Re: Asifism

2007-06-20 Thread Mohsen Ravanbakhsh
What you're referring to, is another problem, namely the other's mind. how we know that another human is experiencing what we do? We actually assume that to be true, that everyone has consciousness. But it doesn't justify the other mistake. This does not mean you can deny your possible(!)

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-20 Thread David Nyman
On Jun 20, 3:35 am, Colin Hales [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Methinks you 'get it'. You are far more eloquent than I am, but we talk of the same thing.. Thank you Colin. 'Eloquence' or 'gibberish'? Hmm...but let us proceed... where I identify ??? as a necessary primitive and comment that

Re: Asifism

2007-06-20 Thread David Nyman
On Jun 20, 8:56 am, Mohsen Ravanbakhsh [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: There is no first person experience problem, because there is no first person experience. Once more here you've interpreted the situation from a third person point of view. I don't care what YOU can conclude from MY behavior.

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-20 Thread David Nyman
On Jun 5, 3:12 pm, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Personally I don' think we can be *personally* mistaken about our own consciousness even if we can be mistaken about anything that consciousness could be about. I agree with this, but I would prefer to stop using the term

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-20 Thread Colin Hales
down a wys.. === Russell Standish wrote: On Sun, Jun 17, 2007 at 03:47:19PM +1000, Colin Hales wrote: Hi, RUSSEL All I can say is that I don't understand your distinction. You have introduced a new term necessary primitive - what on earth is