Joao Leao wrote: > James N Rose wrote: > > > Joao wrote: > > > > "Speaking as a devout Platonist ..." > > > > About 7 years ago I realized there was > > a severe contradiction resident in modern > > concepts of Being. > > > > Godel's Incompleteness Theorems have > > established a condition-of-knowledge which seem > > to challenge if not negate Platonic thought. > > That just happens to be totally orthogonal to what > Godel himself expressed as his own opinion on the > consequence of his theorem... Godel is possibly > the most consequent of all XXcent. self professed > Platonists. > > > > > I'd like to get your ideas on the following: > > > > Consider the Platonic Ideal of 'apple'. I can > > almost guarantee that your mind immediately came > > up with an image of 'apple' including stem, colorful > > skin, other qualities, etc. > > > > As Godel designated -system internally consistent-, > > we might at first presume the two depictions to be > > isomorphic. > > Why? Is there any reason why my "apple" need to > fit a consistent system of "appleness"? I don't think so... > > > But I submit that per Godel, 'apple' includes only > > those characteristics or qualia evident up to > > but not external to the bounds of the system, > > whatever they may be. > > > > That being the case, 'color' of any existential > > ideal-apple exists only in the out-space where the > > platonic apple per se -does not-. > > > > Therefore 'color' and 'apple' - in any platonic sense - > > must be mutually exclusive. Which seems to press the > > 2500 year old standing impression of 'ideal apple'. > > Not at all. You are confusing images with things and > forgetting a good deal of what platonism is about. An > apple, this apple, the apple I am thinking of, all partake > the form of "appleness" whatever that is. The color of > this apple, the color of that bird, this red, the "red" you > are thinking of right now", all partake of the form of > "redness" in the Patonic world. There is no contradition > here. There are no forms here! > > > > > > > Another discontinuity. > > > > If you climb Mount Everest and sit down on it, > > does the mountain now satisfy the platonic ideal > > of "chair"? > > No, why should it? The form of a chair is not the > form of "anything I sit on"! You can sit on a table > or on your head for all I care... This is a different in > "extension" which is much easier to grasp than one > of intention, but it is the same think. > > > Thanks in advance for your thoughts, > > > > James Rose > > I am afraid you are obviously confused about the basis of > platonism and the dispute with kantianism, if you will. > I suggest you read Stanley Rosen's "Antiplatonism" in > his collection "The Ancients and the Moderns" for a > recent and detailed review of the issue you raise, namely > conditions-of-knowledge as conditions-of-being, a > sibject prone to post-kantian confusions.... > > Regards, > > -Joao Leao > > -- > > Joao Pedro Leao ::: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics > 1815 Massachussetts Av. , Cambridge MA 02140 > Work Phone: (617)-496-7990 extension 124 > VoIP Phone: (617)=384-6679 > Cell-Phone: (617)-817-1800 > ---------------------------------------------- > "All generalizations are abusive (specially this one!)" > -------------------------------------------------------
-- Joao Pedro Leao ::: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics 1815 Massachussetts Av. , Cambridge MA 02140 Work Phone: (617)-496-7990 extension 124 VoIP Phone: (617)=384-6679 Cell-Phone: (617)-817-1800 ---------------------------------------------- "All generalizations are abusive (specially this one!)" -------------------------------------------------------