Le 06-juil.-05, à 00:56, Russell Standish a écrit :
You are right, my apologies. I read the necessitation rule backwards
in your thesis. You do in fact say P = []P. I'll take your word for
it that consistency destroys necessitation, but I don't have the
intuitive understanding of it yet. Never
On Sun, Jun 26, 2005 at 05:30:08PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
This reminds me of something I wanted to ask you Bruno. In your
work
you axiomatise knowledge and end up with various logical systems
that
describe variously 1st person knowledge, 1st person communicable
knowledge,
Le 05-juil.-05, à 09:39, Russell Standish a écrit :
On Sun, Jun 26, 2005 at 05:30:08PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
This reminds me of something I wanted to ask you Bruno. In your
work
you axiomatise knowledge and end up with various logical systems
that
describe variously 1st person
On Tue, Jul 05, 2005 at 12:09:24PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
How does it give the logic of temporal knowledge? I understand from
your points below, that the necessitation rule is necessary for Kripke
semantics, and its is clear to me that necessitation follows from
Thaetetus 1 3, whereas
Le 05-juil.-05, à 12:32, Russell Standish a écrit :
On Tue, Jul 05, 2005 at 12:09:24PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
How does it give the logic of temporal knowledge? I understand from
your points below, that the necessitation rule is necessary for
Kripke
semantics, and its is clear to me
On Tue, Jul 05, 2005 at 04:03:11PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
If D'P = BP ~B~P P, then D'P = P (ie necessitation). So it seems
it is the conjunction of truth of P that gives rise to necessitation,
no?
No. Necessitation is the inference rule according to which if the
machine proves
On Fri, Jun 24, 2005 at 03:25:29PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Perhaps. It depends of your definition of OM, and of your
everything theory.
Let me tell you the Lobian's answer: if I have a successor OM then I
have a successor OM which has no successor OM.
OK, I am cheating here, but
Le 26-juin-05, à 03:22, Quentin Anciaux a écrit :
Le Samedi 25 Juin 2005 18:51, Bruno Marchal a écrit :
Not really because you assume our eyes are bounded. Any finite machine
running forever recurs but not infinite or universal one.
Bruno
Yes I assume my eyes are bounded... because they
Le 26-juin-05, à 08:47, Russell Standish a écrit :
On Fri, Jun 24, 2005 at 03:25:29PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Perhaps. It depends of your definition of OM, and of your
everything theory.
Let me tell you the Lobian's answer: if I have a successor OM then I
have a successor OM which has
Le 26-juin-05, à 08:47, Russell Standish a écrit :
On Fri, Jun 24, 2005 at 03:25:29PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Perhaps. It depends of your definition of OM, and of your
everything theory.
Let me tell you the Lobian's answer: if I have a successor OM then
I
have a successor OM which
Quentin Anciaux writes:
1) assume an observer that can see.
2) assume that the observer can see only at a certain resolution/level
(it's
true that I can't see everything, I do not see quarks for example, nor my
cells)
Then, I can digitalize every image that I (assuming I'm an observer ;) can
Hi Quentin,
Hi Bruno,
Le Vendredi 24 Juin 2005 15:25, Bruno Marchal a écrit :
Because if everything exists... every OM has a
successor (and I'd say it must always have more than one),
Perhaps. It depends of your definition of OM, and of your
everything theory.
Let me tell you the Lobian's
Le 22-juin-05, à 19:50, Quentin Anciaux a écrit :
I have one more question about measure :
I don't understand the concept of 'increasing' and 'decreasing'
measure if I
assume everything exists.
Me neither. Especially when I accept, for the sake of some argument,
the ASSA
(Absolute Self
Hi Bruno,
Le Vendredi 24 Juin 2005 15:25, Bruno Marchal a écrit :
Because if everything exists... every OM has a
successor (and I'd say it must always have more than one),
Perhaps. It depends of your definition of OM, and of your
everything theory.
Let me tell you the Lobian's answer: if
Please replace bits by bytes ;)
Quentin Anciaux
Hi list,
I have one more question about measure :
I don't understand the concept of 'increasing' and 'decreasing' measure if I
assume everything exists. Because if everything exists... every OM has a
successor (and I'd say it must always have more than one), and concerning
good or bad OM
Hi Quentin, Stathis
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Hi list,
I have one more question about measure :
I don't understand the concept of 'increasing' and 'decreasing' measure if I
assume everything exists. Because if everything exists... every OM has a
successor (and I'd say it must always have
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