Hi Bruno Marchal
If the world (not the mind) functions as a digital machine, I speculate
that, following Kant's intuition that there are two primitive
forms of being, time and space, where time is time and space is
the carrier/container of discrete events, then the contingent world
is just linear time (consciousness) and Platonia, which is time-independent,
must be a Fourier transform of the world of time, containing
a spectrum of events or transforming what the eye sees at the
moment into a frequency or frequency-space fourier transform.
Then the mind is just consciousness in some fashion of those events,
and that is what Heaven will be like.
Bohm had a related idea (the Implicate/Explicate worlds).
If there was a beginning, then the transform(s) would be one-sided.
[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
11/17/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-11-16, 11:32:26
Subject: Re: In the beginning were the numbers
On 15 Nov 2012, at 17:18, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Stephen P. King and Bruno,
Perhaps these problems below fade away if you think
of numbers in this way:
In the beginning were the numbers
and the numbers were with Mind and
the numbers were Mind.
I can accept this a short poetical sum up. But strictly speaking mind is what a
universal numbers can do relatively to other minds. To identify mind and number
is too crude. Mind is more in the person dreams supported by enough complex
number relations. Keep in mind I am working with the assumption that the brain
function like a digitalm machine, at some level.
Bruno
[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
11/15/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Stephen P. King
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-11-01, 14:21:55
Subject: Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 11/1/2012 11:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
[SPK] Bruno would have us, in step 8 of UDA, to "not assume a concrete robust
physical universe".
?
Reread step 8. Step 7 and step 8 are the only steps where I explicitly do
assume a primitive physical reality.
In step 8, it is done for the reductio ad absurdum.
Dear Bruno,
I have cut and pasted your exact words from SANE04 and you still didn't
understand... From:
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.pdf
"...what if we don? grant a concrete robust physical universe?"
"Actually the 8th present step will explain
that such a move is nevertheless without purpose. This will make the notion of
concrete and
existing universe completely devoid of any explicative power. It will
follow that a much
weaker and usual form of Ockham? razor can be used to conclude that not only
physics has
been epistemologically reduced to machine psychology, but that ?matter?
has been
ontologically reduced to ?mind? where mind is defined as the object study of
fundamental
machine psychology."
My claim is that neither physical worlds nor numbers (or any other object
that must supervene on mind) can be ontologically primitive. Both must emerge
from a neutral ground that is neither and has no particular properties.
[SPK] He goes on to argue that Occam's razor would demand that we reject the
very idea of the existence of physical worlds
Only of primitive physical worlds. And you did agree with this. I just prove
this from comp. That's the originality. A bit of metaphysics is made into a
theorem in a theory (comp).
Can we agree that physical worlds emerge somehow from sharable aspects of
multiple sheaves of computations?
[SPK] given that he can 'show' how they can be reconstructed or derived from
irreducible - and thus ontologically primitive - Arithmetic 'objects' {0, 1, +,
*} that are "operating" somehow in an atemporal way. We should be able to make
the argument run without ever appealing to a Platonic realm or any kind of
'realism'. In my thinking, if arithmetic is powerful enough to be a TOE and run
the TOE to generate our world, then that power should be obvious. My problem is
that it looks tooo much like the 'explanation' of creation that we find in
mythology, whether it is the Ptah of ancient Egypt or the egg of Pangu or
whatever other myth one might like. What makes an explanation framed in the
sophisticated and formal language of modal logic any different?
I use the self-reference logic, for obvious reason. Again, this entails the sue
of some modal logics, due to a *theorem* by Solovay. All correct machine whose
beliefs extend RA obeys to G and G*. There is no choice in the matter.
That is not changed or involved by my argument.
[SPK] I agree 1000000000% with your point about 'miracles'. I am very
suspicions of "special explanations' or 'natural conspiracies'. (This comes
from my upbringing as a "Bible-believing Fundamentalist" and eventual rejection
of that literalist mental straight-jacket.) As I see things, any condition or
situation that can be used to 'explain' some other conceptually difficult
condition or situation should be either universal in that they apply anywhere
and anytime
But even in your theory anywhere and anytime must be defined by something more
primitive, given that you agree that physics cannot be the fundamental theory,
given that the physical reality is not primitive.
The concepts of "where" and "when" (positions in a space-time) would seem
to be rendered meaningless if there is no space-time (or observers/measurements
to define it), no? OH, BTW, I don't think that we disagree that "physics cannot
be the fundamental theory". Physics requires measurements/observations to be
meaningful. Where I agree with you is in your considerations of 1p and observer
indeterminacy. Where you and I disagree is on the question of resources.
Resources are required for computations to "run" so there has to be the
availability of resources involved in *any* consideration of computations.
Ignoring these considerations by only considering computations as Platonic
objects is wrong, IMHO.
You seem to be OK with computations as purely timeless objects (in
Platonia) that are such that somehow we finite entities can create physical
objects that can implement (in their dynamical functions) instances of such,
while I claim that computations are equivalence classes of functions that
physical systems can implement *and* abstract objects. I see these two views as
two poles of a spectrum. There is a lot more detail in my considerations that I
do not have time to go into at this time...
My Theory of comp: Sheaves of Computations/arithmetic - define ->
particular physical states *and* sheaves of physical states - allow ->
particular computations. They are mutually supervenient, neither is
ontologically primitive. Both emerge from a property neutral ground.
Bruno
--
Onward!
Stephen
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