On Mar 10, 8:57 pm, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote:
To Evgeniy's train of thought I would attach another question (what you,
savants of Q-science may answer easily): if the universe expands (does it,
indeed?) do the interstitial spaces in an atom expand similarly, or they are
exempt and
John,
I am probably not that far from agnosticism but the question is how to
make it useful for practitioners like me who have to earn money. I mean
that it is still necessary to take decisions and then the question would
be how.
Although this could be just illusion somehow made by numbers
On 10.03.2011 01:29 1Z said the following:
On Mar 9, 7:22 pm, Evgenii Rudnyiuse...@rudnyi.ru wrote:
When you compare heat and molecular motion, first it would be good
to define what molecular motion is.
At the beginning, the molecules and atoms were considered as hard
spheres. At this
Thanks, David, for a reasonable post.
I admire Evgeniy for his boldness of a frontal attack against conventional
physicality's terms.
I would go a step further (is it a surprise?) like: ontology is rather a
description of a stagnant knowledge (state? even if dynamic) of *a
phase*considered in
On Mar 9, 7:24 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 08 Mar 2011, at 15:54, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 8, 1:43 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 07 Mar 2011, at 21:48, David Nyman wrote:
On 7 March 2011 15:56, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Reduction is not
On 08/03/11 12:29, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 8, 11:32 am, Andrew Soltauandrewsol...@gmail.com wrote:
On 06/03/11 15:06, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 4, 5:46 pm, Andrew Soltauandrewsol...@gmail.comwrote:
The measurement problem is the question of why, or even if, collapse
occurs. Certainly no coherent
On 08/03/11 14:39, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 8, 11:47 am, Andrew Soltauandrewsol...@gmail.com wrote:
On 06/03/11 15:22, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 4, 8:12 pm, Andrew Soltauandrewsol...@gmail.comwrote:
On 04/03/11 19:10, Brent Meeker wrote:Collapse appears to instruments as
well as people
We don't
Peter, your comments appear to illustrate a basic confusion between
ontological and epistemological claims that makes me think that you
haven't taken on board the fundamental distinction entailed in Bruno's
original statement:
Ontological reduction does not necessarily entail epistemological
On Mar 9, 12:50 pm, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote:
Peter, your comments appear to illustrate a basic confusion between
ontological and epistemological claims that makes me think that you
haven't taken on board the fundamental distinction entailed in Bruno's
original statement:
On 08/03/11 18:41, Bruno Marchal wrote:
1) SWE
what is SWE?
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On Mar 9, 1:46 pm, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote:
On 9 March 2011 13:30, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
Peter, this is too confusing, you seem to be debating a straw man.
Let's try to keep it simple: am I to assume that you don't agree that
ontological reduction entails
On 9 March 2011 14:17, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
Phlogiston was eliminated, heat was reduced. There's a difference
So on this basis you would claim that heat is *ontologically* (i.e.
not merely epistemologically) distinguishable from molecular motion?
On Mar 9, 1:46 pm, David Nyman
On Mar 9, 2:23 pm, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote:
On 9 March 2011 14:17, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
Phlogiston was eliminated, heat was reduced. There's a difference
So on this basis you would claim that heat is *ontologically* (i.e.
not merely epistemologically)
On 9 March 2011 14:39, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
So on this basis you would claim that heat is *ontologically* (i.e.
not merely epistemologically) distinguishable from molecular motion?
No. I would say it is ontologically the same as molecular
motion, and molecular motion exists, so
On 09 Mar 2011, at 14:31, Andrew Soltau wrote:
On 08/03/11 18:41, Bruno Marchal wrote:
1) SWE
what is SWE?
Sorry. It is Schroedinger Wave Equation.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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Everything List
On 3/9/2011 3:28 AM, 1Z wrote:
I can
say yes to the doctor if my consciousness and qualia is related to a
noumenal hinterland of the matter in my physical brain. That noumenal
matter hinterland contradicts the idea that there is a level of
description of myself where matter and physical
On 3/9/2011 4:00 AM, Andrew Soltau wrote:
Coupled with the
inability to find any physiology corresponding to phenomenal
consciousness,
That's an odd thing to say. It is rather well known
that phenomenal consciousness can be switched off
by drugs.
True, but when not switched off, when operating
On 09 Mar 2011, at 12:28, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 9, 7:24 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 08 Mar 2011, at 15:54, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 8, 1:43 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 07 Mar 2011, at 21:48, David Nyman wrote:
On 7 March 2011 15:56, Bruno Marchal
On 3/9/2011 4:30 AM, Andrew Soltau wrote:
Omnes for example, is that the collapse is purely
epistemological. All that changes is our knowledge or model of the
state and QM merely
predicts probabilities for this change.
That's what I thought I was saying!
No. Everett and Omnes are quite
On Mar 9, 4:30 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 09 Mar 2011, at 12:28, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 9, 7:24 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 08 Mar 2011, at 15:54, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 8, 1:43 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 07 Mar 2011, at 21:48, David
On Mar 9, 4:47 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
On 3/9/2011 4:50 AM, David Nyman wrote:
Peter, your comments appear to illustrate a basic confusion between
ontological and epistemological claims that makes me think that you
haven't taken on board the fundamental
On 3/9/2011 5:30 AM, 1Z wrote:
Zombies are not a typical example of the problems of reduction,
they are an instance of the reduction being bought too cheaply:
the reductive materialist presents the off-the-peg conclusion that
consciousness
just is neural firing, without filling in the
On Mar 9, 3:25 pm, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote:
On 9 March 2011 14:39, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
So on this basis you would claim that heat is *ontologically* (i.e.
not merely epistemologically) distinguishable from molecular motion?
No. I would say it is ontologically
On 9 March 2011 16:21, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
To me that is an open question. Are philosophical zombies possible? It
seems unlikely, but when I consider specific ideas about consciousness, such
as Julian Jaynes, then it seems more plausible that conscious-like behavior
On 09 Mar 2011, at 17:49, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 9, 4:30 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
OK. I guess you associate pain to the primitive matter. But that is
even more incoherent with respect to the comp hypothesis.
There is nothing mystical about the falsehood of comp. It
is
On 9 March 2011 17:22, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
The point of eliminativism is that the eliminated thing doesn't exist
at all.
Just so. At a reduced ontological level, heat doesn't exist at all -
it's just molecular motion, no more, no less, and any explanation
invoking heat could in
On Mar 9, 5:56 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
In that sense all right. Comp is the theory which accept as axiom that
my brain/body is Turing emulable at some level.
But in that sense, comp is a theory of everything. Indeed, it even
makes elementary arithmetic a theory of
On Mar 9, 6:00 pm, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote:
On 9 March 2011 17:22, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
The point of eliminativism is that the eliminated thing doesn't exist
at all.
Just so. At a reduced ontological level, heat doesn't exist at all -
It does, because it is
When you compare heat and molecular motion, first it would be good to
define what molecular motion is.
At the beginning, the molecules and atoms were considered as hard
spheres. At this state, there was the problem as follows. We bring a
glass of hot water in the room and leave it there.
On 3/9/2011 8:49 AM, 1Z wrote:
If you have a theory of qualia using primitive matter, and coherent
with comp, then you should be able to use it to extract a flaw in the
UD Argument.
Here's one: minds can be computed, but they only have
real conscious if they run on the metal (at the
On 3/9/2011 9:24 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 9 March 2011 16:21, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
To me that is an open question. Are philosophical zombies possible? It
seems unlikely, but when I consider specific ideas about consciousness, such
as Julian Jaynes, then it
On Mar 9, 5:15 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
On 3/9/2011 5:30 AM, 1Z wrote:
Zombies are not a typical example of the problems of reduction,
they are an instance of the reduction being bought too cheaply:
the reductive materialist presents the off-the-peg conclusion that
On 3/9/2011 11:46 AM, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 9, 5:15 pm, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
On 3/9/2011 5:30 AM, 1Z wrote:
Zombies are not a typical example of the problems of reduction,
they are an instance of the reduction being bought too cheaply:
the reductive materialist
On 9 March 2011 19:09, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
Fine, Peter, have it your way. We can't seem to progress beyond
vocabulary difficulties to the substance. No doubt I have been less
than persuasive, and thus have failed to convince you that there is
indeed any substance. But since I have
On 9 March 2011 19:43, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
Yes, I realize there are kinds of consciousness. I thought the interesting
idea in Jaynes was that perceptual consciousness, which I'm sure my dog has,
was co-opted by evolution to become self-consciousness. Specifically that
On 9 March 2011 19:22, Evgenii Rudnyi use...@rudnyi.ru wrote:
So I personally not that sure that molecular motion has more meaning
*ontologically* than heat.
Actually, I agree with you. Of course whatever we can speak or
theorise about is, strictly, entirely epistemological and consequently
On Mar 9, 10:33 pm, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote:
On 9 March 2011 19:09, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
Fine, Peter, have it your way. We can't seem to progress beyond
vocabulary difficulties to the substance.
Unfortunately non-vocabulary differences have to be expressed in
On Mar 9, 7:28 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
On 3/9/2011 8:49 AM, 1Z wrote:
If you have a theory of qualia using primitive matter, and coherent
with comp, then you should be able to use it to extract a flaw in the
UD Argument.
Here's one: minds can be computed,
On Mar 9, 7:22 pm, Evgenii Rudnyi use...@rudnyi.ru wrote:
When you compare heat and molecular motion, first it would be good to
define what molecular motion is.
At the beginning, the molecules and atoms were considered as hard
spheres. At this state, there was the problem as follows. We
On 09 Mar 2011, at 19:10, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 9, 5:56 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
In that sense all right. Comp is the theory which accept as axiom
that
my brain/body is Turing emulable at some level.
But in that sense, comp is a theory of everything. Indeed, it even
makes
On 3/9/2011 4:15 PM, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 9, 7:28 pm, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
On 3/9/2011 8:49 AM, 1Z wrote:
If you have a theory of qualia using primitive matter, and coherent
with comp, then you should be able to use it to extract a flaw in the
UD
On 09 Mar 2011, at 20:09, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 9, 6:00 pm, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote:
On 9 March 2011 17:22, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
The point of eliminativism is that the eliminated thing doesn't
exist
at all.
Just so. At a reduced ontological level, heat doesn't
On 06/03/11 18:07, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Hi Andrew,
On 06 Mar 2011, at 14:14, Andrew Soltau wrote:
Hi Bruno
On 05/03/11 14:46, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 Mar 2011, at 20:10, Andrew Soltau wrote:
I remind you that we are in the everything list which is based on
the idea that everything is
On 06/03/11 15:06, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 4, 5:46 pm, Andrew Soltauandrewsol...@gmail.com wrote:
The measurement problem is the question of why, or even if, collapse
occurs. Certainly no coherent concept of how and why collapse occurs has
been formulated in a manner which meets with general
On 06/03/11 15:19, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 4, 7:10 pm, Andrew Soltauandrewsol...@gmail.com wrote:
I remind you that we are in the everything list which is based on the
idea that everything is simpler than something.
If we take Chalmers and Bitbol seriously, consciousness is a perfectly
symmetrical
On 06/03/11 15:22, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 4, 8:12 pm, Andrew Soltauandrewsol...@gmail.com wrote:
On 04/03/11 19:10, Brent Meeker wrote: Collapse appears to instruments as
well as people
We don't have any evidence for that,
Of course we do
That was a rather blanket statement. But if we can
On 06/03/11 15:27, 1Z wrote:
Clearly it is a universal property of the system in which we find
ourselves, physical or arithmetical.
One philosopher saying something doesn't make it clear
Indeed. Clearly, in this case, it is a universal property of the system
in which we findourselves,
On Mar 8, 1:02 am, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote:
On 8 March 2011 00:11, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
It's rather well known that reductivism and eliminativism are
not equivalent positions, for instance.
snip
And reductive identity theorists say mind is a bunch
of micro
On Mar 8, 11:32 am, Andrew Soltau andrewsol...@gmail.com wrote:
On 06/03/11 15:06, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 4, 5:46 pm, Andrew Soltauandrewsol...@gmail.com wrote:
The measurement problem is the question of why, or even if, collapse
occurs. Certainly no coherent concept of how and why collapse
On 07 Mar 2011, at 21:48, David Nyman wrote:
On 7 March 2011 15:56, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Reduction is not elimination
snip
Ontological reduction does not necessarily entail epistemological
*elimination*, but it does entail ontological *elimination*.
Bruno, this is
On Mar 8, 11:47 am, Andrew Soltau andrewsol...@gmail.com wrote:
On 06/03/11 15:22, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 4, 8:12 pm, Andrew Soltauandrewsol...@gmail.com wrote:
On 04/03/11 19:10, Brent Meeker wrote: Collapse appears to instruments
as well as people
We don't have any evidence for that,
On Mar 8, 1:43 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 07 Mar 2011, at 21:48, David Nyman wrote:
On 7 March 2011 15:56, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Reduction is not elimination
snip
Ontological reduction does not necessarily entail epistemological
*elimination*,
On 3/8/2011 10:41 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
We could start with lambda terms, or combinators instead. A
computation (of phi_4(5) is just a sequence
phi_4^0 (5) phi_4^1 (5) phi_4^2 (5) phi_4^3 (5) phi_4^4 (5)
phi_4^5 (5) phi_4^6 (5) ...
_4 is the program. 5 is the input. ^i is the ith
On 8 March 2011 12:16, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
There are uncontroversial examples of successful reduction, eg
the reduction of heat to molecular motion. In these cases
the reduced phenomenon still exists. There is still such
a thing as heat. People who sincerely think mind is
On Mar 8, 9:15 pm, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote:
On 8 March 2011 12:16, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
There are uncontroversial examples of successful reduction, eg
the reduction of heat to molecular motion. In these cases
the reduced phenomenon still exists. There is still
On 8 March 2011 23:42, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
How can they fail to be composite when they include interactions,
structures and bindings? What ***are*** you on about?
Say there is a pile of bricks that, under some externally-applied
description, could be construed as a house; then that
On Mar 9, 1:03 am, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote:
On 8 March 2011 23:42, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
How can they fail to be composite when they include interactions,
structures and bindings? What ***are*** you on about?
Say there is a pile of bricks that, under some
On 08 Mar 2011, at 20:11, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/8/2011 10:41 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
We could start with lambda terms, or combinators instead. A
computation (of phi_4(5) is just a sequence
phi_4^0 (5) phi_4^1 (5) phi_4^2 (5) phi_4^3 (5) phi_4^4 (5)
phi_4^5 (5) phi_4^6 (5) ...
On 08 Mar 2011, at 15:54, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 8, 1:43 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 07 Mar 2011, at 21:48, David Nyman wrote:
On 7 March 2011 15:56, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Reduction is not elimination
snip
Ontological reduction does not necessarily
of the
strongness of its provability predicate (the B in the hypostases)).
Have a good day,
Bruno
-Original Message-
From: Brent Meeker Sent: Sunday, March 06, 2011 3:09 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: ON THE THEORY OF EVERYTHING was Another TOE short paper
On 3/6/2011 7
On 06 Mar 2011, at 16:16, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 4, 5:49 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 04 Mar 2011, at 17:31, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 4, 2:20 pm, Andrew Soltau andrewsol...@gmail.com wrote:
I suspect we all may.
Wong states that, important as a grand unified theory might be,
...
On Mar 7, 9:30 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 06 Mar 2011, at 16:16, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 4, 5:49 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 04 Mar 2011, at 17:31, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 4, 2:20 pm, Andrew Soltau andrewsol...@gmail.com wrote:
I suspect we all may.
Wong
On 07 Mar 2011, at 15:10, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 7, 9:30 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 06 Mar 2011, at 16:16, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 4, 5:49 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 04 Mar 2011, at 17:31, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 4, 2:20 pm, Andrew Soltau andrewsol...@gmail.com
On Mar 7, 2:52 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
You haven;t explained why they should be dealing with
consc. in the first place. Surely it is prima facie psychology.
There is no human observation without consciousness.
There can be no observations without sense organs,
but it
On 07 Mar 2011, at 16:12, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 7, 2:52 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
You haven;t explained why they should be dealing with
consc. in the first place. Surely it is prima facie psychology.
There is no human observation without consciousness.
There can be no
On 07 Mar 2011, at 16:41, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 07 Mar 2011, at 16:12, 1Z wrote:
Reduction is not elimination
Ontological reduction does not necessarily entail epistemological
reduction, but it does entail ontological reduction.
Please read:
Ontological reduction does not
On 7 March 2011 15:56, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Reduction is not elimination
snip
Ontological reduction does not necessarily entail epistemological
*elimination*, but it does entail ontological *elimination*.
Bruno, this is what I was trying to say some time ago to Peter. Why
On Mar 7, 8:48 pm, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote:
On 7 March 2011 15:56, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Reduction is not elimination
snip
Ontological reduction does not necessarily entail epistemological
*elimination*, but it does entail ontological *elimination*.
On 8 March 2011 00:11, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
It's rather well known that reductivism and eliminativism are
not equivalent positions, for instance.
snip
And reductive identity theorists say mind is a bunch
of micro physical goings-on, whereas their eliminativist
opponents say mind
Hi Bruno
On 05/03/11 14:46, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 Mar 2011, at 20:10, Andrew Soltau wrote:
I remind you that we are in the everything list which is based on
the idea that everything is simpler than something.
If we take Chalmers and Bitbol seriously, consciousness is a
perfectly
On Mar 4, 5:46 pm, Andrew Soltau andrewsol...@gmail.com wrote:
The measurement problem is the question of why, or even if, collapse
occurs. Certainly no coherent concept of how and why collapse occurs has
been formulated in a manner which meets with general acceptance. It
appears, as Davies
On Mar 4, 5:49 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 04 Mar 2011, at 17:31, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 4, 2:20 pm, Andrew Soltau andrewsol...@gmail.com wrote:
I suspect we all may.
Wong states that, important as a grand unified theory might be,
... it
is lacking in one important
On Mar 4, 7:10 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
Collapse appears to instruments as well as people - that's why we can
shared records of experiments and agree on them. I'm not sure what you
mean by account for collapse. At least one interpretation of QM,
advocated by Peres,
On Mar 4, 7:10 pm, Andrew Soltau andrewsol...@gmail.com wrote:
I remind you that we are in the everything list which is based on the
idea that everything is simpler than something.
If we take Chalmers and Bitbol seriously, consciousness is a perfectly
symmetrical emergent property of the
On Mar 4, 8:12 pm, Andrew Soltau andrewsol...@gmail.com wrote:
On 04/03/11 19:10, Brent Meeker wrote: Collapse appears to instruments as
well as people
We don't have any evidence for that,
Of course we do
indeed, if we take either the
concept of Wigner's friend or Rovelli's RQM
On Mar 6, 1:14 pm, Andrew Soltau andrewsol...@gmail.com wrote:
Hi Bruno
On 05/03/11 14:46, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 Mar 2011, at 20:10, Andrew Soltau wrote:
I remind you that we are in the everything list which is based on
the idea that everything is simpler than something.
If we
Hi Andrew,
On 06 Mar 2011, at 14:14, Andrew Soltau wrote:
Hi Bruno
On 05/03/11 14:46, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 Mar 2011, at 20:10, Andrew Soltau wrote:
I remind you that we are in the everything list which is based on
the idea that everything is simpler than something.
If we take
On 3/6/2011 7:16 AM, 1Z wrote:
It is. In the collapse theory, it has to be the collapser (the other
theories are too vague, or refuted).
Not at all. Objective collapse theories such as GRW have not been
refuted,
and spiritual interpretations, like von Neumann's are the vagues of
the lot
On 3/6/2011 7:18 AM, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 4, 7:10 pm, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
Collapse appears to instruments as well as people - that's why we can
shared records of experiments and agree on them. I'm not sure what you
mean by account for collapse. At least one
*Brent,*
*I agree with most of your statements (whatver value this may have...) Let
me interject below.*
*John M
*
On Sun, Mar 6, 2011 at 3:06 PM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.comwrote:
On 3/6/2011 7:16 AM, 1Z wrote:
It is. In the collapse theory, it has to be the collapser (the other
-Original Message-
From: Brent Meeker Sent: Sunday, March 06, 2011 3:09 PM To:
everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: ON THE THEORY OF EVERYTHING
was Another TOE short paper
On 3/6/2011 7:18 AM, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 4, 7:10 pm, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote
).
**
Best
John M
*
*
-Original Message-
From: Brent Meeker Sent: Sunday, March 06, 2011 3:09 PM To:
everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: ON THE THEORY OF EVERYTHING
was Another TOE short paper
On 3/6/2011 7:18 AM, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 4, 7:10 pm, Brent Meekermeeke
On 04 Mar 2011, at 20:10, Andrew Soltau wrote:
I remind you that we are in the everything list which is based on
the idea that everything is simpler than something.
If we take Chalmers and Bitbol seriously, consciousness is a
perfectly symmetrical emergent property of the Everything, and
I suspect we all may.
Wong states that, important as a grand unified theory might be, ... it
is lacking in one important fundamental aspect, viz., the role of
consciousness [which] could in fact be considered the most fundamental
aspect of physics.
Given that conciousness seems all too
On Mar 4, 2:20 pm, Andrew Soltau andrewsol...@gmail.com wrote:
I suspect we all may.
Wong states that, important as a grand unified theory might be, ... it
is lacking in one important fundamental aspect, viz., the role of
consciousness [which] could in fact be considered the most
On 04 Mar 2011, at 17:31, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 4, 2:20 pm, Andrew Soltau andrewsol...@gmail.com wrote:
I suspect we all may.
Wong states that, important as a grand unified theory might be,
... it
is lacking in one important fundamental aspect, viz., the role of
consciousness [which] could
On 3/4/2011 6:20 AM, Andrew Soltau wrote:
I suspect we all may.
Wong states that, important as a grand unified theory might be, ...
it is lacking in one important fundamental aspect, viz., the role of
consciousness [which] could in fact be considered the most fundamental
aspect of physics.
Collapse appears to instruments as well as people - that's why we can
shared records of experiments and agree on them. I'm not sure what you
mean by account for collapse. At least one interpretation of QM,
advocated by Peres, Fuchs, and Omnes for example, is that the collapse
is purely
I remind you that we are in the everything list which is based on the
idea that everything is simpler than something.
If we take Chalmers and Bitbol seriously, consciousness is a perfectly
symmetrical emergent property of the Everything, and you can't get much
simpler than that.
--
You
On 04/03/11 19:10, Brent Meeker wrote:
Collapse appears to instruments as well as people
We don't have any evidence for that, indeed, if we take either the
concept of Wigner's friend or Rovelli's RQM seriously, this is not the
case.
- that's why we can shared records of experiments and agree
Although the moments, as defined by Everett's formulation, must have
overlapping definitions,
The new metaphor perfectly reflects one aspect of the situation. The
experiential state, meaning the contents of the sensorium, is in all
likelihood updated in exactly such a way. At the same time,
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