Re: Movie graph and computational supervenience

2009-01-28 Thread Pete Carlton
What is wrong? In my opinion, it is that you are thinking that anything at all exists in addition to or supervening on the gates, or the movie, or the functions. I think you have a picture in your mind like this: let's say there are two side-by-side computers, and let's say the one on the

Re: A summary I just wrote for my blog

2009-02-10 Thread Pete Carlton
Not too much here that would raise hackles on the everything-list, but (IMHO) for the first sentence-- Perhaps it's time I had another go at explaining all that weird stuff I believe in and why. The word believe can mean many things but in my parlance it means to attach a very high

Re: adult vs. child

2009-02-10 Thread Pete Carlton
As the observer you know all this information, and you look at the clock and see that it is 5:00 PM. What can you conclude from this and what should you expect? To me, it seems that you must conclude that you are currently either A1 or A2, and that in one minute you will be B, with 100%

Re: UDA revisited and then some

2006-12-07 Thread Pete Carlton
A definitive treatment of this problem is Daniel Dennett's story Where am I? http://www.newbanner.com/SecHumSCM/WhereAmI.html On Dec 6, 2006, at 4:06 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: Quentin Anciaux wrote: Le Mercredi 6 Décembre 2006 19:35, Brent Meeker a écrit : Quentin Anciaux wrote: ...

Re: Asifism

2007-06-02 Thread Pete Carlton
On Jun 1, 2007, at 6:53 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: I assure you, at least one entity in the universe is conscious: me. If evolution could have made me a zombie, it would have. Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that evolution couldn't help but grant me consciousness as a

Re: Penrose and algorithms

2007-06-21 Thread Pete Carlton
You could look up Murmurs in the Cathedral, Daniel Dennett's review of Penrose's The Emperor's New Mind, in the Times literary supplement (and maybe online somewhere?) Here's an excerpt from a review of the review: -- However, Penrose's main thesis, for which all this scientific

Re: against UD+ASSA, part 1

2007-10-02 Thread Pete Carlton
Since barring global disaster there will be massively more observers in the future, why did you find yourself born so early? Surely your probability of being born in the future (where there are far more observers) was much much higher than your chances of being born so early among a far

Re: Another tedious hypothetical

2005-06-06 Thread Pete Carlton
On Jun 5, 2005, at 11:14 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:I would say 0: 0. All a  Coincidence (I don't see *big* coincidences) and then 5.I'm agnostic about what you talk about. I love the book by Suzanne Blackmore "In search of the light" because it shows parapsychology can be done seriously, but then

Re: Another tedious hypothetical

2005-06-06 Thread Pete Carlton
Jesse has it right on here, and one can go even further in this vein.  You are impressed by the relationship between one particular story and one particular event - but you hand-picked both the story and the event for discussion here because of their superficial similarities.  You challenged me to

Re: Dualism and the DA

2005-06-17 Thread Pete Carlton
On Jun 17, 2005, at 10:24 AM, Hal Finney wrote: Does it make sense for Jobs to say, who would I have been if that had happened? Yes, it makes sense, but only because we know that the phrase Who would I have been, uttered by Steve Jobs, is just a convenient way for expressing a

Re: Dualism and the DA

2005-06-20 Thread Pete Carlton
On Jun 17, 2005, at 10:17 PM, Russell Standish wrote:snipI still find it hard to understand this argument. The question "Whatis it like to be a bat?" still has meaning, but is probablyunanswerable (although Dennett, I notice considers it answerable,contra Nagel!)Dennett considers it answerable,

Re: Dualism and the DA

2005-06-21 Thread Pete Carlton
On Jun 20, 2005, at 10:44 AM, Hal Finney wrote:Pete Carlton writes: snip-- we don't need to posit any  kind of dualism to paper over it, we just have to revise our concept  of "I". Hal Finney wrote:Copies seem a little more problematic.  We're pretty cavalier aboutcreating and destroying them in

Re: Dualism and the DA

2005-06-24 Thread Pete Carlton
ink that taking these as primitive leads us into error; in particular the idea that there's a definite answer to the question "what observer moment am I now experiencing?".Best regards Pete Carlton

Re: More is Better (anesthetic)

2005-07-02 Thread Pete Carlton
The discussion about whether it would be okay to use anesthetic that worked only by removing memories is missing one important piece:  that the effects of pain are not just floating "experiences" perceived by the "mind", but have very real effects on the body - high stress levels, release of

Re: Duplicates Are Selves

2005-07-03 Thread Pete Carlton
other words, it is because he extends the "normal" desire of self-preservation to the duplicate, that he would accept certain choices.  Whether this is in fact correct is not a scientific question but one for philosophical ethics (and a very interesting one).Pete Carlton

Re: Duplicates Are Selves

2005-07-03 Thread Pete Carlton
Pete: I think this interpretation, using I, has an unnecessary complication to it. What I think Lee is really saying (in third person terms) is, Person A ought to terminate person A's life, because person A desires the existence of (person B + 5 dollars) more strongly than he desires the

Re: Duplicates Are Selves

2005-07-04 Thread Pete Carlton
On Jul 4, 2005, at 8:11 AM, Lee Corbin wrote:You think that person A ought (in the ethical sense) to have a strong  desire for the future existence of person B - no less, in fact, than  for the future existence of person A.  You imply this when you say  the subject is selfish.  I see your point,

Re: The Time Deniers

2005-07-06 Thread Pete Carlton
On Jul 6, 2005, at 9:08 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote: There is a huge difference in kind between existing and emulating. Existing is atemporal by definition since existence can not depend on any other property. Emulations involve some notion of a process and such are temporal. The

Re: The Time Deniers and the idea of time as a dimension

2005-07-07 Thread Pete Carlton
On Jul 6, 2005, at 10:37 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote:PC:But isn't the use of time as the dimension along which things vary  (or are 'processed') a somewhat arbitrary choice?[SPK]   Please notice that the identification of "time" with a "dimension" involves the identification with each moment in

Re: More than one kind of 'causality'?

2005-09-19 Thread Pete Carlton
On Sep 19, 2005, at 1:00 AM, Marc Geddes wrote: Here's a speculation: The model I'm working with for my theory seems to suggest 3 different fundamental kinds of 'cause and effect'. The first is physical causality - motion of physical objects through space. The second is mental causality

Re: Mathematics: Is it really what you think it is?

2006-01-28 Thread Pete Carlton
Hi Marc -- it's interesting to wonder about what it would be like to directly perceive mathematics -- but we also have to acknowledge when we ask the question, what are the philosophical assumptions we're smuggling along. For instance, the human brain is not capable of direct perception

Re: Fermi's Paradox

2006-07-08 Thread Pete Carlton
On Jul 6, 2006, at 10:56 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:Destroying your species runs counter to evolution. I'll rephrase that: everything that happens in nature is by definition in accordance with evolution, but those species that destroy themselves will die out, while those species that don't

Re: 2C Mary

2003-06-04 Thread Pete Carlton
On Tuesday, June 3, 2003, at 03:17 PM, Colin Hales wrote: Re the latter thought: Can I suggest reading a pile of Daniel Dennett? The 'representationalist' or its extremum: the eliminativist end of consciousness is, as are all other philosophical positions as far as I can tell, both right and

Re: Quantum accident survivor

2003-11-05 Thread Pete Carlton
..=) Best regards, Pete -- Pete Carlton, Ph. D. [EMAIL PROTECTED] Life Sciences Division Lawrence Berkeley National Lab Berkeley, CA USA

Re: Quantum accident survivor

2003-11-07 Thread Pete Carlton
Hi, Doesn't this part: In a materialistic framework, ' I ' am a bunch of atoms. These atoms happen to constitute a system that has self-referential qualities that we call consciousness. If it happened that these atoms temporarily (like in a coma or anesthesy) or permanently (death) lose this

Re: Determinism

2004-01-16 Thread Pete Carlton
by holistic and unclosable? -- Pete Carlton

Re: More on qualia of consciousness and occam's razor

2004-02-03 Thread Pete Carlton
On Feb 3, 2004, at 3:19 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: I am using terms like information loosely when discussing subjective experience precisely because I cannot think of a way to formalise it. Perhaps its defining characteristic is that it cannot be formalised. One can imagine that if we made

of general interest

2004-08-18 Thread Pete Carlton
On www.edge.org, an exchange between Lee Smolin and Leonard Susskind on the anthropic principle. http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/smolin_susskind04/smolin_susskind.html

Ambjørn et al.

2004-10-12 Thread Pete Carlton
Of possible general interest - J. Ambjørn J. Jurkiewicz and R. Loll (also a writeup in Nature news, at http://www.nature.com/news/2004/041004/full/041004-17.html) Emergence of a 4D World from Causal Quantum Gravity http://dx.doi.org/10.1103%2FPhysRevLett.93.131301

Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-11-14 Thread Pete Carlton
I am not quite sure how justification (5) is meant to hang on this structure. Where does the idea of asking questions come from? Why is the Nothing supposed to be the kind of thing that should asked questions in the first place? Why is the fact that Nothing can't answer a question any more

Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-12-17 Thread Pete Carlton
As usual when I ask a question like this, if the answer is available in a text on logic or elsewhere, please just tell me where to look. ..I'm also interested in the implicit use of time, or sequence, in many of the ideas discussed here. For instance you might say that some of your Somethings

John Conway, Free Will Theorem

2005-04-07 Thread Pete Carlton
Greetings, I recently attended a talk here in Berkeley, California given by John Conway (of 'Game of Life' fame), in which he discussed some of his results with Simon Kochen, extending the Kochen-Specker paradox. He presents this as the Free Will Theorem, saying basically that particles

Re: Free Will Theorem

2005-04-18 Thread Pete Carlton
On Apr 11, 2005, at 11:11 PM, Russell Standish wrote: I'm dealing with these questions in an artificial life system - Tierra to be precise. I have compared the original Tierra code, with one in which the random no. generator is replaced with a true random no. generator called HAVEGE, and another