Tom Caylor wrote:
Brent Meeker wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:
This cannot be explained away by
faith in the sense that one can have faith in the gravity god or a
deist god (because no empirical finding counts for or against such
beliefs): rather,
dan9el wrote:
Tom Caylor wrote:
Brent Meeker wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:
This cannot be explained away by faith in the sense that
one can have faith in the gravity god or a deist god
(because no empirical finding counts for or against such
beliefs): rather,
Le 11-nov.-06, à 19:07, 1Z a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 11-nov.-06, à 01:09, 1Z a écrit :
No, because there are no possible worlds where (2^32582657)-1
is not a prime number.
This is for me a typical arithmetical realist statement.
Most philosophers who use the possible
worlds
Tom Caylor writes:
Brent Meeker wrote:
OK. But I'd say that in fact almost no one believes something without any
evidence, i.e. on *blind* faith. Religious faith is usually belief based
on *selected* evidence; it is faith because it is contrary to the total
evidence. Bruno seems
Le 11-nov.-06, à 01:09, 1Z a écrit :
No, because there are no possible worlds where (2^32582657)-1
is not a prime number.
This is for me a typical arithmetical realist statement.
Causality , as opposed
to material implication, requires contingency.
Yes. And grosso modo there will be as
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 11-nov.-06, à 01:09, 1Z a écrit :
No, because there are no possible worlds where (2^32582657)-1
is not a prime number.
This is for me a typical arithmetical realist statement.
Most philosophers who use the possible
worlds terminology do nothing PW's actually
Brent Meeker writes:
This cannot be explained away by
faith in the sense that one can have faith in the gravity god or a
deist god (because no empirical finding counts for or against such
beliefs): rather, it comes down to a matter of simultaneously
believing x and not-x.
Seems like
Johnathan Corgan writes:
That's because for hundreds, if not thousands, of years their theologians
have had to explain why their God is invisible, unnoticable,
incompehensible, and undetectable. So a null experimental outcome,
like the recent studies of the efficacy of healing
On Sat, 2006-11-11 at 00:30 +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
http://whywontgodhealamputees.com/god5.htm
Great article! I initially thought that it was written by some poor, honest
Christian
genuinely struggling with the logical consequences of his beliefs. But then
such a
person
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 09-nov.-06, à 14:07, 1Z a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 31-oct.-06, à 19:37, 1Z a écrit :
Well, I think numbers don't exist AT ALL
I have not the slightest idea what you mean by that.
If you don't understand anti-Platonism, that would certainly
Brent Meeker wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:
This cannot be explained away by
faith in the sense that one can have faith in the gravity god or a
deist god (because no empirical finding counts for or against such
beliefs): rather, it comes down to a matter of
Tom Caylor wrote:
1Z wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 09-nov.-06, à 14:07, 1Z a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 31-oct.-06, à 19:37, 1Z a écrit :
Well, I think numbers don't exist AT ALL
I have not the slightest idea what you mean by that.
If you don't understand anti-Platonism, that
Brent Meeker wrote:
Tom Caylor wrote:
1Z wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 09-nov.-06, à 14:07, 1Z a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 31-oct.-06, à 19:37, 1Z a écrit :
Well, I think numbers don't exist AT ALL
I have not the slightest idea what you mean by that.
If you don't
Peter Jones writes:
Most people would not say yes doctor to a process that recorded
their
brain on a tape a left it in a filing cabinet. Yet, that is all you
can
get out of the timeless world of Plato's heaven (programme vs
process).
Why? Plato's heaven is full of
1Z wrote:
Tom Caylor wrote:
1Z wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 09-nov.-06, à 14:07, 1Z a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 31-oct.-06, à 19:37, 1Z a écrit :
Well, I think numbers don't exist AT ALL
I have not the slightest idea what you mean by that.
Tom Caylor wrote:
Brent Meeker wrote:
Tom Caylor wrote:
1Z wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 09-nov.-06, à 14:07, 1Z a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 31-oct.-06, à 19:37, 1Z a écrit :
Well, I think numbers don't exist AT ALL
I have not the slightest idea what you
Peter Jones (1Z) a écrit :
Most people would not say yes doctor to a process that recorded
their
brain on a tape a left it in a filing cabinet. Yet, that is all you
can
get out of the timeless world of Plato's heaven (programme vs
process).
Why? Plato's heaven is full of mathematical
Le 31-oct.-06, à 19:37, 1Z a écrit :
Well, I think numbers don't exist AT ALL
I have not the slightest idea what you mean by that. Your longer
metaphysics post begs many of the questions addressed in this list.
Personally: I have no theory, just an argument showing that if we take
the
Le 03-nov.-06, à 15:06, 1Z a écrit :
We don't *have* to assume that there is a gulf between the first
personal
and third personal.
A gulf? Do you agree there is at least a difference?
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Peter Jones (1Z) a écrit :
Most people would not say yes doctor to a process that recorded
their
brain on a tape a left it in a filing cabinet. Yet, that is all you
can
get out of the timeless world of Plato's heaven (programme vs
process).
Why? Plato's
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 03-nov.-06, à 15:06, 1Z a écrit :
We don't *have* to assume that there is a gulf between the first
personal
and third personal.
A gulf? Do you agree there is at least a difference?
The difference boils down to the incommuncability of certain things,
as far as
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 31-oct.-06, à 19:37, 1Z a écrit :
Well, I think numbers don't exist AT ALL
I have not the slightest idea what you mean by that.
If you don't understand anti-Platonism, that would certainly explain
why you don't argue against it.
Your longer
metaphysics post
Le 09-nov.-06, à 13:53, 1Z a écrit :
If you can show that subjective experience exists in Platonia,
you can use that to show that some things will seem dynamical.
If you can show that there a dynamic processes in Platonia,
you can use that to show there are running computations
and
Le 09-nov.-06, à 14:07, 1Z a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 31-oct.-06, à 19:37, 1Z a écrit :
Well, I think numbers don't exist AT ALL
I have not the slightest idea what you mean by that.
If you don't understand anti-Platonism, that would certainly explain
why you don't argue
Le 09-nov.-06, à 13:57, 1Z a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 03-nov.-06, à 15:06, 1Z a écrit :
We don't *have* to assume that there is a gulf between the first
personal
and third personal.
A gulf? Do you agree there is at least a difference?
The difference boils down to the
: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Tuesday, November 07, 2006 11:11 PM
Subject: RE: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
Brent Meeker writes:
snip
A theist God (as opposed to a deist God) is one who intervenes in the
natural order, i.e. does miracles
Brent Meeker writes:
It's also possible that God intervenes all the time in a perfectly
consistent
manner to sustain natural laws, such that if he stopped doing so the whole
universe would instantly disintegrate.
That's possible, but then he's a deist God. He doesn't do miracles
Le 07-nov.-06, à 20:10, Tom Caylor a écrit :
Brent Meeker wrote:
Tom Caylor wrote:
Brent Meeker wrote:
Tom Caylor wrote:
Bruno has tried to introduce us before to the concept of universes
or
worlds made from logic, bottom up (a la constructing elephants).
These
universes can be
On Wed, 2006-11-08 at 09:39 -0800, Brent Meeker wrote:
Good old-fashioned miracles are not lawlike, which is what makes them
subject to empirical verification. If God is a Protestant, then an
examination of a list of lottery ticket winners or people with
serious illnesses should show
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:
It's also possible that God intervenes all the time in a
perfectly consistent manner to sustain natural laws, such that if
he stopped doing so the whole universe would instantly
disintegrate.
That's possible, but then he's a deist God. He
Brent Meeker wrote:
Tom Caylor wrote:
Brent Meeker wrote:
Tom Caylor wrote:
Bruno has tried to introduce us before to the concept of universes or
worlds made from logic, bottom up (a la constructing elephants). These
universes can be consistent or inconsistent.
But approaching it
Brent Meeker wrote:
An excellent essay. I agree with almost everything you wrote; and you put it
very well. Would you mind if I cross posted it to Vic Stenger's AVOID-L
mailing list. You can check out the list here:
http://www.colorado.edu/philosophy/vstenger/
Although Victor Stenger
Tom Caylor wrote:
Brent Meeker wrote:
An excellent essay. I agree with almost everything you wrote; and you put
it very well. Would you mind if I cross posted it to Vic Stenger's AVOID-L
mailing list. You can check out the list here:
http://www.colorado.edu/philosophy/vstenger/
Brent Meeker writes:
Tom Caylor wrote:
Brent Meeker wrote:
An excellent essay. I agree with almost everything you wrote; and you put
it very well. Would you mind if I cross posted it to Vic Stenger's
AVOID-L mailing list. You can check out the list here:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:
Tom Caylor wrote:
Brent Meeker wrote:
An excellent essay. I agree with almost everything you wrote; and you put
it very well. Would you mind if I cross posted it to Vic Stenger's
AVOID-L mailing list. You can check out the list here:
Le 02-nov.-06, à 17:34, David Nyman a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
I don't understand really what you mean by AUDA is not RITSIAR. AUDA
is just the lobian interview, or if you prefer the complete
mathematical formalization of the UDA reasoning. In some sense you can
interpret it as the
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 02-nov.-06, à 17:34, David Nyman a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
I don't understand really what you mean by AUDA is not RITSIAR. AUDA
is just the lobian interview, or if you prefer the complete
mathematical formalization of the UDA reasoning. In some sense
Bruno Marchal wrote:
I don't understand really what you mean by AUDA is not RITSIAR. AUDA
is just the lobian interview, or if you prefer the complete
mathematical formalization of the UDA reasoning. In some sense you can
interpret it as the eventual elimination of the yes doctor hypothesis
Le 31-oct.-06, à 19:01, 1Z a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 30-oct.-06, à 14:15, Stathis Papaioannou wrote (in part):
A computationalist would add that a computer analogue
of a person would also have the same mental states, but this is more
controversial.
Is it really? With the
David Nyman writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
I think I see what you mean, but it's as much a problem for the intact and
normally functioning brain as it is for teleportation experiments, isn't it?
Yes, that's my point! I'm trying to argue that the brain has actually
come up with a
Le 28-oct.-06, à 23:24, 1Z a écrit :
Stathis: and no explicit ordering is necessary. The counting sequence
one, two, three may involve millions of slices of brain activity or
computer emulation activity spread throughout space and time, and it
may take many of these slices to form a
Le 29-oct.-06, à 12:11, 1Z a écrit :
If numbers aren't real at all they cannot generate reality
(ITSIAR).
You beg the question. Numbers are not physically real
does not entails
that numbers don't exist at all, unless you define real by physical
real.
I didn't say numbers are not
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 29-oct.-06, à 12:11, 1Z a écrit :
If numbers aren't real at all they cannot generate reality
(ITSIAR).
You beg the question. Numbers are not physically real
does not entails
that numbers don't exist at all, unless you define real by physical
real.
Le 29-oct.-06, à 17:43, David Nyman a écrit :
Peter, when you said that the physical might be 'relations all the way
down', and I asked you what would you find if you went 'all the way
down', you replied 'primary matter'. IOW, you posit primary matter as a
'bare substrate' to which are
Le 30-oct.-06, à 14:15, Stathis Papaioannou wrote (in part):
A computationalist would add that a computer analogue
of a person would also have the same mental states, but this is more
controversial.
Is it really? With the notable couragous exception of Penrose I don't
know people who
Le 30-oct.-06, à 00:40, David Nyman wrote (to Peter Jones (1Z)):
Name your
turtle. Can't we just get on with investigating what either theory
explains or predicts, and stop arguing over words - isn't this why no
agreement is ever reached on this?
Peter, I think that David is right. We
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 30-oct.-06, à 14:15, Stathis Papaioannou wrote (in part):
A computationalist would add that a computer analogue
of a person would also have the same mental states, but this is more
controversial.
Is it really? With the notable couragous exception of Penrose I
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 29-oct.-06, à 17:43, David Nyman a écrit :
Peter, when you said that the physical might be 'relations all the way
down', and I asked you what would you find if you went 'all the way
down', you replied 'primary matter'. IOW, you posit primary matter as a
'bare
Bruno Marchal writes:
Le 30-oct.-06, à 14:15, Stathis Papaioannou wrote (in part):
A computationalist would add that a computer analogue
of a person would also have the same mental states, but this is more
controversial.
Is it really? With the notable couragous exception of
Peter Jones writes:
Another staunch opponent is Edelmann.
http://dangerousintersection.org/?p=178
'The notion that the brain is a kind of computer is an error of such
magnitude, Mr. Edelman believes,
that cognitive science is on the brink of a crisis. I claim, he
writes, that the
Brent Meeker writes:
Suppose that being conscious is something a brain does. Then a
Observer-second would be one second of that brain activity. When
this OS was magically initiated it would already include potentials
traveling down axons, etc, the residue of the previous OS and
Peter Jones writes:
I suppose you could say that there is no feeling of continuity from one
microsecond to the next in a normally functioning brain either, because it
takes many microseconds to make a thought. My point is that whatever it
takes to make a thought and however vague
Peter jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
Here is another thought experiment. You are watching an object
moving against a
stationary background at a velocity of 10 m/s. Suddenly, the object
seems to instantly
jump 10 metres in the
Tom Caylor wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 27-oct.-06, à 13:04, Quentin Anciaux a écrit :
Hi Stathis,
Le Vendredi 27 Octobre 2006 12:16, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Here is another thought experiment. You are watching an object moving
against a stationary background at a
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
Errmm.. if by recover we are able to replay them as
conscious (re)experiences. The memory-trace need
only contain time-stamps indicating the order
and timing of the contents of the experience. The
total structure of
Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
I think I see what you mean, but it's as much a problem for the intact and
normally functioning brain as it is for teleportation experiments, isn't
it? For that
matter, it's as much a problem for a computer that gets teleported around
David Nyman wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
I think I see what you mean, but it's as much a problem for the intact and
normally functioning brain as it is for teleportation experiments, isn't it?
Yes, that's my point! I'm trying to argue that the brain has actually
come up with a
Brent Meeker writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
David Nyman writes:
I think we're in agreement, Stathis, but I'm trying to focus on a
problem, and what I think is a non-trivial aspect of evolved brain
functionality that would be required to overcome it. Of course, I agree
with
Le 27-oct.-06, à 13:04, Quentin Anciaux a écrit :
Hi Stathis,
Le Vendredi 27 Octobre 2006 12:16, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Here is another thought experiment. You are watching an object moving
against a stationary background at a velocity of 10 m/s. Suddenly, the
object seems to
Le 27-oct.-06, à 15:58, 1Z a écrit :
If numbers aren't real at all they cannot generate reality
(ITSIAR).
You beg the question. Numbers are not physically real does not entails
that numbers don't exist at all, unless you define real by physical
real.
The question you should ask is: are
Le 27-oct.-06, à 16:06, 1Z a écrit :
Principally I mean in the physical universe, or in Plato's heaven.
Bruno always sounds like a Platonist, but he keeps denying he is one.
Quite the contrary. I vindicate that I am even a plotinist, or a
neoplatonist if you prefer.
I just don't share
1Z wrote:
Peter, when you said that the physical might be 'relations all the way
down', and I asked you what would you find if you went 'all the way
down', you replied 'primary matter'. IOW, you posit primary matter as a
'bare substrate' to which are attached whatever properties theory
David Nyman writes:
I think we're in agreement, Stathis, but I'm trying to focus on a
problem, and what I think is a non-trivial aspect of evolved brain
functionality that would be required to overcome it. Of course, I agree
with you that each aspect of the experience '.falls perfectly
Brent Meeker writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent meeker writes:
That is not clear to me. Perhaps it turns on the meaning of
content in an OM. Generally if my OM's are taken to be on the
order of a second or longer, I think the order could be
reconstructed from the
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent meeker writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
I think it is simpler to go back to your own clones-in-the-next-room
example
rather than introducing the complication of neurophysiology (or indeed
physics).
You are
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
Date: Fri, 27 Oct 2006 05:14:03 -0700
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
My brain must
at some subconscious level have the structure
David Nyman wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
The point is, whatever you are thinking during t1t2, you are thinking
*something*,
and you are thinking the same something in (a), (b) and (c). Whatever
complex
brain processes are occurring during t1t2 in (a) are also occurring in (b)
1Z wrote:
I think we're in agreement, Stathis, but I'm trying to focus on a
problem, and what I think is a non-trivial aspect of evolved brain
functionality that would be required to overcome it. Of course, I agree
with you that each aspect of the experience '.falls perfectly into
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent meeker writes:
That is not clear to me. Perhaps it turns on the meaning of
content in an OM. Generally if my OM's are taken to be on
the order of a second or longer, I think the order could be
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent meeker writes:
That is not clear to me. Perhaps it turns on the meaning of
content in an OM. Generally if my OM's are taken to be on the
order of a second or longer, I think the order could
Hi Stathis,
Le Vendredi 27 Octobre 2006 12:16, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Here is another thought experiment. You are watching an object moving
against a stationary background at a velocity of 10 m/s. Suddenly, the
object seems to instantly jump 10 metres in the direction of motion, and
Brent meeker writes:
That is not clear to me. Perhaps it turns on the meaning of content in
an OM. Generally if my OM's are taken to be on the order of a second or
longer, I think the order could be reconstructed from the content. But I
also think there would be exceptions. For example
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
My brain must
at some subconscious level have the structure of the whole sentence spanning
a 2 second interval
t1-t2 or else the sentence could not be generated.
It's still unclear to me from the above whether we're in agreement or
not. I'm concerned that you may
Le 26-oct.-06, à 17:52, 1Z a écrit :
No, I am just asking. I have even
come up with formulations like real in the sense
that I am real which avoid begging any questions about what
kind of reality I have.
Ah OK. I guess that is the RITSIAR. I let you know that:
1) I agree matter exists
Le 26-oct.-06, à 18:02, 1Z a écrit :
Measure is a lot more difficult in MMW. It has to be
deprived by apriori necessity. Do you have
a solution?
A good candidate for apriori necessity (and possibility) is provability
(and conssitency) by a lobian machine.
Le 26-oct.-06, à 21:11, 1Z a écrit :
If your definition of truth is limited to logical inference given a
certain set of axioms and inference rules, then what are we trying to
do on the Everything List?
That's *mathematical* truth.
It is not. This is just provability. Since Godel we know
Le 26-oct.-06, à 22:55, 1Z a écrit :
In an MMW, measure cannot be chosen to match experience, empirically,
it has to be deduced apriori.
Yes. You are rioght. And this is what I have done. Please be patient I
will give all the explanation. Or search in the archive those I have
already
Quentin Anciaux writes:
Hi Stathis,
Le Vendredi 27 Octobre 2006 12:16, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Here is another thought experiment. You are watching an object moving
against a stationary background at a velocity of 10 m/s. Suddenly, the
object seems to instantly jump 10 metres in
, October 26, 2006 8:23 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
Le 23-oct.-06, à 00:12, 1Z a écrit :
Huh? Computationalism is no more able to account for
qualia than physicalism.
Computationalism (the standard one) through my work (don't hesitate
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 26-oct.-06, à 17:52, 1Z a écrit :
No, I am just asking. I have even
come up with formulations like real in the sense
that I am real which avoid begging any questions about what
kind of reality I have.
Ah OK. I guess that is the RITSIAR. I let you know that:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Sorry for the comment delay.
Le 23-oct.-06, à 16:49, David Nyman a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
As usual, the truth of a mathematical existence-claim does not
prove Platonism.
By Platonism, or better arithmetical realism I just mean the belief
by many
1Z wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 26-oct.-06, à 17:52, 1Z a écrit :
No, I am just asking. I have even
come up with formulations like real in the sense
that I am real which avoid begging any questions about what
kind of reality I have.
Ah OK. I guess that is the RITSIAR. I
Tom Caylor wrote:
1Z wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 26-oct.-06, à 17:52, 1Z a écrit :
No, I am just asking. I have even
come up with formulations like real in the sense
that I am real which avoid begging any questions about what
kind of reality I have.
Ah OK.
Brent Meeker wrote:
Tom Caylor wrote:
Bruno has tried to introduce us before to the concept of universes or
worlds made from logic, bottom up (a la constructing elephants). These
universes can be consistent or inconsistent.
But approaching it from the empirical side (top down rather
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 26-oct.-06, à 21:11, 1Z a écrit :
If your definition of truth is limited to logical inference given a
certain set of axioms and inference rules, then what are we trying to
do on the Everything List?
That's *mathematical* truth.
It is not. This is just
Tom Caylor wrote:
Brent Meeker wrote:
Tom Caylor wrote:
Bruno has tried to introduce us before to the concept of universes or
worlds made from logic, bottom up (a la constructing elephants). These
universes can be consistent or inconsistent.
But approaching it from the
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 26-oct.-06, à 18:02, 1Z a écrit :
Measure is a lot more difficult in MMW. It has to be
deprived by apriori necessity. Do you have
a solution?
A good candidate for apriori necessity (and possibility) is provability
(and conssitency) by a lobian machine.
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
I think it is simpler to go back to your own clones-in-the-next-room example
rather than introducing the complication of neurophysiology (or indeed
physics).
You are informed that your current stream of consciousness is either being
1Z wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 26-oct.-06, à 21:11, 1Z a écrit :
If your definition of truth is limited to logical inference given a
certain set of axioms and inference rules, then what are we trying to
do on the Everything List?
That's *mathematical* truth.
It is not.
Tom Caylor wrote:
Brent Meeker wrote:
Tom Caylor wrote:
Bruno has tried to introduce us before to the concept of universes or
worlds made from logic, bottom up (a la constructing elephants). These
universes can be consistent or inconsistent.
But approaching it from the
Tom Caylor wrote:
Tom Caylor wrote:
Brent Meeker wrote:
Tom Caylor wrote:
Bruno has tried to introduce us before to the concept of universes or
worlds made from logic, bottom up (a la constructing elephants). These
universes can be consistent or inconsistent.
But
Tom Caylor wrote:
1Z wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 26-oct.-06, à 21:11, 1Z a écrit :
If your definition of truth is limited to logical inference given a
certain set of axioms and inference rules, then what are we trying to
do on the Everything List?
That's
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent meeker writes:
That is not clear to me. Perhaps it turns on the meaning of
content in an OM. Generally if my OM's are taken to be on the
order of a second or longer, I think the order could be
reconstructed from the content. But I also think there
Tom Caylor wrote:
Brent Meeker wrote:
Tom Caylor wrote:
Bruno has tried to introduce us before to the concept of universes or
worlds made from logic, bottom up (a la constructing elephants). These
universes can be consistent or inconsistent.
But approaching it from the empirical side (top
into position in each case by virtue of its content alone.
Stathis Papaioannou
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
Date: Fri, 27 Oct 2006 05:14:03 -0700
Stathis Papaioannou wrote
Brent meeker writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
I think it is simpler to go back to your own clones-in-the-next-room
example
rather than introducing the complication of neurophysiology (or indeed
physics).
You are informed that your current stream of
Peter Jones writes (quoting David Nyman):
The key aspect is that the structure of each OM is inherently what
might be termed a perceiver-percept dyad - that is, it must contain
whatever process or structure is involved both in *representing* the
available information and *responding*
1Z wrote:
I don't see why. Are you saying they are still closed
even if their information content is similar? Why should that be?
How can I fail to have similar information content
to myself five minutes form now? Why doesn't it apply
spatially? Why doensnt each neuron have its own
Le 25-oct.-06, à 13:57, 1Z a écrit :
Brent Meeker wrote:
It's even more than seeing where axioms and rules of inference lead.
Given some axioms and rules of inference the only truths you can
reach are those of the form It is true that axioms = theorems.
For formalists, all
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
(b) can't be right. However many copies of you there are, you only experience
being one at
a time.
Stathis, I concur with this view, and for the reasons you give.
However, much as I hate to complicate this issue further, I wonder if
you have a view on the
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