David Nyman writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
I think I see what you mean, but it's as much a problem for the intact and
normally functioning brain as it is for teleportation experiments, isn't it?
Yes, that's my point! I'm trying to argue that the brain has actually
come up with a
Le 28-oct.-06, à 23:24, 1Z a écrit :
Stathis: and no explicit ordering is necessary. The counting sequence
one, two, three may involve millions of slices of brain activity or
computer emulation activity spread throughout space and time, and it
may take many of these slices to form a
Le 29-oct.-06, à 12:11, 1Z a écrit :
If numbers aren't real at all they cannot generate reality
(ITSIAR).
You beg the question. Numbers are not physically real
does not entails
that numbers don't exist at all, unless you define real by physical
real.
I didn't say numbers are not
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 29-oct.-06, à 12:11, 1Z a écrit :
If numbers aren't real at all they cannot generate reality
(ITSIAR).
You beg the question. Numbers are not physically real
does not entails
that numbers don't exist at all, unless you define real by physical
real.
Le 29-oct.-06, à 17:43, David Nyman a écrit :
Peter, when you said that the physical might be 'relations all the way
down', and I asked you what would you find if you went 'all the way
down', you replied 'primary matter'. IOW, you posit primary matter as a
'bare substrate' to which are
Le 30-oct.-06, à 14:15, Stathis Papaioannou wrote (in part):
A computationalist would add that a computer analogue
of a person would also have the same mental states, but this is more
controversial.
Is it really? With the notable couragous exception of Penrose I don't
know people who
Le 30-oct.-06, à 00:40, David Nyman wrote (to Peter Jones (1Z)):
Name your
turtle. Can't we just get on with investigating what either theory
explains or predicts, and stop arguing over words - isn't this why no
agreement is ever reached on this?
Peter, I think that David is right. We
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 30-oct.-06, à 14:15, Stathis Papaioannou wrote (in part):
A computationalist would add that a computer analogue
of a person would also have the same mental states, but this is more
controversial.
Is it really? With the notable couragous exception of Penrose I
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 29-oct.-06, à 17:43, David Nyman a écrit :
Peter, when you said that the physical might be 'relations all the way
down', and I asked you what would you find if you went 'all the way
down', you replied 'primary matter'. IOW, you posit primary matter as a
'bare
Bruno Marchal writes:
Le 30-oct.-06, à 14:15, Stathis Papaioannou wrote (in part):
A computationalist would add that a computer analogue
of a person would also have the same mental states, but this is more
controversial.
Is it really? With the notable couragous exception of
Peter Jones writes:
Another staunch opponent is Edelmann.
http://dangerousintersection.org/?p=178
'The notion that the brain is a kind of computer is an error of such
magnitude, Mr. Edelman believes,
that cognitive science is on the brink of a crisis. I claim, he
writes, that the
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