach are those of the form It is true that axioms =
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
David Nyman writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
(b) can't be right. However many copies of you there are, you only
experience being one at
a time.
Stathis, I concur with this view, and for the reasons you give.
However, much as I hate to complicate this issue
Tom Caylor wrote:
Again, the kind of formalism that says
everything can be brought under a single
formal scheme (the Hilbertian
programme) is different from the kind
that says mathematical truths are dependent on axioms,
and different truths will be arrived at under different
Le Jeudi 26 Octobre 2006 18:02, 1Z a écrit :
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
But c breaks down into:
c1) I experience something coherent that obeys the laws of
physics
and
c2) I experience wild and crazy harry Potter stuff.
The memory-traces corresponding to c2 are a possible
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le Jeudi 26 Octobre 2006 18:02, 1Z a écrit :
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
But c breaks down into:
c1) I experience something coherent that obeys the laws of
physics
and
c2) I experience wild and crazy harry Potter stuff.
The memory-traces
1Z wrote:
Tom Caylor wrote:
Again, the kind of formalism that says
everything can be brought under a single
formal scheme (the Hilbertian
programme) is different from the kind
that says mathematical truths are dependent on axioms,
and different truths will be arrived at under
Tom Caylor wrote:
1Z wrote:
Tom Caylor wrote:
Again, the kind of formalism that says
everything can be brought under a single
formal scheme (the Hilbertian
programme) is different from the kind
that says mathematical truths are dependent on axioms,
and different
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le Jeudi 26 Octobre 2006 18:02, 1Z a écrit :
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
But c breaks down into:
c1) I experience something coherent that obeys the laws of
physics
and
c2) I experience wild and crazy harry Potter stuff.
The memory-traces corresponding to c2 are a
1Z wrote:
Tom Caylor wrote:
1Z wrote:
Tom Caylor wrote:
Again, the kind of formalism that says
everything can be brought under a single
formal scheme (the Hilbertian
programme) is different from the kind
that says mathematical truths are dependent on axioms,
Tom Caylor wrote:
1Z wrote:
Tom Caylor wrote:
Again, the kind of formalism that says
everything can be brought under a single
formal scheme (the Hilbertian
programme) is different from the kind
that says mathematical truths are dependent on axioms,
and different truths will be arrived
1Z wrote:
Brent Meeker wrote:
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le Jeudi 26 Octobre 2006 18:02, 1Z a écrit :
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
But c breaks down into:
c1) I experience something coherent that obeys the laws of
physics
and
c2) I experience wild and crazy harry Potter stuff.
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