Life in Leibniz/Platonia
Hi Bruno Marchal We are our memory, which is timeless and so part of Platonia, although it is continually added to, so changes in that respect. Still, it is our identity, our soul. Being in Platonia, even if forgotten, it survives death, which is somewhat agreeable with the Christian concept of Heaven/Hell. If we're good, the good stays with us, if bad, that stays with us. What we experience to be put into memory is contingent, and distorted or unclear. - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2013-02-01, 11:57:56 Subject: Re: Lessons from the Block Universe On 31 Jan 2013, at 09:38, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal The block universe is the physical universe. So we are not part of it, for it does not allow subjectivity, which is nonphysical. Or mathematics or comp, which are also nonphysical. But you have to explain the relation between both, like getting a consciousnes change when taking an aspirin, of why fear generates change in matter, like building bombs. In fact, comp makes the block-physical universe into the (limit) border of the block-mindscape. Of course here I sum up shortly what is really described by (modal logical) equations. Bruno - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2013-01-30, 12:45:53 Subject: Re: Lessons from the Block Universe On 29 Jan 2013, at 15:04, Richard Ruquist wrote: A block universe does not allow for consciousness. With comp consciousness does not allow any (aristotelian) universes. There is comp block mindscape, and the universe(s) = the border of the mindscape as seen from inside. The fact the we all possess consciousness, so we think, means that our universe is not completely blocked, From inside. although the deviations from block may be minor and inconsequential regarding the Omega Point. The comp mind-body problems can be restated by the fact that with comp, there is an infinity of omega points, and the physics of here and now should be retrieved from some sum or integral on all omega points. By using the self-reference logics we got all the nuances we need (3p, 1p, 1p-plural, communicable, sharable, observable, etc.). Bruno Richard. On Mon, Jan 28, 2013 at 11:18 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: Here's an essay that is suggestive of Bruno's distinction between what is provable and what is true (knowable) but unprovable. Maybe this is a place where COMP could contribute to the understanding of QM. Brent Lessons from the Block Universe Ken Wharton Department of Physics and Astronomy San Jos State University http://fqxi.org/data/essay-contest-files/Wharton_Wharton_Essay.pdf?phpMyAdmin=0c371ccdae9b5ff3071bae814fb4f9e9 In Liouville mechanics, states of incomplete knowledge exhibit phenomena analogous to those exhibited by pure quantum states. Among these are the existence of a no-cloning theorem for such states [21, 23], the impossibility of discriminating such states with certainty [21, 24], the lack of exponential divergence of such states (in the space of epistemic states) under chaotic evolution [25], and, for correlated states, many of the features of entanglement [26]. On the other hand, states of complete knowledge do not exhibit these phenomena. This suggests that one would obtain a better analogy with quantum theory if states of complete knowledge were somehow impossible to achieve, that is, if somehow maximal knowledge was always incomplete knowledge [21, 22, 27]. This idea is borne out by the results of this paper. In fact, the toy theory suggests that the restriction on knowledge should take a particular form, namely, that one? knowledge be quantitatively equal to one? ignorance in a state of maximal knowledge. It is important to bear in mind that one cannot derive quantum theory from the toy theory, nor from any simple modification thereof. The problem is that the toy theory is a theory of incomplete knowledge about local and noncontextual hidden variables, and it is well known that quantum theory cannot be understood in this way [28, 30, 31]. This prompts the obvious question: if a quantum state is a state of knowledge, and it is not knowledge of local and noncontextual hidden variables, then what is it knowledge about? We do not at present have a good answer to this question. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Re: the grammar of platonia
On 10 Nov 2012, at 12:39, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal Chomsky says in effect that what we call platonia is grammatically structured, hence the rapidity that children learn language. At the least one can form simple propositions such I see the cat. Yes. It is Plato's reminiscence. We can only understand things by ourselves. The Others can only help (in the lucky case). I suggest that these proposations are at first vocal, as you can see young children moving their lips when learning to read. Most plausible. But they are even first lived, when meeting the cat. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/10/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-09, 14:36:40 Subject: Re: 15 22 4 On 09 Nov 2012, at 13:50, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal Arithmetic is just numbers. Not at all. you need laws so that numbers can enter in relation with each other. The relation x y, for example is Ez(x + z = y) The relation x divides y, for another example is Ez(x* z = y) So you need + and *, and you need axioms to relate the laws, like x + 0 = x x + (y + 1) = (x + y) + 1 x *0 = 0 x*(y + 1) = x*y + x And by G del this will capture a tiny part of the arithmetical truth, but by Putnam-Davis-Robinson-Matiyasevich (70 years of work by quite talentuopus logician) that theory can (at least now) easily be shown Turing universal. They have no meaning and are (3p) unless observed from a fixed identity (1p). Yes. But their relations can be such that some 1p emerge. That follows either by comp, or by the usual definition of knowledge + the incompleteness theorem (see my papers, but of course this needs some math and computer science to study) As proof of that consider these three arithmetic characters from mandarin: ?? ??? ? The meanings of these are 15 22 4 But you have to makes sense of the characters before you use them. Absolutely. Chinese baby will learn that ? is the number of digits handing the human arm. In other words, you need a fixed, conscious observer. Here you made a jump. I agree with you though, but technically this might need elaboration. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/9/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-08, 11:00:12 Subject: Re: Leibniz: Reality as Dust On 08 Nov 2012, at 16:35, Richard Ruquist wrote: On Thu, Nov 8, 2012 at 10:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Nov 2012, at 14:51, Richard Ruquist wrote: Stephan, If the compact manifolds of string theory are all different and distinct (as I claim in my paper from observations of a variable fine structure constant across the universe), then the manifolds should form a Stone space if each manifold instantly maps all the others into itself, my (BEC physics) conjecture, but also a Buddhist belief- Indra's Pearls. If so, youall may be working on implications of string theory- like consciousness. However, in my paper I claim that a 'leap of faith' is necessary to go from incompleteness to consciousness (C). Would you agree? Bruno says C emerges naturally from comp. More precisely, I say that consciousness and matter emerges from elementary arithmetic, *once* you bet on comp, that is the idea that the brain or the body can be Turing emulated at some right level so that you would remain conscious. Bruno And of course what I am hoping as a physicist rather than a mathematician or logician is that the compact manifolds may be the basis of the elementary arithmetic from which spacetime, matter (ie., strings) and consciousness emerge. Is it not more elegant if we can derived the strings (which are rather sophisticated mathematical object) from arithmetic (through computationalism)? It seems to me that string theory assumes or presumes arithmetic. Indeed it even assumes that the sum (in some sense, 'course) of all natural numbers gives -1/12. In fact all theories assume the arithmetical platonia, except some part of non Turing universal algebraic structures. However, I do not understand what it means to bet on comp. You bet on comp when you bet that that you can survive with a digital brain (a computer) replacing the brain. Comp is just Descartes Mechanism, after the discovery of the universal machine. The biggest discovery that nature do and redo all the times. Does the whole shebang collapse if brains do not exist? No. But brains cannot not exist, as they exist, in some sense, already in arithmetic. The whole shebang is a sharable dream. I call the computer universal number to help people to keep their arithmetical existence in mind. I will say more in FOAR asap. You can find
Spotless platonia
Hi Bruno Marchal I sweep the undesireable stuff you mention into contingia and keep platonia spotless and perfect. Time-independent equations or propositions, necessary and/or persistent truths. Platonia is objective thirdness = 3p Secondness = relational, time-dependent truths (events) = 2p Oneness= time allone= iondividual consciousness.= 1p Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/10/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-08, 10:15:37 Subject: Re: Communicability On 08 Nov 2012, at 14:42, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/8/2012 6:38 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King There are no accidents in Platonia. There are also perfect parabolas, because Platonia is the realm of necessary logic, of pure reason and math, which are inextended. Hi Roger, There are no accidents in and all is perfect and there is no extension or time Platonia because we define Platonia that way. But if we are to take Platonia as our basic ontological theory we have a problem, we are unable to explain the necessity of the imperfect world of matter that has time and is imperfect. Not at all. After G?el and Co. we know that Platonia, or simply Arithmetic is full of relative imperfections. The machines which lives in Platonia suffer all from intrinsic limitations. Now, we know that Platonia contains typhoon, black hole, big bangs, taxes and death. Platonism is not the same before and after G?el-Turing. We can perhaps say that comp admits a more nietzchean reading of Plato. This could be called neo-neo-platonism, which is neoplatonism + Church thesis. It is also very pythagorean, as the numbers can, and have to, be seen in a new perspective. It is a utopia that, like all utopias, is put up as a means to avoid the facts of our mortal coil. I am interested in ontologies that imply the necessity of the imperfect and not a retreat to some unaccessible perfection. The real shock with modern comp is that now we know that even heaven is not perfect. It contains many doors to hell. And vice versa: Hell contains doors to heaven. The main difference is that it is easy to find a door to hell in paradise, and it is hard to find a door to paradise in hell. And there is a large fuzzy frontier between both. The idea that arithmetical platonia is perfect is a rest of Hilbert's dream (or nightmare as some call it). With comp even God is not perfect. He is overwhelmed by the No?, and then the universal soul put a lot of mess in the whole. At least we can understand the fall of the soul, and the origin of matter. Matter is where God lost completely control, and that's why the Greek Platonists can easily identify matter with evil. It is the price of Turing universality. The existence of *partial* computable function, and, with comp, of processes which escapes all theories. The happy consequences is that, by such phenomena, life and consciousness resist to normative and reductionist thinking. The universal machine is born universal dissident. Bruno Thrown earthly objects are extended and thus fly contingently, since spin, humidity and dust particles can create flight imperfections and no measurements of their flights can be perfect. I am also told that Heisenberg's uncertainty principle does not depend on scale. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/8/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-07, 19:45:05 Subject: Re: Communicability On 11/7/2012 1:19 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 11/7/2012 5:52 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: Again: we are still left without an explanation as to how the accidental coincidence of a Platonic Truth and an actual fact of the world occurs. Why do you write 'accidental'? Platonia is our invention to describe classes of facts by abstracting away particulars. Brent -- Hi Brent, It seems to be that when we abstract away the particulars we lose the ability to talk about particulars. -- Onward! Stephen -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list
the grammar of platonia
Hi Bruno Marchal Chomsky says in effect that what we call platonia is grammatically structured, hence the rapidity that children learn language. At the least one can form simple propositions such I see the cat. I suggest that these proposations are at first vocal, as you can see young children moving their lips when learning to read. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/10/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-09, 14:36:40 Subject: Re: 15 22 4 On 09 Nov 2012, at 13:50, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal Arithmetic is just numbers. Not at all. you need laws so that numbers can enter in relation with each other. The relation x y, for example is Ez(x + z = y) The relation x divides y, for another example is Ez(x* z = y) So you need + and *, and you need axioms to relate the laws, like x + 0 = x x + (y + 1) = (x + y) + 1 x *0 = 0 x*(y + 1) = x*y + x And by G del this will capture a tiny part of the arithmetical truth, but by Putnam-Davis-Robinson-Matiyasevich (70 years of work by quite talentuopus logician) that theory can (at least now) easily be shown Turing universal. They have no meaning and are (3p) unless observed from a fixed identity (1p). Yes. But their relations can be such that some 1p emerge. That follows either by comp, or by the usual definition of knowledge + the incompleteness theorem (see my papers, but of course this needs some math and computer science to study) As proof of that consider these three arithmetic characters from mandarin: ?? ??? ? The meanings of these are 15 22 4 But you have to makes sense of the characters before you use them. Absolutely. Chinese baby will learn that ? is the number of digits handing the human arm. In other words, you need a fixed, conscious observer. Here you made a jump. I agree with you though, but technically this might need elaboration. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/9/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-08, 11:00:12 Subject: Re: Leibniz: Reality as Dust On 08 Nov 2012, at 16:35, Richard Ruquist wrote: On Thu, Nov 8, 2012 at 10:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Nov 2012, at 14:51, Richard Ruquist wrote: Stephan, If the compact manifolds of string theory are all different and distinct (as I claim in my paper from observations of a variable fine structure constant across the universe), then the manifolds should form a Stone space if each manifold instantly maps all the others into itself, my (BEC physics) conjecture, but also a Buddhist belief- Indra's Pearls. If so, youall may be working on implications of string theory- like consciousness. However, in my paper I claim that a 'leap of faith' is necessary to go from incompleteness to consciousness (C). Would you agree? Bruno says C emerges naturally from comp. More precisely, I say that consciousness and matter emerges from elementary arithmetic, *once* you bet on comp, that is the idea that the brain or the body can be Turing emulated at some right level so that you would remain conscious. Bruno And of course what I am hoping as a physicist rather than a mathematician or logician is that the compact manifolds may be the basis of the elementary arithmetic from which spacetime, matter (ie., strings) and consciousness emerge. Is it not more elegant if we can derived the strings (which are rather sophisticated mathematical object) from arithmetic (through computationalism)? It seems to me that string theory assumes or presumes arithmetic. Indeed it even assumes that the sum (in some sense, 'course) of all natural numbers gives -1/12. In fact all theories assume the arithmetical platonia, except some part of non Turing universal algebraic structures. However, I do not understand what it means to bet on comp. You bet on comp when you bet that that you can survive with a digital brain (a computer) replacing the brain. Comp is just Descartes Mechanism, after the discovery of the universal machine. The biggest discovery that nature do and redo all the times. Does the whole shebang collapse if brains do not exist? No. But brains cannot not exist, as they exist, in some sense, already in arithmetic. The whole shebang is a sharable dream. I call the computer universal number to help people to keep their arithmetical existence in mind. I will say more in FOAR asap. You can find my papers on that subject from my URL, but don't hesitate to ask any question, even on references. The simplest, concise, yet complete (with the references!) paper is this one: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be
Re: Is Nietzsche's shade wandering in platonia ?
On 06 Nov 2012, at 17:45, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: Hi Roger, If you want to read him that trivially, go ahead. The constant, eternal revaluation of all values. This is just implied by asking what's going on?. And yes, this is gently consistent with never ending platonic questioning + a popper style negation, even humor, on his own statements, that they are wrong, that they not be overly concretized. Nietzsche never taught his own ideas, although he was active academically very early. If you'd open a single page, you'd see how conflicted he was about the transmission of fruits of introspection. But I wouldn't want to offend you with any of that, or that I think he anticipated the computer + its consequences more than once, as you already have made up your mind in a rather discriminatory fashion without reading the man/machine in his native language, so... I am not merely a platonist: also guitar cowboy and dance and jam in every realm I can and keep my platonism in check with my sense of groove and swing + good steak, now and then. I have a taste for the Dionysian joys, for colors, and richness, variety as much as I love Platonia. But Platonia, in this abstract technical sense you imply, is pretty joyless and dull. Nietzsche is good antidote for that. On Kant he mused once: What kind of a soul must build such an unassailable fortress of thought? What is it distracting itself from, building these labyrinths of descriptive power for a group of disciples it will never admit to itself, that it vainly wants to have? For why else build such fortresses? For these reason I'd suggest for you to not read him, especially not in German. Right on with garbage he taught, would be the first thing he'd admit and laugh. It does look we agree that Nietzsche was a poet with a deep talent. I read Also Sprach Zarathustra, in german and in french, and I love it, but, later, rereading it, I got a feeling of uneasiness. I got it also with many people idolatring Nietzche, or taking granted what he said, I dunno. It might be, correct me if I am wrong, a sort of remanent atheism in the work, or perhaps it is, like with art, just a question of taste. May be I have unconsciously rely his uber mensh with what happened in WW II. I certainly do appreciare Richard Strauss Also Sprach Zarathustra, but that's thanks to 2001 Space Odyssey, plausibly! Bruno PGC On Tue, Nov 6, 2012 at 4:59 PM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi Platonist Guitar Cowboy So what ? I have no stomach for the revaluation of all values and the other garbage Nietzsche taught. If you are truly a platonist, you would agree with me. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Platonist Guitar Cowboy Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-06, 10:35:15 Subject: Re: Re: Is Nietzsche's shade wandering in platonia ? Hi Roger, So what? On Tue, Nov 6, 2012 at 3:47 PM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Platonist Guitar Cowboy By poet, I suspect that Bruno was attesting to Nietzsche's ability to think in terms of metaphors (such as Apollo and Dionysius in his Genealogy of Morals. ) Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Platonist Guitar Cowboy Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-06, 07:48:01 Subject: Re: Is Nietzsche's shade wandering in platonia ? On Tue, Nov 6, 2012 at 1:28 PM, Bruno Marchal ?rote: On 05 Nov 2012, at 13:43, Roger Clough wrote: Shades of Nietzsche ! Tell me it isn't so ! No, it is not so. No worry to have. I am glad we share some uneasiness with Nietzche. I take it for a great poet, but a bad philosopher. ? Then your German is better than mine, as a native speaker. Having enough distance and humor for one's own statements doesn't come through much in the translations. I don't think he ever took himself seriously as a philosopher, and he often pokes subtly fun at the notion. Ok, I'll get back to the herd then :) Cowboy -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because
Re: Re: Is Nietzsche's shade wandering in platonia ?
Hi Bruno Marchal I feel exactly as you do. I would never have Nietzsche's books burned, there is much of value in them. Or at least some value. His criticism of reason's being used by Christianity, for example, parallels to an appreciable extent Luther's criticism of the Catholic church, three centuries previously, which held reason and action over faith (Luther held faith over everything). That was the breaking point for the Reformation. Luther in fact said that Reason is the Devil's whore. He later softened that view but just a little. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/7/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-07, 05:39:11 Subject: Re: Is Nietzsche's shade wandering in platonia ? On 06 Nov 2012, at 17:45, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: Hi Roger, If you want to read him that trivially, go ahead. The constant, eternal revaluation of all values. This is just implied by asking what's going on?. And yes, this is gently consistent with never ending platonic questioning + a popper style negation, even humor, on his own statements, that they are wrong, that they not be overly concretized. Nietzsche never taught his own ideas, although he was active academically very early. If you'd open a single page, you'd see how conflicted he was about the transmission of fruits of introspection. But I wouldn't want to offend you with any of that, or that I think he anticipated the computer + its consequences more than once, as you already have made up your mind in a rather discriminatory fashion without reading the man/machine in his native language, so... I am not merely a platonist: also guitar cowboy and dance and jam in every realm I can and keep my platonism in check with my sense of groove and swing + good steak, now and then. I have a taste for the Dionysian joys, for colors, and richness, variety as much as I love Platonia. But Platonia, in this abstract technical sense you imply, is pretty joyless and dull. Nietzsche is good antidote for that. On Kant he mused once: What kind of a soul must build such an unassailable fortress of thought? What is it distracting itself from, building these labyrinths of descriptive power for a group of disciples it will never admit to itself, that it vainly wants to have? For why else build such fortresses? For these reason I'd suggest for you to not read him, especially not in German. Right on with garbage he taught, would be the first thing he'd admit and laugh. It does look we agree that Nietzsche was a poet with a deep talent. I read Also Sprach Zarathustra, in german and in french, and I love it, but, later, rereading it, I got a feeling of uneasiness. I got it also with many people idolatring Nietzche, or taking granted what he said, I dunno. It might be, correct me if I am wrong, a sort of remanent atheism in the work, or perhaps it is, like with art, just a question of taste. May be I have unconsciously rely his uber mensh with what happened in WW II. I certainly do appreciare Richard Strauss Also Sprach Zarathustra, but that's thanks to 2001 Space Odyssey, plausibly! Bruno PGC On Tue, Nov 6, 2012 at 4:59 PM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Platonist Guitar Cowboy So what ? I have no stomach for the revaluation of all values and the other garbage Nietzsche taught. If you are truly a platonist, you would agree with me. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Platonist Guitar Cowboy Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-06, 10:35:15 Subject: Re: Re: Is Nietzsche's shade wandering in platonia ? Hi Roger, So what? On Tue, Nov 6, 2012 at 3:47 PM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Platonist Guitar Cowboy By poet, I suspect that Bruno was attesting to Nietzsche's ability to think in terms of metaphors (such as Apollo and Dionysius in his Genealogy of Morals. ) Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Platonist Guitar Cowboy Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-06, 07:48:01 Subject: Re: Is Nietzsche's shade wandering in platonia ? On Tue, Nov 6, 2012 at 1:28 PM, Bruno Marchal ?rote: On 05 Nov 2012, at 13:43, Roger Clough wrote: Shades of Nietzsche ! Tell me it isn't so ! No, it is not so. No worry to have. I am glad we share some uneasiness with Nietzche. I take it for a great poet, but a bad philosopher. ? Then your German is better than mine, as a native speaker. Having enough distance and humor for one's own statements doesn't come through much in the translations. I don't think he ever took himself seriously as a philosopher, and he often pokes subtly fun
Re: Is Nietzsche's shade wandering in platonia ?
Hi Bruno, As I read it, the Übermensch is the being that is aware of the limits of Mensch ideology and values. Of course this can be hijacked to support discrimination against groups, but only if you want to be dishonest. But he emphasizes that abandoning the humanist conception of values is only a destruction insofar as it is paired with the sovereign power of affirmation and the ability, to reach a place, where we can say yes to the world, without guilt or dishonesty in conscience. To Zarathustra, negation has come to dominate human thought, it has become constitutive of human self-image: with this human, the whole world sinks and sickens, the whole of life is depreciated, everything known slides into its own nothingness. Zarathustra says Yes and Amen in a tremendous and unbounded way (see Chapter six of Thus spoke Zarathustra, if you're interested) and so does the Übermensch. This paints for me joyful agnostic with human entity questioned as ontological primitive. And again, Zarathustra makes fun of the followers that take him seriously. But I don't want to sell Nietzsche here as he wouldn't want to be sold; just to point out that the revaluation of all values and your unease, as they appear framed to me here, are not warranted by anything I've read. Cowboy On Wed, Nov 7, 2012 at 11:39 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 06 Nov 2012, at 17:45, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: Hi Roger, If you want to read him that trivially, go ahead. The constant, eternal revaluation of all values. This is just implied by asking what's going on?. And yes, this is gently consistent with never ending platonic questioning + a popper style negation, even humor, on his own statements, that they are wrong, that they not be overly concretized. Nietzsche never taught his own ideas, although he was active academically very early. If you'd open a single page, you'd see how conflicted he was about the transmission of fruits of introspection. But I wouldn't want to offend you with any of that, or that I think he anticipated the computer + its consequences more than once, as you already have made up your mind in a rather discriminatory fashion without reading the man/machine in his native language, so... I am not merely a platonist: also guitar cowboy and dance and jam in every realm I can and keep my platonism in check with my sense of groove and swing + good steak, now and then. I have a taste for the Dionysian joys, for colors, and richness, variety as much as I love Platonia. But Platonia, in this abstract technical sense you imply, is pretty joyless and dull. Nietzsche is good antidote for that. On Kant he mused once: What kind of a soul must build such an unassailable fortress of thought? What is it distracting itself from, building these labyrinths of descriptive power for a group of disciples it will never admit to itself, that it vainly wants to have? For why else build such fortresses? For these reason I'd suggest for you to not read him, especially not in German. Right on with garbage he taught, would be the first thing he'd admit and laugh. It does look we agree that Nietzsche was a poet with a deep talent. I read Also Sprach Zarathustra, in german and in french, and I love it, but, later, rereading it, I got a feeling of uneasiness. I got it also with many people idolatring Nietzche, or taking granted what he said, I dunno. It might be, correct me if I am wrong, a sort of remanent atheism in the work, or perhaps it is, like with art, just a question of taste. May be I have unconsciously rely his uber mensh with what happened in WW II. I certainly do appreciare Richard Strauss Also Sprach Zarathustra, but that's thanks to 2001 Space Odyssey, plausibly! Bruno PGC On Tue, Nov 6, 2012 at 4:59 PM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi Platonist Guitar Cowboy So what ? I have no stomach for the revaluation of all values and the other garbage Nietzsche taught. If you are truly a platonist, you would agree with me. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Platonist Guitar Cowboy Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-06, 10:35:15 Subject: Re: Re: Is Nietzsche's shade wandering in platonia ? Hi Roger, So what? On Tue, Nov 6, 2012 at 3:47 PM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Platonist Guitar Cowboy By poet, I suspect that Bruno was attesting to Nietzsche's ability to think in terms of metaphors (such as Apollo and Dionysius in his Genealogy of Morals. ) Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Platonist Guitar Cowboy Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-06, 07:48:01 Subject: Re: Is Nietzsche's shade wandering in platonia ? On Tue, Nov 6, 2012 at 1:28 PM, Bruno Marchal
Re: Re: Re: Re: Is Nietzsche's shade wandering in platonia ?
: Re: Re: Re: Is Nietzsche's shade wandering in platonia ? Hi Roger, If you want to read him that trivially, go ahead. The constant, eternal revaluation of all values. This is just implied by asking what's going on?. And yes, this is gently consistent with never ending platonic questioning + a popper style negation, even humor, on his own statements, that they are wrong, that they not be overly concretized. Nietzsche never taught his own ideas, although he was active academically very early. If you'd open a single page, you'd see how conflicted he was about the transmission of fruits of introspection. But I wouldn't want to offend you with any of that, or that I think he anticipated the computer + its consequences more than once, as you already have made up your mind in a rather discriminatory fashion without reading the man/machine in his native language, so... I am not merely a platonist: also guitar cowboy and dance and jam in every realm I can and keep my platonism in check with my sense of groove and swing +? good steak, now and then. I have a taste for the Dionysian joys, for colors, and richness, variety as much as I love Platonia. But Platonia, in this abstract technical sense you imply, is pretty joyless and dull. Nietzsche is good antidote for that. On Kant he mused once: What kind of a soul must build such an unassailable fortress of thought? What is it distracting itself from, building these labyrinths of descriptive power for a group of disciples it will never admit to itself, that it vainly wants to have? For why else build such fortresses? For these reason I'd suggest for you to not read him, especially not in German. Right on with garbage he taught, would be the first thing he'd admit and laugh. PGC On Tue, Nov 6, 2012 at 4:59 PM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Platonist Guitar Cowboy So what ? I have no stomach for the revaluation of all values and the other garbage Nietzsche taught. If you are truly a platonist, you would agree with me. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Platonist Guitar Cowboy Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-06, 10:35:15 Subject: Re: Re: Is Nietzsche's shade wandering in platonia ? Hi Roger, So what? On Tue, Nov 6, 2012 at 3:47 PM, Roger Clough ?rote: Hi Platonist Guitar Cowboy By poet, I suspect that Bruno was attesting to Nietzsche's ability to think in terms of metaphors (such as Apollo and Dionysius in his Genealogy of Morals. ) Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Platonist Guitar Cowboy Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-06, 07:48:01 Subject: Re: Is Nietzsche's shade wandering in platonia ? On Tue, Nov 6, 2012 at 1:28 PM, Bruno Marchal ?rote: On 05 Nov 2012, at 13:43, Roger Clough wrote: Shades of Nietzsche ! Tell me it isn't so ! No, it is not so. No worry to have. I am glad we share some uneasiness with Nietzche. I take it for a great poet, but a bad philosopher. ? Then your German is better than mine, as a native speaker. Having enough distance and humor for one's own statements doesn't come through much in the translations. I don't think he ever took himself seriously as a philosopher, and he often pokes subtly fun at the notion. Ok, I'll get back to the herd then :) Cowboy -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Is Nietzsche's shade wandering in platonia ?
Hi Platonist Guitar Cowboy That fellow seemingly accepted all of Neitzche's views, as you seem to. I didn't say that one shouldn't endorse Nietzsche's views, that's your business, not mine. I don't, but that's my prerogative. I just just said that they are obviously incompatible with those of Plato. Note that also, later on in The Republic, Plato banned all poets, which was a strong suit of Nietzche's, he was masterly with metaphors. Overall, I doubt if Nietzsche and Plato would get along. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/7/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Platonist Guitar Cowboy Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-07, 10:43:52 Subject: Re: Re: Re: Re: Is Nietzsche's shade wandering in platonia ? Hi Roger, If you have to quote Nietzsche enemies to make your ideological point, go ahead. This tells its own story, I don't have to comment further on. The Slave/Master thing boils down to something simpler than all this: do we want to rule ourselves or be ruled? Platonism he attacks insofar, as he points out that too many, the herd, want to apparently be ruled and do not want to step up to empower themselves genuinely, or fear doing so. This should not stop the affirmative spirit from reaching for more positive notion of ethics and politics. But if we don't fight for this affirmation, stand up to tyrannical ideas in an unbounded way, then we shouldn't scratch our heads at why we will remain slaves. Trivially, he speaks of honesty as recognizing power as the main currency of human: let us not kid ourselves here, the people that run things will continue to shape society's identity. To be able to affirm, we have to struggle to reach the child's holy yes, but to do so, he thinks it inevitable that we've got to become Lions first. Whereby the Lion's No! is but means to the child's eternal unbounded yes as an end, and in no shape or form primary to him as your copied quote suggests. That's just plain wrong. The Yes remains primary throughout, but we have dirty work to do, is more accurate. And this grates with Platonism, in that he fears it lacks lion, to achieve the affirmation it pertains to stand for. A Yes-Person without power is a slave to him. This makes people uncomfortable even today, I guess. This is no contradiction for me with Platonism; rather he updates its affirmative quality and relativizes its we don't know, so we won't move aspect; the donkey aspect of Platonism for him. Yes, he announces the Dionysian affirmation that no negation can defile BUT in less primary terms he denounces the affirmation of the platonist donkey who doesn't know how to say No!. Nietzsche doesn't attack human reason in itself as your quote unwittingly states, he attacks blind faith in the reasoner: go out and dance a little, loose yourself, get a bit high, make some sweet love, will ya, before you take yourself too seriously? seems more accurate to me, than this platitude of attacking reason, like some highschool punk, via argument in transparent trivial contradiction. If the writer of the quote makes Nietzsche out to be that stupid, I rest my case, that your quote is ideological concerning Nietzsche, never having understood the kind of reasoning I am pointing towards. Cowboy, Jamaican Lion Style :) On Wed, Nov 7, 2012 at 3:10 PM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Platonist Guitar Cowboy You're welcome to endorse Nietszche's attack on reason, but I can't see how anybody could be a platonist at the same time. Consider this (apparently by somebody else sympathetic to Nietzsche's views): http://groups.able2know.org/philforum/topic/1803-1 In his book The Geneology of Morals Nietzsche attacks what he calls slave morality and advances what he calls master morality. Platonism, to Nietzsche is a version of slave morality and Nietzsche goes on to call Christianity Platonism for the people. Slave morality is a morality which holds the good to be the highest point that humans could reach for and master morality is a morality that is created by the elite, aristocratic group within society and this master group holds the masses of the people under its inevitably oppressive rule. The masters of master morality make the rules because they alone have the capacity to be responsible. Nietzsche goes on to say that slavery in some sense or another must exist if any society is to approach greatness. The 'good' for Nietzsche lays in the hierarchical structure which gives absolute power only to those few who are capable of wielding it: the top most tier of the aristocratic hierarchy are the people who give meaning and value to the society, they are identical with the society's inner identity. But there is more to the story. Nietzsche also attacks the modern philosophical systems such as Kant's. He accuses philosophical system builders as being purveyors of slave
Re: Re: Is Nietzsche's shade wandering in platonia ?
Hi Roger, You make me smile, without sarcasm. Usually he is accused of being too right in asserting will to power and his views on slave morality are usually used to justify this. If you do read him, note that his bombastic style, physical and naturalist metaphors and claims are where his insecurities reside: he doesn't hide this. Genealogy of Morals is sub-titled a Polemic, after all. He likes to stir things up. But once you get passed this unease, you'll just find another wrong lover of love, with an astonishing ability to dream and predict our chaos. But thank god the conservatives are NOT in power now: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/07/colorado-washington-pot-legalization-_n_2086023.html Good news for Nietzsche and Dionysian affirmation, this. :) Cowboy On Wed, Nov 7, 2012 at 5:44 PM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi Cowboy, Without meaning to make any judgement, or mean any insult, sociologically Nietzsche is representative of the far left. Those people used to puzzle me (I am a conservative) since they were essentially hostile to all authority, which of course includes the establishment: religion, patriotism, the military, marriage, the family, the rich, capitalism, morality, the paintings of Norman Rockwell, and so forth. Being a conservative, I hold the opposite views. But these people are necessary if change is ever to be made. Nothing would change if we conservatives were always in power. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/7/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-07, 10:55:39 Subject: Re: Is Nietzsche's shade wandering in platonia ? Hi CowBoy, On 07 Nov 2012, at 15:55, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: As I read it, the ?ermensch is the being that is aware of the limits of Mensch ideology and values. Of course this can be hijacked to support discrimination against groups, but only if you want to be dishonest. But he emphasizes that abandoning the humanist conception of values is only a destruction insofar as it is paired with the sovereign power of affirmation and the ability, to reach a place, where we can say yes to the world, without guilt or dishonesty in conscience. To Zarathustra, negation has come to dominate human thought, it has become constitutive of human self-image: with this human, the whole world sinks and sickens, the whole of life is depreciated, everything known slides into its own nothingness. Zarathustra says Yes and Amen in a tremendous and unbounded way (see Chapter six of Thus spoke Zarathustra, if you're interested) and so does the ?ermensch. This paints for me joyful agnostic with human entity questioned as ontological primitive. And again, Zarathustra makes fun of the followers that take him seriously. But I don't want to sell Nietzsche here as he wouldn't want to be sold; just to point out that the revaluation of all values and your unease, as they appear framed to me here, are not warranted by anything I've read. All right. You convince me. I might need to reread him. I was very young when reading it, and I was still living some WAR II consequences (I am born in Germany). A joyful agnostic is certainly better than a fundamentalist atheist, sure. Bruno On Wed, Nov 7, 2012 at 11:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 06 Nov 2012, at 17:45, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: Hi Roger, If you want to read him that trivially, go ahead. The constant, eternal revaluation of all values. This is just implied by asking what's going on?. And yes, this is gently consistent with never ending platonic questioning + a popper style negation, even humor, on his own statements, that they are wrong, that they not be overly concretized. Nietzsche never taught his own ideas, although he was active academically very early. If you'd open a single page, you'd see how conflicted he was about the transmission of fruits of introspection. But I wouldn't want to offend you with any of that, or that I think he anticipated the computer + its consequences more than once, as you already have made up your mind in a rather discriminatory fashion without reading the man/machine in his native language, so... I am not merely a platonist: also guitar cowboy and dance and jam in every realm I can and keep my platonism in check with my sense of groove and swing + good steak, now and then. I have a taste for the Dionysian joys, for colors, and richness, variety as much as I love Platonia. But Platonia, in this abstract technical sense you imply, is pretty joyless and dull. Nietzsche is good antidote for that. On Kant he mused once: What kind of a soul must build such an unassailable fortress of thought? What is it distracting itself from, building these labyrinths of descriptive power for a group of disciples it will never admit to itself, that it vainly
Re: Re: Re: Is Nietzsche's shade wandering in platonia ?
Hi Platonist Guitar Cowboy The far right and the far left have many things in common. Or similar. The occupy folks are essentially anarchists, while we conservatives, although not wanting to do away with govt entirely, prefer to keep it small and less over-bearing. And although adding another kind of dope to the market doesn't seem like a good idea to me, just because I know of what an addiction can do to you (technically speakling, I am a recovering alcoholic) pragmatically speaking, the legalization of pot makes sense. I think Paraguay has or will legislate that the government sell the pot to improve its budget. It would help california's bottom line. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/7/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Platonist Guitar Cowboy Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-07, 11:57:09 Subject: Re: Re: Is Nietzsche's shade wandering in platonia ? Hi Roger, You make me smile, without sarcasm. Usually he is accused of being too right in asserting will to power and his views on slave morality are usually used to justify this. If you do read him, note that his bombastic style, physical and naturalist metaphors and claims are where his insecurities reside: he doesn't hide this. Genealogy of Morals is sub-titled a Polemic, after all. He likes to stir things up. But once you get passed this unease, you'll just find another wrong lover of love, with an astonishing ability to dream and predict our chaos. But thank god the conservatives are NOT in power now: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/07/colorado-washington-pot-legalization-_n_2086023.html Good news for Nietzsche and Dionysian affirmation, this. :) Cowboy On Wed, Nov 7, 2012 at 5:44 PM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Cowboy, Without meaning to make any judgement, or mean any insult, sociologically Nietzsche is representative of the far left. Those people used to puzzle me (I am a conservative) since they were essentially hostile to all authority, which of course includes the establishment: religion, patriotism, the military, marriage, the family, the rich, capitalism, morality, the paintings of Norman Rockwell, and so forth. Being a conservative, I hold the opposite views. But these people are necessary if change is ever to be made. Nothing would change if we conservatives were always in power. ?oger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/7/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-07, 10:55:39 Subject: Re: Is Nietzsche's shade wandering in platonia ? Hi CowBoy, On 07 Nov 2012, at 15:55, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: As I read it, the ?ermensch is the being that is aware of the limits of Mensch ideology and values. Of course this can be hijacked to support discrimination against groups, but only if you want to be dishonest. But he emphasizes that abandoning the humanist conception of values is only a destruction insofar as it is paired with the sovereign power of affirmation and the ability, to reach a place, where we can say yes to the world, without guilt or dishonesty in conscience. To Zarathustra, negation has come to dominate human thought, it has become constitutive of human self-image: with this human, the whole world sinks and sickens, the whole of life is depreciated, everything known slides into its own nothingness. Zarathustra says Yes and Amen in a tremendous and unbounded way (see Chapter six of Thus spoke Zarathustra, if you're interested) and so does the ?ermensch. This paints for me joyful agnostic with human entity questioned as ontological primitive. And again, Zarathustra makes fun of the followers that take him seriously. But I don't want to sell Nietzsche here as he wouldn't want to be sold; just to point out that the revaluation of all values and your unease, as they appear framed to me here, are not warranted by anything I've read. All right. You convince me. I might need to reread him. I was very young when reading it, and I was still living some WAR II consequences (I am born in Germany). A joyful agnostic is certainly better than a fundamentalist atheist, sure. Bruno On Wed, Nov 7, 2012 at 11:39 AM, Bruno Marchal ?rote: On 06 Nov 2012, at 17:45, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: Hi Roger, If you want to read him that trivially, go ahead. The constant, eternal revaluation of all values. This is just implied by asking what's going on?. And yes, this is gently consistent with never ending platonic questioning + a popper style negation, even humor, on his own statements, that they are wrong, that they not be overly concretized. Nietzsche never taught his own ideas, although he was active academically very early. If you'd open a single page, you'd see how conflicted he was about
Re: Is Nietzsche's shade wandering in platonia ?
On 07 Nov 2012, at 15:44, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal I feel exactly as you do. I would never have Nietzsche's books burned, there is much of value in them. Or at least some value. His criticism of reason's being used by Christianity, for example, parallels to an appreciable extent Luther's criticism of the Catholic church, three centuries previously, which held reason and action over faith (Luther held faith over everything). That was the breaking point for the Reformation. Luther in fact said that Reason is the Devil's whore. He later softened that view but just a little. It is a difficult subject, as the aristotelian conception of platonism is different from a platonist conception of platonism. Through Augustin we can only say that a *part* of Platonism has gone through, in christianism, but usually it concerns the mystics teaching, which is usually ignored when lived and recuperate and distorted after. The same with Judaism and Islam, although later, whose mainstream will fall in the aristotelian metaphysical trap, with exception, again among the mystics, or the occultists (Sufi, Cabbala). And it is hard to separate the occultism and secrecy due to oppression, from the literal misunderstanding leading to the superstitions, all this in complex historical evolution. The idea that reason is the Devil is a constant in all religion which lack faith in God, as if you needed to lie or to hide anything to protect God! There is no conflict between reason and faith, as truth extends reason. In practice we are often wrong so this needs an ability to revise opinions, and changing one's mind, even if it is harder on the fundamentals. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/7/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-07, 05:39:11 Subject: Re: Is Nietzsche's shade wandering in platonia ? On 06 Nov 2012, at 17:45, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: Hi Roger, If you want to read him that trivially, go ahead. The constant, eternal revaluation of all values. This is just implied by asking what's going on?. And yes, this is gently consistent with never ending platonic questioning + a popper style negation, even humor, on his own statements, that they are wrong, that they not be overly concretized. Nietzsche never taught his own ideas, although he was active academically very early. If you'd open a single page, you'd see how conflicted he was about the transmission of fruits of introspection. But I wouldn't want to offend you with any of that, or that I think he anticipated the computer + its consequences more than once, as you already have made up your mind in a rather discriminatory fashion without reading the man/machine in his native language, so... I am not merely a platonist: also guitar cowboy and dance and jam in every realm I can and keep my platonism in check with my sense of groove and swing + good steak, now and then. I have a taste for the Dionysian joys, for colors, and richness, variety as much as I love Platonia. But Platonia, in this abstract technical sense you imply, is pretty joyless and dull. Nietzsche is good antidote for that. On Kant he mused once: What kind of a soul must build such an unassailable fortress of thought? What is it distracting itself from, building these labyrinths of descriptive power for a group of disciples it will never admit to itself, that it vainly wants to have? For why else build such fortresses? For these reason I'd suggest for you to not read him, especially not in German. Right on with garbage he taught, would be the first thing he'd admit and laugh. It does look we agree that Nietzsche was a poet with a deep talent. I read Also Sprach Zarathustra, in german and in french, and I love it, but, later, rereading it, I got a feeling of uneasiness. I got it also with many people idolatring Nietzche, or taking granted what he said, I dunno. It might be, correct me if I am wrong, a sort of remanent atheism in the work, or perhaps it is, like with art, just a question of taste. May be I have unconsciously rely his uber mensh with what happened in WW II. I certainly do appreciare Richard Strauss Also Sprach Zarathustra, but that's thanks to 2001 Space Odyssey, plausibly! Bruno PGC On Tue, Nov 6, 2012 at 4:59 PM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Platonist Guitar Cowboy So what ? I have no stomach for the revaluation of all values and the other garbage Nietzsche taught. If you are truly a platonist, you would agree with me. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Platonist Guitar Cowboy Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-06, 10:35:15 Subject: Re: Re: Is Nietzsche's
Re: Re: Is Nietzsche's shade wandering in platonia ?
Hi Bruno Marchal A later Lutheran by the name of Kierkegaard said that God, being infinite, is an absurdity to finite man's brain. Being an absurdity, reason cannot apprehend God. K said instead that God can only be experienced subjectively, and that that experience of God was simply one of trust, as a child trusts its parents, its mother especially. Lutherans call that trust faith. This lead K to conclude (and I agree) that truth is subjective (1p). Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/7/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-07, 12:17:50 Subject: Re: Is Nietzsche's shade wandering in platonia ? On 07 Nov 2012, at 15:44, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal I feel exactly as you do. I would never have Nietzsche's books burned, there is much of value in them. Or at least some value. His criticism of reason's being used by Christianity, for example, parallels to an appreciable extent Luther's criticism of the Catholic church, three centuries previously, which held reason and action over faith (Luther held faith over everything). That was the breaking point for the Reformation. Luther in fact said that Reason is the Devil's whore. He later softened that view but just a little. It is a difficult subject, as the aristotelian conception of platonism is different from a platonist conception of platonism. Through Augustin we can only say that a *part* of Platonism has gone through, in christianism, but usually it concerns the mystics teaching, which is usually ignored when lived and recuperate and distorted after. The same with Judaism and Islam, although later, whose mainstream will fall in the aristotelian metaphysical trap, with exception, again among the mystics, or the occultists (Sufi, Cabbala). And it is hard to separate the occultism and secrecy due to oppression, from the literal misunderstanding leading to the superstitions, all this in complex historical evolution. The idea that reason is the Devil is a constant in all religion which lack faith in God, as if you needed to lie or to hide anything to protect God! There is no conflict between reason and faith, as truth extends reason. In practice we are often wrong so this needs an ability to revise opinions, and changing one's mind, even if it is harder on the fundamentals. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/7/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-07, 05:39:11 Subject: Re: Is Nietzsche's shade wandering in platonia ? On 06 Nov 2012, at 17:45, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: Hi Roger, If you want to read him that trivially, go ahead. The constant, eternal revaluation of all values. This is just implied by asking what's going on?. And yes, this is gently consistent with never ending platonic questioning + a popper style negation, even humor, on his own statements, that they are wrong, that they not be overly concretized. Nietzsche never taught his own ideas, although he was active academically very early. If you'd open a single page, you'd see how conflicted he was about the transmission of fruits of introspection. But I wouldn't want to offend you with any of that, or that I think he anticipated the computer + its consequences more than once, as you already have made up your mind in a rather discriminatory fashion without reading the man/machine in his native language, so... I am not merely a platonist: also guitar cowboy and dance and jam in every realm I can and keep my platonism in check with my sense of groove and swing + good steak, now and then. I have a taste for the Dionysian joys, for colors, and richness, variety as much as I love Platonia. But Platonia, in this abstract technical sense you imply, is pretty joyless and dull. Nietzsche is good antidote for that. On Kant he mused once: What kind of a soul must build such an unassailable fortress of thought? What is it distracting itself from, building these labyrinths of descriptive power for a group of disciples it will never admit to itself, that it vainly wants to have? For why else build such fortresses? For these reason I'd suggest for you to not read him, especially not in German. Right on with garbage he taught, would be the first thing he'd admit and laugh. It does look we agree that Nietzsche was a poet with a deep talent. I read Also Sprach Zarathustra, in german and in french, and I love it, but, later, rereading it, I got a feeling of uneasiness. I got it also with many people idolatring Nietzche, or taking granted what he said, I dunno. It might be, correct me if I am wrong, a sort of remanent atheism in the work, or perhaps it is, like with art
Re: Is Nietzsche's shade wandering in platonia ?
On 11/7/2012 11:44 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Cowboy, Without meaning to make any judgement, or mean any insult, sociologically Nietzsche is representative of the far left. Those people used to puzzle me (I am a conservative) since they were essentially hostile to all authority, which of course includes the establishment: religion, patriotism, the military, marriage, the family, the rich, capitalism, morality, the paintings of Norman Rockwell, and so forth. Being a conservative, I hold the opposite views. But these people are necessary if change is ever to be made. Nothing would change if we conservatives were always in power. Hear Hear! -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Is Nietzsche's shade wandering in platonia ?
On 05 Nov 2012, at 13:43, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal OK, you say propositions might have a contradiction but you might not yet have found the contradictions. That's a profound point. Either we have not yet found the contradiction, or we have not the tool to prevent the existence of infinite non standard proof of a contradiction to exist (which is the Godelian reason for the consistency of inconsistency, contrary to what Stephen said in a recent post). Nobody really believes that RA or PA can be contradictory. It is easy to prove the consistency of arithmetic in the usual math (informal set theory). Gödel's theorem does not cast any doubt on arithmetic, quite the contrary. In other words, one can't ever be sure if a proposition is necessarily true, because, as Woody Allen says, forever is a long time. Especially with non standard time. And the variety and number of possible copntradictions is possibly vast. Transfinite, even. Shades of Nietzsche ! Tell me it isn't so ! No, it is not so. No worry to have. I am glad we share some uneasiness with Nietzche. I take it for a great poet, but a bad philosopher. I guess that's the same as saying that you can never be sure of contingency either. I need to lie down for a while. This is beginning to look like existentialism. No worry. I am afraid that Stephen introduced some confusion here. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/5/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-04, 08:56:01 Subject: Re: The two types of truth On 03 Nov 2012, at 12:45, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal and Stephen, http://www.angelfire.com/md2/timewarp/leibniz.html Leibniz declares that there are two kinds of truth: truths of reason [which are non-contradictory, are always either true or false], We can only hope that they are non contradictory. And although true or false, they are aslo known or unknown, believed of not believed, disbelieved or not disbelieved, etc. and truths of fact [which are not always either true or false]. Why? They are contextual, but you can study the relation fact/context in the higher structure level. Truths of reason are a priori, while truths of fact are a posteriori. Truths of reason are necessary, permanent truths. Truths of fact are contingent, empirical truths. Both kinds of truth must have a sufficient reason. Truths of reason have their sufficient reason in being opposed to the contradictoriness and logical inconsistency of propositions which deny them. Truths of fact have their sufficient reason in being more perfect than propositions which deny them. Unfortunately, this is acceptable below Sigma_1 truth, but doubtable above, so even in the lower complexity part of arithmetic, things are not that simple. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/3/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-03, 07:13:24 Subject: Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm On 02 Nov 2012, at 23:12, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/2/2012 1:23 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: I can understand these symbols because there is at least a way to physically implement them. Those notion have nothing to do with physical implementation. So your thinking about them is not a physical act? Too much ambiguous. Even staying in comp I can answer yes and no. Yes, because my human thinking is locally supported by physical events. No, because the whole couple mind/physical events is supported by platonic arithmetical truth. Dear Bruno, Where is the evidence of the existence of a Platonic realm? It is part of the assumption. We postulate arithmetic. I try to avoid the use of platonic there, as I used the term in Plato sense. In that sense Platonia = the greek No?, and it is derived from arithmetic and comp. All you need is the belief that 43 is prime independently of 43 is prime. The mere self-consistency of an idea is proof of existence Already in arithmetic we have the consistence of the existence of a prrof of the false, this certainly does not mean that there exist a proof of the false. So self-consistency is doubtfully identifiable with truth, and still less with existence. but the idea must be understood by a multiplicity of entities with the capacity to distinguish truth from falsehood to have any coherence as an idea! Not at all. 43 is prime might be true, even in absence of universe and observer. We cannot just assume that the mere existence of some undefined acts to determine the properties of the undefined. Truth and falsity are possible properties, they are not ontological aspects of existence. Truth is no more a property than existence. It makes no sense. Bruno
Re: Is Nietzsche's shade wandering in platonia ?
On Tue, Nov 6, 2012 at 1:28 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 05 Nov 2012, at 13:43, Roger Clough wrote: Shades of Nietzsche ! Tell me it isn't so ! No, it is not so. No worry to have. I am glad we share some uneasiness with Nietzche. I take it for a great poet, but a bad philosopher. Then your German is better than mine, as a native speaker. Having enough distance and humor for one's own statements doesn't come through much in the translations. I don't think he ever took himself seriously as a philosopher, and he often pokes subtly fun at the notion. Ok, I'll get back to the herd then :) Cowboy -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Is Nietzsche's shade wandering in platonia ?
On 05 Nov 2012, at 15:08, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/5/2012 7:43 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal OK, you say propositions might have a contradiction but you might not yet have found the contradictions. That's a profound point. In other words, one can't ever be sure if a proposition is necessarily true, because, as Woody Allen says, forever is a long time. And the variety and number of possible copntradictions is possibly vast. Shades of Nietzsche ! Tell me it isn't so ! I guess that's the same as saying that you can never be sure of contingency either. I need to lie down for a while. This is beginning to look like existentialism. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/5/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen Hi Roger, Great question! If we are allowed to take forever to pay back a debt, then we have an effective free lunch! I don't see this. The debt remains. Many countries have such free lunch, which of course are not free at all. What you are thinking about with the concept of propositions might have a contradiction but you might not yet have found the contradictions is what is known as omega-inconsistent logical systems. Not really. Even if we can look at all the proofs possible, they might all not get the falsity. The omega-inconsistent theories keep saying that they are inconsistent, and they remain consistent as we cannot exclude the existence of non standard infinite proofs in the system. But the proof of inconsistency will have a non standard length, and is not a proof in the usual sense of the word. ;-) Theories that are consistent right up until they produce a statement that is not consistent. No, that's an inconsistent theory. omega-inconsistent theories never produce a contradiction. But they just disbelieves this. By the way, the usual rules of logical inference in math assumes that truth theories are never inconsistent. It is not an assumption. It is provable. Soundness implies consistency, but the reverse is false. An omega-inconsistent theory is consistent but not sound. They assert arithmetical falsity, like the fact that they are inconsistent. Bruno What about theories that are only 'almost' never inconsistent? This might help us think about the shade of Nietzche a bit more. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Is Nietzsche's shade wandering in platonia ?
Hi Platonist Guitar Cowboy By poet, I suspect that Bruno was attesting to Nietzsche's ability to think in terms of metaphors (such as Apollo and Dionysius in his Genealogy of Morals. ) Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Platonist Guitar Cowboy Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-06, 07:48:01 Subject: Re: Is Nietzsche's shade wandering in platonia ? On Tue, Nov 6, 2012 at 1:28 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Nov 2012, at 13:43, Roger Clough wrote: Shades of Nietzsche ! Tell me it isn't so ! No, it is not so. No worry to have. I am glad we share some uneasiness with Nietzche. I take it for a great poet, but a bad philosopher. ? Then your German is better than mine, as a native speaker. Having enough distance and humor for one's own statements doesn't come through much in the translations. I don't think he ever took himself seriously as a philosopher, and he often pokes subtly fun at the notion. Ok, I'll get back to the herd then :) Cowboy -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Re: Is Nietzsche's shade wandering in platonia ?
Hi Platonist Guitar Cowboy So what ? I have no stomach for the revaluation of all values and the other garbage Nietzsche taught. If you are truly a platonist, you would agree with me. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Platonist Guitar Cowboy Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-06, 10:35:15 Subject: Re: Re: Is Nietzsche's shade wandering in platonia ? Hi Roger, So what? On Tue, Nov 6, 2012 at 3:47 PM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Platonist Guitar Cowboy By poet, I suspect that Bruno was attesting to Nietzsche's ability to think in terms of metaphors (such as Apollo and Dionysius in his Genealogy of Morals. ) Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Platonist Guitar Cowboy Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-06, 07:48:01 Subject: Re: Is Nietzsche's shade wandering in platonia ? On Tue, Nov 6, 2012 at 1:28 PM, Bruno Marchal ?rote: On 05 Nov 2012, at 13:43, Roger Clough wrote: Shades of Nietzsche ! Tell me it isn't so ! No, it is not so. No worry to have. I am glad we share some uneasiness with Nietzche. I take it for a great poet, but a bad philosopher. ? Then your German is better than mine, as a native speaker. Having enough distance and humor for one's own statements doesn't come through much in the translations. I don't think he ever took himself seriously as a philosopher, and he often pokes subtly fun at the notion. Ok, I'll get back to the herd then :) Cowboy -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Re: Is Nietzsche's shade wandering in platonia ?
Hi Roger, If you want to read him that trivially, go ahead. The constant, eternal revaluation of all values. This is just implied by asking what's going on?. And yes, this is gently consistent with never ending platonic questioning + a popper style negation, even humor, on his own statements, that they are wrong, that they not be overly concretized. Nietzsche never taught his own ideas, although he was active academically very early. If you'd open a single page, you'd see how conflicted he was about the transmission of fruits of introspection. But I wouldn't want to offend you with any of that, or that I think he anticipated the computer + its consequences more than once, as you already have made up your mind in a rather discriminatory fashion without reading the man/machine in his native language, so... I am not merely a platonist: also guitar cowboy and dance and jam in every realm I can and keep my platonism in check with my sense of groove and swing + good steak, now and then. I have a taste for the Dionysian joys, for colors, and richness, variety as much as I love Platonia. But Platonia, in this abstract technical sense you imply, is pretty joyless and dull. Nietzsche is good antidote for that. On Kant he mused once: What kind of a soul must build such an unassailable fortress of thought? What is it distracting itself from, building these labyrinths of descriptive power for a group of disciples it will never admit to itself, that it vainly wants to have? For why else build such fortresses? For these reason I'd suggest for you to not read him, especially not in German. Right on with garbage he taught, would be the first thing he'd admit and laugh. PGC On Tue, Nov 6, 2012 at 4:59 PM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi Platonist Guitar Cowboy So what ? I have no stomach for the revaluation of all values and the other garbage Nietzsche taught. If you are truly a platonist, you would agree with me. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Platonist Guitar Cowboy Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-06, 10:35:15 Subject: Re: Re: Is Nietzsche's shade wandering in platonia ? Hi Roger, So what? On Tue, Nov 6, 2012 at 3:47 PM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Platonist Guitar Cowboy By poet, I suspect that Bruno was attesting to Nietzsche's ability to think in terms of metaphors (such as Apollo and Dionysius in his Genealogy of Morals. ) Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Platonist Guitar Cowboy Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-06, 07:48:01 Subject: Re: Is Nietzsche's shade wandering in platonia ? On Tue, Nov 6, 2012 at 1:28 PM, Bruno Marchal ?rote: On 05 Nov 2012, at 13:43, Roger Clough wrote: Shades of Nietzsche ! Tell me it isn't so ! No, it is not so. No worry to have. I am glad we share some uneasiness with Nietzche. I take it for a great poet, but a bad philosopher. ? Then your German is better than mine, as a native speaker. Having enough distance and humor for one's own statements doesn't come through much in the translations. I don't think he ever took himself seriously as a philosopher, and he often pokes subtly fun at the notion. Ok, I'll get back to the herd then :) Cowboy -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed
Is Nietzsche's shade wandering in platonia ?
Hi Bruno Marchal OK, you say propositions might have a contradiction but you might not yet have found the contradictions. That's a profound point. In other words, one can't ever be sure if a proposition is necessarily true, because, as Woody Allen says, forever is a long time. And the variety and number of possible copntradictions is possibly vast. Shades of Nietzsche ! Tell me it isn't so ! I guess that's the same as saying that you can never be sure of contingency either. I need to lie down for a while. This is beginning to look like existentialism. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/5/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-04, 08:56:01 Subject: Re: The two types of truth On 03 Nov 2012, at 12:45, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal and Stephen, http://www.angelfire.com/md2/timewarp/leibniz.html Leibniz declares that there are two kinds of truth: truths of reason [which are non-contradictory, are always either true or false], We can only hope that they are non contradictory. And although true or false, they are aslo known or unknown, believed of not believed, disbelieved or not disbelieved, etc. and truths of fact [which are not always either true or false]. Why? They are contextual, but you can study the relation fact/context in the higher structure level. Truths of reason are a priori, while truths of fact are a posteriori. Truths of reason are necessary, permanent truths. Truths of fact are contingent, empirical truths. Both kinds of truth must have a sufficient reason. Truths of reason have their sufficient reason in being opposed to the contradictoriness and logical inconsistency of propositions which deny them. Truths of fact have their sufficient reason in being more perfect than propositions which deny them. Unfortunately, this is acceptable below Sigma_1 truth, but doubtable above, so even in the lower complexity part of arithmetic, things are not that simple. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/3/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-03, 07:13:24 Subject: Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm On 02 Nov 2012, at 23:12, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/2/2012 1:23 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: I can understand these symbols because there is at least a way to physically implement them. Those notion have nothing to do with physical implementation. So your thinking about them is not a physical act? Too much ambiguous. Even staying in comp I can answer yes and no. Yes, because my human thinking is locally supported by physical events. No, because the whole couple mind/physical events is supported by platonic arithmetical truth. Dear Bruno, Where is the evidence of the existence of a Platonic realm? It is part of the assumption. We postulate arithmetic. I try to avoid the use of platonic there, as I used the term in Plato sense. In that sense Platonia = the greek No?, and it is derived from arithmetic and comp. All you need is the belief that 43 is prime independently of 43 is prime. The mere self-consistency of an idea is proof of existence Already in arithmetic we have the consistence of the existence of a prrof of the false, this certainly does not mean that there exist a proof of the false. So self-consistency is doubtfully identifiable with truth, and still less with existence. but the idea must be understood by a multiplicity of entities with the capacity to distinguish truth from falsehood to have any coherence as an idea! Not at all. 43 is prime might be true, even in absence of universe and observer. We cannot just assume that the mere existence of some undefined acts to determine the properties of the undefined. Truth and falsity are possible properties, they are not ontological aspects of existence. Truth is no more a property than existence. It makes no sense. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http
Re: Is Nietzsche's shade wandering in platonia ?
On 11/5/2012 7:43 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal OK, you say propositions might have a contradiction but you might not yet have found the contradictions. That's a profound point. In other words, one can't ever be sure if a proposition is necessarily true, because, as Woody Allen says, forever is a long time. And the variety and number of possible copntradictions is possibly vast. Shades of Nietzsche ! Tell me it isn't so ! I guess that's the same as saying that you can never be sure of contingency either. I need to lie down for a while. This is beginning to look like existentialism. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net mailto:%20rclo...@verizon.net 11/5/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen Hi Roger, Great question! If we are allowed to take forever to pay back a debt, then we have an effective free lunch! What you are thinking about with the concept of propositions might have a contradiction but you might not yet have found the contradictions is what is known as omega-inconsistent logical systems http://math.stackexchange.com/questions/110635/how-it-is-posible-that-omega-inconsistency-does-not-lead-to-inconsistency. ;-) Theories that are consistent right up until they produce a statement that is not consistent. By the way, the usual rules of logical inference in math assumes that truth theories are never inconsistent. What about theories that are only 'almost' never inconsistent? This might help us think about the shade of Nietzche a bit more. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Is Nietzsche's shade wandering in platonia ?
Hi Stephen P. King That might be what I think Bruno referred to as 6 sigma truth, namely truth that has a probability within std dev of 6 sigma of being true. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/5/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-05, 09:08:03 Subject: Re: Is Nietzsche's shade wandering in platonia ? On 11/5/2012 7:43 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal OK, you say propositions might have a contradiction but you might not yet have found the contradictions. That's a profound point. In other words, one can't ever be sure if a proposition is necessarily true, because, as Woody Allen says, forever is a long time. And the variety and number of possible copntradictions is possibly vast. Shades of Nietzsche ! Tell me it isn't so ! I guess that's the same as saying that you can never be sure of contingency either. I need to lie down for a while. This is beginning to look like existentialism. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/5/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen Hi Roger, Great question! If we are allowed to take forever to pay back a debt, then we have an effective free lunch! What you are thinking about with the concept of propositions might have a contradiction but you might not yet have found the contradictions is what is known as omega-inconsistent logical systems. ;-) Theories that are consistent right up until they produce a statement that is not consistent. By the way, the usual rules of logical inference in math assumes that truth theories are never inconsistent. What about theories that are only 'almost' never inconsistent? This might help us think about the shade of Nietzche a bit more. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Information theory, computationalism and the science of Platonia
Information theory, computationalism and the science of Platonia I am not a mathematician, so what I say here may be nonsense, but can't we say something more scientific about Platonia and monads than we have ? For example: a) I think that the physics or science of Platonia must be information theory. b) I conceive of the One as a singularity which is analogous to the Big Bang singularity except that it is inverse to it. The Big Bang singularity is one in which matter pours out of intelligence. c) The Platonic singularity might be one in which meaningful information, instead of matter, pours out of intelligence. d) If we consider this Big Bang process as platonic, then creation begins as perfect forms and these become less perfect as they drop down in some sort of physical ontology. e) The infomation of each monad is contained in its perceptions, which I envision as data sets, each data set is a reflection of all of the other monadic data sets but from the point of view of that monad. This suggests that perhaps the information has a holographic format. Or the Bohmian implicit/explict dichotomy. f) The total amount of information in the universe has to be the sum of those in e). This is suggestive again of Bohm or holography. etc. etc. etc. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/2/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Applying Kant's categories to Platonia
Hi Stephen P. King and Bruno, Number would probably be under one of Kant's categories, quantity. 昐ubstance (e.g., man, horse) 昋uantity (e.g., four-foot, five-foot) 昋uality (e.g., white, grammatical) 昍elation (e.g., double, half) 昉lace (e.g., in the Lyceum, in the market-place) 旸ate (e.g., yesterday, last year) 昉osture (e.g., is lying, is sitting) 昐tate (e.g., has shoes on, has armor on) 旳ction (e.g., cutting, burning) 昉assion (e.g., being cut, being burned) These are the a priori categories of a human mind which Kant deduced as necessary for a human to understand anything, derived from Kant's transcendental deduction. The term transcendental is misleading, for Kant only transcended from the outside world to the human mind, not above it. However if they are a priori and make sense to a human mind (are categories of understanding), it would not seem unreasonable to assign them anthromorphically to cosmic mind such as the One or the supreme monad. I have not studied these much and need to look further into it as I cannot understand anything myselof without the additional category of examples :-). Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/31/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-30, 17:03:47 Subject: Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm On 10/30/2012 3:05 PM, meekerdb wrote: [SPK] Unless multiple entities can agree that the sequence of symbols 17 is prime is an indicator of some particular mathematical object and one of its particular properties, then how does 17 is prime come to mean anything at all? I agree with that. But you're talking about the tokens 17 is prime not the concept that 17 is prime. Could not a person who grew up alone on an island realize that 17 has no divisors, and he could even invent a private language in which he could write down Peano's axioms. Why are you using such trivial and parochial framing for abstract questions? Why the reference to single individuals? Did you not understand that I am claiming that meaningfulness requires at least the possibility of interaction between many entities such that each can evaluate the truth value of a proposition and thus can truthfully claim to have knowledge of true statements? A person that grew and died on a desert island may have discovered for itself that 17 objects cannot be divided into equal subsets, but our statements about that are mere figemnts of our imagination as we could know nothing objective and non-imaginative at all about that person. We are imagining ourselves to have powers that we simply do not have. We are not omniscient voyeurs of Reality and there is not anything that is. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: I think Monads may be the strategy to allow internal changes within Platonia
On 11 Oct 2012, at 15:40, Roger Clough wrote: This might be of possible importance with regard to comp. First of all, there are a fixed number of monads in this world, since they cannot be created or destroyed. Fixed number? You mean a finite number or an infinite cardinal? While, as I understand it, the identities or Souls of monads do not change, they do change internally. This is because their contents represent the rapidly changing (in time and space as well as internally) corporeal bodies in the changing physical world. This seems to be Leibniz's solution to the problem raised by the question, How can monads, being ideas, belong to unchanging Platonia, if the monads at the same time represent rapidly changing coporeal bodies in this contingent, ever-changing world ? The answer seems to be that only the identities or souls of the monads, not their contents, belong to Platonia. Here comp can be much precise. With regard to comp, presumably there are a fixed number of sets or files, each with a fixed identity, each of which contains rapidly changing data. The the data in each file instantly reflects the data in all of the other files, each data set from a unique perspective. Something like that, yes. Will explain more asap. It is hard to explain as few people knows enough of logics/computer science. You might read my relatively recent explanation to the FOAR list, or in the archive of this list, or in the papers on my url. I agree with this post, but it is not yet clear if you would agree or just appreciate the reason why I am agreeing with you. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
I think Monads may be the strategy to allow internal changes within Platonia
This might be of possible importance with regard to comp. First of all, there are a fixed number of monads in this world, since they cannot be created or destroyed. While, as I understand it, the identities or Souls of monads do not change, they do change internally. This is because their contents represent the rapidly changing (in time and space as well as internally) corporeal bodies in the changing physical world. This seems to be Leibniz's solution to the problem raised by the question, How can monads, being ideas, belong to unchanging Platonia, if the monads at the same time represent rapidly changing coporeal bodies in this contingent, ever-changing world ? The answer seems to be that only the identities or souls of the monads, not their contents, belong to Platonia. With regard to comp, presumably there are a fixed number of sets or files, each with a fixed identity, each of which contains rapidly changing data. The the data in each file instantly reflects the data in all of the other files, each data set from a unique perspective. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/11/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Numbers and other inhabitants of Platonia are also inhabitantsofmonads
Hi Richard Ruquist Absolutely. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/2/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Richard Ruquist Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-01, 16:51:44 Subject: Re: Numbers and other inhabitants of Platonia are also inhabitantsofmonads String theory and variable fine-structure measurements across the universe suggest that the discrete and distinct monads are ennumerable. On Mon, Oct 1, 2012 at 4:32 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/1/2012 10:17 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King Good idea, but unfortunately monads are not numbers, numbers will now guide them or replace them. Monads have to be associated with corporeal bodies down here in contingia, where crap happens. Hi Roger, I agree, monads are not numbers. Monads use numbers. Roger Clough,rclo...@verizon.net 10/1/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-09-30, 14:22:03 Subject: Re: Numbers and other inhabitants of Platonia are also inhabitants ofmonads On 9/30/2012 8:34 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal I'm still trying to figure out how numbers and ideas fit into Leibniz's metaphysics. Little is written about this issue, so I have to rely on what Leibniz says otherwise about monads. Previously I noted that numbers could not be monads because monads constantly change. Another argument against numbers being monads is that all monads must be attached to corporeal bodies. So monads refer to objects in the (already) created world, whose identities persist, while ideas and numbers are not created objects. While numbers and ideas cannot be monads, they have to be are entities in the mind, feelings, and bodily aspects of monads. For Leibniz refers to the intellect of human monads. And similarly, numbers and ideas must be used in the fictional construction of matter-- in the bodily aspect of material monads, as well as the construction of our bodies and brains. Dear Roger, Bruno's idea is a form of Pre-Established Hamony, in that the truth of the numbers is a pre-established ontological primitive. -- Onward! -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Numbers and other inhabitants of Platonia are also inhabitants ofmonads
Hi Stephen P. King Good idea, but unfortunately monads are not numbers, numbers will now guide them or replace them. Monads have to be associated with corporeal bodies down here in contingia, where crap happens. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/1/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-09-30, 14:22:03 Subject: Re: Numbers and other inhabitants of Platonia are also inhabitants ofmonads On 9/30/2012 8:34 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal I'm still trying to figure out how numbers and ideas fit into Leibniz's metaphysics. Little is written about this issue, so I have to rely on what Leibniz says otherwise about monads. Previously I noted that numbers could not be monads because monads constantly change. Another argument against numbers being monads is that all monads must be attached to corporeal bodies. So monads refer to objects in the (already) created world, whose identities persist, while ideas and numbers are not created objects. While numbers and ideas cannot be monads, they have to be are entities in the mind, feelings, and bodily aspects of monads. For Leibniz refers to the intellect of human monads. And similarly, numbers and ideas must be used in the fictional construction of matter-- in the bodily aspect of material monads, as well as the construction of our bodies and brains. Dear Roger, Bruno's idea is a form of Pre-Established Hamony, in that the truth of the numbers is a pre-established ontological primitive. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers and other inhabitants of Platonia are also inhabitants ofmonads
On 10/1/2012 10:17 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King Good idea, but unfortunately monads are not numbers, numbers will now guide them or replace them. Monads have to be associated with corporeal bodies down here in contingia, where crap happens. Hi Roger, I agree, monads are not numbers. Monads use numbers. Roger Clough,rclo...@verizon.net 10/1/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-09-30, 14:22:03 Subject: Re: Numbers and other inhabitants of Platonia are also inhabitants ofmonads On 9/30/2012 8:34 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal I'm still trying to figure out how numbers and ideas fit into Leibniz's metaphysics. Little is written about this issue, so I have to rely on what Leibniz says otherwise about monads. Previously I noted that numbers could not be monads because monads constantly change. Another argument against numbers being monads is that all monads must be attached to corporeal bodies. So monads refer to objects in the (already) created world, whose identities persist, while ideas and numbers are not created objects. While numbers and ideas cannot be monads, they have to be are entities in the mind, feelings, and bodily aspects of monads. For Leibniz refers to the intellect of human monads. And similarly, numbers and ideas must be used in the fictional construction of matter-- in the bodily aspect of material monads, as well as the construction of our bodies and brains. Dear Roger, Bruno's idea is a form of Pre-Established Hamony, in that the truth of the numbers is a pre-established ontological primitive. -- Onward! -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers and other inhabitants of Platonia are also inhabitants ofmonads
String theory and variable fine-structure measurements across the universe suggest that the discrete and distinct monads are ennumerable. On Mon, Oct 1, 2012 at 4:32 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: On 10/1/2012 10:17 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King Good idea, but unfortunately monads are not numbers, numbers will now guide them or replace them. Monads have to be associated with corporeal bodies down here in contingia, where crap happens. Hi Roger, I agree, monads are not numbers. Monads use numbers. Roger Clough,rclo...@verizon.net 10/1/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-09-30, 14:22:03 Subject: Re: Numbers and other inhabitants of Platonia are also inhabitants ofmonads On 9/30/2012 8:34 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal I'm still trying to figure out how numbers and ideas fit into Leibniz's metaphysics. Little is written about this issue, so I have to rely on what Leibniz says otherwise about monads. Previously I noted that numbers could not be monads because monads constantly change. Another argument against numbers being monads is that all monads must be attached to corporeal bodies. So monads refer to objects in the (already) created world, whose identities persist, while ideas and numbers are not created objects. While numbers and ideas cannot be monads, they have to be are entities in the mind, feelings, and bodily aspects of monads. For Leibniz refers to the intellect of human monads. And similarly, numbers and ideas must be used in the fictional construction of matter-- in the bodily aspect of material monads, as well as the construction of our bodies and brains. Dear Roger, Bruno's idea is a form of Pre-Established Hamony, in that the truth of the numbers is a pre-established ontological primitive. -- Onward! -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Numbers and other inhabitants of Platonia are also inhabitants of monads
Hi Bruno Marchal I'm still trying to figure out how numbers and ideas fit into Leibniz's metaphysics. Little is written about this issue, so I have to rely on what Leibniz says otherwise about monads. Previously I noted that numbers could not be monads because monads constantly change. Another argument against numbers being monads is that all monads must be attached to corporeal bodies. So monads refer to objects in the (already) created world, whose identities persist, while ideas and numbers are not created objects. While numbers and ideas cannot be monads, they have to be are entities in the mind, feelings, and bodily aspects of monads. For Leibniz refers to the intellect of human monads. And similarly, numbers and ideas must be used in the fictional construction of matter-- in the bodily aspect of material monads, as well as the construction of our bodies and brains. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 9/30/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-09-29, 10:29:23 Subject: Re: questions on machines, belief, awareness, and knowledge On 29 Sep 2012, at 14:43, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 24.09.2012 18:23 meekerdb said the following: On 9/24/2012 2:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 23 Sep 2012, at 18:33, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 23.09.2012 16:51 Bruno Marchal said the following: On 23 Sep 2012, at 09:31, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 22.09.2012 22:49 meekerdb said the following: ... In the past, Bruno has said that a machine that understands transfinite induction will be conscious. But being conscious and intelligent are not the same thing. Brent In my view this is the same as epiphenomenalism. Engineers develop a robot to achieve a prescribed function. They do not care about consciousness in this respect. Then consciousness will appear automatically but the function developed by engineers does not depend on it. Hence epiphenomenalism seems to apply. Not at all. Study UDA to see why exactly, but if comp is correct, consciousness is somehow what defines the physical realities, making possible for engineers to build the machines, and then consciousness, despite not being programmable per se, does have a role, like relatively speeding up the computations. Like non free will, the epiphenomenalism is only apparent because you take the outer god's eyes view, but with comp, there is no matter, nor consciousness, at that level, and we have no access at all at that level (without assuming comp, and accessing it intellectually, that is only arithmetic). This is hard to explain if you fail to see the physics/machine's psychology/theology reversal. You are still (consciously or not) maintaining the physical supervenience thesis, or an aristotelian ontology, but comp prevents this to be possible. Bruno, I have considered a concrete case, when engineers develop a robot, not a general one. For such a concrete case, I do not understand your answer. I have understood Brent in such a way that when engineers develop a robot they must just care about functionality to achieve and they can ignore consciousness at all. Whether it appears in the robot or not, it is not a business of engineers. Do you agree with such a statement or not? In my defense, I only said that the engineers could develop artificial intelligences without considering consciousnees. I didn't say they *must* do so, and in fact I think they are ethically bound to consider it. John McCarthy has already written on this years ago. And it has nothing to do with whether supervenience or comp is true. In either case an intelligent robot is likely to be a conscious being and ethical considerations arise. Dear Bruno and Brent, Frankly speaking I do not quite understand you answers. When I try to convert your thoughts to some guidelines for engineers developing robots, I get only something like as follows. 1) When you make your design, do not care about consciousness, just implement functions required. 2) When a robot is ready, it may have consciousness. We have not a clue how to check if it has it but you must consider ethical implications (say shutting a robot down may be equivalent to a murder). Evgenii P.S. In my view 1) and 2) implies epiphenomenolism for consciousness. If consciousness is epiphenomenal, how could matter be explained through a theory of consciousness/first person, as this is made obligatory when we assume that we are machines? I remind you that things go in this way, if we are machine: number === consciousness === matter (and only then: matter === human consciousness === human notion of number. That might explains the confusion) I assume some basic understanding of the FPI and the UDA here. (FPI = first person
Re: Pre-established harmony comp in relation to Platonia and Contingia
Thanks for the very interesting video. Concerning Platonia and Contingia, there are much to say if we introduce natural selection, the only well know creative process. The world of Platonia, in terms of natural selection, is the peak of the fitness landscape (FT). The FT is the point of perfection from which the living form, or the living behaviour can not be improved. Contingia is the world of extinction by random, imprevisible events. When contingia enters,the most filnely adapted beings perish due to their specialization, and gives the world to generalists, good in nothing, bacterias, fungi and adapted of fortune that casually are adapted to the disaster scenario: scavengers, tunnel diggers, shallow water habitants etc. None of them are beatiful. But extinction gives a opportunity to new perfect forms that are better than the former. If there would be no extinction, we would still be bacterias. This creative destruction appears also in the market, (That is a controlled darwinian process under State laws). and in general in any creative process. The perfect forms inhabit our mind because we have to measure ourselves against the ideal. Beauty is a measure of closeness to the ideal. I´m persuaded for example that the beauty of movements of a dancer is related with the use of energy for a given movement. the less energy the dancer use, the more beautiful is the movement. And we perceive this use of energy as smooth and beatiful movement because to mate or to be a friend of a good user of his energies (by a good neurocoordination) has been crucial for survial. A good dancer is in the peak of fitness landscape in energy usage, so he exhibit it. And Platonia in our mind know it. There are evolutonary explanations for many others notons of beauty. As Penrose said the motor of this process of evolution and life is the gradient of entropy. The photosyntesis is a capture of energy that requires the building of a chemical (and phisical) infrastructure that requires information processing, from genes to phenotype building programs to reproduction and so on. And only in a positive gradient of entrophy this processing is possiblehttp://www.google.es/url?sa=trct=jq=esrc=ssource=webcd=3cad=rjaved=0CC8QFjACurl=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.slideshare.net%2Fagcorona1%2Farrow-of-time-determined-by-lthe-easier-direction-of-computation-for-lifeei=kz1oUNjjIJCxhAesjIDgAgusg=AFQjCNGhgf10g4gWWodpK-QwcKptsdCWTwsig2=LEWaQzY5cTrUV1I8wkA7bQfor living beings. I would also like to suggest that the pre-established harmony (PEH) of Leibniz is more complex but still acts as Leibniz intended, while one might apply traditional cosmological concepts to it. Perhaps someone with more physics (and brains) than I could use this to roughly specify what the PEH is. In the traditional understanding it would simply be the decay of order into disorder. Note that Penrose has looked recently into the issue of how large the entropy can get. See the series starting at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fJ-D5AUGVcI I believe that entropy begins to eventually diminish as gravity. It may be that comp and the Turing machine have analogous behaviors. Have received the following content - Sender: Roger Clough Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-09-29, 04:18:28 Subject: Platonia and Contingia Platonia and Contingia We are all somewhat familiar with Platonia, the Platonic source of order in the world. I suggest that there must also be Contingia, that being our contingent, everyday world, which, following Boltzmann and the concept of entropy, is the source of disorder. I would also like to suggest that Platonic causation is goal-oriented, also referred to by Aristotle as end causation, and favors life, while in Contingia, causation is that of everyday determinism, which tends to create disorder, entropy, decay and death. Then there will always be two opposing forces, one of order (Platonia) and one of disorder or entropy (Contingia). Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 9/29/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Evolution according to Platonia and Contingia
Hi Alberto G. Corona Yes, it is the goal-seeking aspect of life coming from Platonia inside or overlooking the survival of the fittest aspect of Contingia. Lifeless evolution is also possible, as you observe, although as you observe from Penrose, it could be just due to the gradient in the entropy. Good point. Leibniz allows for an unfolding of life from the changing seeds evolving within a particular monad (its subsequent generations, so to speak). According to Leibniz, monads cannot die or be created, so he would conceive of evolution as an unfolding of subsequent forms of a given monad, which might represent a species. Or perhaps the tree of life itself. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 9/30/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Alberto G. Corona Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-09-30, 08:43:57 Subject: Re: Pre-established harmony comp in relation to Platonia andContingia Thanks for the very interesting video. Concerning Platonia and Contingia, there are much to say if we introduce natural selection, the only well know creative process. The world of Platonia, in terms of natural selection, is the peak of the fitness landscape (FT). ?he FT is the point of perfection from which the living form, or the living behaviour can not be improved. ? Contingia is the world of extinction by random, imprevisible events. When contingia enters,the most filnely adapted beings perish due to their specialization, and gives the world to generalists, good in nothing, bacterias, fungi and ? adapted of fortune that casually are adapted to the disaster scenario: scavengers, tunnel diggers, shallow water habitants etc. ?one of them are beatiful. ?ut extinction gives a opportunity to new perfect forms that are better than the former. If there would be no extinction, we would still be bacterias. This creative destruction appears also in the market, (That is a controlled darwinian process under State laws). and in general in any creative process. The perfect forms inhabit our mind because we have to measure ourselves against the ideal. Beauty is a measure of closeness to the ideal. I? persuaded for example that the beauty of movements of a dancer is related with the use of energy for a given movement. the less energy the dancer use, the more beautiful is the movement. And we perceive this use of energy as smooth and beatiful movement because to mate or to be a friend of a good ?ser of his energies (by a good neurocoordination) has been crucial for survial. A good dancer is in the peak of fitness landscape in energy usage, so he exhibit it. And Platonia in our mind know it. There are evolutonary explanations for many others notons of beauty. As Penrose said the motor of this process of evolution and life ?s the gradient of entropy. The photosyntesis is a capture of energy that requires the building of a chemical (and phisical) infrastructure that requires information processing, from genes to phenotype building programs to reproduction and so on. ? And only in a positive gradient of entrophy this processing is possible for living beings. I would also like to suggest that the pre-established harmony (PEH) of Leibniz is more complex but still acts as Leibniz intended, while one might apply traditional cosmological concepts to it. Perhaps someone with more physics (and brains) than I could use this to roughly specify what the PEH is. In the traditional understanding it would simply be the decay of order into disorder. Note that Penrose has looked recently into the issue of how large the entropy can get. See the series starting at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fJ-D5AUGVcI I believe that entropy begins to eventually diminish as gravity. It may be that comp and the Turing machine have analogous behaviors. Have received the following content - Sender: Roger Clough Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-09-29, 04:18:28 Subject: Platonia and Contingia Platonia and Contingia We are all somewhat familiar with Platonia, the Platonic source of order in the world. I suggest that there must also be Contingia, that being our contingent, everyday world, which, following Boltzmann and the concept of entropy, is the source of disorder. I would also like to suggest that Platonic causation is goal-oriented, also referred to by Aristotle as end causation, and favors life, while in Contingia, causation is that of everyday determinism, which tends to create disorder, entropy, decay and death. Then there will always be two opposing forces, one of order (Platonia) and one of disorder or entropy (Contingia). Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 9/29/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Re: Numbers and other inhabitants of Platonia are also inhabitants of monads
On 9/30/2012 8:34 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal I'm still trying to figure out how numbers and ideas fit into Leibniz's metaphysics. Little is written about this issue, so I have to rely on what Leibniz says otherwise about monads. Previously I noted that numbers could not be monads because monads constantly change. Another argument against numbers being monads is that all monads must be attached to corporeal bodies. So monads refer to objects in the (already) created world, whose identities persist, while ideas and numbers are not created objects. While numbers and ideas cannot be monads, they have to be are entities in the mind, feelings, and bodily aspects of monads. For Leibniz refers to the intellect of human monads. And similarly, numbers and ideas must be used in the fictional construction of matter-- in the bodily aspect of material monads, as well as the construction of our bodies and brains. Dear Roger, Bruno's idea is a form of Pre-Established Hamony, in that the truth of the numbers is a pre-established ontological primitive. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Pre-established harmony comp in relation to Platonia and Contingia
On 9/30/2012 8:43 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote: Thanks for the very interesting video. Hi Alberto, I agree. Roger Penrose is one of my favorite theorists. Concerning Platonia and Contingia, there are much to say if we introduce natural selection, the only well know creative process. The world of Platonia, in terms of natural selection, is the peak of the fitness landscape (FT). The FT is the point of perfection from which the living form, or the living behaviour can not be improved. Contingia is the world of extinction by random, imprevisible events. When contingia enters,the most filnely adapted beings perish due to their specialization, and gives the world to generalists, good in nothing, bacterias, fungi and adapted of fortune that casually are adapted to the disaster scenario: scavengers, tunnel diggers, shallow water habitants etc. None of them are beatiful. But extinction gives a opportunity to new perfect forms that are better than the former. If there would be no extinction, we would still be bacterias. A very good point! One of my constant complaints is that the Selection aspect of evolution is grossly neglected in discussions of it. This creative destruction appears also in the market, (That is a controlled darwinian process under State laws). and in general in any creative process. Yes, it is the tendency to select an outcome from a domain of many possible outcomes. Mathematically, it resembles a many-to-one mapping function. Mutation, in evolutionary models, can be seen mathematically as a one-to-many mapping function. It is interesting to me that these two mapping functions are the inverse or dual of each other. I think that this feature can be used to mathematically model evolution. The perfect forms inhabit our mind because we have to measure ourselves against the ideal. Beauty is a measure of closeness to the ideal. I´m persuaded for example that the beauty of movements of a dancer is related with the use of energy for a given movement. the less energy the dancer use, the more beautiful is the movement. And we perceive this use of energy as smooth and beatiful movement because to mate or to be a friend of a good user of his energies (by a good neurocoordination) has been crucial for survial. A good dancer is in the peak of fitness landscape in energy usage, so he exhibit it. And Platonia in our mind know it. There are evolutonary explanations for many others notons of beauty. As Penrose said the motor of this process of evolution and life is the gradient of entropy. The photosyntesis is a capture of energy that requires the building of a chemical (and phisical) infrastructure that requires information processing, from genes to phenotype building programs to reproduction and so on. And only in a positive gradient of entrophy this processing is possible http://www.google.es/url?sa=trct=jq=esrc=ssource=webcd=3cad=rjaved=0CC8QFjACurl=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.slideshare.net%2Fagcorona1%2Farrow-of-time-determined-by-lthe-easier-direction-of-computation-for-lifeei=kz1oUNjjIJCxhAesjIDgAgusg=AFQjCNGhgf10g4gWWodpK-QwcKptsdCWTwsig2=LEWaQzY5cTrUV1I8wkA7bQ for living beings. It might be that living being are, as an equivalence class, all the possible structures that can process gradients of entropy for the purpose of generated their structure. I would also like to suggest that the pre-established harmony (PEH) of Leibniz is more complex but still acts as Leibniz intended, while one might apply traditional cosmological concepts to it. Perhaps someone with more physics (and brains) than I could use this to roughly specify what the PEH is. In the traditional understanding it would simply be the decay of order into disorder. Note that Penrose has looked recently into the issue of how large the entropy can get. See the series starting at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fJ-D5AUGVcI I believe that entropy begins to eventually diminish as gravity. It may be that comp and the Turing machine have analogous behaviors. snip -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Platonia and Contingia
Platonia and Contingia We are all somewhat familiar with Platonia, the Platonic source of order in the world. I suggest that there must also be Contingia, that being our contingent, everyday world, which, following Boltzmann and the concept of entropy, is the source of disorder. I would also like to suggest that Platonic causation is goal-oriented, also referred to by Aristotle as end causation, and favors life, while in Contingia, causation is that of everyday determinism, which tends to create disorder, entropy, decay and death. Then there will always be two opposing forces, one of order (Platonia) and one of disorder or entropy (Contingia). Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 9/29/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Pre-established harmony comp in relation to Platonia and Contingia
Pre-established harmony comp in relation to Platonia and Contingia I would also like to suggest that the pre-established harmony (PEH) of Leibniz is more complex but still acts as Leibniz intended, while one might apply traditional cosmological concepts to it. Perhaps someone with more physics (and brains) than I could use this to roughly specify what the PEH is. In the traditional understanding it would simply be the decay of order into disorder. Note that Penrose has looked recently into the issue of how large the entropy can get. See the series starting at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fJ-D5AUGVcI I believe that entropy begins to eventually diminish as gravity. It may be that comp and the Turing machine have analogous behaviors. Have received the following content - Sender: Roger Clough Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-09-29, 04:18:28 Subject: Platonia and Contingia Platonia and Contingia We are all somewhat familiar with Platonia, the Platonic source of order in the world. I suggest that there must also be Contingia, that being our contingent, everyday world, which, following Boltzmann and the concept of entropy, is the source of disorder. I would also like to suggest that Platonic causation is goal-oriented, also referred to by Aristotle as end causation, and favors life, while in Contingia, causation is that of everyday determinism, which tends to create disorder, entropy, decay and death. Then there will always be two opposing forces, one of order (Platonia) and one of disorder or entropy (Contingia). Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 9/29/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Platonia always rules !
Hi Bruno Marchal In idealism the ideal world is the reflection of the actual world, so that the material brain is reflected in the ideal mind, but one critical difference. Thought requires that somewhere there's a someone or something in the driver's seat. I can't imagine a material self, it has to be mental-- transcendent, in Platonia or the mind. It is what causes motion and makes decisions. Platonia always rules ! Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 9/25/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-09-24, 10:52:42 Subject: Re: Zombieopolis Thought Experiment On 24 Sep 2012, at 16:13, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal A computer being not conscious ? All computer operations (to my mind,probably not yours) are actual (in spacetime). But consciousness is an inherent (mental, not in spacetime) activity. All right, in that sense a computer cannot think. I agree, but a brain cannot think too, nor any body. They can only manifest consciousness, which, we agree on this, is in Platonia. Computer can support a knowing self, like a brain, unless you decide not, but then it looks like arbitrary racism. You just decide that some entities cannot think, because *you* fail to recognize yourself in them. You could at least say that you don't know, or give argument, but you just repeat that brain can support consciousness and that silicon cannot, without giving an atom of justification. This can't be serious. Cs = subject + object A computer has no inherent realms, no conscious self or observer. Instead, a computer is all object (completely in the objective realm), no subject. You can implement a self-transformative software on computers. You should be more careful and study a bit of computer science before judging computers, especially if you assert strong negative statements about them. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 9/24/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-09-24, 09:52:34 Subject: Re: Zombieopolis Thought Experiment On 24 Sep 2012, at 14:51, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stathis Papaioannou Try to define consciousness. If you can't, how do you know that a computer is conscious ? Try to define consciousness. If you can't how do you know that a computer is not conscious? Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 9/24/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stathis Papaioannou Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-09-24, 08:38:48 Subject: Re: Re: Zombieopolis Thought Experiment On Mon, Sep 24, 2012 at 10:02 PM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stathis Papaioannou You need a self or observer to be conscious, and computers have no self. So they can't be conscious. Consciousness = a subject looking at, or aware of, an object. Computers have no subject. So where do you get the idea that computers have no self, no subject and can't be observers or be conscious? You may as well claim that women aren't conscious but just act as if they are conscious, like an advanced computer pretending to have a self. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit
Re: Re: Does Platonia exist ?
Hi Bruno Marchal But R^3 is not extended in spacetime, is not at location r at time t and isn't a physical but a mental object I would say rather that R^3 inheres. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 9/24/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-09-22, 15:49:55 Subject: Re: Does Platonia exist ? On 22 Sep 2012, at 11:25, Roger Clough wrote: ROGER: Hi Bruno Marchal I think we should only use the word exists only when we are referring to physical existence. BRUNO: Hmm That might aggravate the naturalist or materialist human penchant. ROGER: Why ? Naturalist and materialist entities are extended and so physically exist. R^3 is extended, but is not physical. The Mandelbrot set is extended, but is not physical. What I say here is how I think Leibniz would respond. Thus I can truthfully say, for example, that God does not exist. Wikipedia says, In common usage, it [existence] is the world we are aware of through our senses, and that persists independently without them. BRUNO: But that points on the whole problem. With comp and QM, even when you observe the moon, it is not really there. ROGER: Yes it is. Although I observe the moon phenomenologically, it still has physical existence in spacetime because it is extended. I don't what is spacetime. I work on where spacetime oir space time hallucinations come from. At least that's Leibniz' position, namely that phenomena, although illusions, still have physical presence. I don't understand. the physical is what need an explanation, notably when you assume comp. Leibniz refers to these as well-founded phenomena. You can still stub your toe on phenomenological rocks. Yes. But this is more an argument that phenomenological rocks can make you stub the toe, even when non extended, like when being virtual or arithmetical. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Existence On the other hand, Platonia, Plotinus, Plato, Kant and Leibniz, take the opposite view or what is real and what exists. To them ideas and other nonphysical items such as numbers or anything not extended in space, anything outside of spacetime are what exist, the physical world out there is merely an appearance, a phenomenon. Following Leibniz, I would say of such things that they live, since life has such attributes. BRUNO: Hmm... Then numbers lives, but with comp, only universal or Lobian numbers can be said reasonably enough to be living. You might go to far. Even in Plato, the No? content (all the ideas) is richer that its living part. I doubt Plato would have said that a circle is living. Life will need the soul to enact life in the intelligible. Plato's One is a special case, saince it is a monad of monads, OK, it makes sense with m?nad of monads = universal machine/number, and monad = machine/number. And more esoteric thinking treats numbers more as beings: http://supertarot.co.uk/westcott/monad.htm BRUNO: The person and its body. OK. For the term exist I think we should allow all reading, and just ask people to remind us of the sense before the use. With comp, all the exists comes from the ExP(x) use in arithmetic, and their arithmetical epistemological version, like []Ex[]P(x), or []Ex[]P(x), etc. That gives a testable toy theology (testable as such a theology contains the physics as a subpart). Bruno ROGER: You lost me, except I believe that a main part of confusion and disagreement on this list comes because of multiple meanings of the word exists, which brings me back to where I started: I think we should only use the word exists only when we are referring to physical (extended) existence. Which brings me back to my statement: this will not help. You can use this in the mundane life, or even when doing physics (although with QM, even this is no more clear). But if you serach a TOE, it is clearer to clearly distinguish what you assume to exist at the start, and what exists by derivation, and what exists in the mind of the self-aware creatures appearing by derivation. Keep in mind that the UD arrgument is supposed, at the least, to show that the TOE is just arithmetic (or anything Turing equivalent), and that the physical reality has to be recovered mathematically by the statistical interference of number's dream. That is an exercise in theoretical computer science. We can recover more, as we can get a large non communicable, but hopable or fearable, part. Bruno - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-09-21, 04:10:52 Subject: Re: Numbers in Space On 21 Sep 2012, at 03:28, Stephen P
Re: Re: Does Platonia exist ?
Hi Stephen P. King I have since abandoned the term living for the term to inhere to apply to nonphysical existence such as thoughts or ideas or numbers. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 9/24/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-09-22, 15:40:12 Subject: Re: Does Platonia exist ? On 9/22/2012 5:34 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Alberto G. Corona If we can define what we are talking about, most of our problems will be solved. That is why I believe we ought to use the Descartes-Leibniz definition of physical existence as that which is in spacetime (is extended). Thus the brain exists. Nonphysical existence (mind) is that which is not extended in space and hence is said to be nonextended or inextended. I have been referring to this type of existence as living, but number does not seem tpo be alive since it does not change while living things do. I sucggest that we use the term mental for inextended entities. Then both number and mind are mental. Roger Clough,rclo...@verizon.net 9/22/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen Dear Roger, The only problem that I see is that the term living has an associated schemata of meaningfulness. It would be better, I argue, to cleanser the term existence of its vague and nonsensical associations and use it for the necessary possibility of both the extended and non-extended aspects of the One. -- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Does Platonia exist ?
On 24 Sep 2012, at 12:32, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal But R^3 is not extended in spacetime, is not at location r at time t and isn't a physical but a mental object What makes you sure that the physical is not a mental object? I would say rather that R^3 inheres. Not sure this helps. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Does Platonia exist ?
Hi Bruno Marchal R^3 has no dimensions, and does not exist in spacetime. So instead of calling it actual, I say that it inheres (when read or thought). Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 9/24/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-09-24, 09:03:42 Subject: Re: Does Platonia exist ? On 24 Sep 2012, at 12:32, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal But R^3 is not extended in spacetime, is not at location r at time t and isn't a physical but a mental object What makes you sure that the physical is not a mental object? I would say rather that R^3 inheres. Not sure this helps. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Does Platonia exist ?
ROGER: Hi Bruno Marchal I think we should only use the word exists only when we are referring to physical existence. BRUNO: Hmm That might aggravate the naturalist or materialist human penchant. ROGER: Why ? Naturalist and materialist entities are extended and so physically exist. What I say here is how I think Leibniz would respond. Thus I can truthfully say, for example, that God does not exist. Wikipedia says, In common usage, it [existence] is the world we are aware of through our senses, and that persists independently without them. BRUNO: But that points on the whole problem. With comp and QM, even when you observe the moon, it is not really there. ROGER: Yes it is. Although I observe the moon phenomenologically, it still has physical existence in spacetime because it is extended. At least that's Leibniz' position, namely that phenomena, although illusions, still have physical presence. Leibniz refers to these as well-founded phenomena. You can still stub your toe on phenomenological rocks. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Existence On the other hand, Platonia, Plotinus, Plato, Kant and Leibniz, take the opposite view or what is real and what exists. To them ideas and other nonphysical items such as numbers or anything not extended in space, anything outside of spacetime are what exist, the physical world out there is merely an appearance, a phenomenon. Following Leibniz, I would say of such things that they live, since life has such attributes. BRUNO: Hmm... Then numbers lives, but with comp, only universal or Lobian numbers can be said reasonably enough to be living. You might go to far. Even in Plato, the No? content (all the ideas) is richer that its living part. I doubt Plato would have said that a circle is living. Life will need the soul to enact life in the intelligible. Plato's One is a special case, saince it is a monad of monads, And more esoteric thinking treats numbers more as beings: http://supertarot.co.uk/westcott/monad.htm BRUNO: The person and its body. OK. For the term exist I think we should allow all reading, and just ask people to remind us of the sense before the use. With comp, all the exists comes from the ExP(x) use in arithmetic, and their arithmetical epistemological version, like []Ex[]P(x), or []Ex[]P(x), etc. That gives a testable toy theology (testable as such a theology contains the physics as a subpart). Bruno ROGER: You lost me, except I believe that a main part of confusion and disagreement on this list comes because of multiple meanings of the word exists, which brings me back to where I started: I think we should only use the word exists only when we are referring to physical (extended) existence. - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-09-21, 04:10:52 Subject: Re: Numbers in Space On 21 Sep 2012, at 03:28, Stephen P. King wrote: On 9/20/2012 12:14 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Thursday, September 20, 2012 11:48:15 AM UTC-4, Jason wrote: It's not doing the computations that is hard, the computations are already there. The problem is learning their results. The problem is doing anything in the first place. Computations don't do anything at all. The reason that we do things is that we are not computations. We use computations. We can program things, but we can't thing programs without something to thing them with. This is a fatal flaw. If Platonia exists, it makes no sense for anything other than Platonia to exist. It would be redundant to go through the formality of executing any function is already executed non-locally. Why 'do' anything? Bruno can 't answer that question. He is afraid that it will corrupt Olympia. Not at all, the answer is easy here. In the big picture, that is arithmetic, nothing is done. The computations are already done in it. doing things is a relative internal notion coming from the first person perspectives. Also, Platonia does not really exist, nor God, as existence is what belongs to Platonia. Comp follows Plotinus on this, both God and Matter does not belong to the category exist (ontologically). They are epistemological beings. Bruno -- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email
Re: Re: Does Platonia exist ?
Hi Alberto G. Corona If we can define what we are talking about, most of our problems will be solved. That is why I believe we ought to use the Descartes-Leibniz definition of physical existence as that which is in spacetime (is extended). Thus the brain exists. Nonphysical existence (mind) is that which is not extended in space and hence is said to be nonextended or inextended. I have been referring to this type of existence as living, but number does not seem tpo be alive since it does not change while living things do. I sucggest that we use the term mental for inextended entities. Then both number and mind are mental. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 9/22/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Alberto G. Corona Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-09-21, 12:42:47 Subject: Re: Does Platonia exist ? Hi, Anyone serious about knowing truths must either spend its life trying to define the concept of existence and fighting for it or? to discard it for all uses. The concept of phisical exsitence has a primitive utilitary nature: ?re there men in the other side of the mountain?. This urgent need to fix the knowledge of the phisical environment makes existence something crucial for communication. More sophisticated civilizations added to the existence more subtle concepts, which had effects in the personal and social life of the people: philosophical, psichological , political, religious. In this?ense materialism is a return to primitivism. ? In pragmatic terms, ?nything that has effects in life exist. Are you humans with hands, minds etc ?r are you allucinations, robots? I don? know it properly, but you exist for me.? This makes the concept of existence redundant, or at most, a matter of public consensus in the context of a community. But probably existence has never been more than this. Alberto. 2012/9/21 Bruno Marchal On 21 Sep 2012, at 12:21, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal ? I think we should only use the word exists ?nly when we are referring to physical existence. Hmm That might aggravate the naturalist or materialist human penchant. Thus I can truthfully say, for example, that God does not exist. ? Wikipedia says, In common usage, it [existence] is the world we are aware of through our senses, ? and that persists independently without them. But that points on the whole problem. With comp and QM, even when you observe the moon, it is not really there. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Existence On the other hand, Platonia, Plotinus, Plato, Kant and Leibniz, take the opposite view or what is real and what exists. To them ideas and other nonphysical items such as numbers or anything not extended in space, anything outside of spacetime are what exist, the physical world out there is merely an appearance, a phenomenon. ?ollowing Leibniz, I would say of such things that they live, since life has such attributes. Hmm... Then numbers lives, but with comp, only universal or Lobian numbers can be said reasonably enough to be living. You might go to far. Even in Plato, the No? content (all the ideas) is richer that its living part. I doubt Plato would have said that a circle is living. Life will need the soul to enact life in the intelligible. So when we say that a man exists, we are speaking of the physical man. But when we say that he lives, we are speaking of man as a mental or living being. The person and its body. OK. For the term exist I think we should allow all reading, and just ask people to remind us of the sense before the use. With comp, all the exists comes from the ExP(x) use in arithmetic, and their arithmetical epistemological version, like []Ex[]P(x), or?]Ex[]P(x), etc. That gives a testable toy theology (testable as such a theology contains the physics as a subpart). Bruno - Receiving the following content - ? From: Bruno Marchal ? Receiver: everything-list ? Time: 2012-09-21, 04:10:52 Subject: Re: Numbers in Space On 21 Sep 2012, at 03:28, Stephen P. King wrote: On 9/20/2012 12:14 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Thursday, September 20, 2012 11:48:15 AM UTC-4, Jason wrote: It's not doing the computations that is hard, the computations are already there. ?he problem is learning their results. The problem is doing anything in the first place. Computations don't do anything at all. The reason that we do things is that we are not computations. We use computations. We can program things, but we can't thing programs without something to thing them with. This is a fatal flaw. If Platonia exists, it makes no sense for anything other than Platonia to exist. It would be redundant to go through the formality of executing any function is already executed non-locally. Why 'do' anything? ??runo can 't answer that question. He
Re: Does Platonia exist ?
On 9/22/2012 5:34 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Alberto G. Corona If we can define what we are talking about, most of our problems will be solved. That is why I believe we ought to use the Descartes-Leibniz definition of physical existence as that which is in spacetime (is extended). Thus the brain exists. Nonphysical existence (mind) is that which is not extended in space and hence is said to be nonextended or inextended. I have been referring to this type of existence as living, but number does not seem tpo be alive since it does not change while living things do. I sucggest that we use the term mental for inextended entities. Then both number and mind are mental. Roger Clough,rclo...@verizon.net 9/22/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen Dear Roger, The only problem that I see is that the term living has an associated schemata of meaningfulness. It would be better, I argue, to cleanser the term existence of its vague and nonsensical associations and use it for the necessary possibility of both the extended and non-extended aspects of the One. -- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Does Platonia exist ?
On 22 Sep 2012, at 11:25, Roger Clough wrote: ROGER: Hi Bruno Marchal I think we should only use the word exists only when we are referring to physical existence. BRUNO: Hmm That might aggravate the naturalist or materialist human penchant. ROGER: Why ? Naturalist and materialist entities are extended and so physically exist. R^3 is extended, but is not physical. The Mandelbrot set is extended, but is not physical. What I say here is how I think Leibniz would respond. Thus I can truthfully say, for example, that God does not exist. Wikipedia says, In common usage, it [existence] is the world we are aware of through our senses, and that persists independently without them. BRUNO: But that points on the whole problem. With comp and QM, even when you observe the moon, it is not really there. ROGER: Yes it is. Although I observe the moon phenomenologically, it still has physical existence in spacetime because it is extended. I don't what is spacetime. I work on where spacetime oir space time hallucinations come from. At least that's Leibniz' position, namely that phenomena, although illusions, still have physical presence. I don't understand. the physical is what need an explanation, notably when you assume comp. Leibniz refers to these as well-founded phenomena. You can still stub your toe on phenomenological rocks. Yes. But this is more an argument that phenomenological rocks can make you stub the toe, even when non extended, like when being virtual or arithmetical. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Existence On the other hand, Platonia, Plotinus, Plato, Kant and Leibniz, take the opposite view or what is real and what exists. To them ideas and other nonphysical items such as numbers or anything not extended in space, anything outside of spacetime are what exist, the physical world out there is merely an appearance, a phenomenon. Following Leibniz, I would say of such things that they live, since life has such attributes. BRUNO: Hmm... Then numbers lives, but with comp, only universal or Lobian numbers can be said reasonably enough to be living. You might go to far. Even in Plato, the No? content (all the ideas) is richer that its living part. I doubt Plato would have said that a circle is living. Life will need the soul to enact life in the intelligible. Plato's One is a special case, saince it is a monad of monads, OK, it makes sense with mùonad of monads = universal machine/number, and monad = machine/number. And more esoteric thinking treats numbers more as beings: http://supertarot.co.uk/westcott/monad.htm BRUNO: The person and its body. OK. For the term exist I think we should allow all reading, and just ask people to remind us of the sense before the use. With comp, all the exists comes from the ExP(x) use in arithmetic, and their arithmetical epistemological version, like []Ex[]P(x), or []Ex[]P(x), etc. That gives a testable toy theology (testable as such a theology contains the physics as a subpart). Bruno ROGER: You lost me, except I believe that a main part of confusion and disagreement on this list comes because of multiple meanings of the word exists, which brings me back to where I started: I think we should only use the word exists only when we are referring to physical (extended) existence. Which brings me back to my statement: this will not help. You can use this in the mundane life, or even when doing physics (although with QM, even this is no more clear). But if you serach a TOE, it is clearer to clearly distinguish what you assume to exist at the start, and what exists by derivation, and what exists in the mind of the self-aware creatures appearing by derivation. Keep in mind that the UD arrgument is supposed, at the least, to show that the TOE is just arithmetic (or anything Turing equivalent), and that the physical reality has to be recovered mathematically by the statistical interference of number's dream. That is an exercise in theoretical computer science. We can recover more, as we can get a large non communicable, but hopable or fearable, part. Bruno = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = == - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-09-21, 04:10:52 Subject: Re: Numbers in Space On 21 Sep 2012, at 03:28, Stephen P. King wrote: On 9/20/2012 12:14 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Thursday, September 20, 2012 11:48:15 AM UTC-4, Jason wrote: It's not doing the computations that is hard, the computations are already there. The problem is learning their results. The problem is doing anything in the first place. Computations don't do anything at all. The reason that we do things is that we are not computations. We use computations. We can program things, but we can't
Does Platonia exist ?
Hi Bruno Marchal I think we should only use the word exists only when we are referring to physical existence. Thus I can truthfully say, for example, that God does not exist. Wikipedia says, In common usage, it [existence] is the world we are aware of through our senses, and that persists independently without them. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Existence On the other hand, Platonia, Plotinus, Plato, Kant and Leibniz, take the opposite view or what is real and what exists. To them ideas and other nonphysical items such as numbers or anything not extended in space, anything outside of spacetime are what exist, the physical world out there is merely an appearance, a phenomenon. Following Leibniz, I would say of such things that they live, since life has such attributes. So when we say that a man exists, we are speaking of the physical man. But when we say that he lives, we are speaking of man as a mental or living being. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 9/21/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-09-21, 04:10:52 Subject: Re: Numbers in Space On 21 Sep 2012, at 03:28, Stephen P. King wrote: On 9/20/2012 12:14 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Thursday, September 20, 2012 11:48:15 AM UTC-4, Jason wrote: It's not doing the computations that is hard, the computations are already there. The problem is learning their results. The problem is doing anything in the first place. Computations don't do anything at all. The reason that we do things is that we are not computations. We use computations. We can program things, but we can't thing programs without something to thing them with. This is a fatal flaw. If Platonia exists, it makes no sense for anything other than Platonia to exist. It would be redundant to go through the formality of executing any function is already executed non-locally. Why 'do' anything? Bruno can 't answer that question. He is afraid that it will corrupt Olympia. Not at all, the answer is easy here. In the big picture, that is arithmetic, nothing is done. The computations are already done in it. doing things is a relative internal notion coming from the first person perspectives. Also, Platonia does not really exist, nor God, as existence is what belongs to Platonia. Comp follows Plotinus on this, both God and Matter does not belong to the category exist (ontologically). They are epistemological beings. Bruno -- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Does Platonia exist ?
On 21 Sep 2012, at 12:21, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal I think we should only use the word exists only when we are referring to physical existence. Hmm That might aggravate the naturalist or materialist human penchant. Thus I can truthfully say, for example, that God does not exist. Wikipedia says, In common usage, it [existence] is the world we are aware of through our senses, and that persists independently without them. But that points on the whole problem. With comp and QM, even when you observe the moon, it is not really there. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Existence On the other hand, Platonia, Plotinus, Plato, Kant and Leibniz, take the opposite view or what is real and what exists. To them ideas and other nonphysical items such as numbers or anything not extended in space, anything outside of spacetime are what exist, the physical world out there is merely an appearance, a phenomenon. Following Leibniz, I would say of such things that they live, since life has such attributes. Hmm... Then numbers lives, but with comp, only universal or Lobian numbers can be said reasonably enough to be living. You might go to far. Even in Plato, the Noùs content (all the ideas) is richer that its living part. I doubt Plato would have said that a circle is living. Life will need the soul to enact life in the intelligible. So when we say that a man exists, we are speaking of the physical man. But when we say that he lives, we are speaking of man as a mental or living being. The person and its body. OK. For the term exist I think we should allow all reading, and just ask people to remind us of the sense before the use. With comp, all the exists comes from the ExP(x) use in arithmetic, and their arithmetical epistemological version, like []Ex[]P(x), or []Ex[]P(x), etc. That gives a testable toy theology (testable as such a theology contains the physics as a subpart). Bruno - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-09-21, 04:10:52 Subject: Re: Numbers in Space On 21 Sep 2012, at 03:28, Stephen P. King wrote: On 9/20/2012 12:14 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Thursday, September 20, 2012 11:48:15 AM UTC-4, Jason wrote: It's not doing the computations that is hard, the computations are already there. The problem is learning their results. The problem is doing anything in the first place. Computations don't do anything at all. The reason that we do things is that we are not computations. We use computations. We can program things, but we can't thing programs without something to thing them with. This is a fatal flaw. If Platonia exists, it makes no sense for anything other than Platonia to exist. It would be redundant to go through the formality of executing any function is already executed non-locally. Why 'do' anything? Bruno can 't answer that question. He is afraid that it will corrupt Olympia. Not at all, the answer is easy here. In the big picture, that is arithmetic, nothing is done. The computations are already done in it. doing things is a relative internal notion coming from the first person perspectives. Also, Platonia does not really exist, nor God, as existence is what belongs to Platonia. Comp follows Plotinus on this, both God and Matter does not belong to the category exist (ontologically). They are epistemological beings. Bruno -- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Does Platonia exist ?
Hi, Anyone serious about knowing truths must either spend its life trying to define the concept of existence and fighting for it or to discard it for all uses. The concept of phisical exsitence has a primitive utilitary nature: Are there men in the other side of the mountain?. This urgent need to fix the knowledge of the phisical environment makes existence something crucial for communication. More sophisticated civilizations added to the existence more subtle concepts, which had effects in the personal and social life of the people: philosophical, psichological , political, religious. In this sense materialism is a return to primitivism. In pragmatic terms, anything that has effects in life exist. Are you humans with hands, minds etc or are you allucinations, robots? I don´t know it properly, but you exist for me. This makes the concept of existence redundant, or at most, a matter of public consensus in the context of a community. But probably existence has never been more than this. Alberto. 2012/9/21 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be On 21 Sep 2012, at 12:21, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal I think we should only use the word exists only when we are referring to physical existence. Hmm That might aggravate the naturalist or materialist human penchant. Thus I can truthfully say, for example, that God does not exist. Wikipedia says, In common usage, it [existence] is the world we are aware of through our senses, and that persists independently without them. But that points on the whole problem. With comp and QM, even when you observe the moon, it is not really there. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Existence On the other hand, Platonia, Plotinus, Plato, Kant and Leibniz, take the opposite view or what is real and what exists. To them ideas and other nonphysical items such as numbers or anything not extended in space, anything outside of spacetime are what exist, the physical world out there is merely an appearance, a phenomenon. Following Leibniz, I would say of such things that they live, since life has such attributes. Hmm... Then numbers lives, but with comp, only universal or Lobian numbers can be said reasonably enough to be living. You might go to far. Even in Plato, the Noùs content (all the ideas) is richer that its living part. I doubt Plato would have said that a circle is living. Life will need the soul to enact life in the intelligible. So when we say that a man exists, we are speaking of the physical man. But when we say that he lives, we are speaking of man as a mental or living being. The person and its body. OK. For the term exist I think we should allow all reading, and just ask people to remind us of the sense before the use. With comp, all the exists comes from the ExP(x) use in arithmetic, and their arithmetical epistemological version, like []Ex[]P(x), or []Ex[]P(x), etc. That gives a testable toy theology (testable as such a theology contains the physics as a subpart). Bruno - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-09-21, 04:10:52 Subject: Re: Numbers in Space On 21 Sep 2012, at 03:28, Stephen P. King wrote: On 9/20/2012 12:14 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Thursday, September 20, 2012 11:48:15 AM UTC-4, Jason wrote: It's not doing the computations that is hard, the computations are already there. The problem is learning their results. The problem is doing anything in the first place. Computations don't do anything at all. The reason that we do things is that we are not computations. We use computations. We can program things, but we can't thing programs without something to thing them with. This is a fatal flaw. If Platonia exists, it makes no sense for anything other than Platonia to exist. It would be redundant to go through the formality of executing any function is already executed non-locally. Why 'do' anything? Bruno can 't answer that question. He is afraid that it will corrupt Olympia. Not at all, the answer is easy here. In the big picture, that is arithmetic, nothing is done. The computations are already done in it. doing things is a relative internal notion coming from the first person perspectives. Also, Platonia does not really exist, nor God, as existence is what belongs to Platonia. Comp follows Plotinus on this, both God and Matter does not belong to the category exist (ontologically). They are epistemological beings. Bruno -- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
Platonia as a cosmic computer
Hi Jason Resch With the exception of the All, which acts like the central processing unit of a computer, the world entities, represented abstractly there as ideas, an act like the software and hardware of a giant computer. The All, like the CPU, brings these abstractions elsewhere in Platonia into action, something like the mind does. So the All is the brains of a computer. Platonia is what one might call the ideal aspect of the phenomenol world, as in the philosophy of Idealism. There everything is ideas, so Platonia is an abstract representation of the phenomenol world. The phenomenol world (the world we can touch, hear, see, etc.) also exists as we actually see it. In leibniz's idealism, the abstract representations if of a single part are called monads. If multiple parts, than composite monads. Each monad therefore is an abstraction or ideal form of an object in the phenomenol world. In Leibniz's view, the physical events we observe and measure in the phenomenol world obey the laws of physics for example only through their monads, not directly. Thus what we see is a physical representation of the monads, And the monads, being ideas, can be treated as computer software and hardware. These are moderated and controlled (causing their physical forms to act according to the laws), by what is called the Supreme Monad, which serves the same purpose as the main computer chip in the central processing unit. In Platonia this is called the All. In Christianity it is called God. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 9/17/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so that everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Jason Resch Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-09-15, 22:36:59 Subject: Re: science only works with half a brain On Sat, Sep 15, 2012 at 2:50 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 9/15/2012 8:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Sep 2012, at 18:36, Jason Resch wrote: On Fri, Sep 14, 2012 at 8:32 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: ? contend that universality is the independence of computations to any particular machine but there must be at least one physical system that can implement a given computation for that computation to be knowable. This is just a accessibility question, in the Kripke sense of accessible worlds. Stephen, Could you provide a definition of what you mean by 'physical system'? Do you think it is possible, even in theory, for entities to distinguish whether they are in a physical system or a mathematical one? ?f so, what difference would they test to make that distinction? I am philosophically pretty well convinced by this argument.? But there is still a logical problem, pointed by Peter Jones (1Z) on this list. Peter believes that comp makes sense only for primitively material machine, period.? So he would answer to you that the mathematical machine is just not conscious, and that the distinction you ask is the difference between being conscious (and material) and being non conscious at all (and immaterial). I don't see any way to reply to this which does not bring the movie graph, the 323 principles, and that kind of stuff into account. But of course I can understand that the idea that arithmetic is full of immaterial philosophical zombies is rather weird, notably because they have also endless discussion on zombie, and that arithmetic contains P. Jones counterpart defending in exactly his way, that *he* is material, but Peter does not care as they are zombie and are not conscious, in his theory. In Peter's ontology, with which I have considerable empathy, they simply don't exist.? Exist is what distinguishes material things from Platonia's abstractions - of course that doesn't play so well on something called the *EVERYTHING-LIST*.? :-) Brent, Under what theory do you (or Peter) operate under to decide whether or not an abstraction in platonia exists? ?t seems arbitrary and rather biased to confer this property only to those abstractions that happen to be nearest to us. Why should this additional property, namely existence, make any difference regarding which structures in platonia can have the property of conscious? ?t seems like this would lead to abstract objects that are only abstractly conscious and concrete objects which have the full-fledged concrete consciousness. ?fter all, we say that 2 is even, not that it is abstractly even. ?f some program in platonia is conscious, is it abstractly conscious or just conscious? I think our existence in this universe makes the conclusion clear. ?n other branch of the wave function, or in other physical universes predicted by string theory, our universe exists only as an abstraction, yet our relative abstraction (to some entities) does not makes us into zombies. ?hy should there be no symmetry in this regard? ?ow can our abstractions be zombies, while their abstractions are conscious
Re: Time and Concurrency Platonia?
On 11 Feb 2012, at 21:32, acw wrote: On 2/10/2012 13:54, Stephen P. King wrote: On 2/9/2012 3:40 PM, acw wrote: [SPK] I do not see how this deals effectively with the concurrency problem! :-( Using the Platonia idea is a cheat as it is explicitly unphysical. But physics by itself does not explain consciousness either (as shown by MGA). Maybe I just don't see what the concurrency problem is. It has no constraints of thermodynamics, no limits on speeds of signals, no explanation as to how an Ideal Form is defined, e.g. what is the standard of its perfection, ect. It is no different from the Realm of God in religious mythos, so what is it doing here in our rational considerations? Forgive me but I was raised by parents that where Fundamentalists Believers, so please understand that I have an allergy to ideas that remind me of the mental prison that I had to work so hard to escape. I'm not asking you to share all of Plato's beliefs here. It's merely a minimal amount of magic, not unlike the magic you have to accept by positing a 3p world. The amount is basically this: arithmetical (or computational) sentences have truth values independent of anything physical and consciousness/qualia may be how some such arithmetical truth feels from the inside. Without at least some axioms, one cannot get anywhere, you can't reduce arithmetic to only logic and so on. Why would Platonia have to have the same constraints as our physical realms - it need only obey to constraints of logic and math, which usually means stuff that is contained within the Church Turing Thesis and its implications. Speed of signals? If some theory is inconsistent, it's only there as part of the reasoning of some other machine. Ideal Form? How do you define an integer or the axioms that talk about arithmetic? Popular religious mythos tend to be troublesome because they involve *logically impossible* properties being attributed to Gods and other beings - things which are inconsistent. It's not like one doesn't assume some axioms in any theory - they are there in almost any scientific theory. Yet, unlike popular religions, you're free to evaluate your hypotheses and use evidence and meta-reasoning to decide which one is more likely to be true and then try to use the results of such theories to predict how stuff will behave or bet on various things. Of course, it's not hard to get trapped in a bad epistemology, and I can see why you'd be extra skeptical of bad theories, however nobody is telling you to believe a theory is true or false, instead it asks you to work out the consequences of each theory's axioms (as well as using meta-reasoning skills to weed down overly complex theories, if you prefer using Occam's) and then either choose to use or not use that particular theory depending if the results match your observations/expectations/standards/... (if expectations are broken, one would either have to update beliefs or theories or both). Hi ACW, What ever the global structure that we use to relate our ideas and provide explanations, it makes sense that we do not ignore problems that are inconvenient. A big problem that I have with Platonia is that it does not address the appearance of change that we finite semi- autonomous beings observe. The problem of time is just a corollary to this. I would prefer to toss out any postulates that require *any* magic. Magic is like Arsenic poison, every little bit doubles the harmful effects. Magic is only used for things which have to either be axioms or which just cannot be reduced further. Arithmetic cannot be reduced further. What we have as subjective experience is not directly communicable, it is very 'magical', yet our theories must explain it somehow. We may want to have no axioms at all, but such theories are inconsistent as they can prove anything at all. I make just a little technical remark. A theory without any axiom is consistent, because it cannot prove anything, not even a falsity. It has a model, indeed, all models are model of the empty theory. It makes such a theory non interesting, but perfectly consistent. To be inconsistent you will need axioms and rules such that you can prove a proposition and its negation. Otherwise I am OK with most of what you say. For the measure problem, and the derivation of the physical laws, I use the self-reference logics. I might come back on this, but it needs some background in mathematical logic. Bruno Why do we even need a notion of 3p except as a pedagogical tool? What we need, at least, is a stratification scheme that allows us to represent these differences, but we need to understand that in doing this we are sneaking in the notion of a 3p that is equivalent to some kind of agent whose only mission is to observe differences and that is a fallacy since we are trying to explain observers in the first place. Unless we have some way to handle a fundamental
Re: Time and Concurrency Platonia?
On 2/10/2012 13:54, Stephen P. King wrote: On 2/9/2012 3:40 PM, acw wrote: [SPK] I do not see how this deals effectively with the concurrency problem! :-( Using the Platonia idea is a cheat as it is explicitly unphysical. But physics by itself does not explain consciousness either (as shown by MGA). Maybe I just don't see what the concurrency problem is. It has no constraints of thermodynamics, no limits on speeds of signals, no explanation as to how an Ideal Form is defined, e.g. what is the standard of its perfection, ect. It is no different from the Realm of God in religious mythos, so what is it doing here in our rational considerations? Forgive me but I was raised by parents that where Fundamentalists Believers, so please understand that I have an allergy to ideas that remind me of the mental prison that I had to work so hard to escape. I'm not asking you to share all of Plato's beliefs here. It's merely a minimal amount of magic, not unlike the magic you have to accept by positing a 3p world. The amount is basically this: arithmetical (or computational) sentences have truth values independent of anything physical and consciousness/qualia may be how some such arithmetical truth feels from the inside. Without at least some axioms, one cannot get anywhere, you can't reduce arithmetic to only logic and so on. Why would Platonia have to have the same constraints as our physical realms - it need only obey to constraints of logic and math, which usually means stuff that is contained within the Church Turing Thesis and its implications. Speed of signals? If some theory is inconsistent, it's only there as part of the reasoning of some other machine. Ideal Form? How do you define an integer or the axioms that talk about arithmetic? Popular religious mythos tend to be troublesome because they involve *logically impossible* properties being attributed to Gods and other beings - things which are inconsistent. It's not like one doesn't assume some axioms in any theory - they are there in almost any scientific theory. Yet, unlike popular religions, you're free to evaluate your hypotheses and use evidence and meta-reasoning to decide which one is more likely to be true and then try to use the results of such theories to predict how stuff will behave or bet on various things. Of course, it's not hard to get trapped in a bad epistemology, and I can see why you'd be extra skeptical of bad theories, however nobody is telling you to believe a theory is true or false, instead it asks you to work out the consequences of each theory's axioms (as well as using meta-reasoning skills to weed down overly complex theories, if you prefer using Occam's) and then either choose to use or not use that particular theory depending if the results match your observations/expectations/standards/... (if expectations are broken, one would either have to update beliefs or theories or both). Hi ACW, What ever the global structure that we use to relate our ideas and provide explanations, it makes sense that we do not ignore problems that are inconvenient. A big problem that I have with Platonia is that it does not address the appearance of change that we finite semi-autonomous beings observe. The problem of time is just a corollary to this. I would prefer to toss out any postulates that require *any* magic. Magic is like Arsenic poison, every little bit doubles the harmful effects. Magic is only used for things which have to either be axioms or which just cannot be reduced further. Arithmetic cannot be reduced further. What we have as subjective experience is not directly communicable, it is very 'magical', yet our theories must explain it somehow. We may want to have no axioms at all, but such theories are inconsistent as they can prove anything at all. Why do we even need a notion of 3p except as a pedagogical tool? What we need, at least, is a stratification scheme that allows us to represent these differences, but we need to understand that in doing this we are sneaking in the notion of a 3p that is equivalent to some kind of agent whose only mission is to observe differences and that is a fallacy since we are trying to explain observers in the first place. Unless we have some way to handle a fundamental notion of change, there is no way to deal with questions of change and time. Please notice how many instances we are using verbs in our considerations of COMP ideas. Where and how does the change implicit in the verb, as like running the UD, obtain? We cannot ignore this. I am highlighting the concurrency problem b/c it shows how this problem cannot be ignored. The Platonic Realm, especially the Arithmetic Realist one, is by definition fixed and static, nothing changes in it at all! How do we get the appearance of time from it? It is possible to show how, but the proponents of COMP need to explain this, IMHO. It is incoherent at best to make statements like the UD is running on the walls of Platonia. How is that even
Re: Time and Concurrency Platonia? (was: Ontological Problems of COMP)
On 2/9/2012 3:40 PM, acw wrote: [SPK] I do not see how this deals effectively with the concurrency problem! :-( Using the Platonia idea is a cheat as it is explicitly unphysical. But physics by itself does not explain consciousness either (as shown by MGA). Maybe I just don't see what the concurrency problem is. It has no constraints of thermodynamics, no limits on speeds of signals, no explanation as to how an Ideal Form is defined, e.g. what is the standard of its perfection, ect. It is no different from the Realm of God in religious mythos, so what is it doing here in our rational considerations? Forgive me but I was raised by parents that where Fundamentalists Believers, so please understand that I have an allergy to ideas that remind me of the mental prison that I had to work so hard to escape. I'm not asking you to share all of Plato's beliefs here. It's merely a minimal amount of magic, not unlike the magic you have to accept by positing a 3p world. The amount is basically this: arithmetical (or computational) sentences have truth values independent of anything physical and consciousness/qualia may be how some such arithmetical truth feels from the inside. Without at least some axioms, one cannot get anywhere, you can't reduce arithmetic to only logic and so on. Why would Platonia have to have the same constraints as our physical realms - it need only obey to constraints of logic and math, which usually means stuff that is contained within the Church Turing Thesis and its implications. Speed of signals? If some theory is inconsistent, it's only there as part of the reasoning of some other machine. Ideal Form? How do you define an integer or the axioms that talk about arithmetic? Popular religious mythos tend to be troublesome because they involve *logically impossible* properties being attributed to Gods and other beings - things which are inconsistent. It's not like one doesn't assume some axioms in any theory - they are there in almost any scientific theory. Yet, unlike popular religions, you're free to evaluate your hypotheses and use evidence and meta-reasoning to decide which one is more likely to be true and then try to use the results of such theories to predict how stuff will behave or bet on various things. Of course, it's not hard to get trapped in a bad epistemology, and I can see why you'd be extra skeptical of bad theories, however nobody is telling you to believe a theory is true or false, instead it asks you to work out the consequences of each theory's axioms (as well as using meta-reasoning skills to weed down overly complex theories, if you prefer using Occam's) and then either choose to use or not use that particular theory depending if the results match your observations/expectations/standards/... (if expectations are broken, one would either have to update beliefs or theories or both). Hi ACW, What ever the global structure that we use to relate our ideas and provide explanations, it makes sense that we do not ignore problems that are inconvenient. A big problem that I have with Platonia is that it does not address the appearance of change that we finite semi-autonomous beings observe. The problem of time is just a corollary to this. I would prefer to toss out any postulates that require *any* magic. Magic is like Arsenic poison, every little bit doubles the harmful effects. Why do we even need a notion of 3p except as a pedagogical tool? What we need, at least, is a stratification scheme that allows us to represent these differences, but we need to understand that in doing this we are sneaking in the notion of a 3p that is equivalent to some kind of agent whose only mission is to observe differences and that is a fallacy since we are trying to explain observers in the first place. Unless we have some way to handle a fundamental notion of change, there is no way to deal with questions of change and time. Please notice how many instances we are using verbs in our considerations of COMP ideas. Where and how does the change implicit in the verb, as like running the UD, obtain? We cannot ignore this. I am highlighting the concurrency problem b/c it shows how this problem cannot be ignored. The Platonic Realm, especially the Arithmetic Realist one, is by definition fixed and static, nothing changes in it at all! How do we get the appearance of time from it? It is possible to show how, but the proponents of COMP need to explain this, IMHO. It is incoherent at best to make statements like the UD is running on the walls of Platonia. How is that even a meaningful claim? Another problem is the problem of space as we see in the way that 1p indeterminacy is defined in UDA. We read of a notion of cutting and pasting. Cut 'from where and pasted to where? How is the difference in position of say, Washington and Moscow, obtain in a Realm that has nothing like space? Unless we have a substrate of some kind
Re: Platonia
On 03 Mar 2011, at 19:44, Pzomby wrote: On Mar 3, 2:07 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 03 Mar 2011, at 02:54, Pzomby wrote: On Mar 2, 6:03 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 02 Mar 2011, at 05:48, Pzomby wrote: That is why I limit myself for the TOE to natural numbers and their addition and multiplication. The reason is that it is enough, by comp, and nobody (except perhaps some philosophers) have any problem with that. Yes. A couple of questions from a philosophical point of view: Language gives meaning to the numbers as in their operations; functions, units of measurements (kilo, meter, ounce, kelvin etc.). I am not sure language gives meaning. Language have meaning, but I think meaning, sense, and reference are more primary. With the mechanist assumption, meaning sense and references will be 'explained' by what the numbers 'thinks' about that, in the manner of computer science (which can be seen as a branch of number theory). Not sure what you mean by “what the numbers ‘thinks’ ”. Are you stating that numbers have or represent some type of dispositional property? Yes. Not intrinsically. So you cannot say the number 456000109332897 likes the smell of coffee, but it makes sense to say that relatively to the universal numbers u1, u2, u3, ... the number 456000109332897 likes the smell of coffee. A bit like you could say, relatively to fortran, the number x computes this or that function. A key point is that if a number feels something, it does not know which number 'he' is, and strictly speaking we are confronted to many vocabulary problems, which I simplifies for not being too much long and boring. I shoudl say that a number like 456000109332897 might play the local role of a body of a person which likes the smell of coffee. But, locally, I identify person and their bodies, knowing that in fine, the 'real physical body will comes from a competition among all universal numbers, or among all the corresponding computational histories. What of the opinion that ‘numbers’ themselves (without human consciousness to perform operations and functions) only represent instances of matter and forces with their dispositional properties? Once you have addition and multiplication, you don't need humans to do the interpretation. Indeed with addition and multiplication, you have a natural encoding of all interpretation by all universal numbers. The idea that matter and forces have dispositional properties is locally true, but we have to extract matter and forces from the more primitive relation between numbers if we take the comp hypothesis seriously enough (that is what I argue for, at least, cf UDA, MGA, AUDA). If “once you have addition and multiplication, you don't need humans to do the interpretation” and “the idea that matter and forces have dispositional properties is locally true, but we have to extract matter and forces from the more primitive relation between numbers”: Then, in what describable realm does that ultimately put numbers under the ‘comp hypothesis’? At the ultimate ontological bottom, you need a infinite collection of abstract primary objects, having primary elementary relations so that they constitute a universal system (in the sense of Post, Church, Turing, Kleene ...). My two favorite examples (among an infinity possible) are 1) the numbers (0, s(0), s(s(0)), ...) together with addition and multiplication. This is taught in high school, albeit their Turing universality is not easy at all to demonstrate. In that case, the numbers are put at the bottom. 2) the combinators (K, S, (K K), (K S), (S K), (S S), (K (K K)), (K (S K), ) Combinators are either K or S or any (X Y) with X and Y being combinators. The basic basic elementary operation are the rule of Elimination and Duplication: ((K x) y) = x (((S x) y) z) = ((x z)(y z)) It can be shown that with the numbers you can define the combinators, and with the combinators you can define the numbers. If you choose the combinators at the ontological bottom, you get the numbers by theorems, and vice versa. Both the numbers and the combinators are Turing universal, and that makes them enough to emulate the Löbian machines histories, and explain why from their points of view the physical realm is apparent, and sensible. We could start with a quantum universal system, but then we will lose a criteria for distinguishing the quanta from the qualia (it is not just 'treachery' with respect to the (mind) body problem). Bruno I believe, I somewhat follow (in general) what you are stating, but the question remains as to the realm that the primitive or fundamental numbers exist in, if, in fact, they are at an ontological bottom. If numbers were existing *in* something, they would not constitute an ontological bottom. You can take sets in place of numbers, and then the numbers exists *in* models of set theories. or you can take the combinators, and
Re: Platonia
On Mar 4, 8:02 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Somehow. The fundamentality arrow is roughly like this: NUMBERS = UNIVERSAL CONSCIOUSNESS = PHYSICAL LAWS = BIOLOGICAL CONSCIOUSNESS. On the other hand: PHYSICS=COMPUTATION=CONSCIOUSNESS=NUMBERS Shows how computationalism is compatible with mathematical anti realism -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Platonia
On 04 Mar 2011, at 15:24, 1Z wrote: On Mar 4, 8:02 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Somehow. The fundamentality arrow is roughly like this: NUMBERS = UNIVERSAL CONSCIOUSNESS = PHYSICAL LAWS = BIOLOGICAL CONSCIOUSNESS. On the other hand: PHYSICS=COMPUTATION=CONSCIOUSNESS=NUMBERS Shows how computationalism is compatible with mathematical anti realism I remind you that you are the one defending computationalism (yes doctor + Church thesis) and mathematical antirealism. I am the one arguing that comp is incompatible with materialism/physicalism. What is left, without materialism, could be biologicalism, mathematicalism, ... perhaps theologicalism. The terms are not important. To understand the reasoning and its implications is what matter. Computationalism needs only the common sense idea in math that if u is a universal number then u(n) will converge or will not converge. This can be seen as a formal statement. Are you conceding that we have to abandon comp to keep math? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Platonia
On 03 Mar 2011, at 02:54, Pzomby wrote: On Mar 2, 6:03 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 02 Mar 2011, at 05:48, Pzomby wrote: That is why I limit myself for the TOE to natural numbers and their addition and multiplication. The reason is that it is enough, by comp, and nobody (except perhaps some philosophers) have any problem with that. Yes. A couple of questions from a philosophical point of view: Language gives meaning to the numbers as in their operations; functions, units of measurements (kilo, meter, ounce, kelvin etc.). I am not sure language gives meaning. Language have meaning, but I think meaning, sense, and reference are more primary. With the mechanist assumption, meaning sense and references will be 'explained' by what the numbers 'thinks' about that, in the manner of computer science (which can be seen as a branch of number theory). Not sure what you mean by “what the numbers ‘thinks’ ”. Are you stating that numbers have or represent some type of dispositional property? Yes. Not intrinsically. So you cannot say the number 456000109332897 likes the smell of coffee, but it makes sense to say that relatively to the universal numbers u1, u2, u3, ... the number 456000109332897 likes the smell of coffee. A bit like you could say, relatively to fortran, the number x computes this or that function. A key point is that if a number feels something, it does not know which number 'he' is, and strictly speaking we are confronted to many vocabulary problems, which I simplifies for not being too much long and boring. I shoudl say that a number like 456000109332897 might play the local role of a body of a person which likes the smell of coffee. But, locally, I identify person and their bodies, knowing that in fine, the 'real physical body will comes from a competition among all universal numbers, or among all the corresponding computational histories. What of the opinion that ‘numbers’ themselves (without human consciousness to perform operations and functions) only represent instances of matter and forces with their dispositional properties? Once you have addition and multiplication, you don't need humans to do the interpretation. Indeed with addition and multiplication, you have a natural encoding of all interpretation by all universal numbers. The idea that matter and forces have dispositional properties is locally true, but we have to extract matter and forces from the more primitive relation between numbers if we take the comp hypothesis seriously enough (that is what I argue for, at least, cf UDA, MGA, AUDA). If “once you have addition and multiplication, you don't need humans to do the interpretation” and “the idea that matter and forces have dispositional properties is locally true, but we have to extract matter and forces from the more primitive relation between numbers”: Then, in what describable realm does that ultimately put numbers under the ‘comp hypothesis’? At the ultimate ontological bottom, you need a infinite collection of abstract primary objects, having primary elementary relations so that they constitute a universal system (in the sense of Post, Church, Turing, Kleene ...). My two favorite examples (among an infinity possible) are 1) the numbers (0, s(0), s(s(0)), ...) together with addition and multiplication. This is taught in high school, albeit their Turing universality is not easy at all to demonstrate. In that case, the numbers are put at the bottom. 2) the combinators (K, S, (K K), (K S), (S K), (S S), (K (K K)), (K (S K), ) Combinators are either K or S or any (X Y) with X and Y being combinators. The basic basic elementary operation are the rule of Elimination and Duplication: ((K x) y) = x (((S x) y) z) = ((x z)(y z)) It can be shown that with the numbers you can define the combinators, and with the combinators you can define the numbers. If you choose the combinators at the ontological bottom, you get the numbers by theorems, and vice versa. Both the numbers and the combinators are Turing universal, and that makes them enough to emulate the Löbian machines histories, and explain why from their points of view the physical realm is apparent, and sensible. We could start with a quantum universal system, but then we will lose a criteria for distinguishing the quanta from the qualia (it is not just 'treachery' with respect to the (mind) body problem). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Platonia
On Mar 3, 2:07 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 03 Mar 2011, at 02:54, Pzomby wrote: On Mar 2, 6:03 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 02 Mar 2011, at 05:48, Pzomby wrote: That is why I limit myself for the TOE to natural numbers and their addition and multiplication. The reason is that it is enough, by comp, and nobody (except perhaps some philosophers) have any problem with that. Yes. A couple of questions from a philosophical point of view: Language gives meaning to the numbers as in their operations; functions, units of measurements (kilo, meter, ounce, kelvin etc.). I am not sure language gives meaning. Language have meaning, but I think meaning, sense, and reference are more primary. With the mechanist assumption, meaning sense and references will be 'explained' by what the numbers 'thinks' about that, in the manner of computer science (which can be seen as a branch of number theory). Not sure what you mean by “what the numbers ‘thinks’ ”. Are you stating that numbers have or represent some type of dispositional property? Yes. Not intrinsically. So you cannot say the number 456000109332897 likes the smell of coffee, but it makes sense to say that relatively to the universal numbers u1, u2, u3, ... the number 456000109332897 likes the smell of coffee. A bit like you could say, relatively to fortran, the number x computes this or that function. A key point is that if a number feels something, it does not know which number 'he' is, and strictly speaking we are confronted to many vocabulary problems, which I simplifies for not being too much long and boring. I shoudl say that a number like 456000109332897 might play the local role of a body of a person which likes the smell of coffee. But, locally, I identify person and their bodies, knowing that in fine, the 'real physical body will comes from a competition among all universal numbers, or among all the corresponding computational histories. What of the opinion that ‘numbers’ themselves (without human consciousness to perform operations and functions) only represent instances of matter and forces with their dispositional properties? Once you have addition and multiplication, you don't need humans to do the interpretation. Indeed with addition and multiplication, you have a natural encoding of all interpretation by all universal numbers. The idea that matter and forces have dispositional properties is locally true, but we have to extract matter and forces from the more primitive relation between numbers if we take the comp hypothesis seriously enough (that is what I argue for, at least, cf UDA, MGA, AUDA). If “once you have addition and multiplication, you don't need humans to do the interpretation” and “the idea that matter and forces have dispositional properties is locally true, but we have to extract matter and forces from the more primitive relation between numbers”: Then, in what describable realm does that ultimately put numbers under the ‘comp hypothesis’? At the ultimate ontological bottom, you need a infinite collection of abstract primary objects, having primary elementary relations so that they constitute a universal system (in the sense of Post, Church, Turing, Kleene ...). My two favorite examples (among an infinity possible) are 1) the numbers (0, s(0), s(s(0)), ...) together with addition and multiplication. This is taught in high school, albeit their Turing universality is not easy at all to demonstrate. In that case, the numbers are put at the bottom. 2) the combinators (K, S, (K K), (K S), (S K), (S S), (K (K K)), (K (S K), ) Combinators are either K or S or any (X Y) with X and Y being combinators. The basic basic elementary operation are the rule of Elimination and Duplication: ((K x) y) = x (((S x) y) z) = ((x z)(y z)) It can be shown that with the numbers you can define the combinators, and with the combinators you can define the numbers. If you choose the combinators at the ontological bottom, you get the numbers by theorems, and vice versa. Both the numbers and the combinators are Turing universal, and that makes them enough to emulate the Löbian machines histories, and explain why from their points of view the physical realm is apparent, and sensible. We could start with a quantum universal system, but then we will lose a criteria for distinguishing the quanta from the qualia (it is not just 'treachery' with respect to the (mind) body problem). Bruno I believe, I somewhat follow (in general) what you are stating, but the question remains as to the realm that the primitive or fundamental numbers exist in, if, in fact, they are at an ontological bottom. If numbers are not a part of matter, forces and human consciousness where do they exist? Perhaps it could be considered that quanta and qualia,
Re: Platonia
On 3/3/2011 10:44 AM, Pzomby wrote: My brief opinion(s): As well as numbers having dispositional and computational properties, numbers remain symbolic or representative of their own dispositional, relational and computational characteristics or attributes. A TOE will describe in detail what numbers, mathematics and languages represent (or what the computations represent). An accurate description of the induction of universals (what numbers represent) into particulars (matter, personhood etc.) would be a result. ‘Numbers’ (along with comp) appear to…like languages, words, mathematical symbols and notations….have a trait of ‘being’ representational of forces and matter. If universal numbers along with their dispositions and relations are at the ontological bottom, then the process, (maybe evolvement or induction) to matter, forces, body and mind, consciousness and personhood should be describable in a coherent way. But Bruno isn't proposing that numbers are the ontological botttom. He's proposing that computation is. Numbers are just one way of representing and talking about computation and arithmetic is presumably familiar to everyone. Whatever is taken as ontologically fundamental can't be a representation of something else. There is a possibility though that nothing is fundamental and that explanation and description is always ultimately circular. If this circle is sufficiently broad, so as to include everything, it might be considered a virtuous circularity, rather than the vicious variety we're taught to avoid. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Platonia
On 02 Mar 2011, at 05:48, Pzomby wrote: That is why I limit myself for the TOE to natural numbers and their addition and multiplication. The reason is that it is enough, by comp, and nobody (except perhaps some philosophers) have any problem with that. Yes. A couple of questions from a philosophical point of view: Language gives meaning to the numbers as in their operations; functions, units of measurements (kilo, meter, ounce, kelvin etc.). I am not sure language gives meaning. Language have meaning, but I think meaning, sense, and reference are more primary. With the mechanist assumption, meaning sense and references will be 'explained' by what the numbers 'thinks' about that, in the manner of computer science (which can be seen as a branch of number theory). Not sure what you mean by “what the numbers ‘thinks’ ”. Are you stating that numbers have or represent some type of dispositional property? Yes. Not intrinsically. So you cannot say the number 456000109332897 likes the smell of coffee, but it makes sense to say that relatively to the universal numbers u1, u2, u3, ... the number 456000109332897 likes the smell of coffee. A bit like you could say, relatively to fortran, the number x computes this or that function. A key point is that if a number feels something, it does not know which number 'he' is, and strictly speaking we are confronted to many vocabulary problems, which I simplifies for not being too much long and boring. I shoudl say that a number like 456000109332897 might play the local role of a body of a person which likes the smell of coffee. But, locally, I identify person and their bodies, knowing that in fine, the 'real physical body will comes from a competition among all universal numbers, or among all the corresponding computational histories. What of the opinion that ‘numbers’ themselves (without human consciousness to perform operations and functions) only represent instances of matter and forces with their dispositional properties? Once you have addition and multiplication, you don't need humans to do the interpretation. Indeed with addition and multiplication, you have a natural encoding of all interpretation by all universal numbers. The idea that matter and forces have dispositional properties is locally true, but we have to extract matter and forces from the more primitive relation between numbers if we take the comp hypothesis seriously enough (that is what I argue for, at least, cf UDA, MGA, AUDA). Numbers alone may symbolize some fundamental describable matter and forces but a complete and coherent TOE should include elevated human consciousness beyond the primitive which in itself requires a relatively sophisticated language to give meaning to the numbers and their operations. Hmm... You can use numbers to symbolize things, by coding, addresses, etc. But numbers constitutes a reality per se, more or less captured (incompletely) by some theories (language, axioms, proof technics, ...). In this context, that might be important. Then, you are inferring, that ‘numbers’ can be and perhaps are ‘nouns’? Why not. '24 is even', or '24 is the address of my uncle', etc. 24 is a noun there. If so, then numbers would be human mental objects that have properties of both functions and relations. Again, you don't need humans for that. Universal numbers exists (provably so in even very little arithmetical theories). And assuming comp, it is (not so easy) to show that humans mental state are relative computational states, which means relative numbers (relative to universal numbers). If you fix a universal number, each number can play the role of a partial computable function: x(y) === phi_x(y), with phi_i an enumeration of all partial computable function (which exists by Church thesis). Thanks You are welcome, Bruno Would not any TOE describing the universe appears to require human sophisticated language using referent nouns, (and conjunctions, adjectives and verbs etc.) to give meaning to the numbers and their functions and operations? With the mechanist assumption, humans and their language will be described by machine operations, which will corresponds to a collection of numbers relations (definable with addition and multiplication). This is not obvious and relies in great part of the progress of mathematical logic. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Platonia
On Mar 2, 6:03 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 02 Mar 2011, at 05:48, Pzomby wrote: That is why I limit myself for the TOE to natural numbers and their addition and multiplication. The reason is that it is enough, by comp, and nobody (except perhaps some philosophers) have any problem with that. Yes. A couple of questions from a philosophical point of view: Language gives meaning to the numbers as in their operations; functions, units of measurements (kilo, meter, ounce, kelvin etc.). I am not sure language gives meaning. Language have meaning, but I think meaning, sense, and reference are more primary. With the mechanist assumption, meaning sense and references will be 'explained' by what the numbers 'thinks' about that, in the manner of computer science (which can be seen as a branch of number theory). Not sure what you mean by “what the numbers ‘thinks’ ”. Are you stating that numbers have or represent some type of dispositional property? Yes. Not intrinsically. So you cannot say the number 456000109332897 likes the smell of coffee, but it makes sense to say that relatively to the universal numbers u1, u2, u3, ... the number 456000109332897 likes the smell of coffee. A bit like you could say, relatively to fortran, the number x computes this or that function. A key point is that if a number feels something, it does not know which number 'he' is, and strictly speaking we are confronted to many vocabulary problems, which I simplifies for not being too much long and boring. I shoudl say that a number like 456000109332897 might play the local role of a body of a person which likes the smell of coffee. But, locally, I identify person and their bodies, knowing that in fine, the 'real physical body will comes from a competition among all universal numbers, or among all the corresponding computational histories. What of the opinion that ‘numbers’ themselves (without human consciousness to perform operations and functions) only represent instances of matter and forces with their dispositional properties? Once you have addition and multiplication, you don't need humans to do the interpretation. Indeed with addition and multiplication, you have a natural encoding of all interpretation by all universal numbers. The idea that matter and forces have dispositional properties is locally true, but we have to extract matter and forces from the more primitive relation between numbers if we take the comp hypothesis seriously enough (that is what I argue for, at least, cf UDA, MGA, AUDA). If “once you have addition and multiplication, you don't need humans to do the interpretation” and “the idea that matter and forces have dispositional properties is locally true, but we have to extract matter and forces from the more primitive relation between numbers”: Then, in what describable realm does that ultimately put numbers under the ‘comp hypothesis’? Numbers alone may symbolize some fundamental describable matter and forces but a complete and coherent TOE should include elevated human consciousness beyond the primitive which in itself requires a relatively sophisticated language to give meaning to the numbers and their operations. Hmm... You can use numbers to symbolize things, by coding, addresses, etc. But numbers constitutes a reality per se, more or less captured (incompletely) by some theories (language, axioms, proof technics, ...). In this context, that might be important. Thanks You are welcome, Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Platonia
On 28 Feb 2011, at 21:37, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 27 Feb 2011, at 00:25, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 23 Feb 2011, at 17:37, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Brent Meeker-2 wrote: The easy way is to assume inconsistent descriptions are merely an arbitrary combination of symbols that fail to describe something in particular and thus have only the content that every utterance has by virtue of being uttered: There exists ... (something). But we need utterances that *don't* entail existence. If we find something that doesn't entail existence, it still entails existence because every utterance is proof that existence IS. We need only utterances that entail relative non-existence or that don't entail existence in a particular way in a particular context. You need some non relative absolute base to define relative existence. The absolute base is the undeniable reality of there being experience. But this one is not communicable. It does play a role in comp, though. But we can say there is an undeniable reality of there being experience. Isn't this communicating that there is the undeniable reality of there being experience? OK. I was using communicating in the sense of a provable communication. You cannot convince someone that you are conscious. If he decides that you are a zombie, you might better run, probably, but there is no way you could prove the contrary. OK this makes sense. But is there any provable communication, then? After all we can never prove the axioms needed for a provable communication. All axioms are provable in one line. Just say provable by axioms. Sorry, I don't understand you here. How does saying provable by axioms prove anything? It seems to be a description of charateristic that can either be true or false (provable or not provable by axioms). Probably you mean something else, but I don't know what. I meant provable by the fact of being an axiom. A proof is a sequence of formula, each of which are either an axiom or a result from a previously proved formula by the means of the inference rules. Let me give an example: The theory T has the following axioms: 1) p 2) p - r 3) r - u And the (common) modus ponens inference rule: it says that from a formula A and a formula A - B, you can derive the formula B In the theory T, it is easy to prove u. The proof is the sequence of formula, (I add justification alongside, but formally they don't belongs to the formal proof) p (by axiom 1) p - r(by axiom 2) r(by modus ponens and the two preceding formula in this proof) r - u(by axiom 3) u (by modus ponens and the two preceding formula in this proof) So the theory T proves the formula u. Now, suppose someone ask me for a proof of p, in the theory T. I will just write the following (rather short) sequence of formula: p (by axiom 1). To proves p in one line, consisting simply in remembering one axiom. That's what I meant by provable in one line. Bruno Marchal wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Brent Meeker-2 wrote: So they don't add anything to platonia because they merely assert the existence of existence, which leaves platonia as described by consistent theories. I think the paradox is a linguistic paradox and it poses really no problem. Ultimately all descriptions refer to an existing object, but some are too broad or explosive or vague to be of any (formal) use. I may describe a system that is equal to standard arithmetics but also has 1=2 as an axiom. This makes it useless practically (or so I guess...) but it may still be interpreted in a way that it makes sense. 1=2 may mean that there is 1 object that is 2 two objects, so it simply asserts the existence of the one number two. 3=7 may mean that there are 3 objects that are 7 objects which might be interpreted as aserting the existence of (for example) 7*1, 7*2 and 7*3. The problem is not that there is no possible true interpretation of 1=2; the problem is that in standard logic a falsity allows you to prove anything. Yes, so we can prove anything. This simply begs the question what the anything is. All sentences we derive from the inconsistency would mean the same (even though we don't know what exactly it is). We could just write 1=1 instead and we would have expressed the same, but in a way that is easier to make sense of. This is not problematic, it only makes the proofs in the inconsisten system worthless (at least in a formal context were we assume classical logic). And it would make Platonia worthless. The real, genuine, Platonia is already close to be worthless due to the consistency of inconsistency for machine. This already put quite a mess in Platonia. By allowing complete contradiction, you make it a trivial object. Why? When we
Re: Platonia
That is why I limit myself for the TOE to natural numbers and their addition and multiplication. The reason is that it is enough, by comp, and nobody (except perhaps some philosophers) have any problem with that. Yes. A couple of questions from a philosophical point of view: Language gives meaning to the numbers as in their operations; functions, units of measurements (kilo, meter, ounce, kelvin etc.). I am not sure language gives meaning. Language have meaning, but I think meaning, sense, and reference are more primary. With the mechanist assumption, meaning sense and references will be 'explained' by what the numbers 'thinks' about that, in the manner of computer science (which can be seen as a branch of number theory). Not sure what you mean by “what the numbers ‘thinks’ ”. Are you stating that numbers have or represent some type of dispositional property? What of the opinion that ‘numbers’ themselves (without human consciousness to perform operations and functions) only represent instances of matter and forces with their dispositional properties? Numbers alone may symbolize some fundamental describable matter and forces but a complete and coherent TOE should include elevated human consciousness beyond the primitive which in itself requires a relatively sophisticated language to give meaning to the numbers and their operations. Hmm... You can use numbers to symbolize things, by coding, addresses, etc. But numbers constitutes a reality per se, more or less captured (incompletely) by some theories (language, axioms, proof technics, ...). In this context, that might be important. Then, you are inferring, that ‘numbers’ can be and perhaps are ‘nouns’? If so, then numbers would be human mental objects that have properties of both functions and relations. Thanks Would not any TOE describing the universe appears to require human sophisticated language using referent nouns, (and conjunctions, adjectives and verbs etc.) to give meaning to the numbers and their functions and operations? With the mechanist assumption, humans and their language will be described by machine operations, which will corresponds to a collection of numbers relations (definable with addition and multiplication). This is not obvious and relies in great part of the progress of mathematical logic. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/- Hide quoted text - - Show quoted text - -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Platonia
On 26 Feb 2011, at 19:50, Pzomby wrote: On Feb 21, 9:11 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 21 Feb 2011, at 13:26, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 20 Feb 2011, at 00:39, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Isn't it enough to say everything that we *could* describe in mathematics exists in platonia? The problem is that we can describe much more things than the one we are able to show consistent, so if you allow what we could describe you take too much. If you define Platonia by all consistent things, you get something inconsistent due to paradox similar to Russell paradox or St-Thomas paradox with omniscience and omnipotence. Why can inconsistent descriptions not refer to an existing object? The easy way is to assume inconsistent descriptions are merely an arbitrary combination of symbols that fail to describe something in particular and thus have only the content that every utterance has by virtue of being uttered: There exists ... (something). So they don't add anything to platonia because they merely assert the existence of existence, which leaves platonia as described by consistent theories. I think the paradox is a linguistic paradox and it poses really no problem. Ultimately all descriptions refer to an existing object, but some are too broad or explosive or vague to be of any (formal) use. I may describe a system that is equal to standard arithmetics but also has 1=2 as an axiom. This makes it useless practically (or so I guess...) but it may still be interpreted in a way that it makes sense. 1=2 may mean that there is 1 object that is 2 two objects, so it simply asserts the existence of the one number two. But what is two if 2 = 1. I can no more have clue of what you mean. Two is the successor of one. You obviously now what that means. So keep this meaning and reconcile it with 2=1. You might get the meaning two is the one (number) that is the succesor of one. Or one (number) is the successor of two. In essence it expresses 2*...=1*... or 2*X=1*Y. And it might mean the succesor of one number is the succesor of the succesor of one number. or 2+...=1+... or 2+X=1+Y. The reason that it is not a good idea to define 2=1 is because it doesn't express something that can't be expressed in standard arithmetic, but it makes everything much more confusing and redundant. In mathematics we want to be precise as possible so it's good rule to always have to specifiy which quantity we talk about, so that we avoid talking about something - that is one thing - that is something - that is two things - but rather talk about one thing and two things directly; because it is already clear that two things are a thing. OK. Bruno Marchal wrote: Now, just recall that Platonia is based on classical logic where the falsity f, or 0 = 1, entails all proposition. So if you insist to say that 0 = 1, I will soon prove that you owe to me A billions of dollars, and that you should prepare the check. You could prove that, but what is really meant by that is another question. It may simply mean I want to play a joke on you. All statements are open to interpretation, I don't think we can avoid that entirely. We are ususally more interested in the statements that are less vague, but vague or crazy statements are still valid on some level (even though often on an very boring, because trivial, level; like saying S afs fdsLfs, which is just expressing that something exists). We formalize things, or make them as formal as possible, when we search where we disagree, or when we want to find a mistake. The idea of making things formal, like in first order logic, is to be able to follow a derivation or an argument in a way which does not depend on any interpretation, other than the procedural inference rule. Bruno Marchal wrote: 3=7 may mean that there are 3 objects that are 7 objects which might be interpreted as aserting the existence of (for example) 7*1, 7*2 and 7*3. Logicians and mathematicians are more simple minded than that, and it does not always help to be understood. If you allow circles with edges, and triangles with four sides in Platonia, we will loose any hope of understanding each other. I don't think we have disallow circles with edges, and triangles with four sides; it is enough if we keep in mind that it is useful to use words in a sense that is commonly understood. That is why I limit myself for the TOE to natural numbers and their addition and multiplication. The reason is that it is enough, by comp, and nobody (except perhaps some philosophers) have any problem with that. Yes. A couple of questions from a philosophical point of view: Language gives meaning to the numbers as in their operations; functions, units of measurements (kilo, meter, ounce, kelvin etc.). I am not sure language gives meaning. Language have meaning, but I think meaning, sense, and reference are more primary. With the mechanist
Re: Platonia
On 26 Feb 2011, at 22:55, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: So our disagreement seems to be quite subtle. It seemed to me you wanted to make numbers the absolute thing. But when we are really modest it seems to me we have to admit the meaning in numbers is an intersubjective agreement in interpretation and we should not be too quick in disregarding seemingly contradictory statements as completetly false. We try to understand things by reducing them to things we already consider having a good understanding of. If not we are doing obstructive philosophy, cutting the hair kind of activity. We may also understand things by seeing their truth is not (at least practically) reducible to anything we have a good understanding of. Yes, I agree. But this need to be done relatively to a very clear theory about what we do understand. If we understand consciousness can not be reduced to anything else, we learnt something. anything else is much too big. It is part to the object of study in the search of a TOE. I thought you are not a reductionist? I am not a reductionist indeed. On the contrary I show that consciousness and matter are not reducible to number relations or theories, except by taking them all, as we are obliged to do when we say yes to the doctor. When we accept that our brain can be described as a machine, then we can understand our consciousness is not reducible to finite collections of numbers, but to infinite collections, and that some aspect of consciousness (private qualia) are not reducible at all, although they can handled by machines and numbers. This is counter-intuitive and rather hard to figure out, but thanks to the comp hyp, this can be (meta--formalize, even by introspecting universal machine (the Löbian machine's 'interview' does just that). Bruno Marchal wrote: But this does suppose the kind of understanding that 1 is different from 2. Of course I understand that 1 is different than 2. But nevertheless I can also makes sense of 1=2 (for example it might express the same as 1X=2X, that is, the object we are talking about has no distinction of quantities). I also see the difference between lion and animal. But it nevertheless makes sense to say that a lion is an animal or that an animal is a lion. The problem is not in making sense of some expression, but in agreeing about *some* meaning, and this usually with some goal in mind. Bruno Marchal wrote: By the way I have some doubts about 0 being properly conceived of as a number. It might be more useful to conceive of it as a non-number symbol, like for example infinity. Zero makes some things in mathematics messy if interpreted as a number. For example removable discontinuities in functions (I don't know what the right term is in English): If we have the function (x+1)(x-1)/(x+1)(x+2), this functions is not defined for x=-1, but in a sense it clearly should be and indeed if we reduce the terms (which seems to be seen as valid, although we implicitly divide through zero) it is defined for x=-1. So this suggest that it would be better to give zero a relative meaning, so that for example 0/0 may mean different things in different contexts (like the symbol x). I have no clue how this could be formalized, though. Also it may be I'm just interpreting some inconsistency that is not there due to my lack of understanding. Such problem are usually handled in an analysis course. Unfortunately no, at least not in school. As I remember it came down to We get a function '(x-1)/(x+2)' that removes the discontinuity by analyzing the limits at the undefined x, but this doesn't answer the question why there is function that should be - but isn't - defined at a point in the first place. Maybe it is just an inappropriate use of intuition and there is no sense in that the function should be defined any more than 3/0 should be defined. Yes. It makes no 'useful' sense. Bruno Marchal wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: That is why I like comp, because it allows (and forces) to derive the psychological existence, the theological existence, the physical, existence, and the sensible existence from the classical existence of numbers, which is simple by definition, if you agree with the use of classical logic in number theory. Honestly I still have doubts about this. The reason is that there is always the implicit axiom I am conscious. (for example a bit more explicit in Yes, Doctor), which is incredibly general. The statement I am conscious is not just general. It cannot be formalized at all, and is not part of any scientific discourse (as opposed to the sentence I am conscious). I'm not so sure. Isn't saying I am conscious formalizing that I am conscious? Not at all. To be formalize, we must be able to use any terms in place of any terms. You cannot do such a substitution for I am conscious. But you can use any terms and symbols once
Re: Platonia
On 27 Feb 2011, at 00:25, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 23 Feb 2011, at 17:37, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Brent Meeker-2 wrote: The easy way is to assume inconsistent descriptions are merely an arbitrary combination of symbols that fail to describe something in particular and thus have only the content that every utterance has by virtue of being uttered: There exists ... (something). But we need utterances that *don't* entail existence. If we find something that doesn't entail existence, it still entails existence because every utterance is proof that existence IS. We need only utterances that entail relative non-existence or that don't entail existence in a particular way in a particular context. You need some non relative absolute base to define relative existence. The absolute base is the undeniable reality of there being experience. But this one is not communicable. It does play a role in comp, though. But we can say there is an undeniable reality of there being experience. Isn't this communicating that there is the undeniable reality of there being experience? OK. I was using communicating in the sense of a provable communication. You cannot convince someone that you are conscious. If he decides that you are a zombie, you might better run, probably, but there is no way you could prove the contrary. OK this makes sense. But is there any provable communication, then? After all we can never prove the axioms needed for a provable communication. All axioms are provable in one line. Just say provable by axioms. Of course a theory will be *interesting* if the axioms are plausible, about their subject matter, and simple, and in few numbers, etc. The axioms needs to be true in some reality (model). But provable is always supposed to mean provable in this or that theory. Is a theory true? This is outside the scope of science. That question belongs to philosophy, and IMO is almost a private question. Now I do about that, concerning the usual standard natural numbers (0, 1, 2, ...) you agree that for all x 0 ≠ s(x), for example. It means that zero is not a successor of a natural number. Of course zero is the successor of -1, but this concerns another structure (the set of integers (..., -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, ...). Bruno Marchal wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: But it is not enough. usually people agree with the axiom of Peano Arithmetic, or the initial part of some set theory. But Peano Arithmetics is not a non relative absolute base. It is relative to the meaning we give it and to the existence of some reality. 1+1=2 can have infinite meanings, that all are relative to our interpretation (If I lay another apple into the bowl with one apple in it there are two apples is one of them) and there being meaning in the first place. Hmm... Most people agrees on a standard meaning for the natural numbers, like in the Fermat theorem, or any theorem or conjecture in number theory, or when you are using numbers in computer science. 1+1 = 2 is true in all those interpretations, even if computer science we use also some algebra where 1+1=0. That does not contradict that the standard integer are all different from 0, except 0. OK, but I insist that the fact that most people agree on something does not make it a non relative absolute base. I agree. Science is not democratic. We don't vote to decide the truth of an arithmetical proposition. We prove it in a theory on which people agrees. Bruno Marchal wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Brent Meeker-2 wrote: So they don't add anything to platonia because they merely assert the existence of existence, which leaves platonia as described by consistent theories. I think the paradox is a linguistic paradox and it poses really no problem. Ultimately all descriptions refer to an existing object, but some are too broad or explosive or vague to be of any (formal) use. I may describe a system that is equal to standard arithmetics but also has 1=2 as an axiom. This makes it useless practically (or so I guess...) but it may still be interpreted in a way that it makes sense. 1=2 may mean that there is 1 object that is 2 two objects, so it simply asserts the existence of the one number two. 3=7 may mean that there are 3 objects that are 7 objects which might be interpreted as aserting the existence of (for example) 7*1, 7*2 and 7*3. The problem is not that there is no possible true interpretation of 1=2; the problem is that in standard logic a falsity allows you to prove anything. Yes, so we can prove anything. This simply begs the question what the anything is. All sentences we derive from the inconsistency would mean the same (even though we don't know what exactly it is). We could just write 1=1 instead and we would have expressed the same, but in a way that is easier to make sense of. This is not problematic
Re: Platonia
On 2/28/2011 1:42 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: This is a very technical point. It can be shown that classical first order logic+addition gives a theory too much weak to be able to defined multiplication or even the idea of repeating an operation a certain arbitrary finite number of time. Likewise it is possible to make a theory of multiplication, and then addition is not definable in it. The pure addition theory is known as Pressburger arithmetic, and has been shown complete (it proves all the true sentences *expressible* in its language, thus without multiplication symbols); and decidable, unlike the usual Robinson or Peano Arithmetic, with + and *, which are incomplete and undecidable. Once you have the naturals numbers and both addition and multiplication, you get already (Turing) universality, and thus incompleteness, insolubility. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ Hmmm. Does that mean an arithmetic based on first order logic, addition, and a logarithm operation might be complete and yet include a kind of multiplication? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Platonia
On 28 Feb 2011, at 18:36, Brent Meeker wrote: On 2/28/2011 1:42 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: This is a very technical point. It can be shown that classical first order logic+addition gives a theory too much weak to be able to defined multiplication or even the idea of repeating an operation a certain arbitrary finite number of time. Likewise it is possible to make a theory of multiplication, and then addition is not definable in it. The pure addition theory is known as Pressburger arithmetic, and has been shown complete (it proves all the true sentences *expressible* in its language, thus without multiplication symbols); and decidable, unlike the usual Robinson or Peano Arithmetic, with + and *, which are incomplete and undecidable. Once you have the naturals numbers and both addition and multiplication, you get already (Turing) universality, and thus incompleteness, insolubility. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ Hmmm. That's just known results in the field. Does that mean an arithmetic based on first order logic, addition, and a logarithm operation I guess you mean some digital truncation of it, by ceilings or bottom, with logarithm(n) = the least natural number bigger than logarithm(n), or the biggest natural number smaller than logarithm(n) ? might be complete Quite possible, but I really don't know that. Interesting, but not necessarily an easy exercise. and yet include a kind of multiplication? If addition + natural number logarithm is Turing complete (universal), then multiplication, like any Turing computable functions will be capable of being defined in the theory. Note this: diophantine (means that the variables refer to integers) polynomial of degree 4 equations are Turing universal. In particular there is a degree four universal polynomial which, equated to 0, is universal. But on the real numbers, you can use Sturm Liouville technic to solves such polynomial equation. The first order theory of the real numbers is complete and decidable. Thus you cannot defined the natural numbers in such a theory! But the theory of the trigonometric polynomials on the reals is again Turing complete. Now you can use the sin function to define the natural numbers, and you get the addition and multiplication on them by the usual real addition and multiplication. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Platonia
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 27 Feb 2011, at 00:25, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 23 Feb 2011, at 17:37, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Brent Meeker-2 wrote:
The easy way is to assume inconsistent descriptions are merely
an
arbitrary
combination of symbols that fail to describe something in
particular and
thus have only the content that every utterance has by
virtue of
being
uttered: There exists ... (something).
But we need utterances that *don't* entail existence.
If we find something that doesn't entail existence, it still
entails
existence because every utterance is proof that existence IS.
We need only utterances that entail relative non-existence or
that
don't
entail existence in a particular way in a particular context.
You need some non relative absolute base to define relative
existence.
The absolute base is the undeniable reality of there being
experience.
But this one is not communicable. It does play a role in comp,
though.
But we can say there is an undeniable reality of there being
experience.
Isn't this communicating that there is the undeniable reality of
there being
experience?
OK. I was using communicating in the sense of a provable
communication. You cannot convince someone that you are conscious. If
he decides that you are a zombie, you might better run, probably, but
there is no way you could prove the contrary.
OK this makes sense. But is there any provable communication, then?
After
all we can never prove the axioms needed for a provable communication.
All axioms are provable in one line. Just say provable by axioms.
Sorry, I don't understand you here. How does saying provable by axioms
prove anything? It seems to be a description of charateristic that can
either be true or false (provable or not provable by axioms).
Probably you mean something else, but I don't know what.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Brent Meeker-2 wrote:
So they don't add anything to platonia because they merely
assert
the
existence of existence, which leaves platonia as described by
consistent
theories.
I think the paradox is a linguistic paradox and it poses
really no
problem.
Ultimately all descriptions refer to an existing object, but
some
are too
broad or explosive or vague to be of any (formal) use.
I may describe a system that is equal to standard arithmetics
but
also
has
1=2 as an axiom. This makes it useless practically (or so I
guess...) but
it
may still be interpreted in a way that it makes sense. 1=2 may
mean that
there is 1 object that is 2 two objects, so it simply asserts
the
existence
of the one number two. 3=7 may mean that there are 3 objects
that are 7
objects which might be interpreted as aserting the existence
of
(for
example) 7*1, 7*2 and 7*3.
The problem is not that there is no possible true
interpretation of
1=2;
the problem is that in standard logic a falsity allows you to
prove
anything.
Yes, so we can prove anything. This simply begs the question
what
the
anything is. All sentences we derive from the inconsistency
would
mean the
same (even though we don't know what exactly it is).
We could just write 1=1 instead and we would have expressed
the
same, but
in a way that is easier to make sense of.
This is not problematic, it only makes the proofs in the
inconsisten
system
worthless (at least in a formal context were we assume classical
logic).
And it would make Platonia worthless. The real, genuine,
Platonia
is
already close to be worthless due to the consistency of
inconsistency
for machine. This already put quite a mess in Platonia. By
allowing
complete contradiction, you make it a trivial object.
Why? When we contradict ourselves we may simply interpret this
as a
expression of the trivial truth of existence. This doesn't change
Plantonia
at all, because it exists either way.
The whole point of Gödel's theorem is that M proves 0=1 is
different
from M proves provable('0=1'). The first implies the second, but
the
second does not implies the first. The difference between G and G*
comes from this fact.
If we know that something can be proven, how is it different from
taking it
to be proven?
By incompleteness provable(false) - false is not provable in the
system.
OK. But still provable(false)-false is true if we assume
consistency,
right?
So above you meant implying as in being a provable consequence of?
Not really. By A - B, I mean ~A v B. Or ~(A ~B). being a provable
consequence would better be captured by B(A - B), with B some
provability predicate.
Does A - B mean B follows from A?
How is that equal to not-A or B?
So from provable('0=1') it does not follow 0=1, even if we assume
consistency and don't mean a provable consequence?
How can something be provable in a consistent system and what
Re: Platonia
On Feb 21, 9:11 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 21 Feb 2011, at 13:26, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 20 Feb 2011, at 00:39, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Isn't it enough to say everything that we *could* describe in mathematics exists in platonia? The problem is that we can describe much more things than the one we are able to show consistent, so if you allow what we could describe you take too much. If you define Platonia by all consistent things, you get something inconsistent due to paradox similar to Russell paradox or St-Thomas paradox with omniscience and omnipotence. Why can inconsistent descriptions not refer to an existing object? The easy way is to assume inconsistent descriptions are merely an arbitrary combination of symbols that fail to describe something in particular and thus have only the content that every utterance has by virtue of being uttered: There exists ... (something). So they don't add anything to platonia because they merely assert the existence of existence, which leaves platonia as described by consistent theories. I think the paradox is a linguistic paradox and it poses really no problem. Ultimately all descriptions refer to an existing object, but some are too broad or explosive or vague to be of any (formal) use. I may describe a system that is equal to standard arithmetics but also has 1=2 as an axiom. This makes it useless practically (or so I guess...) but it may still be interpreted in a way that it makes sense. 1=2 may mean that there is 1 object that is 2 two objects, so it simply asserts the existence of the one number two. But what is two if 2 = 1. I can no more have clue of what you mean. Two is the successor of one. You obviously now what that means. So keep this meaning and reconcile it with 2=1. You might get the meaning two is the one (number) that is the succesor of one. Or one (number) is the successor of two. In essence it expresses 2*...=1*... or 2*X=1*Y. And it might mean the succesor of one number is the succesor of the succesor of one number. or 2+...=1+... or 2+X=1+Y. The reason that it is not a good idea to define 2=1 is because it doesn't express something that can't be expressed in standard arithmetic, but it makes everything much more confusing and redundant. In mathematics we want to be precise as possible so it's good rule to always have to specifiy which quantity we talk about, so that we avoid talking about something - that is one thing - that is something - that is two things - but rather talk about one thing and two things directly; because it is already clear that two things are a thing. OK. Bruno Marchal wrote: Now, just recall that Platonia is based on classical logic where the falsity f, or 0 = 1, entails all proposition. So if you insist to say that 0 = 1, I will soon prove that you owe to me A billions of dollars, and that you should prepare the check. You could prove that, but what is really meant by that is another question. It may simply mean I want to play a joke on you. All statements are open to interpretation, I don't think we can avoid that entirely. We are ususally more interested in the statements that are less vague, but vague or crazy statements are still valid on some level (even though often on an very boring, because trivial, level; like saying S afs fdsLfs, which is just expressing that something exists). We formalize things, or make them as formal as possible, when we search where we disagree, or when we want to find a mistake. The idea of making things formal, like in first order logic, is to be able to follow a derivation or an argument in a way which does not depend on any interpretation, other than the procedural inference rule. Bruno Marchal wrote: 3=7 may mean that there are 3 objects that are 7 objects which might be interpreted as aserting the existence of (for example) 7*1, 7*2 and 7*3. Logicians and mathematicians are more simple minded than that, and it does not always help to be understood. If you allow circles with edges, and triangles with four sides in Platonia, we will loose any hope of understanding each other. I don't think we have disallow circles with edges, and triangles with four sides; it is enough if we keep in mind that it is useful to use words in a sense that is commonly understood. That is why I limit myself for the TOE to natural numbers and their addition and multiplication. The reason is that it is enough, by comp, and nobody (except perhaps some philosophers) have any problem with that. Yes. A couple of questions from a philosophical point of view: Language gives meaning to the numbers as in their operations; functions, units of measurements (kilo, meter, ounce, kelvin etc.). Numbers
Re: Platonia
that in the future we must necessarily remember our old present (so the future can just be a future where what is now has already subjectively happened - which is obviously not the case)? It seems more appropiate to me to say we live in timelessness (out of which time emerges). If we really are already in a advanced technological future, why are we not - or only badly - able to communicate with the entities there? And why is there even seemingly linear time? -- View this message in context: http://old.nabble.com/Platonia-tp30955253p31022200.html Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Platonia
On 24 Feb 2011, at 22:13, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 22 Feb 2011, at 22:14, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Now, just recall that Platonia is based on classical logic where the falsity f, or 0 = 1, entails all proposition. So if you insist to say that 0 = 1, I will soon prove that you owe to me A billions of dollars, and that you should prepare the check. You could prove that, but what is really meant by that is another question. It may simply mean I want to play a joke on you. All statements are open to interpretation, I don't think we can avoid that entirely. We are ususally more interested in the statements that are less vague, but vague or crazy statements are still valid on some level (even though often on an very boring, because trivial, level; like saying S afs fdsLfs, which is just expressing that something exists). We formalize things, or make them as formal as possible, when we search where we disagree, or when we want to find a mistake. The idea of making things formal, like in first order logic, is to be able to follow a derivation or an argument in a way which does not depend on any interpretation, other than the procedural inference rule. Yes, I get the idea. I agree that the derivation does not depend on any interpretation (other than one we can easily agree on). But what the axioms and the derivations thereof really mean is open to interpretation. Otherwise we would have no discussion about Do numbers exist?. I don't think we can understand 1+1=2 without some amount of interpretation. We need to interpret that the two objects are of the same kind, for example. Formal results are useless if we are not able to interpret what they mean. I am not sure. We want avoid the philosophical discussion, which can be endless and obstructive. So instead of trying to find the ultimate interpretation on which everybody would agree, we try, in a spirit of respect of all interpretation, to find our common agreement. Is 0 a number? OK, we agree that 0 is a number, and from that, agreeing with classical logic, we already agree that at least one number exist, 0. And the existence case is closed. OK? Next question, do we agree that numbers have a successor? Yes, that is the point, if x is a number, we want it having a successor, and successors , 0, s(0), s(s(0)), ... In this manner, we don't throw away, any interpretation of the numbers, but we are able to derive many things from what we agree on. The question of the relation between human and numbers is very interesting, but has to be addressed at some other levels, with some supplementary hypotheses. If not we mix unrelated difficulties. I agree. Some interpretation is needed to make sense of numbers, but we can easily agree on that. Some more interpretation is needed to make sense of numbers in the context of practical use (we need relative interpretation of one as one meter, one joule, one apple, which all are different yet all use the number one, so in this context 1=1 may be false or undefined because we might need *different* relative one, just like there are different relative x). Yes. It is the difficulty of applied science. So our disagreement seems to be quite subtle. It seemed to me you wanted to make numbers the absolute thing. But when we are really modest it seems to me we have to admit the meaning in numbers is an intersubjective agreement in interpretation and we should not be too quick in disregarding seemingly contradictory statements as completetly false. We try to understand things by reducing them to things we already consider having a good understanding of. If not we are doing obstructive philosophy, cutting the hair kind of activity. See my example of 1=2. It might reveal a deeper sense of the relativity of numbers (what is one in a context is one billion in another; my one head may be conceived of consisting of many billions of cells), that is quite compatible with the sense in 1+1=2. Remember that our discussion evolves initially from Peter (1Z) apparent lack of understanding that once we accept that the brain or body can be described at some level as a digital machine, then the physical science are no more the fundamental or basic science, and that to solve the mind-body problem we have to solve the body problem. It means also that we have to backtrack 1500 years in the theological science. But this does suppose the kind of understanding that 1 is different from 2. Like I guess you do understand that in physics E = mc^2 does not imply that E = mc. By the way I have some doubts about 0 being properly conceived of as a number. It might be more useful to conceive of it as a non-number symbol, like for example infinity. Zero makes some things in mathematics messy if interpreted as a number. For example removable discontinuities in functions (I don't know what the right term
Re: Platonia
On 23 Feb 2011, at 17:37, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Brent Meeker-2 wrote: The easy way is to assume inconsistent descriptions are merely an arbitrary combination of symbols that fail to describe something in particular and thus have only the content that every utterance has by virtue of being uttered: There exists ... (something). But we need utterances that *don't* entail existence. If we find something that doesn't entail existence, it still entails existence because every utterance is proof that existence IS. We need only utterances that entail relative non-existence or that don't entail existence in a particular way in a particular context. You need some non relative absolute base to define relative existence. The absolute base is the undeniable reality of there being experience. But this one is not communicable. It does play a role in comp, though. But we can say there is an undeniable reality of there being experience. Isn't this communicating that there is the undeniable reality of there being experience? OK. I was using communicating in the sense of a provable communication. You cannot convince someone that you are conscious. If he decides that you are a zombie, you might better run, probably, but there is no way you could prove the contrary. We merely communicate something that everbody already fundamentally knows. That is correct also, I think. Though some like to deny what they already know. That is bad faith, and is common. Bruno Marchal wrote: But it is not enough. usually people agree with the axiom of Peano Arithmetic, or the initial part of some set theory. But Peano Arithmetics is not a non relative absolute base. It is relative to the meaning we give it and to the existence of some reality. 1+1=2 can have infinite meanings, that all are relative to our interpretation (If I lay another apple into the bowl with one apple in it there are two apples is one of them) and there being meaning in the first place. Hmm... Most people agrees on a standard meaning for the natural numbers, like in the Fermat theorem, or any theorem or conjecture in number theory, or when you are using numbers in computer science. 1+1 = 2 is true in all those interpretations, even if computer science we use also some algebra where 1+1=0. That does not contradict that the standard integer are all different from 0, except 0. Bruno Marchal wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Brent Meeker-2 wrote: So we can say things like, Sherlock Holmes lived at 10 Baker Street are true, even though Sherlock Holmes never existed. Whether Sherlock Holmes existed is not a trivial question. He didn't exist like me and you, but he did exist as an idea. Even if you met *a* Sherlock Holmes in Platonia, you have no cirteria to say it is the usual fictive person created by Conan Doyle, because, in Platonia, he is not created by Conan Doyle, ... In Platonia he is not created by Conan Doyle, which makes sense, given the possible that other people use the same fictional character, so he is essentially discovered, not created. But I don't know what you want to imply with that. Just that fictionism, the idea that numbers are fiction of the same type as fictive personage from novels does not make sense, except to confuse matter. Well I didn't want to imply that. Fictionage personage usually refer to some relative manifestation of an idea, while numbers are a more general and abstract notion. And if they are fiction, they are very prevalent fiction (not just among people but among nature), which makes them basically non-fiction. OK. Bruno Marchal wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Brent Meeker-2 wrote: So they don't add anything to platonia because they merely assert the existence of existence, which leaves platonia as described by consistent theories. I think the paradox is a linguistic paradox and it poses really no problem. Ultimately all descriptions refer to an existing object, but some are too broad or explosive or vague to be of any (formal) use. I may describe a system that is equal to standard arithmetics but also has 1=2 as an axiom. This makes it useless practically (or so I guess...) but it may still be interpreted in a way that it makes sense. 1=2 may mean that there is 1 object that is 2 two objects, so it simply asserts the existence of the one number two. 3=7 may mean that there are 3 objects that are 7 objects which might be interpreted as aserting the existence of (for example) 7*1, 7*2 and 7*3. The problem is not that there is no possible true interpretation of 1=2; the problem is that in standard logic a falsity allows you to prove anything. Yes, so we can prove anything. This simply begs the question what the anything is. All sentences we derive from the inconsistency would mean the same (even though we don't know what exactly
Re: Platonia
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 22 Feb 2011, at 22:14, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Now, just recall that Platonia is based on classical logic where the falsity f, or 0 = 1, entails all proposition. So if you insist to say that 0 = 1, I will soon prove that you owe to me A billions of dollars, and that you should prepare the check. You could prove that, but what is really meant by that is another question. It may simply mean I want to play a joke on you. All statements are open to interpretation, I don't think we can avoid that entirely. We are ususally more interested in the statements that are less vague, but vague or crazy statements are still valid on some level (even though often on an very boring, because trivial, level; like saying S afs fdsLfs, which is just expressing that something exists). We formalize things, or make them as formal as possible, when we search where we disagree, or when we want to find a mistake. The idea of making things formal, like in first order logic, is to be able to follow a derivation or an argument in a way which does not depend on any interpretation, other than the procedural inference rule. Yes, I get the idea. I agree that the derivation does not depend on any interpretation (other than one we can easily agree on). But what the axioms and the derivations thereof really mean is open to interpretation. Otherwise we would have no discussion about Do numbers exist?. I don't think we can understand 1+1=2 without some amount of interpretation. We need to interpret that the two objects are of the same kind, for example. Formal results are useless if we are not able to interpret what they mean. I am not sure. We want avoid the philosophical discussion, which can be endless and obstructive. So instead of trying to find the ultimate interpretation on which everybody would agree, we try, in a spirit of respect of all interpretation, to find our common agreement. Is 0 a number? OK, we agree that 0 is a number, and from that, agreeing with classical logic, we already agree that at least one number exist, 0. And the existence case is closed. OK? Next question, do we agree that numbers have a successor? Yes, that is the point, if x is a number, we want it having a successor, and successors , 0, s(0), s(s(0)), ... In this manner, we don't throw away, any interpretation of the numbers, but we are able to derive many things from what we agree on. The question of the relation between human and numbers is very interesting, but has to be addressed at some other levels, with some supplementary hypotheses. If not we mix unrelated difficulties. I agree. Some interpretation is needed to make sense of numbers, but we can easily agree on that. Some more interpretation is needed to make sense of numbers in the context of practical use (we need relative interpretation of one as one meter, one joule, one apple, which all are different yet all use the number one, so in this context 1=1 may be false or undefined because we might need *different* relative one, just like there are different relative x). So our disagreement seems to be quite subtle. It seemed to me you wanted to make numbers the absolute thing. But when we are really modest it seems to me we have to admit the meaning in numbers is an intersubjective agreement in interpretation and we should not be too quick in disregarding seemingly contradictory statements as completetly false. See my example of 1=2. It might reveal a deeper sense of the relativity of numbers (what is one in a context is one billion in another; my one head may be conceived of consisting of many billions of cells), that is quite compatible with the sense in 1+1=2. By the way I have some doubts about 0 being properly conceived of as a number. It might be more useful to conceive of it as a non-number symbol, like for example infinity. Zero makes some things in mathematics messy if interpreted as a number. For example removable discontinuities in functions (I don't know what the right term is in English): If we have the function (x+1)(x-1)/(x+1)(x+2), this functions is not defined for x=-1, but in a sense it clearly should be and indeed if we reduce the terms (which seems to be seen as valid, although we implicitly divide through zero) it is defined for x=-1. So this suggest that it would be better to give zero a relative meaning, so that for example 0/0 may mean different things in different contexts (like the symbol x). I have no clue how this could be formalized, though. Also it may be I'm just interpreting some inconsistency that is not there due to my lack of understanding. Bruno Marchal wrote: It might lead to a language that is too difficult, too little flexible and too much restricting for almost all purposes. Not really. Formal can be very flexible, like the programming languages, but natural language are naturally
Re: Platonia
Bruno Marchal wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Brent Meeker-2 wrote: The easy way is to assume inconsistent descriptions are merely an arbitrary combination of symbols that fail to describe something in particular and thus have only the content that every utterance has by virtue of being uttered: There exists ... (something). But we need utterances that *don't* entail existence. If we find something that doesn't entail existence, it still entails existence because every utterance is proof that existence IS. We need only utterances that entail relative non-existence or that don't entail existence in a particular way in a particular context. You need some non relative absolute base to define relative existence. The absolute base is the undeniable reality of there being experience. But this one is not communicable. It does play a role in comp, though. But we can say there is an undeniable reality of there being experience. Isn't this communicating that there is the undeniable reality of there being experience? We merely communicate something that everbody already fundamentally knows. Though some like to deny what they already know. Bruno Marchal wrote: But it is not enough. usually people agree with the axiom of Peano Arithmetic, or the initial part of some set theory. But Peano Arithmetics is not a non relative absolute base. It is relative to the meaning we give it and to the existence of some reality. 1+1=2 can have infinite meanings, that all are relative to our interpretation (If I lay another apple into the bowl with one apple in it there are two apples is one of them) and there being meaning in the first place. Bruno Marchal wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Brent Meeker-2 wrote: So we can say things like, Sherlock Holmes lived at 10 Baker Street are true, even though Sherlock Holmes never existed. Whether Sherlock Holmes existed is not a trivial question. He didn't exist like me and you, but he did exist as an idea. Even if you met *a* Sherlock Holmes in Platonia, you have no cirteria to say it is the usual fictive person created by Conan Doyle, because, in Platonia, he is not created by Conan Doyle, ... In Platonia he is not created by Conan Doyle, which makes sense, given the possible that other people use the same fictional character, so he is essentially discovered, not created. But I don't know what you want to imply with that. Just that fictionism, the idea that numbers are fiction of the same type as fictive personage from novels does not make sense, except to confuse matter. Well I didn't want to imply that. Fictionage personage usually refer to some relative manifestation of an idea, while numbers are a more general and abstract notion. And if they are fiction, they are very prevalent fiction (not just among people but among nature), which makes them basically non-fiction. Bruno Marchal wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Brent Meeker-2 wrote: So they don't add anything to platonia because they merely assert the existence of existence, which leaves platonia as described by consistent theories. I think the paradox is a linguistic paradox and it poses really no problem. Ultimately all descriptions refer to an existing object, but some are too broad or explosive or vague to be of any (formal) use. I may describe a system that is equal to standard arithmetics but also has 1=2 as an axiom. This makes it useless practically (or so I guess...) but it may still be interpreted in a way that it makes sense. 1=2 may mean that there is 1 object that is 2 two objects, so it simply asserts the existence of the one number two. 3=7 may mean that there are 3 objects that are 7 objects which might be interpreted as aserting the existence of (for example) 7*1, 7*2 and 7*3. The problem is not that there is no possible true interpretation of 1=2; the problem is that in standard logic a falsity allows you to prove anything. Yes, so we can prove anything. This simply begs the question what the anything is. All sentences we derive from the inconsistency would mean the same (even though we don't know what exactly it is). We could just write 1=1 instead and we would have expressed the same, but in a way that is easier to make sense of. This is not problematic, it only makes the proofs in the inconsisten system worthless (at least in a formal context were we assume classical logic). And it would make Platonia worthless. The real, genuine, Platonia is already close to be worthless due to the consistency of inconsistency for machine. This already put quite a mess in Platonia. By allowing complete contradiction, you make it a trivial object. Why? When we contradict ourselves we may simply interpret this as a expression of the trivial truth of existence. This doesn't change Plantonia at all, because it exists either way. The whole point of Gödel's theorem is that M
Re: Platonia
On 22 Feb 2011, at 22:14, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Now, just recall that Platonia is based on classical logic where the falsity f, or 0 = 1, entails all proposition. So if you insist to say that 0 = 1, I will soon prove that you owe to me A billions of dollars, and that you should prepare the check. You could prove that, but what is really meant by that is another question. It may simply mean I want to play a joke on you. All statements are open to interpretation, I don't think we can avoid that entirely. We are ususally more interested in the statements that are less vague, but vague or crazy statements are still valid on some level (even though often on an very boring, because trivial, level; like saying S afs fdsLfs, which is just expressing that something exists). We formalize things, or make them as formal as possible, when we search where we disagree, or when we want to find a mistake. The idea of making things formal, like in first order logic, is to be able to follow a derivation or an argument in a way which does not depend on any interpretation, other than the procedural inference rule. Yes, I get the idea. I agree that the derivation does not depend on any interpretation (other than one we can easily agree on). But what the axioms and the derivations thereof really mean is open to interpretation. Otherwise we would have no discussion about Do numbers exist?. I don't think we can understand 1+1=2 without some amount of interpretation. We need to interpret that the two objects are of the same kind, for example. Formal results are useless if we are not able to interpret what they mean. I am not sure. We want avoid the philosophical discussion, which can be endless and obstructive. So instead of trying to find the ultimate interpretation on which everybody would agree, we try, in a spirit of respect of all interpretation, to find our common agreement. Is 0 a number? OK, we agree that 0 is a number, and from that, agreeing with classical logic, we already agree that at least one number exist, 0. And the existence case is closed. OK? Next question, do we agree that numbers have a successor? Yes, that is the point, if x is a number, we want it having a successor, and successors , 0, s(0), s(s(0)), ... In this manner, we don't throw away, any interpretation of the numbers, but we are able to derive many things from what we agree on. The question of the relation between human and numbers is very interesting, but has to be addressed at some other levels, with some supplementary hypotheses. If not we mix unrelated difficulties. I have to admit I'm not sure if it is valuable to make everything as formal as possible, if we want to find a mistake. My intuition says it is not, at least not always. It might to lead into a loop, where we formalize everything as much as possible and make very little progress in what we really want to achieve. I agree. Only, when it is hard to find the mistake, we do get more formal or we become the victim of that mistake. If in our informal communication we want to find where we disagree (which seems to be an important function of communication), we should formalize our natural language, too. I think that this is just impossible. To formalize a natural language, or a person, would kill it. It would be like pretending we can know our level, or that we trust blindly the doctor in case he would contend himself to send your Gödel number to the museum. Natural language are of the type alive, they changed, get new words from other languages, etc. I think it has been tried, but I'm not sure whether there is much value in doing that. No value, unless the natural language is perishing, because only known by few old people. Then it might be nice to formalize it to keep its memory in the natural languages museum indeed. It might lead to a language that is too difficult, too little flexible and too much restricting for almost all purposes. Not really. Formal can be very flexible, like the programming languages, but natural language are naturally self-transforming, and have to adapt. I'm not sure, either, if it is - even just in science - always a good approach to try to find mistakes. Maybe there are none and we never really know and trying to do will lead nowhere or there always some mistakes and trying to eliminate them will just spawn new ones. Maybe both are true in some way. Mistakes are what make us progress. Beware the fatal mistake, like flying a plane with a bug in the altimeter. I guess both sides are important: We have to formalize, to establish structures, that give us some frame of reasoning and we have to break formalities (which might manifest as some kind of behavior that appears very mad, if not evil, like denying God in the middle ages) in order to discover new structures. This might
Re: Platonia
On Feb 23, 9:46 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 22 Feb 2011, at 22:14, benjayk wrote: Molecules and Cells are formal things. Form is matter, in *some* sense. Form is not *primary* matter in any sense. People having problem with numbers have been victim of a traumatic teaching of math. The philosophical question of the existence of any thing, except consciousness here and now, is desperately complex. That is why I like comp, because it allows (and forces) to derive the psychological existence, the theological existence, the physical, existence, and the sensible existence from the classical existence of numbers, which is simple by definition, if you agree with the use of classical logic in number theory. What is classical existence? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Platonia
On 21 Feb 2011, at 17:34, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 20 Feb 2011, at 13:13, benjayk wrote: Brent Meeker-2 wrote: On 2/19/2011 3:39 PM, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Isn't it enough to say everything that we *could* describe in mathematics exists in platonia? The problem is that we can describe much more things than the one we are able to show consistent, so if you allow what we could describe you take too much. If you define Platonia by all consistent things, you get something inconsistent due to paradox similar to Russell paradox or St-Thomas paradox with omniscience and omnipotence. Why can inconsistent descriptions not refer to an existing object? Because an inconsistent description implies everything, whether the object described exists or not. From Sherlock Holmes is a detective and is not a detective. anything at all follows. I think it is perfectly fine when something implies everything. For me it makes very much sense to think of everything as everything existing. The distinction something existant / something non-existant is a relative one, in the absolute sense existence is all there is - and it includes relative non-existence (for example Santa Claus exists, but has relative non-existence in the set of things that manifests in a consistent and predictable way to many observers). Aso, it emerges naturally from seemingly consistent logic that everything exists (see Curry's paradox). Curry paradox was a real contradiction, Curry put his theory in the trash the day he sees the contradiction, and begun some other less ambitious theory (the illetive theory of combinators). OK, but this doesn't change the rest of the rest of the argument. Also, the Curry paradox is still there in natural language, which seems capable of making useful statements even though the Curry paradox entails the truth of every statement in natural language. Natural language are very complex, and that is why we constraint the machine to use formal language in the ideal case. But even for natural language, it is usually accept that not all sentence are true, and some fuzzy version of Tarski theory of truth can already be helpful for many situation. In particular snow is white is true because it is the case that snow is white. Bruno Marchal wrote: Brent Meeker-2 wrote: The easy way is to assume inconsistent descriptions are merely an arbitrary combination of symbols that fail to describe something in particular and thus have only the content that every utterance has by virtue of being uttered: There exists ... (something). But we need utterances that *don't* entail existence. If we find something that doesn't entail existence, it still entails existence because every utterance is proof that existence IS. We need only utterances that entail relative non-existence or that don't entail existence in a particular way in a particular context. You need some non relative absolute base to define relative existence. The absolute base is the undeniable reality of there being experience. But this one is not communicable. It does play a role in comp, though. But it is not enough. usually people agree with the axiom of Peano Arithmetic, or the initial part of some set theory. Bruno Marchal wrote: Brent Meeker-2 wrote: So we can say things like, Sherlock Holmes lived at 10 Baker Street are true, even though Sherlock Holmes never existed. Whether Sherlock Holmes existed is not a trivial question. He didn't exist like me and you, but he did exist as an idea. Even if you met *a* Sherlock Holmes in Platonia, you have no cirteria to say it is the usual fictive person created by Conan Doyle, because, in Platonia, he is not created by Conan Doyle, ... In Platonia he is not created by Conan Doyle, which makes sense, given the possible that other people use the same fictional character, so he is essentially discovered, not created. But I don't know what you want to imply with that. Just that fictionism, the idea that numbers are fiction of the same type as fictive personage from novels does not make sense, except to confuse matter. Bruno Marchal wrote: Brent Meeker-2 wrote: So they don't add anything to platonia because they merely assert the existence of existence, which leaves platonia as described by consistent theories. I think the paradox is a linguistic paradox and it poses really no problem. Ultimately all descriptions refer to an existing object, but some are too broad or explosive or vague to be of any (formal) use. I may describe a system that is equal to standard arithmetics but also has 1=2 as an axiom. This makes it useless practically (or so I guess...) but it may still be interpreted in a way that it makes sense. 1=2 may mean that there is 1 object that is 2 two objects, so it simply asserts the existence of the one number two. 3=7 may mean that there are 3 objects that are 7
Re: Platonia
On Feb 18, 8:52 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 18 Feb 2011, at 12:53, 1Z wrote: On Feb 18, 9:48 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Hi, What do you mean by Platonia? The kind of Platonia in Tegmark or in Peter's (1Z) post does not make sense for mathematicians. Even if you are using a theory like Quine's NF, which allows mathematical universes, you still have no mathematical description of the whole mathematical reality. Tegmark is naïve about this. *Arithmetical* platonia can be said to exist, at least in the sense that you can prove it to exist in models of acceptable set theories, like ZF. It is just the structure (N, +, x). It is used in all papers in physics, math and logic, including Pratt ... Used as a formalism. It is not the case that everyone who uses arithmetic is a Platonist I did not say that, even with platonism restricted to arithmetical realism, except for those using classical arithmetic or models of PA in ZF, etc. To believe in (N,+,x) you need a stronger realism than arithmetical realism, which says nothing about infinite sets. To make use of in (N,+,x) you need no realism at all. Infinite sets are irrelevant to the formalist And I am still waiting for you to explain me what *is* formalism without using arithmetical realism or equivalent. In foundations of mathematics, philosophy of mathematics, and philosophy of logic, formalism is a theory that holds that statements of mathematics and logic can be thought of as statements about the consequences of certain string manipulation rules. For example, Euclidean geometry can be seen as a game whose play consists in moving around certain strings of symbols called axioms according to a set of rules called rules of inference to generate new strings. In playing this game one can prove that the Pythagorean theorem is valid because the string representing the Pythagorean theorem can be constructed using only the stated rules. According to formalism, the truths expressed in logic and mathematics are not about numbers, sets, or triangles or any other contensive subject matter — in fact, they aren't about anything at all. They are syntactic forms whose shapes and locations have no meaning unless they are given an interpretation (or semantics). Let me answer to you. To be able to use a formalism, you need to define what are the well-formed sentences; I'e told you over and over that by fomalism I mean mathematics as a game, not mechanisability for this you need to define them in the usual recursive way (or equivalent way) and this, together with simple rules (like finding the first and second in a couple of expressions) is ontologically as rich as sigma_1 realism. SIgma_ 1 is just another formal game to formalists: to them, it has no ontology. Formalism, and all form of finitism Formalism has nothing at all to do with finitism which is a bit richer than ultrafinitism, is entirely constructed (implicitly or explicitly) on arithmetical realism. How can anti realism be constructed on realism? You are presumably indulging in your peculiarity of using realism to mean bivalence Gödel showed the deep bisimulation of formalism and arithmetic. They may well be structurally, formally, abstractly equivalent in some way. That doesn't mean either is real -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Platonia
On Feb 19, 12:34 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 18 Feb 2011, at 17:13, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi, What do you mean by Platonia? The kind of Platonia in Tegmark or in Peter's (1Z) post does not make sense for mathematicians. Even if you are using a theory like Quine's NF, which allows mathematical universes, you still have no mathematical description of the whole mathematical reality. Do you have to have a description of the whole mathematical reality to assert it exists? You need it to make sense of it. Mathematical attempts lead to either inconsistent theories, or to a definition of a putative mathematician (like with the theory of topos), which is very interesting but not quite platonic. So you can't have mathematics without a mathematician? As a figure of speech Platonia can make sense, but it is doubtful in a theoretical context, like when we search for a TOE. Isn't it enough to say everything that we *could* describe in mathematics exists in platonia? The problem is that we can describe much more things than the one we are able to show consistent, so if you allow what we could describe you take too much. If you define Platonia by all consistent things, you get something inconsistent due to paradox similar to Russell paradox or St-Thomas paradox with omniscience and omnipotence. Then let Platonia be all consistent and non paradoxical things And then when you try to convey something which is counter-intuitive and against the current main paradigm, like your poor servitor, you have to base things on what the most agree (but this is not an argument, just a methodological remark). -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Platonia
On Feb 20, 6:53 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 20 Feb 2011, at 00:39, benjayk wrote: You will find the best and the worst. Podnieks' page is not too bad.http://www.ltn.lv/~podnieks/ a correct philosophical position of a mathematician should be: a) Platonism - on working days - when I'm doing mathematics (otherwise, my doing will be inefficient), b) Formalism - on weekends - when I'm thinking about mathematics (otherwise, I will end up in mysticism). (The initial version of this aphorism was proposed in 1979 by Reuben Hersh / picture). But actually the correct philosophy is the weekend philosophy, because it is always weekend for philosophers. What mathematicians apply during the week is methodology. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Platonia
On Feb 20, 7:12 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 20 Feb 2011, at 13:13, benjayk wrote: So we can say things like, Sherlock Holmes lived at 10 Baker Street are true, even though Sherlock Holmes never existed. Whether Sherlock Holmes existed is not a trivial question. He didn't exist like me and you, but he did exist as an idea. Even if you met *a* Sherlock Holmes in Platonia, you have no cirteria to say it is the usual fictive person created by Conan Doyle, because, in Platonia, he is not created by Conan Doyle, ... In Platonism, there is no creating, only finding -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Platonia
Bruno Marchal wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Now, just recall that Platonia is based on classical logic where the falsity f, or 0 = 1, entails all proposition. So if you insist to say that 0 = 1, I will soon prove that you owe to me A billions of dollars, and that you should prepare the check. You could prove that, but what is really meant by that is another question. It may simply mean I want to play a joke on you. All statements are open to interpretation, I don't think we can avoid that entirely. We are ususally more interested in the statements that are less vague, but vague or crazy statements are still valid on some level (even though often on an very boring, because trivial, level; like saying S afs fdsLfs, which is just expressing that something exists). We formalize things, or make them as formal as possible, when we search where we disagree, or when we want to find a mistake. The idea of making things formal, like in first order logic, is to be able to follow a derivation or an argument in a way which does not depend on any interpretation, other than the procedural inference rule. Yes, I get the idea. I agree that the derivation does not depend on any interpretation (other than one we can easily agree on). But what the axioms and the derivations thereof really mean is open to interpretation. Otherwise we would have no discussion about Do numbers exist?. I don't think we can understand 1+1=2 without some amount of interpretation. We need to interpret that the two objects are of the same kind, for example. Formal results are useless if we are not able to interpret what they mean. I have to admit I'm not sure if it is valuable to make everything as formal as possible, if we want to find a mistake. My intuition says it is not, at least not always. It might to lead into a loop, where we formalize everything as much as possible and make very little progress in what we really want to achieve. If in our informal communication we want to find where we disagree (which seems to be an important function of communication), we should formalize our natural language, too. I think it has been tried, but I'm not sure whether there is much value in doing that. It might lead to a language that is too difficult, too little flexible and too much restricting for almost all purposes. I'm not sure, either, if it is - even just in science - always a good approach to try to find mistakes. Maybe there are none and we never really know and trying to do will lead nowhere or there always some mistakes and trying to eliminate them will just spawn new ones. Maybe both are true in some way. I guess both sides are important: We have to formalize, to establish structures, that give us some frame of reasoning and we have to break formalities (which might manifest as some kind of behavior that appears very mad, if not evil, like denying God in the middle ages) in order to discover new structures. This might be the reason for the dream state. I don't feel we can make an easy distinction between formal activities and informal activities, too (like banishing structure-breaking creativity into the arts). It just feels wrong for me. It will lead to zombie scientists (actually there are already quite a few of them, I think you whom I mean ;) ) and utterly mad artists. Bruno Marchal wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: 3=7 may mean that there are 3 objects that are 7 objects which might be interpreted as aserting the existence of (for example) 7*1, 7*2 and 7*3. Logicians and mathematicians are more simple minded than that, and it does not always help to be understood. If you allow circles with edges, and triangles with four sides in Platonia, we will loose any hope of understanding each other. I don't think we have disallow circles with edges, and triangles with four sides; it is enough if we keep in mind that it is useful to use words in a sense that is commonly understood. That is why I limit myself for the TOE to natural numbers and their addition and multiplication. The reason is that it is enough, by comp, and nobody (except perhaps some philosophers) have any problem with that. I'm not so sure about this. There seem to be many people who have a problem with numbers, especially with ascribing existence to them (even if it seems obvious to you) - not just some philosophers. Bruno Marchal wrote: I think it is a bit authoritarian to disallow some statements as truth. I feel it is better to think of truth as everything describable or experiencable; and then we differ between truth as non-falsehood and the trivial truth of falsehoods. It avoids that we have to fight wars between truth and falsehood. Truth swallows everything up. If somebody says something ridiculous like All non christian people go to hell., we acknowledge that expresses some truth about what he feels and believes, instead of only seeing that what he says
Re: Platonia
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 20 Feb 2011, at 00:39, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Isn't it enough to say everything that we *could* describe in mathematics exists in platonia? The problem is that we can describe much more things than the one we are able to show consistent, so if you allow what we could describe you take too much. If you define Platonia by all consistent things, you get something inconsistent due to paradox similar to Russell paradox or St-Thomas paradox with omniscience and omnipotence. Why can inconsistent descriptions not refer to an existing object? The easy way is to assume inconsistent descriptions are merely an arbitrary combination of symbols that fail to describe something in particular and thus have only the content that every utterance has by virtue of being uttered: There exists ... (something). So they don't add anything to platonia because they merely assert the existence of existence, which leaves platonia as described by consistent theories. I think the paradox is a linguistic paradox and it poses really no problem. Ultimately all descriptions refer to an existing object, but some are too broad or explosive or vague to be of any (formal) use. I may describe a system that is equal to standard arithmetics but also has 1=2 as an axiom. This makes it useless practically (or so I guess...) but it may still be interpreted in a way that it makes sense. 1=2 may mean that there is 1 object that is 2 two objects, so it simply asserts the existence of the one number two. But what is two if 2 = 1. I can no more have clue of what you mean. Two is the successor of one. You obviously now what that means. So keep this meaning and reconcile it with 2=1. You might get the meaning two is the one (number) that is the succesor of one. Or one (number) is the successor of two. In essence it expresses 2*...=1*... or 2*X=1*Y. And it might mean the succesor of one number is the succesor of the succesor of one number. or 2+...=1+... or 2+X=1+Y. The reason that it is not a good idea to define 2=1 is because it doesn't express something that can't be expressed in standard arithmetic, but it makes everything much more confusing and redundant. In mathematics we want to be precise as possible so it's good rule to always have to specifiy which quantity we talk about, so that we avoid talking about something - that is one thing - that is something - that is two things - but rather talk about one thing and two things directly; because it is already clear that two things are a thing. Bruno Marchal wrote: Now, just recall that Platonia is based on classical logic where the falsity f, or 0 = 1, entails all proposition. So if you insist to say that 0 = 1, I will soon prove that you owe to me A billions of dollars, and that you should prepare the check. You could prove that, but what is really meant by that is another question. It may simply mean I want to play a joke on you. All statements are open to interpretation, I don't think we can avoid that entirely. We are ususally more interested in the statements that are less vague, but vague or crazy statements are still valid on some level (even though often on an very boring, because trivial, level; like saying S afs fdsLfs, which is just expressing that something exists). Bruno Marchal wrote: 3=7 may mean that there are 3 objects that are 7 objects which might be interpreted as aserting the existence of (for example) 7*1, 7*2 and 7*3. Logicians and mathematicians are more simple minded than that, and it does not always help to be understood. If you allow circles with edges, and triangles with four sides in Platonia, we will loose any hope of understanding each other. I don't think we have disallow circles with edges, and triangles with four sides; it is enough if we keep in mind that it is useful to use words in a sense that is commonly understood. I think it is a bit authoritarian to disallow some statements as truth. I feel it is better to think of truth as everything describable or experiencable; and then we differ between truth as non-falsehood and the trivial truth of falsehoods. It avoids that we have to fight wars between truth and falsehood. Truth swallows everything up. If somebody says something ridiculous like All non christian people go to hell., we acknowledge that expresses some truth about what he feels and believes, instead of only seeing that what he says is false. I believe the only way we can learn to understand each other is if we acknowledge the truth in every utterance. Bruno Marchal wrote: I don't think the omnipotence paradox is problematic, also. It simply shows that omnipotence is nothing that can be properly conceived of using classical logic. We may assume omnipotence and non-omnipotence are compatible; omnipotence encompasses non-omnipotence and is on some level equivalent to it. For example: The omnipotent
Re: Platonia
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 20 Feb 2011, at 13:13, benjayk wrote: Brent Meeker-2 wrote: On 2/19/2011 3:39 PM, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Isn't it enough to say everything that we *could* describe in mathematics exists in platonia? The problem is that we can describe much more things than the one we are able to show consistent, so if you allow what we could describe you take too much. If you define Platonia by all consistent things, you get something inconsistent due to paradox similar to Russell paradox or St-Thomas paradox with omniscience and omnipotence. Why can inconsistent descriptions not refer to an existing object? Because an inconsistent description implies everything, whether the object described exists or not. From Sherlock Holmes is a detective and is not a detective. anything at all follows. I think it is perfectly fine when something implies everything. For me it makes very much sense to think of everything as everything existing. The distinction something existant / something non-existant is a relative one, in the absolute sense existence is all there is - and it includes relative non-existence (for example Santa Claus exists, but has relative non-existence in the set of things that manifests in a consistent and predictable way to many observers). Aso, it emerges naturally from seemingly consistent logic that everything exists (see Curry's paradox). Curry paradox was a real contradiction, Curry put his theory in the trash the day he sees the contradiction, and begun some other less ambitious theory (the illetive theory of combinators). OK, but this doesn't change the rest of the rest of the argument. Also, the Curry paradox is still there in natural language, which seems capable of making useful statements even though the Curry paradox entails the truth of every statement in natural language. Bruno Marchal wrote: Brent Meeker-2 wrote: The easy way is to assume inconsistent descriptions are merely an arbitrary combination of symbols that fail to describe something in particular and thus have only the content that every utterance has by virtue of being uttered: There exists ... (something). But we need utterances that *don't* entail existence. If we find something that doesn't entail existence, it still entails existence because every utterance is proof that existence IS. We need only utterances that entail relative non-existence or that don't entail existence in a particular way in a particular context. You need some non relative absolute base to define relative existence. The absolute base is the undeniable reality of there being experience. Bruno Marchal wrote: Brent Meeker-2 wrote: So we can say things like, Sherlock Holmes lived at 10 Baker Street are true, even though Sherlock Holmes never existed. Whether Sherlock Holmes existed is not a trivial question. He didn't exist like me and you, but he did exist as an idea. Even if you met *a* Sherlock Holmes in Platonia, you have no cirteria to say it is the usual fictive person created by Conan Doyle, because, in Platonia, he is not created by Conan Doyle, ... In Platonia he is not created by Conan Doyle, which makes sense, given the possible that other people use the same fictional character, so he is essentially discovered, not created. But I don't know what you want to imply with that. Bruno Marchal wrote: Brent Meeker-2 wrote: So they don't add anything to platonia because they merely assert the existence of existence, which leaves platonia as described by consistent theories. I think the paradox is a linguistic paradox and it poses really no problem. Ultimately all descriptions refer to an existing object, but some are too broad or explosive or vague to be of any (formal) use. I may describe a system that is equal to standard arithmetics but also has 1=2 as an axiom. This makes it useless practically (or so I guess...) but it may still be interpreted in a way that it makes sense. 1=2 may mean that there is 1 object that is 2 two objects, so it simply asserts the existence of the one number two. 3=7 may mean that there are 3 objects that are 7 objects which might be interpreted as aserting the existence of (for example) 7*1, 7*2 and 7*3. The problem is not that there is no possible true interpretation of 1=2; the problem is that in standard logic a falsity allows you to prove anything. Yes, so we can prove anything. This simply begs the question what the anything is. All sentences we derive from the inconsistency would mean the same (even though we don't know what exactly it is). We could just write 1=1 instead and we would have expressed the same, but in a way that is easier to make sense of. This is not problematic, it only makes the proofs in the inconsisten system worthless (at least in a formal context were we assume
Re: Platonia
On 21 Feb 2011, at 13:26, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 20 Feb 2011, at 00:39, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Isn't it enough to say everything that we *could* describe in mathematics exists in platonia? The problem is that we can describe much more things than the one we are able to show consistent, so if you allow what we could describe you take too much. If you define Platonia by all consistent things, you get something inconsistent due to paradox similar to Russell paradox or St-Thomas paradox with omniscience and omnipotence. Why can inconsistent descriptions not refer to an existing object? The easy way is to assume inconsistent descriptions are merely an arbitrary combination of symbols that fail to describe something in particular and thus have only the content that every utterance has by virtue of being uttered: There exists ... (something). So they don't add anything to platonia because they merely assert the existence of existence, which leaves platonia as described by consistent theories. I think the paradox is a linguistic paradox and it poses really no problem. Ultimately all descriptions refer to an existing object, but some are too broad or explosive or vague to be of any (formal) use. I may describe a system that is equal to standard arithmetics but also has 1=2 as an axiom. This makes it useless practically (or so I guess...) but it may still be interpreted in a way that it makes sense. 1=2 may mean that there is 1 object that is 2 two objects, so it simply asserts the existence of the one number two. But what is two if 2 = 1. I can no more have clue of what you mean. Two is the successor of one. You obviously now what that means. So keep this meaning and reconcile it with 2=1. You might get the meaning two is the one (number) that is the succesor of one. Or one (number) is the successor of two. In essence it expresses 2*...=1*... or 2*X=1*Y. And it might mean the succesor of one number is the succesor of the succesor of one number. or 2+...=1+... or 2+X=1+Y. The reason that it is not a good idea to define 2=1 is because it doesn't express something that can't be expressed in standard arithmetic, but it makes everything much more confusing and redundant. In mathematics we want to be precise as possible so it's good rule to always have to specifiy which quantity we talk about, so that we avoid talking about something - that is one thing - that is something - that is two things - but rather talk about one thing and two things directly; because it is already clear that two things are a thing. OK. Bruno Marchal wrote: Now, just recall that Platonia is based on classical logic where the falsity f, or 0 = 1, entails all proposition. So if you insist to say that 0 = 1, I will soon prove that you owe to me A billions of dollars, and that you should prepare the check. You could prove that, but what is really meant by that is another question. It may simply mean I want to play a joke on you. All statements are open to interpretation, I don't think we can avoid that entirely. We are ususally more interested in the statements that are less vague, but vague or crazy statements are still valid on some level (even though often on an very boring, because trivial, level; like saying S afs fdsLfs, which is just expressing that something exists). We formalize things, or make them as formal as possible, when we search where we disagree, or when we want to find a mistake. The idea of making things formal, like in first order logic, is to be able to follow a derivation or an argument in a way which does not depend on any interpretation, other than the procedural inference rule. Bruno Marchal wrote: 3=7 may mean that there are 3 objects that are 7 objects which might be interpreted as aserting the existence of (for example) 7*1, 7*2 and 7*3. Logicians and mathematicians are more simple minded than that, and it does not always help to be understood. If you allow circles with edges, and triangles with four sides in Platonia, we will loose any hope of understanding each other. I don't think we have disallow circles with edges, and triangles with four sides; it is enough if we keep in mind that it is useful to use words in a sense that is commonly understood. That is why I limit myself for the TOE to natural numbers and their addition and multiplication. The reason is that it is enough, by comp, and nobody (except perhaps some philosophers) have any problem with that. I think it is a bit authoritarian to disallow some statements as truth. I feel it is better to think of truth as everything describable or experiencable; and then we differ between truth as non-falsehood and the trivial truth of falsehoods. It avoids that we have to fight wars between truth and falsehood. Truth swallows everything up. If somebody says something ridiculous like All non christian people go to hell
Re: Platonia
Brent Meeker-2 wrote: On 2/19/2011 3:39 PM, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Isn't it enough to say everything that we *could* describe in mathematics exists in platonia? The problem is that we can describe much more things than the one we are able to show consistent, so if you allow what we could describe you take too much. If you define Platonia by all consistent things, you get something inconsistent due to paradox similar to Russell paradox or St-Thomas paradox with omniscience and omnipotence. Why can inconsistent descriptions not refer to an existing object? Because an inconsistent description implies everything, whether the object described exists or not. From Sherlock Holmes is a detective and is not a detective. anything at all follows. I think it is perfectly fine when something implies everything. For me it makes very much sense to think of everything as everything existing. The distinction something existant / something non-existant is a relative one, in the absolute sense existence is all there is - and it includes relative non-existence (for example Santa Claus exists, but has relative non-existence in the set of things that manifests in a consistent and predictable way to many observers). Aso, it emerges naturally from seemingly consistent logic that everything exists (see Curry's paradox). Brent Meeker-2 wrote: The easy way is to assume inconsistent descriptions are merely an arbitrary combination of symbols that fail to describe something in particular and thus have only the content that every utterance has by virtue of being uttered: There exists ... (something). But we need utterances that *don't* entail existence. If we find something that doesn't entail existence, it still entails existence because every utterance is proof that existence IS. We need only utterances that entail relative non-existence or that don't entail existence in a particular way in a particular context. Brent Meeker-2 wrote: So we can say things like, Sherlock Holmes lived at 10 Baker Street are true, even though Sherlock Holmes never existed. Whether Sherlock Holmes existed is not a trivial question. He didn't exist like me and you, but he did exist as an idea. Brent Meeker-2 wrote: So they don't add anything to platonia because they merely assert the existence of existence, which leaves platonia as described by consistent theories. I think the paradox is a linguistic paradox and it poses really no problem. Ultimately all descriptions refer to an existing object, but some are too broad or explosive or vague to be of any (formal) use. I may describe a system that is equal to standard arithmetics but also has 1=2 as an axiom. This makes it useless practically (or so I guess...) but it may still be interpreted in a way that it makes sense. 1=2 may mean that there is 1 object that is 2 two objects, so it simply asserts the existence of the one number two. 3=7 may mean that there are 3 objects that are 7 objects which might be interpreted as aserting the existence of (for example) 7*1, 7*2 and 7*3. The problem is not that there is no possible true interpretation of 1=2; the problem is that in standard logic a falsity allows you to prove anything. Yes, so we can prove anything. This simply begs the question what the anything is. All sentences we derive from the inconsistency would mean the same (even though we don't know what exactly it is). We could just write 1=1 instead and we would have expressed the same, but in a way that is easier to make sense of. This is not problematic, it only makes the proofs in the inconsisten system worthless (at least in a formal context were we assume classical logic). -- View this message in context: http://old.nabble.com/Platonia-tp30955253p30970304.html Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Platonia
On 20 Feb 2011, at 00:39, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Isn't it enough to say everything that we *could* describe in mathematics exists in platonia? The problem is that we can describe much more things than the one we are able to show consistent, so if you allow what we could describe you take too much. If you define Platonia by all consistent things, you get something inconsistent due to paradox similar to Russell paradox or St-Thomas paradox with omniscience and omnipotence. Why can inconsistent descriptions not refer to an existing object? The easy way is to assume inconsistent descriptions are merely an arbitrary combination of symbols that fail to describe something in particular and thus have only the content that every utterance has by virtue of being uttered: There exists ... (something). So they don't add anything to platonia because they merely assert the existence of existence, which leaves platonia as described by consistent theories. I think the paradox is a linguistic paradox and it poses really no problem. Ultimately all descriptions refer to an existing object, but some are too broad or explosive or vague to be of any (formal) use. I may describe a system that is equal to standard arithmetics but also has 1=2 as an axiom. This makes it useless practically (or so I guess...) but it may still be interpreted in a way that it makes sense. 1=2 may mean that there is 1 object that is 2 two objects, so it simply asserts the existence of the one number two. But what is two if 2 = 1. I can no more have clue of what you mean. Now, just recall that Platonia is based on classical logic where the falsity f, or 0 = 1, entails all proposition. So if you insist to say that 0 = 1, I will soon prove that you owe to me A billions of dollars, and that you should prepare the check. 3=7 may mean that there are 3 objects that are 7 objects which might be interpreted as aserting the existence of (for example) 7*1, 7*2 and 7*3. Logicians and mathematicians are more simple minded than that, and it does not always help to be understood. If you allow circles with edges, and triangles with four sides in Platonia, we will loose any hope of understanding each other. I don't think the omnipotence paradox is problematic, also. It simply shows that omnipotence is nothing that can be properly conceived of using classical logic. We may assume omnipotence and non-omnipotence are compatible; omnipotence encompasses non-omnipotence and is on some level equivalent to it. For example: The omnipotent God can make a stone that is too heavy for him to lift, because God can manifest as a person (that's still God, but an non-omnipotent omnipotent one) that cannot lift the stone. That makes the term omnipotent trivial. You can quickly be lead to give any meaning to any sentence. Did you confess that you killed your wife? yes, sure, but by I killed my wife I was meaning that I love eggs on a plate. This will not help when discussing fundamental issues. Bruno Marchal wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Like in Plotinus, the ultimate being (arithmetical platonia) is not a being itself (nor is matter!). Could you explain what you mean with that? Platonia, the platonia of Plato, is the Noûs, [...] Many thanks for your effort to explain this to me. :) Honestly your non-technical explanation is a bit vague for me and your technical explanation is simply way to technical for me. Some things seem to make sense, but overall it's still quite mysterious to me. Frankly I am a bit afraid to ask questions concerning your technical explanation, because I'm not sure if you can answer them succintly or whether I understand your explanations and I don't want you to waste your time explaining it to me in great detail and then still be not much more smarter. There are good book on self)-reference, but they need some familiarity in mathematical logic. An excellent book on Logic is the book by Elliot Mendelson, another one is by Boolos, Jeffrey and Burgess. Maybe I will try searching some terms that I don't understand (or that I don't understand the context of) on the list or in the web. You will find the best and the worst. Podnieks' page is not too bad. http://www.ltn.lv/~podnieks/ Or perhaps it well help when I learn logic at the university, though I guess it will be not so much in depth. It depends on many things. A have a few questions regarding the non-technical part of explanation, though: What does it mean that the soul falls, falls from what? From Heaven. From Platonia. From the harmonic static state of the universal consciousness to the state with death and taxes. It is hard for me to explain the sense of Plotinus, which itself is discussed by many scholars, and in different terms according to their own inclinations. But I did provide an arithmetical translation, and there I can be more precise
Re: Platonia
On 20 Feb 2011, at 13:13, benjayk wrote: Brent Meeker-2 wrote: On 2/19/2011 3:39 PM, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Isn't it enough to say everything that we *could* describe in mathematics exists in platonia? The problem is that we can describe much more things than the one we are able to show consistent, so if you allow what we could describe you take too much. If you define Platonia by all consistent things, you get something inconsistent due to paradox similar to Russell paradox or St-Thomas paradox with omniscience and omnipotence. Why can inconsistent descriptions not refer to an existing object? Because an inconsistent description implies everything, whether the object described exists or not. From Sherlock Holmes is a detective and is not a detective. anything at all follows. I think it is perfectly fine when something implies everything. For me it makes very much sense to think of everything as everything existing. The distinction something existant / something non-existant is a relative one, in the absolute sense existence is all there is - and it includes relative non-existence (for example Santa Claus exists, but has relative non-existence in the set of things that manifests in a consistent and predictable way to many observers). Aso, it emerges naturally from seemingly consistent logic that everything exists (see Curry's paradox). Curry paradox was a real contradiction, Curry put his theory in the trash the day he sees the contradiction, and begun some other less ambitious theory (the illetive theory of combinators). Brent Meeker-2 wrote: The easy way is to assume inconsistent descriptions are merely an arbitrary combination of symbols that fail to describe something in particular and thus have only the content that every utterance has by virtue of being uttered: There exists ... (something). But we need utterances that *don't* entail existence. If we find something that doesn't entail existence, it still entails existence because every utterance is proof that existence IS. We need only utterances that entail relative non-existence or that don't entail existence in a particular way in a particular context. You need some non relative absolute base to define relative existence. Brent Meeker-2 wrote: So we can say things like, Sherlock Holmes lived at 10 Baker Street are true, even though Sherlock Holmes never existed. Whether Sherlock Holmes existed is not a trivial question. He didn't exist like me and you, but he did exist as an idea. Even if you met *a* Sherlock Holmes in Platonia, you have no cirteria to say it is the usual fictive person created by Conan Doyle, because, in Platonia, he is not created by Conan Doyle, ... Brent Meeker-2 wrote: So they don't add anything to platonia because they merely assert the existence of existence, which leaves platonia as described by consistent theories. I think the paradox is a linguistic paradox and it poses really no problem. Ultimately all descriptions refer to an existing object, but some are too broad or explosive or vague to be of any (formal) use. I may describe a system that is equal to standard arithmetics but also has 1=2 as an axiom. This makes it useless practically (or so I guess...) but it may still be interpreted in a way that it makes sense. 1=2 may mean that there is 1 object that is 2 two objects, so it simply asserts the existence of the one number two. 3=7 may mean that there are 3 objects that are 7 objects which might be interpreted as aserting the existence of (for example) 7*1, 7*2 and 7*3. The problem is not that there is no possible true interpretation of 1=2; the problem is that in standard logic a falsity allows you to prove anything. Yes, so we can prove anything. This simply begs the question what the anything is. All sentences we derive from the inconsistency would mean the same (even though we don't know what exactly it is). We could just write 1=1 instead and we would have expressed the same, but in a way that is easier to make sense of. This is not problematic, it only makes the proofs in the inconsisten system worthless (at least in a formal context were we assume classical logic). And it would make Platonia worthless. The real, genuine, Platonia is already close to be worthless due to the consistency of inconsistency for machine. This already put quite a mess in Platonia. By allowing complete contradiction, you make it a trivial object. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Platonia
Bruno Marchal wrote: Isn't it enough to say everything that we *could* describe in mathematics exists in platonia? The problem is that we can describe much more things than the one we are able to show consistent, so if you allow what we could describe you take too much. If you define Platonia by all consistent things, you get something inconsistent due to paradox similar to Russell paradox or St-Thomas paradox with omniscience and omnipotence. Why can inconsistent descriptions not refer to an existing object? The easy way is to assume inconsistent descriptions are merely an arbitrary combination of symbols that fail to describe something in particular and thus have only the content that every utterance has by virtue of being uttered: There exists ... (something). So they don't add anything to platonia because they merely assert the existence of existence, which leaves platonia as described by consistent theories. I think the paradox is a linguistic paradox and it poses really no problem. Ultimately all descriptions refer to an existing object, but some are too broad or explosive or vague to be of any (formal) use. I may describe a system that is equal to standard arithmetics but also has 1=2 as an axiom. This makes it useless practically (or so I guess...) but it may still be interpreted in a way that it makes sense. 1=2 may mean that there is 1 object that is 2 two objects, so it simply asserts the existence of the one number two. 3=7 may mean that there are 3 objects that are 7 objects which might be interpreted as aserting the existence of (for example) 7*1, 7*2 and 7*3. I don't think the omnipotence paradox is problematic, also. It simply shows that omnipotence is nothing that can be properly conceived of using classical logic. We may assume omnipotence and non-omnipotence are compatible; omnipotence encompasses non-omnipotence and is on some level equivalent to it. For example: The omnipotent God can make a stone that is too heavy for him to lift, because God can manifest as a person (that's still God, but an non-omnipotent omnipotent one) that cannot lift the stone. Bruno Marchal wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Like in Plotinus, the ultimate being (arithmetical platonia) is not a being itself (nor is matter!). Could you explain what you mean with that? Platonia, the platonia of Plato, is the Noûs, [...] Many thanks for your effort to explain this to me. :) Honestly your non-technical explanation is a bit vague for me and your technical explanation is simply way to technical for me. Some things seem to make sense, but overall it's still quite mysterious to me. Frankly I am a bit afraid to ask questions concerning your technical explanation, because I'm not sure if you can answer them succintly or whether I understand your explanations and I don't want you to waste your time explaining it to me in great detail and then still be not much more smarter. Maybe I will try searching some terms that I don't understand (or that I don't understand the context of) on the list or in the web. Or perhaps it well help when I learn logic at the university, though I guess it will be not so much in depth. A have a few questions regarding the non-technical part of explanation, though: What does it mean that the soul falls, falls from what? Why is matter evil? Because it is not perfect as platonia is? As it provides a field were truth can manifest itself, it seems like this is a good thing for the soul to learn to know itself, even if some aspect of matter are bad. The tension between the divine intellect and the soul is the gap between truth and believability, right? How can the One / matter be outside of existence? I have no clue what this could mean. Is the outside of existence not existence as well? Is the one conscious? What you write seems to imply it is (eg the ONE and the Divine Intellect are overwhelmed by the Universal Soul,), but I thought only the universal soul can experience? Do you mean it literally that the soul leaves matter at some point? Why does the one let matter eminate at all then? -- View this message in context: http://old.nabble.com/Platonia-tp30955253p30968384.html Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Platonia
On 2/19/2011 3:39 PM, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Isn't it enough to say everything that we *could* describe in mathematics exists in platonia? The problem is that we can describe much more things than the one we are able to show consistent, so if you allow what we could describe you take too much. If you define Platonia by all consistent things, you get something inconsistent due to paradox similar to Russell paradox or St-Thomas paradox with omniscience and omnipotence. Why can inconsistent descriptions not refer to an existing object? Because an inconsistent description implies everything, whether the object described exists or not. From Sherlock Holmes is a detective and is not a detective. anything at all follows. The easy way is to assume inconsistent descriptions are merely an arbitrary combination of symbols that fail to describe something in particular and thus have only the content that every utterance has by virtue of being uttered: There exists ... (something). But we need utterances that *don't* entail existence. So we can say things like, Sherlock Holmes lived at 10 Baker Street are true, even though Sherlock Holmes never existed. So they don't add anything to platonia because they merely assert the existence of existence, which leaves platonia as described by consistent theories. I think the paradox is a linguistic paradox and it poses really no problem. Ultimately all descriptions refer to an existing object, but some are too broad or explosive or vague to be of any (formal) use. I may describe a system that is equal to standard arithmetics but also has 1=2 as an axiom. This makes it useless practically (or so I guess...) but it may still be interpreted in a way that it makes sense. 1=2 may mean that there is 1 object that is 2 two objects, so it simply asserts the existence of the one number two. 3=7 may mean that there are 3 objects that are 7 objects which might be interpreted as aserting the existence of (for example) 7*1, 7*2 and 7*3. The problem is not that there is no possible true interpretation of 1=2; the problem is that in standard logic a falsity allows you to prove anything. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Platonia
Hi, What do you mean by Platonia? The kind of Platonia in Tegmark or in Peter's (1Z) post does not make sense for mathematicians. Even if you are using a theory like Quine's NF, which allows mathematical universes, you still have no mathematical description of the whole mathematical reality. Tegmark is naïve about this. *Arithmetical* platonia can be said to exist, at least in the sense that you can prove it to exist in models of acceptable set theories, like ZF. It is just the structure (N, +, x). It is used in all papers in physics, math and logic, including Pratt ... Now, with computationalism, we don't even need such a mathematical arithmetical Platonia. We need only the idea that arithmetical truth (even a tiny effective part of it) is independent of you and me. Like in Plotinus, the ultimate being (arithmetical platonia) is not a being itself (nor is matter!). So neither Platonia, nor even arithmetical Platonia needs to exist. Numbers needs to exist in some sense, and do exist in theories like RA or PA, in the sense that such theories formally proves that Ex(x = sss0) for example. Just to be a bit precise. Bruno On 18 Feb 2011, at 02:49, Stephen Paul King wrote: Hi All, Question: Why must Platonia exist? Onward! Stephen “It is amazing what can be accomplished when nobody cares about who gets the credit.” Robert Yates -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Platonia
On Feb 18, 5:43 am, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: On Thu, Feb 17, 2011 at 7:49 PM, Stephen Paul King stephe...@charter.netwrote: Hi All, Question: Why must Platonia exist? How many ways are there to arrange 4 people in a line? If you think the answer 24 is true, regardless of any assumptions of axioms or set theory, etc. then truth has an objective, eternal, causeless existence of its own. These truths and falsehoods define or depend on the existence of other abstract objects, propositions, theoreticals, etc. That mathematical truth is eternal, fixed etc, does not mean it ha any existence at all, and can be explained by mathematics being non- referential Platonism gets its force from noting the robustness and fixity of mathematical truths, which are often described as eternal. The reasoning seems to be that if the truth of a statement is fixed, it must be fixed by something external to itself. In other words, mathematical truths msut be discovered, because if they were made they could have be made differently, and so would not be fixed and eternal. But there is no reason to think that these two metaphors --discovering and making-- are the only options. Perhaps the modus operandi of mathematics is unique; perhaps it combines the fixed objectivity of discovering a physical fact about the external world whilst being nonetheless an internal, non-empirical activity. The Platonic thesis seems more obvious than it should because of an ambiguity in the word objective. Objective truths may be defined ontologically as truths about real-world objects. Objective truths may also be defined epistemically as truths that do not depend on the whims or preferences of the speaker (unlike statements about the best movie of flavour of ice-cream). Statements that are objective in the ontological sense tend to be objective in the epistemic sense, but that does not mean that all statements that are objective in the epistemic sense need be objective in the ontological sense. They may fail to depend on individual whims and preferences without depending on anything external to the mind. We are able to answer questions about mathematical objects in a clear and unambiguous way, but that does not mean mathematical objects are clear and unambiguous things. Being able to answer questions is essentially epistemic. It doesn't imply any ontology in itself. The epistemic fact that we can , in principle, answer questions about real people may be explained by the existence and perceptual accessibility of real people: but our ability to answer questions about mathematical objects is explained by the existence of clear definitions and rules doen't need to posit of existing immaterial numbers (plus some mode of quasi-perceptual access to them). by the -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Platonia
On Feb 18, 9:48 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Hi, What do you mean by Platonia? The kind of Platonia in Tegmark or in Peter's (1Z) post does not make sense for mathematicians. Even if you are using a theory like Quine's NF, which allows mathematical universes, you still have no mathematical description of the whole mathematical reality. Tegmark is naïve about this. *Arithmetical* platonia can be said to exist, at least in the sense that you can prove it to exist in models of acceptable set theories, like ZF. It is just the structure (N, +, x). It is used in all papers in physics, math and logic, including Pratt ... Used as a formalism. It is not the case that everyone who uses arithmetic is a Platonist Now, with computationalism, we don't even need such a mathematical arithmetical Platonia. We need only the idea that arithmetical truth (even a tiny effective part of it) is independent of you and me. Like in Plotinus, the ultimate being (arithmetical platonia) is not a being itself (nor is matter!). So neither Platonia, nor even arithmetical Platonia needs to exist. Numbers needs to exist in some sense, and do exist in theories like RA or PA, in the sense that such theories formally proves that Ex(x = sss0) for example. Just to be a bit precise. Bruno On 18 Feb 2011, at 02:49, Stephen Paul King wrote: Hi All, Question: Why must Platonia exist? Onward! Stephen “It is amazing what can be accomplished when nobody cares about who gets the credit.” Robert Yates -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group athttp://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Platonia
Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi, What do you mean by Platonia? The kind of Platonia in Tegmark or in Peter's (1Z) post does not make sense for mathematicians. Even if you are using a theory like Quine's NF, which allows mathematical universes, you still have no mathematical description of the whole mathematical reality. Do you have to have a description of the whole mathematical reality to assert it exists? Isn't it enough to say everything that we *could* describe in mathematics exists in platonia? Bruno Marchal wrote: Like in Plotinus, the ultimate being (arithmetical platonia) is not a being itself (nor is matter!). Could you explain what you mean with that? -- View this message in context: http://old.nabble.com/Platonia-tp30955253p30959973.html Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Platonia
On 18 Feb 2011, at 12:53, 1Z wrote: On Feb 18, 9:48 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Hi, What do you mean by Platonia? The kind of Platonia in Tegmark or in Peter's (1Z) post does not make sense for mathematicians. Even if you are using a theory like Quine's NF, which allows mathematical universes, you still have no mathematical description of the whole mathematical reality. Tegmark is naïve about this. *Arithmetical* platonia can be said to exist, at least in the sense that you can prove it to exist in models of acceptable set theories, like ZF. It is just the structure (N, +, x). It is used in all papers in physics, math and logic, including Pratt ... Used as a formalism. It is not the case that everyone who uses arithmetic is a Platonist I did not say that, even with platonism restricted to arithmetical realism, except for those using classical arithmetic or models of PA in ZF, etc. To believe in (N,+,x) you need a stronger realism than arithmetical realism, which says nothing about infinite sets. And I am still waiting for you to explain me what *is* formalism without using arithmetical realism or equivalent. Let me answer to you. To be able to use a formalism, you need to define what are the well-formed sentences; for this you need to define them in the usual recursive way (or equivalent way) and this, together with simple rules (like finding the first and second in a couple of expressions) is ontologically as rich as sigma_1 realism. Formalism, and all form of finitism which is a bit richer than ultrafinitism, is entirely constructed (implicitly or explicitly) on arithmetical realism. Gödel showed the deep bisimulation of formalism and arithmetic. With your use of the term Platonia, the theory I am working on, is usually called finitism, and is usually considered as anti platonism. This use is misleading because it is platonist, and even pythagorean, in the sense of the neoplatonist. I think you are confusing people on the genuine issues, here. Bruno Now, with computationalism, we don't even need such a mathematical arithmetical Platonia. We need only the idea that arithmetical truth (even a tiny effective part of it) is independent of you and me. Like in Plotinus, the ultimate being (arithmetical platonia) is not a being itself (nor is matter!). So neither Platonia, nor even arithmetical Platonia needs to exist. Numbers needs to exist in some sense, and do exist in theories like RA or PA, in the sense that such theories formally proves that Ex(x = sss0) for example. Just to be a bit precise. Bruno On 18 Feb 2011, at 02:49, Stephen Paul King wrote: Hi All, Question: Why must Platonia exist? Onward! Stephen “It is amazing what can be accomplished when nobody cares about who gets the credit.” Robert Yates -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com . To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group athttp://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Platonia
On 18 Feb 2011, at 17:13, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi, What do you mean by Platonia? The kind of Platonia in Tegmark or in Peter's (1Z) post does not make sense for mathematicians. Even if you are using a theory like Quine's NF, which allows mathematical universes, you still have no mathematical description of the whole mathematical reality. Do you have to have a description of the whole mathematical reality to assert it exists? You need it to make sense of it. Mathematical attempts lead to either inconsistent theories, or to a definition of a putative mathematician (like with the theory of topos), which is very interesting but not quite platonic. As a figure of speech Platonia can make sense, but it is doubtful in a theoretical context, like when we search for a TOE. Isn't it enough to say everything that we *could* describe in mathematics exists in platonia? The problem is that we can describe much more things than the one we are able to show consistent, so if you allow what we could describe you take too much. If you define Platonia by all consistent things, you get something inconsistent due to paradox similar to Russell paradox or St-Thomas paradox with omniscience and omnipotence. And then when you try to convey something which is counter-intuitive and against the current main paradigm, like your poor servitor, you have to base things on what the most agree (but this is not an argument, just a methodological remark). Bruno Marchal wrote: Like in Plotinus, the ultimate being (arithmetical platonia) is not a being itself (nor is matter!). Could you explain what you mean with that? Platonia, the platonia of Plato, is the Noûs, also called the Intelligible Realm, or the World of Ideas, with the idea that Ideas are more true/real than any of their terrestrial approximation/ incarnation. For example the perfect circle is in Platonia, together with PI, but any natural circle is a gross and less real imitation of the eternal ideas. What we see is conceived as being only the shadow of that intelligible reality. But in the Parmenides, Plato understood that the Intelligible Realm has to come from something completely unified, and Plotinus attributes his notion of ONE to the Parmenides of Plato. In neoplatonism the ONE, which is really without name, nor description of any kind, truly ineffable, is the principle from which both the Intelligible Realm will emanate 'followed' by the Universal Soul. The Universal Soul is a sort of product of both the ONE (the soul keeps its umbilical cord uncut with GOD (the ONE), and the Intelligible Realm, also called the Divine Intellect. That are the three primary hypostases of Plotinus: the One, the Divine Intellect, and the Universal Soul. They correspond more or less to the origin, the reason, and the experience, but are presented as three Gods, in the usual greek manner. The One has many things in common with the God of the monotheist religion, and the Universal Soul has many things in common with the Inner God of the mystic and many schools of Eastern religions. There is a inevitable tension between the Divine Intellect and the Soul, and eventually the Soul will fall, and that is how Matter, a quasi synonymous of Evil, rises. The notion of existence or being is defined by the Divine Intellect. What exist is what the Divine Intellect can talk about, and it cannot talk about the One, because of its absolute ineffability and inaccessibility, and it cannot talk about Matter, which cannot belong to the Intelligible Realm, because it is so much unintelligible that even God (the one) has no control on it. This makes the One, and Matter outside 'existence' or being. They are the antipode of the intelligible existing things. Intelligible by ... the divine intellect, note, which has to be distinguished from Man, i.e. the terrestrial intellect, or discursive reasoner, which is the one who dies and pays taxes, and try to understand. Now, it has been shown that if you give to a universal machine some provability and inductive inference abilities (easy to do), and ask such a machine to introspect itself, the machine is able to distinguish truth, belief (proof) and knowledge (proof of truth). She can know that a truth encompassing herself is not nameable or describable. She can distinguish the terrestrial believer from the divine believer, and even guess a part of the divine discourse, with divine meaning true on that level where truth is not definable. She can understand and feel (accepting some definition already in Plato and Plotinus) the inevitable tension between the Divine Intellect and the Universal Soul, she can understand (believe, proof) that the Universal Soul (which actually is also unnameable) has already a foot in matter', and that the Soul will fall (by connecting inappropriately the terrestrial intellect
Platonia
Hi All, Question: Why must Platonia exist? Onward! Stephen “It is amazing what can be accomplished when nobody cares about who gets the credit.” Robert Yates -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Platonia
On Thu, Feb 17, 2011 at 7:49 PM, Stephen Paul King stephe...@charter.netwrote: Hi All, Question: Why must Platonia exist? How many ways are there to arrange 4 people in a line? If you think the answer 24 is true, regardless of any assumptions of axioms or set theory, etc. then truth has an objective, eternal, causeless existence of its own. These truths and falsehoods define or depend on the existence of other abstract objects, propositions, theoreticals, etc. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
