But I do think the nature of conscious qualia, as an abstract system, is
interesting and non-trivial. Each person is their own universe - there is
something more to feelings than just a neuron lighting up, they are part of
an integrated dynamic.
2008/11/2 Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED]
2008/11/1 Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2008/11/1 Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
Well if I'm Kory or Bruno, I'm not me...
You distorted my hypothetical. Could you not still be you and simply
have the mistaken notion that your name is Kory? If your earliest
Replies to Jason Resch and Brent Meeker:
On 01 Nov 2008, at 12:26, Jason Resch wrote:
I've thought of an interesting modification to the original UDA
argument which would suggest that one's consciousness is at both
locations simultaneously.
Since the UDA accepts digital mechanism as
On 01 Nov 2008, at 13:11, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
I think I cannot be me without *my* memories... I equate memories and
me. If not what is me, if I'm still me without my memories ?
Yes.
You can write in the euthanasia letter that you would like the doctor
to kill you if after an accident
On 02 Nov 2008, at 01:16, Kory Heath asks (to Brent)
Subjectively, what
should I expect to experience (or feel that I'm most likely to
experience) when I step into a teleporter, and I know that the thing
that's going to come out Receiver A will be 100% me and the thing
that's going to come
I disagree with the first, but I agree with the second. I don't think
qualia (which are conscious by definition) form a system. This seems to
be the case in logical inferences. Each thought follows from the
previous by some rules of inference. And we have abstracted that system
- it's
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2008/11/1 Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2008/11/1 Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
Well if I'm Kory or Bruno, I'm not me...
You distorted my hypothetical. Could you not still be you and simply
have the mistaken
On Nov 2, 2008, at 8:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Assuming comp the answer should be this:
If you agree that you survive (100%) in some car accident where you
lose some 90% of you (third and first person descriptions), then
accepting one halve in the WM perfect duplication, entails P= 1/2
On Nov 1, 2008, at 7:07 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
We can ask how similar each one is to the Kory
that stepped into the teleporter, but there's no fact of the matter
about which one is *really* Kory.
I completely agree with that. But I don't agree with (and don't think
the above implies) the
Kory Heath wrote:
On Nov 1, 2008, at 7:07 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
We can ask how similar each one is to the Kory
that stepped into the teleporter, but there's no fact of the matter
about which one is *really* Kory.
I completely agree with that. But I don't agree with (and don't
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Replies to Jason Resch and Brent Meeker:
On 01 Nov 2008, at 12:26, Jason Resch wrote:
I've thought of an interesting modification to the original UDA
argument which would suggest that one's consciousness is at both
locations simultaneously.
Since the UDA
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