Hi Richard Ruquist Leibniz's point in the divisibility argument is that you cannot call matter a substance, because if it is infinitely divisible, there can be no "there" there, nothing that couldn't be cut in two.
IMHO Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle achieves the same intended result, because there can never be some final cutting event, even though the fundamental particles cannot be divided. There's no "there" there. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/8/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen ----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Richard Ruquist Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-08, 08:03:22 Subject: Re: Leibniz on consciousness and the self as non-materialistic Hi Roger, We now know that matter is not infinitely divisible. So the argument of Leibniz is falsified. In appreciation, Richard On Mon, Oct 8, 2012 at 6:50 AM, Roger Clough wrote: > > Leibniz on consciousness and the self as non-materialistic > > http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/leibniz-mind/ > > > "In other writings, Leibniz suggests exactly what characteristic it is of > perception and consciousness > that the mechanical principles of materialism cannot account for. The > following passages, the first > from the New System of Nature (1695), the second from the Reply to Bayle > (1702), are revealing in this regard: > Furthermore, by means of the soul or form, there is a true unity which > corresponds to what is called the > I in us; such a thing could not occur in artificial machines, nor in the > simple mass of matter, however organized it may be. > But in addition to the general principles which establish the monads of which > compound things are > merely the results, internal experience refutes the Epicurean [i.e. > materialist] doctrine. This experience is the > consciousness which is in us of this I which apperceives things which occur > in the body. This perception > cannot be explained by figures and movements [of materials]. > > Leibniz's point is that whatever is the subject of perception and > consciousness must be truly one, > a single "I" properly regarded as one conscious being. An aggregate of matter > is not truly one and so > cannot be regarded as a single I, capable of being the subject of a unified > mental life. > This interpretation fits nicely with Lebniz's oft-repeated definition of > perception as the representation in the > simple of the compound, or of that which is outside. (Principles of Nature > and Grace, sec.2 (1714)). > More explicitly, in a letter to Antoine Arnauld of 9 October 1687, Leibniz > wrote that "In natural perception > and sensation, it is enough for what is divisible and material and dispersed > into many entities to be > expressed or represented in a single indivisible entity or in a substance > which is endowed with genuine unity. > If perception (and hence, consciousness) essentially involves a > representation of a variety of content in a simple, > indivisible "I" then we may construct Leibniz's argument against materialism > as follows: > > Materialism holds that matter can explain (is identical with, can give rise > to) perception. > A perception is a state whereby a variety of content is represented in a true > unity. > Thus, whatever is not a true unity cannot give rise to perception. Whatever > is > divisible is not a true unity. Matter is infinitely divisible. Hence, matter > cannot > form a true unity. Hence, matter cannot explain (be identical with, give rise > to) > perception. If matter cannot explain (be identical to, give rise to) > perception, > then materialism is false. Hence, materialism is false. " > > Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net > 10/8/2012 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
