subject:"Question for Bruno"

On 8 Apr 2017 2:11 a.m., "Brent Meeker"  wrote:

On 4/7/2017 5:12 PM, David Nyman wrote:

On 7 Apr 2017 11:53 p.m., "Brent Meeker"  wrote:

On 4/7/2017 3:22 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

> As I remarked before, it is as if consciousness were concealed from the
> outside by a two-part public/private encryption scheme. Whereas the public
> part is in principle entirely extrinsically inspectable the decryption can
> be completed only in terms of the private perspective of *the system in
> question*. This then inevitably entails that decrypted messages of this
> kind must be inter-subjectively incommunicable despite the ultimate irony
> that they amount to the entirety of inter-subjectively "shareable" concrete
> reality. It is of course in this sense also that the brain is secondary to
> consciousness: i.e. that self-referential perceptual apprehension is the
> filter through which a concrete reality, with all its brains and bodies, is
> enabled in the first place to emerge (and I do mean emerge in a strong
> sense). That primary "grasp on reality" is what enables any subsequent
> abstract analysis in terms of a reductive "bottom up" physical mechanism
> playing the role of a locally-dominating computational mechanism (or IOW
> what you have termed the reversal of physics and machine psychology).
>

But what, in the computations of the UD, is "perceptual apprehension"?
Bruno says that the physical world in not computed, the way some people
speculate that "we are a simulation", but only thoughts are computed and
the physical world is inferred.

Yes of course, but it's that very "inference" in the first person
perspective that unavoidably must present as perceptual apprehension
before it can be abstracted to any other level of analysis. The point I've
been making (which goodness knows is hardly novel in these discussions) is
that the existence of self-reflexive computations

But that's the point I'm questioning.  Bruno notes that an algorithmic
machine can prove somethings about itself.  But is this what we refer to as
perception?  I don't think so.  Perception includes and inference or
construction of the thing perceived.  In case of a declarative sentence it
may be a proposition about something, e.g. "There's no chair in this room."
or  "That sentence contradicts one of the axioms I assumed."  But
perception can be mistaken.  Can proofs be mistaken?

Yes, just as a syllogism can be both sound on the basis of its premises and
yet false in its real world conclusions. However, I think you place too
much weight at such an early stage on the fine detail of the relation
between proof, belief and truth, which cannot at this point be more than
illustrative. The more important thing to grasp IMO is the categorical
distinction between 3p and 1p systems of logic. This is plausibly
sufficient to suggest, or at least not rule out, how computation might
support perception in the sense of a non-analytic reference to something
entangled with, but transcending, formal proofs.

is what permits the emulation of an internal or subjective logic in terms
of which there can be precisely this direct apprehension (a term
etymologically related to grasping) of a concrete perceptual reality. And
the logical cost of any denial that such apprehension is veridical (as, at
least at face value, in the case of Churchland or Dennett) must be the loss
not only of such concrete perception in itself (and no, this conjunction of
concrete and perceptual isn't a contradiction), but also the entire sense
of any purported utterance that could otherwise be understood as referring
to it.

So any instance of optical illusion entails the "logical cost" of  "entire
sense of any purported utterance that could otherwise be understood as
referring to it."  Hence it is impossible to describe an optical illusion,
such as Escher's staircase which closes on itself but gives the illusion of
always ascending counterclockwise and descending clockwise.

How many times have we gone around the block of this particular
misunderstanding? I apologise for any continuing failing in clarity on my
part, but do I really need to make the distinction yet again between the
primary apprehension of a percept, without which nothing can follow, and
any subsequent inference from it, whether accurate or mistaken? This is as
applicable to an "illusion" as to any purportedly accurate perception, a
distinction that, whereas it appears systematically to elude the likes of
Dennett, I had hoped was not lost on yourself.

I agree that the physical world is inferred from those perceptions that
have point-of-view-invariance as my friend Vic Stenger called it.  But I
don't see how a POVI subset of UD computations can just be picked out by
some anthropic principle.  ISTM they must have some computed unity
independent of conscious thoughts (which must be a subset of zero measure).

Yes indeed, but don't you have it backwards here? Surely

Re: Question for Bruno about Lucas/Penrose

2017-04-07 Thread Brent Meeker




On 4/7/2017 5:12 PM, David Nyman wrote:



On 7 Apr 2017 11:53 p.m., "Brent Meeker" > wrote:




On 4/7/2017 3:22 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

As I remarked before, it is as if consciousness were concealed
from the outside by a two-part public/private encryption
scheme. Whereas the public part is in principle entirely
extrinsically inspectable the decryption can be completed only
in terms of the private perspective of *the system in
question*. This then inevitably entails that decrypted
messages of this kind must be inter-subjectively
incommunicable despite the ultimate irony that they amount to
the entirety of inter-subjectively "shareable" concrete
reality. It is of course in this sense also that the brain is
secondary to consciousness: i.e. that self-referential
perceptual apprehension is the filter through which a concrete
reality, with all its brains and bodies, is enabled in the
first place to emerge (and I do mean emerge in a strong
sense). That primary "grasp on reality" is what enables any
subsequent abstract analysis in terms of a reductive "bottom
up" physical mechanism playing the role of a
locally-dominating computational mechanism (or IOW what you
have termed the reversal of physics and machine psychology).


But what, in the computations of the UD, is "perceptual
apprehension"?  Bruno says that the physical world in not
computed, the way some people speculate that "we are a
simulation", but only thoughts are computed and the physical world
is inferred. 



Yes of course, but it's that very "inference" in the first person 
perspective that unavoidably must present as perceptual apprehension 
before it can be abstracted to any other level of analysis. The point 
I've been making (which goodness knows is hardly novel in these 
discussions) is that the existence of self-reflexive computations


But that's the point I'm questioning.  Bruno notes that an algorithmic 
machine can prove somethings about itself.  But is this what we refer to 
as perception?  I don't think so.  Perception includes and inference or 
construction of the thing perceived.  In case of a declarative sentence 
it may be a proposition about something, e.g. "There's no chair in this 
room." or  "That sentence contradicts one of the axioms I assumed."  But 
perception can be mistaken.  Can proofs be mistaken?


is what permits the emulation of an internal or subjective logic in 
terms of which there can be precisely this direct apprehension (a term 
etymologically related to grasping) of a concrete perceptual reality. 
And the logical cost of any denial that such apprehension is veridical 
(as, at least at face value, in the case of Churchland or Dennett) 
must be the loss not only of such concrete perception in itself (and 
no, this conjunction of concrete and perceptual isn't a 
contradiction), but also the entire sense of any purported utterance 
that could otherwise be understood as referring to it.


So any instance of optical illusion entails the "logical cost" of 
"entire sense of any purported utterance that could otherwise be 
understood as referring to it."  Hence it is impossible to describe an 
optical illusion, such as Escher's staircase which closes on itself but 
gives the illusion of always ascending counterclockwise and descending 
clockwise.




I agree that the physical world is inferred from those perceptions
that have point-of-view-invariance as my friend Vic Stenger called
it.  But I don't see how a POVI subset of UD computations can just
be picked out by some anthropic principle.  ISTM they must have
some computed unity independent of conscious thoughts (which must
be a subset of zero measure).


Yes indeed, but don't you have it backwards here? Surely it's rather 
that a POVI non-zero subset of reflexive UD computations is 
hypothesised to pick out a physical world in which it is itself embedded.


No.  In fact the significance of symmetry laws was not understood as 
basic to physics until the 20th century.   You may say they were 
hypothesized, but many such hypotheses turned out to be false. Finding 
the ones that are true is empirical and uncertain...not relations 
characteristic of mathematical proofs.  So how are proofs good models of 
perceptions or beliefs, reflexive or otherwise?



That's implicit in the comp theory.


But I don't think comp theory is proven - so it cannot be cited in 
support of what is implicit in it.  One of it's failings seems to be 
that there is far too much implicit in it.


And note that this physical world is in the first instance apprehended 
(perceived, grasped) as a concrete percept.
Any other level of analysis can only ever be a secondary inference 
from this primary apprehension.


But that's not the neo-platonist

Re: Question for Bruno about Lucas/Penrose

On 7 Apr 2017 11:53 p.m., "Brent Meeker"  wrote:

On 4/7/2017 3:22 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

> As I remarked before, it is as if consciousness were concealed from the
> outside by a two-part public/private encryption scheme. Whereas the public
> part is in principle entirely extrinsically inspectable the decryption can
> be completed only in terms of the private perspective of *the system in
> question*. This then inevitably entails that decrypted messages of this
> kind must be inter-subjectively incommunicable despite the ultimate irony
> that they amount to the entirety of inter-subjectively "shareable" concrete
> reality. It is of course in this sense also that the brain is secondary to
> consciousness: i.e. that self-referential perceptual apprehension is the
> filter through which a concrete reality, with all its brains and bodies, is
> enabled in the first place to emerge (and I do mean emerge in a strong
> sense). That primary "grasp on reality" is what enables any subsequent
> abstract analysis in terms of a reductive "bottom up" physical mechanism
> playing the role of a locally-dominating computational mechanism (or IOW
> what you have termed the reversal of physics and machine psychology).
>

But what, in the computations of the UD, is "perceptual apprehension"?
Bruno says that the physical world in not computed, the way some people
speculate that "we are a simulation", but only thoughts are computed and
the physical world is inferred.

Yes of course, but it's that very "inference" in the first person
perspective that unavoidably must present as perceptual apprehension
before it can be abstracted to any other level of analysis. The point I've
been making (which goodness knows is hardly novel in these discussions) is
that the existence of self-reflexive computations is what permits the
emulation of an internal or subjective logic in terms of which there can be
precisely this direct apprehension (a term etymologically related to
grasping) of a concrete perceptual reality. And the logical cost of any
denial that such apprehension is veridical (as, at least at face value, in
the case of Churchland or Dennett) must be the loss not only of such
concrete perception in itself (and no, this conjunction of concrete and
perceptual isn't a contradiction), but also the entire sense of any
purported utterance that could otherwise be understood as referring to it.

I agree that the physical world is inferred from those perceptions that
have point-of-view-invariance as my friend Vic Stenger called it.  But I
don't see how a POVI subset of UD computations can just be picked out by
some anthropic principle.  ISTM they must have some computed unity
independent of conscious thoughts (which must be a subset of zero measure).

Yes indeed, but don't you have it backwards here? Surely it's rather that a
POVI non-zero subset of reflexive UD computations is hypothesised to pick
out a physical world in which it is itself embedded. That's implicit in the
comp theory. And note that this physical world is in the first instance
apprehended (perceived, grasped) as a concrete percept. Any other level of
analysis can only ever be a secondary inference from this primary
apprehension. And my point is that if, instead of this, you jump ahead to
the point at which the "physical computation" is already independently
assumed (aka primitive) there can be no further a priori need for any
hypothesis of subjectivity or for that matter any concrete perceptual
reality that might accompany it. A self-sustaining
bottom-up-all-the-way-down physical mechanism can have no principled
rationale for such baroque supplementary hypotheses. Computation, by
contrast, unavoidably implies precisely the contrary. Hence that is one of
its chief recommendations for evaluation as a TOE.

Of course you are right that, in terms of the computational ontology
assumed at the outset, this hypothesised subset must be evaluated
independently of the conscious thought to which it is supposed to give
rise. And it is an open problem whether such a subset is indeed most
plausibly encapsulated within the kind of consistent quantum-logical
physical mechanism that we take to underlie our shared perceptual reality.
This question of course lies at the heart of the whole enterprise. Its
plausibility must be evaluated, amongst other considerations, with respect
to computational relative measure in the face of the entire trace of the
UD, the complexities of which I confess I am incompetent to assess.

David

Brent

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Re: Question for Bruno about Lucas/Penrose

On 7 Apr 2017 11:22 p.m., "Bruno Marchal"  wrote:


On 07 Apr 2017, at 14:21, David Nyman wrote:

On 7 April 2017 at 11:24, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 07 Apr 2017, at 00:11, David Nyman wrote:
>
>
>
> On 6 Apr 2017 6:44 p.m., "Bruno Marchal"  wrote:
>
>
> On 06 Apr 2017, at 12:02, David Nyman wrote:
>
>
>
> On 6 Apr 2017 8:45 a.m., "Bruno Marchal"  wrote:
>
>
> On 05 Apr 2017, at 22:51, David Nyman wrote:
>
>
>
> On 5 Apr 2017 7:46 p.m., "Brent Meeker"  wrote:
>
>
>
> On 4/5/2017 1:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 04 Apr 2017, at 16:47, David Nyman wrote:
>
> I've been thinking about the Lucas/Penrose view of the purported
> limitations of computation as the basis for human thought. I know that
> Bruno has given a technical refutation of this position, but I'm
> insufficiently competent in the relevant areas for this to be intuitively
> convincing for me. So I've been musing on a more personally intuitive
> explication, perhaps along the following lines.
>
> The mis-step on the part of L/P, ISTM, is that they fail to distinguish
> between categorically distinct 3p and 1p logics which, properly understood,
> should in fact be seen as the stock-in-trade of computationalism. The
> limitation they point to is inherent in incompleteness - i.e. the fact that
> there are more (implied) truths than proofs within the scope of any
> consistent (1p) formal system of sufficient power. L/P point out that
> despite this we humans can 'see' the missing truths, despite the lack of a
> formal proof, and hence it must follow that we have access to some
> non-algorithmic method inaccessible to computation. What I think they're
> missing here - because they're considering the *extrinsic or external* (3p)
> logic to be exclusively definitive of what they mean by computation - is
> the significance in this regard of the *intrinsic or internal* (1p) logic.
> This is what Bruno summarises as Bp and p, or true, justified belief, in
> terms of which perceptual objects are indeed directly 'seen' or
> apprehended. Hence a computational subject will have access not only to
> formal proof (3p) but also to direct perceptual apprehension (1p). It is
> this latter which then constitutes the 'seeing' of the truth that
> (literally) transcends the capabilities of the 3p system considered in
> isolation.
>
>
> I don't think so.  It is not direct perceptual "seeing the truth"; it is
> an inference in language and depends on language.  The fallacy of L/P is
> they assume you can know what machine you are and therefore you can "see"
> the truth of your Godel sentence, but in fact you don't know what
> algorithmic machine you are.
>
>
> That's an interesting point also, but I'm not sure you've quite taken my
> meaning. I'm specifically making use of Tarski's criterion of truth as
> correspondence with the facts. When considering matters in the
> first-person, the "facts" in question are in the first instance perceptual
> and hence as such directly apprehended. Hence we have access to a second
> means of judging truth, in this specific sense, over and above the
> restrictions of any purely algorithmic procedure. In other words, we are
> able directly to apprehend or "see" a correspondence *in concrete
> perceptual terms* of an assertion with facts to which it purports to refer.
> And indeed that's exactly how we are able to make the relevant distinction:
> i.e. between working through a formal procedure, which we are equally able
> to do, and at the same time grasping a directly perceptible correspondence
> that eludes the restrictions of that procedure. The linguistic part comes
> later in justifying our judgement (to another or for that matter to
> ourselves) post hoc.
>
>
> Yes, that is what I said, but you put it in a much more better way than
> me! Consciousness is in the truth, or in its "direct perception through
> sense". Note that happens in dreams too, where the cortex will build the
> []p, and the stem is bringing the "p", which sometimes can be random
> letting the [] in need of some imagination (dream weirdness).
>
>
> Actually it might really have been more accurate to have said that, rather
> than it being a second means, our *primary* means of judging truth is by
> direct apprehension of perceptual correspondence. Algorithmic proof is
> surely secondary to this.
>
>
> It is secondary, like the brain is secondary to consciousness.
>
>
> Yes, I think I grasp that subtlety, because of the relation between the
> two logics encapsulated in Bp and p. However, I was referring here in
> particular to formal analysis as actually performed within an individual
> first-person perspective, being inevitability secondary to primary
> apprehension within that perspective.
>
>
>
> Yes. I ask myself if you are not tempted by founding everything from the
> 1p view.
>

Well, I was certainly much more open to this temptation when we first

Re: Question for Bruno about Lucas/Penrose

2017-04-07 Thread Brent Meeker




On 4/7/2017 3:22 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
As I remarked before, it is as if consciousness were concealed from 
the outside by a two-part public/private encryption scheme. Whereas 
the public part is in principle entirely extrinsically inspectable the 
decryption can be completed only in terms of the private perspective 
of *the system in question*. This then inevitably entails that 
decrypted messages of this kind must be inter-subjectively 
incommunicable despite the ultimate irony that they amount to the 
entirety of inter-subjectively "shareable" concrete reality. It is of 
course in this sense also that the brain is secondary to 
consciousness: i.e. that self-referential perceptual apprehension is 
the filter through which a concrete reality, with all its brains and 
bodies, is enabled in the first place to emerge (and I do mean emerge 
in a strong sense). That primary "grasp on reality" is what enables 
any subsequent abstract analysis in terms of a reductive "bottom up" 
physical mechanism playing the role of a locally-dominating 
computational mechanism (or IOW what you have termed the reversal of 
physics and machine psychology).


But what, in the computations of the UD, is "perceptual apprehension"?  
Bruno says that the physical world in not computed, the way some people 
speculate that "we are a simulation", but only thoughts are computed and 
the physical world is inferred.  I agree that the physical world is 
inferred from those perceptions that have point-of-view-invariance as my 
friend Vic Stenger called it.  But I don't see how a POVI subset of UD 
computations can just be picked out by some anthropic principle.  ISTM 
they must have some computed unity independent of conscious thoughts 
(which must be a subset of zero measure).


Brent

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Re: Question for Bruno about Lucas/Penrose

2017-04-07 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 07 Apr 2017, at 14:21, David Nyman wrote:


On 7 April 2017 at 11:24, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

On 07 Apr 2017, at 00:11, David Nyman wrote:




On 6 Apr 2017 6:44 p.m., "Bruno Marchal"  wrote:

On 06 Apr 2017, at 12:02, David Nyman wrote:




On 6 Apr 2017 8:45 a.m., "Bruno Marchal"  wrote:

On 05 Apr 2017, at 22:51, David Nyman wrote:




On 5 Apr 2017 7:46 p.m., "Brent Meeker"   
wrote:



On 4/5/2017 1:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 04 Apr 2017, at 16:47, David Nyman wrote:

I've been thinking about the Lucas/Penrose view of the  
purported limitations of computation as the basis for human  
thought. I know that Bruno has given a technical refutation of  
this position, but I'm insufficiently competent in the relevant  
areas for this to be intuitively convincing for me.  
So  I've been musing on a more personally intuitive  
explication, perhaps along the following lines.


The mis-step on the part of L/P, ISTM, is that they fail to  
distinguish between categorically distinct 3p and 1p logics  
which, properly understood, should in fact be seen as the stock- 
in-trade of computationalism. The limitation they point to is  
inherent in incompleteness - i.e. the fact that there are more  
(implied) truths than proofs within the scope of any consistent  
(1p) formal system of sufficient power. L/P point out that  
despite this we humans can 'see' the missing truths, despite  
the lack of a formal proof, and hence it must follow that we  
have access to some non-algorithmic method inaccessible to  
computation. What I think they're missing here - because  
they're considering the *extrinsic or external* (3p) logic to  
be exclusively definitive of what they mean by computation - is  
the significance in this regard of the *intrinsic or internal*  
(1p) logic. This is what Bruno  summarises as Bp  
and p, or true, justified belief, in terms of which perceptual  
objects are indeed directly 'seen' or apprehended. Hence a  
computational subject will have access not only to formal proof  
(3p) but also to direct perceptual apprehension (1p). It is  
this latter which then constitutes the 'seeing' of the truth  
that (literally) transcends the capabilities of the 3p system  
considered in isolation.


I don't think so.  It is not direct perceptual "seeing the  
truth"; it is an inference in language and depends on language.   
The fallacyof L/P is they assume you can know what machine  
you are and therefore you can "see" the truth of your Godel  
sentence, but in fact you don't know what algorithmic machine you  
are.


That's an interesting point also, but I'm not sure you've quite  
taken my meaning. I'm specifically making use of Tarski's  
criterion of truth as correspondence with the facts. When  
considering matters in the first-person, the "facts" in  
question are in the first instance perceptual and hence as such  
directly apprehended. Hence we have access to a second means of  
judging truth, in this specific sense, over and above the  
restrictions of any purely algorithmic procedure. In other words,  
we are able directly to apprehend or "see" a correspondence *in  
concrete perceptual terms* of an assertion with facts to which it  
purports to refer. And indeed that's exactly how we are able to  
make the relevant distinction: i.e. between working through a  
formal procedure, which we are equally able to do, and at the  
same time grasping a directly perceptible correspondence that  
eludes the restrictions of that procedure. The linguistic part  
comes later in justifying our judgement (to another or for that  
matter to ourselves) post hoc.


Yes, that is what I said, but you put it in a much more better way  
than me! Consciousness is in the truth, or in its "direct  
perception through sense". Note that happens in dreams too, where  
the cortex will build the []p, and the stem is bringing the "p",  
which sometimes can be random letting the [] in need of some  
imagination (dream weirdness).


Actually it might really have been more accurate to have said  
that, rather than it being a second means, our *primary* means of  
judging truth is by direct apprehension of perceptual  
correspondence. Algorithmic proof is surely secondary to this.


It is secondary, like the brain is secondary to consciousness.

Yes, I think I grasp that subtlety, because of the relation between  
the two logics encapsulated in Bp and p. However, I was referring  
here in particular to formal analysis as actually performed within  
an individual first-person perspective, being inevitability  
secondary to primary apprehension within that perspective.



Yes. I ask myself if you are not tempted by founding everything from  
the 1p view.


Well, I was certainly much more open to this temptation when we  
first began our discussions (was it really 10 years ago?!). But  
you have persuaded me - or more

Re: Question for Bruno about Lucas/Penrose

On 7 April 2017 at 11:24, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 07 Apr 2017, at 00:11, David Nyman wrote:
>
>
>
> On 6 Apr 2017 6:44 p.m., "Bruno Marchal"  wrote:
>
>
> On 06 Apr 2017, at 12:02, David Nyman wrote:
>
>
>
> On 6 Apr 2017 8:45 a.m., "Bruno Marchal"  wrote:
>
>
> On 05 Apr 2017, at 22:51, David Nyman wrote:
>
>
>
> On 5 Apr 2017 7:46 p.m., "Brent Meeker"  wrote:
>
>
>
> On 4/5/2017 1:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 04 Apr 2017, at 16:47, David Nyman wrote:
>
> I've been thinking about the Lucas/Penrose view of the purported
> limitations of computation as the basis for human thought. I know that
> Bruno has given a technical refutation of this position, but I'm
> insufficiently competent in the relevant areas for this to be intuitively
> convincing for me. So I've been musing on a more personally intuitive
> explication, perhaps along the following lines.
>
> The mis-step on the part of L/P, ISTM, is that they fail to distinguish
> between categorically distinct 3p and 1p logics which, properly understood,
> should in fact be seen as the stock-in-trade of computationalism. The
> limitation they point to is inherent in incompleteness - i.e. the fact that
> there are more (implied) truths than proofs within the scope of any
> consistent (1p) formal system of sufficient power. L/P point out that
> despite this we humans can 'see' the missing truths, despite the lack of a
> formal proof, and hence it must follow that we have access to some
> non-algorithmic method inaccessible to computation. What I think they're
> missing here - because they're considering the *extrinsic or external* (3p)
> logic to be exclusively definitive of what they mean by computation - is
> the significance in this regard of the *intrinsic or internal* (1p) logic.
> This is what Bruno summarises as Bp and p, or true, justified belief, in
> terms of which perceptual objects are indeed directly 'seen' or
> apprehended. Hence a computational subject will have access not only to
> formal proof (3p) but also to direct perceptual apprehension (1p). It is
> this latter which then constitutes the 'seeing' of the truth that
> (literally) transcends the capabilities of the 3p system considered in
> isolation.
>
>
> I don't think so.  It is not direct perceptual "seeing the truth"; it is
> an inference in language and depends on language.  The fallacy of L/P is
> they assume you can know what machine you are and therefore you can "see"
> the truth of your Godel sentence, but in fact you don't know what
> algorithmic machine you are.
>
>
> That's an interesting point also, but I'm not sure you've quite taken my
> meaning. I'm specifically making use of Tarski's criterion of truth as
> correspondence with the facts. When considering matters in the
> first-person, the "facts" in question are in the first instance perceptual
> and hence as such directly apprehended. Hence we have access to a second
> means of judging truth, in this specific sense, over and above the
> restrictions of any purely algorithmic procedure. In other words, we are
> able directly to apprehend or "see" a correspondence *in concrete
> perceptual terms* of an assertion with facts to which it purports to refer.
> And indeed that's exactly how we are able to make the relevant distinction:
> i.e. between working through a formal procedure, which we are equally able
> to do, and at the same time grasping a directly perceptible correspondence
> that eludes the restrictions of that procedure. The linguistic part comes
> later in justifying our judgement (to another or for that matter to
> ourselves) post hoc.
>
>
> Yes, that is what I said, but you put it in a much more better way than
> me! Consciousness is in the truth, or in its "direct perception through
> sense". Note that happens in dreams too, where the cortex will build the
> []p, and the stem is bringing the "p", which sometimes can be random
> letting the [] in need of some imagination (dream weirdness).
>
>
> Actually it might really have been more accurate to have said that, rather
> than it being a second means, our *primary* means of judging truth is by
> direct apprehension of perceptual correspondence. Algorithmic proof is
> surely secondary to this.
>
>
> It is secondary, like the brain is secondary to consciousness.
>
>
> Yes, I think I grasp that subtlety, because of the relation between the
> two logics encapsulated in Bp and p. However, I was referring here in
> particular to formal analysis as actually performed within an individual
> first-person perspective, being inevitability secondary to primary
> apprehension within that perspective.
>
>
>
> Yes. I ask myself if you are not tempted by founding everything from the
> 1p view.
>

Well, I was certainly much more open to this temptation when we first
began our discussions (was it really 10 years ago?!). But you have
persuaded me - or more accurately helped me to

Re: Question for Bruno about Lucas/Penrose

2017-04-07 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 07 Apr 2017, at 00:11, David Nyman wrote:




On 6 Apr 2017 6:44 p.m., "Bruno Marchal"  wrote:

On 06 Apr 2017, at 12:02, David Nyman wrote:




On 6 Apr 2017 8:45 a.m., "Bruno Marchal"  wrote:

On 05 Apr 2017, at 22:51, David Nyman wrote:




On 5 Apr 2017 7:46 p.m., "Brent Meeker"   
wrote:



On 4/5/2017 1:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 04 Apr 2017, at 16:47, David Nyman wrote:

I've been thinking about the Lucas/Penrose view of the purported  
limitations of computation as the basis for human thought. I  
know that Bruno has given a technical refutation of this  
position, but I'm insufficiently competent in the relevant areas  
for this to be intuitively convincing for me. So I've been  
musing on a more personally intuitive explication, perhaps along  
the following lines.


The mis-step on the part of L/P, ISTM, is that they fail to  
distinguish between categorically distinct 3p and 1p logics  
which, properly understood, should in fact be seen as the stock- 
in-trade of computationalism. The limitation they point to is  
inherent in incompleteness - i.e. the fact that there are more  
(implied) truths than proofs within the scope of any consistent  
(1p) formal system of sufficient power. L/P point out that  
despite this we humans can 'see' the missing truths, despite the  
lack of a formal proof, and hence it must follow that we have  
access to some non-algorithmic method inaccessible to  
computation. What I think they're missing here - because they're  
considering the *extrinsic or external* (3p) logic to be  
exclusively definitive of what they mean by computation - is the  
significance in this regard of the *intrinsic or internal* (1p)  
logic. This is what Bruno summarises as Bp and p, or true,  
justified belief, in terms of which perceptual objects are  
indeed directly 'seen' or apprehended. Hence a computational  
subject will have access not only to formal proof (3p) but also  
to direct perceptual apprehension (1p). It is this latter which  
then constitutes the 'seeing' of the truth that (literally)  
transcends the capabilities of the 3p system considered in  
isolation.


I don't think so.  It is not direct perceptual "seeing the truth";  
it is an inference in language and depends on language.  The  
fallacy of L/P is they assume you can know what machine you are  
and therefore you can "see" the truth of your Godel sentence, but  
in fact you don't know what algorithmic machine you are.


That's an interesting point also, but I'm not sure you've quite  
taken my meaning. I'm specifically making use of Tarski's  
criterion of truth as correspondence with the facts. When  
considering matters in the first-person, the "facts" in question  
are in the first instance perceptual and hence as such directly  
apprehended. Hence we have access to a second means of judging  
truth, in this specific sense, over and above the restrictions of  
any purely algorithmic procedure. In other words, we are able  
directly to apprehend or "see" a correspondence *in concrete  
perceptual terms* of an assertion with facts to which it purports  
to refer. And indeed that's exactly how we are able to make the  
relevant distinction: i.e. between working through a formal  
procedure, which we are equally able to do, and at the same time  
grasping a directly perceptible correspondence that eludes the  
restrictions of that procedure. The linguistic part comes later in  
justifying our judgement (to another or for that matter to  
ourselves) post hoc.


Yes, that is what I said, but you put it in a much more better way  
than me! Consciousness is in the truth, or in its "direct  
perception through sense". Note that happens in dreams too, where  
the cortex will build the []p, and the stem is bringing the "p",  
which sometimes can be random letting the [] in need of some  
imagination (dream weirdness).


Actually it might really have been more accurate to have said that,  
rather than it being a second means, our *primary* means of judging  
truth is by direct apprehension of perceptual correspondence.  
Algorithmic proof is surely secondary to this.


It is secondary, like the brain is secondary to consciousness.

Yes, I think I grasp that subtlety, because of the relation between  
the two logics encapsulated in Bp and p. However, I was referring  
here in particular to formal analysis as actually performed within  
an individual first-person perspective, being inevitability  
secondary to primary apprehension within that perspective.



Yes. I ask myself if you are not tempted by founding everything from  
the 1p view. Note that this can be done, but is technically much more  
difficult. You would need to formalize "provability" in something like  
Heyting Arithmetic (PA without excluded middle). Albert Visser has  
studied this, but it is more difficult (no truth table in intuitionist  
logic, so the propositional basic logic

Re: Question for Bruno about Lucas/Penrose

2017-04-07 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 06 Apr 2017, at 22:57, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 4/6/2017 12:35 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 05 Apr 2017, at 20:46, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 4/5/2017 1:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 04 Apr 2017, at 16:47, David Nyman wrote:

I've been thinking about the Lucas/Penrose view of the purported  
limitations of computation as the basis for human thought. I  
know that Bruno has given a technical refutation of this  
position, but I'm insufficiently competent in the relevant areas  
for this to be intuitively convincing for me. So I've been  
musing on a more personally intuitive explication, perhaps along  
the following lines.


The mis-step on the part of L/P, ISTM, is that they fail to  
distinguish between categorically distinct 3p and 1p logics  
which, properly understood, should in fact be seen as the stock- 
in-trade of computationalism. The limitation they point to is  
inherent in incompleteness - i.e. the fact that there are more  
(implied) truths than proofs within the scope of any consistent  
(1p) formal system of sufficient power. L/P point out that  
despite this we humans can 'see' the missing truths, despite the  
lack of a formal proof, and hence it must follow that we have  
access to some non-algorithmic method inaccessible to  
computation. What I think they're missing here - because they're  
considering the *extrinsic or external* (3p) logic to be  
exclusively definitive of what they mean by computation - is the  
significance in this regard of the *intrinsic or internal* (1p)  
logic. This is what Bruno summarises as Bp and p, or true,  
justified belief, in terms of which perceptual objects are  
indeed directly 'seen' or apprehended. Hence a computational  
subject will have access not only to formal proof (3p) but also  
to direct perceptual apprehension (1p). It is this latter which  
then constitutes the 'seeing' of the truth that (literally)  
transcends the capabilities of the 3p system considered in  
isolation.


I don't think so.  It is not direct perceptual "seeing the truth";  
it is an inference in language and depends on language.


?

It is not an inference, but the recognition of a fact, like when a  
smoke detector detect smoke.


But the fact that is "recognized" is that the Goedel sentence is (in  
Goedel's language which he has encoded in arithmetic) says it cannot  
be proven - and then one infers that the axiomatic system cannot be  
completed.  I don't see how any of this can even be considered  
without language and inferences.


I am not sure why you say this. I was talking about the p in "[]p &  
p". You can't apply Gödel on this because the truth of p cannot be  
defined in arithmetic. That is how the first-person escapes  
incompleteness and can believe consistently to be consistent (or even  
complete). S4Grz does prove <>t. The problem is that its reference to  
truth makes it mute on basically any question. Indeed, it cannot use  
language or inference. Axiomatically, it is a knower, and knower are  
not machine from their own point of view. Only G* knows that []p = []p  
& p, the machine can't know that.


Let us write [m]p for the machine proves p, and [1]p by I know p. f is  
for "0=1", say. The error by Lucas and Penrose is that we know that  
the machine is consistent (even correct) so we can say


   [m]f -> f

But the machine cannot, so I am superior to that machine. But if we  
are machine, we can't say [m]f -> f with m being my body-machine. Oh,  
said Penrose, but we, human, knows [1]f -> f, and we would  know that  
[1] = [m] if we believe in mechanism. But that is wrong, we don't know  
that [1] = [m]. We can only bet on it, and the machine can do that bet  
too. In fact the machine can define its own knowledge for each  
particular proposition by [1]p = [m]p & p, like us, and realise that  
this can only belong to its own G* minus G, by *assuming* its own  
correctness at the metalevel. Then she is computationalist, but remain  
consistent only if she does not assume this at the ground level. She  
has to admit that to enter the telportation box, his hope to survive  
cannot be justified, making its own belief in computationalist into an  
act of faith. Its modesty requires it mentionning it is theology.








There is an implicit assumption of being awake, or not dreaming,  
but still no inference, nor does it use language,


Who does proofs without language?


The experiencer, or intuitionists mathematicians. Not to confuse with  
the metamathematics of intuitionism. When you put your hand in the  
fire, you don't say: I don't understand could you elaborate on the  
proof? You just put your hand quickly of the fire, without needing to  
verify a proof.







at least not necessarily. The smoke detector detects smoke through  
it senses, and so believe in some representational sense that there  
is smoke (the [](smoke)), and ... there is smoke (the p of []p & p).


Which is an instance of physical perception - not logical

Re: Question for Bruno about Lucas/Penrose

2017-04-06 Thread David Nyman

On 6 Apr 2017 6:44 p.m., "Bruno Marchal"  wrote:


On 06 Apr 2017, at 12:02, David Nyman wrote:



On 6 Apr 2017 8:45 a.m., "Bruno Marchal"  wrote:


On 05 Apr 2017, at 22:51, David Nyman wrote:



On 5 Apr 2017 7:46 p.m., "Brent Meeker"  wrote:



On 4/5/2017 1:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 04 Apr 2017, at 16:47, David Nyman wrote:

I've been thinking about the Lucas/Penrose view of the purported
limitations of computation as the basis for human thought. I know that
Bruno has given a technical refutation of this position, but I'm
insufficiently competent in the relevant areas for this to be intuitively
convincing for me. So I've been musing on a more personally intuitive
explication, perhaps along the following lines.

The mis-step on the part of L/P, ISTM, is that they fail to distinguish
between categorically distinct 3p and 1p logics which, properly understood,
should in fact be seen as the stock-in-trade of computationalism. The
limitation they point to is inherent in incompleteness - i.e. the fact that
there are more (implied) truths than proofs within the scope of any
consistent (1p) formal system of sufficient power. L/P point out that
despite this we humans can 'see' the missing truths, despite the lack of a
formal proof, and hence it must follow that we have access to some
non-algorithmic method inaccessible to computation. What I think they're
missing here - because they're considering the *extrinsic or external* (3p)
logic to be exclusively definitive of what they mean by computation - is
the significance in this regard of the *intrinsic or internal* (1p) logic.
This is what Bruno summarises as Bp and p, or true, justified belief, in
terms of which perceptual objects are indeed directly 'seen' or
apprehended. Hence a computational subject will have access not only to
formal proof (3p) but also to direct perceptual apprehension (1p). It is
this latter which then constitutes the 'seeing' of the truth that
(literally) transcends the capabilities of the 3p system considered in
isolation.


I don't think so.  It is not direct perceptual "seeing the truth"; it is an
inference in language and depends on language.  The fallacy of L/P is they
assume you can know what machine you are and therefore you can "see" the
truth of your Godel sentence, but in fact you don't know what algorithmic
machine you are.


That's an interesting point also, but I'm not sure you've quite taken my
meaning. I'm specifically making use of Tarski's criterion of truth as
correspondence with the facts. When considering matters in the
first-person, the "facts" in question are in the first instance perceptual
and hence as such directly apprehended. Hence we have access to a second
means of judging truth, in this specific sense, over and above the
restrictions of any purely algorithmic procedure. In other words, we are
able directly to apprehend or "see" a correspondence *in concrete
perceptual terms* of an assertion with facts to which it purports to refer.
And indeed that's exactly how we are able to make the relevant distinction:
i.e. between working through a formal procedure, which we are equally able
to do, and at the same time grasping a directly perceptible correspondence
that eludes the restrictions of that procedure. The linguistic part comes
later in justifying our judgement (to another or for that matter to
ourselves) post hoc.


Yes, that is what I said, but you put it in a much more better way than me!
Consciousness is in the truth, or in its "direct perception through sense".
Note that happens in dreams too, where the cortex will build the []p, and
the stem is bringing the "p", which sometimes can be random letting the []
in need of some imagination (dream weirdness).


Actually it might really have been more accurate to have said that, rather
than it being a second means, our *primary* means of judging truth is by
direct apprehension of perceptual correspondence. Algorithmic proof is
surely secondary to this.


It is secondary, like the brain is secondary to consciousness.


Yes, I think I grasp that subtlety, because of the relation between the two
logics encapsulated in Bp and p. However, I was referring here in
particular to formal analysis as actually performed within an individual
first-person perspective, being inevitability secondary to primary
apprehension within that perspective.

This is a bit like the egg and the chicken. p does precede logically []p
(the representational or algorithmic). Yet the senses are useful only if we
can re-enact the experience. You can see "p" as the fact (like the true
fact that it rains, blurred with some representation of that fact), and []p
as the building of a theory with the axiom "it rains", which needs to be
represented in some way that the entity can re-enact the experience that it
rains when needed, like when looking for an umbrella in a room without
windows (so that you need to remember that it rains all

Re: Question for Bruno about Lucas/Penrose

2017-04-06 Thread Brent Meeker




On 4/6/2017 12:35 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 05 Apr 2017, at 20:46, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 4/5/2017 1:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 04 Apr 2017, at 16:47, David Nyman wrote:

I've been thinking about the Lucas/Penrose view of the purported 
limitations of computation as the basis for human thought. I know 
that Bruno has given a technical refutation of this position, but 
I'm insufficiently competent in the relevant areas for this to be 
intuitively convincing for me. So I've been musing on a more 
personally intuitive explication, perhaps along the following lines.


The mis-step on the part of L/P, ISTM, is that they fail to 
distinguish between categorically distinct 3p and 1p logics which, 
properly understood, should in fact be seen as the stock-in-trade 
of computationalism. The limitation they point to is inherent in 
incompleteness - i.e. the fact that there are more (implied) truths 
than proofs within the scope of any consistent (1p) formal system 
of sufficient power. L/P point out that despite this we humans can 
'see' the missing truths, despite the lack of a formal proof, and 
hence it must follow that we have access to some non-algorithmic 
method inaccessible to computation. What I think they're missing 
here - because they're considering the *extrinsic or external* (3p) 
logic to be exclusively definitive of what they mean by computation 
- is the significance in this regard of the *intrinsic or internal* 
(1p) logic. This is what Bruno summarises as Bp and p, or true, 
justified belief, in terms of which perceptual objects are indeed 
directly 'seen' or apprehended. Hence a computational subject will 
have access not only to formal proof (3p) but also to direct 
perceptual apprehension (1p). It is this latter which then 
constitutes the 'seeing' of the truth that (literally) transcends 
the capabilities of the 3p system considered in isolation.


I don't think so.  It is not direct perceptual "seeing the truth"; it 
is an inference in language and depends on language.


?

It is not an inference, but the recognition of a fact, like when a 
smoke detector detect smoke.


But the fact that is "recognized" is that the Goedel sentence is (in 
Goedel's language which he has encoded in arithmetic) says it cannot be 
proven - and then one infers that the axiomatic system cannot be 
completed.  I don't see how any of this can even be considered without 
language and inferences.


There is an implicit assumption of being awake, or not dreaming, but 
still no inference, nor does it use language,


Who does proofs without language?

at least not necessarily. The smoke detector detects smoke through it 
senses, and so believe in some representational sense that there is 
smoke (the [](smoke)), and ... there is smoke (the p of []p & p).


Which is an instance of physical perception - not logical proof.

Brent

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Re: Question for Bruno about Lucas/Penrose



On 06 Apr 2017, at 12:02, David Nyman wrote:




On 6 Apr 2017 8:45 a.m., "Bruno Marchal"  wrote:

On 05 Apr 2017, at 22:51, David Nyman wrote:




On 5 Apr 2017 7:46 p.m., "Brent Meeker"  wrote:


On 4/5/2017 1:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 04 Apr 2017, at 16:47, David Nyman wrote:

I've been thinking about the Lucas/Penrose view of the purported  
limitations of computation as the basis for human thought. I know  
that Bruno has given a technical refutation of this position, but  
I'm insufficiently competent in the relevant areas for this to be  
intuitively convincing for me. So I've been musing on a more  
personally intuitive explication, perhaps along the following  
lines.


The mis-step on the part of L/P, ISTM, is that they fail to  
distinguish between categorically distinct 3p and 1p logics  
which, properly understood, should in fact be seen as the stock- 
in-trade of computationalism. The limitation they point to is  
inherent in incompleteness - i.e. the fact that there are more  
(implied) truths than proofs within the scope of any consistent  
(1p) formal system of sufficient power. L/P point out that  
despite this we humans can 'see' the missing truths, despite the  
lack of a formal proof, and hence it must follow that we have  
access to some non-algorithmic method inaccessible to  
computation. What I think they're missing here - because they're  
considering the *extrinsic or external* (3p) logic to be  
exclusively definitive of what they mean by computation - is the  
significance in this regard of the *intrinsic or internal* (1p)  
logic. This is what Bruno summarises as Bp and p, or true,  
justified belief, in terms of which perceptual objects are indeed  
directly 'seen' or apprehended. Hence a computational subject  
will have access not only to formal proof (3p) but also to direct  
perceptual apprehension (1p). It is this latter which then  
constitutes the 'seeing' of the truth that (literally) transcends  
the capabilities of the 3p system considered in isolation.


I don't think so.  It is not direct perceptual "seeing the truth";  
it is an inference in language and depends on language.  The  
fallacy of L/P is they assume you can know what machine you are and  
therefore you can "see" the truth of your Godel sentence, but in  
fact you don't know what algorithmic machine you are.


That's an interesting point also, but I'm not sure you've quite  
taken my meaning. I'm specifically making use of Tarski's criterion  
of truth as correspondence with the facts. When considering  
matters in the first-person, the "facts" in question are in the  
first instance perceptual and hence as such directly apprehended.  
Hence we have access to a second means of judging truth, in this  
specific sense, over and above the restrictions of any purely  
algorithmic procedure. In other words, we are able directly to  
apprehend or "see" a correspondence *in concrete perceptual terms*  
of an assertion with facts to which it purports to refer. And  
indeed that's exactly how we are able to make the relevant  
distinction: i.e. between working through a formal procedure, which  
we are equally able to do, and at the same time grasping a directly  
perceptible correspondence that eludes the restrictions of that  
procedure. The linguistic part comes later in justifying our  
judgement (to another or for that matter to ourselves) post hoc.


Yes, that is what I said, but you put it in a much more better way  
than me! Consciousness is in the truth, or in its "direct perception  
through sense". Note that happens in dreams too, where the cortex  
will build the []p, and the stem is bringing the "p", which  
sometimes can be random letting the [] in need of some imagination  
(dream weirdness).


Actually it might really have been more accurate to have said that,  
rather than it being a second means, our *primary* means of judging  
truth is by direct apprehension of perceptual correspondence.  
Algorithmic proof is surely secondary to this.


It is secondary, like the brain is secondary to consciousness. This is  
a bit like the egg and the chicken. p does precede logically []p (the  
representational or algorithmic). Yet the senses are useful only if we  
can re-enact the experience. You can see "p" as the fact (like the  
true fact that it rains, blurred with some representation of that  
fact), and []p as the building of a theory with the axiom "it rains",  
which needs to be represented in some way that the entity can re-enact  
the experience that it rains when needed, like when looking for an  
umbrella in a room without windows (so that you need to remember that  
it rains all along).


p comes first, and like Everett you can identify it with the first  
perceptual judgment (to be sure that will need more basic "theory"  
already in the brain, so we might add nuances on the perceptual p,  
(but here the theories are trivial, like

Re: Question for Bruno about Lucas/Penrose

2017-04-06 Thread David Nyman

On 6 Apr 2017 8:45 a.m., "Bruno Marchal"  wrote:


On 05 Apr 2017, at 22:51, David Nyman wrote:



On 5 Apr 2017 7:46 p.m., "Brent Meeker"  wrote:



On 4/5/2017 1:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 04 Apr 2017, at 16:47, David Nyman wrote:

I've been thinking about the Lucas/Penrose view of the purported
limitations of computation as the basis for human thought. I know that
Bruno has given a technical refutation of this position, but I'm
insufficiently competent in the relevant areas for this to be intuitively
convincing for me. So I've been musing on a more personally intuitive
explication, perhaps along the following lines.

The mis-step on the part of L/P, ISTM, is that they fail to distinguish
between categorically distinct 3p and 1p logics which, properly understood,
should in fact be seen as the stock-in-trade of computationalism. The
limitation they point to is inherent in incompleteness - i.e. the fact that
there are more (implied) truths than proofs within the scope of any
consistent (1p) formal system of sufficient power. L/P point out that
despite this we humans can 'see' the missing truths, despite the lack of a
formal proof, and hence it must follow that we have access to some
non-algorithmic method inaccessible to computation. What I think they're
missing here - because they're considering the *extrinsic or external* (3p)
logic to be exclusively definitive of what they mean by computation - is
the significance in this regard of the *intrinsic or internal* (1p) logic.
This is what Bruno summarises as Bp and p, or true, justified belief, in
terms of which perceptual objects are indeed directly 'seen' or
apprehended. Hence a computational subject will have access not only to
formal proof (3p) but also to direct perceptual apprehension (1p). It is
this latter which then constitutes the 'seeing' of the truth that
(literally) transcends the capabilities of the 3p system considered in
isolation.


I don't think so.  It is not direct perceptual "seeing the truth"; it is an
inference in language and depends on language.  The fallacy of L/P is they
assume you can know what machine you are and therefore you can "see" the
truth of your Godel sentence, but in fact you don't know what algorithmic
machine you are.


That's an interesting point also, but I'm not sure you've quite taken my
meaning. I'm specifically making use of Tarski's criterion of truth as
correspondence with the facts. When considering matters in the
first-person, the "facts" in question are in the first instance perceptual
and hence as such directly apprehended. Hence we have access to a second
means of judging truth, in this specific sense, over and above the
restrictions of any purely algorithmic procedure. In other words, we are
able directly to apprehend or "see" a correspondence *in concrete
perceptual terms* of an assertion with facts to which it purports to refer.
And indeed that's exactly how we are able to make the relevant distinction:
i.e. between working through a formal procedure, which we are equally able
to do, and at the same time grasping a directly perceptible correspondence
that eludes the restrictions of that procedure. The linguistic part comes
later in justifying our judgement (to another or for that matter to
ourselves) post hoc.


Yes, that is what I said, but you put it in a much more better way than me!
Consciousness is in the truth, or in its "direct perception through sense".
Note that happens in dreams too, where the cortex will build the []p, and
the stem is bringing the "p", which sometimes can be random letting the []
in need of some imagination (dream weirdness).


Actually it might really have been more accurate to have said that, rather
than it being a second means, our *primary* means of judging truth is by
direct apprehension of perceptual correspondence. Algorithmic proof is
surely secondary to this. It can only be subsequent to apprehension of
primary facts (which exhaust in effect our grasp on concrete
inter-subjective reality) that we are able to deploy algorithmic methods.
These latter are applicable not to the concrete perceptual world directly
but rather to its formally abstracted "view from nowhere" idealisation.
Hence it is in the last analysis hardly surprising that this secondary
abstraction fails to bridge the gap to all the truths primarily accessible
in terms of direct perceptual correspondence.

David


A remark on entheogen:

I think that with cannabis, you blur the "p" in "[]p & p", and
with salvia you blur the "[]p" in "[]p & p". (with the surprise that you
still remain as a sort of conscious person).

Oops I have to go. Before I fall in the machine's blasphem ... More on this
later most probably.

Bruno




David



Brent



Exact. And going a little further, that is what the Gödel-Löbian machine
already says (or say out of time and space).




If the foregoing makes sense, it may also give a useful clue in the debate
over intuitionism

Re: Question for Bruno about Lucas/Penrose



On 05 Apr 2017, at 22:51, David Nyman wrote:




On 5 Apr 2017 7:46 p.m., "Brent Meeker"  wrote:


On 4/5/2017 1:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 04 Apr 2017, at 16:47, David Nyman wrote:

I've been thinking about the Lucas/Penrose view of the purported  
limitations of computation as the basis for human thought. I know  
that Bruno has given a technical refutation of this position, but  
I'm insufficiently competent in the relevant areas for this to be  
intuitively convincing for me. So I've been musing on a more  
personally intuitive explication, perhaps along the following lines.


The mis-step on the part of L/P, ISTM, is that they fail to  
distinguish between categorically distinct 3p and 1p logics which,  
properly understood, should in fact be seen as the stock-in-trade  
of computationalism. The limitation they point to is inherent in  
incompleteness - i.e. the fact that there are more (implied)  
truths than proofs within the scope of any consistent (1p) formal  
system of sufficient power. L/P point out that despite this we  
humans can 'see' the missing truths, despite the lack of a formal  
proof, and hence it must follow that we have access to some non- 
algorithmic method inaccessible to computation. What I think  
they're missing here - because they're considering the *extrinsic  
or external* (3p) logic to be exclusively definitive of what they  
mean by computation - is the significance in this regard of the  
*intrinsic or internal* (1p) logic. This is what Bruno summarises  
as Bp and p, or true, justified belief, in terms of which  
perceptual objects are indeed directly 'seen' or apprehended.  
Hence a computational subject will have access not only to formal  
proof (3p) but also to direct perceptual apprehension (1p). It is  
this latter which then constitutes the 'seeing' of the truth that  
(literally) transcends the capabilities of the 3p system  
considered in isolation.


I don't think so.  It is not direct perceptual "seeing the truth";  
it is an inference in language and depends on language.  The fallacy  
of L/P is they assume you can know what machine you are and  
therefore you can "see" the truth of your Godel sentence, but in  
fact you don't know what algorithmic machine you are.


That's an interesting point also, but I'm not sure you've quite  
taken my meaning. I'm specifically making use of Tarski's criterion  
of truth as correspondence with the facts. When considering  
matters in the first-person, the "facts" in question are in the  
first instance perceptual and hence as such directly apprehended.  
Hence we have access to a second means of judging truth, in this  
specific sense, over and above the restrictions of any purely  
algorithmic procedure. In other words, we are able directly to  
apprehend or "see" a correspondence *in concrete perceptual terms*  
of an assertion with facts to which it purports to refer. And indeed  
that's exactly how we are able to make the relevant distinction:  
i.e. between working through a formal procedure, which we are  
equally able to do, and at the same time grasping a directly  
perceptible correspondence that eludes the restrictions of that  
procedure. The linguistic part comes later in justifying our  
judgement (to another or for that matter to ourselves) post hoc.


Yes, that is what I said, but you put it in a much more better way  
than me! Consciousness is in the truth, or in its "direct perception  
through sense". Note that happens in dreams too, where the cortex will  
build the []p, and the stem is bringing the "p", which sometimes can  
be random letting the [] in need of some imagination (dream weirdness).


A remark on entheogen:

I think that with cannabis, you blur the "p" in "[]p & p", and
with salvia you blur the "[]p" in "[]p & p". (with the surprise that  
you still remain as a sort of conscious person).


Oops I have to go. Before I fall in the machine's blasphem ... More on  
this later most probably.


Bruno





David


Brent




Exact. And going a little further, that is what the Gödel-Löbian  
machine already says (or say out of time and space).






If the foregoing makes sense, it may also give a useful clue in  
the debate over intuitionism versus Platonism in mathematics.  
Indeed, perceptual mathematics (as we might term it) - i.e. the  
mathematics we derive from the study of the relations obtaining  
between objects in our perceptual reality - may well be  
"considered to be purely the result of the constructive mental  
activity of humans" (Wikipedia). However, under computationalism,  
this very 'perceptual mathematics' can itself be shown to be the  
consequence of a deeper, underlying Platonist mathematics (if we  
may so term the bare assumption of the sufficiency of arithmetic  
for computation and its implications).


Is this intelligible?


I have no critics. Your point is done by the machine through a  
theorem of Grzegorczyk on one par: the fact

Re: Question for Bruno about Lucas/Penrose



On 05 Apr 2017, at 20:46, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 4/5/2017 1:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 04 Apr 2017, at 16:47, David Nyman wrote:

I've been thinking about the Lucas/Penrose view of the purported  
limitations of computation as the basis for human thought. I know  
that Bruno has given a technical refutation of this position, but  
I'm insufficiently competent in the relevant areas for this to be  
intuitively convincing for me. So I've been musing on a more  
personally intuitive explication, perhaps along the following lines.


The mis-step on the part of L/P, ISTM, is that they fail to  
distinguish between categorically distinct 3p and 1p logics which,  
properly understood, should in fact be seen as the stock-in-trade  
of computationalism. The limitation they point to is inherent in  
incompleteness - i.e. the fact that there are more (implied)  
truths than proofs within the scope of any consistent (1p) formal  
system of sufficient power. L/P point out that despite this we  
humans can 'see' the missing truths, despite the lack of a formal  
proof, and hence it must follow that we have access to some non- 
algorithmic method inaccessible to computation. What I think  
they're missing here - because they're considering the *extrinsic  
or external* (3p) logic to be exclusively definitive of what they  
mean by computation - is the significance in this regard of the  
*intrinsic or internal* (1p) logic. This is what Bruno summarises  
as Bp and p, or true, justified belief, in terms of which  
perceptual objects are indeed directly 'seen' or apprehended.  
Hence a computational subject will have access not only to formal  
proof (3p) but also to direct perceptual apprehension (1p). It is  
this latter  which then constitutes the 'seeing' of  
the truth that (literally) transcends the capabilities of the 3p  
system considered in isolation.


I don't think so.  It is not direct perceptual "seeing the truth";  
it is an inference in language and depends on language.


?

It is not an inference, but the recognition of a fact, like when a  
smoke detector detect smoke. There is an implicit assumption of being  
awake, or not dreaming, but still no inference, nor does it use  
language, at least not necessarily. The smoke detector detects smoke  
through it senses, and so believe in some representational sense that  
there is smoke (the [](smoke)), and ... there is smoke (the p of []p &  
p).



The fallacy of L/P is they assume you can know what machine you are  
and therefore you can "see" the truth of your Godel sentence,


They assumed they know that they are correct. Not that they are  
machine, which is indeed what they want prove to be impossible.


Bruno



but in fact you don't know what algorithmic machine you are.

Brent



Exact. And going a little further, that is what the Gödel-Löbian  
machine already says (or say out of time and space).






If the foregoing makes sense, it may also give a useful clue in  
the debate over intuitionism versus Platonism in mathematics.  
Indeed, perceptual mathematics (as we might term it) - i.e. the  
mathematics we derive from the study of the relations obtaining  
between objects in our perceptual reality - may well be  
"considered to be purely the result of the constructive mental  
activity of humans" (Wikipedia). However, under computationalism,  
this very 'perceptual mathematics' can itself be shown to be the  
consequence of a deeper, underlying Platonist mathematics (if we  
may so term the bare assumption of the sufficiency of arithmetic  
for computation and its implications).


Is this intelligible?


I have no critics. Your point is done by the machine through a  
theorem of Grzegorczyk on one par: the fact that S4Grz, like S4,  
formalises Intutionistic logic, and of Boolos and Goldblatt on  
another par: the fact that the formula Grz *has to* be added to S4  
to get the arithmetical completeness of the "[]p & p". Note that  
this makes the intuitionist into a temporal logic, and attach  
duration to consciousness, like with Bergson and Brouwer himself.


Eventually it is amazing and counter-intuitive, because it ascribes  
consciousness to all universal numbers, probably the same before  
they get the differentiation along the infinitely many computations  
supporting them. Needless to say that such consciousness is in a  
highly dissociated state at the start, a bit like after consuming  
some salvia perhaps (!).


Your analysis can be extended on the intelligible and sensible  
(neo)Platonist theory of matter, but with p restricted to the  
sigma_1 sentences (which describe in arithmetic the universal  
dovetailing), with or without the adding of "<>t", which typically  
transform the notion of "belief []p" or "knowledge []p & p" into  
notion of "probabilities".


In summary

p (truth, god, the one)
[]p (rational belief)
[]p & p (knowledge, intuitionist subject)
[]p & <>t  (probability, quantum logic)
[]p & <>t &

Re: Question for Bruno about Lucas/Penrose



On 05 Apr 2017, at 12:54, David Nyman wrote:




On 5 Apr 2017 9:54 a.m., "Bruno Marchal"  wrote:

On 04 Apr 2017, at 16:47, David Nyman wrote:

I've been thinking about the Lucas/Penrose view of the purported  
limitations of computation as the basis for human thought. I know  
that Bruno has given a technical refutation of this position, but  
I'm insufficiently competent in the relevant areas for this to be  
intuitively convincing for me. So I've been musing on a more  
personally intuitive explication, perhaps along the following lines.


The mis-step on the part of L/P, ISTM, is that they fail to  
distinguish between categorically distinct 3p and 1p logics which,  
properly understood, should in fact be seen as the stock-in-trade  
of computationalism. The limitation they point to is inherent in  
incompleteness - i.e. the fact that there are more (implied) truths  
than proofs within the scope of any consistent (1p) formal system  
of sufficient power. L/P point out that despite this we humans can  
'see' the missing truths, despite the lack of a formal proof, and  
hence it must follow that we have access to some non-algorithmic  
method inaccessible to computation. What I think they're missing  
here - because they're considering the *extrinsic or external* (3p)  
logic to be exclusively definitive of what they mean by computation  
- is the significance in this regard of the *intrinsic or internal*  
(1p) logic. This is what Bruno summarises as Bp and p, or true,  
justified belief, in terms of which perceptual objects are indeed  
directly 'seen' or apprehended. Hence a computational subject will  
have access not only to formal proof (3p) but also to direct  
perceptual apprehension (1p). It is this latter which then  
constitutes the 'seeing' of the truth that (literally) transcends  
the capabilities of the 3p system considered in isolation.


 Exact. And going a little further, that is what  the  
Gödel-Löbian machine already says (or  say out of time and  
space).


I'm pleased we agree. By the way, on re-reading my text above I  
notice that I had written "any consistent (1p) formal system of  
sufficient power", when I had actually meant to write (3p). In other  
words, I meant a formal system defined extrinsically in the  
ordinarily accepted sense. However I think that, despite my typo,  
you understood my meaning.


I confirm. My brain focused on "formal" which is at the antipode of  
the 1p.


Bruno






If the foregoing makes sense, it may also give a useful clue in the  
debate over intuitionism versus Platonism in mathematics. Indeed,  
perceptual mathematics (as we might term it) - i.e. the mathematics  
we derive from the study of the relations obtaining between objects  
in our perceptual reality - may well be "considered to be purely  
the result of the constructive mental activity of  
humans" (Wikipedia). However, under computationalism, this very  
'perceptual mathematics' can itself be shown to be the consequence  
of a deeper, underlying Platonist mathematics (if we may so term  
the bare assumption of the sufficiency of arithmetic for  
computation and its implications).


Is this intelligible?


I have no critics. Your point is done by the machine through a  
theorem of Grzegorczyk on one par: the fact that S4Grz, like S4,  
formalises Intutionistic logic, and of Boolos and Goldblatt on  
another par: the fact that the formula Grz *has to* be added to S4  
to get the arithmetical completeness of the "[]p & p". Note that  
this makes the intuitionist into a temporal logic, and attach  
duration to consciousness, like with Bergson and Brouwer himself.


Eventually it is amazing and counter-intuitive, because it ascribes  
consciousness to all universal numbers, probably the same before  
they get the differentiation along the infinitely many computations  
supporting them. Needless to say that such consciousness is in a  
highly dissociated state at the start, a bit like after consuming  
some salvia perhaps (!).


Your analysis can be extended on the intelligible and sensible  
(neo)Platonist theory of matter, but with p restricted to the  
sigma_1 sentences (which describe in arithmetic the universal  
dovetailing), with or without the adding of "<>t", which typically  
transform the notion of "belief []p" or "knowledge []p & p" into  
notion of "probabilities".


In summary

p (truth, god, the one)
[]p (rational belief)
[]p & p (knowledge, intuitionist subject)
[]p & <>t  (probability, quantum logic)
[]p & <>t & p (intuitionist probability, quale logic).

The quanta themselves appear to be qualia. In fact a quanta is a  
sharable qualia by two universal number when supported by a same  
universal number. That can be used to show that the "many worlds" of  
the physicists (Everett theory) confirms Computationalism and  
protect it from solipsism. The physical is indeed first person  
PLURAL, and its sharableness comes from

Re: Question for Bruno about Lucas/Penrose

2017-04-05 Thread David Nyman

On 5 Apr 2017 7:46 p.m., "Brent Meeker"  wrote:



On 4/5/2017 1:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 04 Apr 2017, at 16:47, David Nyman wrote:

I've been thinking about the Lucas/Penrose view of the purported
limitations of computation as the basis for human thought. I know that
Bruno has given a technical refutation of this position, but I'm
insufficiently competent in the relevant areas for this to be intuitively
convincing for me. So I've been musing on a more personally intuitive
explication, perhaps along the following lines.

The mis-step on the part of L/P, ISTM, is that they fail to distinguish
between categorically distinct 3p and 1p logics which, properly understood,
should in fact be seen as the stock-in-trade of computationalism. The
limitation they point to is inherent in incompleteness - i.e. the fact that
there are more (implied) truths than proofs within the scope of any
consistent (1p) formal system of sufficient power. L/P point out that
despite this we humans can 'see' the missing truths, despite the lack of a
formal proof, and hence it must follow that we have access to some
non-algorithmic method inaccessible to computation. What I think they're
missing here - because they're considering the *extrinsic or external* (3p)
logic to be exclusively definitive of what they mean by computation - is
the significance in this regard of the *intrinsic or internal* (1p) logic.
This is what Bruno summarises as Bp and p, or true, justified belief, in
terms of which perceptual objects are indeed directly 'seen' or
apprehended. Hence a computational subject will have access not only to
formal proof (3p) but also to direct perceptual apprehension (1p). It is
this latter which then constitutes the 'seeing' of the truth that
(literally) transcends the capabilities of the 3p system considered in
isolation.


I don't think so.  It is not direct perceptual "seeing the truth"; it is an
inference in language and depends on language.  The fallacy of L/P is they
assume you can know what machine you are and therefore you can "see" the
truth of your Godel sentence, but in fact you don't know what algorithmic
machine you are.


That's an interesting point also, but I'm not sure you've quite taken my
meaning. I'm specifically making use of Tarski's criterion of truth as
correspondence with the facts. When considering matters in the
first-person, the "facts" in question are in the first instance perceptual
and hence as such directly apprehended. Hence we have access to a second
means of judging truth, in this specific sense, over and above the
restrictions of any purely algorithmic procedure. In other words, we are
able directly to apprehend or "see" a correspondence *in concrete
perceptual terms* of an assertion with facts to which it purports to refer.
And indeed that's exactly how we are able to make the relevant distinction:
i.e. between working through a formal procedure, which we are equally able
to do, and at the same time grasping a directly perceptible correspondence
that eludes the restrictions of that procedure. The linguistic part comes
later in justifying our judgement (to another or for that matter to
ourselves) post hoc.

David



Brent



Exact. And going a little further, that is what the Gödel-Löbian machine
already says (or say out of time and space).




If the foregoing makes sense, it may also give a useful clue in the debate
over intuitionism versus Platonism in mathematics. Indeed, perceptual
mathematics (as we might term it) - i.e. the mathematics we derive from the
study of the relations obtaining between objects in our perceptual reality
- may well be "considered to be purely the result of the constructive
mental activity of humans" (Wikipedia). However, under computationalism,
this very 'perceptual mathematics' can itself be shown to be the
consequence of a deeper, underlying Platonist mathematics (if we may so
term the bare assumption of the sufficiency of arithmetic for computation
and its implications).

Is this intelligible?


I have no critics. Your point is done by the machine through a theorem of
Grzegorczyk on one par: the fact that S4Grz, like S4, formalises
Intutionistic logic, and of Boolos and Goldblatt on another par: the fact
that the formula Grz *has to* be added to S4 to get the arithmetical
completeness of the "[]p & p". Note that this makes the intuitionist into a
temporal logic, and attach duration to consciousness, like with Bergson and
Brouwer himself.

Eventually it is amazing and counter-intuitive, because it ascribes
consciousness to all universal numbers, probably the same before they get
the differentiation along the infinitely many computations supporting them.
Needless to say that such consciousness is in a highly dissociated state at
the start, a bit like after consuming some salvia perhaps (!).

Your analysis can be extended on the intelligible and sensible
(neo)Platonist theory of matter, but with p restricted to the sigma_1
sentences

Re: Question for Bruno about Lucas/Penrose

2017-04-05 Thread Brent Meeker




On 4/5/2017 1:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 04 Apr 2017, at 16:47, David Nyman wrote:

I've been thinking about the Lucas/Penrose view of the purported 
limitations of computation as the basis for human thought. I know 
that Bruno has given a technical refutation of this position, but I'm 
insufficiently competent in the relevant areas for this to be 
intuitively convincing for me. So I've been musing on a more 
personally intuitive explication, perhaps along the following lines.


The mis-step on the part of L/P, ISTM, is that they fail to 
distinguish between categorically distinct 3p and 1p logics which, 
properly understood, should in fact be seen as the stock-in-trade of 
computationalism. The limitation they point to is inherent in 
incompleteness - i.e. the fact that there are more (implied) truths 
than proofs within the scope of any consistent (1p) formal system of 
sufficient power. L/P point out that despite this we humans can 'see' 
the missing truths, despite the lack of a formal proof, and hence it 
must follow that we have access to some non-algorithmic method 
inaccessible to computation. What I think they're missing here - 
because they're considering the *extrinsic or external* (3p) logic to 
be exclusively definitive of what they mean by computation - is the 
significance in this regard of the *intrinsic or internal* (1p) 
logic. This is what Bruno summarises as Bp and p, or true, justified 
belief, in terms of which perceptual objects are indeed directly 
'seen' or apprehended. Hence a computational subject will have access 
not only to formal proof (3p) but also to direct perceptual 
apprehension (1p). It is this latter which then constitutes the 
'seeing' of the truth that (literally) transcends the capabilities of 
the 3p system considered in isolation.


I don't think so.  It is not direct perceptual "seeing the truth"; it is 
an inference in language and depends on language.  The fallacy of L/P is 
they assume you can know what machine you are and therefore you can 
"see" the truth of your Godel sentence, but in fact you don't know what 
algorithmic machine you are.


Brent



Exact. And going a little further, that is what the Gödel-Löbian 
machine already says (or say out of time and space).






If the foregoing makes sense, it may also give a useful clue in the 
debate over intuitionism versus Platonism in mathematics. Indeed, 
perceptual mathematics (as we might term it) - i.e. the mathematics 
we derive from the study of the relations obtaining between objects 
in our perceptual reality - may well be "considered to be purely the 
result of the constructive mental activity of humans" (Wikipedia). 
However, under computationalism, this very 'perceptual mathematics' 
can itself be shown to be the consequence of a deeper, underlying 
Platonist mathematics (if we may so term the bare assumption of the 
sufficiency of arithmetic for computation and its implications).


Is this intelligible?


I have no critics. Your point is done by the machine through a theorem 
of Grzegorczyk on one par: the fact that S4Grz, like S4, formalises 
Intutionistic logic, and of Boolos and Goldblatt on another par: the 
fact that the formula Grz *has to* be added to S4 to get the 
arithmetical completeness of the "[]p & p". Note that this makes the 
intuitionist into a temporal logic, and attach duration to 
consciousness, like with Bergson and Brouwer himself.


Eventually it is amazing and counter-intuitive, because it ascribes 
consciousness to all universal numbers, probably the same before they 
get the differentiation along the infinitely many computations 
supporting them. Needless to say that such consciousness is in a 
highly dissociated state at the start, a bit like after consuming some 
salvia perhaps (!).


Your analysis can be extended on the intelligible and sensible 
(neo)Platonist theory of matter, but with p restricted to the sigma_1 
sentences (which describe in arithmetic the universal dovetailing), 
with or without the adding of "<>t", which typically transform the 
notion of "belief []p" or "knowledge []p & p" into notion of 
"probabilities".


In summary

p (truth, god, the one)
[]p (rational belief)
[]p & p (knowledge, intuitionist subject)
[]p & <>t  (probability, quantum logic)
[]p & <>t & p (intuitionist probability, quale logic).

The quanta themselves appear to be qualia. In fact a quanta is a 
sharable qualia by two universal number when supported by a same 
universal number. That can be used to show that the "many worlds" of 
the physicists (Everett theory) confirms Computationalism and protect 
it from solipsism. The physical is indeed first person PLURAL, and its 
sharableness comes from the linearity of the tensor product. At each 
instant we all enter the same replication machinery. The Z logics 
justifies the linearity and reversibility, but not clearly enough to 
extract the unitarity and use Gleason to make the measure unique. But 
this is for the next

Re: Question for Bruno about Lucas/Penrose

2017-04-05 Thread David Nyman

On 5 Apr 2017 9:54 a.m., "Bruno Marchal"  wrote:


On 04 Apr 2017, at 16:47, David Nyman wrote:

I've been thinking about the Lucas/Penrose view of the purported
limitations of computation as the basis for human thought. I know that
Bruno has given a technical refutation of this position, but I'm
insufficiently competent in the relevant areas for this to be intuitively
convincing for me. So I've been musing on a more personally intuitive
explication, perhaps along the following lines.

The mis-step on the part of L/P, ISTM, is that they fail to distinguish
between categorically distinct 3p and 1p logics which, properly understood,
should in fact be seen as the stock-in-trade of computationalism. The
limitation they point to is inherent in incompleteness - i.e. the fact that
there are more (implied) truths than proofs within the scope of any
consistent (1p) formal system of sufficient power. L/P point out that
despite this we humans can 'see' the missing truths, despite the lack of a
formal proof, and hence it must follow that we have access to some
non-algorithmic method inaccessible to computation. What I think they're
missing here - because they're considering the *extrinsic or external* (3p)
logic to be exclusively definitive of what they mean by computation - is
the significance in this regard of the *intrinsic or internal* (1p) logic.
This is what Bruno summarises as Bp and p, or true, justified belief, in
terms of which perceptual objects are indeed directly 'seen' or
apprehended. Hence a computational subject will have access not only to
formal proof (3p) but also to direct perceptual apprehension (1p). It is
this latter which then constitutes the 'seeing' of the truth that
(literally) transcends the capabilities of the 3p system considered in
isolation.


 Exact. And going a little further, that is what  the
Gödel-Löbian machine already says (or  say out of time and space).


I'm pleased we agree. By the way, on re-reading my text above I notice
that I had written "any consistent (1p) formal system of sufficient power",
when I had actually meant to write (3p). In other words, I meant a formal
system defined extrinsically in the ordinarily accepted sense. However I
think that, despite my typo, you understood my meaning.


If the foregoing makes sense, it may also give a useful clue in the debate
over intuitionism versus Platonism in mathematics. Indeed, perceptual
mathematics (as we might term it) - i.e. the mathematics we derive from the
study of the relations obtaining between objects in our perceptual reality
- may well be "considered to be purely the result of the constructive
mental activity of humans" (Wikipedia). However, under computationalism,
this very 'perceptual mathematics' can itself be shown to be the
consequence of a deeper, underlying Platonist mathematics (if we may so
term the bare assumption of the sufficiency of arithmetic for computation
and its implications).

Is this intelligible?


I have no critics. Your point is done by the machine through a theorem of
Grzegorczyk on one par: the fact that S4Grz, like S4, formalises
Intutionistic logic, and of Boolos and Goldblatt on another par: the fact
that the formula Grz *has to* be added to S4 to get the arithmetical
completeness of the "[]p & p". Note that this makes the intuitionist into a
temporal logic, and attach duration to consciousness, like with Bergson and
Brouwer himself.

Eventually it is amazing and counter-intuitive, because it ascribes
consciousness to all universal numbers, probably the same before they get
the differentiation along the infinitely many computations supporting them.
Needless to say that such consciousness is in a highly dissociated state at
the start, a bit like after consuming some salvia perhaps (!).

Your analysis can be extended on the intelligible and sensible
(neo)Platonist theory of matter, but with p restricted to the sigma_1
sentences (which describe in arithmetic the universal dovetailing), with or
without the adding of "<>t", which typically transform the notion of
"belief []p" or "knowledge []p & p" into notion of "probabilities".

In summary

p (truth, god, the one)
[]p (rational belief)
[]p & p (knowledge, intuitionist subject)
[]p & <>t  (probability, quantum logic)
[]p & <>t & p (intuitionist probability, quale logic).

The quanta themselves appear to be qualia. In fact a quanta is a sharable
qualia by two universal number when supported by a same universal number.
That can be used to show that the "many worlds" of the physicists (Everett
theory) confirms Computationalism and protect it from solipsism. The
physical is indeed first person PLURAL, and its sharableness comes from the
linearity of the tensor product. At each instant we all enter the same
replication machinery. The Z logics justifies the linearity and
reversibility, but not clearly enough to extract the unitarity and use
Gleason to make the measure unique. But this is for the next

Re: Question for Bruno about Lucas/Penrose

2017-04-05 Thread Bruno Marchal


I add a commentary.

Penrose and Hammerof did agree at the start, but then Hammerof's plea  
for a quantum brain made him back into computationalism, as a quantum  
computer is still a universal number.


Penrose did not, as he was aware of this, and seem to want "non- 
computationalism", so he needs to assume the physical reduction of the  
wave to get it. In fact Penrose is the only scientist I know who seems  
genuinely non-computationalist. But his use of Gödel is technically  
wrong in his first book, and, despite corrected in the second volume,  
he dismisses that correction.


From Godel's incompleteness you can't deduce that we are not machine,  
but you can still deduce that "if we are machine, we cannot know for  
sure which machine we are". And that can be related to David Nyman's  
previous analysis, and to the first person indeterminacy: we cannot  
know which machine we are, and a fortiori, which (infinities)  
computations support us among a continuum of computations + oracles.  
It is the way to get the mathematics of the measure problem.



Bruno



On 05 Apr 2017, at 06:28, Jason Resch wrote:

In my view, Penrose's theory that computation could not explain  
human thought was based on the flawed idea that there exist problems  
that humans could solve which no computer could. I prepared the  
following to offer my explanation for why this is an unsupported  
supposition:


-
In general, modern theories of consciousness react to the  
consequences of the Church-Turing thesis in one of three ways, which  
has yielded the following three philosophical camps:



Non-computable physicists

Weak AI proponents

Computationalists

Believe human thought involves physical processes that are non- 
computable, and therefore conclude that it’s impossible to replicate  
the behavior of a human brain using a computer.


Believe the behavior of the human brain can be replicated by  
computer, but assume such a reproduction, no matter how good, would  
not possess a mind or consciousness.


Believe the behavior of the human brain can be replicated by a  
computer, and assume that when the reproduction is sufficiently  
faithful, it possesses a mind and conscious.



Descartes reason for rejecting mechanism was that he believed no  
machine could be engineered with enough complexity to account for  
human language and thought. Yet today, it is nearly universally  
accepted (among biologists, physicists, cognitive scientists and  
philosophers) that such machines are possible, for unless human  
beings violate the laws of physics, we ourselves are examples of  
such machines: machines that can think.


Yet, not everyone agrees that the behaviors exhibited by we “human  
machines” can be replicated by the kind of machines Turing  
described. It may be that some element of human reasoning relies on  
a physical process that is not computable. For example, something  
that is infinite in complexity or fundamentally nondeterministic.


The English mathematician and physicist Roger Penrose falls into  
this camp. He has argued that human thought cannot be emulated by  
any algorithm or computer. This argument, known as the Lucas-Penrose  
argument, is based on the observation that there are certain  
problems which no computer is able to solve. A famous example of  
which is the halting problem, first described by Turing in his 1936  
paper.


The halting problem is: given an arbitrary computer program,  
determine whether that program will, if started, ever complete  
(halt). In the same paper, Turing proved that regardless of the  
approach (algorithm) employed by the computer, there would always  
exist some programs for which it was impossible to answer the  
halting question.


The British philosopher John Lucas and Roger Penrose both considered  
this limitation of computers to be clear evidence of the superiority  
of man over (Turing) machines. It further inspired Penrose to  
propose, in his 1989 book The Emperor’s New Mind, that non- 
algorithmic (not Turing emulable) processes must be involved in the  
brain. This would have to be in order to explain why humans could  
solve these problems while computers could not.



Yet, all currently known laws of physics (with the notable exception  
of wave-function collapse) are deterministic, and can be modeled by  
Turing machines. This led Penrose to propose that the currently  
known laws of physics are inadequate to explain the workings of  
human thought, and that some undiscovered physics holds the key to  
understanding the workings of the mind.


Penrose, together with the anesthesiologist and consciousness  
researcher Stuart Hameroff, speculated that the brain may harness  
quantum mechanical effects, such as wave-function collapse, or  
somehow makes use of (the presently not well understood) quantum  
gravity to achieve its unique reasoning abilities.


However, Lucas’s and Penrose’s argument contains an overlooked  
assumption: that

Re: Question for Bruno about Lucas/Penrose

2017-04-05 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 05 Apr 2017, at 06:28, Jason Resch wrote:

In my view, Penrose's theory that computation could not explain  
human thought was based on the flawed idea that there exist problems  
that humans could solve which no computer could. I prepared the  
following to offer my explanation for why this is an unsupported  
supposition:


-
In general, modern theories of consciousness react to the  
consequences of the Church-Turing thesis in one of three ways, which  
has yielded the following three philosophical camps:



Non-computable physicists

Weak AI proponents

Computationalists

Believe human thought involves physical processes that are non- 
computable, and therefore conclude that it’s impossible to replicate  
the behavior of a human brain using a computer.


Believe the behavior of the human brain can be replicated by  
computer, but assume such a reproduction, no matter how good, would  
not possess a mind or consciousness.


Believe the behavior of the human brain can be replicated by a  
computer, and assume that when the reproduction is sufficiently  
faithful, it possesses a mind and conscious.



Descartes reason for rejecting mechanism



I agree with you post (above and below). I just add that my work  
(helped by Löb and Solovay's result and others of course) show that  
the machine already make the Penrose-Lucas "mistake" when they use the  
first person view, until they bet on "non-solipism", going from "I  
know that my soul is not a machine" to "if I am a machine, then only  
God can know that my soul is supported by (infinitely many) machines  
(and then I know I am confronted with a hierarchy of non-computable  
phenomena, which computer scientist have already discovered: the  
degrees of unsolvability.


Then I would not say that Descartes rejected Mechanism (indeed the  
mainstream would say he (re)discovered it), but he imposed on it a  
human dualism, ... but I think it was just to avoid being burned by  
the french clergy. Eventually he flew out of France.


Bruno



was that he believed no machine could be engineered with enough  
complexity to account for human language and thought. Yet today, it  
is nearly universally accepted (among biologists, physicists,  
cognitive scientists and philosophers) that such machines are  
possible, for unless human beings violate the laws of physics, we  
ourselves are examples of such machines: machines that can think.


Yet, not everyone agrees that the behaviors exhibited by we “human  
machines” can be replicated by the kind of machines Turing  
described. It may be that some element of human reasoning relies on  
a physical process that is not computable. For example, something  
that is infinite in complexity or fundamentally nondeterministic.


The English mathematician and physicist Roger Penrose falls into  
this camp. He has argued that human thought cannot be emulated by  
any algorithm or computer. This argument, known as the Lucas-Penrose  
argument, is based on the observation that there are certain  
problems which no computer is able to solve. A famous example of  
which is the halting problem, first described by Turing in his 1936  
paper.


The halting problem is: given an arbitrary computer program,  
determine whether that program will, if started, ever complete  
(halt). In the same paper, Turing proved that regardless of the  
approach (algorithm) employed by the computer, there would always  
exist some programs for which it was impossible to answer the  
halting question.


The British philosopher John Lucas and Roger Penrose both considered  
this limitation of computers to be clear evidence of the superiority  
of man over (Turing) machines. It further inspired Penrose to  
propose, in his 1989 book The Emperor’s New Mind, that non- 
algorithmic (not Turing emulable) processes must be involved in the  
brain. This would have to be in order to explain why humans could  
solve these problems while computers could not.



Yet, all currently known laws of physics (with the notable exception  
of wave-function collapse) are deterministic, and can be modeled by  
Turing machines. This led Penrose to propose that the currently  
known laws of physics are inadequate to explain the workings of  
human thought, and that some undiscovered physics holds the key to  
understanding the workings of the mind.


Penrose, together with the anesthesiologist and consciousness  
researcher Stuart Hameroff, speculated that the brain may harness  
quantum mechanical effects, such as wave-function collapse, or  
somehow makes use of (the presently not well understood) quantum  
gravity to achieve its unique reasoning abilities.


However, Lucas’s and Penrose’s argument contains an overlooked  
assumption: that humans were capable of solving the halting problem.  
Certainly, a human programmer or team of programmers can examine a  
program and figure out whether or not it will ever complete. Even if  
it is a very complex program,

Re: Question for Bruno about Lucas/Penrose

2017-04-05 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 04 Apr 2017, at 16:47, David Nyman wrote:

I've been thinking about the Lucas/Penrose view of the purported  
limitations of computation as the basis for human thought. I know  
that Bruno has given a technical refutation of this position, but  
I'm insufficiently competent in the relevant areas for this to be  
intuitively convincing for me. So I've been musing on a more  
personally intuitive explication, perhaps along the following lines.


The mis-step on the part of L/P, ISTM, is that they fail to  
distinguish between categorically distinct 3p and 1p logics which,  
properly understood, should in fact be seen as the stock-in-trade of  
computationalism. The limitation they point to is inherent in  
incompleteness - i.e. the fact that there are more (implied) truths  
than proofs within the scope of any consistent (1p) formal system of  
sufficient power. L/P point out that despite this we humans can  
'see' the missing truths, despite the lack of a formal proof, and  
hence it must follow that we have access to some non-algorithmic  
method inaccessible to computation. What I think they're missing  
here - because they're considering the *extrinsic or external* (3p)  
logic to be exclusively definitive of what they mean by computation  
- is the significance in this regard of the *intrinsic or internal*  
(1p) logic. This is what Bruno summarises as Bp and p, or true,  
justified belief, in terms of which perceptual objects are indeed  
directly 'seen' or apprehended. Hence a computational subject will  
have access not only to formal proof (3p) but also to direct  
perceptual apprehension (1p). It is this latter which then  
constitutes the 'seeing' of the truth that (literally) transcends  
the capabilities of the 3p system considered in isolation.


Exact. And going a little further, that is what the Gödel-Löbian  
machine already says (or say out of time and space).






If the foregoing makes sense, it may also give a useful clue in the  
debate over intuitionism versus Platonism in mathematics. Indeed,  
perceptual mathematics (as we might term it) - i.e. the mathematics  
we derive from the study of the relations obtaining between objects  
in our perceptual reality - may well be "considered to be purely the  
result of the constructive mental activity of humans" (Wikipedia).  
However, under computationalism, this very 'perceptual mathematics'  
can itself be shown to be the consequence of a deeper, underlying  
Platonist mathematics (if we may so term the bare assumption of the  
sufficiency of arithmetic for computation and its implications).


Is this intelligible?


I have no critics. Your point is done by the machine through a theorem  
of Grzegorczyk on one par: the fact that S4Grz, like S4, formalises  
Intutionistic logic, and of Boolos and Goldblatt on another par: the  
fact that the formula Grz *has to* be added to S4 to get the  
arithmetical completeness of the "[]p & p". Note that this makes the  
intuitionist into a temporal logic, and attach duration to  
consciousness, like with Bergson and Brouwer himself.


Eventually it is amazing and counter-intuitive, because it ascribes  
consciousness to all universal numbers, probably the same before they  
get the differentiation along the infinitely many computations  
supporting them. Needless to say that such consciousness is in a  
highly dissociated state at the start, a bit like after consuming some  
salvia perhaps (!).


Your analysis can be extended on the intelligible and sensible  
(neo)Platonist theory of matter, but with p restricted to the sigma_1  
sentences (which describe in arithmetic the universal dovetailing),  
with or without the adding of "<>t", which typically transform the  
notion of "belief []p" or "knowledge []p & p" into notion of  
"probabilities".


In summary

p (truth, god, the one)
[]p (rational belief)
[]p & p (knowledge, intuitionist subject)
[]p & <>t  (probability, quantum logic)
[]p & <>t & p (intuitionist probability, quale logic).

The quanta themselves appear to be qualia. In fact a quanta is a  
sharable qualia by two universal number when supported by a same  
universal number. That can be used to show that the "many worlds" of  
the physicists (Everett theory) confirms Computationalism and protect  
it from solipsism. The physical is indeed first person PLURAL, and its  
sharableness comes from the linearity of the tensor product. At each  
instant we all enter the same replication machinery. The Z logics  
justifies the linearity and reversibility, but not clearly enough to  
extract the unitarity and use Gleason to make the measure unique. But  
this is for the next generation, hopefully (as many seem to prefer the  
obscurantist statu quo alas).


Bruno





David

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Re: Question for Bruno about Lucas/Penrose

2017-04-04 Thread Jason Resch

In my view, Penrose's theory that computation could not explain human
thought was based on the flawed idea that there exist problems that humans
could solve which no computer could. I prepared the following to offer my
explanation for why this is an unsupported supposition:

-

In general, modern theories of consciousness react to the consequences of
the Church-Turing thesis in one of three ways, which has yielded the
following three philosophical camps:

Non-computable physicists

Weak AI proponents

Computationalists

Believe human thought involves physical processes that are non-computable,
and therefore conclude that it’s impossible to replicate the behavior of a
human brain using a computer.

Believe the behavior of the human brain can be replicated by computer, but
assume such a reproduction, no matter how good, would not possess a mind or
consciousness.

Believe the behavior of the human brain can be replicated by a computer,
and assume that when the reproduction is sufficiently faithful, it
possesses a mind and conscious.

Descartes reason for rejecting mechanism was that he believed no machine
could be engineered with enough complexity to account for human language
and thought. Yet today, it is nearly universally accepted (among
biologists, physicists, cognitive scientists and philosophers) that such
machines are possible, for unless human beings violate the laws of physics,
we ourselves are examples of such machines: machines that can think.

Yet, not everyone agrees that the behaviors exhibited by we “human
machines” can be replicated by the kind of machines Turing described. It
may be that some element of human reasoning relies on a physical process
that is not computable. For example, something that is infinite in
complexity or fundamentally nondeterministic.

The English mathematician and physicist Roger Penrose falls into this camp.
He has argued that human thought cannot be emulated by any algorithm or
computer. This argument, known as the Lucas-Penrose argument, is based on
the observation that there are certain problems which no computer is able
to solve. A famous example of which is the halting problem, first described
by Turing in his 1936 paper.

The halting problem is: given an arbitrary computer program, determine
whether that program will, if started, ever complete (halt). In the same
paper, Turing proved that regardless of the approach (algorithm) employed
by the computer, there would always exist some programs for which it was
impossible to answer the halting question.

The British philosopher John Lucas and Roger Penrose both considered this
limitation of computers to be clear evidence of the superiority of man over
(Turing) machines. It further inspired Penrose to propose, in his 1989 book The
Emperor’s New Mind, that non-algorithmic (not Turing emulable) processes
must be involved in the brain. This would have to be in order to explain
why humans could solve these problems while computers could not.

Yet, all currently known laws of physics (with the notable exception of
wave-function collapse) are deterministic, and can be modeled by Turing
machines. This led Penrose to propose that the currently known laws of
physics are inadequate to explain the workings of human thought, and that
some undiscovered physics holds the key to understanding the workings of
the mind.

Penrose, together with the anesthesiologist and consciousness researcher
Stuart Hameroff, speculated that the brain may harness quantum mechanical
effects, such as wave-function collapse, or somehow makes use of (the
presently not well understood) quantum gravity to achieve its unique
reasoning abilities.

However, Lucas’s and Penrose’s argument contains an overlooked assumption:
that humans were capable of solving the halting problem. Certainly, a human
programmer or team of programmers can examine a program and figure out
whether or not it will ever complete. Even if it is a very complex program,
given enough time, or a skilled enough team, a determination can eventually
be made. Or so they believed.

As it turns out, it is quite easy to write a computer program such that
whether or not it ever completes depends on some, as of yet unknown, result
in mathematics. For example, in number theory the Goldbach conjecture
hypothesizes
that every even number greater than 2 can be represented as the sum of two
prime numbers. Despite countless efforts by mathematicians since 1742, and
even an offered prize of $1,000,000 to anyone who could prove or disprove
it, the truth or falsehood of the conjecture remains unknown.

A program based on the Goldbach conjecture might look something like this:

Step 1: Set X = 4
Step 2: Set R = 0
Step 3: For each Y from 1 to X, if both Y and (X – Y) are prime, set R = 1
Step 4: If R = 1, Set X = X + 2 and go to Step 2
Step 5: If R = 0, print X and halt

This simple program searches for a counterexample to the Goldbach
conjecture. If the Goldbach conjecture is false, this program

Question for Bruno about Lucas/Penrose

2017-04-04 Thread David Nyman

I've been thinking about the Lucas/Penrose view of the purported
limitations of computation as the basis for human thought. I know that
Bruno has given a technical refutation of this position, but I'm
insufficiently competent in the relevant areas for this to be intuitively
convincing for me. So I've been musing on a more personally intuitive
explication, perhaps along the following lines.

The mis-step on the part of L/P, ISTM, is that they fail to distinguish
between categorically distinct 3p and 1p logics which, properly understood,
should in fact be seen as the stock-in-trade of computationalism. The
limitation they point to is inherent in incompleteness - i.e. the fact that
there are more (implied) truths than proofs within the scope of any
consistent (1p) formal system of sufficient power. L/P point out that
despite this we humans can 'see' the missing truths, despite the lack of a
formal proof, and hence it must follow that we have access to some
non-algorithmic method inaccessible to computation. What I think they're
missing here - because they're considering the *extrinsic or external* (3p)
logic to be exclusively definitive of what they mean by computation - is
the significance in this regard of the *intrinsic or internal* (1p) logic.
This is what Bruno summarises as Bp and p, or true, justified belief, in
terms of which perceptual objects are indeed directly 'seen' or
apprehended. Hence a computational subject will have access not only to
formal proof (3p) but also to direct perceptual apprehension (1p). It is
this latter which then constitutes the 'seeing' of the truth that
(literally) transcends the capabilities of the 3p system considered in
isolation.

If the foregoing makes sense, it may also give a useful clue in the debate
over intuitionism versus Platonism in mathematics. Indeed, perceptual
mathematics (as we might term it) - i.e. the mathematics we derive from the
study of the relations obtaining between objects in our perceptual reality
- may well be "considered to be purely the result of the constructive
mental activity of humans" (Wikipedia). However, under computationalism,
this very 'perceptual mathematics' can itself be shown to be the
consequence of a deeper, underlying Platonist mathematics (if we may so
term the bare assumption of the sufficiency of arithmetic for computation
and its implications).

Is this intelligible?

David

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Re: A question for Bruno

2017-04-01 Thread Bruno Marchal

I realise I did not answer this post. As the step 7 is crucial, I will  
make some remark, and try to answer the question. Sorry for the delay  
Charles.


On 28 Aug 2016, at 00:38, Charles Goodwin wrote:

Hi everyone and everything, I was discussing comp and similar things  
with Liz the other day and we came across a sticking point in what I  
think (from memory) is step 7 of the UDA. Maybe you can help?


I'm assuming AR, "Yes, Doctor" and so on. At step 7 we reach the  
point where we assume that a physical Universal Dovetailer can be  
created


Actually, we don't need to assume that. It is a consequence of the  
fact that the physical universe is Turing-complete, like the existence  
of the physical implementation of the universal number (the general  
purpose computer) illustrates. So we can write the code of a Universal  
Dovetailer, and run it.


The infinite tape is not part of the universal Turing machine. It is  
his environment. A number u is universal with respect to an acceptable  
enumaration of partial computable function if phi_u() =  
phi_x(y). ( is coding of a couple of numbers into a number).





and that it runs forever,


Yes, that is the important assumption in step 7, and normally  
discharged in step 8.




and ask what is the probability that my observer moments are  
generated by it, rather than by my brain.


Well, this is simple to compute or evaluate intuitively in a mono- 
universe, there is no chance that your experience remains "out of the  
UD*".


With a multiverse, it is less easy, but there is also no chance, to  
remain in the level zero of the physical reality.






Now ISTM that the UD will have an infinite number of possible  
programmes to run, so even if it runs forever, how does it get on to  
the second step in any of them?


Now I remember why I did not answer, someone else did. And the answer  
was: that is why we have to dovetail, and run all programs little  
piece by little pieces.


All the best to you and Liz,

Bruno







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Re: A question for Bruno

2016-09-17 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 16 Sep 2016, at 17:40, Stephen Paul King wrote:




On Fri, Sep 16, 2016 at 11:16 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


On 16 Sep 2016, at 01:29, Stephen Paul King wrote:




On Thu, Sep 15, 2016 at 6:47 PM, Brent Meeker  
 wrote:



On 9/15/2016 11:03 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote:
I get that and buy it too, Brent. Platonia is the "flat" Complete  
version, I am looking for the infinite tower of incomplete yet  
consistent theories


I don't understand what you mean by that.  I assume "theories"  
refers to axiomatic systems.  If I take one such system, like  
arithmetic, I can keep adding the unprovable Godel sentences as  
axioms and so create an unbounded "tower" of systems.  Is that what  
you mean?


Yes, sorta.




and trying to make sense of computational languages that could use  
those theories. Remember that computers do not need to be Turing  
Complete if they only need to compute one algorithm efficiently  
and correctly.


That's the view of an algorithm as computing a function; so given  
an input there is a certain correct output.  But the UD doesn't  
have any input.


It has itself as an input. :-P


?

Possibly in a quite novel non standard sense, but I'm afarid this  
could lead to confusion, especially with beginners.


The UD is typically a program without input. You enter its code in  
the language of some universal machine, without giving it any input,  
and it runs forever, meaning it has no output.


Extensionally, it is equivalent with the empty function from the  
empty set to the empty set (the unique element of 0^0 in set  
theoretical term, with 0 identified with the empty set).


Intensionally, assuming computationalism it is all activities of all  
machines in all locally consistent context.


Some would like to add, all thoughts, but the thoughts remain stable  
and make possibly sense only on the infinities on which the First  
Person Indeterminacy operates.


In the 3-1 picture, we can attach a consciousness to a program/ 
machine/3-p-representation..., it is often polite, but in the 1-p  
picture, that is, from the first person perspective "you" are  
related to an infinity (2^aleph_0) of computational histories. The  
UD "runs" you on all real oracles, notably.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




Can the UD diagonalize with almost all possible versions of itself?  
I have forgotten some details...



The giant miracle here is that the class of all programs is immune to  
diagonalization, unlike any class of always stopping programs. So, to  
get all stopping programs, we must generate all programs, and to get  
all stopping executions, there is no choice other than dovetailing on  
all executions, the stopping and non stopping one.
The closure of the set of partial recursive function for  
diagonalization is the main conceptual argument in favor of Church  
thesis, and it is what make the universal machines/numbers, truly  
universal, so to speak.
So yes, the UD can be said to diagonalize itself, but it changes  
nothing: the UD remains invariant for the application of the diagonal.


Best regards Stephen,

Bruno







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Re: A question for Bruno

2016-09-16 Thread Stephen Paul King

I apologize but it seems that none of us has time to explain other people's
ideas to each other or to read their papers for ourselves.

On Fri, Sep 16, 2016 at 11:27 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 16 Sep 2016, at 03:27, Stephen Paul King wrote:
>
> The idea is to think of computations as discrete, they do one thing:
> process one algorithm and halt.
>
>
> or not halt. You limit yourself to halting computation.
>
> If each halting computation is simpler than arbitrary computations, it
> happens that the notion of halting computations is more complex than the
> notion of arbitrary computations.
>
> For example, there is no universal halting machine, and there is no UD
> computting all and only all halting computations.
>
> The only way to generate all halting computations necessitate the
> generations of all computations, the halting one and the non halting. There
> is no algorithmic means to separate the halting machine from the non
> halting one.
>
> yet, the halting computations, when you get them all, is what structure
> the "measure space", and that is exploited to get the measure one case by
> the intensional ("material") variant of the self-reference logic,
> restricted to the "halting computations", modeled by the true sigma_1
> sentences.
>
>
>
> Obviously I am not talking about Turing machines...
>
>
> ?
>
> We seem to miss a precise idea of what you are talking about, I'm afraid.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
> On Thu, Sep 15, 2016 at 9:03 PM, Brent Meeker 
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 9/15/2016 4:29 PM, Stephen Paul King wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Sep 15, 2016 at 6:47 PM, Brent Meeker 
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 9/15/2016 11:03 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote:
>>>
>>> I get that and buy it too, Brent. Platonia is the "flat" Complete
>>> version, I am looking for the infinite tower of incomplete yet consistent
>>> theories
>>>
>>>
>>> I don't understand what you mean by that.  I assume "theories" refers to
>>> axiomatic systems.  If I take one such system, like arithmetic, I can keep
>>> adding the unprovable Godel sentences as axioms and so create an unbounded
>>> "tower" of systems.  Is that what you mean?
>>>
>>
>> Yes, sorta.
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> and trying to make sense of computational languages that could use those
>>> theories. Remember that computers do not need to be Turing Complete if they
>>> only need to compute one algorithm efficiently and correctly.
>>>
>>>
>>> That's the view of an algorithm as computing a function; so given an
>>> input there is a certain correct output.  But the UD doesn't have any input.
>>>
>>
>> It has itself as an input. :-P
>>
>>
>> I suppose you can think of it as a null input.  But it also has not
>> output.  It doesn't halt.  So I'm not sure what you mean by computing one
>> algorithm efficiently and correctly.
>>
>> Brent
>>
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Re: A question for Bruno

2016-09-16 Thread Stephen Paul King

On Fri, Sep 16, 2016 at 11:16 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 16 Sep 2016, at 01:29, Stephen Paul King wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thu, Sep 15, 2016 at 6:47 PM, Brent Meeker 
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 9/15/2016 11:03 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote:
>>
>> I get that and buy it too, Brent. Platonia is the "flat" Complete
>> version, I am looking for the infinite tower of incomplete yet consistent
>> theories
>>
>>
>> I don't understand what you mean by that.  I assume "theories" refers to
>> axiomatic systems.  If I take one such system, like arithmetic, I can keep
>> adding the unprovable Godel sentences as axioms and so create an unbounded
>> "tower" of systems.  Is that what you mean?
>>
>
> Yes, sorta.
>
>
>
>>
>>
>> and trying to make sense of computational languages that could use those
>> theories. Remember that computers do not need to be Turing Complete if they
>> only need to compute one algorithm efficiently and correctly.
>>
>>
>> That's the view of an algorithm as computing a function; so given an
>> input there is a certain correct output.  But the UD doesn't have any input.
>>
>
> It has itself as an input. :-P
>
>
> ?
>
> Possibly in a quite novel non standard sense, but I'm afarid this could
> lead to confusion, especially with beginners.
>
> The UD is typically a program without input. You enter its code in the
> language of some universal machine, without giving it any input, and it
> runs forever, meaning it has no output.
>
> Extensionally, it is equivalent with the empty function from the empty set
> to the empty set (the unique element of 0^0 in set theoretical term, with 0
> identified with the empty set).
>
> Intensionally, assuming computationalism it is all activities of all
> machines in all locally consistent context.
>
> Some would like to add, all thoughts, but the thoughts remain stable and
> make possibly sense only on the infinities on which the First Person
> Indeterminacy operates.
>
> In the 3-1 picture, we can attach a consciousness to a 
> program/machine/3-p-representation...,
> it is often polite, but in the 1-p picture, that is, from the first person
> perspective "you" are related to an infinity (2^aleph_0) of computational
> histories. The UD "runs" you on all real oracles, notably.
>
> Bruno
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>
Can the UD diagonalize with almost all possible versions of itself? I have
forgotten some details...


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Re: A question for Bruno

On 16 Sep 2016, at 03:27, Stephen Paul King wrote:

The idea is to think of computations as discrete, they do one thing:
process one algorithm and halt.

or not halt. You limit yourself to halting computation.

If each halting computation is simpler than arbitrary computations, it
happens that the notion of halting computations is more complex than
the notion of arbitrary computations.

For example, there is no universal halting machine, and there is no UD
computting all and only all halting computations.

The only way to generate all halting computations necessitate the
generations of all computations, the halting one and the non halting.
There is no algorithmic means to separate the halting machine from the
non halting one.

yet, the halting computations, when you get them all, is what
structure the "measure space", and that is exploited to get the
measure one case by the intensional ("material") variant of the self-
reference logic, restricted to the "halting computations", modeled by
the true sigma_1 sentences.

Obviously I am not talking about Turing machines...

We seem to miss a precise idea of what you are talking about, I'm
afraid.

Bruno

On Thu, Sep 15, 2016 at 9:03 PM, Brent Meeker
wrote:

On 9/15/2016 4:29 PM, Stephen Paul King wrote:

On Thu, Sep 15, 2016 at 6:47 PM, Brent Meeker
wrote:

On 9/15/2016 11:03 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote:
I get that and buy it too, Brent. Platonia is the "flat" Complete
version, I am looking for theinfinite
tower of incomplete yet consistent theories

I don't understand what you mean by that. I assume "theories"
refers to axiomatic systems. If I take one such system, like
arithmetic, I can keep adding the unprovable Godel sentences as
axioms and so create an unbounded "tower" of systems. Is that what
you mean?

Yes, sorta.

and trying to make sense of computational languages that could use
those theories. Remember that computers do not need to be Turing
Complete if they only need to compute one algorithm efficiently
and correctly.

That's the view of an algorithm as computing a function; so given
an input there is a certain correct output. But the UD doesn't
have any input.

It has itself as an input. :-P

I suppose you can think of it as a null input. But it also has not
output. It doesn't halt. So I'm not sure what you mean by
computing one algorithm efficiently and correctly.

Brent

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Re: A question for Bruno

On 16 Sep 2016, at 01:29, Stephen Paul King wrote:

On Thu, Sep 15, 2016 at 6:47 PM, Brent Meeker
wrote:

On 9/15/2016 11:03 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote:
I get that and buy it too, Brent. Platonia is the "flat" Complete
version, I am looking for the infinite tower of incomplete yet
consistent theories

Yes, sorta.

That's the view of an algorithm as computing a function; so given an
input there is a certain correct output. But the UD doesn't have
any input.

It has itself as an input. :-P

Possibly in a quite novel non standard sense, but I'm afarid this
could lead to confusion, especially with beginners.

The UD is typically a program without input. You enter its code in the
language of some universal machine, without giving it any input, and
it runs forever, meaning it has no output.

Extensionally, it is equivalent with the empty function from the empty
set to the empty set (the unique element of 0^0 in set theoretical
term, with 0 identified with the empty set).

Intensionally, assuming computationalism it is all activities of all
machines in all locally consistent context.

Some would like to add, all thoughts, but the thoughts remain stable
and make possibly sense only on the infinities on which the First
Person Indeterminacy operates.

In the 3-1 picture, we can attach a consciousness to a program/machine/
3-p-representation..., it is often polite, but in the 1-p picture,
that is, from the first person perspective "you" are related to an
infinity (2^aleph_0) of computational histories. The UD "runs" you on
all real oracles, notably.

Bruno

Brent

This seems to be an attack on the UD, which requires
computational universality, but I assure you that it is very
Digital Mechanism friendly. I am after Correct computers, not
Universal computers. An example of such is the TauChain.

On Thu, Sep 15, 2016 at 1:54 PM, Brent Meeker
wrote:
According to Bruno it's in Platonia. It's timeless and doesn't
"go", it just IS, like 2+2 IS 4.

Brent

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Re: A question for Bruno

On 15 Sep 2016, at 20:03, Stephen Paul King wrote:

I get that and buy it too, Brent. Platonia is the "flat" Complete
version, I am looking for the infinite tower of incomplete yet
consistent theories and trying to make sense of computational
languages that could use those theories. Remember that computers do
not need to be Turing Complete if they only need to compute one
algorithm efficiently and correctly.
This seems to be an attack on the UD, which requires
computational universality, but I assure you that it is very Digital
Mechanism friendly. I am after Correct computers, not Universal
computers. An example of such is the TauChain.

Robinson Arithmetic (which is basically only the succession, addition
and multiplication laws) is *essentially undecidable*. It means that
it is Turing complete (and thus undecidable and arithmetically
incomplete) and, and that is what Tarski meant by *essentially
undecidable, all its consistent extensions are (even those non
computable).

Bruno

On Thu, Sep 15, 2016 at 1:54 PM, Brent Meeker
wrote:
According to Bruno it's in Platonia. It's timeless and doesn't
"go", it just IS, like 2+2 IS 4.

Brent

On 9/15/2016 10:13 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote:
OK, but where is the "motivation" that pushes the execution of the
UD coming from? Where is the "go!" in the numbers?

On Thu, Sep 15, 2016 at 1:11 PM, Brent Meeker
wrote:
In this case we have a lot of threads and along each thread there
is an implicit order (the execution of the UD), but there is no
inherent relative order of the threads.

Brent

On 9/15/2016 9:15 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote:
There is "time is a measure of change" concept, which lines up
with what you're saying: "... 'time' is only a real number..." The
numbers are labels, not the change itself.

On Thu, Sep 15, 2016 at 11:57 AM, Brent Meeker
wrote:

On 9/15/2016 12:44 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 14 Sep 2016, at 02:13, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 9/13/2016 7:22 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On Sunday, 11 September 2016, Brent Meeker
wrote:
In the UD model of the world, time as we perceive it, is
emergent. The "execution" of the program is timeless and
exists in Platonia. So the steps of the UD have no duration,
they are logically prior to time and duration. On the other
hand, I think so called "observer moments" must have duration
in the emergent sense and must overlap. But their relation to
the UD threads is more aspirational than proven.

I think it should be possible to pause and restart at any point
a process underpinning consciousness and leave the stream of
consciousness unchanged; otherwise there would be a radical
decoupling of the mental from the physical. At the limit, this
means the process underpinning consciousness can be cut up into
infinitesimals.

Infinitesimals, I think not, at least not in Bruno's model.
Each thread of the UD's computation can be cut and restarted,
but underlying an "observer moment" or a "thought" are
infinitely many threads and there is no reference by which you
can define cutting them all at "the same time". So they make
the "time" of consciousness essentially real valued.

Good point.

But that is where the "infinitesimal" comes in, I would say, be
them in terms of Cauchy sequences or in term of Non Standard
analysis, that's not important at this stage. It depends on the
mathematics of the arithmetical measure on 1p experiences (we get
them trough the math of self-reference, but are still a long way
from an arithmetical Gleason theorem).

Bruno

PS wrote this mail yesterday, seems to not have gone through.
Sorry if sent in double exemplars.

But the 'time' is only a real number if you can order the events
in the different threads relative to one another. In the
materialist theory of mind that is provided by physical time, the
evolution parameter of the wave function. I think that means that
in your theory you have to derive time in order to locate
'thoughts' or 'observer moments'; they are no givens that you can
assume.

Brent
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Re: A question for Bruno



On 15 Sep 2016, at 17:57, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 9/15/2016 12:44 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 14 Sep 2016, at 02:13, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 9/13/2016 7:22 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On Sunday, 11 September 2016, Brent Meeker   
wrote:
In the UD model of the world, time as we perceive it, is  
emergent.  The "execution" of the program is timeless and exists  
in Platonia.  So the steps of the UD have no duration, they are  
logically prior to time and duration.  On the other hand, I think  
so called "observer moments" must have duration in the emergent  
sense and must overlap.  But their relation to the UD threads is  
more aspirational than proven.


I think it should be possible to pause and restart at any point a  
process underpinning consciousness and leave the stream of  
consciousness unchanged; otherwise there would be a radical  
decoupling of the mental from the physical. At the limit, this  
means the process underpinning consciousness can be cut up into  
infinitesimals.


Infinitesimals, I think not, at least not in Bruno's model.  Each  
thread of the UD's computation can be cut and restarted, but  
underlying an "observer moment" or a "thought" are infinitely many  
threads and there is no reference by which you can define cutting  
them all at "the same time".  So they make the "time" of  
consciousness essentially real valued.


Good point.

But that is where the "infinitesimal" comes in, I would say, be  
them in terms of Cauchy sequences or in term of Non Standard  
analysis, that's not important at this stage. It depends on the  
mathematics of the arithmetical measure on 1p experiences (we get  
them trough the math of self-reference, but are still a long way  
from an arithmetical Gleason theorem).


Bruno

PS wrote this mail yesterday, seems to not have gone through. Sorry  
if sent in double exemplars.


But the 'time' is only a real number if you can order the events in  
the different threads relative to one another.  In the materialist  
theory of mind that is provided by physical time, the evolution  
parameter of the wave function.


OK, but it does not work, as we lost all connection between  
physicalness and consciousness (by UDA).



I think that means that in your theory you have to derive time in  
order to locate 'thoughts' or 'observer moments'; they are no givens  
that you can assume.


Indeed. But we already got it through the logics of the first person  
(S4Grz1, X1*).


Note that the physical time is also not well explained in "materialist  
physics". In the DeWitt-Wheeler equation, it disappears, and reappears  
as a local indexical/modal notion. Strictly speaking, physicists have  
not yet an account of reality coherent with both QM and GR, so that is  
an problem in physics too. Anyway, we can't invoke a primitive  
physicalness to explain the conscious appearance of physicalness in  
the digital mechanist frame.


Bruno




Brent

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Re: A question for Bruno

On 15 Sep 2016, at 19:38, Stephen Paul King wrote:

I think that time (and physicality) within 1p is sufficient, if
there have a large enough plurality of interacting finite minds.
What I have trouble with DM is that it is not obvious where we get
that plurality. I still suspect that a weak version of Tennenbaum's
theorem could solve this problem, but we may lose Turing
completeness. I would happily trade completeness for correctness.

http://mathoverflow.net/questions/38160/computable-nonstandard-models-for-weak-systems-of-arithemtic/121252

Tennenbaum theorem does not make us losing Turing-completeness. Quite
the contrary, we escape the bound of the computable, which belongs to
all intepretation of arithmetic, standard and non standard as well.

We would loose computationalism, in some sense.

Bruno

On Thu, Sep 15, 2016 at 1:30 PM, Bruno Marchal
wrote:

On 15 Sep 2016, at 13:44, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 15 September 2016 at 05:25, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Hi Stathis,

I really like this explanation of supervenience. I only worry
that we need a lot more detail, of how exactly "A and B are
unaffected if the timing, order or duration of a and b are
changed." works. AFAIK, this requirement looks a lot like mutual
independence, but it clearly can not be. There must be a non-zero
probability of transitions within the processes at each level of
the tower, something like a 'time' at each.

Information about timing, order or duration of a and b that does
not change a and b cannot change A and B either. This follows from
the definition of supervenience.

That brings me to my next question: Where do we get the
inequality of entropy when it is NOT at equilibrium for a system.
Deriving an arrow of time is not just a matter of figuring out how
to chain labels in observer moments, we need an actual transition
from one state to another in our theory.
Does anyone here have a nice explanation of Markov Processes
that they could point me to?

If there are real processes occurring in real time, this is not
necessarily relevant to the supervenient mental processes. A future
mental state could be computed in real time before a past mental
state; it could have happened to you right now, and you wouldn't
know. Thus, even if there is a real world, with real time and an
arrow of time, the subjective world is timeless.

OK. In the 3-1 picture, where we look at the cloud of true (and
prouvable) sigma_1 sentences, that seems quite reasonable.

Before smoking salvia, I would have added: but *only* in the 3-1
picture. I would have defended the idea that in the 1p picture, the
(1p) subjective experience is bounded to get some duration/
subjective-time aspects, like Brouwer, Bergson, Dogen and other
Heracliteans seemed to claim, and even like the universal machine
seems to claim ([]p & p, the 1p, leads to a logic of intuitionist
time) but salvia succeeded in making me doubt about this. Salvia can
be *quite* dissociative.

Still today, I doubt that consciousness without time makes
subjective sense, but I believe there might be an altered
consciousness state where we feel to live the contrary. Coming back
from that state is a highly surprising and highly confusing
experience. We can memorize only a piece of that coming back.

Bruno

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Re: A question for Bruno

That's a good example, actually!

On Thu, Sep 15, 2016 at 10:17 PM, Brent Meeker  wrote:

> Can you give an example?  What I'm led to think of is something like:
> % Add two and two
> print "4"
> halt
>
> Brent
>
>
>
> On 9/15/2016 6:27 PM, Stephen Paul King wrote:
>
> The idea is to think of computations as discrete, they do one thing:
> process one algorithm and halt. Obviously I am not talking about Turing
> machines...
>
> On Thu, Sep 15, 2016 at 9:03 PM, Brent Meeker 
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 9/15/2016 4:29 PM, Stephen Paul King wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Sep 15, 2016 at 6:47 PM, Brent Meeker 
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 9/15/2016 11:03 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote:
>>>
>>> I get that and buy it too, Brent. Platonia is the "flat" Complete
>>> version, I am looking for the infinite tower of incomplete yet consistent
>>> theories
>>>
>>>
>>> I don't understand what you mean by that.  I assume "theories" refers to
>>> axiomatic systems.  If I take one such system, like arithmetic, I can keep
>>> adding the unprovable Godel sentences as axioms and so create an unbounded
>>> "tower" of systems.  Is that what you mean?
>>>
>>
>> Yes, sorta.
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> and trying to make sense of computational languages that could use those
>>> theories. Remember that computers do not need to be Turing Complete if they
>>> only need to compute one algorithm efficiently and correctly.
>>>
>>>
>>> That's the view of an algorithm as computing a function; so given an
>>> input there is a certain correct output.  But the UD doesn't have any input.
>>>
>>
>> It has itself as an input. :-P
>>
>>
>> I suppose you can think of it as a null input.  But it also has not
>> output.  It doesn't halt.  So I'm not sure what you mean by computing one
>> algorithm efficiently and correctly.
>>
>> Brent
>> --
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Re: A question for Bruno


Can you give an example?  What I'm led to think of is something like:

% Add two and two
print "4"
halt

Brent



On 9/15/2016 6:27 PM, Stephen Paul King wrote:
The idea is to think of computations as discrete, they do one thing: 
process one algorithm and halt. Obviously I am not talking about 
Turing machines...


On Thu, Sep 15, 2016 at 9:03 PM, Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 9/15/2016 4:29 PM, Stephen Paul King wrote:



On Thu, Sep 15, 2016 at 6:47 PM, Brent Meeker
> wrote:



On 9/15/2016 11:03 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote:

I get that and buy it too, Brent. Platonia is the "flat"
Complete version, I am looking for the infinite tower of
incomplete yet consistent theories


I don't understand what you mean by that.  I assume
"theories" refers to axiomatic systems.  If I take one such
system, like arithmetic, I can keep adding the unprovable
Godel sentences as axioms and so create an unbounded "tower"
of systems. Is that what you mean?


Yes, sorta.




and trying to make sense of computational languages that
could use those theories. Remember that computers do not
need to be Turing Complete if they only need to compute one
algorithm efficiently and correctly.


That's the view of an algorithm as computing a function; so
given an input there is a certain correct output.  But the UD
doesn't have any input.


It has itself as an input. :-P


I suppose you can think of it as a null input. But it also has not
output.  It doesn't halt.  So I'm not sure what you mean by
computing one algorithm efficiently and correctly.

Brent
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Re: A question for Bruno

The idea is to think of computations as discrete, they do one thing:
process one algorithm and halt. Obviously I am not talking about Turing
machines...

On Thu, Sep 15, 2016 at 9:03 PM, Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 9/15/2016 4:29 PM, Stephen Paul King wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thu, Sep 15, 2016 at 6:47 PM, Brent Meeker 
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 9/15/2016 11:03 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote:
>>
>> I get that and buy it too, Brent. Platonia is the "flat" Complete
>> version, I am looking for the infinite tower of incomplete yet consistent
>> theories
>>
>>
>> I don't understand what you mean by that.  I assume "theories" refers to
>> axiomatic systems.  If I take one such system, like arithmetic, I can keep
>> adding the unprovable Godel sentences as axioms and so create an unbounded
>> "tower" of systems.  Is that what you mean?
>>
>
> Yes, sorta.
>
>
>
>>
>>
>> and trying to make sense of computational languages that could use those
>> theories. Remember that computers do not need to be Turing Complete if they
>> only need to compute one algorithm efficiently and correctly.
>>
>>
>> That's the view of an algorithm as computing a function; so given an
>> input there is a certain correct output.  But the UD doesn't have any input.
>>
>
> It has itself as an input. :-P
>
>
> I suppose you can think of it as a null input.  But it also has not
> output.  It doesn't halt.  So I'm not sure what you mean by computing one
> algorithm efficiently and correctly.
>
> Brent
>
> --
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Re: A question for Bruno




On 9/15/2016 4:29 PM, Stephen Paul King wrote:



On Thu, Sep 15, 2016 at 6:47 PM, Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 9/15/2016 11:03 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote:

I get that and buy it too, Brent. Platonia is the "flat" Complete
version, I am looking for the infinite tower of incomplete yet
consistent theories


I don't understand what you mean by that.  I assume "theories"
refers to axiomatic systems.  If I take one such system, like
arithmetic, I can keep adding the unprovable Godel sentences as
axioms and so create an unbounded "tower" of systems.  Is that
what you mean?


Yes, sorta.




and trying to make sense of computational languages that could
use those theories. Remember that computers do not need to be
Turing Complete if they only need to compute one algorithm
efficiently and correctly.


That's the view of an algorithm as computing a function; so given
an input there is a certain correct output.  But the UD doesn't
have any input.


It has itself as an input. :-P


I suppose you can think of it as a null input.  But it also has not 
output.  It doesn't halt.  So I'm not sure what you mean by computing 
one algorithm efficiently and correctly.


Brent

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Re: A question for Bruno

On Thu, Sep 15, 2016 at 6:47 PM, Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 9/15/2016 11:03 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote:
>
> I get that and buy it too, Brent. Platonia is the "flat" Complete version,
> I am looking for the infinite tower of incomplete yet consistent theories
>
>
> I don't understand what you mean by that.  I assume "theories" refers to
> axiomatic systems.  If I take one such system, like arithmetic, I can keep
> adding the unprovable Godel sentences as axioms and so create an unbounded
> "tower" of systems.  Is that what you mean?
>

Yes, sorta.



>
>
> and trying to make sense of computational languages that could use those
> theories. Remember that computers do not need to be Turing Complete if they
> only need to compute one algorithm efficiently and correctly.
>
>
> That's the view of an algorithm as computing a function; so given an input
> there is a certain correct output.  But the UD doesn't have any input.
>

It has itself as an input. :-P



>
>
> Brent
>
>This seems to be an attack on the UD, which requires computational
> universality, but I assure you that it is very Digital Mechanism friendly.
> I am after Correct computers, not Universal computers. An example of such
> is the TauChain.
>
> On Thu, Sep 15, 2016 at 1:54 PM, Brent Meeker 
> wrote:
>
>> According to Bruno it's in Platonia.  It's timeless and doesn't "go", it
>> just IS, like 2+2 IS 4.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
> --
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>



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Re: A question for Bruno

2016-09-15 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

What I meant was that the subjective experience of time would be the same
whether there was a material universe with real time, a material block
universe without time, or no material universe.

On 16 September 2016 at 02:16, Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 9/15/2016 4:44 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
> On 15 September 2016 at 05:25, Stephen Paul King <
> stephe...@provensecure.com> wrote:
>
>> Hi Stathis,
>>
>>I really like this explanation of supervenience. I only worry that we
>> need a lot more detail, of how exactly "A and B are unaffected if the
>> timing, order or duration of a and b are changed." works. AFAIK, this
>> requirement looks a lot like mutual independence, but it clearly can not
>> be. There must be a non-zero probability of transitions within the
>> processes at each level of the tower, something like a 'time' at each.
>>
>
> Information about timing, order or duration of a and b that does not
> change a and b cannot change A and B either. This follows from the
> definition of supervenience.
>
>
>>
>>That brings me to my next question: Where do we get the inequality of
>> entropy when it is NOT at equilibrium for a system. Deriving an arrow of
>> time is not just a matter of figuring out how to chain labels in observer
>> moments, we need an actual transition from one state to another in our
>> theory.
>>Does anyone here have a nice explanation of Markov Processes that they
>> could point me to?
>>
>
> If there are real processes occurring in real time, this is not
> necessarily relevant to the supervenient mental processes. A future mental
> state could be computed in real time before a past mental state; it could
> have happened to you right now, and you wouldn't know. Thus, even if there
> is a real world, with real time and an arrow of time, the subjective world
> is timeless.
>
>
> Yet one subjective experiences duration and order.
>
> I think you've misplaced the concrete.
>
> Brent
>
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Re: A question for Bruno




On 9/15/2016 11:03 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote:
I get that and buy it too, Brent. Platonia is the "flat" Complete 
version, I am looking for the infinite tower of incomplete yet 
consistent theories


I don't understand what you mean by that.  I assume "theories" refers to 
axiomatic systems.  If I take one such system, like arithmetic, I can 
keep adding the unprovable Godel sentences as axioms and so create an 
unbounded "tower" of systems.  Is that what you mean?


and trying to make sense of computational languages that could use 
those theories. Remember that computers do not need to be Turing 
Complete if they only need to compute one algorithm efficiently and 
correctly.


That's the view of an algorithm as computing a function; so given an 
input there is a certain correct output.  But the UD doesn't have any input.


Brent

 This seems to be an attack on the UD, which requires computational 
universality, but I assure you that it is very Digital Mechanism 
friendly. I am after Correct computers, not Universal computers. An 
example of such is the TauChain.


On Thu, Sep 15, 2016 at 1:54 PM, Brent Meeker > wrote:


According to Bruno it's in Platonia.  It's timeless and doesn't
"go", it just IS, like 2+2 IS 4.

Brent



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Re: A question for Bruno

I get that and buy it too, Brent. Platonia is the "flat" Complete version,
I am looking for the infinite tower of incomplete yet consistent theories
and trying to make sense of computational languages that could use those
theories. Remember that computers do not need to be Turing Complete if they
only need to compute one algorithm efficiently and correctly.
   This seems to be an attack on the UD, which requires computational
universality, but I assure you that it is very Digital Mechanism friendly.
I am after Correct computers, not Universal computers. An example of such
is the TauChain.

On Thu, Sep 15, 2016 at 1:54 PM, Brent Meeker  wrote:

> According to Bruno it's in Platonia.  It's timeless and doesn't "go", it
> just IS, like 2+2 IS 4.
>
> Brent
>
> On 9/15/2016 10:13 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote:
>
> OK, but where is the "motivation" that pushes the execution of the UD
> coming from? Where is the "go!" in the numbers?
>
> On Thu, Sep 15, 2016 at 1:11 PM, Brent Meeker 
> wrote:
>
>> In this case we have a lot of threads and along each thread there is an
>> implicit order (the execution of the UD), but there is no inherent relative
>> order of the threads.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>> On 9/15/2016 9:15 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote:
>>
>> There is "time is a measure of change" concept, which lines up with what
>> you're saying: "... 'time' is only a real number..." The numbers are
>> labels, not the change itself.
>>
>> On Thu, Sep 15, 2016 at 11:57 AM, Brent Meeker 
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 9/15/2016 12:44 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 14 Sep 2016, at 02:13, Brent Meeker wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 9/13/2016 7:22 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sunday, 11 September 2016, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>>>
 In the UD model of the world, time as we perceive it, is emergent.  The
 "execution" of the program is timeless and exists in Platonia.  So the
 steps of the UD have no duration, they are logically prior to time and
 duration.  On the other hand, I think so called "observer moments" must
 have duration in the emergent sense and must overlap.  But their relation
 to the UD threads is more aspirational than proven.

>>> I think it should be possible to pause and restart at any point
>>> a process underpinning consciousness and leave the stream of consciousness
>>> unchanged; otherwise there would be a radical decoupling of the mental from
>>> the physical. At the limit, this means the process underpinning
>>> consciousness can be cut up into infinitesimals.
>>>
>>>
>>> Infinitesimals, I think not, at least not in Bruno's model.  Each thread
>>> of the UD's computation can be cut and restarted, but underlying an
>>> "observer moment" or a "thought" are infinitely many threads and there is
>>> no reference by which you can define cutting them all at "the same time".
>>> So they make the "time" of consciousness essentially real valued.
>>>
>>>
>>> Good point.
>>>
>>> But that is where the "infinitesimal" comes in, I would say, be them in
>>> terms of Cauchy sequences or in term of Non Standard analysis, that's not
>>> important at this stage. It depends on the mathematics of the arithmetical
>>> measure on 1p experiences (we get them trough the math of self-reference,
>>> but are still a long way from an arithmetical Gleason theorem).
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>> PS wrote this mail yesterday, seems to not have gone through. Sorry if
>>> sent in double exemplars.
>>>
>>>
>>> But the 'time' is only a real number if you can order the events in the
>>> different threads relative to one another.  In the materialist theory of
>>> mind that is provided by physical time, the evolution parameter of the wave
>>> function.  I think that means that in your theory you have to derive time
>>> in order to locate 'thoughts' or 'observer moments'; they are no givens
>>> that you can assume.
>>>
>>> Brent
>>> --
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>>>
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>>
>> Kindest Regards,
>>
>> Stephen Paul King
>>
>> Senior Researcher
>>
>> Mobile: (864) 567-3099 <%28864%29%20567-3099>
>>
>> stephe...@provensecure.com
>>
>>  http://www.provensecure.us/
>>
>>  “This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the use
>> of the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain
>> information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged, confidential and
>>

Re: A question for Bruno

According to Bruno it's in Platonia.  It's timeless and doesn't "go", it 
just IS, like 2+2 IS 4.


Brent


On 9/15/2016 10:13 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote:
OK, but where is the "motivation" that pushes the execution of the UD 
coming from? Where is the "go!" in the numbers?


On Thu, Sep 15, 2016 at 1:11 PM, Brent Meeker > wrote:


In this case we have a lot of threads and along each thread there
is an implicit order (the execution of the UD), but there is no
inherent relative order of the threads.

Brent


On 9/15/2016 9:15 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote:

There is "time is a measure of change" concept, which lines up
with what you're saying: "...'time' is only a real number..." The
numbers are labels, not the change itself.

On Thu, Sep 15, 2016 at 11:57 AM, Brent Meeker
> wrote:



On 9/15/2016 12:44 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 14 Sep 2016, at 02:13, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 9/13/2016 7:22 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On Sunday, 11 September 2016, Brent Meeker
 wrote:

In the UD model of the world, time as we perceive it,
is emergent.  The "execution" of the program is
timeless and exists in Platonia.  So the steps of the
UD have no duration, they are logically prior to time
and duration.  On the other hand, I think so called
"observer moments" must have duration in the emergent
sense and must overlap.  But their relation to the UD
threads is more aspirational than proven.

I think it should be possible to pause and restart at any
point a process underpinning consciousness and leave the
stream of consciousness unchanged; otherwise there would
be a radical decoupling of the mental from the physical.
At the limit, this means the process underpinning
consciousness can be cut up into infinitesimals.


Infinitesimals, I think not, at least not in Bruno's
model.  Each thread of the UD's computation can be cut and
restarted, but underlying an "observer moment" or a
"thought" are infinitely many threads and there is no
reference by which you can define cutting them all at "the
same time".  So they make the "time" of consciousness
essentially real valued.


Good point.

But that is where the "infinitesimal" comes in, I would say,
be them in terms of Cauchy sequences or in term of Non
Standard analysis, that's not important at this stage. It
depends on the mathematics of the arithmetical measure on 1p
experiences (we get them trough the math of self-reference,
but are still a long way from an arithmetical Gleason theorem).

Bruno

PS wrote this mail yesterday, seems to not have gone
through. Sorry if sent in double exemplars.


But the 'time' is only a real number if you can order the
events in the different threads relative to one another.  In
the materialist theory of mind that is provided by physical
time, the evolution parameter of the wave function.  I think
that means that in your theory you have to derive time in
order to locate 'thoughts' or 'observer moments'; they are no
givens that you can assume.

Brent
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Re: A question for Bruno

I think that time (and physicality) within 1p is sufficient, if there have
a large enough plurality of interacting finite minds. What I have trouble
with DM is that it is not obvious where we get that plurality. I still
suspect that a weak version of Tennenbaum's theorem could solve this
problem, but we may lose Turing completeness. I would happily trade
completeness for correctness.

http://mathoverflow.net/questions/38160/computable-nonstandard-models-for-weak-systems-of-arithemtic/121252

On Thu, Sep 15, 2016 at 1:30 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 15 Sep 2016, at 13:44, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
> On 15 September 2016 at 05:25, Stephen Paul King <
> stephe...@provensecure.com> wrote:
>
>> Hi Stathis,
>>
>>I really like this explanation of supervenience. I only worry that we
>> need a lot more detail, of how exactly "A and B are unaffected if the
>> timing, order or duration of a and b are changed." works. AFAIK, this
>> requirement looks a lot like mutual independence, but it clearly can not
>> be. There must be a non-zero probability of transitions within the
>> processes at each level of the tower, something like a 'time' at each.
>>
>
> Information about timing, order or duration of a and b that does not
> change a and b cannot change A and B either. This follows from the
> definition of supervenience.
>
>
>>
>>That brings me to my next question: Where do we get the inequality of
>> entropy when it is NOT at equilibrium for a system. Deriving an arrow of
>> time is not just a matter of figuring out how to chain labels in observer
>> moments, we need an actual transition from one state to another in our
>> theory.
>>Does anyone here have a nice explanation of Markov Processes that they
>> could point me to?
>>
>
> If there are real processes occurring in real time, this is not
> necessarily relevant to the supervenient mental processes. A future mental
> state could be computed in real time before a past mental state; it could
> have happened to you right now, and you wouldn't know. Thus, even if there
> is a real world, with real time and an arrow of time, the subjective world
> is timeless.
>
>
> OK. In the 3-1 picture, where we look at the cloud of true (and prouvable)
> sigma_1 sentences, that seems quite reasonable.
>
> Before smoking salvia, I would have added: but *only* in the 3-1 picture.
> I would have defended the idea that in the 1p picture, the (1p) subjective
> experience is bounded to get some duration/subjective-time aspects, like
> Brouwer, Bergson, Dogen and other Heracliteans seemed to claim, and even
> like the universal machine seems to claim ([]p & p, the 1p,  leads to a
> logic of intuitionist time) but salvia succeeded in making me doubt about
> this. Salvia can be *quite* dissociative.
>
> Still today, I doubt that consciousness without time makes subjective
> sense, but I believe there might be an altered consciousness state where we
> feel to live the contrary.  Coming back from that state is a highly
> surprising and highly confusing experience. We can memorize only a piece of
> that coming back.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
> --
> Stathis Papaioannou
>
> --
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>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
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Re: A question for Bruno

2016-09-15 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 15 Sep 2016, at 13:44, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:




On 15 September 2016 at 05:25, Stephen Paul King  wrote:

Hi Stathis,

   I really like this explanation of supervenience. I only worry  
that we need a lot more detail, of how exactly "A and B are  
unaffected if the timing, order or duration of a and b are changed."  
works. AFAIK, this requirement looks a lot like mutual independence,  
but it clearly can not be. There must be a non-zero probability of  
transitions within the processes at each level of the tower,  
something like a 'time' at each.


Information about timing, order or duration of a and b that does not  
change a and b cannot change A and B either. This follows from the  
definition of supervenience.



   That brings me to my next question: Where do we get the  
inequality of entropy when it is NOT at equilibrium for a system.  
Deriving an arrow of time is not just a matter of figuring out how  
to chain labels in observer moments, we need an actual transition  
from one state to another in our theory.
   Does anyone here have a nice explanation of Markov Processes that  
they could point me to?


If there are real processes occurring in real time, this is not  
necessarily relevant to the supervenient mental processes. A future  
mental state could be computed in real time before a past mental  
state; it could have happened to you right now, and you wouldn't  
know. Thus, even if there is a real world, with real time and an  
arrow of time, the subjective world is timeless.


OK. In the 3-1 picture, where we look at the cloud of true (and  
prouvable) sigma_1 sentences, that seems quite reasonable.


Before smoking salvia, I would have added: but *only* in the 3-1  
picture. I would have defended the idea that in the 1p picture, the  
(1p) subjective experience is bounded to get some duration/subjective- 
time aspects, like Brouwer, Bergson, Dogen and other Heracliteans  
seemed to claim, and even like the universal machine seems to claim  
([]p & p, the 1p,  leads to a logic of intuitionist time) but salvia  
succeeded in making me doubt about this. Salvia can be *quite*  
dissociative.


Still today, I doubt that consciousness without time makes subjective  
sense, but I believe there might be an altered consciousness state  
where we feel to live the contrary.  Coming back from that state is a  
highly surprising and highly confusing experience. We can memorize  
only a piece of that coming back.


Bruno




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Re: A question for Bruno

OK, but where is the "motivation" that pushes the execution of the UD
coming from? Where is the "go!" in the numbers?

On Thu, Sep 15, 2016 at 1:11 PM, Brent Meeker  wrote:

> In this case we have a lot of threads and along each thread there is an
> implicit order (the execution of the UD), but there is no inherent relative
> order of the threads.
>
> Brent
>
> On 9/15/2016 9:15 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote:
>
> There is "time is a measure of change" concept, which lines up with what
> you're saying: "... 'time' is only a real number..." The numbers are
> labels, not the change itself.
>
> On Thu, Sep 15, 2016 at 11:57 AM, Brent Meeker 
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 9/15/2016 12:44 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 14 Sep 2016, at 02:13, Brent Meeker wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 9/13/2016 7:22 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sunday, 11 September 2016, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>>
>>> In the UD model of the world, time as we perceive it, is emergent.  The
>>> "execution" of the program is timeless and exists in Platonia.  So the
>>> steps of the UD have no duration, they are logically prior to time and
>>> duration.  On the other hand, I think so called "observer moments" must
>>> have duration in the emergent sense and must overlap.  But their relation
>>> to the UD threads is more aspirational than proven.
>>>
>> I think it should be possible to pause and restart at any point a process
>> underpinning consciousness and leave the stream of consciousness unchanged;
>> otherwise there would be a radical decoupling of the mental from the
>> physical. At the limit, this means the process underpinning consciousness
>> can be cut up into infinitesimals.
>>
>>
>> Infinitesimals, I think not, at least not in Bruno's model.  Each thread
>> of the UD's computation can be cut and restarted, but underlying an
>> "observer moment" or a "thought" are infinitely many threads and there is
>> no reference by which you can define cutting them all at "the same time".
>> So they make the "time" of consciousness essentially real valued.
>>
>>
>> Good point.
>>
>> But that is where the "infinitesimal" comes in, I would say, be them in
>> terms of Cauchy sequences or in term of Non Standard analysis, that's not
>> important at this stage. It depends on the mathematics of the arithmetical
>> measure on 1p experiences (we get them trough the math of self-reference,
>> but are still a long way from an arithmetical Gleason theorem).
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>> PS wrote this mail yesterday, seems to not have gone through. Sorry if
>> sent in double exemplars.
>>
>>
>> But the 'time' is only a real number if you can order the events in the
>> different threads relative to one another.  In the materialist theory of
>> mind that is provided by physical time, the evolution parameter of the wave
>> function.  I think that means that in your theory you have to derive time
>> in order to locate 'thoughts' or 'observer moments'; they are no givens
>> that you can assume.
>>
>> Brent
>> --
>> You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the
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>>
>
>
>
> --
>
> Kindest Regards,
>
> Stephen Paul King
>
> Senior Researcher
>
> Mobile: (864) 567-3099
>
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> information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged, confidential and
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Re: A question for Bruno

In this case we have a lot of threads and along each thread there is an 
implicit order (the execution of the UD), but there is no inherent 
relative order of the threads.


Brent


On 9/15/2016 9:15 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote:
There is "time is a measure of change" concept, which lines up with 
what you're saying: "...'time' is only a real number..." The numbers 
are labels, not the change itself.


On Thu, Sep 15, 2016 at 11:57 AM, Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 9/15/2016 12:44 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 14 Sep 2016, at 02:13, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 9/13/2016 7:22 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On Sunday, 11 September 2016, Brent Meeker
 wrote:

In the UD model of the world, time as we perceive it, is
emergent.  The "execution" of the program is timeless and
exists in Platonia.  So the steps of the UD have no
duration, they are logically prior to time and duration. On
the other hand, I think so called "observer moments" must
have duration in the emergent sense and must overlap. But
their relation to the UD threads is more aspirational than
proven.

I think it should be possible to pause and restart at any point
a process underpinning consciousness and leave the stream of
consciousness unchanged; otherwise there would be a radical
decoupling of the mental from the physical. At the limit, this
means the process underpinning consciousness can be cut up into
infinitesimals.


Infinitesimals, I think not, at least not in Bruno's model. 
Each thread of the UD's computation can be cut and restarted,

but underlying an "observer moment" or a "thought" are
infinitely many threads and there is no reference by which you
can define cutting them all at "the same time".  So they make
the "time" of consciousness essentially real valued.


Good point.

But that is where the "infinitesimal" comes in, I would say, be
them in terms of Cauchy sequences or in term of Non Standard
analysis, that's not important at this stage. It depends on the
mathematics of the arithmetical measure on 1p experiences (we get
them trough the math of self-reference, but are still a long way
from an arithmetical Gleason theorem).

Bruno

PS wrote this mail yesterday, seems to not have gone through.
Sorry if sent in double exemplars.


But the 'time' is only a real number if you can order the events
in the different threads relative to one another.  In the
materialist theory of mind that is provided by physical time, the
evolution parameter of the wave function.  I think that means that
in your theory you have to derive time in order to locate
'thoughts' or 'observer moments'; they are no givens that you can
assume.

Brent
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Re: A question for Bruno

Could it be that the concrete is the subjective reflection of the abstract?

On Thu, Sep 15, 2016 at 12:16 PM, Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 9/15/2016 4:44 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
> On 15 September 2016 at 05:25, Stephen Paul King <
> stephe...@provensecure.com> wrote:
>
>> Hi Stathis,
>>
>>I really like this explanation of supervenience. I only worry that we
>> need a lot more detail, of how exactly "A and B are unaffected if the
>> timing, order or duration of a and b are changed." works. AFAIK, this
>> requirement looks a lot like mutual independence, but it clearly can not
>> be. There must be a non-zero probability of transitions within the
>> processes at each level of the tower, something like a 'time' at each.
>>
>
> Information about timing, order or duration of a and b that does not
> change a and b cannot change A and B either. This follows from the
> definition of supervenience.
>
>
>>
>>That brings me to my next question: Where do we get the inequality of
>> entropy when it is NOT at equilibrium for a system. Deriving an arrow of
>> time is not just a matter of figuring out how to chain labels in observer
>> moments, we need an actual transition from one state to another in our
>> theory.
>>Does anyone here have a nice explanation of Markov Processes that they
>> could point me to?
>>
>
> If there are real processes occurring in real time, this is not
> necessarily relevant to the supervenient mental processes. A future mental
> state could be computed in real time before a past mental state; it could
> have happened to you right now, and you wouldn't know. Thus, even if there
> is a real world, with real time and an arrow of time, the subjective world
> is timeless.
>
>
> Yet one subjective experiences duration and order.
>
> I think you've misplaced the concrete.
>
> Brent
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the
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Stephen Paul King

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stephe...@provensecure.com

 http://www.provensecure.us/

 “This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the use of
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Re: A question for Bruno




On 9/15/2016 4:44 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On 15 September 2016 at 05:25, Stephen Paul King 
> wrote:


Hi Stathis,

 I really like this explanation of supervenience. I only worry
that we need a lot more detail, of how exactly "A and B are
unaffected if the timing, order or duration of a and b are
changed." works. AFAIK, this requirement looks a lot like mutual
independence, but it clearly can not be. There must be a non-zero
probability of transitions within the processes at each level of
the tower, something like a 'time' at each.


Information about timing, order or duration of a and b that does not 
change a and b cannot change A and B either. This follows from the 
definition of supervenience.


 That brings me to my next question: Where do we get the
inequality of entropy when it is NOT at equilibrium for a system.
Deriving an arrow of time is not just a matter of figuring out how
to chain labels in observer moments, we need an actual transition
from one state to another in our theory.
 Does anyone here have a nice explanation of Markov Processes that
they could point me to?


If there are real processes occurring in real time, this is not 
necessarily relevant to the supervenient mental processes. A future 
mental state could be computed in real time before a past mental 
state; it could have happened to you right now, and you wouldn't know. 
Thus, even if there is a real world, with real time and an arrow of 
time, the subjective world is timeless.


Yet one subjective experiences duration and order.

I think you've misplaced the concrete.

Brent

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Re: A question for Bruno

There is "time is a measure of change" concept, which lines up with what
you're saying: "... 'time' is only a real number..." The numbers are
labels, not the change itself.

On Thu, Sep 15, 2016 at 11:57 AM, Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 9/15/2016 12:44 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 14 Sep 2016, at 02:13, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
>
> On 9/13/2016 7:22 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, 11 September 2016, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
>> In the UD model of the world, time as we perceive it, is emergent.  The
>> "execution" of the program is timeless and exists in Platonia.  So the
>> steps of the UD have no duration, they are logically prior to time and
>> duration.  On the other hand, I think so called "observer moments" must
>> have duration in the emergent sense and must overlap.  But their relation
>> to the UD threads is more aspirational than proven.
>>
> I think it should be possible to pause and restart at any point a process
> underpinning consciousness and leave the stream of consciousness unchanged;
> otherwise there would be a radical decoupling of the mental from the
> physical. At the limit, this means the process underpinning consciousness
> can be cut up into infinitesimals.
>
>
> Infinitesimals, I think not, at least not in Bruno's model.  Each thread
> of the UD's computation can be cut and restarted, but underlying an
> "observer moment" or a "thought" are infinitely many threads and there is
> no reference by which you can define cutting them all at "the same time".
> So they make the "time" of consciousness essentially real valued.
>
>
> Good point.
>
> But that is where the "infinitesimal" comes in, I would say, be them in
> terms of Cauchy sequences or in term of Non Standard analysis, that's not
> important at this stage. It depends on the mathematics of the arithmetical
> measure on 1p experiences (we get them trough the math of self-reference,
> but are still a long way from an arithmetical Gleason theorem).
>
> Bruno
>
> PS wrote this mail yesterday, seems to not have gone through. Sorry if
> sent in double exemplars.
>
>
> But the 'time' is only a real number if you can order the events in the
> different threads relative to one another.  In the materialist theory of
> mind that is provided by physical time, the evolution parameter of the wave
> function.  I think that means that in your theory you have to derive time
> in order to locate 'thoughts' or 'observer moments'; they are no givens
> that you can assume.
>
> Brent
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the
> Google Groups "Everything List" group.
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> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
>



-- 

Kindest Regards,

Stephen Paul King

Senior Researcher

Mobile: (864) 567-3099

stephe...@provensecure.com

 http://www.provensecure.us/

 “This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the use of
the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain
information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged, confidential and
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immediately.”

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Re: A question for Bruno