Re: Re: One more nail in comp's coffin.
Hi Jason Resch No, have proven solipsism. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/24/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Jason Resch Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-23, 10:30:37 Subject: Re: One more nail in comp's coffin. On Mon, Oct 22, 2012 at 8:50 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno, My own subjectivity is 1p. I don't believe a computer can have consciousness, but suppose we let the computer have consciousness as well. Let a descriptor be 3p. Let my consciousness = 1p But the computer's consciousness would be different, say 1p' -- because, let's say, it's less intelligent than I am. Or it's not travelled around the world as I have. Or it is only 3 years old. I've only used it for 3 years. Or it is Christian while I am a pagan. Or it is a materialist while I follow Leibniz. Or I am drunk and it is sober. Then the meaning of the 3p to me = 1p(3p). The meaning of the 3p to the computer = 1p'(3p). These obviously aren't ?oing to be the same. So comp can't work or work with any reliability. You could use this same argument to disprove the consciousness of every other person on earth. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: One more nail in comp's coffin.
On Oct 24, 2012, at 6:33 AM, Roger Cloughrclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi Jason Resch No, have proven solipsism. What? Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/24/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Jason Resch Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-23, 10:30:37 Subject: Re: One more nail in comp's coffin. On Mon, Oct 22, 2012 at 8:50 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno, My own subjectivity is 1p. I don't believe a computer can have consciousness, but suppose we let the computer have consciousness as well. Let a descriptor be 3p. Let my consciousness = 1p But the computer's consciousness would be different, say 1p' -- because, let's say, it's less intelligent than I am. Or it's not travelled around the world as I have. Or it is only 3 years old. I've only used it for 3 years. Or it is Christian while I am a pagan. Or it is a materialist while I follow Leibniz. Or I am drunk and it is sober. Then the meaning of the 3p to me = 1p(3p). The meaning of the 3p to the computer = 1p'(3p). These obviously aren't ?oing to be the same. So comp can't work or work with any reliability. You could use this same argument to disprove the consciousness of every other person on earth. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: One more nail in comp's coffin.
On Mon, Oct 22, 2012 at 8:50 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi Bruno, My own subjectivity is 1p. I don't believe a computer can have consciousness, but suppose we let the computer have consciousness as well. Let a descriptor be 3p. Let my consciousness = 1p But the computer's consciousness would be different, say 1p' -- because, let's say, it's less intelligent than I am. Or it's not travelled around the world as I have. Or it is only 3 years old. I've only used it for 3 years. Or it is Christian while I am a pagan. Or it is a materialist while I follow Leibniz. Or I am drunk and it is sober. Then the meaning of the 3p to me = 1p(3p). The meaning of the 3p to the computer = 1p'(3p). These obviously aren't going to be the same. So comp can't work or work with any reliability. You could use this same argument to disprove the consciousness of every other person on earth. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
One more nail in comp's coffin.
Hi Bruno, My own subjectivity is 1p. I don't believe a computer can have consciousness, but suppose we let the computer have consciousness as well. Let a descriptor be 3p. Let my consciousness = 1p But the computer's consciousness would be different, say 1p' -- because, let's say, it's less intelligent than I am. Or it's not travelled around the world as I have. Or it is only 3 years old. I've only used it for 3 years. Or it is Christian while I am a pagan. Or it is a materialist while I follow Leibniz. Or I am drunk and it is sober. Then the meaning of the 3p to me = 1p(3p). The meaning of the 3p to the computer = 1p'(3p). These obviously aren't going to be the same. So comp can't work or work with any reliability. On Monday, October 22, 2012 3:00:29 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote: Hi Craig Weinberg Good. But I think either you have to be more specific about your definitions or else specify more broadly, like in terms of categories. http://multisenserealism.com Also, your definition of thought is a good step, but I myself want to know how thinking is done. What is thinking ? Thinking, strictly speaking, doesn't have a what or a how. Thinking has a who and a why. How do you move your arm? How does something funny make you laugh? These are experienced events which can be caused by physiological events or the physiological events can be caused by experience. They are the same thing, only one view is public facing and reduced to objects in space and the other is private facing and lacking certain description. Thinking is a trick which allows us to personally experience what we could otherwise could not personally experience. It is virtual or meta-feeling; an algebraic substitution of feeling: It is the experience of If there is an experience of X. Craig Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net 10/22/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen --- - Receiving the following content - From: Craig Weinberg Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-21, 10:06:21 Subject: Re: Re: The Peirce-Leibniz triads Ver. 2 On Sunday, October 21, 2012 7:19:42 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote: CRAIG: Cool Roger, It mostly makes sense to me, except I don't understand why I. is associated with objects and substance when it is feeling, perception, and first person quale. ROGER: It is not uncommon to find such objective/subjective dyslexia in the literature. This stuff is hard to get a hold of. It can be, yeah, although my model makes it really easy. Subject and object are poles on a continuum, with private, proprietary, solipsistic, trans-rational sense qualities on the East (Orienting) end and public, generic, nihilistic, logical realism quantities on the Western end. In the center region between the two poles, subjectivity and objectivity are clearly discernible as inner and outer body/world perception (I call this the mundane fold as it is like a crease which acts as a barrier). In the edge region, the East and West actually meet in the sort of transcendental oblivion of subjective union with the ultimate (nirvana, satori, enlightenment, etc) CRAIG: To me, thinking is just as much first person as feeling, and they both are subjective qualia. Thinking is a meta-quale of feeling (which is a meta-quale of awarenessperceptionsensationsense) ROGER: Actually I have yet to find a clear or useful definition of thinking (how it works). In fact Wittgenstein at one point said that he does not know what thinking is (!). But I believe you have to think if you compare objects across an equals sign, so comparison (a dyad) seems to me to be a basic type of thinking. A think a comparison is a basic type of everything. As luck would have it, I just posted this definition for what a thought is yesterday: What exactly is a thought? A thought is a private, personal, directly participatory narrative subjective experience which is typically expressed in a verbal-gestural sense modality (as words or feelings easily converted to words by an agency of proprietary interior voice). Thoughts can be discerned from images, awareness, and perception by their potential purposefulness; they serve as the seeds for public action. Generally public actions which are understood to be voluntary are assumed to be the consequence of private thoughts. Behaviors which are ?houghtless? are deemed to be unconscious, subconscious, accidental, or socially impaired. CRAIG: That puts the whole subjective enchilada as Firstness and leaves objects and substance to Secondness. This is Self-Body distinction. What you have is like Lower-Self/Higher- Self distinction but with objects kind of shoehorned in there. Once you see matter as a public extension and self as a private intention,
