Re: MGA 2

2008-11-23 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
2008/11/23 Jason Resch [EMAIL PROTECTED]: I would side with Kory that a looked up recording of conscious activity is not conscious. My argument being that static information has no implicit meaning because there are an infinite number of ways a bit string can be interpreted. However in a

Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)

2008-11-23 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 20 Nov 2008, at 19:08, m.a. wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Let us go back to the point. The point of MGA is to show that MEC + MAT implies a contradiction. You can see that it is equivalent with - the proposition saying that MEC implies NON MAT (mechanism refutes materialism). -

Re: MGA 1

2008-11-23 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 21 Nov 2008, at 10:45, Kory Heath wrote: However, the materialist-mechanist still has some grounds to say that there's something interestingly different about Lucky Kory than Original Kory. It is a physical fact of the matter that Lucky Kory is not causally connected to Pre-Teleportation

Re: MGA 2

2008-11-23 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 22 Nov 2008, at 17:27, Kory Heath wrote: On Nov 22, 2008, at 7:26 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote: Ok, but what if consciousness is a computational process that potentially depends on the entire state of the universe? Let's suppose for example that quantum particles are the fundamental

Re: MGA 1

2008-11-23 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 20 Nov 2008, at 21:27, Jason Resch wrote: On Thu, Nov 20, 2008 at 12:03 PM, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: The state machine that would represent her in the case of injection of random noise is a different state machine that would represent her normally functioning

Re: MGA 1 bis (exercise)

2008-11-23 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 20 Nov 2008, at 19:38, Brent Meeker wrote: Talk about consciousness will seem as quaint as talk about the elan vital does now. Then you are led to eliminativism of consciousness. This makes MEC+MAT trivially coherent. The price is big: consciousness does no more exist, like the

Re: MGA 1

2008-11-23 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 20 Nov 2008, at 21:40, Gordon Tsai wrote: Bruno: I think you and John touched the fundamental issues of human rational. It's a dilemma encountered by phenomenology. Now I have a question: In theory we can't distinguish ourselves from a Lobian Machine. Note that in the math

Re: MGA 1

2008-11-23 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 22 Nov 2008, at 11:06, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Yes, there must be a problem with the assumptions. The only assumption that I see we could eliminate, painful though it might be for those of a scientific bent, is the idea that consciousness supervenes on physical activity. Q.E.D.

Re: MGA 2

2008-11-23 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 22 Nov 2008, at 21:45, Brent Meeker wrote: Telmo Menezes wrote: Quentin, Ok, but what if consciousness is a computational process that potentially depends on the entire state of the universe? Let's suppose for example that quantum particles are the fundamental building blocks,

Re: MGA 2

2008-11-23 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 22 Nov 2008, at 22:10, Brent Meeker wrote: If we apply the Conway's Life rule to all the cells, it seems like the creatures in the grid ought to be conscious. If we don't apply the Life rule to any of the cells, but just pull the data from our previously-created lookup table, it seems

Re: MGA 2

2008-11-23 Thread Kory Heath
On Nov 22, 2008, at 1:56 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: But how would they agree on this? If we knew the answer to that we wouldn't need to be considering these (nomologically) impossible thought experiments. They would use the same criteria that they use to decide that humans are conscious

Re: MGA 1

2008-11-23 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 23 Nov 2008, at 03:24, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2008/11/23 Kory Heath [EMAIL PROTECTED]: On Nov 22, 2008, at 2:06 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Yes, there must be a problem with the assumptions. The only assumption that I see we could eliminate, painful though it might be for

Re: MGA 2

2008-11-23 Thread Kory Heath
On Nov 22, 2008, at 6:52 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Which leads again to the problem of partial zombies. What is your objection to saying that the looked up computation is also conscious? How would that be inconsistent with observation, or lead to logical contradiction? I can only

Re: MGA 2

2008-11-23 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 23 Nov 2008, at 04:46, Jason Resch wrote: On Sat, Nov 22, 2008 at 8:52 PM, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: 2008/11/23 Kory Heath [EMAIL PROTECTED]: If we apply the Conway's Life rule to all the cells, it seems like the creatures in the grid ought to be conscious.

Re: MGA 2

2008-11-23 Thread A. Wolf
We have to go from consciousness at (dx,dt) Since when can consciousness be an instantaneous event? Anna --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email

Re: MGA 2

2008-11-23 Thread Kory Heath
On Nov 22, 2008, at 1:10 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: So why should it make a difference whether those state changes are decided by gates in the cpu or a huge look-up table? The difference is in the number of times that the relevant computation was physically implemented. When you query the

Re: MGA 2

2008-11-23 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 23 Nov 2008, at 16:06, A. Wolf wrote: We have to go from consciousness at (dx,dt) Since when can consciousness be an instantaneous event? Oops! replace with (Dx,Dt). I have no deltas. Bruno Anna http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

Re: MGA 2

2008-11-23 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 23 Nov 2008, at 15:48, Kory Heath wrote: On Nov 22, 2008, at 6:52 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Which leads again to the problem of partial zombies. What is your objection to saying that the looked up computation is also conscious? How would that be inconsistent with observation, or

Re: MGA 1

2008-11-23 Thread John Mikes
On 11/22/08, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: John Mikes wrote: Brent, did your dog communicate to you (in dogese, of course) that she has - NO - INNER NARRATIVE? or you are just ignorant to perceive such? (Of course do not expect such at the complexity level of your 11b neurons) John

Re: MGA 2

2008-11-23 Thread A. Wolf
Since when can consciousness be an instantaneous event? Oops! replace with (Dx,Dt). I have no deltas. Yeah, but still. I don't think consciousness can be freeze-framed mathematically like this. I haven't been reading the conversation, though...I should probably try to catch up. Anna

Re: MGA 1

2008-11-23 Thread John Mikes
On 11/23/08, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On 20 Nov 2008, at 21:40, Gordon Tsai wrote: Bruno: I think you and John touched the fundamental issues of human rational. It's a dilemma encountered by phenomenology. Now I have a question: In theory we can't distinguish ourselves

Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)

2008-11-23 Thread John Mikes
And how much is that 2 kg in that 'other' universe? JM On 11/23/08, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On 20 Nov 2008, at 19:08, m.a. wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Let us go back to the point. The point of MGA is to show that MEC + MAT implies a contradiction. You can see that it is

Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)

2008-11-23 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 23 Nov 2008, at 17:46, John Mikes wrote: And how much is that 2 kg in that 'other' universe? Like two kg, when weighted on Earth. I was literal for the sake of the reasoning. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You

Re: MGA 1

2008-11-23 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 23 Nov 2008, at 17:41, John Mikes wrote: On 11/23/08, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: About mechanism, the optimist reasons like that. I love myself because I have a so interesting life with so many rich experiences. Now you tell me I am a machine. So I love machine because

Re: MGA 2

2008-11-23 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 23 Nov 2008, at 17:23, A. Wolf wrote: Since when can consciousness be an instantaneous event? Oops! replace with (Dx,Dt). I have no deltas. Yeah, but still. I don't think consciousness can be freeze-framed mathematically like this. I haven't been reading the conversation,

Re: MGA 2

2008-11-23 Thread Brent Meeker
Kory Heath wrote: On Nov 22, 2008, at 1:10 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: So why should it make a difference whether those state changes are decided by gates in the cpu or a huge look-up table? The difference is in the number of times that the relevant computation was physically

Re: Confirmed: Reality is the dream of NUMBERS

2008-11-23 Thread Tom Caylor
I posted a comment to this article: According to this article, the best we can do is to VIRTUALLY CONFIRM something. But since reality is VIRTUAL, according to this VIRTUAL CONFIRMATION, is not VIRTUAL CONFIRMATION equivalent, in reality, to CONFIRMATION? On Nov 22, 6:45 pm, Colin Hales [EMAIL

Re: MGA 2

2008-11-23 Thread Brent Meeker
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 23 Nov 2008, at 15:48, Kory Heath wrote: On Nov 22, 2008, at 6:52 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Which leads again to the problem of partial zombies. What is your objection to saying that the looked up computation is also conscious? How would that be inconsistent

Re: MGA 2

2008-11-23 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 23 Nov 2008, at 21:21, Brent Meeker wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 23 Nov 2008, at 15:48, Kory Heath wrote: On Nov 22, 2008, at 6:52 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Which leads again to the problem of partial zombies. What is your objection to saying that the looked up computation is

Re: Confirmed: Reality is the dream of NUMBERS

2008-11-23 Thread Kim Jones
Oh, somebody will stick their head up soon and disagree. Where would all the fun and games be if some rash, working scientist actually confirmed something? Counting angels on pinheads is a very satisfying intellectual pastime for some - always was, always will be... K On 24/11/2008, at

Re: MGA 2

2008-11-23 Thread Günther Greindl
Bruno, From this we can extract a logic of the observable proposition and compare with the empirical quantum logic, making comp testable, and already tested on its most weird consequences, retrospectively. you could refute COMP (MEC) if it would contradict empirical QM, but QM (and

Re: MGA 2

2008-11-23 Thread Quentin Anciaux
Hi, Le dimanche 23 novembre 2008 à 22:09 +0100, Günther Greindl a écrit : Bruno, From this we can extract a logic of the observable proposition and compare with the empirical quantum logic, making comp testable, and already tested on its most weird consequences, retrospectively.

Re: MGA 2

2008-11-23 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 23 Nov 2008, at 22:09, Günther Greindl wrote: Bruno, From this we can extract a logic of the observable proposition and compare with the empirical quantum logic, making comp testable, and already tested on its most weird consequences, retrospectively. you could refute COMP (MEC) if it

Re: MGA 1 - (to B.M)

2008-11-23 Thread John Mikes
Bruno, right before my par on 'sharing a 3rd pers. opinion: more or less (maybe) resembling the original 'to be shared' one. In its (1st) 'personal' variation. (Cf: perceived reality). you included a remark not too dissimilar in essence, but with one word in it I want to reflect on: The

Re: Confirmed: Reality is the dream of NUMBERS

2008-11-23 Thread Colin Hales
OK. I was rowing my apparently virtual boat merrily down the stream. But apparently that's not interesting enough. :-) VIRTUAL is just a word. AS-IF would be a good synonym. The physicists in question are trying to make sense of a *model* of appearances (how the world appears to them when they

Re: Confirmed: Reality is the dream of NUMBERS

2008-11-23 Thread Kim Jones
On 24/11/2008, at 10:29 AM, Colin Hales wrote: OK. I was rowing my apparently virtual boat merrily down the stream. But apparently that's not interesting enough. :-) It's more interesting when you get a barbershop quartet to sing it as a round - then you get polyphony! VIRTUAL is

Re: MGA 2

2008-11-23 Thread Russell Standish
On Sun, Nov 23, 2008 at 03:59:02PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: I would side with Kory that a looked up recording of conscious activity is not conscious. I agree with you. The point here is just that MEC+MAT implies it. This I don't follow. I would have thought it implies the

Re: Confirmed: Reality is the dream of NUMBERS

2008-11-23 Thread Colin Hales
Kim Jones wrote: On 24/11/2008, at 10:29 AM, Colin Hales wrote: OK. I was rowing my apparently virtual boat merrily down the stream. But apparently that's not interesting enough. :-) It's more interesting when you get a barbershop quartet to sing it as a round - then you get polyphony!

Re: Confirmed: Reality is the dream of NUMBERS

2008-11-23 Thread Tom Caylor
On Nov 23, 4:29 pm, Colin Hales [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: According to this article, the best we can do is to VIRTUALLY CONFIRM something. But since reality is VIRTUAL, according to this VIRTUAL CONFIRMATION, is not VIRTUAL CONFIRMATION equivalent, in reality, to CONFIRMATION?

Re: Confirmed: Reality is the dream of NUMBERS

2008-11-23 Thread Colin Hales
Tom Caylor wrote: On Nov 23, 4:29 pm, Colin Hales [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: According to this article, the best we can do is to VIRTUALLY CONFIRM something. But since reality is VIRTUAL, according to this VIRTUAL CONFIRMATION, is not VIRTUAL CONFIRMATION equivalent, in reality, to