Re: Bruno List continued

2011-10-04 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On Tue, Oct 4, 2011 at 2:30 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: The neurons are firing in my brain as I'm thinking, but if you could go down to the microscopic level you would see that they are firing due to the various physical factors that make neurons fire, eg. fluxes of

Re: Bruno List continued

2011-10-04 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Oct 4, 2:11 am, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: The ion channel only opens when the ligand binds. The ligand only binds if it is present in the synapse. It is only present in the synapse when the presynaptic neuron fires. And so on. It's the 'and so on' where your

Re: Bruno List continued

2011-10-04 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2011/10/4 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com On Oct 4, 2:11 am, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: The ion channel only opens when the ligand binds. The ligand only binds if it is present in the synapse. It is only present in the synapse when the presynaptic neuron fires.

Re: Bruno List continued

2011-10-04 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Oct 4, 8:54 am, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2011/10/4 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com On Oct 4, 2:11 am, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: The ion channel only opens when the ligand binds. The ligand only binds if it is present in the synapse. It is

Re: Interesting paper on consciousness, computation and MWI

2011-10-04 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 04 Oct 2011, at 01:00, Russell Standish wrote: On Mon, Oct 03, 2011 at 05:31:21PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: The states are countable, but not the (3-)states + the neighborhhood of (infinite) computations that you are mentioning yourselves. Not sure if I see where is the problem. It

Re: Bruno List continued

2011-10-04 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 04 Oct 2011, at 02:29, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Tue, Oct 4, 2011 at 4:09 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: I agree with Craig, although the way he presents it might seems a bit uncomputationalist, (if I can say(*)). Thoughts act on matter all the time. It is a selection

Re: Interesting paper on consciousness, computation and MWI

2011-10-04 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 04 Oct 2011, at 05:33, Brian Tenneson wrote: From page 17 It is my contention that the only way out of this dilemma is to deny the initial assumption that a classical computer running a particular program can generate conscious awareness in the first place. What about the possibility

Re: David Eagleman on CHOICE

2011-10-04 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 04 Oct 2011, at 02:27, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote: Ok, so this is where I would disagree. It only seems that to define a computation you need to look at the time evolution, because a snapshot doesn't contain enough information about the dynamics of the system. But here one considers all of

Re: David Eagleman on CHOICE

2011-10-04 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 03 Oct 2011, at 19:12, meekerdb wrote: On 10/3/2011 9:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 03 Oct 2011, at 00:47, meekerdb wrote: On 10/2/2011 7:13 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Sun, Oct 2, 2011 at 3:01 AM, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote: It's a strange, almost paradoxical result

Re: Existence and Properties

2011-10-04 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 03 Oct 2011, at 19:41, meekerdb wrote: On 10/3/2011 8:43 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: [SPK] Let me try to be sure that I understand this comment. When you write: they will all see the same laws are you referring to those invariant quantities and relations/functions with respect

Re: COMP is empty(?)

2011-10-04 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 03 Oct 2011, at 20:51, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 30 Sep 2011, at 17:26, benjayk wrote: COMP is the attempt to solve the mind-body problem with basing everything on computations. This is not correct. Comp is the assumption that the brain functions without extra magic,

Re: COMP is empty(?)

2011-10-04 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 03 Oct 2011, at 21:00, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Just a little correction. I wrote (on 30 Sep 2011) : On 30 Sep 2011, at 17:26, benjayk wrote: snip The only thing that COMP does is to propose a complicated thought construct which essentially reveals its own emptiness.

Re: Existence and Properties

2011-10-04 Thread Stephen P. King
On 10/4/2011 10:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 03 Oct 2011, at 19:41, meekerdb wrote: On 10/3/2011 8:43 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: [SPK] Let me try to be sure that I understand this comment. When you write: they will all see the same laws are you referring to those invariant quantities

Re: Bruno List continued

2011-10-04 Thread meekerdb
On 10/3/2011 11:11 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Tue, Oct 4, 2011 at 2:30 PM, Craig Weinbergwhatsons...@gmail.com wrote: The neurons are firing in my brain as I'm thinking, but if you could go down to the microscopic level you would see that they are firing due to the various physical

Re: COMP is empty(?)

2011-10-04 Thread benjayk
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 03 Oct 2011, at 21:00, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Just a little correction. I wrote (on 30 Sep 2011) : On 30 Sep 2011, at 17:26, benjayk wrote: snip The only thing that COMP does is to propose a complicated thought construct which essentially

Re: Existence and Properties

2011-10-04 Thread meekerdb
On 10/4/2011 10:25 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: The conservation laws come from the requirement that we want our laws to be the same for everyone at every time and place. This is our idea of laws. I'm sure you're familiar with Noether's theorem and how she showed that conservation of moment

Re: COMP is empty(?)

2011-10-04 Thread benjayk
Bruno Marchal wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: But then one 3-thing remains uncomputable, and undefined, namely the very foundation of computations. We can define computations in terms of numbers relations, and we can define number relations in terms of +,*,N. But what is N? It is 0 and

Re: COMP is empty(?)

2011-10-04 Thread meekerdb
On 10/4/2011 1:44 PM, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: But then one 3-thing remains uncomputable, and undefined, namely the very foundation of computations. We can define computations in terms of numbers relations, and we can define number relations in terms of +,*,N.

Re: Interesting paper on consciousness, computation and MWI

2011-10-04 Thread Brian Tenneson
Hmm... Unfortunately there are several terms there I don't understand. Digital brain. What's a brain? I ask because I'm betting it doesn't mean a pile of gray and white matter. Then you mention artificial brain. That's different from digital? Is digital more nonphysical than artificial? On

Re: Existence and Properties

2011-10-04 Thread Stephen P. King
On 10/4/2011 4:20 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 10/4/2011 10:25 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: The conservation laws come from the requirement that we want our laws to be the same for everyone at every time and place. This is our idea of laws. I'm sure you're familiar with Noether's theorem and how

Re: Bruno List continued

2011-10-04 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Oct 4, 2:59 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: This goes by the name causal completeness; the idea that the 3-p observable state at t is sufficient to predict the state at t+dt.  Craig wants add to this that there is additional information which is not 3-p observable and which

Re: Bruno List continued

2011-10-04 Thread meekerdb
On 10/4/2011 5:15 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Oct 4, 2:59 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote: This goes by the name causal completeness; the idea that the 3-p observable state at t is sufficient to predict the state at t+dt. Craig wants add to this that there is additional information

Re: Bruno List continued

2011-10-04 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On Wed, Oct 5, 2011 at 5:59 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: This goes by the name causal completeness; the idea that the 3-p observable state at t is sufficient to predict the state at t+dt.  Craig wants add to this that there is additional information which is not 3-p observable and

Re: Bruno List continued

2011-10-04 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Oct 4, 8:46 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 10/4/2011 5:15 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Oct 4, 2:59 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote: This goes by the name causal completeness; the idea that the 3-p observable state at t is sufficient to predict the state at t+dt.

Re: Bruno List continued

2011-10-04 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Oct 4, 9:32 pm, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: On Wed, Oct 5, 2011 at 5:59 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: This goes by the name causal completeness; the idea that the 3-p observable state at t is sufficient to predict the state at t+dt.  Craig wants add to this

Re: Bruno List continued

2011-10-04 Thread meekerdb
On 10/4/2011 8:14 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Oct 4, 8:46 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 10/4/2011 5:15 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Oct 4, 2:59 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote: This goes by the name causal completeness; the idea that the 3-p observable state at t is

Re: Bruno List continued

2011-10-04 Thread meekerdb
On 10/4/2011 6:32 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Wed, Oct 5, 2011 at 5:59 AM, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote: This goes by the name causal completeness; the idea that the 3-p observable state at t is sufficient to predict the state at t+dt. Craig wants add to this that there is