Re: Arguments against uploading
Nice. It could be heavier on support on the points, but not bad for a superficial pop-sci treatment. My comments: It’s a mistake to think of this debate in terms of having insufficient understanding or technology to simulate consciousness. The point is that we already have sufficient understanding of the problem to suspect that in fact, the entire assumption that private experience can be assembled by public bodies is false. I see this not as a point of religious sentiment, but of physical ontology. To presume that we could ever make a program, for instance, which projects an image that we can see without any physical projection technology would be an error. No amount of logic can turn a simulation of water into actual water that we can drink. To quote Korzybski, “The map is not the territory”, or Magritte “Ceci n’est pas une pipe.” It seems that we have become so enamored with computation that we have lost this sense of discernment between figures which we use to represent and the genuine presentations which are experienced first hand. Figures and symbols are only valid within a particular mode of interpretation. What is stored in a computer has no aesthetic content. If you tell the computer the data is a picture, it will barf out onto the screen whatever noise corresponds to that picture. If you tell the computer to use the sound card instead, then it will dump the noise as acoustic vibration. The computer doesn’t care, either way, data is just data. It is a-signifying and generic - the exact opposite of conscious experience which derives its significance from proprietary experience through time rather than mechanical function or forms. Consciousness is neither form nor function, it is the participatory aesthetic appreciation of form and function, and I am willing to bet that it is actually the fundamental principle of the cosmos, upon which all forms and functions, all matter and energy depend. As far as embodiment goes, the issue should be refocused so that human consciousness in particular is understood as a special case within the universal phenomenon of sensory-motor participation, which goes all the way down to the bottom. It’s not that mind needs a body, its that private awareness correlates to specific public presentations. These public presentations, while possible to imitate and substitute to the extent that the insensitivity of the perceiver permits, there is no way, from an absolute perspective to completely replace any experience with anything other than that particular experience. Unlike figures and symbols, experiences are rooted in the firmament of eternity. They make a certain kind of sense from every angle which is transparent - experiences allow us to triangulate meaning through them, and to elide or bridge gaps with leaps of understanding. (“A-ha!”). Experiences can misrepresent each other on different levels, conflicting expectations can produce ‘illusions’ but these all ultimately have the potential to be revealed through the fullness of time. Simulated reality offers no such universal grounding, and promises true prisons which are isolated from any possibility of escape. That could happen in theory as a consequence of Strong AI, but it won’t in reality, because Strong AI will, I think, evaporate in a cloud of hype eventually, and I think that this very conversation is a clue that it is happening already. This is not a bad thing, not a cause for mourning and disappointment, but an exciting time when we can set aside our toy model of physics which disqualifies its model maker for long enough to form a new, fully integrated model of the universe which sees perception not as a metaphysical ‘emergent property’ but as the private view of physics itself. Physics is perception and participation, i.e. consciousness. On Wednesday, May 1, 2013 9:41:36 PM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote: http://io9.com/you-ll-probably-never-upload-your-mind-into-a-computer-474941498 -- Onward! Stephen I apologize in advance for the gross errors that this post and all of my posts will contain. ;-) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Arguments against uploading
The arguments are not so much arguments, but a collection of dubious assumptions. His first argument is that the brain is not computable, which requires assuming the brain does not operate according to known physics, as all known physics is computable. The second and third objections are that we need to understand consciousness and solve the hard problem before we can replicate a brain. I don't see how this follows. Ted Berger offers a convincing argument against the necessity of needing a theory of mind to do his work (which is creating neural prosthesis): I don't need a grand theory of the mind to fix what is essentially a signal-processing problem. A repairman doesn't need to understand music to fix your broken CD player. The fourth argument is that special materials are needed for consciousness. Where is the evidence? The fifth argument is that a non-physical soul is required. If a gelatinous blob of cells can have a soul, why can't any other machine? The sixth, that it would be unethical is surprising. Is it unethical to give people artificial hearts, or limbs? Why will it be unethical to give them prosthetic brain regions or entire brains? The seventh, again requires belief in some kind of non-physical soul that can't be duplicated and is necessary for identity. The eight, well who wouldn't take the risk of hacking over the certainty of biological death? Despite the large number of arguments, I find none of them convincing. Jason On Thu, May 2, 2013 at 11:45 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote: Nice. It could be heavier on support on the points, but not bad for a superficial pop-sci treatment. My comments: It’s a mistake to think of this debate in terms of having insufficient understanding or technology to simulate consciousness. The point is that we already have sufficient understanding of the problem to suspect that in fact, the entire assumption that private experience can be assembled by public bodies is false. I see this not as a point of religious sentiment, but of physical ontology. To presume that we could ever make a program, for instance, which projects an image that we can see without any physical projection technology would be an error. No amount of logic can turn a simulation of water into actual water that we can drink. To quote Korzybski, “The map is not the territory”, or Magritte “Ceci n’est pas une pipe.” It seems that we have become so enamored with computation that we have lost this sense of discernment between figures which we use to represent and the genuine presentations which are experienced first hand. Figures and symbols are only valid within a particular mode of interpretation. What is stored in a computer has no aesthetic content. If you tell the computer the data is a picture, it will barf out onto the screen whatever noise corresponds to that picture. If you tell the computer to use the sound card instead, then it will dump the noise as acoustic vibration. The computer doesn’t care, either way, data is just data. It is a-signifying and generic - the exact opposite of conscious experience which derives its significance from proprietary experience through time rather than mechanical function or forms. Consciousness is neither form nor function, it is the participatory aesthetic appreciation of form and function, and I am willing to bet that it is actually the fundamental principle of the cosmos, upon which all forms and functions, all matter and energy depend. As far as embodiment goes, the issue should be refocused so that human consciousness in particular is understood as a special case within the universal phenomenon of sensory-motor participation, which goes all the way down to the bottom. It’s not that mind needs a body, its that private awareness correlates to specific public presentations. These public presentations, while possible to imitate and substitute to the extent that the insensitivity of the perceiver permits, there is no way, from an absolute perspective to completely replace any experience with anything other than that particular experience. Unlike figures and symbols, experiences are rooted in the firmament of eternity. They make a certain kind of sense from every angle which is transparent - experiences allow us to triangulate meaning through them, and to elide or bridge gaps with leaps of understanding. (“A-ha!”). Experiences can misrepresent each other on different levels, conflicting expectations can produce ‘illusions’ but these all ultimately have the potential to be revealed through the fullness of time. Simulated reality offers no such universal grounding, and promises true prisons which are isolated from any possibility of escape. That could happen in theory as a consequence of Strong AI, but it won’t in reality, because Strong AI will, I think, evaporate in a cloud of hype eventually, and I think that this very conversation is a clue that it is happening
Re: Arguments against uploading
On Thursday, May 2, 2013 3:08:17 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote: The arguments are not so much arguments, but a collection of dubious assumptions. His first argument is that the brain is not computable, which requires assuming the brain does not operate according to known physics, as all known physics is computable. All known physics is computable because it is based on the public interaction of material bodies. Consciousness is not isomorphic to those kinds of interactions. Our thoughts and emotions are known physics as much as the measurements of objects, but we are not used to thinking of them that way. Whether or not the brain is computable I think doesn't matter because brain activity is only a representation of one aspect of experience, which is not going to be very useful taken out of the context of the total history of experience. The brain is a flatland footprint of experience. We might compute the contours of the sole of the shoe, but that doesn't tell us about the person wearing them. The second and third objections are that we need to understand consciousness and solve the hard problem before we can replicate a brain. I don't see how this follows. Ted Berger offers a convincing argument against the necessity of needing a theory of mind to do his work (which is creating neural prosthesis): I don't need a grand theory of the mind to fix what is essentially a signal-processing problem. A repairman doesn't need to understand music to fix your broken CD player. We don't need to understand the hard problem if we can replicate a brain, but understanding the hard problem tells us why replicating a brain doesn't mean that there is any subjective experience associated with its function. The fourth argument is that special materials are needed for consciousness. Where is the evidence? Well, there is the complete lack of any inorganic consciousness in the universe as far as we know. That isn't evidence, but it might be a clue. Materials matter to our body quite a bit. The fifth argument is that a non-physical soul is required. If a gelatinous blob of cells can have a soul, why can't any other machine? Because the blob of cells was once a single cell which divided itself because it had the power to do so. Perhaps a synthetic biology would work similarly, but the approach right now to machines is to assemble them out of dumb parts. There may be an important difference between an organism and an organization. The sixth, that it would be unethical is surprising. Is it unethical to give people artificial hearts, or limbs? Why will it be unethical to give them prosthetic brain regions or entire brains? If you had to develop artificial hearts by legions of making mutant children who had to live their lives in misery, then there would be an ethical issue. That would be the case if computation alone could indeed become conscious. Any program loop left running might be conjuring inconceivable agony for some machine-person in the Platonic aethers. The seventh, again requires belief in some kind of non-physical soul that can't be duplicated and is necessary for identity. Your position requires denial of any significant difference between conscious intent and unconscious reflex. The eight, well who wouldn't take the risk of hacking over the certainty of biological death? Yeah, that the risk of hacking is a red herring. We are already being hacked by commercial interests. Despite the large number of arguments, I find none of them convincing. I wouldn't either from that article alone, but they are ok as a short list to begin to investigate the deeper issues. Craig Jason On Thu, May 2, 2013 at 11:45 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: Nice. It could be heavier on support on the points, but not bad for a superficial pop-sci treatment. My comments: It’s a mistake to think of this debate in terms of having insufficient understanding or technology to simulate consciousness. The point is that we already have sufficient understanding of the problem to suspect that in fact, the entire assumption that private experience can be assembled by public bodies is false. I see this not as a point of religious sentiment, but of physical ontology. To presume that we could ever make a program, for instance, which projects an image that we can see without any physical projection technology would be an error. No amount of logic can turn a simulation of water into actual water that we can drink. To quote Korzybski, “The map is not the territory”, or Magritte “Ceci n’est pas une pipe.” It seems that we have become so enamored with computation that we have lost this sense of discernment between figures which we use to represent and the genuine presentations which are experienced first hand. Figures and symbols are only valid within a particular mode of interpretation.
Re: Arguments against uploading
On Wed, May 1, 2013 at 9:41 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.netwrote: http://io9.com/you-ll-probably-never-upload-your-mind-into-a-computer-474941498 1) Brain functions are not computable because* *most of its important features are the result of unpredictable, nonlinear interactions among billions of cells. Well 10^11 neurons in the brain is a big number and 10^15 synapses in that brain is a even bigger number, but it is no where near to being infinite and every one of those neurons and every one of the 10^4 neurons in that neuron operates according to the laws of physics, therefore it is computable. It's true that random behavior is not computable, but hardware electronic random number generators cost about $2 if you think having one is important. 2) we may never be able to explain how and why we have qualia Even if that is true it would be irrelevant if you're reverse engineering a brain, if a upload works you don't need to understand why it works. 3) we still need to figure out how our brains segregate elements in complex patterns, a process that allows us to distinguish them as discrete objects. Computers can perform object recognition, I admit that today's computers are slow at it but they are rapidly getting better and it is certainly no show stopper. 4) Mind-body dualism is true, consciousness lies somewhere outside the brai*n*, perhaps as some ethereal soul or spirit. We know for a fact that if we change the brain consciousness changes and we know for a fact that if our consciousness changes so does our brain, and that certainly doesn't sound like dualism to me. And so ethereal soul joins luminiferous aether and phlogiston as obsolete scientific terms, although this point is sure to be a hit with Jesus freaks and snake handlers. 5) It would be unethical to develop I see nothing unethical about it but it would be irrelevant even if it was. This was supposed to be a list of reasons why uploading couldn't happen not why it shouldn't. 6) We can never be sure it works[...] the* *continuity of consciousness problem We can't be sure about anything. I think. And there is no continuity problem, the external world might jump ahead but to itself consciousness is always continuous. 7) Uploaded minds would be vulnerable to hacking and abuse And non uploaded biological brains are vulnerable to bacteria, viruses, and physical abuse; and at least with uploads you can always keep a up to date backup stashed away in a safe place far away. In short these pathetic reasons would not convince one single member of the species Homo sapiens that uploading was impossible unless they already very much wanted to be convinced. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Arguments against uploading
http://io9.com/you-ll-probably-never-upload-your-mind-into-a-computer-474941498 -- Onward! Stephen I apologize in advance for the gross errors that this post and all of my posts will contain. ;-) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
