On 26 Dec 2011, at 05:47, Joseph Knight wrote:
On Sat, Dec 24, 2011 at 9:05 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
On 23 Dec 2011, at 20:16, Joseph Knight wrote:
The same problem arises in Part 2. Bruno claims that we are forced
to accept that Alice’s consciousness supervenes
On 26 Dec 2011, at 02:28, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sat, Dec 24, 2011 at 05:45:46PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 23 Dec 2011, at 23:53, Russell Standish wrote:
Why do you think that we couldn't find a similar sort of explanation
for why the activity in other branches is relevant to
On 26 Dec 2011, at 02:00, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sat, Dec 24, 2011 at 04:44:41PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The concept of supervenience has no purchase on the concreteness or
otherwise of the supervened on.
Maudlin uses supervenience for physical supervenience, like Kim
and most
Not at all. A 'simulated apple' is just several pictures superimposed.
You are mistaking a visual representation of physics and biochemistry
for actual physics and biochemistry.
Then, I hereby declare that what your retina projects only images
superimposed from a simulated world and all your
On 25 Dec 2011, at 23:21, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sat, Dec 24, 2011 at 04:25:58PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Sorry - perhaps static is the wrong word. I meant there is only one
UD, like there is only one number 1, so there's no way the UD
could be
different in the case of difference
Not at all. A 'simulated apple' is just several pictures superimposed.
You are mistaking a visual representation of physics and biochemistry
for actual physics and biochemistry.
Then, I hereby declare that what your retina projects is only images
superimposed from a simulated world and all
On 26 Dec 2011, at 02:09, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sat, Dec 24, 2011 at 04:12:20PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
It looks like. But with comp we would survive even if we are sent in
a classical universe, once it runs the classical computation.
Russell is adding something to the comp
On Mon, Dec 26, 2011 at 11:09:27AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 26 Dec 2011, at 02:00, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sat, Dec 24, 2011 at 04:44:41PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The concept of supervenience has no purchase on the concreteness or
otherwise of the supervened on.
Maudlin
On 25 Dec 2011, at 21:29, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Dec 25, 12:01 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 25 Dec 2011, at 16:16, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Does that mean that you consider numbers biological?
I consider that some relations between some numbers are biological.
Some are
On 26 Dec 2011, at 12:06, Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, Dec 26, 2011 at 11:09:27AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 26 Dec 2011, at 02:00, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sat, Dec 24, 2011 at 04:44:41PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The concept of supervenience has no purchase on the
On Dec 26, 5:35 am, alexalex alexmka...@yahoo.com wrote:
Not at all. A 'simulated apple' is just several pictures superimposed.
You are mistaking a visual representation of physics and biochemistry
for actual physics and biochemistry.
Then, I hereby declare that what your retina projects
On Mon, Dec 26, 2011 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
If you were observing the Earth by radio telescope from a nearby star you
would be noticing that it has been getting quieter and quieter.
I have to admit that is true and a big jump in that direction was made on
June 12 2009. On that
On 26 Dec 2011, at 14:50, David Nyman wrote:
On 26 December 2011 11:06, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au
wrote:
I guess I should make this clearer. SUP-PHYS is SUP-PRIMITIVE-PHYS.
This does clarify some things. But I still don't see where
primitiveness is defined, or comes into
On Dec 26, 6:43 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 25 Dec 2011, at 21:29, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Dec 25, 12:01 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 25 Dec 2011, at 16:16, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Does that mean that you consider numbers biological?
I consider that
On 26 December 2011 16:23, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On reflection,
this distinction can be made explicit in two ways: either they are
distinct and separable (i.e. physico-computational dualism), or they
are ultimately indistinguishable (i.e. frank eliminativism about
On 12/26/2011 2:09 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Even if the physics is not concrete, but purely phenomenological as
indicated by steps 1-7 of the UDA, and if the consciousness supervenes on
it, it is still physical supervenience, surely.
Not in the usual sense of supervenience, or what I call
On 12/26/2011 2:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
If a low level emulate a high level, and if something does not supervene on the low
level X *when doing that emulation*, it will not supervene on the higher level too.
That's why once we can say yes to the doctor for a correct level, we can
On 12/26/2011 5:50 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 26 December 2011 11:06, Russell Standishli...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:
I guess I should make this clearer. SUP-PHYS is SUP-PRIMITIVE-PHYS.
This does clarify some things. But I still don't see where
primitiveness is defined, or comes into
On 12/26/2011 7:15 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Mon, Dec 26, 2011 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
If you were observing the Earth by radio telescope from a nearby star you
would be
noticing that it has been getting quieter and quieter.
I have to admit
On 26 December 2011 17:59, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
Or a neutral monism in which they are different ways of organizing the same
data - as quantum field theory can be done with either fields or particles.
Yes, perhaps, but then what precisely is the word neutral supposed
to signify
Or more likely he is just too far away and his species didn't last
long enough. It seems
doubtful whether our civilization will be able to get past oil depletion and
global warming.
Oil depletion, DA, and the simulation argument with the first of its
hypothesis being taken as true makes it
On 12/26/2011 11:37 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 26 December 2011 17:59, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote:
Or a neutral monism in which they are different ways of organizing the same
data - as quantum field theory can be done with either fields or particles.
Yes, perhaps, but then what
On Dec 26, 12:35 pm, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote:
But once the central ontological distinction is made between qua
materia and qua computatio, a truthful eye cannot avoid seeing that
either there are two primitives in play here or only one. If the
former, then a dualism of some
On 26 Dec 2011, at 18:03, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Dec 26, 6:43 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 25 Dec 2011, at 21:29, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Dec 25, 12:01 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 25 Dec 2011, at 16:16, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Does that mean that you
On 26 December 2011 19:49, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
ISTM that in Bruno's schema, the physical computations are to be
seen as emerging from (or being filtered by) the mental ones.
He's often taken that way. But I think I now understand Bruno's idea that
consciousness still
On Mon, Dec 26, 2011 at 1:09 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote
I don't think Dyson spheres are possible.
What law of physics do they violate?
You seem to be hypothesizing an ET who is superhuman.
Good heavens, well of course I'm hypothesizing an ET who is superhuman!
Technology has
On 12/26/2011 1:37 PM, John Clark wrote:
On Mon, Dec 26, 2011 at 1:09 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote
I don't think Dyson spheres are possible.
What law of physics do they violate?
Stability.
You seem to be hypothesizing an ET who is
On 12/26/2011 1:45 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 26 December 2011 19:50, Craig Weinbergwhatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
Not if the sense of dualism*is* the primitive.
My comments, like the OP, were directed towards the assumptions of the
computational theory of mind, and the various ways in which
On Mon, Dec 26, 2011 at 01:08:25PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 26 Dec 2011, at 12:06, Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, Dec 26, 2011 at 11:09:27AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 26 Dec 2011, at 02:00, Russell Standish wrote:
Good analogy. Let's explore it further. Tommy is in the
On Mon, Dec 26, 2011 at 11:34:52AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
It is not used in Maudlin's argument, but in your extension to handle
multiversal supervenience.
You might make this precise, because I don't see the point. But the
best answer to your concrete multiverse argument, is that
On Mon, Dec 26, 2011 at 4:56 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
What law of physics do they [ Dyson spheres] violate?
Stability.
Professor Dyson certainly didn't think his spheres were unstable and he was
pretty smart, exactly where do you think he went wrong?
We have the technology
On 12/26/2011 9:42 PM, John Clark wrote:
On Mon, Dec 26, 2011 at 4:56 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
What law of physics do they [ Dyson spheres] violate?
Stability.
Professor Dyson certainly didn't think his spheres were unstable and he was
On Sat, Dec 24, 2011 at 06:10:34PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Agreed. As I said, I never had a problem with the conclusion, just the
argument.
Also, I am concerned about any disproof of physical supervenience
(regardless of the primitivity question), as supervenience is an
important
On 12/27/2011 1:20 AM, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/26/2011 9:42 PM, John Clark wrote:
On Mon, Dec 26, 2011 at 4:56 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
What law of physics do they [ Dyson spheres] violate?
Stability.
Professor Dyson certainly didn't think
On 12/26/2011 11:04 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 12/27/2011 1:20 AM, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/26/2011 9:42 PM, John Clark wrote:
On Mon, Dec 26, 2011 at 4:56 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
What law of physics do they [ Dyson spheres] violate?
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