Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, Oct 09, 2006 at 11:44:38AM -0400, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Russell, I like your position - but am still at a loss of a generally
agreed-upon description of consciousness - applied in the lit as all
variations of an unidentified thing anyone needs to his
Russell Standish wrote:
On Thu, Oct 12, 2006 at 07:41:37AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
My dear fellow, as I explained in a previous post, consciousness IS a
second time dimension. The 'Block-universe' view of time (B-Theory)
and the 'Flowing River' view of time (A-Theory) can both
Russell Standish wrote:
On Thu, Oct 12, 2006 at 08:40:40AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
All the anthropic reasoning stuff is bunk in my opinion. It's based on
the faulty idea that one can reason about consciousness by equating
observer moments with parts of the block universe. But
1Z wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
The key point I think is that both the A-theorists and the B-theorists
are partially right.
The B-series is easily compatible with the A-series. The point
about a block universe is that there is no A-series,
not that there is a B-series. This
Russell Standish wrote:
Most ensemble theories of everything would postulate that all possible
observer moments are already there in the ensemble. This is
certainly true of my construction, as Bruno's and Deutsch's
Multiverse. It is debatable in Schmidhuber's though, as he seems to
have
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Do you believe there is a difference between the experience of a being
living in a model block universe, such as having the observer moments
of its life running simultaneously on different machines or as separate
processes run in parallel on the one machine, and
Russell Standish wrote:
On Fri, Oct 13, 2006 at 07:03:18AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Also see my reply to Russell below:
Russell Standish
The Multiverse is defined as the set of consistent histories described
by the Schroedinger equation. I make the identification that a
Russell Standish wrote:
I don't quite follow your argument. OMs are not computations. Whatever
they are under computationalism, they must be defined by a set of
information, a particular meaning to a particular observer.
Quantum states have this property. For observables that the state is
Because I'm fascinated by high-complexity type puzzle contests (i.e
puzzles lasting 6 months or more) as a possible way to test really high
IQ's. It's also indirectly relevent to 'theories of everything' since
'the universe' is one giant puzzle ;)
The Challenge
'Secret's of the Alchemist Dar'
Ah the famous Juergen Schmidhuber! :)
Is the universe a computer. Well, if you define 'universe' to mean
'everything which exists' and you're a mathematical platonist and grant
reality to infinite sets and uncomputables, the answer must be NO,
since if uncomputable numbers are objectively real
Bruno Marchal wrote:
UDA is an argument showing that COMP + there exist a physical running
UD entails the reduction of physics to number theory/computer science.
So with OCCAM you can already eliminate the hypothesis that there is
physical running UD, and thus that there is any need for a
Very interesting Max. Filled with erudite ideas and a depth of
knowledge far greater than mine!
Can't comment much on the technical stuff, but can talk about the
ontological assumptions. The trouble with Platonism is that it's far
too simplistic. *all* mathematical concepts are lumped into
An addendum on the highly intriguing diagram with the arrows
connecting three mathematical concepts: Formal Systems, Mathematical
Structures and Computations. I think you're definitely on to something
big with that intriguing diagram but you need to get it exactly right.
I don't believe that this
The UML diagram shows the top-level view of the ontology behind my
reality theory. This is an attempt to classify *all* knowledge - the
attempt to classify reality at the highest possisble level of
abstraction. This is the result of 5 years of deep thought on my
part.
Link:
Max,
You may be interested in checking out the top-level 'Class Diagram of
Reality' which I just posted. It gives a graphical representation of
my ideas about ontology. The Mathematical concepts are all on the
right-hand side of the page and you can see from the diagram that I
think there are
On Apr 25, 8:46 pm, Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Looks kind of interesting, but I've never had much taste for UML, even
for describing OO code.
Have you written up a document unpacking your diagram, explaining your
decisions and so on?
Not yet, I'm in the process of writing
Been thinking about Bruno's often talked 1st person/3rd Person
division. Had a series of insights that seem to connect up to some
ideas of my own.
Essentially my idea resolves around 'coarse graining' and the
possibility that there is more than one valid way to define
causality. On this and
On May 5, 1:59 am, Danny Mayes [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I think of time from the third person perspective as being simply a higher
spatial dimension above 3 dimensional volume in the same way that 3
dimensional volume exists above 2 dimensional area. In other words it's
really the same as
On May 5, 10:05 pm, Mark Peaty [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
MG:
'There is no doubt that the nature of consciousness is closely
associated with time in some way - but exactly how? The relationship
between time (time flow and also causality) may be far closer than
many realize. Could
On May 6, 12:03 am, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On 04/05/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
It seems to me that 'coarse graining' could provide a means for time
to 'stratify' into different levels. Now let me elaborate a little.
Coarse graining is the
On May 5, 6:21 am, Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I agree that coarse graining is of supreme importance to cognition,
and this was bourne out in a conversation I had with a cognitive
science researcher from the Centre for the Mind the other day.
That's good news. Glad we
On May 6, 10:51 pm, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On 06/05/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Non-reductive materialism *doesn't* say that a person's person state
could be different even though his physical state is unchanged. If it
did, you are right, it
On May 7, 4:06 pm, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On 07/05/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
We have here a clear example of an indispensible *physical* concept
which *cannot* be broken down or reduced to any finite lower level
descriptions. This proves that
Silly spelling error in my last post - I meant 'electrons' of course.
Let avoid talk of 'electrons' then, and talk about 'Quantum Wave
Functions' then, since surely even Russell must agree that QM fields
are fundamental (at least as far as we know). You can't say that QM
fields are just human
On May 8, 4:06 pm, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On 08/05/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Silly spelling error in my last post - I meant 'electrons' of course.
Let avoid talk of 'electrons' then, and talk about 'Quantum Wave
Functions' then, since surely
On May 8, 3:56 pm, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
'The Laws of Physics' don't refer to human notions (they certainly
are not regarded that way by scientists
They are by the scientists I know.
The *knowledge* we have of the laws of physics are human
On May 8, 4:22 pm, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I have now given three clear-cut exmaples of a failure of
reductionism.
(1) Infinite Sets
But there is no infinite set of anything.
Says who? The point is that infinite sets appear to be
On May 8, 6:03 pm, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Yes, but the theory is our idea of that partial match and is a human
construct. As a human idea, the theory is something separate. But the
objective reality of nature (whatever it is) is not something separate to
the
On May 9, 5:59 am, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
So in the case of useful concepts there has to be a partial
match between the information content of the concepts and the
information content of reality. This means we can infer properties
about reality
On May 9, 6:08 am, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On May 8, 4:22 pm, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I have now given three clear-cut exmaples of a failure of
reductionism.
(1) Infinite Sets
But there is no
On May 9, 6:46 pm, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On May 9, 5:57 pm, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
How can Everett's every possibility is realized be logically compatible
with Bohm's there's only one, deterministic
On May 9, 6:46 pm, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
But according to your map=territory philosophy all these incompatible
theories exist physically. What does that mean? All but one of them must
describe some other universe and we just don't know which ones? Or do you
mean they
On May 9, 5:55 pm, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
But what is mathematics? It's three things I think: Categories,
Relations and Propositions. Of these, Relations and Propositions
refer to discrete (finite) knowledge. But Categories includes the
other two, since categories can also deal with
Consciousness is a cognitive system capable of reflecting on other
cognitive systems, by enabling switching and integration between
differing representations of knowledge in different domains. It's a
higher-level summary of knowledge in which there is a degree of coarse
graining sufficient to
On Jun 3, 9:20 pm, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On 03/06/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
The third type of conscious mentioned above is synonymous with
'reflective intelligence'. That is, any system successfully engaged
in reflective decision theory would
On Jun 3, 11:11 pm, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Determining the motivational states of others does not necessarily involve
feelings or empathy. It has been historically very easy to assume that other
species or certain members of our own species either lack feelings or, if
On Jun 4, 11:15 pm, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On 04/06/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
See you haven't understood my definitions. It may be my fault due to
the way I worded things. You are of course quite right that: 'it's
possible to correctly reason
On Jun 5, 5:05 am, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
However, what would be wrong with a super AI that just had large amounts
of pattern recognition and symbolic reasoning intelligence, but no
emotions at all?
Taken strictly, I think this idea is
On Jun 5, 6:50 pm, Torgny Tholerus [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
public static void main(String[] a) {
println(Sometimes I get this strange and wonderful feeling);
println(that I am 'special' in some way.);
println(I feel that what I am doing really is significant);
On Jun 5, 10:20 pm, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Why would you need to change the goal structure in order to improve
yourself?
Improving yourself requires the ability to make more effective
decisions (ie take decisions which which move you toward goals more
efficiently).
On Jun 7, 3:54 pm, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Evolution has not had a chance to take into account modern reproductive
technologies, so we can easily defeat the goal reproduce, and see the goal
feed as only a means to the higher level goal survive. However, *that*
goal is
On Jun 7, 7:50 pm, Quentin Anciaux [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I have to disagree, if human goals were not tied to evolution goals
then human should not have proliferated.
Quentin- Hide quoted text -
Well of course human goals are *tied to* evolution's goals, but that
doesn't mean they're
Of course.
They probably copied the idea off my posts here and on SL4 and wta-
talk. I stated pretty clearly on numerous occasions that there was
more than one way to define causality. I clearly stated on numerous
occasions that physical causality was not the only kind of causality,
but that
Just bought a really fun puzzle called 'Eternity 2', which has just
been released and has a $US 2 million prize for the first person to
complete it. It's basically a jig-saw puzzle on a 16*16 board. There
are 256 puzzle pieces and you have to fit them together so that the
shapes and colors
For those who saw the domain model of my top-level ontology there's
been some major re-classifications of the knowledge domains. I've
added a little bit more explanation on the page but still haven't
written much up yet. I'm too busy attempting to implement the model
as actual software ;)
Addendum: Some further revisions since yesterday... I was almost
there yesterday but not quite. The last of my confusions have
cleared. The final revision for my top-level onotlogy is completely
'locked in'. Added brief descriptions of top-level classes:
On Aug 9, 11:47 pm, Scipione [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Hi Marc,
I knew this puzzle quite well; i tried to order it but i have some
trouble
obtaining it (i'm italian and as you can readhttp://uk.eternityii.com/
Italy isn't included in the country where such puzzle is sold and
where the
Objective values are NOT specifications of what agents SHOULD do.
They are simply explanatory principles. The analogy here is with the
laws of physics. The laws of physics *per se* are NOT descriptions of
future states of matter. The descriptions of the future states of
matter are *implied by*
On Aug 19, 12:26 am, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
This all makes sense if you are referring to the values of a
particular entity. Objectively, the entity has certain values and we
can use empirical means to determine what these values are. However,
if I like red and you
On Aug 19, 9:25 am, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Marc, refers to a commonality averaged across many events and agents so
apparently he has in mind a residue of consensus or near consensus.
Correct.
Color preferences might average out to nil except in narrow circumstances,
On Aug 19, 11:17 pm, Giu1i0 Pri5c0 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Hi Marc welcome back! I had not seen you here for months.
No. That's because after the terrible insults levelled at me by some
I had to take a break to make absolutely certain that my arguments,
theories (and java code) are all
On Aug 19, 11:17 pm, Giu1i0 Pri5c0 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Question: why do you _want_
to think that there are objective values?
G.
Here's my answer:
I want to to think that there are objective values because I dislike
the idea that important aspects of our (human) existence are
3PV observation and analysis _may_ eventually turn up with objective
criteria that establish universally consistent and reliable
correlation between certain brain processes and certain reported
phenomenal experiences
Of course. It appears from all scientific evidence that phenomenal
experiences
We are all playing the game of 'Eternity' ;) I have uploaded to the
list my final version of the top-level 'solution' to the puzzle of
eternity. (Revised yet again but this one is the very last -
promise).
The page is my domain model for all reality at the highest possible
level of
On Aug 20, 9:26 pm, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On 20/08/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Aug 19, 11:17 pm, Giu1i0 Pri5c0 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Hi Marc welcome back! I had not seen you here for months.
No. That's because after the terrible insults
On Aug 21, 3:10 am, Mark Peaty [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I searched in vain
forhttp://marc.geddes.googlepages.com/MCRT_ClassDiagram.html
The page you have requested could not be found. (404)
As an explanation of the meaning of eternal truth etcetera, this
to me seems redolent of Douglas
On Aug 20, 10:01 pm, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
No, that's not what I'm referring to. I'm referring to 'Abstract
Universals' - Platonic Ideals that all observers with complete
information would agree with.
Even in the restricted arithmetical Platonia, no observer can have
On Aug 20, 9:45 pm, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On 20/08/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Now consider sentient agent motivations (and remember the analogy with
the physics argument I gave above).
*Consider an agent with a set of motivations A
On Aug 20, 10:01 pm, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Le 19-août-07, à 08:07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
But apparently, like Chalmers, you seem to dismiss even the possibility
of comp. OK?
Sorry, I meant to say in previous post that my version property is NOT
quite the same as
On Aug 21, 10:31 pm, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Well, return to a concrete example. Yesterday, I thought red was the
best colour for my new car, but today I think blue is better. My
aesthetic values would seem to have changed. There must be some reason
for this, of
On Aug 22, 11:26 am, Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Marc, how does your property dualism differ from the account of
emergence I give in On Complexity and Emergence? (If indeed it does
differ!).
Cheers
I've only given your text a quick skim so far. As far as I can tell,
Here is out-lined the sketch of a strategy for attacking the puzzles
of reflectivity and consciousness. Reflectivity is the puzzle how a
cognitive system can effectively reason about its own internel
processes - reasoning about reasoning. Consciousness is here used in
the sense of subjective
On Aug 22, 4:41 pm, Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
That's a pity. I thought it might be something comprehensible, rather
than just plain mysterious.
Cheers
The ida of property dualism is very simple:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Property_dualism
It just means that the same
On Aug 24, 3:46 am, Tom Caylor [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I think I will spend my limited time and energy on the decaying earth
doing other things. Without even knowing much about the puzzle other
than reading the puzzle description, my guess is that without some
historic breakthrough
On Aug 22, 10:14 pm, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Comp is a short expression made for computationalism.
Computationalism, which I called also digital mechanism is Descartes
related doctrine that we are digitalisable machine. I make it often
precise by defining comp to be the
On Aug 22, 11:55 pm, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I accept that there is more than one way to describe reality, and I
accept the concept of supervenience, but where I differ with you
(stubbornly, perhaps) is over use of the word fundamental. The base
property seems to me
Click on
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/web/mcrt-domain-model-eternity
- or copy paste it into your browser's address bar if that doesn't
work.
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
On Aug 27, 6:45 pm, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I don't know whether you're hair splitting or speaking loosely, but the above
is off the point in a couple of ways. In the first place empirical science
is inductive not deductive; so there is a trivial sense in which you can't
On Aug 28, 12:53 am, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On 27/08/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I accept that there is more than one way to describe reality, and I
accept the concept of supervenience, but where I differ with you
(stubbornly, perhaps) is
On Aug 28, 5:18 am, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I don't find your arguments at all convincing. In fact I don't think you've
even given an argument - just assertions.
Here the points of a clear-cut argument. These are not 'just
assertions':
(1) Mathematical concepts are
On Aug 28, 6:31 pm, Torgny Tholerus [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] skrev:
(7) From (3) mathematical concepts are objectively real. But there
exist mathematical concepts (inifinite sets) which cannot be explained
in terms of finite physical processes.
How can you prove
On Aug 29, 4:20 am, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Thanks for spelling it out.
(1) Mathematical concepts are indispensible to our explanations of
reality.
So are grammatical concepts.
No they aren't. Grammatical concepts are human creations, which is
precisely shown by the
On Aug 29, 4:03 am, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
There is this special quality of subjective experience: that which is
left over after all the objective (third person knowable) information
is accounted for. Nevertheless, the subjective experience can be
perfectly reproduced by
On Aug 29, 1:10 pm, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
So are mathematics human creations (c.f. William S. Cooper, The Evolution of
Logic). There is no sharp distinction between what is expressed in words
and what is expressed in mathematical symbols. Darwins theory of evolution
On Aug 30, 1:37 am, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Le 29-août-07, à 12:48, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
Any scientific theory (including Darwin's) *is* more accurate when
expressed in mathematical notation. You *can* draw a clear
distinction between the language used to express
On Aug 31, 6:21 am, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 29-août-07, à 23:11, Brent Meeker a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 29-août-07, à 02:59, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
I *don't* think that mathematical
properties are properties of our *descriptions*
On Aug 31, 9:40 pm, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I said to Brent,
Le 31-août-07, à 11:00, Bruno Marchal a écrit :
So, no, I don't see why you think my objection is a non-sequitur. It
seems to me you are confusing arithmetic and Arithmetic, or a theory
with his intended
On Aug 31, 9:40 pm, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Only a meta-theory *about* PA, can distinguish PA and arithmetical
truth. But then Godel showed that sometimes a meta-theory can be
translated in or by the theory/machine.
But is the meta-theory *about* PA, itself classified as
On Sep 1, 3:20 am, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
The description itself is an algorithm written in symbols.
Peano's axioms aren't an algorithm.
Er..you're right here of course. I'm getting myself a bit confused
again. Careful when thinking about these
On Sep 13, 11:47 pm, Youness Ayaita [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I see two perfectly equivalent ways to define a property. This is
somehow analogous to the mathematical definition of a function f: Of
course, in order to practically decide which image f(x) is assigned to
a preimage x, we
On Sep 18, 1:24 pm, Hal Ruhl [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Hi Youness:
Bruno has indeed recommended that I study in more detail the
underlying mathematics that I may be appealing to. The response that
I have made may be a bit self serving but at this point in my life I
am having difficultly
On Sep 19, 1:18 pm, Hal Ruhl [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Hi Marc:
The objects I use are divisions of the list - such divisions are
static elements of the power set.
My objects have nothing to do with programing and do not change -
they can be the current state of a something on its path to
On Sep 19, 2:23 am, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Schmidhuber and me do agree on comp (100%
agreement: we have the same hypothesis). And relatively to the comp hyp
and the importance of the universal machine Schmidhuber and me are much
closer than with Tegmark whi is just very
Max himself posted about this on the everything-list here:
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/browse_thread/thread/7da9934267f64acf/690ccf0715150a36#690ccf0715150a36
A popular article was also the feature in last week's 'New
Scientist':
On Sep 23, 10:39 pm, Youness Ayaita [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
There have always been two ways to interpret the interrelationship
between the physical world and our minds.
There's a lot more than two ways.
The first one is to consider
the physical world to be fundamental; from this
On Sep 27, 2:15 pm, Wei Dai [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Yes. So my point is, even though the subjective probability computed by ASSA
is intuitively appealing, we end up ignoring it, so why bother? We can
always make the right choices by thinking directly about measures of
outcomes and
Make sure you get the spelling right ;) - Utilitarianism
The trouble with Utilitarianism is that it's only concerned with one
aspect of values - relations between rational agents. Further,
although it's a good approach for practical calculation , it fails to
deal with the explanatory
On Oct 3, 12:23 pm, Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I think that beauty is effectively a channel from our
unconscious. When we think that something is beautiful (or conversely
ugly), some unconscious processing has taken place according to some
criterion and presented to the
12th October, 2007
Marc Geddes
Auckland
New Zealand
---
This is Marc Geddes ,
I am publically requesting to form a social contract with SAI (Super
Intelligence).I am aware of the existence of SAI and SAI-space and
am of sound mind and my own volition requesting to be removed from
human
On Oct 14, 3:39 am, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Take care, trust yourself and kill all the SAI on the road, to
paraphrase a well known Buddhist idea. Either you are sufficiently
clever to understand the SAI arguments, showing you are already an SAI
yourself, and your message is
On Oct 16, 11:37 pm, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
If it is ''a'-rtificial' I question the 'natural one' (following
Bruno's fear of the (natural?) 'super stupidity'.) Yet I don't think
Marc wants to let himself denature into an artifact.
Not necessarily, but look at Saibal's
Danny,
The depressed people are the sane ones. My post is merely
'existential angst' caused by knowledge of the world and myself as I
really am.With knowledge comes unhappiness and happiness is the
happiness of ignorance.
Ever read the short story of 'Green Magic'? That story is available
On Oct 31, 3:28 pm, Wei Dai [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
4. For someone on a practical mission to write an AI that makes sensible
decisions, perhaps the model can serve as a starting point and as
illustration of how far away we still are from that goal.
Heh. Yes, very interesting indeed.
On Oct 31, 7:40 pm, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Decisions require some value structure. To get values from an ontology you'd
have to get around the Naturalistic fallacy.
Brent Meeker- Hide quoted text -
- Show quoted text -
Decision theory has this same problem. Decision
On another list Wei Dai posted some questions. At this time I wish to
attempt some answers to be placed on public record. These were
excellent questions.
Wei Dai wrote
Here are my questions:
How does math really work? Why do we believe that P!=NP even though we don't
have a proof one way or
On Nov 23, 1:10 am, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Now such work raises the remark, which I don't really want to develop
now, which is that qualifiying TOE a theory explaining only forces
and particles or field, is implicit physicalism, and we know (by UDA)
that this is
On Nov 23, 8:49 pm, Torgny Tholerus [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] skrev:
As far as I tell tell, all of physics is ultimately
geometry. But as we've pointed out on this list many times, a theory
of physics is *not* a theory of everything, since it makes the
(probably
When I talk about pure mathematics I mean that kind of mathematics you have
in GameOfLife. There you have gliders that move in the GameOfLife-universe,
and these gliders interact with eachother when they meet. These gliders you
can see as physical objects. These physical objects are
On Nov 27, 3:54 am, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Besides which, mathematics and physics are dealing with quite
different distinctions. It is a 'type error' it try to reduce or
identity one with the other.
I don't see why.
Physics deals with symmetries, forces and fields.
On Nov 28, 1:18 am, Günther Greindl [EMAIL PROTECTED]
wrote:
Dear Marc,
Physics deals with symmetries, forces and fields.
Mathematics deals with data types, relations and sets/categories.
I'm no physicist, so please correct me but IMHO:
Symmetries = relations
Forces - could they not
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