Re: Consciousness schmonscioisness
Jesse Mazer wrote (sometime ago). However, for those who do believe in consciousness, it is still possible to disbelieve in *continuity* of consciousness-- You may be right, but that is hard to understand. Could you elaborate a little bit? Is not consciousness the thing which build some continuity among observer moment? (Here build could even mean creates the illusion of) there could just be a lot of separate observer-moments that don't become anything different from what they already are ... Possible. But that is not the way you live it (generally). Isn't it? (so there'd be no point in asking which copy I'd become in a replication experiment). ...mmhhh... Bruno
Re: Consciousness schmonscioisness
Your statement, 'without consciousness you can't incorporate the anthropic principle into your fundamental theory', is wrong. You can, it's just that you look for conditions that would support this observer-moment (a 'self-referential thought'), rather than conditions that support some physical object like a brain. In your last paragraph you seem to concede that s single observer-moment can be 'conscious' and stand-alone. What need is there for this extra word, 'conscious'? What does it add to 'observer-moment'? James - Original Message - From: Jesse Mazer [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Saturday, February 10, 2001 1:19 PM Subject: Re: Consciousness schmonscioisness James Higgo (co.uk) wrote: It's been almost two years you guys have been hung up on this 'I' nonsense - can't you conceive, for one moment, that there is no 'I'? Can you grasp the indisputable fact that this debate is meaningless if there is no 'I', just observer-moments without an 'observer'? Has anybody out there understood this point? How does it make sense to talk about observer-moments if you don't believe in consciousness? Those who don't believe in consciousness at all should really just talk about the probability of various physical configurations, computations, or something similar. But without consciousness you can't incorporate the anthropic principle into your fundamental theory--no reason to say some patterns/computations can be experienced while others can't. However, for those who do believe in consciousness, it is still possible to disbelieve in *continuity* of consciousness--there could just be a lot of separate observer-moments that don't become anything different from what they already are (so there'd be no point in asking which copy I'd become in a replication experiment). Jesse Mazer _ Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com
Re: Consciousness schmonscioisness
James Higgo (co.uk) wrote: Your statement, 'without consciousness you can't incorporate the anthropic principle into your fundamental theory', is wrong. You can, it's just that you look for conditions that would support this observer-moment (a 'self-referential thought'), rather than conditions that support some physical object like a brain. How can you rigorously define the notion of a self-referential thought? Even a very simple computation can be self-referential in some way, and physical processes that can be seen as implementing these sorts of simple computations are undoubtedly much more common than physical processes that are doing the sort of complex information-processing that goes on in my brain. Is it just amazing luck that I find myself to be one of these extremely rare complex observer-moments? In your last paragraph you seem to concede that s single observer-moment can be 'conscious' and stand-alone. What need is there for this extra word, 'conscious'? What does it add to 'observer-moment'? I discussed this issue briefly (and the issue of continuity vs. isolated observer-moments) on my first post on this list, at http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m2358.html. Basically the idea is to differentiate between a position like Chalmers' and one like Dennett's--is there a real truth about what is like to be a given observer-moment or not? Also, as I mention above, I don't think you can make sense of anthropic reasoning unless you have an objective way to settle which patterns/computations can be experienced and which can't. Jesse Mazer _ Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com
Re: Consciousness schmonscioisness
James Higgo (co.uk) wrote: It's been almost two years you guys have been hung up on this 'I' nonsense - can't you conceive, for one moment, that there is no 'I'? Can you grasp the indisputable fact that this debate is meaningless if there is no 'I', just observer-moments without an 'observer'? Has anybody out there understood this point? How does it make sense to talk about observer-moments if you don't believe in consciousness? Those who don't believe in consciousness at all should really just talk about the probability of various physical configurations, computations, or something similar. But without consciousness you can't incorporate the anthropic principle into your fundamental theory--no reason to say some patterns/computations can be experienced while others can't. However, for those who do believe in consciousness, it is still possible to disbelieve in *continuity* of consciousness--there could just be a lot of separate observer-moments that don't become anything different from what they already are (so there'd be no point in asking which copy I'd become in a replication experiment). Jesse Mazer _ Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com
Re: Consciousness schmonscioisness
Scott bemoans James H's appreciable contempt on consciousness (or whatever it may be called) which is a brilliant moneymaker and tenuremaker for people who can't do better. Then he asked the question: I thought time didn't exist? Scott First: the past tense is objectionable unless the answer is negative (=Yes, it didn't). Then again - and I apologize if I divulge something from a private message, the list has funny ways of 'replying' - but Scott wrote among others: Difference is not the same, even if it's the same difference upon my remark on the list that - as I consider - information is difference. Well, I beg to differ: it is about the level of same. If you consider a same difference of 3 that may be absolutely 'unsame', depending on 3 what. If you include the contents of two TOEs ( I point here to my denial of omniscience, necessary for a TOE) - and the comparison is a 3, you may not duplicate THIS and so that difference is information. We usually deal in incomplete information, by incomplete modeling in our thinking. So Scott may be right: we CANNOT compare (absolutely) same differences. Scott, is this what you pointed at? John Mikes
Re: Consciousness schmonscioisness
On Sat, 10 Feb 2001, John Mikes wrote: Scott First: the past tense is objectionable unless the answer is negative (=Yes, it didn't). I don't approach my choice of and use of language by choosing words that are continuously defendable from a certain perspective. That is, I am not scientific in my approach. Actually, my statement seems to indicate that I believe that time does exist. It wasn't meant to be objectionable, but rather a reference back to trying to get a solid answer from J.H. -- to which he always responds that he doesn't have the time (to explain to me why time doesn't exist). I try to gather what I can from this list -- although there appear to be so many divergent beliefs, that I have a difficult time truly extracting anything, let alone everything. Back to the poiint: I'm a little crazier -- I simply think everything can't happen all at once, hence there has to be (degrees of) difference. I beg to differ: it is about the level of same. If you consider a same I talk about this to various people who probably don't care to hear about it. But, to me, one can't discuss levels of sameness to the same extent that one can with difference... therefore I approach it from the perspective of difference -- but we are probably talking about very similar concepts from slightly different perspectives. not duplicate THIS and so that difference is information. We usually deal in incomplete information, by incomplete modeling in our thinking. So Scott may be right: we CANNOT compare (absolutely) same differences. Scott, is this what you pointed at? John Mikes Yes. Now to offend everyone... in my own simplistic method, I am programming a system that extracts information through difference. It is a pet project of mine. Whether it turns out to be everything, or not, is not important. I simply want it to turn out to be something. I am simply here, and elsewhere, looking to either find additional insight or anything that might shoot down my theories/ideas or cause me to alter them. I'd love to talk with anyone, via private emails, about this programming project. Scott ps: AI is alive, if is believes that it is. AI exists because it believes that it does.
Consciousness schmonscioisness
It's been almost two years you guys have been hung up on this 'I' nonsense - can't you conceive, for one moment, that there is no 'I'? Can you grasp the indisputable fact that this debate is meaningless if there is no 'I', just observer-moments without an 'observer'? Has anybody out there understood this point? (Apart from Jacques Mallah, who has long deserted the debate, and maybe Martin Marcel). Could we start a separate list at eskimo-com for people who still want to have the pointless old consciousness debate below? James - Original Message - From: Jesse Mazer [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Friday, February 09, 2001 5:46 PM Subject: RE: on formally describable universes and measures (fwd) Meeker, Brent wrote: Bruno, perhaps I'm just unusally dense today; but I dont' grasp the uncertainity to you write of the the Washington-Moscow thought experiment. It seems obvious to me that when I am reconstituted in Washington and reconstituted in Moscow then I am in both places. This of course assumes that there is no mystical, indivisble soul that is really me. It follows from the idea that my internal pyschological states derive from the physical processes of my body - and if the body is reproduced then so are those processes. After the split, though, the experience of the two copies will diverge. If I find myself in Moscow, I am no longer the same person as my twin in Washington...if I knew the Washington twin was going to be tortured my attitude would be quite different from what it would be if *I* was going to be tortured. So, if continuity of consciousness is real it is reasonable to expect that our theory of consciousness should allow for the possibility of splitting, and that from a first-person point of view, I-before-the-split would have an X% chance of becoming one copy and a Y% chance of becoming another. That is not to deny, though, that the split would happen both ways at once--in other words, each copy would be correct in saying it was continuous with the single consciousness before the split. Jesse Mazer _ Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com
