Re: Modal Realism vs. MWI

2002-10-10 Thread Bruno Marchal



Tim May wrote:



While I find Deutsch fairly persuasive, the verdict is of course not 
yet in whether MWI is the correct interpretation. The double slit 
results had a traditional wave mechanics interpretation 75 years 
ago (wave-particle duality), and this remains a viable 
interpretation even today. (I'm not talking about popularity, either 
on this list or in the overall community, just technical 
viability.)


I am afraid I disagree with the amount of what I understand here :)
What do you mean by traditional wave mechanics ? Bohr or de Broglie ?
Copenhague or Bohm?, or perhaps Everett? (through Schroedinger).

You know the wave *has* some probability interpretation. Now you can call the
objects of the domain of uncertainty, states, worlds, or histories, 
but the basic
fact is that without the collapse principle those  things are *many*.
Once we accept the idea that the observer obeys the wave equation, it is only
by playing with words that we can say decoherence makes those 
alternate realities
disappearing, when the wave  only describes that they are just 
becoming relatively
inaccessible.

[snip ...]



Very plausible. But be careful of the solipsist move here.
Unless I miss something, like a universal first person may be, I really
don't know.

I'm not following you here.


Sometimes I am afraid that Isham and Smolin use toposes and intuitionnist
logic has a way to hide a little bit those *many realities*. I am not
saying this concerning your or Markopoulou's talking of times. Intuitionism
is Brouwer's solipsist philosophy of the subject, (quite similar to my
comp notion of first person btw). An intuitionist essentially believes only in
its own constructions. It is a self-developing creator. Beautiful and
actually inescapable (with comp).
The main problem with pure intuitionism,is that he has no notion of the
other. (the other being other people or other inaccessible worlds).
But with platonist comp the alternate comp interfere through
relation of similarities ... It is not a matter of choice.




I think---with comp---
that those brouwerian lattices emerge from the non distributive structures
which rises from the coherent glueing of all little pieces of 
consistent (in a
logical sense) histories.

Sounds interesting, but I'm not getting a clear mental picture of 
it. Could you provide a natural transformation from your internal 
picture to one I might be able to form?


I wish I could! I can only offer you a little poetical phrase: stable 
physical realities
emerges from the many many many little pieces of possible machines dreams...
(... or comp is wrong).

Bruno




Re: Modal Realism vs. MWI

2002-10-07 Thread Russell Standish

Tim May wrote:
 
 
 However, I take your point that full Lewis-Stalnaker-D. Lewis modal 
 realism is more disjoint than the less disjoint (initial 
 interference of branching worlds) MWI. In terms of topology, one might 
 say full modal realism is the discrete (perhaps Zariski) topology, 
 while MWI has more notions of closeness, overlap, etc. (I think this 
 could be worked out, but I haven't.)
 
 Certainly after a time interval where decoherence occurs, the 
 interaction between macroscopically different worlds is essentially 
 zero.
 
 So, I will amend my earlier statement to read: After the very early, 
 entangled period, MWI looks, then, like just another variant of modal 
 realism. To wit, there IS a universe in which unicorns exist, and 
 another in which Germany won the Second World War, but these universes 
 are forever and completely out of touch with us.
 
 And since the time of entanglement/coherence is small for most systems, 
 most worlds in MWI are as far apart as modal realism worlds are.
 
 (Digression: I wonder what kind of work has been done on _evolution_ in 
 topology, e.g., the transition of systems from overlapping open sets 
 to the discrete topology? Looks like nucleation and growth out of a 
 continuous medium, or formation of tree structures, perhaps.)

It would appear to me that the modal realism world is a necessity for
consciousness, but that the Multiverse, with its coherence structure
is approximately good enough to allow consciousness to operate.

Having said that, linear interference possibilities appear to be
allowed anyway in the modal realism type model (that seems to be the
import of my Why Occam's razor paper.

Cheers


A/Prof Russell Standish  Director
High Performance Computing Support Unit, Phone 9385 6967, 8308 3119 (mobile)
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 Fax   9385 6965, 0425 253119 ()
Australia[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
Room 2075, Red Centrehttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
International prefix  +612, Interstate prefix 02





Modal Realism vs. MWI

2002-10-04 Thread Tim May


On Friday, October 4, 2002, at 09:13  AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

 At 9:36 -0700 1/10/2002, Tim May wrote:

 MWI looks, then, like just another variant of modal realism. To 
 wit, there IS a universe in which unicorns exist, and another in 
 which Germany won the Second World War, but these universes are 
 forever and completely out of touch with us.

 Not quite due to possible interferences. We do have empirical evidences
 for those worlds imo. (if only the two slits + Bell or better GHZ)

While I find Deutsch fairly persuasive, the verdict is of course not 
yet in whether MWI is the correct interpretation. The double slit 
results had a traditional wave mechanics interpretation 75 years ago 
(wave-particle duality), and this remains a viable interpretation 
even today. (I'm not talking about popularity, either on this list or 
in the overall community, just technical viability.)

However, I take your point that full Lewis-Stalnaker-D. Lewis modal 
realism is more disjoint than the less disjoint (initial 
interference of branching worlds) MWI. In terms of topology, one might 
say full modal realism is the discrete (perhaps Zariski) topology, 
while MWI has more notions of closeness, overlap, etc. (I think this 
could be worked out, but I haven't.)

Certainly after a time interval where decoherence occurs, the 
interaction between macroscopically different worlds is essentially 
zero.

So, I will amend my earlier statement to read: After the very early, 
entangled period, MWI looks, then, like just another variant of modal 
realism. To wit, there IS a universe in which unicorns exist, and 
another in which Germany won the Second World War, but these universes 
are forever and completely out of touch with us.

And since the time of entanglement/coherence is small for most systems, 
most worlds in MWI are as far apart as modal realism worlds are.

(Digression: I wonder what kind of work has been done on _evolution_ in 
topology, e.g., the transition of systems from overlapping open sets 
to the discrete topology? Looks like nucleation and growth out of a 
continuous medium, or formation of tree structures, perhaps.)


 A very natural generalisation (!). Just replace the hom Sets by hom 
 Categories.
 In which you can again replace the hom sets by hom categories 
 What is intriguing is the existence of coherence conditions making 
 those
 constructions apparently very genuine for many stuff from quantum 
 field theories.

Baez (IIRC) has an anecdote about talking with a noted quantum field 
theorist at a conference. The theorist was highly skeptical of 
generalized abstract nonsense (i.e., category theory). Baez told him 
about some of the developments and the theorist went off to sleep on 
it. The next morning he buttonholed Baez and said Braided monoidal 
categories are really cool (I'm paraphrasing from memory).

 I have used the smullyan trees for the G and Co. theorem provers. The 
 tableaux
 structure reflects  in some way the Kripke structure. Posets appears 
 with
 S4-like modal logic.
 You should study Gentzen presentation of logic which are naturally 
 related
 to categories. An indigest but brilliant introduction to many 
 (intuitionnist)
 logics is the North-Holland logic book by Szabo: Algebra of proofs.
 To bad he miss the braided monoidal categories ... For a categorician, 
 knots
 theory is a branch of logic.

I haven't gotten to knots yet, except for a look a few years ago at the 
Vaughan Jones stuff on classifications of knots (more related to string 
theory, which I did a little bit of reading on).

Gentzen is referred to, of course, in the books on logic I'm reading, 
but I'm still absorbing the more basic stuff.

 Possible worlds, something I only encountered in any form (besides 
 Borges, Everett, parallel universes sorts of references) in the past 
 several years, is my real touchstone.

 And, more mundanely, I think it applies to cryptography and money. I 
 had a meeting/party at my house a few weeks ago with about 50 people 
 in attendance (gulp!). We had a series of very short presentations. I 
 gave a very rushed 10-minute introduction to intuitionistic logic, 
 mainly focused on my time as a poset, a lattice example, citing the 
 natural way in which not-not A is not necessarily the same as A. If 
 the past of an event is A, then not-A is its future. But the 
 not-future is larger than the original past, as incomparable (in 
 the poset/trichotomy sense) events influence the future. Or, put in 
 relatitivity/cosmology terms, which many people are more familiar 
 with, ironically, events outside the light cone of the present figure 
 into the future. So the natural causal structure of spacetime is 
 intuitionistic, a Brouwerian lattice.


 Very plausible. But be careful of the solipsist move here.
 Unless I miss something, like a universal first person may be, I really
 don't know.

I'm not following you here.

If you're commenting on my it applies to cryptography and money, we