Le 27-déc.-06, à 19:39, Brent Meeker a écrit :
I do infer from experience that there is some reality. Sometime ago,
Bruno wrote:
"Hence a Reality, yes. But not necessarily a physical reality. Here is
the logical dependence:
NUMBERS -> "MACHINE DREAMS" -> PHYSICAL -> HUMANS -> PHYSICS ->
NUMBERS."
Maybe my interpretation of this is different than Bruno's, but I take
it to mean our explanations can start anywhere in this loop and work
all the way around. So numbers can be explained in terms of physics
(c.f. William S. Cooper) and physical reality can be explained in
terms of numbers (c.f. Bruno Marchal?). These explanations are all
models, representations we create. They are tested against
experience, so they are not arbitrary. They must be logical since
otherwise self-contradiction will render them ambiguous. Whether any
these, or which one, is "really real" is, I think, a meaningless
question.
OK. This shift us back in the old threads concerning a possible theory
of everything (TOE). To be less misleading I should have written:
NUMBERS -> MACHINE DREAMS -> PHYSICAL -> HUMANS -> HUMAN'S PHYSICS ->
HUMAN'S NUMBER
The difference between "NUMBERS" and "HUMAN'S NUMBER" is akin to the
difference between an electron before life appears on this planet, and
an electron as object of study by a human physician.
Recall that my point is the giving of an argument showing that physics
can (and must with comp) be derived from number theory, and this in a
very specific way, making comp testable.
It is the difference between the following theories intended as TOEs:
1) Logic + Number + SWE + wave reduction (= Copenhague's theory of
everything). [Unintelligible, imo]
2) Logic + Number + SWE + comp (= Everett-Deutsch's theory of
everything) [Conceptually simpler, to say the least.]
3) Logic + Number + comp (= your servitor's theory). [Conceptually
even much simpler, and testable]
The main advantage of "3)": due to the technical difference between
provability and truth in self-reference, the theory can provide an
explanation for both quanta and qualia. Of course the quanta could
still behave too strangely with respect to experimental data. If this
is confirmed comp will be refuted, but that is the main interesting
point, imo.
(By logic I mean first order predicate logic, by "number" I mean
Robinson arithmetic, SWE = Schroedinger equation)
The question is not which theory is "really real", but which theory is
the most intelligible with respect to logic, the problem we want to
solve and the empirical data. Today, there is no doubt that QM (SWE) is
far better for predicting measurable relation between observable
numerical data, but is hopeless with regard to qualia (despite it
already said something highly non trivial (but mainly negative)on the
life/death mortality problem).
Perhaps we can come back on this later.
Bruno
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