Re: Dreaming On

2009-07-30 Thread 1Z
On 27 July, 14:17, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: On 27 July, 12:25, Kim Jones kimjo...@ozemail.com.au wrote: Could somebody kindly tell me/explain to me what RITSIAR means? I cannot find any explanation of this in the threads which mention it. On a (slightly) more serious

Re: Dreaming On

2009-07-30 Thread 1Z
On 27 July, 18:17, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 27 Jul 2009, at 14:57, David Nyman wrote: On 27 July, 09:31, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: The UDA is a reasoning which shows that once we postulate an ontological  physical universal, it is impossible to recover

Re: Dreaming On

2009-07-30 Thread 1Z
On 28 July, 00:34, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: AFAICS, until these 'under-the-carpet' issues are squarely faced, the customary waving away of the brain-mind relation as a simplistic functional identity remains pure materialist prejudice, and on the basis of the above, flatly

Re: Dreaming On

2009-07-31 Thread 1Z
On 30 July, 23:55, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/7/30 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com: Cart before the horse: Why should anyone believe in an ontological gap that isn't backed by an explanatory gap? Why indeed? Weren't you arguing for one? The mere existence of the mental

Re: Dreaming On

2009-07-31 Thread 1Z
On 31 July, 10:03, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 31 Jul 2009, at 10:32, 1Z wrote (to David): But you haven't said what the problem is in the emergence of the mental from the physical It is usually called the mind-body problem. There are many good book on the subject

Re: Dreaming On

2009-07-31 Thread 1Z
On 31 July, 14:57, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 31 Jul 2009, at 12:43, 1Z wrote: On 31 July, 10:03, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 31 Jul 2009, at 10:32, 1Z wrote (to David): But you haven't said what the problem is in the emergence of the mental from

Re: Can mind be a computation if physics is fundamental?

2009-08-05 Thread 1Z
On 31 July, 22:39, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: I note that the recent posts by Peter Jones - aka the mysterious 1Z, and the originator of the curiously useful 'real in the sense I am real' or RITSIAR - occurred shortly after my taking his name in vain. Hmm... Anyway

Re: Dreaming On

2009-08-06 Thread 1Z
On 31 July, 14:23, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/7/31 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com: Since the mental is uncontroversially not a fundamental item in physics. it has to be higher-level or emergent in some way, like shoes and ships and sealing-wax. Blimey!  Thanks, Peter

Re: Dreaming On

2009-08-06 Thread 1Z
On 31 July, 14:44, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: On 31 July, 11:43, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: There are many bad solutions too. Finding a good solution means having an exat grasp of the problem, not saying in some vague way that mind and matter are different things

Re: Dreaming On

2009-08-06 Thread 1Z
On 31 July, 18:27, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: Hi, I don't understand what could be mathematically existence ? What is existence ? RITSIAR is a point of view (of an observer)... If something exists, it exists... You're using mathematical existence as if it meant no

Re: Dreaming On

2009-08-06 Thread 1Z
On 31 July, 18:55, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 31 Jul 2009, at 18:05, 1Z wrote: If it isn;t RITSIAR, it cannot be generating me. Mathematical proofs only prove mathematical existence, not onltolgical existence. For a non-Platonist , 23 exists mathematically

Re: Dreaming On

2009-08-06 Thread 1Z
On 3 Aug, 06:51, Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: On Fri, Jul 31, 2009 at 3:21 PM, Bruno Marchalmarc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Rex proposes something like: CONSCIOUSNESS = ? It is radical, and it is difficult to say if it explains anything. I suspect the goal could be personal

Re: Can mind be a computation if physics is fundamental?

2009-08-06 Thread 1Z
On 6 Aug, 03:37, Colin Hales c.ha...@pgrad.unimelb.edu.au wrote: (b) is not a claim of truth or falsehood. It is a claim that the very idea of Sa ever proposing COMP (= doubting that COMP is true) is impossible. This is because it is a formal system trying, with a fixed, formal set of

Re: Dreams and Machines

2009-08-07 Thread 1Z
On 22 July, 17:15, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: Dinna fash yursel laddie, trnaslation: Faut pas te facher. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this

Re: Can mind be a computation if physics is fundamental?

2009-08-10 Thread 1Z
On 10 Aug, 03:54, Colin Hales c.ha...@pgrad.unimelb.edu.au wrote: ronaldheld wrote: As a formally trained Physicist, what do I accept? that Physics is well represented mathematically? That the Multiverse is composed of mathematical structures some of which represent physical laws? Or

Re: Can mind be a computation if physics is fundamental?

2009-08-13 Thread 1Z
On 13 Aug, 01:42, Colin Hales c.ha...@pgrad.unimelb.edu.au wrote: I am not saying humans are magical. I am saying that humans do /not/ operate formally like COMP and that '/formally handling inconsistency/' is not the same thing as '/delivering inconsistency by being an informal/

Re: Can mind be a computation if physics is fundamental?

2009-08-13 Thread 1Z
On 13 Aug, 10:30, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 13 Aug 2009, at 10:53, 1Z wrote: On 13 Aug, 01:42, Colin Hales c.ha...@pgrad.unimelb.edu.au wrote: I am not saying humans are magical. I am saying that humans do /not/ operate formally like COMP and that '/formally

Re: Can mind be a computation if physics is fundamental?

2009-08-14 Thread 1Z
On 14 Aug, 03:11, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Colin Hales wrote: Here's a nice pic to use in discussion from GEB. The map for a formal system (a tree). A formal system could not draw this picture. Where's your proof of this assertion? Seconded.

Re: Dreaming On

2009-08-14 Thread 1Z
wrote: 2009/8/6 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com: You're doing it again. You are assuming that because the mental is epistemically certain, it is ipso facto ontologically basic. But that doesn't follow at all. I have evidence that the physical is basic -- the whole of science. You have

Re: Emulation and Stuff

2009-08-14 Thread 1Z
On 14 Aug, 02:18, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/8/14 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: If we take 'sufficiently' to the limit I suppose I must agree. But as before, in terms of stuffy ontology, any digital emulation - if that's what we're still discussing - is a model,

Re: Emulation and Stuff

2009-08-14 Thread 1Z
On 14 Aug, 04:34, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: David Nyman wrote: And in terms of stuffy ontology, it would be a successful model - but you wouldn't expect to be able to build a house out of emulated bricks. No, I really mean as good as. In other words if we can model

Re: Emulation and Stuff

2009-08-14 Thread 1Z
On 14 Aug, 09:48, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: You are dismissing the first person indeterminacy. A stuffy TM can run a computation. But if a consciousness is attached to that computation, it is automatically attached to an infinity of immaterial and relative computations as

Re: Against Physics

2009-08-14 Thread 1Z
On 14 Aug, 09:51, Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: Brent, On Tue, Aug 11, 2009 at 3:02 PM, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Uncaused things can't be explained. They just are. Didn't anyone ever explain arithmetic or geometry to you? Not every explanation needs to be

Re: Emulation and Stuff

2009-08-17 Thread 1Z
On 16 Aug, 16:34, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 14 Aug 2009, at 14:34, 1Z wrote: On 14 Aug, 09:48, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: You are dismissing the first person indeterminacy. A stuffy TM can   run a computation. But if a consciousness is attached

Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

2009-09-02 Thread 1Z
Yablo and Gallois's paper Is ontology based on a mistake is quite relevant to the question of Platonism, specificall whether true matehmatical assertions of existence have to be taken literally. http://tinyurl.com/ldekg7

Re: A superposition in QM is just due to a choice of basis?

2010-09-17 Thread 1Z
On 28 Aug, 20:29, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: Hi Bret,             Could you elaborate on this point and/or point me to a good discussion of it? From what I have studied so far there is no solution to the measurement problem so far in terms of an explanation of the way that

Re: What's wrong with this?

2010-09-17 Thread 1Z
On 26 Aug, 17:37, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: I should stress, again, I'm not personally committed to this view - it seems indeed highly problematic - but it is what the recipe says. Now, just to emphasise the point, when I say it's a hard thing to do this imaginatively, I mean

Re: What's wrong with this?

2010-09-17 Thread 1Z
On 17 Sep, 14:10, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote: On 17 September 2010 13:33, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: Compounds aren't postulated as some separate set  of entities--they are just set theoretic constructs put of what does exsit. H2O is not distinct from the two H's

Re: What's wrong with this?

2010-09-17 Thread 1Z
On 17 Sep, 18:52, Evgenii Rudnyi use...@rudnyi.ru wrote: on 17.09.2010 14:33 1Z said the following: On 26 Aug, 17:37, David Nymandavid.ny...@gmail.com  wrote: ... Whatever composite categories we might be tempted to have recourse to - you know: molecules, cells, bodies, planets

Re: What's wrong with this?

2010-09-18 Thread 1Z
On 1 Sep, 05:18, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: That these rules generate rational beliefs is a leap of faith, and can neither be refuted nor proven. apart from noting the survival value of rationality over irrationality If the underlying process *didn’t* cause us to present and

Re: What's wrong with this? (a side question)

2010-09-18 Thread 1Z
On 3 Sep, 09:10, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Physicists have a tradition of putting mind and consciousness under   the rug, Physicists have a tradition of not being psychologists front of the 'hard consciousness problem', or the mind-body problem. -- You received this message

Re: What's wrong with this?

2010-09-18 Thread 1Z
On 18 Sep, 16:11, Evgenii Rudnyi use...@rudnyi.ru wrote: on 18.09.2010 01:38 1Z said the following: On 17 Sep, 18:52, Evgenii Rudnyiuse...@rudnyi.ru  wrote: on 17.09.2010 14:33 1Z said the following: On 26 Aug, 17:37, David Nymandavid.ny...@gmail.com    wrote: ... The next

Re: What's wrong with this?

2010-09-18 Thread 1Z
On 18 Sep, 17:20, Evgenii Rudnyi use...@rudnyi.ru wrote: on 18.09.2010 18:08 1Z said the following: ... By the way, about the water. The difference between H, O and H2O is in chemical bonds in H2O. such bonds can be considered basic elements of reality, too I am not sure if I

Re: What's wrong with this? (a side question)

2010-09-18 Thread 1Z
On 18 Sep, 18:21, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 18 Sep 2010, at 14:34, 1Z wrote: On 3 Sep, 09:10, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Physicists have a tradition of putting mind and consciousness under the rug, Physicists have a tradition of not being psychologists

Re: What's wrong with this?

2010-09-18 Thread 1Z
On 18 Sep, 19:32, Evgenii Rudnyi use...@rudnyi.ru wrote: on 18.09.2010 19:40 1Z said the following: On 18 Sep, 17:20, Evgenii Rudnyiuse...@rudnyi.ru  wrote: on 18.09.2010 18:08 1Z said the following: ... By the way, about the water. The difference between H, O and H2O

Re: What's wrong with this?

2010-09-19 Thread 1Z
On 19 Sep, 07:30, Evgenii Rudnyi use...@rudnyi.ru wrote: Well, I thought that reductionism could help an engineer. I don't think anyone said that -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to

Re: What's wrong with this?

2010-09-19 Thread 1Z
On 19 Sep, 07:34, Evgenii Rudnyi use...@rudnyi.ru wrote: on 18.09.2010 23:35 Brent Meeker said the following: On 9/18/2010 12:19 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: on 18.09.2010 21:09 Brent Meeker said the following: On 9/18/2010 9:20 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: on 18.09.2010 18:08 1Z said

Re: Definiteness of Meaning (was: A superposition in QM is just due to a choice of basis?)

2010-09-19 Thread 1Z
On 18 Sep, 22:20, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: Hi Peter and Friends, -Original Message- From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-l...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of 1Z Sent: Friday, September 17, 2010 8:16 AM To: Everything List Subject: Re

Re: Intelligence and Nomologicalism

2010-09-22 Thread 1Z
On 21 Sep, 18:10, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: What is the significance of intelligence in a universe with deterministic laws? Your performance on any IQ test is not due to your possessing some property called intelligence, but rather is an inevitable outcome of the universe's

Re: Intelligence and Nomologicalism

2010-09-23 Thread 1Z
On 22 Sep, 17:20, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: On Wed, Sep 22, 2010 at 4:14 AM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: On 21 Sep, 18:10, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: What is the significance of intelligence in a universe with deterministic laws? Your performance on any

Re: Intelligence and Nomologicalism

2010-09-24 Thread 1Z
On 24 Sep, 04:26, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: On Thu, Sep 23, 2010 at 12:12 PM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: On 22 Sep, 17:20, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: I guess I'd have to hear your definition of property to make any sense of that.  In what sense is it like

Re: Probability, Necessity, and Infinity

2010-11-09 Thread 1Z
On Nov 4, 4:40 am, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: On Wed, Nov 3, 2010 at 5:50 PM, Stephen Paul King stephe...@charter.net wrote: On Tue, Nov 2, 2010 at 8:24 PM, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: if laws were contingent, they would change so frequently, so

Re: Probability, Necessity, and Infinity

2010-11-14 Thread 1Z
On Nov 11, 12:54 am, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Nov 9, 2010 at 3:53 PM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: On Nov 4, 4:40 am, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: If an entity exists in a universe that is subject to unchanging causal laws, how can it have justified

Re: Probability, Necessity, and Infinity

2010-11-15 Thread 1Z
On Nov 14, 11:04 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 14 Nov 2010, at 19:39, 1Z wrote: On Nov 11, 12:54 am, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Nov 9, 2010 at 3:53 PM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: On Nov 4, 4:40 am, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote

Re: Probability, Necessity, and Infinity

2010-11-16 Thread 1Z
On Nov 16, 3:27 am, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: Logical and rational are adjectives.  You're confusing descriptive labels with causal forces. Your argument still doesn't work. You re tacitly assuming that being the result of causal laws is exclusive of being the result

Re: Probability, Necessity, and Infinity

2010-11-17 Thread 1Z
On Nov 16, 5:50 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 15 Nov 2010, at 20:24, 1Z wrote: On Nov 14, 11:04 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 14 Nov 2010, at 19:39, 1Z wrote: On Nov 11, 12:54 am, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Nov 9, 2010 at 3:53

Re: Compatibilism

2010-11-19 Thread 1Z
On Nov 18, 6:31 am, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Nov 16, 2010 at 11:45 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 16 Nov 2010, at 04:51, Rex Allen wrote: On Sun, Nov 14, 2010 at 6:04 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: ? Are you saying that it is obvious

Re: Compatibilism

2010-11-19 Thread 1Z
is the only form of explanagion . And, even if you wanted to, I don't see how they could be made to serve that role.  1Z and I discussed this in the other thread. We don't invoke thought and reason to explain the abilities and behavior of chess playing computers Sometimes we do...see Dennett;s

Re: Probability, Necessity, and Infinity

2010-11-19 Thread 1Z
On Nov 18, 5:10 am, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Nov 16, 2010 at 5:38 AM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: On Nov 16, 3:27 am, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: If logic and reason reduce to causal laws, then ultimately causal laws alone explain the result

Re: Compatibilism

2010-11-23 Thread 1Z
On Nov 21, 6:43 pm, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: On Fri, Nov 19, 2010 at 7:36 AM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: On Nov 19, 3:11 am, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: On Thu, Nov 18, 2010 at 9:56 AM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Rex, Your post reminded

Re: Compatibilism

2010-11-23 Thread 1Z
On Nov 21, 6:35 pm, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: On Fri, Nov 19, 2010 at 7:28 AM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: On Nov 18, 6:31 am, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: My position is: So either there is a reason for what I choose to do, or there isn't

Re: Compatibilism

2010-11-26 Thread 1Z
On Nov 26, 6:01 am, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Nov 23, 2010 at 4:12 PM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: On Nov 21, 6:43 pm, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: On Fri, Nov 19, 2010 at 7:36 AM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: No-one is. They are just valid

Re: Compatibilism

2010-11-26 Thread 1Z
On Nov 26, 6:31 am, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Nov 23, 2010 at 4:20 PM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: On Nov 21, 6:35 pm, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: On Fri, Nov 19, 2010 at 7:28 AM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: On Nov 18, 6:31 am, Rex Allen

Re: Against Mechanism

2010-11-27 Thread 1Z
On Nov 27, 6:49 pm, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: Given that there are an infinite number of ways that your information could be represented, how likely is it that your experience really is caused by a biological brain?  Or even by a representation of a biological brain? Occam's

Re: Against Mechanism

2010-11-28 Thread 1Z
On Nov 27, 7:40 pm, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: On Sat, Nov 27, 2010 at 2:08 PM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: On Nov 27, 6:49 pm, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: Given that there are an infinite number of ways that your information could be represented, how

Re: Against Mechanism

2010-11-28 Thread 1Z
On Nov 27, 7:21 pm, Evgenii Rudnyi use...@rudnyi.ru wrote: on 27.11.2010 20:08 1Z said the following: On Nov 27, 6:49 pm, Rex Allenrexallen31...@gmail.com  wrote: Given that there are an infinite number of ways that your information could be represented, how likely is it that your

Re: Compatibilism

2010-11-28 Thread 1Z
On Nov 27, 8:17 pm, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: On Fri, Nov 26, 2010 at 7:17 AM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: On Nov 26, 6:01 am, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: So Agrippa's Trilemma revolves around the question of how we can justify our beliefs. It seems

Re: Compatibilism

2010-11-28 Thread 1Z
On Nov 27, 8:53 pm, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: On Fri, Nov 26, 2010 at 7:44 AM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: On Nov 26, 6:31 am, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: Any defense of free will must allow for ultimate responsibility for actions. Mine does Random

Re: Against Mechanism

2010-11-28 Thread 1Z
On Nov 28, 9:02 pm, Evgenii Rudnyi use...@rudnyi.ru wrote: on 28.11.2010 20:46 1Z said the following: On Nov 27, 7:21 pm, Evgenii Rudnyiuse...@rudnyi.ru  wrote: on 27.11.2010 20:08 1Z said the following: On Nov 27, 6:49 pm, Rex Allenrexallen31...@gmail.com    wrote: Given

Re: Against Mechanism

2010-11-29 Thread 1Z
On Nov 29, 4:15 am, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: On Sat, Nov 27, 2010 at 4:06 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Right, my view is that there is no thinker, only thought. Once you accept that the conscious experience of a rock exists, what purpose does the actual rock

Re: Compatibilism

2010-11-29 Thread 1Z
of the same stuff And, even if you wanted to, I don't see how they could be made to serve that role.  1Z and I discussed this in the other thread. We don't invoke thought and reason to explain the abilities and behavior of chess playing computers - and while human behavior and ability is much more

Re: Compatibilism

2010-11-29 Thread 1Z
On Nov 28, 11:36 pm, Stephen Paul King stephe...@charter.net wrote: Hi Rex and Bruno,     I think that you are both missing an important point by taking an from infinity view. The fact that the world is not given to us in terms where these is one and only one option given some condition

Re: Against Mechanism

2010-12-03 Thread 1Z
On Dec 3, 4:49 pm, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: How do you know? You can't maintain that indirect realism is true independent of any metaphysical presumptions. I don’t maintain that indirect realism is true. Only that direct realism isn’t, as it can’t account for colors,

Re: Against Mechanism

2010-12-03 Thread 1Z
On Dec 2, 6:29 pm, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: On Sat, Nov 27, 2010 at 5:02 PM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: On 11/27/2010 1:06 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Sat, Nov 27, 2010 at 12:49 PM, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: Even if you have used some physical

Re: Against Mechanism

2010-12-06 Thread 1Z
of thoughts do not cause the survival of the thinker. They are a practical and high level description of the causes. The existence of the trees does not disprove the forest Like 1Z, you're assigning causal power to abstractions that only exist for you. There is a difference between a high level

Re: Autonomy?

2012-06-18 Thread 1Z
On Jun 5, 3:27 am, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: If top level properties were determined by low level properties, then there would only be one level of description. Doens't follow. Forest-level descriptions may be convenient. -- You received this message because you are

Re: Autonomy?

2012-06-18 Thread 1Z
On Jun 15, 5:17 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 6/15/2012 8:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Jun 2012, at 18:21, John Clark wrote: On Mon, Jun 4, 2012  Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com mailto:whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:     I don't understand how we can

Re: Autonomy?

2012-06-18 Thread 1Z
On Jun 16, 6:49 pm, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Fri, Jun 15, 2012  meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: It seems pretty clear.  It's an ability to make decisions in a spirit realm and have them implemented in the physical realm. Physical realm mental realm spirit realm or

Re: Autonomy?

2012-06-18 Thread 1Z
On Jun 17, 7:28 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: No, not that I know to be such; but believers in contra causal free will think that at least some of their actions are. Does anyone describe themselves as a believer in Contra Causal Free Will? People do describe themselves as

Re: Autonomy?

2012-06-18 Thread 1Z
On Jun 18, 6:02 pm, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Mon, Jun 18, 2012 at 12:38 PM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: Thins happen for: a reason and a cause or a reason but not cause or no reason but a cause or no reason and no cause. The dictionary on my Mac says

Re: Autonomy?

2012-06-18 Thread 1Z
On Jun 18, 6:03 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 6/18/2012 9:36 AM, 1Z wrote: About nc-free-will, I have not any idea (yet?) about what it could mean. I tend to agree    with John on this.  It seems pretty clear.  It's an ability to make decisions in a spirit realm

Re: Autonomy?

2012-06-18 Thread 1Z
On Jun 18, 6:22 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 6/18/2012 9:50 AM, 1Z wrote: On Jun 17, 7:28 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net  wrote: No, not that I know to be such; but believers in contra causal free will think that at least some of their actions are. Does anyone

Re: Autonomy?

2012-06-18 Thread 1Z
On Jun 18, 6:46 pm, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Mon, Jun 18, 2012 at 1:31 PM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: causes are not reasons I see. Well, how would the world be different if causes WERE reasons? It means that if someone gets struck by lightning, God really does hate

Re: Autonomy?

2012-06-18 Thread 1Z
On Jun 18, 6:44 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 6/18/2012 10:34 AM, 1Z wrote: On Jun 18, 6:03 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net  wrote: On 6/18/2012 9:36 AM, 1Z wrote: About nc-free-will, I have not any idea (yet?) about what it could mean. I tend to agree

Re: Autonomy?

2012-06-19 Thread 1Z
On Jun 19, 3:59 pm, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Mon, Jun 18, 2012 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: how would the world be different if causes WERE reasons? if someone gets struck  by lightning, God really does hate them. I pray to God you're joking. Causes=reasons is *your

Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

2006-10-08 Thread 1Z
David Nyman wrote: On Oct 7, 1:16 pm, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Numbers that haven't been reified in any sense, don't exist in any way and therefore don't behave in any way. Forgive me for butting in again, but is there not some way to stop this particular disagreement from going

Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

2006-10-08 Thread 1Z
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: I reached this position independently and you may think I'm nuts... I can't help what I see... is there something wrong with this way of thinking? I don't see what you think a non-ideal number is. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You

Re: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-08 Thread 1Z
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 07-oct.-06, à 16:48, 1Z a écrit : That is obviously wrong. Formalists are not Platonists, structuralists are not Platonists, Empiricists are not Platonists. After Godel, even formalists are platonist about numbers. Of course not. If they say

Re: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-08 Thread 1Z
Brent Meeker wrote: But note that Maudlin's argument depends on being in a classical world. The quantum world in which we live the counterfactuals are always realized with some probability. Only under MWI. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message

Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

2006-10-09 Thread 1Z
David Nyman wrote: On Oct 8, 6:29 pm, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Yes. But he says he isn't assuming Platonism, although he must be. Well, if he is, so what? If we allow him this, what then follows - isn't this more interesting? He claims that computationalism is incompatible

Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

2006-10-09 Thread 1Z
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: LZ: Colin Hales wrote: I reached this position independently and you may think I'm nuts... I can't help what I see... is there something wrong with this way of thinking? I don't see what you think a non-ideal number is. This deficit of mine includes having

Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

2006-10-09 Thread 1Z
David Nyman wrote: 1Z wrote: Whatever properties are picked out by a computation will be relevant to it as a computation. Yes, of course. But how are these properties supposed to simultaneously produce a state of consciousness stably linked to the 'computation' when this self-same

Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

2006-10-10 Thread 1Z
Russell Standish wrote: On Mon, Oct 09, 2006 at 10:35:05AM -0700, 1Z wrote: The idea that materialism is not compatible with computationalism is a bold and startling claim. Materialism comes in a couple of different flavours. The one that COMP is incompatible with is eliminative

Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

2006-10-10 Thread 1Z
David Nyman wrote: On Oct 10, 2:51 am, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: It's a claim of computationalism. I am just explaining how computationalism is compatible with physicalism. You are complaining about circularity, not contradiction! So you're saying that this variety

Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

2006-10-10 Thread 1Z
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 10-oct.-06, à 03:52, Russell Standish a écrit : On Mon, Oct 09, 2006 at 10:35:05AM -0700, 1Z wrote: The idea that materialism is not compatible with computationalism is a bold and startling claim. Materialism comes in a couple of different flavours

Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

2006-10-10 Thread 1Z
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 09-oct.-06, à 23:56, Colin Geoffrey Hales a écrit : ...But it's not. Lets talk about the object with this property of five in platonia as 5. Here in reality what we are doing is creating a label I and interpreting the label as a pointer to storage where the

Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

2006-10-10 Thread 1Z
David Nyman wrote: On Oct 10, 2:56 pm, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: If you aren't in fact claiming this, then your appeal to 'computation' as picking out the relevant properties can be valid only in the context of *specific*, not generalised, instantiations, and thus becomes merely

Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

2006-10-10 Thread 1Z
David Nyman wrote: On Oct 10, 2:56 pm, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: If you aren't in fact claiming this, then your appeal to 'computation' as picking out the relevant properties can be valid only in the context of *specific*, not generalised, instantiations, and thus becomes merely

Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

2006-10-10 Thread 1Z
David Nyman wrote: But this conclusion is, I think, why Bruno thinks that 'matter' has no real explanatory role in the account of conscious experience. This isn't quite equivalent to claiming that it can't be the primary reality, but rather to claim that it adds nothing to the accounts of

Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

2006-10-11 Thread 1Z
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 10-oct.-06, à 16:08, 1Z a écrit : If your Platonism is about truth, bot existence, you cannot show that matter is redundant, Ah! I am glad you see my argument is a redundancy argument. If comp is true we cannot rely on the hypothesis of primary matter

Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

2006-10-11 Thread 1Z
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 10-oct.-06, à 16:08, 1Z a écrit : If your Platonism is about truth, bot existence, you cannot show that matter is redundant, Ah! I am glad you see my argument is a redundancy argument. If comp is true we cannot rely on the hypothesis of primary matter

Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

2006-10-11 Thread 1Z
Bruno Marchal wrote: That's a redundancy argument, not an incompatibility argument. Yes. We somethigists have a redundancy argument of our own. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything

Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

2006-10-11 Thread 1Z
Bruno Marchal wrote: That's a redundancy argument, not an incompatibility argument. Yes. We somethigists have a redundancy argument of our own. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything

Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

2006-10-11 Thread 1Z
David Nyman wrote: On Oct 11, 5:11 am, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: But it isn't possible to determine by inspection that they are conscious.Are you claiming it's impossible in principle, or just that we don't know how? It may be impossible in principle (i.e. 1-person

Re: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-12 Thread 1Z
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Russell Standish wrote: On Thu, Oct 12, 2006 at 07:41:37AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: My dear fellow, as I explained in a previous post, consciousness IS a second time dimension. The 'Block-universe' view of time (B-Theory) and the 'Flowing River'

Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

2006-10-12 Thread 1Z
David Nyman wrote: On Oct 11, 11:17 pm, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: It may be impossible in principle (i.e. 1-person experience is ex-hypothesi incommunicable) and we certainly don't know how to.So if I see a square, I can't communicate it? You know you can, of course. But what

Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

2006-10-13 Thread 1Z
David Nyman wrote: On Oct 13, 1:52 am, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: You know you can, of course. But what you are communicating is information derived from your 'seeing a square' in order for others to instantiate something analogous, as 1-person experiences of their own.I disagree

Re: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-15 Thread 1Z
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: I was using quantum state as synonymous with physical state, which I guess is what you are referring to in the above paragraph. The observer sees a classical universe because in observing he collapses the wave function or selects one branch of the multiverse.

Re: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-15 Thread 1Z
Russell Standish wrote: On Fri, Oct 13, 2006 at 07:03:18AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Also see my reply to Russell below: Russell Standish The Multiverse is defined as the set of consistent histories described by the Schroedinger equation. I make the identification that a

Re: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-15 Thread 1Z
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: 1Z wrote: [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: The key point I think is that both the A-theorists and the B-theorists are partially right. The B-series is easily compatible with the A-series. The point about a block universe is that there is no A-series

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