On 05 Feb 2011, at 12:08, Andrew Soltau wrote:
On 05/02/11 01:11, David Nyman wrote:
Bruno's argument is that if we nail our colours to computation for
an explanation of mind, then we should expect any physics extracted
from it to have just such counter-intuitive characteristics.
Hi David
On 06 Feb 2011, at 23:15, Andrew Soltau wrote:
Hi Bruno
I will attempt to define the terms in a manner satisfactory to both
of us, and maybe we will understand each other this way.
CTM Computational Theory of Mind is the concept that the mind
literally is a digital computer ... and that
Hi Bruno
So you can see that comp, as defined in sane04, is a weaker version of
CTM. (And thus all consequences of comp are inherit by CTM).
Certainly it is clear that your /yes doctor/ hypothesis subsumes CTM.
But since it is a broader proposition, I fail to see why all
consequences of
Hi Andrew,
On 07 Feb 2011, at 19:13, Andrew Soltau wrote:
Hi Bruno
So you can see that comp, as defined in sane04, is a weaker version
of CTM. (And thus all consequences of comp are inherit by CTM).
Certainly it is clear that your yes doctor hypothesis subsumes CTM.
Not after step
On 06 Feb 2011, at 01:02, 1Z wrote:
On Feb 5, 8:44 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
That's my point, COMP does not add more white rabbits from this pov.
I dare say. But the Mathematical Multiverses do add a lot more WRs
than
physical multiverses.
Prove this.
Once you take
On 06/02/11 08:51, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 Feb 2011, at 01:02, 1Z wrote:
On Feb 5, 8:44 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
That's my point, COMP does not add more white rabbits from this pov.
I dare say. But the Mathematical Multiverses do add a lot more WRs
than
physical
On Feb 6, 8:51 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 06 Feb 2011, at 01:02, 1Z wrote:
On Feb 5, 8:44 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
That's my point, COMP does not add more white rabbits from this pov.
I dare say. But the Mathematical Multiverses do add a lot
On 06 Feb 2011, at 12:26, Andrew Soltau wrote:
On 06/02/11 08:51, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 Feb 2011, at 01:02, 1Z wrote:
On Feb 5, 8:44 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
That's my point, COMP does not add more white rabbits from this
pov.
I dare say. But the
On 06 Feb 2011, at 16:30, 1Z wrote:
On Feb 6, 8:51 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 06 Feb 2011, at 01:02, 1Z wrote:
On Feb 5, 8:44 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
That's my point, COMP does not add more white rabbits from this
pov.
I dare say. But the
On Feb 6, 5:30 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 06 Feb 2011, at 16:30, 1Z wrote:
On Feb 6, 8:51 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 06 Feb 2011, at 01:02, 1Z wrote:
On Feb 5, 8:44 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
That's my point, COMP does not
Hi Bruno
I will attempt to define the terms in a manner satisfactory to both of
us, and maybe we will understand each other this way.
CTM Computational Theory of Mind is the concept that the mind literally
is a digital computer ... and that thought literally is a kind of
computation.
from
On 04 Feb 2011, at 20:34, Andrew Soltau wrote:
On 04/02/11 19:22, David Nyman wrote:
On 4 February 2011 18:44, Andrew
Soltauandrewsol...@googlemail.com wrote:
From my perspective this debate / clarification is getting lost in
language
problems.
Given that a universal dovetailer must
On 05/02/11 01:11, David Nyman wrote:
Bruno's argument is that if we nail our colours to computation for
an explanation of mind, then we should expect any physics extracted
from it to have just such counter-intuitive characteristics.
Hi David
Thanks, this too is very helpful.
'Looking at'
On 05/02/11 09:55, Bruno Marchal wrote:
If the primitively physical universe does the filtering, then it
cannot contain an omega point, given that it will reproduce, as you
said, a universal dovetailing, and so the indeterminacy on my
computational continuations will bear on that dovetailing,
On 05 Feb 2011, at 12:12, Andrew Soltau wrote:
On 05/02/11 09:55, Bruno Marchal wrote:
If the primitively physical universe does the filtering, then it
cannot contain an omega point, given that it will reproduce, as you
said, a universal dovetailing, and so the indeterminacy on my
On Feb 4, 12:45 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2011/2/4 Andrew Soltau andrewsol...@googlemail.com
I did answer to that... the answer is because you are in that environment...
That's not answer. There are physical constraints on which enviroment
a complex entity could find
in MWI (and QM) you have WR, so in the multiverse there exists at every
moments splitting or differentiation to random universe, so the question of
what filter it out remains (if MWI is true)...
What I want to say is the answer is because *you* are in that environment,
you the consciousness, the
On Feb 5, 1:08 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
in MWI (and QM) you have WR, so in the multiverse there exists at every
moments splitting or differentiation to random universe, so the question of
what filter it out remains (if MWI is true)...
What I want to say is the answer is
On 05 Feb 2011, at 12:08, Andrew Soltau wrote:
On 05/02/11 01:11, David Nyman wrote:
Bruno's argument is that if we nail our colours to computation for
an explanation of mind, then we should expect any physics extracted
from it to have just such counter-intuitive characteristics.
Hi David
On Feb 5, 10:07 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
On 2/5/2011 12:44 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2011/2/5 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com mailto:peterdjo...@yahoo.com
On Feb 5, 1:08 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com
mailto:allco...@gmail.com wrote:
in MWI
Hi Bruno
In step seven what is proved is that
MEC + 'big universe' entails that physic is a branch of computer
science.
Do you see that?
I have no problem with the concept that psychology is a branch of
computer science.
Step 5 plays the big role there. You don't need to be annihilated
Hi,
2011/2/4 Andrew Soltau andrewsol...@googlemail.com
Hi Bruno
In step seven what is proved is that
MEC + 'big universe' entails that physic is a branch of computer science.
Do you see that?
I have no problem with the concept that psychology is a branch of computer
science.
Step
On 04/02/11 09:44, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Hi,
2011/2/4 Andrew Soltau andrewsol...@googlemail.com
mailto:andrewsol...@googlemail.com
Hi Bruno
In step seven what is proved is that
MEC + 'big universe' entails that physic is a branch of
computer science.
2011/2/4 Andrew Soltau andrewsol...@googlemail.com
On 04/02/11 09:44, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Hi,
2011/2/4 Andrew Soltau andrewsol...@googlemail.com
Hi Bruno
In step seven what is proved is that
MEC + 'big universe' entails that physic is a branch of computer
science.
Do you see
On 04 Feb 2011, at 10:29, Andrew Soltau wrote:
Hi Bruno
In step seven what is proved is that
MEC + 'big universe' entails that physic is a branch of computer
science.
Do you see that?
I have no problem with the concept that psychology is a branch of
computer science.
?
The point
On 04 Feb 2011, at 13:43, Andrew Soltau wrote:
'White Rabbits' is Bruno's shorthand for physically impossible
observations. At least, as I understand it.
Not really. Just subjective aberrance. Like seeing a white rabbit with
clothes and looking at his clock and saying too late, too
From my perspective this debate / clarification is getting lost in
language problems.
Given that a universal dovetailer must necessarily produce *all*
experiential realities, all possible experiencable moments, how do you
account for our endlessly repeated observations of an experiential
On 4 February 2011 18:44, Andrew Soltau andrewsol...@googlemail.com wrote:
From my perspective this debate / clarification is getting lost in language
problems.
Given that a universal dovetailer must necessarily produce *all*
experiential realities, all possible experiencable moments, how do
On 04/02/11 19:22, David Nyman wrote:
On 4 February 2011 18:44, Andrew Soltauandrewsol...@googlemail.com wrote:
From my perspective this debate / clarification is getting lost in language
problems.
Given that a universal dovetailer must necessarily produce *all*
experiential realities, all
Hi David
I have just been trawling the list, and found your wonderfully clear
summary:
As I've understood Bruno over the years, he has
never asserted that comp(utational science) necessarily is the
fundamental science of body and mind. Rather, he is saying that IF
computational science is
On 4 February 2011 19:59, Andrew Soltau andrewsol...@googlemail.com wrote:
Your revelation that ' Maudlin uses this result to reject CTM, and Bruno
follows the opposite tack of rejecting materialism. ' makes things very much
clearer for me, I had got seriously bogged down in all this.
My
On 01/02/11 20:07, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But it gives only all possible experiential realities, and even if
these are by chance consistent with a physical quantum environment up
to a certain point, it is tremendously unlikely that at each moment
they will continue to be so.
If you prove
On 01/02/11 20:07, Bruno Marchal wrote:
In step 8 you state that 'a “physical universe” really “exists” and
is too little in the sense of not being able to generate the entire
UD*, nor any reasonable portions of it,'. However, if we adopt
Tipler's Omega point scenario, we get infinite
On 03 Feb 2011, at 11:28, Andrew Soltau wrote:
On 01/02/11 20:07, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But it gives only all possible experiential realities, and even if
these are by chance consistent with a physical quantum environment
up to a certain point, it is tremendously unlikely that at each
On 03 Feb 2011, at 12:05, Andrew Soltau wrote:
On 01/02/11 20:07, Bruno Marchal wrote:
In step 8 you state that 'a “physical universe” really “exists”
and is too little in the sense of not being able to generate the
entire UD*, nor any reasonable portions of it,'. However, if we
adopt
Andrew,
Let me try to be a little more precise or helpful.
I just said,
On 03 Feb 2011, at 15:15, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Yes, but your point in step 8 is that a physical universe is *too
little*, but with omega point it is not too little, it is as rich
as arithmetically possible.
Not at
On Mon, Jan 31, 2011 at 03:29:52PM -0800, Travis Garrett wrote:
Hi Russell,
No problem at all - I myself confess to having skimmed papers in
the past, perhaps even in the last 5 minutes... That I took a bit of
umbrage just shows that I haven't yet transcended into a being of pure
On 27/01/11 17:44, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 25 Jan 2011, at 18:24, Andrew Soltau wrote:
On 24/01/11 21:35, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Thanks for all this. I will do some reading and then go through the
points again. And get back to you.
You are welcome. Ask any question.
Bruno
On 31 Jan 2011, at 12:44, Andrew Soltau wrote:
On 27/01/11 17:44, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 25 Jan 2011, at 18:24, Andrew Soltau wrote:
On 24/01/11 21:35, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Thanks for all this. I will do some reading and then go through
the points again. And get back to you.
You are
Hi Russell,
No problem at all - I myself confess to having skimmed papers in
the past, perhaps even in the last 5 minutes... That I took a bit of
umbrage just shows that I haven't yet transcended into a being of pure
thought :-)
Let me address your 3rd paragraph first. Consider the
On Thu, Jan 27, 2011 at 02:32:15PM -0800, Travis Garrett wrote:
I am somewhat flabbergasted by Russell's response. He says that he is
completely unimpressed - uh, ok, fine - but then he completely
ignores entire sections of the paper where I precisely address the
issues he raises. Going back
On 25 Jan 2011, at 18:24, Andrew Soltau wrote:
On 24/01/11 21:35, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Thanks for all this. I will do some reading and then go through the
points again. And get back to you.
You are welcome. Ask any question.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received
I am somewhat flabbergasted by Russell's response. He says that he is
completely unimpressed - uh, ok, fine - but then he completely
ignores entire sections of the paper where I precisely address the
issues he raises. Going back to the abstract I say:
We then argue that the observers
-Original Message-
From: Travis Garrett
Sent: Thursday, January 27, 2011 5:32 PM
To: Everything List
Subject: Re: Observers and Church/Turing
I am somewhat flabbergasted by Russell's response. He says that he is
completely unimpressed - uh, ok, fine - but then he completely
ignores entire sections
On Wed, Jan 12, 2011 at 04:56:00AM -0800, ronaldheld wrote:
http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/arxiv/pdf/1101/1101.2198v1.pdf
Any comments?
Ronald
I finally got around to reading. I am completely unimpressed. Two
points:
1) His use of Physical Church-Turing Thesis
On 24/01/11 21:35, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Thanks for all this. I will do some reading and then go through the
points again. And get back to you.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to
On 22 Jan 2011, at 17:22, Andrew Soltau wrote:
On 22/01/11 08:44, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Hi Andrew,
On 21 Jan 2011, at 16:08, Andrew Soltau wrote:
Hi
I have an answer to the nature of the relation between the first-
person and specific third-person phenomena. It is based very
simply
On 22/01/11 08:44, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Hi Andrew,
On 21 Jan 2011, at 16:08, Andrew Soltau wrote:
Hi
I have an answer to the nature of the relation between the
first-person and specific third-person phenomena. It is based very
simply on logical type. Here's the concept as brief as I can
Hi
I have an answer to the nature of the relation between the first-person
and specific third-person phenomena. It is based very simply on logical
type. Here's the concept as brief as I can make it.
As Deutsch, Barbour, Davies, and others hold, the universe is clearly
static. Relativity
On Jan 12, 10:50 pm, Colin Hales c.ha...@pgrad.unimelb.edu.au wrote:
I confess to the usual level of exasperation. Yet again the great
culturally maintained mental block subverts real progress. And, yet
again, the participant doesn;t even know they are doing it. Garrett
says
/The key
On 14 Jan 2011, at 06:55, Colin Hales wrote:
Hi David,
I think feisty/curmudgeon is more apt than fierce... but yeah ... :-)
RE: In other words, what is the relation, in your theory,
between the first-person and specific third-person phenomena?
Right to it eh? Call the two perspective 1-P
Hi David,
I think feisty/curmudgeon is more apt than fierce... but yeah ... :-)
RE: In other words, what is the relation, in your theory,
between the first-person and specific third-person phenomena?
Right to it eh? Call the two perspective 1-P and 3P
OK. First, there may be a bit of a
http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/arxiv/pdf/1101/1101.2198v1.pdf
Any comments?
Ronald
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com.
To
-Original Message-
From: ronaldheld
Sent: Wednesday, January 12, 2011 7:56 AM
To: Everything List
Subject: Observers and Church/Turing
http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/arxiv/pdf/1101/1101.2198v1.pdf
Any comments?
Ronald
--
You received this message
I confess to the usual level of exasperation. Yet again the great
culturally maintained mental block subverts real progress. And, yet
again, the participant doesn;t even know they are doing it. Garrett
says
/The key is that observers are just a particular type of information,
as is
Gawd, I've missed you Colin, you fierce old thing! Is it wet where
you are or is the inundation confined to poor old Brisbane?
I suppose you know that Bruno and you agree (at least in my estimation
of your lines of argument) that observation is the key phenomenon to
be explained at the outset,
56 matches
Mail list logo