On method. The applicability of comp and Leibniz to the fleshly brain
Hi Bruno Marchal I am not a mathematician, my background is in physical science (metallurgy) and of laboratory results therein. So I have a problem keeping up. But I think I can say this: Ultimately, IMHO any math or mental abstractions based on the fleshly brain have to be also true for the fleshly brain. The problem is perhaps that the fleshly brain is in , the abstractions in []. I suppose that logically one could use []p. I don't know how one could do this, so to begin with, one could keep operating as usual, by assuming that comp and monads both apply to all brain activity. And in addition, IMHO if you want to also use Leibniz's monads, these must also be associated to appropriate parts of the fleshly brain. A simple form of this would be to at first use a functional account of the brain, and the tripartite brain model (bdi, or belief, desire, intention). Later on, there can be more than one of each type according to what neuroscience tells us. Magnetic resonance imaging could be used to label each functionally different brain area of b,d, and i. So you have a Venn diagram of three circles with the fleshly brain as the central circle with some overlap on either side with comp and monadology. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 11/27/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-23, 11:54:57 Subject: Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation On 22 Nov 2012, at 18:38, Stephen P. King wrote: How exactly does the comparison occur? By comparing the logic of the observable inferred from observation (the quantum logic based on the algebra of the observable/linear positive operators) and the logic obtained from the arithmetical quantization, which exists already. How does the comparison occur? I will not ask what or who is involved, only how. What means exists to compare and contrast a pair of logics? The logic exists, because, by UDA, when translated in arithmetic, makes a relative physical certainty into a true Sigma_1 sentence, which has to be provable, and consistent. So the observability with measure one is given by []p = Bp Dt p, with p arithmetical sigma_1 (this is coherent with the way the physical reality has to be redefined through UDA). Then the quantum logic is given by the quantization []p, thanks to the law p - []p, and this makes possible to reverse the Goldblatt modal translation of quantum logic into arithmetic. Comparison is used in the everyday sense. Just look if we get the quantum propositions, new one, different one, etc. Comp seems to necessitate all possible physical worlds in an equiprobable way. ? Does not comp require all possible 1p to exist? Comp makes all possible 1p existing in arithmetic, from the possible arithmetical pov. There is a deep problem with notions of priors as it seems that we cannot escape from the problem of subjectivity as we see in the (so-called) anthropic principle: each observer will necessarily find itself in a world what has laws compatible with its existence. It seems to me that the observational act itself is a breaking of the perfect symmetry of equiprobability of possible worlds. ? But this claim implies violence to the idea of a 3p. I found at http://higgo.com/qti/Mallah.htm an exchange between Mallah and Standish that seems to illustrate this problem: Russell Standish: The predictions can easily depend of the 'picture' but must be consistent with each other. Let me give a simple example: In one picture, observer A decides to measure the spin of an electron in the x direction. In the other, observer B decides to measure the spin of the electron in the y direction. Observer A will see the spin of the electron aligned with x axis, and Observer B will see it aligned with the y axis. Both observations are correct in the first person picture of that observer. A person with the third person perspective, sees observers A and B as inhabiting separate `worlds' of a multiverse, each with appropriate measure that can be computed from Quantum Mechanics. Jacques Mallah: On the contrary, this is a textbook example of the way I said it works. The theory predicts some measure distribution of observers; an individual observer sees an observation drawn from that distribution. There are no different sets of predictions for different pictures, just the measure distribution and the sample from it. Russell Standish: It sounds to me like you don't think the prediction changes according to what the observer chooses to observe? An electron cannot have its spin aligned with the x axis and the y axis at the same time. Once the experimenter has chosen which direction to measure the spin, the history of that particular is observer is constrained by that fact, and the predictions of QM
Re: On method. The applicability of comp and Leibniz to the fleshly brain
On 27 Nov 2012, at 11:55, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal I am not a mathematician, my background is in physical science (metallurgy) and of laboratory results therein. So I have a problem keeping up. But I think I can say this: Ultimately, IMHO any math or mental abstractions based on the fleshly brain have to be also true for the fleshly brain. The problem is perhaps that the fleshly brain is in , the abstractions in []. I suppose that logically one could use []p. Hmm... You are too quick here. I can see the idea though, but to answer this precisely would be long, and premature. I don't know how one could do this, so to begin with, one could keep operating as usual, by assuming that comp and monads both apply to all brain activity. I think that the monads might be just the number, but seen relatively to some universal number, and so they are programs. the supreme monads is then played by the universal number. You need a universal system to start, and arithmetic is handy for that, conceptually. And in addition, IMHO if you want to also use Leibniz's monads, these must also be associated to appropriate parts of the fleshly brain. The fleshy brain is associate with infinities of computations. It includes all the different computations going thorugh your mind state, but that you cannot distinguish from you 1p view. There is an infinity of such computations in arithmetic. A simple form of this would be to at first use a functional account of the brain, and the tripartite brain model (bdi, or belief, desire, intention). Later on, there can be more than one of each type according to what neuroscience tells us. Magnetic resonance imaging could be used to label each functionally different brain area of b,d, and i. So you have a Venn diagram of three circles with the fleshly brain as the central circle with some overlap on either side with comp and monadology. I reason from comp, and then look how make sense of what we can observe. here you are too fuzzy, and probably have not yet see that fleshy is an emergent pattern in the dream of the numbers, not something existing in some primitive reality. That's the point of reasoning assuming comp. Bruno [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 11/27/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-23, 11:54:57 Subject: Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation On 22 Nov 2012, at 18:38, Stephen P. King wrote: How exactly does the comparison occur? By comparing the logic of the observable inferred from observation (the quantum logic based on the algebra of the observable/linear positive operators) and the logic obtained from the arithmetical quantization, which exists already. How does the comparison occur? I will not ask what or who is involved, only how. What means exists to compare and contrast a pair of logics? The logic exists, because, by UDA, when translated in arithmetic, makes a relative physical certainty into a true Sigma_1 sentence, which has to be provable, and consistent. So the observability with measure one is given by []p = Bp Dt p, with p arithmetical sigma_1 (this is coherent with the way the physical reality has to be redefined through UDA). Then the quantum logic is given by the quantization []p, thanks to the law p - []p, and this makes possible to reverse the Goldblatt modal translation of quantum logic into arithmetic. Comparison is used in the everyday sense. Just look if we get the quantum propositions, new one, different one, etc. Comp seems to necessitate all possible physical worlds in an equiprobable way. ? Does not comp require all possible 1p to exist? Comp makes all possible 1p existing in arithmetic, from the possible arithmetical pov. There is a deep problem with notions of priors as it seems that we cannot escape from the problem of subjectivity as we see in the (so-called) anthropic principle: each observer will necessarily find itself in a world what has laws compatible with its existence. It seems to me that the observational act itself is a breaking of the perfect symmetry of equiprobability of possible worlds. ? But this claim implies violence to the idea of a 3p. I found at http://higgo.com/qti/Mallah.htm an exchange between Mallah and Standish that seems to illustrate this problem: Russell Standish: The predictions can easily depend of the 'picture' but must be consistent with each other. Let me give a simple example: In one picture, observer A decides to measure the spin of an electron in the x direction. In the other, observer B decides to measure the spin of the electron in the y direction. Observer A will see the spin of the electron aligned with x axis,
