Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

2009-09-24 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 23 Sep 2009, at 18:48, Flammarion wrote: He hasn';t made it clear that he is positing Platonism as having expalntory value. Half the time he denies he is positing Platonism at all. And when he seeks to justify it, he makes brief comments to the effect that is self-evident that 7 exists

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-24 Thread Flammarion
On 24 Sep, 00:45, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/23 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: You concluded that the realisation of a computation doesn't cause consciousness.  But did you also mean to imply that nonetheless the realisation of a computation IS consciousness?

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-24 Thread Flammarion
On 24 Sep, 09:14, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: On 24 Sep, 00:45, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/23 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: You concluded that the realisation of a computation doesn't cause consciousness.  But did you also mean to imply that

Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

2009-09-24 Thread Flammarion
On 24 Sep, 01:19, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/23 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: Some people can argue that MGA is not needed. They believe that it is obvious that consciousness is not something material at all, and that it is a waste of time of both trying

Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

2009-09-24 Thread Flammarion
On 24 Sep, 02:10, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/23 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: I thought you had denied that you were seeking some ultimate metaphysically primitive justification, rather than defining a particular set of constraints on the theoretical entities to

Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

2009-09-24 Thread Flammarion
On 24 Sep, 02:28, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: On Sep 22, 1:10 pm, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: No it's what a program is... Would you be different if instantiated on a x86 computer than on an ARM based one ? There's a difference between being independent

Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

2009-09-24 Thread Flammarion
On 24 Sep, 07:25, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: CTM has enough physical commitment to keep a whole bunch of phsycalists happy. In fact i can;t see many Ai research types being happy at retaining CTM only if phsycical realism is abandoned. But then it is a moot point since

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-24 Thread David Nyman
2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: If you don't think CTM solves the HP then presumably you don't hold that conscious states supervene on the physical tokens of particular computational types. They might do inexplocably. But the significant point is that nothing else solves the HP

Re: The seven step series

2009-09-24 Thread Bruno Marchal
Hi, I sum up the definition and results seen so far. N = {0, 1, 2, ...}, the set of natural numbers (also called positive integers). N^N = {f such that f is a function from N to N} = the set of functions from N to N. Universal language: a language in which we can describe formally how

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-24 Thread David Nyman
2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: Another point that has got rather lost here is that computationalists tend to be a lot more concerned about cognition than experience, CTM has no trouble explaining how people play chess. It hasn't got lost - e.g. two sentences later I said I have

Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

2009-09-24 Thread David Nyman
2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: The idealist defence agaisnt these refutations always involves things being arranged just so so as to givew he imitation of a material world with minds supervening on brains. And it doesn't give a good reason why things should be just so. It's a

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-24 Thread Flammarion
On 24 Sep, 14:32, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: If you don't think CTM solves the HP then presumably you don't hold that conscious states supervene on the physical tokens of particular computational types. They might do

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-24 Thread Flammarion
On 24 Sep, 14:50, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: Another point that has got rather lost here is that computationalists tend to be a lot more concerned about cognition than experience, CTM has no trouble explaining how people play

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-24 Thread Flammarion
On 24 Sep, 14:32, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: If you don't think CTM solves the HP then presumably you don't hold that conscious states supervene on the physical tokens of particular computational types. They might do

Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

2009-09-24 Thread david.nyman
2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: AFAICS nobody has been arguing that any metaphysical posit is an a priori truth. The claim that CTM entails the posit of AR is the consequence of a reasoned argument. The alternative is that CTM is false on the posit of PM. You seem to be

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-24 Thread david.nyman
2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: Right..so you are using third person to mean cognitive and 1st person to mean experiential...? I assume that when the term cognitive is used it is intended to be cashed out in some third-person way. However, many terms seem to be used somewhat

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-24 Thread david.nyman
2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: Why harp on the fact that CTM isn't physicalist enough, if you think physicalism is equally sueless? After all, phsycialism is just PM +structure. The difference is that the structure is finer-grained. Agreed. But the harping was motivated

Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

2009-09-24 Thread David Nyman
On Sep 24, 2:44 am, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Of course Johnson's refutation didn't change any idealist minds, but he pointed to the use of operational definitions as the basis of science which ultimately had a lot more influence than Berkeley. That is very true. The

Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

2009-09-24 Thread David Nyman
On Sep 24, 9:39 am, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: Could you either state clearly what work this label is supposed to do, beyond the posit of AR on an abductive basis that we have already agreed on, or drop your insistence on it? I have explained that several times. It clarifies

Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

2009-09-24 Thread Flammarion
On 24 Sep, 16:01, david.nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: AFAICS nobody has been arguing that any metaphysical posit is an a priori truth. The claim that CTM entails the posit of AR is the consequence of a reasoned argument. The alternative

Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

2009-09-24 Thread Flammarion
On 24 Sep, 16:48, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: On Sep 24, 9:39 am, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: Could you either state clearly what work this label is supposed to do, beyond the posit of AR on an abductive basis that we have already agreed on, or drop your

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-24 Thread Flammarion
On 24 Sep, 16:16, david.nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: Why harp on the fact that CTM isn't physicalist enough, if you think physicalism is equally sueless? After all, phsycialism is just PM +structure. The difference is that the

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-24 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com On 24 Sep, 16:16, david.nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: Why harp on the fact that CTM isn't physicalist enough, if you think physicalism is equally sueless? After all, phsycialism is just PM

Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

2009-09-24 Thread David Nyman
2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: You seem to be assuming a workign MGA Actually I'm only assuming my own argument contra the physical intelligibility of CTM, I haven't seen you give an argument that CTM is incompatible with phsycalism, only that CTM wouldn't give the seame

Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

2009-09-24 Thread David Nyman
2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: But this is the very hinge of disagreement. CTM's Trojan Horse is the incoherence of its posit of materialism. Accordign to whom? It's demonstrably as dependant on AR as comp is; What is dependent on AR? Materialism? CTM. But you still won't

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-24 Thread Flammarion
On 24 Sep, 17:34, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com On 24 Sep, 16:16, david.nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: Why harp on the fact that CTM isn't physicalist enough, if you think

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-24 Thread Quentin Anciaux
What are the common relevant physical details of all the proposed executing scheme ? Quentin 2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com On 24 Sep, 17:34, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com On 24 Sep, 16:16, david.nyman

Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

2009-09-24 Thread Flammarion
On 24 Sep, 18:16, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: You seem to be assuming a workign MGA Actually I'm only assuming my own argument contra the physical intelligibility of CTM, I haven't seen you give an argument that CTM is

Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

2009-09-24 Thread Flammarion
On 24 Sep, 18:17, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: But this is the very hinge of disagreement. CTM's Trojan Horse is the incoherence of its posit of materialism. Accordign to whom? It's demonstrably as dependant on AR as comp is;

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-24 Thread David Nyman
2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: if it can't, we need another strategy to disambiguate its actual relation to the physical account. The latter conclusion is what motivates the reversal of matter and mathematics in comp. There is no ambiguity in the reduction of computation to

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-24 Thread Brent Meeker
David Nyman wrote: 2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: if it can't, we need another strategy to disambiguate its actual relation to the physical account. The latter conclusion is what motivates the reversal of matter and mathematics in comp. There is no ambiguity in the reduction

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-24 Thread m.a.
And HP stands for??? - Original Message - From: David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Thursday, September 24, 2009 9:50 AM Subject: Re: Dreaming On 2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: Another point that has got rather lost here is

Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

2009-09-24 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 24 Sep 2009, at 10:35, Flammarion wrote: Platonism=AR. To be precise, Platonism disambiguates AR as an ontological commitment and not just a commitment to mind-independent truth. So Platonism is different from AR. comp (CTM) assumes AR, not platonism. UDA uses AR, not Platonism. UDA uses

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-24 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 25 Sep 2009, at 02:07, m.a. wrote: And HP stands for??? I guess it means Hard Problem (of consciousness). I prefer to use mind-body problem (or hard mind-body problem in some context). I use also HPC (hard problem of consciousness) to distinguish it from the HPM (hard problem of