Hi Brian, IMHO machines can compare things, but only quantitatively. Thus meaning cannot be handled.
In Peirces' philosophy of categories (which is really an epistemology) comparison is not just quantitative but qualitative, for the comparison is triadic, that is, between a) an object with b) its meaning in the form of a word or symbol stored memory c) a word for that meaning. Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/14/2012 ----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-13, 09:15:35 Subject: Re: Words vs experience On 12 Aug 2012, at 19:52, Brian Tenneson wrote: > > This is already a consequence of computer science. All sound > machines looking inward, or doing self-reference, cannot avoid the > discovery between what they can justify with words, and what they > can intuit as truth. > > What do justify and intuit mean? I model intuition by the epistemic analysis of intuitionist or constructive logic/math, and thus by the logic of the knower (S4). i.e. []p -> p []p -> [][]p [](p -> q) -> []p -> []q With the modus ponens rule, and the necessitation rule. Some theorem relates this to intuitionistic logic. See the work of Brouwer but also of Plato and Plotinus actually, for more motivation. > There are some machines out there that do not believe intuiting the > truth exists; ? (I doubt this). In any case it exists necessarily for all sound self- referential machine. > for them, if it is not justified they do not believe. Justify from what? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
