Re: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-12 Thread marc . geddes
Russell Standish wrote: On Mon, Oct 09, 2006 at 11:44:38AM -0400, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Russell, I like your position - but am still at a loss of a generally agreed-upon description of consciousness - applied in the lit as all variations of an unidentified thing anyone needs to his

Re: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-12 Thread marc . geddes
Russell Standish wrote: On Thu, Oct 12, 2006 at 07:41:37AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: My dear fellow, as I explained in a previous post, consciousness IS a second time dimension. The 'Block-universe' view of time (B-Theory) and the 'Flowing River' view of time (A-Theory) can both

Re: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-12 Thread marc . geddes
Russell Standish wrote: On Thu, Oct 12, 2006 at 08:40:40AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: All the anthropic reasoning stuff is bunk in my opinion. It's based on the faulty idea that one can reason about consciousness by equating observer moments with parts of the block universe. But

Re: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-12 Thread marc . geddes
1Z wrote: [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: The key point I think is that both the A-theorists and the B-theorists are partially right. The B-series is easily compatible with the A-series. The point about a block universe is that there is no A-series, not that there is a B-series. This

Re: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-13 Thread marc . geddes
Russell Standish wrote: Most ensemble theories of everything would postulate that all possible observer moments are already there in the ensemble. This is certainly true of my construction, as Bruno's and Deutsch's Multiverse. It is debatable in Schmidhuber's though, as he seems to have

Re: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-13 Thread marc . geddes
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Do you believe there is a difference between the experience of a being living in a model block universe, such as having the observer moments of its life running simultaneously on different machines or as separate processes run in parallel on the one machine, and

Re: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-14 Thread marc . geddes
Russell Standish wrote: On Fri, Oct 13, 2006 at 07:03:18AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Also see my reply to Russell below: Russell Standish The Multiverse is defined as the set of consistent histories described by the Schroedinger equation. I make the identification that a

Re: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-14 Thread marc . geddes
Russell Standish wrote: I don't quite follow your argument. OMs are not computations. Whatever they are under computationalism, they must be defined by a set of information, a particular meaning to a particular observer. Quantum states have this property. For observables that the state is

*Off topic* Puzzle challenge for $US 2 million

2006-10-14 Thread marc . geddes
Because I'm fascinated by high-complexity type puzzle contests (i.e puzzles lasting 6 months or more) as a possible way to test really high IQ's. It's also indirectly relevent to 'theories of everything' since 'the universe' is one giant puzzle ;) The Challenge 'Secret's of the Alchemist Dar'

Re: Zuse Symposium: Is the universe a computer? Berlin Nov 6-7

2006-11-02 Thread marc . geddes
Ah the famous Juergen Schmidhuber! :) Is the universe a computer. Well, if you define 'universe' to mean 'everything which exists' and you're a mathematical platonist and grant reality to infinite sets and uncomputables, the answer must be NO, since if uncomputable numbers are objectively real

Re: ROADMAP 1 (main acronyms)

2006-11-02 Thread marc . geddes
Bruno Marchal wrote: UDA is an argument showing that COMP + there exist a physical running UD entails the reduction of physics to number theory/computer science. So with OCCAM you can already eliminate the hypothesis that there is physical running UD, and thus that there is any need for a

Re: A sequel to my 1996 ultimate ensemble theory paper

2007-04-21 Thread marc . geddes
Very interesting Max. Filled with erudite ideas and a depth of knowledge far greater than mine! Can't comment much on the technical stuff, but can talk about the ontological assumptions. The trouble with Platonism is that it's far too simplistic. *all* mathematical concepts are lumped into

Re: A sequel to my 1996 ultimate ensemble theory paper

2007-04-22 Thread marc . geddes
An addendum on the highly intriguing diagram with the arrows connecting three mathematical concepts: Formal Systems, Mathematical Structures and Computations. I think you're definitely on to something big with that intriguing diagram but you need to get it exactly right. I don't believe that this

Top-Level Class-Diagram of Reality

2007-04-25 Thread marc . geddes
The UML diagram shows the top-level view of the ontology behind my reality theory. This is an attempt to classify *all* knowledge - the attempt to classify reality at the highest possisble level of abstraction. This is the result of 5 years of deep thought on my part. Link:

Re: A sequel to my 1996 ultimate ensemble theory paper

2007-04-25 Thread marc . geddes
Max, You may be interested in checking out the top-level 'Class Diagram of Reality' which I just posted. It gives a graphical representation of my ideas about ontology. The Mathematical concepts are all on the right-hand side of the page and you can see from the diagram that I think there are

Re: Top-Level Class-Diagram of Reality

2007-04-25 Thread marc . geddes
On Apr 25, 8:46 pm, Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Looks kind of interesting, but I've never had much taste for UML, even for describing OO code. Have you written up a document unpacking your diagram, explaining your decisions and so on? Not yet, I'm in the process of writing

An idea to resolve the 1st Person/3rd person division mystery - Coarse graining is the answer!?

2007-05-03 Thread marc . geddes
Been thinking about Bruno's often talked 1st person/3rd Person division. Had a series of insights that seem to connect up to some ideas of my own. Essentially my idea resolves around 'coarse graining' and the possibility that there is more than one valid way to define causality. On this and

Re: An idea to resolve the 1st Person/3rd person division mystery - Coarse graining is the answer!?

2007-05-04 Thread marc . geddes
On May 5, 1:59 am, Danny Mayes [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I think of time from the third person perspective as being simply a higher spatial dimension above 3 dimensional volume in the same way that 3 dimensional volume exists above 2 dimensional area. In other words it's really the same as

Re: An idea to resolve the 1st Person/3rd person division mystery - Coarse graining is the answer!?

2007-05-05 Thread marc . geddes
On May 5, 10:05 pm, Mark Peaty [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: MG: 'There is no doubt that the nature of consciousness is closely associated with time in some way - but exactly how? The relationship between time (time flow and also causality) may be far closer than many realize. Could

Re: An idea to resolve the 1st Person/3rd person division mystery - Coarse graining is the answer!?

2007-05-06 Thread marc . geddes
On May 6, 12:03 am, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On 04/05/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: It seems to me that 'coarse graining' could provide a means for time to 'stratify' into different levels. Now let me elaborate a little. Coarse graining is the

Re: An idea to resolve the 1st Person/3rd person division mystery - Coarse graining is the answer!?

2007-05-06 Thread marc . geddes
On May 5, 6:21 am, Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I agree that coarse graining is of supreme importance to cognition, and this was bourne out in a conversation I had with a cognitive science researcher from the Centre for the Mind the other day. That's good news. Glad we

Re: An idea to resolve the 1st Person/3rd person division mystery - Coarse graining is the answer!?

2007-05-06 Thread marc . geddes
On May 6, 10:51 pm, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On 06/05/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Non-reductive materialism *doesn't* say that a person's person state could be different even though his physical state is unchanged. If it did, you are right, it

Re: An idea to resolve the 1st Person/3rd person division mystery - Coarse graining is the answer!?

2007-05-07 Thread marc . geddes
On May 7, 4:06 pm, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On 07/05/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: We have here a clear example of an indispensible *physical* concept which *cannot* be broken down or reduced to any finite lower level descriptions. This proves that

Re: An idea to resolve the 1st Person/3rd person division mystery - Coarse graining is the answer!?

2007-05-07 Thread marc . geddes
Silly spelling error in my last post - I meant 'electrons' of course. Let avoid talk of 'electrons' then, and talk about 'Quantum Wave Functions' then, since surely even Russell must agree that QM fields are fundamental (at least as far as we know). You can't say that QM fields are just human

Re: An idea to resolve the 1st Person/3rd person division mystery - Coarse graining is the answer!?

2007-05-07 Thread marc . geddes
On May 8, 4:06 pm, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On 08/05/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Silly spelling error in my last post - I meant 'electrons' of course. Let avoid talk of 'electrons' then, and talk about 'Quantum Wave Functions' then, since surely

Re: An idea to resolve the 1st Person/3rd person division mystery - Coarse graining is the answer!?

2007-05-07 Thread marc . geddes
On May 8, 3:56 pm, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: 'The Laws of Physics' don't refer to human notions (they certainly are not regarded that way by scientists They are by the scientists I know. The *knowledge* we have of the laws of physics are human

Re: An idea to resolve the 1st Person/3rd person division mystery - Coarse graining is the answer!?

2007-05-08 Thread marc . geddes
On May 8, 4:22 pm, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I have now given three clear-cut exmaples of a failure of reductionism. (1) Infinite Sets But there is no infinite set of anything. Says who? The point is that infinite sets appear to be

Re: An idea to resolve the 1st Person/3rd person division mystery - Coarse graining is the answer!?

2007-05-08 Thread marc . geddes
On May 8, 6:03 pm, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Yes, but the theory is our idea of that partial match and is a human construct. As a human idea, the theory is something separate. But the objective reality of nature (whatever it is) is not something separate to the

Re: An idea to resolve the 1st Person/3rd person division mystery - Coarse graining is the answer!?

2007-05-08 Thread marc . geddes
On May 9, 5:59 am, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: So in the case of useful concepts there has to be a partial match between the information content of the concepts and the information content of reality. This means we can infer properties about reality

Re: An idea to resolve the 1st Person/3rd person division mystery - Coarse graining is the answer!?

2007-05-08 Thread marc . geddes
On May 9, 6:08 am, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On May 8, 4:22 pm, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I have now given three clear-cut exmaples of a failure of reductionism. (1) Infinite Sets But there is no

Re: An idea to resolve the 1st Person/3rd person division mystery - Coarse graining is the answer!?

2007-05-09 Thread marc . geddes
On May 9, 6:46 pm, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On May 9, 5:57 pm, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: How can Everett's every possibility is realized be logically compatible with Bohm's there's only one, deterministic

Re: An idea to resolve the 1st Person/3rd person division mystery - Coarse graining is the answer!?

2007-05-09 Thread marc . geddes
On May 9, 6:46 pm, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: But according to your map=territory philosophy all these incompatible theories exist physically. What does that mean? All but one of them must describe some other universe and we just don't know which ones? Or do you mean they

Re: An idea to resolve the 1st Person/3rd person division mystery - Coarse graining is the answer!?

2007-05-09 Thread marc . geddes
On May 9, 5:55 pm, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: But what is mathematics? It's three things I think: Categories, Relations and Propositions. Of these, Relations and Propositions refer to discrete (finite) knowledge. But Categories includes the other two, since categories can also deal with

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-03 Thread marc . geddes
Consciousness is a cognitive system capable of reflecting on other cognitive systems, by enabling switching and integration between differing representations of knowledge in different domains. It's a higher-level summary of knowledge in which there is a degree of coarse graining sufficient to

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-03 Thread marc . geddes
On Jun 3, 9:20 pm, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On 03/06/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: The third type of conscious mentioned above is synonymous with 'reflective intelligence'. That is, any system successfully engaged in reflective decision theory would

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-04 Thread marc . geddes
On Jun 3, 11:11 pm, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Determining the motivational states of others does not necessarily involve feelings or empathy. It has been historically very easy to assume that other species or certain members of our own species either lack feelings or, if

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-04 Thread marc . geddes
On Jun 4, 11:15 pm, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On 04/06/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: See you haven't understood my definitions. It may be my fault due to the way I worded things. You are of course quite right that: 'it's possible to correctly reason

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-04 Thread marc . geddes
On Jun 5, 5:05 am, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: However, what would be wrong with a super AI that just had large amounts of pattern recognition and symbolic reasoning intelligence, but no emotions at all? Taken strictly, I think this idea is

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-05 Thread marc . geddes
On Jun 5, 6:50 pm, Torgny Tholerus [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: public static void main(String[] a) { println(Sometimes I get this strange and wonderful feeling); println(that I am 'special' in some way.); println(I feel that what I am doing really is significant);

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-05 Thread marc . geddes
On Jun 5, 10:20 pm, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Why would you need to change the goal structure in order to improve yourself? Improving yourself requires the ability to make more effective decisions (ie take decisions which which move you toward goals more efficiently).

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-07 Thread marc . geddes
On Jun 7, 3:54 pm, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Evolution has not had a chance to take into account modern reproductive technologies, so we can easily defeat the goal reproduce, and see the goal feed as only a means to the higher level goal survive. However, *that* goal is

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-07 Thread marc . geddes
On Jun 7, 7:50 pm, Quentin Anciaux [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I have to disagree, if human goals were not tied to evolution goals then human should not have proliferated. Quentin- Hide quoted text - Well of course human goals are *tied to* evolution's goals, but that doesn't mean they're

Re: A Natural Axiomatization of Church's Thesis

2007-07-17 Thread marc . geddes
Of course. They probably copied the idea off my posts here and on SL4 and wta- talk. I stated pretty clearly on numerous occasions that there was more than one way to define causality. I clearly stated on numerous occasions that physical causality was not the only kind of causality, but that

$US 2 million math puzzle challenge

2007-08-02 Thread marc . geddes
Just bought a really fun puzzle called 'Eternity 2', which has just been released and has a $US 2 million prize for the first person to complete it. It's basically a jig-saw puzzle on a 16*16 board. There are 256 puzzle pieces and you have to fit them together so that the shapes and colors

Major revision to my Top-Level Ontology

2007-08-03 Thread marc . geddes
For those who saw the domain model of my top-level ontology there's been some major re-classifications of the knowledge domains. I've added a little bit more explanation on the page but still haven't written much up yet. I'm too busy attempting to implement the model as actual software ;)

Re: Major revision to my Top-Level Ontology

2007-08-06 Thread marc . geddes
Addendum: Some further revisions since yesterday... I was almost there yesterday but not quite. The last of my confusions have cleared. The final revision for my top-level onotlogy is completely 'locked in'. Added brief descriptions of top-level classes:

Re: $US 2 million math puzzle challenge

2007-08-10 Thread marc . geddes
On Aug 9, 11:47 pm, Scipione [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Hi Marc, I knew this puzzle quite well; i tried to order it but i have some trouble obtaining it (i'm italian and as you can readhttp://uk.eternityii.com/ Italy isn't included in the country where such puzzle is sold and where the

Why Objective Values Exist

2007-08-18 Thread marc . geddes
Objective values are NOT specifications of what agents SHOULD do. They are simply explanatory principles. The analogy here is with the laws of physics. The laws of physics *per se* are NOT descriptions of future states of matter. The descriptions of the future states of matter are *implied by*

Re: Why Objective Values Exist

2007-08-19 Thread marc . geddes
On Aug 19, 12:26 am, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: This all makes sense if you are referring to the values of a particular entity. Objectively, the entity has certain values and we can use empirical means to determine what these values are. However, if I like red and you

Re: Why Objective Values Exist

2007-08-19 Thread marc . geddes
On Aug 19, 9:25 am, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Marc, refers to a commonality averaged across many events and agents so apparently he has in mind a residue of consensus or near consensus. Correct. Color preferences might average out to nil except in narrow circumstances,

Re: Why Objective Values Exist

2007-08-19 Thread marc . geddes
On Aug 19, 11:17 pm, Giu1i0 Pri5c0 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Hi Marc welcome back! I had not seen you here for months. No. That's because after the terrible insults levelled at me by some I had to take a break to make absolutely certain that my arguments, theories (and java code) are all

Re: Why Objective Values Exist

2007-08-19 Thread marc . geddes
On Aug 19, 11:17 pm, Giu1i0 Pri5c0 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Question: why do you _want_ to think that there are objective values? G. Here's my answer: I want to to think that there are objective values because I dislike the idea that important aspects of our (human) existence are

Re: Why Objective Values Exist

2007-08-19 Thread marc . geddes
3PV observation and analysis _may_ eventually turn up with objective criteria that establish universally consistent and reliable correlation between certain brain processes and certain reported phenomenal experiences Of course. It appears from all scientific evidence that phenomenal experiences

Here's to Eternity

2007-08-20 Thread marc . geddes
We are all playing the game of 'Eternity' ;) I have uploaded to the list my final version of the top-level 'solution' to the puzzle of eternity. (Revised yet again but this one is the very last - promise). The page is my domain model for all reality at the highest possible level of

Re: Why Objective Values Exist

2007-08-20 Thread marc . geddes
On Aug 20, 9:26 pm, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On 20/08/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Aug 19, 11:17 pm, Giu1i0 Pri5c0 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Hi Marc welcome back! I had not seen you here for months. No. That's because after the terrible insults

Re: Major revision to my Top-Level Ontology

2007-08-20 Thread marc . geddes
On Aug 21, 3:10 am, Mark Peaty [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I searched in vain forhttp://marc.geddes.googlepages.com/MCRT_ClassDiagram.html The page you have requested could not be found. (404) As an explanation of the meaning of eternal truth etcetera, this to me seems redolent of Douglas

Re: Why Objective Values Exist

2007-08-20 Thread marc . geddes
On Aug 20, 10:01 pm, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: No, that's not what I'm referring to. I'm referring to 'Abstract Universals' - Platonic Ideals that all observers with complete information would agree with. Even in the restricted arithmetical Platonia, no observer can have

Re: Why Objective Values Exist

2007-08-20 Thread marc . geddes
On Aug 20, 9:45 pm, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On 20/08/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Now consider sentient agent motivations (and remember the analogy with the physics argument I gave above). *Consider an agent with a set of motivations A

Re: Why Objective Values Exist

2007-08-20 Thread marc . geddes
On Aug 20, 10:01 pm, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Le 19-août-07, à 08:07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : But apparently, like Chalmers, you seem to dismiss even the possibility of comp. OK? Sorry, I meant to say in previous post that my version property is NOT quite the same as

Re: Why Objective Values Exist

2007-08-21 Thread marc . geddes
On Aug 21, 10:31 pm, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Well, return to a concrete example. Yesterday, I thought red was the best colour for my new car, but today I think blue is better. My aesthetic values would seem to have changed. There must be some reason for this, of

Re: Why Objective Values Exist

2007-08-21 Thread marc . geddes
On Aug 22, 11:26 am, Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Marc, how does your property dualism differ from the account of emergence I give in On Complexity and Emergence? (If indeed it does differ!). Cheers I've only given your text a quick skim so far. As far as I can tell,

Reflectivity solved. Consciousness Explained.

2007-08-21 Thread marc . geddes
Here is out-lined the sketch of a strategy for attacking the puzzles of reflectivity and consciousness. Reflectivity is the puzzle how a cognitive system can effectively reason about its own internel processes - reasoning about reasoning. Consciousness is here used in the sense of subjective

Re: Why Objective Values Exist

2007-08-21 Thread marc . geddes
On Aug 22, 4:41 pm, Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: That's a pity. I thought it might be something comprehensible, rather than just plain mysterious. Cheers The ida of property dualism is very simple: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Property_dualism It just means that the same

Re: $US 2 million math puzzle challenge

2007-08-23 Thread marc . geddes
On Aug 24, 3:46 am, Tom Caylor [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I think I will spend my limited time and energy on the decaying earth doing other things. Without even knowing much about the puzzle other than reading the puzzle description, my guess is that without some historic breakthrough

Re: Why Objective Values Exist

2007-08-26 Thread marc . geddes
On Aug 22, 10:14 pm, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Comp is a short expression made for computationalism. Computationalism, which I called also digital mechanism is Descartes related doctrine that we are digitalisable machine. I make it often precise by defining comp to be the

Re: Why Objective Values Exist

2007-08-26 Thread marc . geddes
On Aug 22, 11:55 pm, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I accept that there is more than one way to describe reality, and I accept the concept of supervenience, but where I differ with you (stubbornly, perhaps) is over use of the word fundamental. The base property seems to me

View this page MCRT Domain Model: Eternity

2007-08-27 Thread marc . geddes
Click on http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/web/mcrt-domain-model-eternity - or copy paste it into your browser's address bar if that doesn't work. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups

Re: Why Objective Values Exist

2007-08-27 Thread marc . geddes
On Aug 27, 6:45 pm, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I don't know whether you're hair splitting or speaking loosely, but the above is off the point in a couple of ways. In the first place empirical science is inductive not deductive; so there is a trivial sense in which you can't

Re: Why Objective Values Exist

2007-08-27 Thread marc . geddes
On Aug 28, 12:53 am, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On 27/08/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I accept that there is more than one way to describe reality, and I accept the concept of supervenience, but where I differ with you (stubbornly, perhaps) is

Re: Why Objective Values Exist

2007-08-27 Thread marc . geddes
On Aug 28, 5:18 am, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I don't find your arguments at all convincing. In fact I don't think you've even given an argument - just assertions. Here the points of a clear-cut argument. These are not 'just assertions': (1) Mathematical concepts are

Re: Why Objective Values Exist

2007-08-28 Thread marc . geddes
On Aug 28, 6:31 pm, Torgny Tholerus [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: [EMAIL PROTECTED] skrev: (7) From (3) mathematical concepts are objectively real. But there exist mathematical concepts (inifinite sets) which cannot be explained in terms of finite physical processes. How can you prove

Re: Why Objective Values Exist

2007-08-28 Thread marc . geddes
On Aug 29, 4:20 am, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Thanks for spelling it out. (1) Mathematical concepts are indispensible to our explanations of reality. So are grammatical concepts. No they aren't. Grammatical concepts are human creations, which is precisely shown by the

Re: Why Objective Values Exist

2007-08-28 Thread marc . geddes
On Aug 29, 4:03 am, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: There is this special quality of subjective experience: that which is left over after all the objective (third person knowable) information is accounted for. Nevertheless, the subjective experience can be perfectly reproduced by

Re: Why Objective Values Exist

2007-08-29 Thread marc . geddes
On Aug 29, 1:10 pm, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: So are mathematics human creations (c.f. William S. Cooper, The Evolution of Logic). There is no sharp distinction between what is expressed in words and what is expressed in mathematical symbols. Darwins theory of evolution

Re: Why Objective Values Exist

2007-08-30 Thread marc . geddes
On Aug 30, 1:37 am, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Le 29-août-07, à 12:48, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : Any scientific theory (including Darwin's) *is* more accurate when expressed in mathematical notation. You *can* draw a clear distinction between the language used to express

Re: Why Objective Values Exist

2007-08-31 Thread marc . geddes
On Aug 31, 6:21 am, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 29-août-07, à 23:11, Brent Meeker a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 29-août-07, à 02:59, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : I *don't* think that mathematical properties are properties of our *descriptions*

Re: Why Objective Values Exist

2007-08-31 Thread marc . geddes
On Aug 31, 9:40 pm, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I said to Brent, Le 31-août-07, à 11:00, Bruno Marchal a écrit : So, no, I don't see why you think my objection is a non-sequitur. It seems to me you are confusing arithmetic and Arithmetic, or a theory with his intended

Re: Why Objective Values Exist

2007-08-31 Thread marc . geddes
On Aug 31, 9:40 pm, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Only a meta-theory *about* PA, can distinguish PA and arithmetical truth. But then Godel showed that sometimes a meta-theory can be translated in or by the theory/machine. But is the meta-theory *about* PA, itself classified as

Re: Why Objective Values Exist

2007-09-01 Thread marc . geddes
On Sep 1, 3:20 am, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: The description itself is an algorithm written in symbols. Peano's axioms aren't an algorithm. Er..you're right here of course. I'm getting myself a bit confused again. Careful when thinking about these

Re: No(-)Justification Justifies The Everything Ensemble

2007-09-17 Thread marc . geddes
On Sep 13, 11:47 pm, Youness Ayaita [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I see two perfectly equivalent ways to define a property. This is somehow analogous to the mathematical definition of a function f: Of course, in order to practically decide which image f(x) is assigned to a preimage x, we

Re: No(-)Justification Justifies The Everything Ensemble

2007-09-17 Thread marc . geddes
On Sep 18, 1:24 pm, Hal Ruhl [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Hi Youness: Bruno has indeed recommended that I study in more detail the underlying mathematics that I may be appealing to. The response that I have made may be a bit self serving but at this point in my life I am having difficultly

Re: No(-)Justification Justifies The Everything Ensemble

2007-09-19 Thread marc . geddes
On Sep 19, 1:18 pm, Hal Ruhl [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Hi Marc: The objects I use are divisions of the list - such divisions are static elements of the power set. My objects have nothing to do with programing and do not change - they can be the current state of a something on its path to

Re: No(-)Justification Justifies The Everything Ensemble

2007-09-19 Thread marc . geddes
On Sep 19, 2:23 am, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Schmidhuber and me do agree on comp (100% agreement: we have the same hypothesis). And relatively to the comp hyp and the importance of the universal machine Schmidhuber and me are much closer than with Tegmark whi is just very

Re: Max Tegmark: The Mathematical Universe

2007-09-20 Thread marc . geddes
Max himself posted about this on the everything-list here: http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/browse_thread/thread/7da9934267f64acf/690ccf0715150a36#690ccf0715150a36 A popular article was also the feature in last week's 'New Scientist':

Re: The physical world is real

2007-09-23 Thread marc . geddes
On Sep 23, 10:39 pm, Youness Ayaita [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: There have always been two ways to interpret the interrelationship between the physical world and our minds. There's a lot more than two ways. The first one is to consider the physical world to be fundamental; from this

Re: against UD+ASSA, part 1

2007-09-27 Thread marc . geddes
On Sep 27, 2:15 pm, Wei Dai [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Yes. So my point is, even though the subjective probability computed by ASSA is intuitively appealing, we end up ignoring it, so why bother? We can always make the right choices by thinking directly about measures of outcomes and

Re: The ASSA leads to a unique utilitarism

2007-10-02 Thread marc . geddes
Make sure you get the spelling right ;) - Utilitarianism The trouble with Utilitarianism is that it's only concerned with one aspect of values - relations between rational agents. Further, although it's a good approach for practical calculation , it fails to deal with the explanatory

Re: The ASSA leads to a unique utilitarism

2007-10-04 Thread marc . geddes
On Oct 3, 12:23 pm, Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I think that beauty is effectively a channel from our unconscious. When we think that something is beautiful (or conversely ugly), some unconscious processing has taken place according to some criterion and presented to the

Request to form 'Social Contract' with SAI

2007-10-12 Thread marc . geddes
12th October, 2007 Marc Geddes Auckland New Zealand --- This is Marc Geddes , I am publically requesting to form a social contract with SAI (Super Intelligence).I am aware of the existence of SAI and SAI-space and am of sound mind and my own volition requesting to be removed from human

Re: Request to form 'Social Contract' with SAI

2007-10-14 Thread marc . geddes
On Oct 14, 3:39 am, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Take care, trust yourself and kill all the SAI on the road, to paraphrase a well known Buddhist idea. Either you are sufficiently clever to understand the SAI arguments, showing you are already an SAI yourself, and your message is

Re: Request to form 'Social Contract' with SAI

2007-10-17 Thread marc . geddes
On Oct 16, 11:37 pm, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: If it is ''a'-rtificial' I question the 'natural one' (following Bruno's fear of the (natural?) 'super stupidity'.) Yet I don't think Marc wants to let himself denature into an artifact. Not necessarily, but look at Saibal's

Re: Request to form 'Social Contract' with SAI

2007-10-26 Thread marc . geddes
Danny, The depressed people are the sane ones. My post is merely 'existential angst' caused by knowledge of the world and myself as I really am.With knowledge comes unhappiness and happiness is the happiness of ignorance. Ever read the short story of 'Green Magic'? That story is available

Re: What are the consequences of UD+ASSA?

2007-10-30 Thread marc . geddes
On Oct 31, 3:28 pm, Wei Dai [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: 4. For someone on a practical mission to write an AI that makes sensible decisions, perhaps the model can serve as a starting point and as illustration of how far away we still are from that goal. Heh. Yes, very interesting indeed.

Re: What are the consequences of UD+ASSA?

2007-10-31 Thread marc . geddes
On Oct 31, 7:40 pm, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Decisions require some value structure. To get values from an ontology you'd have to get around the Naturalistic fallacy. Brent Meeker- Hide quoted text - - Show quoted text - Decision theory has this same problem. Decision

My answers to Wei Dai's questions.

2007-11-11 Thread marc . geddes
On another list Wei Dai posted some questions. At this time I wish to attempt some answers to be placed on public record. These were excellent questions. Wei Dai wrote Here are my questions: How does math really work? Why do we believe that P!=NP even though we don't have a proof one way or

Re: Theory of Everything based on E8 by Garrett Lisi

2007-11-22 Thread marc . geddes
On Nov 23, 1:10 am, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Now such work raises the remark, which I don't really want to develop now, which is that qualifiying TOE a theory explaining only forces and particles or field, is implicit physicalism, and we know (by UDA) that this is

Re: Theory of Everything based on E8 by Garrett Lisi

2007-11-25 Thread marc . geddes
On Nov 23, 8:49 pm, Torgny Tholerus [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: [EMAIL PROTECTED] skrev: As far as I tell tell, all of physics is ultimately geometry. But as we've pointed out on this list many times, a theory of physics is *not* a theory of everything, since it makes the (probably

Re: Theory of Everything based on E8 by Garrett Lisi

2007-11-26 Thread marc . geddes
When I talk about pure mathematics I mean that kind of mathematics you have in GameOfLife. There you have gliders that move in the GameOfLife-universe, and these gliders interact with eachother when they meet. These gliders you can see as physical objects. These physical objects are

Re: Theory of Everything based on E8 by Garrett Lisi

2007-11-26 Thread marc . geddes
On Nov 27, 3:54 am, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Besides which, mathematics and physics are dealing with quite different distinctions. It is a 'type error' it try to reduce or identity one with the other. I don't see why. Physics deals with symmetries, forces and fields.

Re: Theory of Everything based on E8 by Garrett Lisi

2007-11-27 Thread marc . geddes
On Nov 28, 1:18 am, Günther Greindl [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Dear Marc, Physics deals with symmetries, forces and fields. Mathematics deals with data types, relations and sets/categories. I'm no physicist, so please correct me but IMHO: Symmetries = relations Forces - could they not

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