Hi Roger,
When I used the term universal system, I meant it in the sense of Turing
universality ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computational_universality
). It is universal in the same sense of the word as a universal remote. A
Turing universal system is one that can be used to define/emulate any
finite process. In Bruno's proof, if one believes in digital mechanism, he
says that the theory of everything need only be something that provides
Turing universality. My question to him was whether there might be
different probabilities of expectation based on which Turing universal
system is assumed at the start.
I have some comments interleaved below:
On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 9:08 AM, Roger wrote:
> Hi Jason Resch
>
> Personally I believe that the physical universe out there is physical,
>
What makes something real? Do, you believe, for instance that there could
be other physical universes out there, which we may never be able to
access, but nonetheless, seem real to any life forms which might develop
intelligence and consciousness in those universes? What, in your theory,
delineates possibility from actuality?
> in the traditional sense of the word, and can be characterized for
> example by physical experiment. So science is fine, as far as it goes.
>
> But what we experience of the physical universe is a psychological
> or mental construction, so as far as our minds are concerned, it is
> a phenomenon.
>
> From there on, things get a little tricky.
>
> There is a related, hotly contested point of debate which seems to
> some (but not me) to be a fundamental flaw in Leibniz' metaphysics.
>
Leibniz was brilliant, but we have learned a great deal since his time. We
should not expect all of his theories to be correct.
> Leibniz
> discarded the atomic view of matter and let it stand that all matter can
> be divided
> infinitety many times, so there was nothing finally that one could point
> to,
> thus something one could call "real".
>
> I am told that the 12 fundamental physical particles cannot be divided so
> that
> the divisibility argument above does not work. I would agree, but just
> change my definition of real, not as some thing one could point to,
> but the possibility of finding something there to point to. Heisenber's
> Uncertainty
> Theorem rules that out, so in the end I agree with Leibniz's conclusion --
> that matter is not real.
>
Bruno might say it is real, but not fundamental. It can be explained by
something else.
Also, are you familiar with the many-worlds, or many-minds interpretation
of quantum mechanics?
If not, I think this video provides a great introduction:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dEaecUuEqfc
>
> The basis of Leibniz's metaphysics is that, instead, only the monads are
> real,
> since they refer to unitary substances and that these substances, taken
> logically,
> have no parts.
>
What do you think about the idea that information is Leibniz's monad?
Perhaps everything from consciousness to physical particles can be
explained as an informational phenomena. Information cannot be explained
in terms of anything else, and in this sense it has no parts.
*John Archibald Wheeler:* It from bit. Otherwise put, every "it" — every
particle, every field of force, even the space-time continuum itself —
derives its function, its meaning, its very existence entirely — even if in
some contexts indirectly — from the apparatus-elicited answers to yes-or-no
questions, binary choices, bits. "It from bit" symbolizes the idea that
every item of the physical world has at bottom — a very deep bottom, in
most instances — an immaterial source and explanation; that which we call
reality arises in the last analysis from the posing of yes — no questions
and the registering of equipment-evoked responses; in short, that all
things physical are information-theoretic in origin and that this is a
participatory universe.
Jason
>
> Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
> 8/14/2012
>
> - Receiving the following content -
> *From:* Jason Resch
> *Receiver:* everything-list
> *Time:* 2012-08-13, 11:04:33
> *Subject:* Re: Why AI is impossible
>
>
>
> On Mon, Aug 13, 2012 at 8:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> William,
>>
>> On 12 Aug 2012, at 18:01, William R. Buckley wrote:
>>
>>
>> The physical universe is purely subjective.
>>
>>
>> That follows from comp in a constructive way, that is, by giving the
>> means to derive physics from a theory of subejectivity. With comp any first
>> order logical theory of a universal system will do, and the laws of physics
>> and the laws of mind are not dependent of the choice of the initial
>> universal system.
>>
>>
>>
> Bruno,
>
> Does the universal system change the measure of different programs and
> observers, or do programs that implement programs (such as the UDA) end up
> making the initial choice of system of no燾onsequence?
>
> Jason
>
> --
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