Re: language, cloning and thought experiments

2009-02-24 Thread Wei Dai
Jack, welcome back. I no longer read every post here, but I read this post and found your positions pretty close to my own. This one, especially, I totally agree with: The important thing to realize is that _definitions don't matter_! Predictions, decisions, appropriate emotions to a

Re: language, cloning and thought experiments

2009-03-06 Thread Wei Dai
No. First, I don't agree that the real question is what the utility function is or should be. The real question is whether the measure, M, is conserved or whether it decreases. It's just that a lot of people don't understand what that means. I agree that a lot of people don't

Re: language, cloning and thought experiments

2009-03-10 Thread Wei Dai
Jack Mallah wrote: They might not, but I'm sure most would; maybe not exactly that U, but a lot closer to it. Can you explain why you believe that? No. In U = Sum_i M_i Q_i, you sum over all the i's, not just the ones that are similar to you. Of course your Q_i (which is _your_ utility

Re: list archive

2009-09-22 Thread Wei Dai
I've placed a compressed mbox file at http://www.ibiblio.org/weidai/everything-archive/. Add everything.bz2 to this path for the full URL. (I'm trying not to post the full URL directly so the email addresses inside won't get harvested by web robots.) It should be complete as of now. I'll

everything-list and the Singularity

2010-03-14 Thread Wei Dai
Recently I heard the news that Max Tegmark has joined the Advisory Board of SIAI (The Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence, see http://www.singinst.org/blog/2010/03/03/mit-professor-and-cosmologist-max-tegmark-joins-siai-advisory-board/). This news was surprising to me, but in

Re: Natural Order Belief

2006-12-15 Thread Wei Dai
Sorry, John. I set your subscription to no email thinking you wanted to unsubscribe. I've changed it back now. For future reference you can check your subscription status at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/subscribe. - Original Message - From: Kim Jones To:

Re: testing

2006-12-20 Thread Wei Dai
Your posts have been coming through. You can check http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en yourself to see if your posts have been received by the group. - Original Message - From: John Mikes To: everything-list@googlegroups.com ; Wei Dai Sent: Thursday, December 21

RE: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-01-14 Thread Wei Dai
Jason, I think there may be some incorrect assumptions behind your argument. Let me state the facts as I understand them and you can check them against your assumptions or correct me if I'm wrong. The only reason we need reversible computation to do an infinite number of computations is that

RE: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-01-14 Thread Wei Dai
Jason wrote: If that is true then my underlying assumptions were flawed. My argument assumed that a non-reversible universe could not be simulated by a computer with bounded memory and using only reversible computations. The way I arrived at this assumption was imagining a non-reversible

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-01-14 Thread Wei Dai
Jason wrote: I assumed bounded memory due to the limited amount of matter and energy available to build the computer. For instance I've seen it said that the total information content of this universe is about 10^90 bits. If a civilization gathered all the mass and energy available in their

Re: Jason + Stathis

2007-02-12 Thread Wei Dai
On Feb 13, 3:28 am, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: You don't need an emailer that understands HTML to look at an attached jpeg, like the one I attach to this. :-) On the avoid-l mailing list the rule is to keep attachements under 500kb. Perhaps Wei Dai would like to adopt

Re: Jason + Stathis

2007-02-14 Thread Wei Dai
I just remembered that Google Groups also has a file uploading/hosting feature. You can find it at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/files. It's already enabled, so please go ahead and use it as an alternative, or for any files that don't belong on Jason's wiki. - Original

Re: Believing in Divine Destiny

2007-02-27 Thread Wei Dai
A year ago or so Wei Dai put an end to religious discussions on the list. I don't remember if I did that a year ago or not, but I certainly think the current discussion is off-topic. This mailing list is based on the premise that all possible universes exist. Unless someone can think

Re: Justifying the Theory of Everything

2007-07-08 Thread Wei Dai
Jason wrote: I have seen two main justifications on this list for the everything ensemble, the first comes from information theory which says the information content of everything is zero (or close to zero). The other is mathematicalism/arithmatical realism which suggests mathematical truth

Re: One solution to the Measure Problem: UTM outputs a qualia, not a universe

2007-09-18 Thread Wei Dai
Hal wrote: Yes, as you note later this is very similar to the concept I called UD+ASSA or just UDASSA and described in a series of postings to this list back in 2005. It was not original with me but actually was based on an idea of Wei Dai, who founded this last way back in 1998. I

Re: New Scientist: Parallel universes make quantum sense

2007-09-24 Thread Wei Dai
Here's my comment on David Wallace's 2005 paper, Quantum Probability from Subjective Likelihood: improving on Deutsch's proof of the probability rule available at http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/2302/. I think this is probably one of the main works referred to in the New Scientist

against UD+ASSA, part 1

2007-09-26 Thread Wei Dai
I promised to summarize why I moved away from the philosophical position that Hal Finney calls UD+ASSA. Here's part 1, where I argue against ASSA. Part 2 will cover UD. Consider the following thought experiment. Suppose your brain has been destructively scanned and uploaded into a computer by a

against UD+ASSA, part 2

2007-09-26 Thread Wei Dai
In part one I argued against ASSA. Here I first summarize my argument against UD, then against the general possibility of any single objective measure. 1. There is an infinite number of universal Turing machines, so there is an infinite number of UD. If we want to use one UD as an objective

Re: against UD+ASSA, part 1

2007-09-26 Thread Wei Dai
Hal Finney wrote: This is an interesting experiment, but I have two comments. First, you could tighten the dilemma by having the mad scientist flip a biased coin with say a 70% chance of coming up heads, but then he duplicates you if it comes up tails. Now you have it that the different

Re: The ASSA leads to a unique utilitarism

2007-10-04 Thread Wei Dai
Youness Ayaita wrote: Directly speaking: Since all observers must expect to get their next observer moments out of the same ensemble of observer moments, there is no reason to insist on different preferences. Youness, ASSA does not mean what you think, that all observers must expect to get

how to define ASSA (was: The ASSA leads to a unique utilitarism)

2007-10-05 Thread Wei Dai
Russell Standish wrote: This is actually the SSSA, as originally defined by Bostrom. The ASSA is the SSSA applied to next observer moments. I guess there is a bit of confusing on these terms. I did some searching in the mailing list archives to find out how they were originally defined.

Re: What are the consequences of UD+ASSA?

2007-10-24 Thread Wei Dai
Rolf Nelson wrote: 1. Provides a possible explanation for the Measure Problem of why we shouldn't be extremely surprised to find we live in a lawful universe, rather than an extremely chaotic universe, or a homogeneous cloud of gas. One thing I still don't understand, is in what sense

Re: What are the consequences of UD+ASSA?

2007-10-25 Thread Wei Dai
Rolf Nelson wrote: Your observations to date are consistent with all three models. What are the odds that you live in (2) but not (1) or (3)? Surely the answer is extremely high, but how do we justify it *mathematically* (and philosophically)? My current position is, forget the odds. Let's

Re: What are the consequences of UD+ASSA?

2007-10-26 Thread Wei Dai
Rolf Nelson wrote: In standard decision theory, odds (subjective probabilities) are separated from utilities. Is how much you care about the consequences of your actions isomorphic to odds, or is there some subtlety I'm missing here? Your question shows that someone finally understand what

Re: What are the consequences of UD+ASSA?

2007-10-27 Thread Wei Dai
Rolf Nelson wrote: Wei, your examples are convincing, although other decision models have similar problems. If your two examples were the only problems that UDASSA had, I would have few qualms about adopting it over the other decision models I've seen. Note that even if you adopt a decision

Re: What are the consequences of UD+ASSA?

2007-10-27 Thread Wei Dai
Brent Meeker wrote: That's a good argument assuming some laws of physics. But as I understood it, the measure problem was to explain the law-like evolution of the universe as a opposed to a chaotic/random/white-rabbit universe. Is it your interpretation that, among all possible worlds,

Re: What are the consequences of UD+ASSA?

2007-10-28 Thread Wei Dai
Rolf Nelson wrote: On Oct 25, 7:59 am, Wei Dai [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I don't care about (1) and (3) because those universes are too arbitrary or random, and I can defend that by pointing to their high algorithmic complexities. In (3) the universe doesn't have a high aIgorithmic

Re: What are the consequences of UD+ASSA?

2007-10-30 Thread Wei Dai
Rolf Nelson wrote: In the (3) I gave, you're indexed so that the thermal fluctuation doesn't dissolve until November 1, so your actions still have consequences. Still not a problem: the space-time region that I can affect in (3) is too small (i.e., its measure is too small, complexity too

Re: UDA paper

2008-02-27 Thread Wei Dai
Bruno Marchal wrote: If Wei Dai agree, I could send it online: it is a 1,5 Mega QuickTime document attachment. I guess it is a bit too big. Some day I will put them on my web page. It does illustrate some points. The problem is that my all complex plane software does no more run on current

questionnaire (was: All feedback appreciated - An introduction to Algebraic Physics)

2008-07-03 Thread Wei Dai
: Re: All feedback appreciated - An introduction to Algebraic Physics to: Wei Dai: Please: How can I find your 'Everything-Questionnaire'? (Not that I have the answers...) John Mikes On Thu, Jul 3, 2008 at 4:51 AM, Brian Tenneson [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Why is the universe a subset

is induction unformalizable?

2005-07-13 Thread Wei Dai
One day,Earth is contacted by a highly advanced alien civilization, and they tell us that contrary to what most of us think is likely,not all ofthe fundamental physical laws of our universearecomputable. Furthermore, they claim to be able to manufacture black boxes that work as oracles for

Re: is induction unformalizable?

2005-07-13 Thread Wei Dai
Correct me if wrong, but isn't the halting problem only undecidable when the length of the program is unbounded? Wouldn't the AI assign non-zero probability to a machine that solved the halting problem for programs up to size S? (S is the number of stars in the sky, grains of sand, atoms

Re: is induction unformalizable?

2005-07-22 Thread Wei Dai
Couple of comments to the post below. 1. P=?NP is a purely mathematical problem, whereas the existence of an HPO box is an emperical matter. If we had access to a purported HPO box while P=?NP is still unsolved, we can use the box to exhaustively search for proofs of either P=NP or PNP. 2. I

Re: what relation do mathematical models have with reality?

2005-07-30 Thread Wei Dai
Hal Finney wrote: No doubt this is true. But there are still two somewhat-related problems. One is, you can go back in time to the first replicator on earth, and think of its evolution over the ages as a learning process. During this time it learned this intuitive physics, i.e. mathematics and

Re: archive?

2005-08-24 Thread Wei Dai
I'm not sure what's going on with escribe.com, but there's a second archive at http://www.mail-archive.com/everything-list%40eskimo.com/. - Original Message - From: Hal Ruhl [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Wednesday, August 24, 2005 9:14 PM Subject: archive?

Re: Multiverse concepts in string theory

2006-02-13 Thread Wei Dai
Hal wrote: I also get the impression that Susskind's attempts to bring "disreputable" multiverse models into "holy" string theory is more likely to kill string theory than to rehabilitate multiverses. Perhaps I am getting a biased view by only reading this one blog, which opposes string

Re: Multiverse concepts in string theory

2006-02-15 Thread Wei Dai
ng machine in algorithmic information theory. Our aesthetic choices can therefore be encoded into this free parameter. - Original Message - From: Kim Jones To: Wei Dai Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Tuesday, February 14, 2006 10:40 PM Subject: Re: Multivers

ADMIN: list move complete

2006-02-24 Thread Wei Dai
The list move is now complete. Please start sending your posts to the new address: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Also, the list will now be archived at both http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list and http://www.mail-archive.com/everything-list@eskimo.com/. For those of you using Procmail to

proper behavior for a mathematical substructure

2006-03-29 Thread Wei Dai
Is there a difference between physical existence and mathematical existence? I suggest thinking about this problem from a different angle. Consider a mathematical substructure as a rational decision maker. It seems to me that making a decision ideally would consist of the following steps: 1.

Re: proper behavior for a mathematical substructure

2006-03-29 Thread Wei Dai
Brent Meeker wrote: This seems to assume a dualism in which you are both a mathematical structure and at also stand outside the structure caring and making decisions. What makes you say stand outside the structure? I'd say instead that I am a mathematical structure that cares and makes

why can't we erase information?

2006-04-09 Thread Wei Dai
If we consider our observable universe as a computation, it's rather atypical in that it doesn't seem to make use of the erase operation (or other any operation that irreversibly erases information). The second law of thermodynamics is a consequence of this. In order to forget anything

Re: why can't we erase information?

2006-04-11 Thread Wei Dai
Jesse Mazer wrote: As for the question of why we live in a universe that apparently has this property, I don't think there's an anthropic explanation for it, I'd see it as part of the larger question of why we live in a universe whose fundamental laws seem to be so elegant and posess so

Re: why can't we erase information?

2006-04-11 Thread Wei Dai
Ti Bo wrote: On reversibility, there is the observation (I think acredittable to Tom Toffoli) that most/all irreversible systems have a reversible subsystem and the dynamics arrive in that subsystem after some (finite) time. Thus any system that we observe a while after it has started

Re: why can't we erase information?

2006-04-11 Thread Wei Dai
Saibal Mitra wrote: How would an observer know he is living in a universe in which information is lost? Information loss means that time evolution can map two different initial states to the same final state. The observer in the final state thus cannot know that information really has been

Re: why can't we erase information?

2006-04-11 Thread Wei Dai
Jesse Mazer: I have a vague memory that there was some result showing the algorithmic complexity of a string shouldn't depend too strongly on the details of the Turing machine--that it would only differ by some constant amount for any two different machines, maybe? Does this ring a bell with

Re: Why physical laws

1999-06-11 Thread Wei Dai
On Fri, Jun 11, 1999 at 05:35:28PM +0200, Gilles HENRI wrote: James, here you assume that the conscious process derives from physical laws, exactly what I support. In the everything computable exists, nothing prevents to generate Universes where conscious structures do exist, but don't have a

Re: Immortality

2001-10-07 Thread Wei Dai
On Fri, Sep 28, 2001 at 05:57:18PM +0200, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: But there _is_ a modern religion based on universal principles. More precisely, on universal computers. According to the Great Programmer Religion, the Great Programmer wrote a very short program that computes all computable

Re: momentary and persistent minds

1998-06-04 Thread Wei Dai
On Fri, May 29, 1998 at 04:03:00AM +, Nick Bostrom wrote: It seems we can interpret I will observe X as meaning: There is a future brain-state B2, similar in certain respects to the brain-state B1 which instanciates this present cognition C1, such that B2 instanciates C2, and C2

Re: Interpretations, subjectivity

1999-07-12 Thread Wei Dai
On Thu, Jul 08, 1999 at 01:01:32AM -0400, Hans Moravec wrote: Thinking about interpretations brought me to the all-universes position! You may remember the early stages of the rumination in in Mind Children, where I discussed possible beings in Fourier and other transforms of normal space,

Re: consciousness based on information or computation?

1999-02-13 Thread Wei Dai
On Sat, Feb 13, 1999 at 07:29:15PM -0500, Jacques M Mallah wrote: I do not believe your assumptions are simpler than mine. A string is less complicated than a computation, but it is a greater leap from a string to conciousness, and the illusions of dynamics and decisions, than it is

Re: The Rapidly-Accelerating Computer

2000-10-17 Thread Wei Dai
On Fri, Oct 13, 2000 at 08:25:39PM -0700, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I'm not sure it would be zero. The program for the CSO is not particularly complex compared to other observer programs. If you have the program for a constant-speed observer then you only need to simulate the program,

Re: Interpretations, subjectivity

1999-07-12 Thread Wei Dai
On Mon, Jul 12, 1999 at 09:07:17PM -0400, Hans Moravec wrote: And we have no reason to believe that they don't exist. We've never looked. My main example was a 3D Fourier transform of the sun density: Each wave (direction, frequency) mode of the sun becomes a point in the Fourier space.

Re: quantum suicide = deadly dumb

1998-12-10 Thread Wei Dai
On Thu, Dec 10, 1998 at 03:20:58PM +0100, Gilles HENRI wrote: maybe the decision theory itself (I must confess that my only knowledge of it comes from what Wei writes here) is somewhat metaphysical because it assumes that an individual can actually change the evolution of the world (acts upon

Re: another anthropic reasoning

2001-03-20 Thread Wei Dai
I'm sorry for this greatly delayed response. I shouldn't have sent off the original message right before I hoped onto a plane and moved to Boston. If anyone can't remember what this thread was about, please see http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m2514.html. On Thu, Mar 01, 2001 at 03:14:03AM

Re: What's the status of this list?

1998-11-13 Thread Wei Dai
Welcome to the everything list. It has been quiet for several months. It only had a dozen or so subscribers when it was more active (from Jan to July of this year), but now it has about 30. (I don't know what happened, was the list invitation forwarded to some other forum?) You can retrieve or

Re: on formally describable universes and measures

2000-12-21 Thread Wei Dai
On Wed, Dec 20, 2000 at 04:32:47PM +0100, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: It's all in Section 6. Please read 6.1 to get the basic idea, read 6.2 to understand why Levin Search and FAST are optimal. FAST computes the n-th bit of each universe x as quickly as the fastest algorithm for x (save for a

Re: predictions

1999-08-04 Thread Wei Dai
On Tue, Aug 03, 1999 at 10:46:29PM -0400, Christopher Maloney wrote: I'd like to revive an old thread, that has been bothering me a lot lately. I hope you'll all agree that it's a fascinating puzzle. Wei Dai posed this way back, in February of last year: http://www.escribe.com/science

Re: all of me or one of me

1999-04-01 Thread Wei Dai
On Thu, Apr 01, 1999 at 06:36:31PM -0800, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Wouldn't the situation most relevant to the question of identity be one where the two people in the room are both copies of you? Where you can know that each would do exactly the same thing? The reason I didn't use a scenario

Re: on formally describable universes and measures

2000-12-27 Thread Wei Dai
On Wed, Dec 27, 2000 at 04:50:42PM +0100, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: None of the quantum effects we observe forces us to give up the simple idea that our universe can be simulated on a classic TM, just like there is no evidence that forces us to assume the existence of complex and incomputable

Re: practical reasoning and strong SSA

1999-06-02 Thread Wei Dai
On Tue, Jun 01, 1999 at 10:07:05PM -0700, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I don't follow where the dependence on SSSA comes from. This is the assumption that each observer-moment should be considered as a random selection from all observer-moments in the universe (broadly defined). Your example

why is death painful?

1999-06-07 Thread Wei Dai
Should one make decisions based on objective or subjective consequences of his actions? By objective, I mean one should consider how one's actions affect the external world, and by subjective I mean one should only consider one's future subjective experiences. This is very much related to the

all of me or one of me

1999-04-01 Thread Wei Dai
Given the MWI or one of the everything theories we've discussed, the universe must contain multiple observers who have exactly the same memories and experiences as you do. Should you identify with all of them, or should you think, I am one of these people, but I don't know which? I think the

no need for anthropic reasoning

2001-02-15 Thread Wei Dai
The selection of the proper reference class is a serious problem for anthropic reasoning. But perhaps anthropic reasoning is not necessary to take advantage of a theory of everything. Consider how an non-sentient being (excluded by most proposals for the reference class) can use a TOE. Imagine a

Re: David Deutsch on probability in the MWI

1999-06-07 Thread Wei Dai
http://xxx.lanl.gov/pdf/quant-ph/9906015 I just read this paper and it seems to have a pretty big problem. On page 5 it says: For convenience, let us consider games in which the measured value of X^ is numerically equal to the utility of the payoff, measured on some suitable utility scale.

Re: on formally describable universes and measures

2000-12-17 Thread Wei Dai
I just got around to reading Schmidhuber's new paper, and noticed there is something strange about the Speed Prior S. With all of the candidate priors we have seen so far, the probability of a random (incompressible) string of length n is about 2^-n. But with the Speed Prior S, the probability is

reference class of SSA

1999-05-23 Thread Wei Dai
On Tue, May 18, 1999 at 09:37:03AM -0700, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I think that Nick Bostrom, who (as far as I know) conceived of and named the SSA, was not thinking in terms of the Strong SSA. When he discusses my birth rank, he is implicitly assuming that I am the same observer today that

Re: A question about the list

1999-02-01 Thread Wei Dai
On Mon, Feb 01, 1999 at 01:43:41PM -0500, Jacques M Mallah wrote: What exactly does the digest version consist of? I would like a way to avoid getting most of the 'junk' as well. The digest version is not filtered. It just queues the email from the main list, concatenate them and then

X-Processed: unsubscribe harrisdev@everythingforever.com of everything-list-request@eskimo.com

1999-08-05 Thread Wei Dai
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1999-04-08 Thread Wei Dai
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Re: Marchal Thesis

1999-05-11 Thread Wei Dai
You can now post on both: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] On Tue, May 11, 1999 at 03:57:04AM -0700, Higgo James wrote: Can you subscribe me so I can contribute but not send me stuff? I get it through another address.

Re: Does provability matter?

2001-12-11 Thread Wei Dai
+0100, Juergen Schmidhuber wrote: Wei Dai wrote: I'm not sure I understand this. Can you give an example of how our universe might make use of an entire continuum of real numbers? How might someone show this if it were true? I have no idea. In fact, I guess it is impossible

Re: Consistency? Programs for G, G*, ...

2001-08-15 Thread Wei Dai
- Forwarded message from Jenny Higgo - Date: Wed, 15 Aug 2001 06:09:44 -0700 From: Jenny Higgo To: Hal Ruhl, [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Consistency? Programs for G, G*, ... X-Diagnostic: Not on the accept list James Higgo was killed in an air accident on 22nd July. He would be

Re: Does provability matter?

2001-11-14 Thread Wei Dai
Thanks for clarifying the provability issue. I think I understand and agree with you. On Tue, Nov 13, 2001 at 12:05:22PM +0100, Juergen Schmidhuber wrote: What about exploitation? Once you suspect you found the PRG you can use it to predict the future. Unfortunately the prediction will take

Marchal's CCQ paper

2001-11-21 Thread Wei Dai
Marchal, I'm trying to understand your paper. I hope you can help by answering some questions. 1. Please define computational extension. What is an extension? What is it an extension of? What does it mean for an extension to be consistent (consistent with what, in what way)? 2. In your posts

Re: Variations in measure

2001-12-19 Thread Wei Dai
On Wed, Dec 19, 2001 at 09:39:09AM -0800, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: This suggests that the simplicity explanation against flying-rabbit universes is not strong, because the total collection of flying-rabbit universes is close in measure to the simple universe to which they rerpesent

Re: Does provability matter?

2001-11-29 Thread Wei Dai
On Wed, Nov 28, 2001 at 05:27:43PM +0100, Juergen Schmidhuber wrote: Which one? Hm. Let me extend your question and ask: what's the probability that the Great Programmer is more than a mere programmer in the sense that he is not bound by the limits of computability? For instance, if someone

Re: Variations in measure

2001-12-15 Thread Wei Dai
On Sat, Dec 08, 2001 at 12:57:16PM -0800, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: For example, suppose he took a drug which made his mental processes become confused. He was no longer sure of basic facts about himself and the universe. This mental state would no longer be bound to one specific universe.

Re: Does provability matter?

2001-11-15 Thread Wei Dai
On Thu, Nov 15, 2001 at 10:35:58AM +0100, Juergen Schmidhuber wrote: Why do you prefer the Speed Prior? Under the Speed Prior, oracle universes are not just very unlikely, they have probability 0, right? Suppose one day we actually find an oracle for the halting problem, or even just find

Re: Immortality

2001-10-07 Thread Wei Dai
On Fri, Sep 28, 2001 at 03:15:45PM +, K. S. Ryan wrote: Old school religions are losing market share to the modern world. But the modern world does not offer a unified system of beleif describing our place in the universe. Contemporary truths are not packaged as a whole, as a spiritual

relevance of the real measure

2001-12-20 Thread Wei Dai
Suppose there are only two logically possible deterministic universes A and B, and you know that A has measure 0.9, and B has measure 0.1. Suppose that until time T the history of these two universes are identical. At time T an experiment will be done in both universes. In universe A the outcome

Re: to Russell Standish

2001-11-06 Thread Wei Dai
On Sat, Nov 03, 2001 at 03:26:02PM +1100, Russell Standish wrote: In a relatively trivial sense, observers must process information. Quite what this means is a little unclear - for example does it mean that all observers need to be capable of universal computation? Clearly many observers are

Re: relevance of the real measure

2001-12-21 Thread Wei Dai
On Fri, Dec 21, 2001 at 12:12:41AM -0800, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Measure is not supposed to be just an abstract number that is attached to a universe. It has meaning in terms of our own perceptions and experience in that universe. The all-universe theory includes both a model of universes

Re: The Simulation Argument

2001-12-10 Thread Wei Dai
On Sun, Dec 09, 2001 at 08:51:04PM -0500, Nick Bostrom wrote: Suppose we accept this view. The phrasing of the simulation-argument would then change to one where the simulation-hypothesis states that the vast majority of machines running your mind are virtual machines. I would then argue

Re: relevance of the real measure

2001-12-21 Thread Wei Dai
Here's my proposed alternative to our current standard model, which says all possible universes exist and some objectively true measure exists on the set of universes. Instead, let's just say that all possible universes exist, period. There is no objective measure. Instead, measure enters into

Re: Consistency? + Programs for G, G*, ...

2001-05-28 Thread Wei Dai
Please note there is a 40 KB size limit on messages. If you have something longer please put it up on a web site and post a link to it. I had to truncate the following post in order for it to go through. - Forwarded message from Marchal - Date: Mon, 28 May 2001 08:31:12 -0700 Subject:

Re: Consistency? + Programs for G, G*, ...

2001-06-03 Thread Wei Dai
I've changed the max submission size to 60 KB. - Forwarded message from George Levy - Date: Sat, 2 Jun 2001 22:24:23 -0700 From: George Levy To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Consistency? + Programs for G, G*, ... X-Diagnostic: Diverted unprocessed X-Diagnostic: Submission size

Re: another anthropic reasoning

2001-03-21 Thread Wei Dai
On Tue, Mar 20, 2001 at 11:56:33PM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote: OOPS! My mistake. So you always push button 1. I still don't see the paradox. The paradox is that if you always push button 1, you end up with $-18. If you always push button 2 instead, you end up with $0.

Re: another anthropic reasoning

2001-03-20 Thread Wei Dai
On Tue, Mar 20, 2001 at 08:10:10PM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote: I don't see any paradox. This is no different than: If you push button 1, you will lose $9. If you push button 2 you will win $10 one time out of 101 at random. The other 100 times out of 101 you will lose $10. If you push 1

Oracle by Greg Egan

2001-01-23 Thread Wei Dai
Greg Egan is one of my favorite authors. Several of his fictional works have dealt with the idea that all possible universes exist. His latest story Oracle is about Alan Turing in an alternate history of our universe. Here's an interesting quote: Now I know you're lying! he shouted triumphantly.

Re: another anthropic reasoning

2001-03-21 Thread Wei Dai
On Tue, Mar 20, 2001 at 06:14:58PM -0500, Jacques Mallah wrote: Effectively it is, since Bob has a Bayesian probability of affecting Alice and so on. He doesn't know whether he is Alice or Bob, but he does know that his payoff only depends on his own action. Bob has a Bayesian probability

Re: need for anthropic reasoning

2001-02-22 Thread Wei Dai
On Tue, Feb 20, 2001 at 04:52:10PM -0500, Jacques Mallah wrote: I disagree on two counts. First, I don't consider self-consistency to be the only requirement to call something a reasonable goal. To be honest, I consider a goal reasonable only if it is not too different from my own

Re: another anthropic reasoning

2001-03-28 Thread Wei Dai
On Fri, Mar 23, 2001 at 04:53:24PM -0500, Jacques Mallah wrote: You'll have to define what effectively decide means and how to apply that concept generally. (Have you introduced it before? I think this is the first time I've seen it.) I thought the meaning to be obvious in this

Re: another anthropic reasoning

2001-03-22 Thread Wei Dai
On Wed, Mar 21, 2001 at 09:39:10PM -0500, Jacques Mallah wrote: First, it's nice to see that you accept my resolution of the paradox. But I have a hard time believing that your point was, in fact, the above. You brought forth an attack on anthropic reasoning, calling it

Re: my current position (was: AUDA)

2002-01-11 Thread Wei Dai
On Fri, Jan 11, 2002 at 04:59:47PM -0800, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I'm having a lot of trouble understanding this view. Thanks for taking the time to write the questions. I hope this response helps. Why should you care more or less about slow to compute universes? I don't see any reason to

Re: my current position (was: AUDA)

2002-01-16 Thread Wei Dai
On Tue, Jan 15, 2002 at 08:24:13PM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote: I don't understand reason about your compassion. The point is that you have a feeling about a possible future you imagine and so you take action to avoid that future. What I mean is that future should be the causal future of the

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