### Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Hi Hal,

You say my theory is a subset of yours. I don't understand. I have no
theory, just a deductive argument that IF we are (digital) machine then
the physical world is in our head. Then I show how a Universal Turing
Machine can discover it in its own head. This makes comp, or
variants, testable.

I have no theory (beside theory of number and machine), I'm just
listening to the machine. That's all. Then I compare the comp-physics
with empirical physics.

Do you grasp the Universal Dovetailer Argument? Ask if not.

Regards,

Bruno

Le 20-févr.-07, à 04:42, Hal Ruhl a écrit :

Hi Bruno:

At 05:43 AM 2/19/2007, you wrote:

Le 18-févr.-07, à 03:33, Hal Ruhl a écrit :

Hi Bruno:

approach.

The first has to do with the process of making a list.

The assumption is:

Making a list of items [which could be some of
the elements of a set for example] is always a
process of making a one to one mapping of the
items to some of the counting numbers such as:

1 - an item
2 - an item not previously on the list
3 - an item not previously on the list
.
.
.
n - last item and it was not previously on the list

I don' t see clearly an assumption here. I guess you are assuming
existence of things capable of being put in a list.

What I am trying to do is establish what making a
list is in my model and does it have any mathematical credence.

I make it an assumption because some may believe
that make a list means something different.

Effectively? then
why not use the Wi (cf Cutland's book or older explanations I have
try
to be just informal.

See below

My second assumption is:

Objects [such as states of universes for example] have properties.

You talk like if it was an axiomatic. A good test to see if it is an
axiomatic consists to change the primitive words you are using by
arbitrary words. You are saying glass of bears have trees and
garden.

Did you mean class not glass?

You can add that you mean that the term glass of bear is *intended
for states of universes,

I am not a mathematician so I do not quite understand the above.

but recall the goal is to provide an
explanation for the appearance of the states of universes.

If I understand you, that comes later in the walk through of my model

In general
properties are modelized by sets. It is ok to presuppose some naive
set
theory, but then you axiomatic has to be clean.

See below

My third assumption is:

All of the properties it is possible for objects to have can be
listed.

I guess you assume church thesis, and you are talking about effective
properties.

To me at this point the Church Thesis is an
ingredient in some of the possible state
succession sequences allowed in my model.

I mean all properties I do not know if that is
the same as your effective properties.

My fourth assumption is:

The list of possible properties of objects is countably infinite.

? (lists are supposed to be countably infinite (or finite)).

This is my point above - to list inherently a
countably infinite [as max length] process.

I would add that my third assumption becomes more
important later as one of the keys to my model's dynamic.

Conclusions so far:
[All possible objects are defined by all the sub lists of the full
list.]
[The number of objects is uncountably infinite]

What is the full list?

The list of all possible properties of objects.

I will stop there for now and await comments.

As to the remainder of the post:

In the above I have not reached the point of
deriving the dynamic of my model but I am not
focusing on computations when I say that any
succession of states is allowed.  Logically
related successions are allowed.  Successions
displaying any degree of randomness are also allowed.

I have already mentionned that comp entails some strong form of (first
person) randomness. Indeed, a priori to much.

Yes we have discussed this before, and it is one
of the reasons I continue to believe that your approach is a sub set
of mine.

I know it has taken a long time for me to reach a
level in my model where I could even begin to use
an axiom based description and I appreciate your patience.

I would like to finish the walk through of my
model before discussing white rabbits and observation.

I am really sorry Hall. It looks you want to be both informal and
formal. It does not help me to understand what you are trying to say.

I have read that it takes 10 years of focused
practice to become an expert in a given sub discipline.

At this point in my practice of engineering I am
on my way to becoming an expert in a fifth sub discipline.

I hope you can understand why I must continue to
find a path to the development and expression of
my ideas in this venue that is short of becoming
an expert in mathematical

### Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Thanks, Bruno, lots of remarkable notions in your remarks (I mean: I can
write remarks to them 0 sorry for the pun). Let me interject in Italics
below.
John

On 2/5/07, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

Hi John,

Le 03-févr.-07, à 17:20, John Mikes a écrit :

Stathis, Bruno,

This summary sounds fine if I accept to 'let words go'. Is there a
way to
'understand' (=use with comprehension) the 'words' used here without
the
'technical' acceptance of the theoretical platform?

I am not sure. Avoiding technical acceptance of a theoretical platform
can be done for presenting result, not really for discussing about
them.

Before discussing, I want to 'understand' - definitely without first
'accepting' the platform I may discuss. One has to be able to express ideas
for people who do not know them in advance.

There are sacrosanct 'words' used without explaining them (over and
over again?, BUT
at least once for the benefit of that newcomer 'alien' who comes from
another vista' ,
like

(absolute?) probability - is there such a thing as probability, the
figment that
if it happend x times it WILL happen the (X+one)th time as well?

This is inductive inference, not probability.

There are probability-discussions going on on  2 lists. aLL FALL into your
term. Do you have an example for probability (as pointed out from a
muiltitude of possible occurrences)?

combined with
the statistical hoax of counting from select members in a limited
group the version
'A' models and assuming its 'probability'?

That is why to use probability and/or any uncertainty measure we have
to be clear about the axioms we are willing to admit, at least for the
sake of some argument.

I do not accept 'axioms', they are postulated to make a theoretical position
feasible. I will come back to this at your 'numbers'.

observer moment (observer, for that matter), whether the moment is a
time-concept
in it and the 'observer' must be conscious (btw: identifying
'conscious')

The expression observer moment has originated with Nick Bostrom, in
context similar to the doomsday argument. I would call them first
person observer moment. I will try to explain how to translate them in
comp.

Translate it please first into plain English. Without those symbols which
may be looked up in half an hour just to find 8 other ones in the
explanation which then can be looked up to find 5-6 further ones in each and
so on.
this is the reason for my FIRST par question.

number (in the broader sense, yet applied as real integers) (Btw: are
the 'non-Arabic'
numbers also numbers? the figments of evolutionary languages
alp[habetical or not?
Is zero a number? Was not in Platonia - a millennium before its
invention(?!)

Number, by default are the so called natural number: 0, 1, 2, 3, 4,
...
They correspond to the number of strokes in the following sequence of
sets:
{ }, { I }, { II }, { III }, {  }, { I  }, { II  }, {
III  }, {   }, etc.

Does that mean that you cannot distinguish whether 3, 30, 101010, 120, 1002,
etcetera, ALL SYMBOLISED BY {III}   (plus the unmarked zeroes)
(You did not include the hiatus and position, as number, as I see).
Which would nicely fit into the Number=God statement, as infinite
variations of infinite many meanings..

Zero is a number by definition. But this is just a question of
definition. For the Greeks number begins with three. Like the adjective
numerous still rarely applies when only two things are referred too.

Like Teen(ager) starts at 13. Early development counted to 5, (fingers?)
above that it was many. In Russian there is a singular and a  dual case,
then a 'small plural' for 3,4,5, then comes the big plural 6-10 in every
decimal size repeatedly.  Ancient Hungarian etc. music was pentatonal. Now
we are decimalic (for practical reasons, except for some backward countries,
e.g. USA) - our toddler computers are binary. So I presume (induction-wise)
that there will be developed other number-systems as well in the future,
unless we accept humbly to be omniscient and sit at the top of the epistemic
enrichment.

The 'extensions' of machine into (loebian etc.) [non?]-machine, like
comp into the nondigital

? comp does not go out of the digital, except from a first person point
of view (but that is an hard technical point, to be sure).

Do you deny the analogue computing? or(!!) transcribe the participants of
any analogy into numbers? I called above the digital computing  toddler.

In english I would define a universal (digital) machine, by a
digital machine potentially capable of emulating (simulating perfectly)
any other digital machine from a description of it. Today's computers
and interpreters are typical example of such hard and soft
(respectively) universal machines. Now a universal digital machine is
lobian when she knows that she is universal. Defining knows has to
be a bit

### Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Hi Bruno:

As to my grasp of the UDA I think I understood it at one time well
enough for my purpose but that will become clearer as I progress
through my model.   There are not too many more steps.

Examining the complete list of possible properties of objects we
should find Empty of all information.

This would on a sub list.   It would from at least part of the sub
list that could be assigned the name The Nothing or just Nothing.

The Nothing would also be incomplete if there was a meaningful
question it must answer.  The question would be Can The Nothing
sustain its of property of being empty of information?  It can not
this question so its incompleteness is unstable.  It must eventually
eat its way into the rest of the list so to speak - eventually having
an countably infinite number of properties.  This is the source of my
model's dynamic.

The list itself has properties and these are on a sub list.

We actually do not need the list if we allow for simplicity that the
objects it and its sub lists define are themselves the sufficient
elements of the model.  The list is then an object and contains
itself.  It is infinitely nested.  Each nesting has its unstably
incomplete Nothing.  An infinite nesting of dynamic potential.

If the list is complete which seems certain then it should be [I
believe] inconsistent [will answer all questions all ways] which we
have touched on before.  The inconsistency is inherited by the
dynamic so the dynamic  has a random content.

All levels of randomness of trips to completeness are allowed.

A UD trace if I understand it correctly would be equivalent to a
Nothing on a reasonably monotonic trip to completeness.

Yours

Hal Ruhl

At 12:10 PM 2/20/2007, you wrote:

Hi Hal,

You say my theory is a subset of yours. I don't understand. I have no
theory, just a deductive argument that IF we are (digital) machine then
the physical world is in our head. Then I show how a Universal Turing
Machine can discover it in its own head. This makes comp, or
variants, testable.

I have no theory (beside theory of number and machine), I'm just
listening to the machine. That's all. Then I compare the comp-physics
with empirical physics.

Do you grasp the Universal Dovetailer Argument? Ask if not.

Regards,

Bruno

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### Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Le 18-févr.-07, à 03:33, Hal Ruhl a écrit :

Hi Bruno:

In response I will start with some assumptions central to my approach.

The first has to do with the process of making a list.

The assumption is:

Making a list of items [which could be some of
the elements of a set for example] is always a
process of making a one to one mapping of the
items to some of the counting numbers such as:

1 - an item
2 - an item not previously on the list
3 - an item not previously on the list
.
.
.
n - last item and it was not previously on the list

I don' t see clearly an assumption here. I guess you are assuming
existence of things capable of being put in a list. Effectively? then
why not use the Wi (cf Cutland's book or older explanations I have
provided on the list. Help yourself with Podniek's page perhaps, or try
to be just informal.

My second assumption is:

Objects [such as states of universes for example] have properties.

You talk like if it was an axiomatic. A good test to see if it is an
axiomatic consists to change the primitive words you are using by
arbitrary words. You are saying glass of bears have trees and garden.
You can add that you mean that the term glass of bear is *intended
for states of universes, but recall the goal is to provide an
explanation for the appearance of the states of universes. In general
properties are modelized by sets. It is ok to presuppose some naive set
theory, but then you axiomatic has to be clean.

My third assumption is:

All of the properties it is possible for objects to have can be listed.

I guess you assume church thesis, and you are talking about effective
properties.

My fourth assumption is:

The list of possible properties of objects is countably infinite.

? (lists are supposed to be countably infinite (or finite)).

Conclusions so far:
[All possible objects are defined by all the sub lists of the full
list.]
[The number of objects is uncountably infinite]

What is the full list?

I will stop there for now and await comments.

As to the remainder of the post:

In the above I have not reached the point of
deriving the dynamic of my model but I am not
focusing on computations when I say that any
succession of states is allowed.  Logically
related successions are allowed.  Successions
displaying any degree of randomness are also allowed.

I have already mentionned that comp entails some strong form of (first
person) randomness. Indeed, a priori to much.

I would like to finish the walk through of my
model before discussing white rabbits and observation.

I am really sorry Hall. It looks you want to be both informal and
formal. It does not help me to understand what you are trying to say.

Bruno

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### Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Hi Bruno:

At 05:43 AM 2/19/2007, you wrote:

Le 18-févr.-07, à 03:33, Hal Ruhl a écrit :

Hi Bruno:

In response I will start with some assumptions central to my approach.

The first has to do with the process of making a list.

The assumption is:

Making a list of items [which could be some of
the elements of a set for example] is always a
process of making a one to one mapping of the
items to some of the counting numbers such as:

1 - an item
2 - an item not previously on the list
3 - an item not previously on the list
.
.
.
n - last item and it was not previously on the list

I don' t see clearly an assumption here. I guess you are assuming
existence of things capable of being put in a list.

What I am trying to do is establish what making a
list is in my model and does it have any mathematical credence.

I make it an assumption because some may believe
that make a list means something different.

Effectively? then
why not use the Wi (cf Cutland's book or older explanations I have
provided on the list. Help yourself with Podniek's page perhaps, or try
to be just informal.

See below

My second assumption is:

Objects [such as states of universes for example] have properties.

You talk like if it was an axiomatic. A good test to see if it is an
axiomatic consists to change the primitive words you are using by
arbitrary words. You are saying glass of bears have trees and garden.

Did you mean class not glass?

You can add that you mean that the term glass of bear is *intended
for states of universes,

I am not a mathematician so I do not quite understand the above.

but recall the goal is to provide an
explanation for the appearance of the states of universes.

If I understand you, that comes later in the walk through of my model

In general
properties are modelized by sets. It is ok to presuppose some naive set
theory, but then you axiomatic has to be clean.

See below

My third assumption is:

All of the properties it is possible for objects to have can be listed.

I guess you assume church thesis, and you are talking about effective
properties.

To me at this point the Church Thesis is an
ingredient in some of the possible state
succession sequences allowed in my model.

I mean all properties I do not know if that is
the same as your effective properties.

My fourth assumption is:

The list of possible properties of objects is countably infinite.

? (lists are supposed to be countably infinite (or finite)).

This is my point above - to list inherently a
countably infinite [as max length] process.

I would add that my third assumption becomes more
important later as one of the keys to my model's dynamic.

Conclusions so far:
[All possible objects are defined by all the sub lists of the full
list.]
[The number of objects is uncountably infinite]

What is the full list?

The list of all possible properties of objects.

I will stop there for now and await comments.

As to the remainder of the post:

In the above I have not reached the point of
deriving the dynamic of my model but I am not
focusing on computations when I say that any
succession of states is allowed.  Logically
related successions are allowed.  Successions
displaying any degree of randomness are also allowed.

I have already mentionned that comp entails some strong form of (first
person) randomness. Indeed, a priori to much.

Yes we have discussed this before, and it is one
of the reasons I continue to believe that your approach is a sub set of mine.

I know it has taken a long time for me to reach a
level in my model where I could even begin to use
an axiom based description and I appreciate your patience.

I would like to finish the walk through of my
model before discussing white rabbits and observation.

I am really sorry Hall. It looks you want to be both informal and
formal. It does not help me to understand what you are trying to say.

I have read that it takes 10 years of focused
practice to become an expert in a given sub discipline.

At this point in my practice of engineering I am
on my way to becoming an expert in a fifth sub discipline.

I hope you can understand why I must continue to
find a path to the development and expression of
my ideas in this venue that is short of becoming
an expert in mathematical expression.

I appreciate your help and perhaps with a little
more of it I can reach what you are asking for.

Perhaps it is also a good idea to exhaust the
idea of whether or not your approach is or is not
a sub set of another approach.

Yours

Hal Ruhl

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### Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Hi Bruno:

In response I will start with some assumptions central to my approach.

The first has to do with the process of making a list.

The assumption is:

Making a list of items [which could be some of
the elements of a set for example] is always a
process of making a one to one mapping of the
items to some of the counting numbers such as:

1 - an item
2 - an item not previously on the list
3 - an item not previously on the list
.
.
.
n - last item and it was not previously on the list

My second assumption is:

Objects [such as states of universes for example] have properties.

My third assumption is:

All of the properties it is possible for objects to have can be listed.

My fourth assumption is:

The list of possible properties of objects is countably infinite.

Conclusions so far:
[All possible objects are defined by all the sub lists of the full list.]
[The number of objects is uncountably infinite]

I will stop there for now and await comments.

As to the remainder of the post:

In the above I have not reached the point of
deriving the dynamic of my model but I am not
focusing on computations when I say that any
succession of states is allowed.  Logically
related successions are allowed.  Successions
displaying any degree of randomness are also allowed.

I would like to finish the walk through of my
model before discussing white rabbits and observation.

Yours

Hal Ruhl

At 09:49 AM 2/12/2007, you wrote:

Hi Hal,

Le 12-févr.-07, à 03:37, Hal Ruhl a écrit :

Hi Bruno:

I was using some of the main components of my
model to indicate that it allows white rabbits of
all degree.  Any succession of states is
allowed.  If the presence of SAS in certain
successions requires a certain family of white
rabbit distributions then these distributions are present.

Well, thanks for the white rabbit, but the current goal consists in
explaining why we don't see them. When you say any succession of states
is allowed, are you talking about computations? In computations the
states are logically related, and not all succession of states can be
allowed, or you talk about something else, but then what exactly?
What are your assumption, and what are your conclusion? I know you have
axiomatic way of talking, but not the axiomatic way of reasoning. This
makes your talk neither informally convincing (granted some sharable
intuition) nor formally clear. I have always been willing to attribute
to you some intuition, I continue doing so, and I have suggested to you
some books capable of providing helps toward much clarity, which is
what is needed to communicate to others, especially when working on
extremely  hard subject like what we are discussing.
I hope that Jason, who kindly proposes some act of systematization,

Regards,

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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### Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Hi John:

This is what brought me to the idea that while
all objects have simultaneous existence they
also can have degrees of hyper existence. Hyper
existence is like a tag that indicates states
that are, those that are becoming, and those
that have recently been [so to speak].

Hal Ruhl

At 04:26 PM 2/15/2007, you wrote:
Hal:
you seem to have mastered the problem I got
stuck with in the 'timelessness' speculation
(Any succession of states is allowed. )
I could not handle successions in reverse, if
time (as an indicator of succession) is cut out.
I did not want to resort to an atemporal system
where ALL steps of processes (what is a process???) live side by side together.

John M
- Original Message -
From: mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]Hal Ruhl
Sent: Sunday, February 11, 2007 9:37 PM
Subject: Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Hi Bruno:

I was using some of the main components of my
model to indicate that it allows white rabbits of
all degree.  Any succession of states is
allowed.  If the presence of SAS in certain
successions requires a certain family of white
rabbit distributions then these distributions are present.

Hal Ruhl

At 04:23 AM 2/9/2007, you wrote:

Le 07-févr.-07, à 02:45, Hal Ruhl a écrit :

Given an uncountably infinite number of objects generated from a
countably infinite list of properties and an uncountably infinite
number of UD's in the metaphor I can not see an issue with this re my
model.  As I said above Our World can be as precisely as random as
it needs to be.

I don't understand.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

No virus found in this incoming message.
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### Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Hi Hal,

Le 12-févr.-07, à 03:37, Hal Ruhl a écrit :

Hi Bruno:

I was using some of the main components of my
model to indicate that it allows white rabbits of
all degree.  Any succession of states is
allowed.  If the presence of SAS in certain
successions requires a certain family of white
rabbit distributions then these distributions are present.

Well, thanks for the white rabbit, but the current goal consists in
explaining why we don't see them. When you say any succession of states
is allowed, are you talking about computations? In computations the
states are logically related, and not all succession of states can be
allowed, or you talk about something else, but then what exactly?
What are your assumption, and what are your conclusion? I know you have
axiomatic way of talking, but not the axiomatic way of reasoning. This
makes your talk neither informally convincing (granted some sharable
intuition) nor formally clear. I have always been willing to attribute
to you some intuition, I continue doing so, and I have suggested to you
some books capable of providing helps toward much clarity, which is
what is needed to communicate to others, especially when working on
extremely  hard subject like what we are discussing.
I hope that Jason, who kindly proposes some act of systematization,

Regards,

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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### Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Hi Bruno:

I was using some of the main components of my
model to indicate that it allows white rabbits of
all degree.  Any succession of states is
allowed.  If the presence of SAS in certain
successions requires a certain family of white
rabbit distributions then these distributions are present.

Hal Ruhl

At 04:23 AM 2/9/2007, you wrote:

Le 07-févr.-07, à 02:45, Hal Ruhl a écrit :

Given an uncountably infinite number of objects generated from a
countably infinite list of properties and an uncountably infinite
number of UD's in the metaphor I can not see an issue with this re my
model.  As I said above Our World can be as precisely as random as
it needs to be.

I don't understand.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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### Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Le 06-févr.-07, à 03:06, Russell Standish a écrit :

The informatic destructive effects are due to conflicting
information reducing the total amount of information.

Perhaps you could expand?

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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### Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Le 07-févr.-07, à 02:45, Hal Ruhl a écrit :

Given an uncountably infinite number of objects generated from a
countably infinite list of properties and an uncountably infinite
number of UD's in the metaphor I can not see an issue with this re my
model.  As I said above Our World can be as precisely as random as
it needs to be.

I don't understand.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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### Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Hi, Hal:
and you really think there would be an end? Look at this list with allegedly
like-minded chaps and no end of picking on 'everything'. Include
like-minded lists - meaning 'unlike' really - and the internet would fill
up.
Does it make a difference to argue here, or at another site?
Our (meaning the potential scientific crowd) views are so diversified (what
a nice expression for 'underdeveloped') with diverse angles to look at it
FROM, that a wider agreement is IMO hopeless. Even with the reason of 'a'
George Levy's clarity. I introduced this list to a friend from another list
(complexity) who is math-phys minded and his refusal came: these guys are
'too' Platonistic for me.
I think Jason's idea is great, if he can do it we will have a  maybe wider
sortiment of ideas, I doubt a possibility of crystallized-out agreed upon
identifications. But I am a skeptic.
Best regards
John

On 2/7/07, Hal Ruhl [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

Hi John:

I think the idea before was to provide an acronym list and also give each
person or like minded group a limit of a few pages in the FAQ document in
which to present a summary of their point of view.

Hal Ruhl

At 11:59 AM 2/7/2007, you wrote:

Hal:
you really believe that anybody could provide responses acceptable for all
others? (I did not say understandable)
Everybody sits in his own mindset and speaks his own scientific religion
(=scientific belief system) - [said so, whether I aggraveted  now (again)
Russell or not.]
We are in a pretty liquid exchange-state (liquid OM).
Otherwise the idea is excellent, with multiple choice.
John
- Original Message -
From: Hal Ruhl [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Tuesday, February 06, 2007 8:49 PM
Subject: Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Hi John:

Long ago there was some effort to write a FAQ for the list.  Perhaps we
should give it another try.

Hal Ruhl

At 11:30 AM 2/6/2007, you wrote:

Hal and list:
I do not think anybody fully understands what other listers write, even
if one thinks so.
Or is it only my handicap?
John M - Original Message - From: Hal Ruhl[EMAIL PROTECTED] To:
everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Monday, February 05, 2007 10:24 PM
Subject:
Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Hi Bruno:
I do not think I fully understand what you are saying.
Suppose your model bans white rabbits from its evolving universes -
meaning I take it that all successive states are fully logical
consequences of their prior state.
I would see this as a selection of one possibility from two.
just seems to reinforce the idea that it is a sub set in order to avoid
the information generating selection in the full set.
Yours
Hal Ruhl

At 11:30 AM 2/5/2007, you wrote:

Le 05-févr.-07, à 00:46, Hal Ruhl a écrit : As far as I can tell
from this, my model may include Bruno's model as   a subset.   This
means that even if my theory makes disappear all (1-person) white
rabbits, you will still have to justify that your overset does not
reintroduce new one.  Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/

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### Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Hal:
you really believe that anybody could provide responses acceptable for all
others? (I did not say understandable)
Everybody sits in his own mindset and speaks his own scientific religion
(=scientific belief system) - [said so, whether I aggraveted  now (again)
Russell or not.]
We are in a pretty liquid exchange-state (liquid OM).
Otherwise the idea is excellent, with multiple choice.
John
- Original Message -
From: Hal Ruhl
Sent: Tuesday, February 06, 2007 8:49 PM
Subject: Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Hi John:

Long ago there was some effort to write a FAQ for the list.  Perhaps we
should give it another try.

Hal Ruhl

At 11:30 AM 2/6/2007, you wrote:

Hal and list:
I do not think anybody fully understands what other listers write, even
if one thinks so.
Or is it only my handicap?
John M

- Original Message -

From: Hal Ruhl

Sent: Monday, February 05, 2007 10:24 PM

Subject: Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Hi Bruno:

I do not think I fully understand what you are saying.

Suppose your model bans white rabbits from its

evolving universes - meaning I take it that all

successive states are fully logical consequences of their prior state.

I would see this as a selection of one possibility from two.

result re your model, this just seems to

reinforce the idea that it is a sub set in order

to avoid the information generating selection in the full set.

Yours

Hal Ruhl

At 11:30 AM 2/5/2007, you wrote:

Le 05-févr.-07, à 00:46, Hal Ruhl a écrit :

As far as I can tell from this, my model may include Bruno's model as

a subset.

This means that even if my theory makes disappear all (1-person)

white rabbits, you will still have to justify that your overset does

not reintroduce new one.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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### Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Hi John:

I think the idea before was to provide an acronym
list and also give each person or like minded
group a limit of a few pages in the FAQ document
in which to present a summary of their point of view.

Hal Ruhl

At 11:59 AM 2/7/2007, you wrote:
Hal:
you really believe that anybody could provide
responses acceptable for all others? (I did not say understandable)
Everybody sits in his own mindset and speaks his
own scientific religion (=scientific belief
system) - [said so, whether I aggraveted  now (again) Russell or not.]
We are in a pretty liquid exchange-state (liquid OM).
Otherwise the idea is excellent, with multiple choice.
John
- Original Message -
From: mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]Hal Ruhl
Sent: Tuesday, February 06, 2007 8:49 PM
Subject: Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Hi John:

Long ago there was some effort to write a FAQ
for the list.  Perhaps we should give it another try.

Hal Ruhl

At 11:30 AM 2/6/2007, you wrote:
Hal and list:
I do not think anybody fully understands what
other listers write, even if one thinks so.
Or is it only my handicap?
John M
- Original Message -
From: mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]Hal Ruhl
To:
Sent: Monday, February 05, 2007 10:24 PM
Subject: Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Hi Bruno:
I do not think I fully understand what you are saying.
Suppose your model bans white rabbits from its
evolving universes - meaning I take it that all
successive states are fully logical consequences of their prior state.
I would see this as a selection of one possibility from two.
result re your model, this just seems to
reinforce the idea that it is a sub set in order
to avoid the information generating selection in the full set.
Yours
Hal Ruhl

At 11:30 AM 2/5/2007, you wrote:

Le 05-févr.-07, à 00:46, Hal Ruhl a écrit :

As far as I can tell from this, my model may include Bruno's model as
a subset.

This means that even if my theory makes disappear all (1-person)
white rabbits, you will still have to justify that your overset does
not reintroduce new one.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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- Release Date: 2/6/2007 5:52 PM

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### Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Le 06-févr.-07, à 05:25, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :

Hal Ruhl writes:

Hi Bruno:

I do not think I fully understand what you are saying.

Suppose your model bans white rabbits from its
evolving universes - meaning I take it that all
successive states are fully logical consequences of their prior
state.

You mean physical consequences or something similar, don't you? I
don't see anything logically inconsistent about a talking white rabbit
or even the atoms of my keyboard reassembling themselves into a
fire-breathing dragon.

I agree with Stathis. Much more, I can prove to you that the sound
lobian machine agrees with Stathis!
It is a key point: there is nothing inconsistent with my seeing and
measuring white rabbits (cf dreams, videa, ...). Both with QM and/or
comp, we can only hope such events are relatively rare.
Now, a naive reading of the UD can give the feeling that with comp
white rabbits are not rare at all, and that is why I insist at some
point that we have to take more fully into account the objective
constraints of theoretical computer science and mathematical logic
(some of which are counter-intuitive and even necessarily so).

Hal Ruhl continued:

I would see this as a selection of one possibility from two.

result re your model, this just seems to
reinforce the idea that it is a sub set in order
to avoid the information generating selection in the full set.

It *could* be the contrary. In quantum mechanics a case can be given
that it *is* the contrary. It is by taking the full set of (relative
histories) that the quantum phase randomization can eliminate the
quantum aberrant histories (cf Feynman paths).
It works with the QM because of the existence of destructive
interferences, and somehow what the computationalist has to justify is
the (first person plural) appearance of such destructive effects.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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### Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Hal and list:
I do not think anybody fully understands what other listers write, even if
one thinks so.
Or is it only my handicap?
John M
- Original Message -
From: Hal Ruhl
Sent: Monday, February 05, 2007 10:24 PM
Subject: Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Hi Bruno:

I do not think I fully understand what you are saying.

Suppose your model bans white rabbits from its
evolving universes - meaning I take it that all
successive states are fully logical consequences of their prior state.

I would see this as a selection of one possibility from two.

result re your model, this just seems to
reinforce the idea that it is a sub set in order
to avoid the information generating selection in the full set.

Yours

Hal Ruhl

At 11:30 AM 2/5/2007, you wrote:

Le 05-févr.-07, à 00:46, Hal Ruhl a écrit :

As far as I can tell from this, my model may include Bruno's model as
a subset.

This means that even if my theory makes disappear all (1-person)
white rabbits, you will still have to justify that your overset does
not reintroduce new one.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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### Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

On Tue, Feb 06, 2007 at 12:23:19PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:

It *could* be the contrary. In quantum mechanics a case can be given
that it *is* the contrary. It is by taking the full set of (relative
histories) that the quantum phase randomization can eliminate the
quantum aberrant histories (cf Feynman paths).
It works with the QM because of the existence of destructive
interferences, and somehow what the computationalist has to justify is
the (first person plural) appearance of such destructive effects.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

The informatic destructive effects are due to conflicting
information reducing the total amount of information.

If I have the sentence the sheep is totally black and the sheep is
totally white, then I have rather less information about the sheep
than if I had (say) the sheep is totally black.

Addition of information obeys the triangle inequality

I(a+b) \leq I(a) + I(b)

Curiously, addition of wave amplitudes in QM also obey the triangle
inequality. I suspect there is more to this connection than mere
coincidence, although I haven't spent too much time trying to work out
the details.

Cheers

--

A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Mathematics
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au

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### Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Hi Bruno:

At 06:23 AM 2/6/2007, you wrote:

Le 06-févr.-07, à 05:25, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :

Hal Ruhl writes:

Hi Bruno:

I do not think I fully understand what you are saying.

Suppose your model bans white rabbits from its
evolving universes - meaning I take it that all
successive states are fully logical consequences of their prior state.

You mean physical consequences or something
similar, don't you? I don't see anything
logically inconsistent about a talking white
rabbit or even the atoms of my keyboard
reassembling themselves into a fire-breathing dragon.

My model taps the inconsistency of a complete
collection of information to give the dynamic of
its universe state to state succession at least
some random content.  There is no conflict in my
approach with talking white rabbits or uncommonly
evolving keyboards.  What I indicated is that all
I needed to encompass our world in a UD metaphor
of a sub set of my model was a compatible ongoing
intersection of a set [an infinite set most likely] of UD traces.

The picture is a set of say twenty traces all
arriving at twenty Our World compatible
successive states simultaneously.  If the traces
assign a compatible degree of hyper existence to
their respective states then the result is twenty
immediately successive states with a rising then
falling degree of Hyper existence.  The
intersecting traces are not even necessarily
logically related just compatibly coincident for
one of Our World's ticks so to speak.  At the
next tick of our world a completely different
set of twenty traces can be involved.  Our
World can be precisely as random as it needs to be.

I agree with Stathis. Much more, I can prove to
you that the sound lobian machine agrees with Stathis!
It is a key point: there is nothing inconsistent
with my seeing and measuring white rabbits (cf
dreams, videa, ...). Both with QM and/or comp,
we can only hope such events are relatively rare.
Now, a naive reading of the UD can give the
feeling that with comp white rabbits are not
rare at all, and that is why I insist at some
point that we have to take more fully into
account the objective constraints of
theoretical computer science and mathematical
logic (some of which are counter-intuitive and even necessarily so).

Hal Ruhl continued:

I would see this as a selection of one possibility from two.

result re your model, this just seems to
reinforce the idea that it is a sub set in order
to avoid the information generating selection in the full set.

It *could* be the contrary. In quantum mechanics
a case can be given that it *is* the contrary.
It is by taking the full set of (relative
histories) that the quantum phase randomization
can eliminate the quantum aberrant histories (cf Feynman paths).
It works with the QM because of the existence of
destructive interferences, and somehow what the
computationalist has to justify is the (first
person plural) appearance of such destructive effects.

Bruno

Given an uncountably infinite number of objects
generated from a countably infinite list of
properties and an uncountably infinite number of
UD's in the metaphor I can not see an issue with
this re my model.  As I said above Our World
can be as precisely as random as it needs to be.

Hal Ruhl

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### Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Hi John:

Long ago there was some effort to write a FAQ for
the list.  Perhaps we should give it another try.

Hal Ruhl

At 11:30 AM 2/6/2007, you wrote:
Hal and list:
I do not think anybody fully understands what
other listers write, even if one thinks so.
Or is it only my handicap?
John M
- Original Message -
From: mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]Hal Ruhl
Sent: Monday, February 05, 2007 10:24 PM
Subject: Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Hi Bruno:

I do not think I fully understand what you are saying.

Suppose your model bans white rabbits from its
evolving universes - meaning I take it that all
successive states are fully logical consequences of their prior state.

I would see this as a selection of one possibility from two.

result re your model, this just seems to
reinforce the idea that it is a sub set in order
to avoid the information generating selection in the full set.

Yours

Hal Ruhl

At 11:30 AM 2/5/2007, you wrote:

Le 05-févr.-07, à 00:46, Hal Ruhl a écrit :

As far as I can tell from this, my model may include Bruno's model as
a subset.

This means that even if my theory makes disappear all (1-person)
white rabbits, you will still have to justify that your overset does
not reintroduce new one.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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### Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Just to clarify - in the metaphor a UD trace that assigns a Hyper
Existence of say 0.2 does so to all states it lands on because the
UD is that type of UD.

Hal Ruhl

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### Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Hi John,

Le 03-févr.-07, à 17:20, John Mikes a écrit :

Stathis, Bruno,

This summary sounds fine if I accept to 'let words go'. Is there a
way to
'understand' (=use with comprehension) the 'words' used here without
the
'technical' acceptance of the theoretical platform?

I am not sure. Avoiding technical acceptance of a theoretical platform
can be done for presenting result, not really for discussing about
them.

There are sacrosanct 'words' used without explaining them (over and
over again?, BUT
at least once for the benefit of that newcomer 'alien' who comes from
another vista' ,
like

(absolute?) probability - is there such a thing as probability, the
figment that
if it happend x times it WILL happen the (X+one)th time as well?

This is inductive inference, not probability.

combined with
the statistical hoax of counting from select members in a limited
group the version
'A' models  and assuming its 'probability'?

That is why to use probability and/or any uncertainty measure we have
to be clear about the axioms we are willing to admit, at least for the
sake of some argument.

observer moment (observer, for that matter), whether the moment is a
time-concept
in it and the 'observer' must be conscious (btw: identifying
'conscious')

The expression observer moment has originated with Nick Bostrom, in
context similar to the doomsday argument. I would call them first
person observer moment. I will try to explain how to translate them in
comp.

number (in the broader sense, yet applied as real integers) (Btw: are
the 'non-Arabic'
numbers also numbers? the figments of evolutionary languages
alp[habetical or not?
Is zero a number? Was not in Platonia - a millennium before its
invention(?!)

Number, by default are the so called natural number: 0, 1, 2, 3, 4,
...
They correspond to the number of strokes in the following sequence of
sets:
{ }, { I }, { II }, { III }, {  }, { I  }, { II  }, {
III  }, {   }, etc.

Zero is a number by definition. But this is just a question of
definition. For the Greeks number begins with three. Like the adjective
numerous still rarely applies when only two things are referred too.

The 'extensions' of machine into (loebian etc.) [non?]-machine, like
comp into the nondigital

? comp does not go out of the digital, except from a first person point
of view (but that is an hard technical point, to be sure).

In english I would define a universal (digital) machine, by a
digital machine potentially capable of emulating (simulating perfectly)
any other digital machine from a description of it. Today's computers
and interpreters are typical example of such hard and soft
(respectively) universal machines. Now a universal digital machine is
lobian when she knows that she is universal. Defining knows has to
be a bit technical. This is not at all an official definition. Look at
my SANE04 paper for a more offical definition. It is related to a sort
of placebo phenomenon. If we continue this conversation there will be
plenty of time to make this clear. But you are right to ask for
definition, or for more explanations.

and mixing our mental interpretations with what has been
interpreted (unknowable).

Don't hesitate to come back on this? Out of context I could say to much
things and then have to repeat it.

Just some picked examples promoting a not-so-technical glossary for
the rest of the world

Make a list, and send it. So we can think about. Not all

Bruno

John M

On 2/3/07, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED]
wrote:Bruno Marchal writes:

What is correct, and has been singled out by Stathis, is that comp
eludes the material implementation problem, given that we take all
abstract possible relationship between those objects, and they are
all
well defined as purely number theoretical relations. Note that this
is
something I have tried to explain to Jacques Mallah sometimes ago,
but
without much success. This does not make much sense in ASSA
approaches,
but, like George Levy I think, I don't believe in absolute
probability
of being me, or of living my current observer moment. Such a
probability can be given the value one (said George) but it is
close of
saying that the universe is here, which tells us nothing, really.
It is
like answering who are you? by I am me.

I'm satisfied with this summary. The physical implementation problem
is not
a problem when considering abstract machines.

Stathis Papaioannou

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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### Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

On Feb 2, 10:03 am, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

This is a bit ambiguous. The UD dovetails on all computations. Let us
write (comp i k j) for k-th step of computation i on input j.
One computation can then be identified (in a first approximation at
least) with a sequence like:
(comp 777 1 24) (comp 777 2 24) (comp 777 3 24) (comp 777 4 24) (comp
777 5 24) (comp 777 6 24) (comp 777 7 24) (comp 777 8 24) (comp 777 9
24) (comp 777 10 24)
This represents the computation of F_777(24), that is the 777th partial
recursive function on input 24.
Now we know that F_777(24) could be undefined, and that is why the UD
has to dovetetail. So the order of the states generated by the UD is
not, strictly speaking the order of states defining a computation.
Also, the UD is infinitely redundant: in particular the function F_777
has other code, for example , i.e. F_777 = F_. It could be that
the computation (comp 777 i 24) and (comp  i 24) are equivalent
(same algorithm) or completely different (different algorithm), but
actually it is not easy at all to define such equivalence relation
between computation an states.
I mean, even from a pure third person point of view, it is not obvious
to define computations and order on them.
Then, from a first person point of view, the difficulty is made bigger.
It could be, that although F_a and F_b computes different function (and
thus follows completely different algorithm), it could be that (comp a
234 24) and some sub-state of (comp b 34 1000), say, are equivalent
from a first person point of view, which needs to take into account all
the infinity of computations going through my current state.
So I'm afraid that at some point we have to take a more abstract route
(like with the combinators, which better represent possible
computations, or like with the lobian interview).
What is correct, and has been singled out by Stathis, is that comp
eludes the material implementation problem, given that we take all
abstract possible relationship between those objects, and they are all
well defined as purely number theoretical relations. Note that this is
something I have tried to explain to Jacques Mallah sometimes ago, but
without much success. This does not make much sense in ASSA approaches,
but, like George Levy I think, I don't believe in absolute probability
of being me, or of living my current observer moment. Such a
probability can be given the value one (said George) but it is close of
saying that the universe is here, which tells us nothing, really. It is
like answering who are you? by I am me.

Bruno,

Let me begin with saying that I believe in a form of computationalism
in that ultimate ensemble, or plato's heaven contains a turing machine
running every possible program.  I also beleive this universe is, on a
small enough scale, purely digital.  My question to you is, without
accepting some form of fundamental probability, how can the Universal
Dovetailer be preferred over Jürgen Schmidhuber's program?  Both the
UD and JS's iterative counting program will produce all possible
output states.  The difference to me is that every state is equally
likely under JS's program, while the UD will prefer some states and
evolutions of states.  The multiplicity of some states, to me, creates
a probability question.  Therefore it becomes meaningful to consider
what programs will contain the largest number of observer moments, and
how common will those programs be within the UD.

Best Regards,

Jason

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### Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Hi jason,

Le 05-févr.-07, à 17:05, Jason a écrit :

On Feb 2, 10:03 am, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

This is a bit ambiguous. The UD dovetails on all computations. Let us
write (comp i k j) for k-th step of computation i on input j.
One computation can then be identified (in a first approximation at
least) with a sequence like:
(comp 777 1 24) (comp 777 2 24) (comp 777 3 24) (comp 777 4 24) (comp
777 5 24) (comp 777 6 24) (comp 777 7 24) (comp 777 8 24) (comp 777 9
24) (comp 777 10 24)
This represents the computation of F_777(24), that is the 777th
partial
recursive function on input 24.
Now we know that F_777(24) could be undefined, and that is why the UD
has to dovetetail. So the order of the states generated by the UD is
not, strictly speaking the order of states defining a computation.
Also, the UD is infinitely redundant: in particular the function F_777
has other code, for example , i.e. F_777 = F_. It could be
that
the computation (comp 777 i 24) and (comp  i 24) are equivalent
(same algorithm) or completely different (different algorithm), but
actually it is not easy at all to define such equivalence relation
between computation an states.
I mean, even from a pure third person point of view, it is not obvious
to define computations and order on them.
Then, from a first person point of view, the difficulty is made
bigger.
It could be, that although F_a and F_b computes different function
(and
thus follows completely different algorithm), it could be that (comp a
234 24) and some sub-state of (comp b 34 1000), say, are equivalent
from a first person point of view, which needs to take into account
all
the infinity of computations going through my current state.
So I'm afraid that at some point we have to take a more abstract route
(like with the combinators, which better represent possible
computations, or like with the lobian interview).
What is correct, and has been singled out by Stathis, is that comp
eludes the material implementation problem, given that we take all
abstract possible relationship between those objects, and they are all
well defined as purely number theoretical relations. Note that this is
something I have tried to explain to Jacques Mallah sometimes ago, but
without much success. This does not make much sense in ASSA
approaches,
but, like George Levy I think, I don't believe in absolute probability
of being me, or of living my current observer moment. Such a
probability can be given the value one (said George) but it is close
of
saying that the universe is here, which tells us nothing, really. It
is
like answering who are you? by I am me.

Bruno,

Let me begin with saying that I believe in a form of computationalism
in that ultimate ensemble, or plato's heaven contains a turing machine
running every possible program.  I also beleive this universe is, on a
small enough scale, purely digital.  My question to you is, without
accepting some form of fundamental probability, how can the Universal
Dovetailer be preferred over Jürgen Schmidhuber's program?  Both the
UD and JS's iterative counting program will produce all possible
output states.  The difference to me is that every state is equally
likely under JS's program, while the UD will prefer some states and
evolutions of states.

JS great programmer, well I take it as an informal version of the UD.
I think Wei Dai proposed the counting algorithm as a sort of UD.
Whatever. As you describe the UD, it should be clear it renders justice
to the relative computational state, and is coherent with RSSA
(relative self-sampling assumption).
But the main difference between the UD, as it has to be used with comp,
and JS approach is that the UD Argument relies on the distinction
between first person and third person points of view (which is not done
by JS: see my conversation with him in the archive).

And then a result is that there is no primary physical universe, and
the appearance of a physical universe has to be an appearance of
something not entirely computable: If I am a machine then the UNIVERSE,
or GOD or WHAT'S-ITS-NAME is not a computable object.

Somehow, Schmidhuber develops a constructive physics. This can be
interesting, and can have application, but is useless for a theory of
evreything including the mind and persons.

The multiplicity of some states, to me, creates
a probability question.

For all of us, I think. Indeed, it was my purpose to show that if comp
is correct, the mind body problem, actually its  body problem part,  is
reduced partially into a relative probability question on first person
computational states/history.

Therefore it becomes meaningful to consider
what programs will contain the largest number of observer moments, and
how common will those programs be within the UD.

I think this is only partially correct due to the fact that you are
vague about the 1 or 3 - person distinction

### Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Le 05-févr.-07, à 00:46, Hal Ruhl a écrit :

As far as I can tell from this, my model may include Bruno's model as
a subset.

This means that even if my theory makes disappear all (1-person)
white rabbits, you will still have to justify that your overset does
not reintroduce new one.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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### Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

So now we have to find some way sto tackle the problem of finding the
right level of abstraction to pursue ...

Bruno

Le 03-févr.-07, à 10:05, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :

Bruno Marchal writes:

What is correct, and has been singled out by Stathis, is that comp
eludes the material implementation problem, given that we take all
abstract possible relationship between those objects, and they are
all
well defined as purely number theoretical relations. Note that this
is
something I have tried to explain to Jacques Mallah sometimes ago,
but
without much success. This does not make much sense in ASSA
approaches,
but, like George Levy I think, I don't believe in absolute
probability
of being me, or of living my current observer moment. Such a
probability can be given the value one (said George) but it is close
of
saying that the universe is here, which tells us nothing, really. It
is
like answering who are you? by I am me.

I'm satisfied with this summary. The physical implementation problem
is not
a problem when considering abstract machines.

Stathis Papaioannou

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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### Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Hi Bruno:

I do not think I fully understand what you are saying.

Suppose your model bans white rabbits from its
evolving universes - meaning I take it that all
successive states are fully logical consequences of their prior state.

I would see this as a selection of one possibility from two.

result re your model, this just seems to
reinforce the idea that it is a sub set in order
to avoid the information generating selection in the full set.

Yours

Hal Ruhl

At 11:30 AM 2/5/2007, you wrote:

Le 05-févr.-07, à 00:46, Hal Ruhl a écrit :

As far as I can tell from this, my model may include Bruno's model as
a subset.

This means that even if my theory makes disappear all (1-person)
white rabbits, you will still have to justify that your overset does
not reintroduce new one.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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### RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Hal Ruhl writes:

Hi Bruno:  I do not think I fully understand what you are saying.
Suppose your model bans white rabbits from its  evolving universes - meaning
I take it that all  successive states are fully logical consequences of
their prior state.
You mean physical consequences or something similar, don't you? I don't see
anything logically inconsistent about a talking white rabbit or even the atoms
of my keyboard reassembling themselves into a fire-breathing dragon.

Stathis Papaioannou
I would see this as a selection of one possibility from two.  Lets us say
reinforce the idea that it is a sub set in order  to avoid the information
generating selection in the full set.  Yours  Hal Ruhl   At 11:30 AM
2/5/2007, you wrote:   Le 05-févr.-07, à 00:46, Hal Ruhl a écrit :
As far as I can tell from this, my model may include Bruno's model as
a subset.   This means that even if my theory makes disappear all
(1-person) white rabbits, you will still have to justify that your overset
does not reintroduce new one.  Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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### Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Hi John:

Sorry I did not respond earlier.
Lately I do not have time to read the list posts and respond during the week.

At 04:02 PM 1/29/2007, you wrote:
*
You seem to accept 'observer moments' and their interaction - even
postulate one variable needed.

Observer moments and states of universes I take as being identical.

To say that they do not interact is a selection.  Selections create
information and I prefer the point of view that the top level system
should have zero net information.  The All [has many other names
suppose] has zero net information because it contains all
information.  I separate out of the information zero All for
examination a list of all properties that an object can have.   That
is I select a boundary in the All from among its infinite number of
boundaries.  My list being a list can be countably infinite and the
set of all its sub sets would then be uncountably infinite.  There
are then an uncountably infinite number of objects which can be taken
to be states of universes.

How long is an OM? a million years (cosmology) or a msec?

States of universes have permanent uniform existence.  The question
is how long can they have a non zero hyper existence.  The answer
is all values [to avoid more selection].

Even if it is a portion of the latter, it makes the existence quite
discontinuous - with all the difficulties in it. If it is
continuous, then how can we talk about 'moments'? Should we assign
an equal rate change to all existence (meaning: ONE selection for
the OM length)? If it can be ANY, varying from the infinitely short
to the other extreme, it would 'wash away' any sense of the meaning
of an Observer MOMENT concept.

My flow of hyper existence with its possible non binary pulse shapes
could make consciousness continuous for some sequences of
states.  SAS might find a universe state sequence in which the pulse
rises from zero to 1 and then back to zero in a many step stair case
fashion user friendly.

I think the OM is the figment of us, human observers, who want to
use an 'understandable' model. [Like: numbers (in the human logic sense).]

Then, in view of the resulting 'unfathomable', we 'complicate' these
models - originally created FOR comprehension - into
incomprehensibility. [The way as e.g. to bridge Bohm's Explicate to
the Implicate (by Nic de  Cusa's 2nd principle, left out by Bohm:
the Complicate - what I like to assign as math).]
*
That 'one' variable property you mention as needed for state-
interaction is IMO not necessarily  o n e  within our (present) comprehension.

I identify my list's sub sets as states of universes.  The
interaction variable I call hyper existence could be compared with a
UD trace.  When the trace lands on a state it gets a non zero hyper
existence.  You could have UDs that assign a 0.1 hyper existence, UDs
that assign a 0.2 value,  UDs that assign a 0.8 value,  UDs that
assign a 1.0 value etc. etc.  Now all my model would ask for next is
for a sting of universe states that look like ours is in lasting
[infinite] compatible set of UD trace intersections.  Since all UDs
are infinitely nested, an infinite set of such trace intersection
sets would be obtained.  My model has a dynamic originated in the
incompleteness of some of the list sub sets and this dynamic has a
random content due to the internal and external inconsistency of some
of the list's sub sets.

As far as I can tell from this, my model may include Bruno's model as a subset.

Yours

Hal Ruhl

- Original Message -
From: mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]Hal Ruhl
Sent: Sunday, January 28, 2007 11:02 PM
Subject: RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds

One thing that I do not agree with is what seems to me to be a common
holding regarding observer moments [by this I mean discrete states of
universes [which are a sub set of possible objects]] is that they
are each so far assumed to have a set of properties that are to some
extent the same as other observer moments and to some extent
different from all other observer moments [to distinguish individual
moments] but nevertheless the properties of an individual observer
moment are fixed for that observer moment.

This to me is not logical since it is a selection and why that
selection?  Why not have some blend of variable properties and fixed
properties as a possibility?  This seems more in accord with a zero
information ensemble.

Further, if it is also held that observer moments can not interact -
that is also a selection.

I have proposed in other posts that there should be at least one
variable property through which universe states can interact.  The
idea is that all possible universe states have a uniform existence
property, but also can have an addition property that is a variable
that one could

### RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Bruno Marchal writes: What is correct, and has been singled out by Stathis, is
that comp  eludes the material implementation problem, given that we take
all  abstract possible relationship between those objects, and they are all
well defined as purely number theoretical relations. Note that this is
something I have tried to explain to Jacques Mallah sometimes ago, but
without much success. This does not make much sense in ASSA approaches,  but,
like George Levy I think, I don't believe in absolute probability  of being
me, or of living my current observer moment. Such a  probability can be
given the value one (said George) but it is close of  saying that the universe
is here, which tells us nothing, really. It is  like answering who are you?
by I am me.I'm satisfied with this summary. The physical implementation
problem is not a problem when considering abstract machines. Stathis Papaioannou
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### Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Stathis, Bruno,

This summary sounds fine if I accept to 'let words go'. Is there a way to
'understand' (=use with comprehension) the 'words' used here without the
'technical' acceptance of the theoretical platform?
There are sacrosanct 'words' used without explaining them (over and over
again?, BUT
at least once for the benefit of that newcomer 'alien' who comes from
another vista' ,
like

(absolute?) probability - is there such a thing as probability, the figment
that
if it happend x times it WILL happen the (X+one)th time as well? combined
with
the statistical hoax of counting from select members in a limited group
the version
'A' models  and assuming its 'probability'?

observer moment (observer, for that matter), whether the moment is a
time-concept
in it and the 'observer' must be conscious (btw: identifying 'conscious')

number (in the broader sense, yet applied as real integers) (Btw: are the
'non-Arabic'
numbers also numbers? the figments of evolutionary languages alp[habetical
or not?
Is zero a number? Was not in Platonia - a millennium before its
invention(?!)

The 'extensions' of machine into (loebian etc.) [non?]-machine, like comp
into the nondigital
and mixing our mental interpretations with what has been interpreted
(unknowable).

Just some picked examples promoting a not-so-technical glossary for the rest
of the world

John M

On 2/3/07, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

Bruno Marchal writes:

What is correct, and has been singled out by Stathis, is that comp
eludes the material implementation problem, given that we take all
abstract possible relationship between those objects, and they are all
well defined as purely number theoretical relations. Note that this is
something I have tried to explain to Jacques Mallah sometimes ago, but
without much success. This does not make much sense in ASSA approaches,
but, like George Levy I think, I don't believe in absolute probability
of being me, or of living my current observer moment. Such a
probability can be given the value one (said George) but it is close of
saying that the universe is here, which tells us nothing, really. It is
like answering who are you? by I am me.

I'm satisfied with this summary. The physical implementation problem is
not
a problem when considering abstract machines.

Stathis Papaioannou

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### Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Le 01-févr.-07, à 18:46, Brent Meeker a écrit :

Bruno Marchal wrote:

Le 29-janv.-07, à 18:19, Brent Meeker a écrit :

Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 28-janv.-07, à 20:21, Brent Meeker a écrit :

OK, but that means observer moments are not fundamental and the
illusion of their continuity may be provided by the continuity of
their underpinning.  But I don't see how a strictly stepwise
discrete
process as contemplated in the UD can provide that continuity.  It
was
my understanding that it assumed consciousness could be provided
by a
series of disjoint states.

Yes. But a series of discrete states (or their godel number) has to
be
related by a computation for making sense.

So it makes no sense to say that a sequence of number is a
computation.
You have to fix a universal environment. Let us fix once and for
all
a godel numbering. Then it is only relative to some universal number
that a sequence of number can be counted as a computation.
That sounds good - but I don't understand universal environment and
universal number.  We adopt a goedel numbering of arithmetic
expressions.  Do we then represent the computation by a sequence of
goedel numbers, each number corresponding to a mental state (assuming
the computation is a simulation at a sufficient level to satisfy
comp)?  But what number is universal?

OK, remind me if I forget to comment this, but to explain what happens
here I do say a little more on the Fi and Wi. A universal number is
just the code of a universal machine or interpreter (in a nutshell).
I will come back on this.

Now, from a first person point of view, we don't know in which
computation we belong. So from a first person point of view, we have
to
take all equivalent computations (number sequence) relative to all
universal number.

This is enough to explain why from first person points of view,
computations seem to require a continuum. In a sense we have to be
related to the continuum of computations going through our states
(it
includes the infinity of computations describing finer grained
histories with respect to our comp level of substitution.
OK. So the order of computation provides the order of conscious
states
(which may really be very complex and include more than just atoms of
experience); it is not inherent in the states.  And this order is
relative to different  goedel numberings?

I am not sure to understand the relation of your quote of me and the
idea that the order of the computations provides the order of the
conscious state, unless you are refering to the logical order defined
by each computational state. If you run the UD, some internal first
person future could be implemented before some internal first person
past, buut this has nothing to do with the logical or arithmetical
order. OK?
I intend to explain a bit more through the use of the Fi and Wi, (=
the
partial recursive functions and their domain of definition), but it
would help me if you could explain what exactly (or more precisely)
you
mean by order of computation. First person experiences have to be
related to infinities of computational histories, right?

I'm not sure.  I was considering two kinds of order of computation.
One is the time order in the real world of processes in my brain or a
computer simulating me.

Assuming some primitive existence of real world or brain processes,
hypotheses whose coherence is put in doubt with the comp hypothesis.

The other was the order of generation of states by the UD.

This is a bit ambiguous. The UD dovetails on all computations. Let us
write (comp i k j) for k-th step of computation i on input j.
One computation can then be identified (in a first approximation at
least) with a sequence like:
(comp 777 1 24) (comp 777 2 24) (comp 777 3 24) (comp 777 4 24) (comp
777 5 24) (comp 777 6 24) (comp 777 7 24) (comp 777 8 24) (comp 777 9
24) (comp 777 10 24)
This represents the computation of F_777(24), that is the 777th partial
recursive function on input 24.
Now we know that F_777(24) could be undefined, and that is why the UD
has to dovetetail. So the order of the states generated by the UD is
not, strictly speaking the order of states defining a computation.
Also, the UD is infinitely redundant: in particular the function F_777
has other code, for example , i.e. F_777 = F_. It could be that
the computation (comp 777 i 24) and (comp  i 24) are equivalent
(same algorithm) or completely different (different algorithm), but
actually it is not easy at all to define such equivalence relation
between computation an states.
I mean, even from a pure third person point of view, it is not obvious
to define computations and order on them.
Then, from a first person point of view, the difficulty is made bigger.
It could be, that although F_a and F_b computes different function (and
thus follows completely different algorithm), it could be that (comp a
234 24) and some

### Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

On Feb 1, 11:46 am, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:

Le 29-janv.-07, à 18:19, Brent Meeker a écrit :

Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 28-janv.-07, à 20:21, Brent Meeker a écrit :

OK, but that means observer moments are not fundamental and the
illusion of their continuity may be provided by the continuity of
their underpinning.  But I don't see how a strictly stepwise discrete
process as contemplated in the UD can provide that continuity.  It
was
my understanding that it assumed consciousness could be provided by a
series of disjoint states.

Yes. But a series of discrete states (or their godel number) has to be
related by a computation for making sense.

So it makes no sense to say that a sequence of number is a
computation.
You have to fix a universal environment. Let us fix once and for all
a godel numbering. Then it is only relative to some universal number
that a sequence of number can be counted as a computation.
That sounds good - but I don't understand universal environment and
universal number.  We adopt a goedel numbering of arithmetic
expressions.  Do we then represent the computation by a sequence of
goedel numbers, each number corresponding to a mental state (assuming
the computation is a simulation at a sufficient level to satisfy
comp)?  But what number is universal?

OK, remind me if I forget to comment this, but to explain what happens
here I do say a little more on the Fi and Wi. A universal number is
just the code of a universal machine or interpreter (in a nutshell).
I will come back on this.

Now, from a first person point of view, we don't know in which
computation we belong. So from a first person point of view, we have
to
take all equivalent computations (number sequence) relative to all
universal number.

This is enough to explain why from first person points of view,
computations seem to require a continuum. In a sense we have to be
related to the continuum of computations going through our states (it
includes the infinity of computations describing finer grained
histories with respect to our comp level of substitution.
OK. So the order of computation provides the order of conscious states
(which may really be very complex and include more than just atoms of
experience); it is not inherent in the states.  And this order is
relative to different  goedel numberings?

I am not sure to understand the relation of your quote of me and the
idea that the order of the computations provides the order of the
conscious state, unless you are refering to the logical order defined
by each computational state. If you run the UD, some internal first
person future could be implemented before some internal first person
past, buut this has nothing to do with the logical or arithmetical
order. OK?
I intend to explain a bit more through the use of the Fi and Wi, (= the
partial recursive functions and their domain of definition), but it
would help me if you could explain what exactly (or more precisely) you
mean by order of computation. First person experiences have to be
related to infinities of computational histories, right?

I'm not sure.  I was considering two kinds of order of computation. One is
the time order in the real world of processes in my brain or a computer
simulating me.  The other was the order of generation of states by the UD.
I understand from your answer above that the order of generation, in either
case, is regarded as contingent and that 1st person experience is supposed to
be ordered by inherent properties of the states.

If this is correct, it leads back to the question of how big is a
computational state.  It seems that for the inherent order to be coded in
the state, the state must be much bigger than what one is conscious of in an
observer moment.  It also implies, contra Stathis, that one cannot
subdivide a conscious state very finely in time.

Is an observer any less conscious from one planck time to another?
Although two consecutive planck times contain observer brains in
nearly identical states, I see this as meaning over the course of a
second, many subjectively indistinguishable observer moments are
produced, it is only when there is a significant enough change in the
state of the brain that one is able to notice it.  This I think, is
what sets our perceived speed of time (distinguishable observer
moments/second).

A simple thought experiment to determine if consciousness can be
infinitely divided:  If you were to freeze an observer in time, would
that observer stop being conscious?  I believe the representation of a
mind in a certain state is conscious even if not actively changing, as
it still contains in itself self references, information about its
environment at the time it was frozen, and other information we
consider part of consciousness.  When unpaused, this observer would of
course not perceive being frozen,

### RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Brent Meeker writes:

Bruno Marchal wrote:

Le 29-janv.-07, à 18:19, Brent Meeker a écrit :

Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 28-janv.-07, à 20:21, Brent Meeker a écrit :

OK, but that means observer moments are not fundamental and the
illusion of their continuity may be provided by the continuity of
their underpinning.  But I don't see how a strictly stepwise discrete
process as contemplated in the UD can provide that continuity.  It
was
my understanding that it assumed consciousness could be provided by a
series of disjoint states.

Yes. But a series of discrete states (or their godel number) has to be
related by a computation for making sense.

So it makes no sense to say that a sequence of number is a
computation.
You have to fix a universal environment. Let us fix once and for all
a godel numbering. Then it is only relative to some universal number
that a sequence of number can be counted as a computation.
That sounds good - but I don't understand universal environment and
universal number.  We adopt a goedel numbering of arithmetic
expressions.  Do we then represent the computation by a sequence of
goedel numbers, each number corresponding to a mental state (assuming
the computation is a simulation at a sufficient level to satisfy
comp)?  But what number is universal?

OK, remind me if I forget to comment this, but to explain what happens
here I do say a little more on the Fi and Wi. A universal number is
just the code of a universal machine or interpreter (in a nutshell).
I will come back on this.

Now, from a first person point of view, we don't know in which
computation we belong. So from a first person point of view, we have
to
take all equivalent computations (number sequence) relative to all
universal number.

This is enough to explain why from first person points of view,
computations seem to require a continuum. In a sense we have to be
related to the continuum of computations going through our states (it
includes the infinity of computations describing finer grained
histories with respect to our comp level of substitution.
OK. So the order of computation provides the order of conscious states
(which may really be very complex and include more than just atoms of
experience); it is not inherent in the states.  And this order is
relative to different  goedel numberings?

I am not sure to understand the relation of your quote of me and the
idea that the order of the computations provides the order of the
conscious state, unless you are refering to the logical order defined
by each computational state. If you run the UD, some internal first
person future could be implemented before some internal first person
past, buut this has nothing to do with the logical or arithmetical
order. OK?
I intend to explain a bit more through the use of the Fi and Wi, (= the
partial recursive functions and their domain of definition), but it
would help me if you could explain what exactly (or more precisely) you
mean by order of computation. First person experiences have to be
related to infinities of computational histories, right?

I'm not sure.  I was considering two kinds of order of computation. One is
the time order in the real world of processes in my brain or a computer
simulating me.  The other was the order of generation of states by the UD.
I understand from your answer above that the order of generation, in either
case, is regarded as contingent and that 1st person experience is supposed to
be ordered by inherent properties of the states.

If this is correct, it leads back to the question of how big is a
computational state.  It seems that for the inherent order to be coded in
the state, the state must be much bigger than what one is conscious of in an
observer moment.  It also implies, contra Stathis, that one cannot
subdivide a conscious state very finely in time.  If you could then the finer
you divided it, the less information it contained, then the more histories it
would be consistent with.  So how do you decide how big a computational state
is?  If you make it big enough it may pick out a unique history, or at least
one that is unique over a significant time span (say many seconds)?

You seem to be using computational state and mental state interchangeably.
Even if the physical computation is necessary and sufficient for the mental
state, this not the same as saying the two are identical. One point of
difference between them is that the subjective order of the mental states may
be unrelated to the actual order of the physical states underpinning them.

Stathis Papaioannou
_
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### RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Brent Meeker writes: Date: Sun, 28 Jan 2007 21:57:15 -0800 From: [EMAIL
PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: ASSA and
Many-Worlds   Stathis Papaioannou wrote:  Brent Meeker writes:
OK, but that means observer moments are not fundamental and the
illusion of their continuity may be provided by the continuity of
their underpinning. But I don't see how a strictly stepwise discrete
process as contemplated in the UD can provide that continuity. It   was my
understanding that it assumed consciousness could be provided by a
series of disjoint states.   Brent Meeker
It's an assumption of computationalism that the discrete computational
steps will lead to continuity of consciousness. Moreover, it's an
assumption of computationalism that a discontinuity in substrate of
implementation (i.e. from brain to digital computer) will preserve
continuity of consciousness.   Maybe that assumption is
inconsistent.   Computational steps have an order in Platonia. In
implementing them   in the material world, as in a computer, the
sequentiallity (is that a   word?) of the steps is provided by the underlying
physics just as the 1s   and 0s are provided by switches. But without the
continuity of the   substrate it seems the states need some axiomatic,
inherent order as in   Platonia. So then it is not clear that states can be
chopped arbitrarily   finely and still function as computations - or a stream
of conscious states.   Brent MeekerI don't see how it is
possible to mix up something any more thoroughly   in the real world than it
is already mixed up in Platonia.   Sure. In the real world I can write 1 2 4
7 6 3...  But in arithmtic Platonia (a small part of the kingdom) there's no
spacial or temporal order that can conflict with the inherent order.But 1 2 4
7 6 3... is a string in Platonia, always there even if you don't explicitly
state it (as you must do in the real world), and it doesn't manage to confuse
the order of the counting numbers.  It's not as   if God has to explicitly
put the integers in line one after the other:   they just naturally form a
sequence, and they would no less form a   sequence if they were written on
cards and thrown to the wind. Explicit   ordering in the physical world is
important from a third person   perspective. If the putative sequence has a
first person experience, and   the substrate of its implementation is
transparent to that first person   experience (eg. an entity in a virtual
reality environment with no   external input) then the implicit ordering in
Platonia is sufficient to   create the first person impression of
continuity. Stathis Papaioannou  I don't disagree with that.  But
that means that a conscious, 1st person, pair of experiences, i.e. pair of
numbers can have no order other than the inherent order of the numbers.  And if
an experience corresponds to just a number, then experiences are discrete and
can't be chopped finer than some limit.  The order of a pair of experiences is
set by the fact that one is considered first and the other second, perhaps
because there is a subjective sense of the passage of time, perhaps because the
second experience contains a memory of the first, perhaps due to some other
subtle aspect of the content of the experiences. In the real world, the
subjective content reflects brain activity which in turn reflects environmental
input (that's why the sense of order evolved in the first place), but this
relationship is only a contingent one. If the pair of experiences are
experienced in the order AB there is no way for the experiencer to know whether
they were actually generated in the order AB or BA, unless reversing the order
changes the content in some significant way.This means there is no natural
order of physical states (or abstract machine states): the order can be
anything, and the subjective order of experience will be unchanged. It also
means there is no natural order of subjective states: that which seems first,
seems first and that which seems second, seems second. This is good, because it
doesn't depend on any theory or assumption about consciousness.  I guess I
need a more explicit idea of how experiences occur in arithmetic Platonia.  Are
we to imagine that some large number 3875835442... is a single, atomic
experience and another number 3876976342... is another single, atomic
experience and they have no other relation than their natural order?  In that
case, they would be experiences in a certain bundle of streams of consciousness
just in virtue of having some digits in common or having factors in common or
what?  Or are we to imagine another Platonic object, a Turing machine, that
generates both these numbers in a certain sequence (maybe the reverse of their
natural order) - and that's what makes them parts of the same experience
bundle?  Brent MeekerI would say

### Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Le 28-janv.-07, à 20:21, Brent Meeker a écrit :

OK, but that means observer moments are not fundamental and the
illusion of their continuity may be provided by the continuity of
their underpinning.  But I don't see how a strictly stepwise discrete
process as contemplated in the UD can provide that continuity.  It was
my understanding that it assumed consciousness could be provided by a
series of disjoint states.

Yes. But a series of discrete states (or their godel number) has to be
related by a computation for making sense.

So it makes no sense to say that a sequence of number is a computation.
You have to fix a universal environment. Let us fix once and for all
a godel numbering. Then it is only relative to some universal number
that a sequence of number can be counted as a computation.

Now, from a first person point of view, we don't know in which
computation we belong. So from a first person point of view, we have to
take all equivalent computations (number sequence) relative to all
universal number.

This is enough to explain why from first person points of view,
computations seem to require a continuum. In a sense we have to be
related to the continuum of computations going through our states (it
includes the infinity of computations describing finer grained
histories with respect to our comp level of substitution.

Consciousness is typically a first person notion. Strictly speaking it
cannot be associated to one third person computation. Only this one can
be described by a sequence of discrete states (more or less arbitrarily
from a choice of a universal number/system). First person consciousness
is associated with a uncountable (continuous) third person
computation.

That is why all notion of self-correctness can make sense only
relatively to the most *probable* computational histories. OK?

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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### Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Le 29-janv.-07, à 00:11, Jason Resch a écrit :

Thanks, that was an interesting read.  I find it surprising how many
people find MWI so disturbing, perhaps it is the pessimists always
assuming the worst is happening.  Instead of focusing on the good or
bad, I look at the variety it produces.  Many worlds leaves no rock
unturned and no path untread, it realizes every possibility and to me
this is an amazing and beautiful result.

Yes. Although it makes sense in QM only because QM justifies that some
possibility have more weight than others.

Now a universal turing machine (in the mathematical sense) cannot
distinguish ersatz linguistic worlds (cf David Lewis) from real one,

It less clear that some world will be less weighted (and that is what
we call the hunting of white rabbits).

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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### Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:

Date: Sun, 28 Jan 2007 21:57:15 -0800
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:

OK, but that means observer moments are not fundamental and the
illusion of their continuity may be provided by the continuity of
their underpinning. But I don't see how a strictly stepwise
discrete
process as contemplated in the UD can provide that continuity. It
was my
understanding that it assumed consciousness could be provided by a
series of disjoint states.

Brent Meeker

It's an assumption of computationalism that the discrete
computational
steps will lead to continuity of consciousness. Moreover, it's an
assumption of computationalism that a discontinuity in substrate of
implementation (i.e. from brain to digital computer) will preserve
continuity of consciousness.

Maybe that assumption is inconsistent.

Computational steps have an order in Platonia. In implementing them
in the material world, as in a computer, the sequentiallity (is that a
word?) of the steps is provided by the underlying physics just as
the 1s
and 0s are provided by switches. But without the continuity of the
substrate it seems the states need some axiomatic, inherent order
as in
Platonia. So then it is not clear that states can be chopped
arbitrarily
finely and still function as computations - or a stream of
conscious states.

Brent Meeker

I don't see how it is possible to mix up something any more thoroughly
in the real world than it is already mixed up in Platonia.

Sure. In the real world I can write 1 2 4 7 6 3... But in arithmtic
Platonia (a small part of the kingdom) there's no spacial or temporal
order that can conflict with the inherent order.

But 1 2 4 7 6 3... is a string in Platonia, always there even if you
don't explicitly state it (as you must do in the real world), and it
doesn't manage to confuse the order of the counting numbers.

It's not as
if God has to explicitly put the integers in line one after the other:
they just naturally form a sequence, and they would no less form a
sequence if they were written on cards and thrown to the wind.
Explicit
ordering in the physical world is important from a third person
perspective. If the putative sequence has a first person
experience, and
the substrate of its implementation is transparent to that first
person
experience (eg. an entity in a virtual reality environment with no
external input) then the implicit ordering in Platonia is
sufficient to
create the first person impression of continuity.

Stathis Papaioannou

I don't disagree with that. But that means that a conscious, 1st
person, pair of experiences, i.e. pair of numbers can have no order
other than the inherent order of the numbers. And if an experience
corresponds to just a number, then experiences are discrete and can't be
chopped finer than some limit.

The order of a pair of experiences is set by the fact that one is
considered first and the other second, perhaps because there is a
subjective sense of the passage of time, perhaps because the second
experience contains a memory of the first, perhaps due to some other
subtle aspect of the content of the experiences.

But on this view an experience is a complex thing, far from the atomic
perception of a red flash, and even includes parts that are not conscious.
This comports with my speculation that a conscious atom is fairly complex and
has a significant duration such that it overlaps the conscious atoms before and
after. This overlap provides the ordering and the sense of time and continuity.

In the real world, the
subjective content reflects brain activity which in turn reflects
environmental input (that's why the sense of order evolved in the first
place), but this relationship is only a contingent one.

Well that's the question isn't it. Comp assumes it, but comp also leads to
strange if not absurd conclusions.

If the pair of
experiences are experienced in the order AB there is no way for the
experiencer to know whether they were actually generated in the order AB
or BA, unless reversing the order changes the content in some
significant way.

That assumes the experiences can be discretely separated with not overlap.
Certainly there are instances like that: the experience just before you lose
consciousness due to a concussion and the experience just as you regain it are
disjoint in this way.  You only recover continuity through accessing memories
and there is a gap even in that memory.  But in ordinary circumstances the
continuity might be inherent in the overlap of conscious atoms.

This means

### Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

vocabulary - gradually out of my understanding. Sorry.
*
You seem to accept 'observer moments' and their interaction - even postulate
one variable needed.

How long is an OM? a million years (cosmology) or a msec? Even if it is a
portion of the latter, it makes the existence quite discontinuous - with all
the difficulties in it. If it is continuous, then how can we talk about
'moments'? Should we assign an equal rate change to all existence (meaning: ONE
selection for the OM length)? If it can be ANY, varying from the infinitely
short to the other extreme, it would 'wash away' any sense of the meaning of an
Observer MOMENT concept.
I think the OM is the figment of us, human observers, who want to use an
'understandable' model. [Like: numbers (in the human logic sense).]

Then, in view of the resulting 'unfathomable', we 'complicate' these models -
originally created FOR comprehension - into incomprehensibility. [The way as
e.g. to bridge Bohm's Explicate to the Implicate (by Nic de  Cusa's 2nd
principle, left out by Bohm: the Complicate - what I like to assign as
math).]
*
That 'one' variable property you mention as needed for state- interaction is
IMO not necessarily  o n e  within our (present) comprehension.
I like your 'abhorring' a selection: we could select only from within
boundaries of our *present* epistemic cognitive inventory. (Or: from a much
narrower one dating back 2500+ years or any time in between).

John Mikes

- Original Message -
From: Hal Ruhl
Sent: Sunday, January 28, 2007 11:02 PM
Subject: RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds

One thing that I do not agree with is what seems to me to be a common
holding regarding observer moments [by this I mean discrete states of
universes [which are a sub set of possible objects]] is that they
are each so far assumed to have a set of properties that are to some
extent the same as other observer moments and to some extent
different from all other observer moments [to distinguish individual
moments] but nevertheless the properties of an individual observer
moment are fixed for that observer moment.

This to me is not logical since it is a selection and why that
selection?  Why not have some blend of variable properties and fixed
properties as a possibility?  This seems more in accord with a zero
information ensemble.

Further, if it is also held that observer moments can not interact -
that is also a selection.

I have proposed in other posts that there should be at least one
variable property through which universe states can interact.  The
idea is that all possible universe states have a uniform existence
property, but also can have an addition property that is a variable
that one could call hyper existence through which they can
interact.  They interact by mutually altering each others hyper
existence property.  This variable property should not have just a
binary set of values as a possibility but should also have many
discrete levels as a possibility - again to avoid selection.  In
other words a universe state could experience a non square pulse of
hyper existence which could span many of the this particular state
to other state interactions.  This would be like a wave of hyper
existence propagating through some succession of universe
states.  Non binary, non square pulses of propagating hyper existence
could be a basis for what is called consciousness - a flow of
modulated awareness.

Given a random component to the underlying dynamic [which I have also
discussed ] some such wave propagations with non binary, non square
pulses of hyper existence would be through infinite strings of
successive states that would all be life - and even beyond that -
SAS friendly.

Hal Ruhl

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### RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Brent Meeker writes: Stathis Papaioannou wrote:  Brent Meeker writes:
This raises the question again of what is the minimum duration of a
conscious state? You mention 5sec as being a long time for a
coincidental match (would there still be two consciousnesses for that
5sec - I think not), but what about 300msec, or 100msec. There's not
much consciousness in 100msec; so little that it may be occuring
hundreds of times over in different brains.   Brent Meeker
I think the minimum duration of a conscious experience is of the
order of 100 msec, so if you are shown a red flash it will take at
least   this long before you perceive a red flash. This implies a
minimum duration for an observer moment, although the interval can be
divided up arbitrarily (for example, in teleportation thought
experiments)   leaving the experience intact. However, this raises a
difficulty. Suppose you are shown a red flash and 99 msec later you are
teleported to a   distant place. Once you materialise, your neurons
will continue their   processing of the red flash for another 1 msec
and at that point (i.e. 100 msec after being shown the flash) you will
perceive it. Next, suppose that you have no past but are created at the
teleportation receiving   station from information *as if* you had
been shown a red flash 99 msec ago. Your newly-created brain will
process information for another 1   msec and then you should perceive
the red flash. However, in this case you have only been alive for 1
msec, and we can easily change the experiment to make this interval as
short as we want. Does this mean that an   observer moment can
actually be instantaneous? Stathis Papaioannou   This
example implicitly assumes a kind of dualism or cartesian   theatre in which
the brain does some processing *and then* you (the   really real you)
perceives it. This is the idea Dennett criticizes in   Consciousness
Explained. The perception must be the processing and   even if the flash is
very short and it's perceived duration is very   short, the brain processes
producing that perception can be much longer.   Brent Meeker
Do you doubt that you would perceive the red flash in the case where you
have not had 100 msec to process it? At the least you would remember   seeing
the flash, implying that the stream of consciousness will survive   division
into arbitrarily small intervals.Stathis Papaioannou  Assuming that
consciousness supervenes on the physics, this follows just from the continuity
of the physics.  But it doesn't follow that there is some experience
corresponding to 1msec of brain processing - it might be that seeing the
flash spans some time interval.That's true, but it still allows that the
process underpinning consciousness can be arbitrarily divided up. I think
others on the list have used observer moment to mean these arbitrarily small
time slices, even though you can't actually observe anything during one of
them.Stathis Papaioannou
_
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### Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

On 1/28/07, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

Consciousness *seems* to be continuous even if at a fundamental level time
or brain processes are discrete. Also, although I agree that there is no
necessary connection between observer moments, there *seems* to be a
connection, in that almost by definition I won't suddenly find myself
turning Chinese in the next moment even though there are 50 times as many
Chinese as Australians in the world. If the feeling that I remain the same
person from moment to moment is an illusion, then I am interested in how
that illusion can be maintained, regardless of the underlying mechanisms of
consciousness, time, whether or not there exists a real world, and so on.

I think the reason the illusion is maintained is rather trivial, whenever
thought: How come I was born as Stathis Papaioannou, and only ever
remember being Stathis Papaioannou?  Your brain is limited to the
memories contained within it.  And since there is no way for your
brain to have integrated memories of what it is like to be other
observers, your illusion of personal identity is maintained.

Either I'm one of few or one of many. If everyone guesses that they are
one of many, more are going to be right than if everyone guesses that they
are one of few. Therefore, I should guess that I'm one of many. Is that what
you are suggesting?

Yes, and once we assume we are probably one of many similar or identical
observer-moments, we should ask Why should there be many?

The argument has some appeal assuming we have no other reason to favour
guessing that we are one of many or one of few. However, lack of evidence
against something does not necessarily mean that thing is likely or even
possible. As it happens there is perhaps some evidence for MW from quantum
mechanics, but were it not for this, we could easily class MW along with
pink elephants as something very unlikely which cannot be rescued by the
ASSA.

If many-worlds is true, consider for a second how many
histories lines (and copies of you) must have been created by now.  The
universe had been branching into untold numbers of copies, untold numbers of
times each second, for billions of years before you were born.  While not
every branch contains you, once you appeared in one history line, a new copy
of you has been created for every possible outcome of every quantum event
that happens anywhere in this universe.  I would be
astonished if many-worlds turned out to be false, not only because of ASSA,
but also due to due to the paradoxes that exist in other interpretations,
and David Deutsch's reasoning that the computations of a quantum computer
must be done somewhere, and single-world views cannot explain,
for example, how Shor's algorithm works.

From a mathematical/computational perspective a many-world universe has only
marginally more complicated description (program) than a universe that has a
one-to-one mapping of states.

For a simple example of how this is possible, consider the Fibonacci
sequence, defined as:
F(0) = 1
F(1) = 1
F(n1) = F(n-1) + F(n-2)

But a sequence that defines an exponentially growing number of
states can be made just by changing the + to a plus or minus:
F(0) = 1
F(1) = 1
F(n1) = F(n-1) ± F(n-2)

Therefore mathematical descriptions of universes like our own should be
common, and only slightly rarer than universes that lack the property of
many-worlds.  However, many-worlds universes define so many more states, and
so many more observers that most of reality should be generated by short
programs that define massive numbers of states before halting.  An
interesting question: What about programs that loop, would
observers and states in such a universe have an infinite measure or should
looping be treated the same as halting?

Jason

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### Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:

This raises the question again of what is the minimum
duration of a
conscious state? You mention 5sec as being a long time for a
coincidental match (would there still be two consciousnesses
for that
5sec - I think not), but what about 300msec, or 100msec.
There's not
much consciousness in 100msec; so little that it may be occuring
hundreds of times over in different brains.

Brent Meeker

I think the minimum duration of a conscious experience is of
the order
of 100 msec, so if you are shown a red flash it will take at least
this
long before you perceive a red flash. This implies a minimum
duration
for an observer moment, although the interval can be divided up
arbitrarily (for example, in teleportation thought experiments)
leaving
the experience intact. However, this raises a difficulty.
Suppose you
are shown a red flash and 99 msec later you are teleported to a
distant
place. Once you materialise, your neurons will continue their
processing
of the red flash for another 1 msec and at that point (i.e. 100
msec
after being shown the flash) you will perceive it. Next,
suppose that
you have no past but are created at the teleportation receiving
station
from information *as if* you had been shown a red flash 99 msec
ago.
Your newly-created brain will process information for another 1
msec and
then you should perceive the red flash. However, in this case
you have
only been alive for 1 msec, and we can easily change the
experiment to
make this interval as short as we want. Does this mean that an
observer
moment can actually be instantaneous?

Stathis Papaioannou

This example implicitly assumes a kind of dualism or cartesian
theatre in which the brain does some processing *and then* you (the
really real you) perceives it. This is the idea Dennett criticizes in
Consciousness Explained. The perception must be the processing and
even if the flash is very short and it's perceived duration is very
short, the brain processes producing that perception can be much
longer.

Brent Meeker

Do you doubt that you would perceive the red flash in the case
where you
have not had 100 msec to process it? At the least you would remember
seeing the flash, implying that the stream of consciousness will
survive
division into arbitrarily small intervals.

Stathis Papaioannou

Assuming that consciousness supervenes on the physics, this follows
just from the continuity of the physics. But it doesn't follow that
there is some experience corresponding to 1msec of brain processing - it
might be that seeing the flash spans some time interval.

That's true, but it still allows that the process underpinning
consciousness can be arbitrarily divided up. I think others on the list
have used observer moment to mean these arbitrarily small time slices,
even though you can't actually observe anything during one of them.

Stathis Papaioannou

OK, but that means observer moments are not fundamental and the illusion of
their continuity may be provided by the continuity of their underpinning.  But
I don't see how a strictly stepwise discrete process as contemplated in the UD
can provide that continuity.  It was my understanding that it assumed
consciousness could be provided by a series of disjoint states.

Brent Meeker

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### Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Jason Resch wrote:
On 1/28/07, *Stathis Papaioannou* [EMAIL PROTECTED]
mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

Consciousness *seems* to be continuous even if at a fundamental level
time or brain processes are discrete. Also, although I agree that
there is no necessary connection between observer moments, there
*seems* to be a connection, in that almost by definition I won't
suddenly find myself turning Chinese in the next moment even though
there are 50 times as many Chinese as Australians in the world. If
the feeling that I remain the same person from moment to moment is an
illusion, then I am interested in how that illusion can be
maintained, regardless of the underlying mechanisms of consciousness,
time, whether or not there exists a real world, and so on.

I think the reason the illusion is maintained is rather trivial,
whenever your brain has the thought: How come I was born as Stathis
Papaioannou, and only ever remember being Stathis Papaioannou?  Your
brain is limited to the memories contained within it.  And since
there is no way for your brain to have integrated memories of what it
is like to be other observers, your illusion of personal identity is
maintained.

Either I'm one of few or one of many. If everyone guesses that they
are one of many, more are going to be right than if everyone guesses
that they are one of few. Therefore, I should guess that I'm one of
many. Is that what you are suggesting?

Yes, and once we assume we are probably one of many similar or
identical observer-moments, we should ask Why should there be many?

The argument has some appeal assuming we have no other reason to
favour guessing that we are one of many or one of few. However, lack
of evidence against something does not necessarily mean that thing is
likely or even possible. As it happens there is perhaps some evidence
for MW from quantum mechanics, but were it not for this, we could
easily class MW along with pink elephants as something very unlikely
which cannot be rescued by the ASSA.

If many-worlds is true, consider for a second how many histories
lines (and copies of you) must have been created by now.  The
universe had been branching into untold numbers of copies, untold
numbers of times each second, for billions of years before you were
born.  While not every branch contains you, once you appeared in one
history line, a new copy of you has been created for every possible
outcome of every quantum event that happens anywhere in this
universe.

I don't think this is the way to look at it.  It's true that QM predicts an
uncountably infinite number of branchings, even for an universe containing only
a single unstable particle.  But these branchings don't produce different
copies of Stathis.  As a big macroscopic object he is described by a reduced
density matrix that has only extremely tiny off-diagonal terms. So he is a
stable entity against these microscopic quantum events unless they are
amplified so as to change his macroscopic state - as for example if he heard a
geiger counter click.  The microscopic events just add a little fuzz to his
reduced density matrix - and the same for all of the classical world.

You might be interested in Greg Egan's excellent SF story Singleton which is
available online:

ttp://gregegan.customer.netspace.net.au/MISC/SINGLETON/Singleton.html

Egan says People who professed belief in the MWI never seemed to want to take
it seriously, let alone personally.  So he wrote a story in which it is taken
personally.

Brent Meeker

I would be astonished if many-worlds turned out to be
false, not only because of ASSA, but also due to due to the paradoxes
that exist in other interpretations, and David Deutsch's reasoning
that the computations of a quantum computer must be done somewhere,
and single-world views cannot explain, for example, how Shor's
algorithm works.

From a mathematical/computational perspective a many-world universe
has only marginally more complicated description (program) than a
universe that has a one-to-one mapping of states.

For a simple example of how this is possible, consider the Fibonacci
sequence, defined as: F(0) = 1 F(1) = 1 F(n1) = F(n-1) + F(n-2)

But a sequence that defines an exponentially growing number of states
can be made just by changing the + to a plus or minus: F(0) = 1 F(1)
= 1 F(n1) = F(n-1) ± F(n-2)

Therefore mathematical descriptions of universes like our own should
be common, and only slightly rarer than universes that lack the
property of many-worlds.  However, many-worlds universes define so
many more states, and so many more observers that most of reality
should be generated by short programs that define massive numbers of
states before halting.  An interesting question: What about programs
that loop, would observers and states in such a universe have an
infinite measure or should looping be treated the same as halting?

Jason

### Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

On 1/28/07, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

I don't think this is the way to look at it.  It's true that QM predicts
an uncountably infinite number of branchings, even for an universe
containing only a single unstable particle.  But these branchings don't
produce different copies of Stathis.  As a big macroscopic object he is
described by a reduced density matrix that has only extremely tiny
off-diagonal terms. So he is a stable entity against these microscopic
quantum events unless they are amplified so as to change his macroscopic
state - as for example if he heard a geiger counter click.  The microscopic
events just add a little fuzz to his reduced density matrix - and the same
for all of the classical world.

Although microscopic quantum events don't immediatly produce macroscopic
changes, I think the butterfly effect implies that given sufficient
time, they certainly do.  Consider how brownian motion could effect
which sperm results in a pregnancy.  Considering this, I
think that
if you looked at two histories that branched a century ago, you would
find two Earths inhabited by entirely different sets of individuals.
Even if Stathis's brain itself were
never effected directly by quantum events, the fact that he ends up in
branchings that produce different sensory input will no doubt produce
new distnguishable observer moments.

You might be interested in Greg Egan's excellent SF story Singleton which
is available online:

ttp://gregegan.customer.netspace.net.au/MISC/SINGLETON/Singleton.html

Egan says People who professed belief in the MWI never seemed to want to
take it seriously, let alone personally.  So he wrote a story in which it
is taken personally.

Thanks, that was an interesting read.  I find it surprising how many people
find MWI so disturbing, perhaps it is the pessimists always assuming the
worst is happening.  Instead of focusing on the good or bad, I look at the
variety it produces.  Many worlds leaves no rock unturned and no path
untread, it realizes every possibility and to me this is an amazing and
beautiful result.

Jason

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### Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Jason Resch wrote:
On 1/28/07, *Brent Meeker* [EMAIL PROTECTED]
mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

I don't think this is the way to look at it.  It's true that QM
predicts an uncountably infinite number of branchings, even for an
universe containing only a single unstable particle.  But these
branchings don't produce different copies of Stathis.  As a big
macroscopic object he is described by a reduced density matrix that
has only extremely tiny off-diagonal terms. So he is a stable entity
against these microscopic quantum events unless they are amplified so
as to change his macroscopic state - as for example if he heard a
geiger counter click.  The microscopic events just add a little fuzz
to his reduced density matrix - and the same for all of the classical
world.

Although microscopic quantum events don't immediatly produce
macroscopic changes, I think the butterfly effect implies that given
sufficient time, they certainly do.

Maybe.  But it is also the case that there is no chaos in QM.  And even if
Stathis evolves in a way sensitive to initial conditions it doesn't imply that
the chaotic evolution carries him far from his classical path - even in chaos
the deviations may be bounded.

Consider how brownian motion
could effect which sperm results in a pregnancy.

Sure, but this is an example of amplification of microscopic randomness. I
agree that produces a split.

What do you say to the prediction that the decay of an unstable atom must
produce a *continuum* of splittings?

Considering this, I
think that if you looked at two histories that branched a century
ago, you would find two Earths inhabited by entirely different sets
of individuals.

Even if Stathis's brain itself were never effected
directly by quantum events, the fact that he ends up in branchings
that produce different sensory input will no doubt produce new
distnguishable observer moments.

You might be interested in Greg Egan's excellent SF story Singleton
which is available online:

ttp://gregegan.customer.netspace.net.au/MISC/SINGLETON/Singleton.html

Egan says People who professed belief in the MWI never seemed to
want to take it seriously, let alone personally.  So he wrote a
story in which it is taken personally.

Thanks, that was an interesting read.  I find it surprising how many
people find MWI so disturbing, perhaps it is the pessimists always
assuming the worst is happening.  Instead of focusing on the good or
bad, I look at the variety it produces.  Many worlds leaves no rock
unturned and no path untread, it realizes every possibility and to
me this is an amazing and beautiful result.

It's not a result yet - just a speculation.  I don't think it's even a well
defined theory yet.

Brent Meeker

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### Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

On Sun, Jan 28, 2007 at 03:36:24PM +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

Russell Standish writes: There is good reason to suppose that the absolute
measure of an observer moment is inversely proportional to the exponential
of the OM's complexity (this is discussed elsewhere in my book). In such a
case, newborn OM's have vastly greater likelihood of being experienced than
(say) 40 year old adult OMs.But was is the relevance of this from a first
person perspective? It's like saying you are vastly more likely to find
yourself a bacterium than a human. This is the case if you consider youself
standing ouside of the universe, trying to predict whether you will end up a
bacterium, human neonate or 40 year old - which I guess is what you mean when
you say the ASSA is a predictor of birth order - but obviously if you have
any stance at all, you are already embedded in the universe, not a
disembodied mind contemplating its possible futures.Stathis Papaiaonnou
_

The SSA relates to sampling births. The SSSA extends this to observer
paradoxes. But neither the SSA nor SSSA deals with time.

The ASSA and the RSSA refer to specifically subjective expectations,
given you are who you are. I know you are firmly in the RSSA camp,
so probably find the ASSA a little incomprehensible, but it really is
a consistent position (although the evidence that we're not
experiencing babyhood is little hard to explain in the ASSA picture).

Cheers

--

A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Mathematics
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au

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### Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

On Sun, Jan 28, 2007 at 04:42:48AM -, Jason wrote:
I agree that regardless of the creation or destruction of other
copies, there is no reason for there ever to be any effect on first
person experience, that means no funny feelings, no loss of
consciousness, etc.

Many-worlds implies there are always branched histories where an
observer survives to experience another observer-moment.

ASSA Proponents:
Observer-moments that find themselves as extremely and abnormally long-
lived observers should be exceedingly rare.

I fail to see how the above descriptions are mutually exclusive.  I

These are not characterisation of the ASSA and RSSA. The one you label
RSSA is known as the No cul-de-sac assumption. The one you label as ASSA
is a consequence of the ASSA, and some relatively minimal assumptions
on measure.

The reason I started this thread was to discuss the possibility that
Many-Worlds is a property of this universe for purely ASSA reasons, I
see no reason for it to exist for any anthropic reasons, but due to
the exponential growth in observer moments defined by many-world
universes, it makes great sense.

Jason

Occams razor would favour Multiverses for Anthropic Reasons.

I never really understood your point about the ASSA, as the relevant
*SSA for understanding what world we live in is the original SSA
(birth moment sampling) which both the ASSA and the RSSA satisfy.

Cheers

--

A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Mathematics
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au

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### RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Brent Meeker writes:

Assuming that consciousness supervenes on the physics, this follows
just from the continuity of the physics. But it doesn't follow that
there is some experience corresponding to 1msec of brain processing - it
might be that seeing the flash spans some time interval.
That's true, but it still allows that the process underpinning
consciousness can be arbitrarily divided up. I think others on the list
have used observer moment to mean these arbitrarily small time
slices,   even though you can't actually observe anything during one of
them.Stathis Papaioannou  OK, but that means observer moments
are not fundamental and the illusion of their continuity may be
provided by the continuity of their underpinning. But I don't see how a
strictly stepwise discrete process as contemplated in the UD can provide
that continuity. It was my understanding that it assumed consciousness
could be provided by a series of disjoint states.  Brent Meeker
It's an assumption of computationalism that the discrete computational steps
will lead to continuity of consciousness. Moreover, it's an assumption of
computationalism that a discontinuity in substrate of implementation (i.e. from
brain to digital computer) will preserve continuity of consciousness.

Stathis Papaioannou
_
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### RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Brent Meeker writes (quoting Jason Resch):

If many-worlds is true, consider for a second how many histories  lines
(and copies of you) must have been created by now. The   universe had
been branching into untold numbers of copies, untold   numbers of times
each second, for billions of years before you were   born. While not
every branch contains you, once you appeared in one  history line, a new
copy of you has been created for every possible  outcome of every quantum
event that happens anywhere in this  universe.   I don't think this is
the way to look at it. It's true that QM predicts an uncountably infinite
number of branchings, even for an universe containing only a single
unstable particle. But these branchings don't produce different copies of
Stathis. As a big macroscopic object he is described by a reduced density
matrix that has only extremely tiny off-diagonal terms. So he is a stable
entity against these microscopic quantum events unless they are amplified
so as to change his macroscopic state - as for example if he heard a geiger
counter click. The microscopic events just add a little fuzz to his reduced
density matrix - and the same for all of the classical world.  You might
be interested in Greg Egan's excellent SF story Singleton which is
available online:
ttp://gregegan.customer.netspace.net.au/MISC/SINGLETON/Singleton.html
Egan says People who professed belief in the MWI never seemed to want to
take it seriously, let alone personally. So he wrote a story in which it
is taken personally.  Brent Meeker
Doesn't a little fuzz in an infinite number of branchings result in every
possibility actually manifesting an infinite number of times?

Stathis Papaioannou
_
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### Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

Brent Meeker writes:

Assuming that consciousness supervenes on the physics, this follows
just from the continuity of the physics. But it doesn't follow that
there is some experience corresponding to 1msec of brain processing
- it
might be that seeing the flash spans some time interval.

That's true, but it still allows that the process underpinning
consciousness can be arbitrarily divided up. I think others on the
list
have used observer moment to mean these arbitrarily small time
slices,
even though you can't actually observe anything during one of them.

Stathis Papaioannou

OK, but that means observer moments are not fundamental and the
illusion of their continuity may be provided by the continuity of
their underpinning. But I don't see how a strictly stepwise discrete
process as contemplated in the UD can provide that continuity. It was my
understanding that it assumed consciousness could be provided by a
series of disjoint states.

Brent Meeker

It's an assumption of computationalism that the discrete computational
steps will lead to continuity of consciousness. Moreover, it's an
assumption of computationalism that a discontinuity in substrate of
implementation (i.e. from brain to digital computer) will preserve
continuity of consciousness.

Maybe that assumption is inconsistent.

Computational steps have an order in Platonia.  In implementing them in the
material world, as in a computer, the sequentiallity (is that a word?) of the
steps is provided by the underlying physics just as the 1s and 0s are provided
by switches.  But without the continuity of the substrate it seems the states
need some axiomatic, inherent order as in Platonia. So then it is not clear
that states can be chopped arbitrarily finely and still function as
computations - or a stream of conscious states.

Brent Meeker

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### Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes (quoting Jason Resch):

If many-worlds is true, consider for a second how many histories
lines (and copies of you) must have been created by now. The
universe had been branching into untold numbers of copies, untold
numbers of times each second, for billions of years before you were
born. While not every branch contains you, once you appeared in one
history line, a new copy of you has been created for every possible
outcome of every quantum event that happens anywhere in this
universe.

I don't think this is the way to look at it. It's true that QM
predicts an uncountably infinite number of branchings, even for an
universe containing only a single unstable particle. But these
branchings don't produce different copies of Stathis. As a big
macroscopic object he is described by a reduced density matrix that has
only extremely tiny off-diagonal terms. So he is a stable entity against
these microscopic quantum events unless they are amplified so as to
change his macroscopic state - as for example if he heard a geiger
counter click. The microscopic events just add a little fuzz to his
reduced density matrix - and the same for all of the classical world.

You might be interested in Greg Egan's excellent SF story Singleton
which is available online:

ttp://gregegan.customer.netspace.net.au/MISC/SINGLETON/Singleton.html

Egan says People who professed belief in the MWI never seemed to
want to take it seriously, let alone personally. So he wrote a story in
which it is taken personally.

Brent Meeker

Doesn't a little fuzz in an infinite number of branchings result in
every possibility actually manifesting an infinite number of times?

I don't think so.  Part of the trouble is that QM is based on continuum
mathematics: in time, space, and probability.  So when we imagine it being
simulated on a digital computer we're led to think of all these being integer
valued (in suitable units).  So we think we can just talk about discrete states
at discrete times.  But in fact I think we are implicitly relying on the time
continuity in the computer; it that actually causes the computational process
to occur.

The standard form of QM being based on real numbers can accommodate an infinite
number of branchings with none of them significantly diverging from the
classical result.  If you did a QM analysis of the orbit of the Earth you would
not find the Earth diffusing away into space outside the solar system.  You
would find its position to become infinitesimally uncertain about it's orbit
and macroscopically uncertain in its position along its orbit.  It would only
branch off into a truly different path if it were hit by an asteroid or
similar.  Then QM would show two almost orthogonal histories.  Something
similar would apply to a human life: it would proceed mostly as a classical
system with occasional branches.  But exactly how the classical world arises
from the quantum foundation is an unsolved problem

Brent Meeker

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### RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds

One thing that I do not agree with is what seems to me to be a common
holding regarding observer moments [by this I mean discrete states of
universes [which are a sub set of possible objects]] is that they
are each so far assumed to have a set of properties that are to some
extent the same as other observer moments and to some extent
different from all other observer moments [to distinguish individual
moments] but nevertheless the properties of an individual observer
moment are fixed for that observer moment.

This to me is not logical since it is a selection and why that
selection?  Why not have some blend of variable properties and fixed
properties as a possibility?  This seems more in accord with a zero
information ensemble.

Further, if it is also held that observer moments can not interact -
that is also a selection.

I have proposed in other posts that there should be at least one
variable property through which universe states can interact.  The
idea is that all possible universe states have a uniform existence
property, but also can have an addition property that is a variable
that one could call hyper existence through which they can
interact.  They interact by mutually altering each others hyper
existence property.  This variable property should not have just a
binary set of values as a possibility but should also have many
discrete levels as a possibility - again to avoid selection.  In
other words a universe state could experience a non square pulse of
hyper existence which could span many of the this particular state
to other state interactions.  This would be like a wave of hyper
existence propagating through some succession of universe
states.  Non binary, non square pulses of propagating hyper existence
could be a basis for what is called consciousness - a flow of
modulated awareness.

Given a random component to the underlying dynamic [which I have also
discussed ] some such wave propagations with non binary, non square
pulses of hyper existence would be through infinite strings of
successive states that would all be life - and even beyond that -
SAS friendly.

Hal Ruhl

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### RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Brent Meeker writes:

OK, but that means observer moments are not fundamental and the
illusion of their continuity may be provided by the continuity of
their underpinning. But I don't see how a strictly stepwise discrete
process as contemplated in the UD can provide that continuity. It was my
understanding that it assumed consciousness could be provided by a
series of disjoint states. Brent MeekerIt's an
assumption of computationalism that the discrete computational   steps
will lead to continuity of consciousness. Moreover, it's an
assumption of computationalism that a discontinuity in substrate of
implementation (i.e. from brain to digital computer) will preserve
continuity of consciousness.  Maybe that assumption is inconsistent.
Computational steps have an order in Platonia. In implementing them in
the material world, as in a computer, the sequentiallity (is that a
word?) of the steps is provided by the underlying physics just as the 1s
and 0s are provided by switches. But without the continuity of the
substrate it seems the states need some axiomatic, inherent order as in
Platonia. So then it is not clear that states can be chopped arbitrarily
finely and still function as computations - or a stream of conscious
states.  Brent Meeker
I don't see how it is possible to mix up something any more thoroughly in the
real world than it is already mixed up in Platonia. It's not as if God has to
explicitly put the integers in line one after the other: they just naturally
form a sequence, and they would no less form a sequence if they were written on
cards and thrown to the wind. Explicit ordering in the physical world is
important from a third person perspective. If the putative sequence has a first
person experience, and the substrate of its implementation is transparent to
that first person experience (eg. an entity in a virtual reality environment
with no external input) then the implicit ordering in Platonia is sufficient to
create the first person impression of continuity.

Stathis Papaioannou
_
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### Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:

OK, but that means observer moments are not fundamental and the
illusion of their continuity may be provided by the continuity of
their underpinning. But I don't see how a strictly stepwise discrete
process as contemplated in the UD can provide that continuity. It
was my
understanding that it assumed consciousness could be provided by a
series of disjoint states.

Brent Meeker

It's an assumption of computationalism that the discrete computational
steps will lead to continuity of consciousness. Moreover, it's an
assumption of computationalism that a discontinuity in substrate of
implementation (i.e. from brain to digital computer) will preserve
continuity of consciousness.

Maybe that assumption is inconsistent.

Computational steps have an order in Platonia. In implementing them
in the material world, as in a computer, the sequentiallity (is that a
word?) of the steps is provided by the underlying physics just as the 1s
and 0s are provided by switches. But without the continuity of the
substrate it seems the states need some axiomatic, inherent order as in
Platonia. So then it is not clear that states can be chopped arbitrarily
finely and still function as computations - or a stream of conscious states.

Brent Meeker

I don't see how it is possible to mix up something any more thoroughly
in the real world than it is already mixed up in Platonia.

Sure. In the real world I can write 1 2 4 7 6 3...  But in arithmtic Platonia
(a small part of the kingdom) there's no spacial or temporal order that can
conflict with the inherent order.

It's not as
if God has to explicitly put the integers in line one after the other:
they just naturally form a sequence, and they would no less form a
sequence if they were written on cards and thrown to the wind. Explicit
ordering in the physical world is important from a third person
perspective. If the putative sequence has a first person experience, and
the substrate of its implementation is transparent to that first person
experience (eg. an entity in a virtual reality environment with no
external input) then the implicit ordering in Platonia is sufficient to
create the first person impression of continuity.

Stathis Papaioannou

I don't disagree with that.  But that means that a conscious, 1st person, pair
of experiences, i.e. pair of numbers can have no order other than the inherent
order of the numbers.  And if an experience corresponds to just a number, then
experiences are discrete and can't be chopped finer than some limit.

I guess I need a more explicit idea of how experiences occur in arithmetic
Platonia.  Are we to imagine that some large number 3875835442... is a single,
atomic experience and another number 3876976342... is another single, atomic
experience and they have no other relation than their natural order?  In that
case, they would be experiences in a certain bundle of streams of consciousness
just in virtue of having some digits in common or having factors in common or
what?  Or are we to imagine another Platonic object, a Turing machine, that
generates both these numbers in a certain sequence (maybe the reverse of their
natural order) - and that's what makes them parts of the same experience bundle?

Brent Meeker

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### Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Brent meeker writes:
This raises the question again of what is the minimum duration of a
conscious state?  You mention 5sec as being a long time for a coincidental
match (would there still be two consciousnesses for that 5sec - I think not),
but what about 300msec, or 100msec.  There's not much consciousness in
100msec; so little that it may be occuring hundreds of times over in
different brains.

Human brains, and the consciousness they produce are both very complex.
I've heard it said that human vision processes the quivalent of
hundreds of millions of  pixels and can distinguish millions of colors.
The optic nerves transfer information at a rate of about 1 Gbps.  So
for thought experiments and examples I find it useful to reduce qualia
to more simple cases.  Imagine a creature with very primitive sight,
capable of only distinguishing between white and black, and with visual
acuity so poor it is only able to perceive one pixel.  Sight for such a
creature would be equivalent to perceiving one of two states:
brightness or darkness.

When this creature sees white, it would be equivalent to that
creature having an involuntary and vivid thought about white.  That
thought is objectively nothing more than the activation of a certain
group of neurons that react when having the thought about white.
Subjectively, the creature perceives an indescribable quale, and may
say that white is like warmth (in the same way humans rescribe red as
being hot).  This is likely due to links in the neural tissue between
the neurons that process seeing white and the ones that process the
sensation of warmth.

Using this simplified example, it becomes easier to attack the question
of what is the minimum duration for a conscious state?, or How long
is an obsever moment?  One could say that for every planck time, there
an observer moment.  While those neurons are active there will be
observer moment's experiencing the quale of white at each instant.
However, since brain chemistry is so slow (compared to the speed of
light and plank scales) there will be a massive number of observer
moments that are subjectively indistinguishable.  So in this regard one
could also say that new observer moments are only created when the
state of the neural tissue changes, since otherwise they were
indistingushable from the observer's perspective.

In this regard, there is no minimum amount of time an observer moment
must span, all that is required for the observer moment to exist is for
a brain in a certain state to exist.  Note however, that our brains do
not only contain information collected from a single instant, but
rather they contain and are in the middle of processing sensory
information collected over the course of perhaps a 10th - 20th of a
second.  This could explain why a flip book appears to have smooth
motion if you see more than 10 to 20 frames per second, and why a low
frequency sound below 10-20 Hz sounds like individal beats as opposed
to a tone.

Jason

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### Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

On Jan 25, 3:50 am, Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Fri, Jan 26, 2007 at 03:54:32PM -0500, John M wrote:

PS I still would appreciate to be directed to a short text explaining the
essence of ASSA (RSSA?). JIt is in my book. Here is the relevant excerpt:

\section[ASSA vs RSSA]{Absolute vs Relative Self Sampl\-ing Assumption}

In the course of a lengthy, and at times heated debate between Jacques
Mallah and myself, it became clear we were always arguing from
disparate positions\cite{Mallah-Standish}. At the heart of our
difference of opinion was how the strong self sampling
assumption\index{self sampling assumption!strong|emph} should be
applied. Jacques Mallah assumed that each observer moment had an
absolute positive measure, and that our current observer moment is
selected at random from that distribution.

Since I accept the TIME postulate,\index{TIME postulate} only the
birth moment is selected at random, according to the self sampling
assumption. Thereafter, each observer moment's measure can be
determined {\em relative} to its predecessor by means of Born's
rule\index{Born rule}
(\ref{proj-prob}). Arguing with this notion of observer measure, first
person immortality follows provided the no cul-de-sac conjecture\index{no
cul-de-sac conjecture} is
true.

The Everything List adopted the term {\em Absolute Self Sampling
Assumption}\index{self sampling assumption!absolute|emph} to
refer to Mallah's use of strong self sampling, and the {\em Relative
Self Sampling Assumption}\index{self sampling assumption!relative|emph} for
the version I use.  Since this
debate took place, other debates have taken place between members of
the absolute'' camp, which includes such names as Jacques
Mallah,\index{Mallah, Jacques}
Saibal Mitra,\index{Mitra, Saibal} Hal Finney\index{Finney, Hal} and the
relative'' camp which includes
Bruno Marchal,\index{Marchal, Bruno} Stathis
Papaioannou, and myself.

\index{Papaioannou, Stathis}\index{Standish, Russell}

Both of these camps'' appear to have internally consistent pictures.
The fact that I'm not currently experiencing childhood, is for me
strong evidence that the ASSA is an incorrect application of the
strong self sampling assumption.

---­-
A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Mathematics
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au
---­-

I think you can add me to the ASSA camp :)

How does the fact that you're not experiencing childhood provide
evidence that ASSA is incorrect, as chances of experiencing childhood
or adulthood are both significant so I don't see why that would rule
out ASSA ... I kind of expected a different definition for RSSA as this
definition does not even solve any of the crazy paradoxes ASSA has ...
Well, anyway, time to look up the time postulate :)

Also, do you believe one can convince oneself of MWI (versus CI) by
performing a quantum suicide ?

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### RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Brent Meeker writes:  Perhaps even in a minimally conscious state your
experiences are   specific enough to distinguish them from those of everyone
else in a   superficially similar state. But what if, through amazing
coincidence,   you had a 5 second period of consciousness which exactly
matched that of   a stranger on the other side of the world? During that
period it would   be impossible to say (from a 1st person perspective) where
you were   being run or which person you were, in the same way as it would be
impossible to say where you were being run if your consciousness were
implemented on two computers running in perfect lockstep.Stathis
Papaioannou  Which is to say there is no you, or at least you are not your
consciousness.  This raises the question again of what is the minimum
duration of a conscious state?  You mention 5sec as being a long time for a
coincidental match (would there still be two consciousnesses for that 5sec - I
think not), but what about 300msec, or 100msec.  There's not much consciousness
in 100msec; so little that it may be occuring hundreds of times over in
different brains.  Brent MeekerI think the minimum duration of a conscious
experience is of the order of 100 msec, so if you are shown a red flash it will
take at least this long before you perceive a red flash. This implies a minimum
duration for an observer moment, although the interval can be divided up
arbitrarily (for example, in teleportation thought experiments) leaving the
experience intact. However, this raises a difficulty. Suppose you are shown a
red flash and 99 msec later you are teleported to a distant place. Once you
materialise, your neurons will continue their processing of the red flash for
another 1 msec and at that point (i.e. 100 msec after being shown the flash)
you will perceive it. Next, suppose that you have no past but are created at
the teleportation receiving station from information *as if* you had been shown
a red flash 99 msec ago. Your newly-created brain will process information for
another 1 msec and then you should perceive the red flash. However, in this
case you have only been alive for 1 msec, and we can easily change the
experiment to make this interval as short as we want. Does this mean that an
observer moment can actually be instantaneous?Stathis Papaioannou
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### RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds

William Vandenberghe writes: On Jan 25, 3:50 am, Russell Standish [EMAIL
PROTECTED] wrote:  On Fri, Jan 26, 2007 at 03:54:32PM -0500, John M wrote:
PS I still would appreciate to be directed to a short text explaining
the essence of ASSA (RSSA?). JIt is in my book. Here is the relevant excerpt:
\section[ASSA vs RSSA]{Absolute vs Relative Self Sampl\-ing Assumption}
In the course of a lengthy, and at times heated debate between Jacques
Mallah and myself, it became clear we were always arguing from  disparate
positions\cite{Mallah-Standish}. At the heart of our  difference of opinion
was how the strong self sampling  assumption\index{self sampling
assumption!strong|emph} should be  applied. Jacques Mallah assumed that each
observer moment had an  absolute positive measure, and that our current
observer moment is  selected at random from that distribution.   Since I
accept the TIME postulate,\index{TIME postulate} only the  birth moment is
selected at random, according to the self sampling  assumption. Thereafter,
each observer moment's measure can be  determined {\em relative} to its
predecessor by means of Born's  rule\index{Born rule}  (\ref{proj-prob}).
Arguing with this notion of observer measure, first  person immortality
follows provided the no cul-de-sac conjecture\index{no cul-de-sac conjecture}
is  true.   The Everything List adopted the term {\em Absolute Self
SamplingAssumption}\index{self sampling assumption!absolute|emph} to
refer to Mallah's use of strong self sampling, and the {\em RelativeSelf
Sampling Assumption}\index{self sampling assumption!relative|emph} for the
version I use.  Since thisdebate took place, other debates have taken
place between members ofthe absolute'' camp, which includes such names
as JacquesMallah,\index{Mallah, Jacques}Saibal Mitra,\index{Mitra,
Saibal} Hal Finney\index{Finney, Hal} and the relative'' camp which includes
Bruno Marchal,\index{Marchal, Bruno} StathisPapaioannou, and myself.
\index{Papaioannou, Stathis}\index{Standish, Russell}   Both of these
camps'' appear to have internally consistent pictures.  The fact that I'm
not currently experiencing childhood, is for me  strong evidence that the
ASSA is an incorrect application of the  strong self sampling assumption.

---­-
A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
MathematicsUNSW SYDNEY 2052
[EMAIL PROTECTED]  Australia
http://www.hpcoders.com.au
---­-
I think you can add me to the ASSA camp :)  How does the fact that you're
not experiencing childhood provide evidence that ASSA is incorrect, as chances
of experiencing childhood or adulthood are both significant so I don't see why
that would rule out ASSA ... I kind of expected a different definition for
RSSA as this definition does not even solve any of the crazy paradoxes ASSA
has ... Well, anyway, time to look up the time postulate :)Suppose for
simplicity that there is only one world: you live your life from birth to death
and that's it. God reveals to you that you will live to be 100, but on your
50th birthday he will create a zillion copies of you which will all run in
parallel for one minute and then all but one of the copies will be instantly
destroyed. This means that almost all of your measure will be contained in that
one minute on your 50th birthday. You can add variations to this thought
experiment: God planned this before you were born; God will not decide to do
this until you are 45; God will wait until the eve of your 50th birthday and
toss a coin to decide whether he will make the copies or not; God does not tell
you of his decision and you have to come up with a method to test whether he
makes the copies or not. I claim that it will be impossible to notice anything
unusual happening at any point in your life as a result of God's action or
inaction. The first minute of your 50th birthday will last exactly one minute
and will feel exactly the same as the preceding and the following minute. What
do you think the ASSA predicts you will experience? Can you design a test to
see what God is up to if he doesn't tell you? Stathis Papaioannou
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### Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

On Jan 27, 12:24 pm, Stathis Papaioannou
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
William Vandenberghe writes: On Jan 25, 3:50 am, Russell Standish [EMAIL
PROTECTED] wrote:  On Fri, Jan 26, 2007 at 03:54:32PM -0500, John M
wrote:  PS I still would appreciate to be directed to a short text
explaining the essence of ASSA (RSSA?). JIt is in my book. Here is the
relevant excerpt:   \section[ASSA vs RSSA]{Absolute vs Relative Self
Sampl\-ing Assumption}   In the course of a lengthy, and at times heated
debate between Jacques  Mallah and myself, it became clear we were always
arguing from  disparate positions\cite{Mallah-Standish}. At the heart of
our  difference of opinion was how the strong self sampling
assumption\index{self sampling assumption!strong|emph} should be  applied.
Jacques Mallah assumed that each observer moment had an  absolute positive
measure, and that our current observer moment is  selected at random from
that distribution.   Since I accept the TIME postulate,\index{TIME
postulate} only the  birth moment is selected at random, according to the
self sampling  assumption. Thereafter, each observer moment's measure can
be  determined {\em relative} to its predecessor by means of Born's
rule\index{Born rule}  (\ref{proj-prob}). Arguing with this notion of
observer measure, first  person immortality follows provided the no
cul-de-sac conjecture\index{no cul-de-sac conjecture} is  true.   The
Everything List adopted the term {\em Absolute Self Sampling
Assumption}\index{self sampling assumption!absolute|emph} torefer to
Mallah's use of strong self sampling, and the {\em RelativeSelf
Sampling Assumption}\index{self sampling assumption!relative|emph} for the
version I use.  Since thisdebate took place, other debates have taken
place between members ofthe absolute'' camp, which includes such
names as JacquesMallah,\index{Mallah, Jacques}Saibal
Mitra,\index{Mitra, Saibal} Hal Finney\index{Finney, Hal} and the
relative'' camp which includesBruno Marchal,\index{Marchal, Bruno}
StathisPapaioannou, and myself.   \index{Papaioannou,
Stathis}\index{Standish, Russell}   Both of these camps'' appear to
have internally consistent pictures.  The fact that I'm not currently
experiencing childhood, is for me  strong evidence that the ASSA is an
incorrect application of the  strong self sampling assumption.
---­­-
A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
MathematicsUNSW SYDNEY 2052
[EMAIL PROTECTED]  Australia
http://www.hpcoders.com.au
---­­-
I think you can add me to the ASSA camp :)  How does the fact that
you're not experiencing childhood provide evidence that ASSA is incorrect,
as chances of experiencing childhood or adulthood are both significant so I
don't see why that would rule out ASSA ... I kind of expected a different
definition for RSSA as this definition does not even solve any of the crazy
paradoxes ASSA has ... Well, anyway, time to look up the time postulate
:)Suppose for simplicity that there is only one world: you live your life
from birth to death and that's it. God reveals to you that you will live to
be 100, but on your 50th birthday he will create a zillion copies of you
which will all run in parallel for one minute and then all but one of the
copies will be instantly destroyed. This means that almost all of your
measure will be contained in that one minute on your 50th birthday. You can
add variations to this thought experiment: God planned this before you were
born; God will not decide to do this until you are 45; God will wait until
the eve of your 50th birthday and toss a coin to decide whether he will make
the copies or not; God does not tell you of his decision and you have to come
up with a method to test whether he makes the copies or not. I claim that it
will be impossible to notice anything unusual happening at any point in your
life as a result of God's action or inaction. The first minute of your 50th
birthday will last exactly one minute and will feel exactly the same as the
preceding and the following minute. What do you think the ASSA predicts you
will experience? Can you design a test to see what God is up to if he doesn't
tell you? Stathis
Papaioannou_
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wrong in their formatting.

ASSA predicts you are most likely to be thinking that you are 50, and
if any random consciousness thinks he is 50 years of age, he will be
correct in zillion/(zillion+99)

### RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds

William Vandenberghe writes:[SP]Suppose for simplicity that there is only one
from birth to death and that's it. God reveals to you that you will
live to be 100, but on your 50th birthday he will create a zillion
copies of you which will all run in parallel for one minute and then
all but one of the copies will be instantly destroyed. This means that
almost all of your measure will be contained in that one minute on your
50th birthday. You can add variations to this thought experiment: God
planned this before you were born; God will not decide to do this until
you are 45; God will wait until the eve of your 50th birthday and toss
a coin to decide whether he will make the copies or not; God does not
tell you of his decision and you have to come up with a method to test
whether he makes the copies or not. I claim that it will be impossible
to notice anything unusual happening at any point in your life as a
result of God's action or inaction. The first minute of your 50th
birthday will last exactly one minute and will feel exactly the same as
the preceding and the following minute. What do you think the ASSA
predicts you will experience? Can you design a test to see what God is
up to if he doesn't tell you? [WV] ASSA predicts you are most likely to be
thinking that you are 50, and  if any random consciousness thinks he is 50
years of age, he will be  correct in zillion/(zillion+99) cases, but there is
no way to actually  know to know this no ... The real question is what happens
if an  infinite number of copies are created, then ASSA states you will
actually be thinking you are 50 for sure, and RSSA may avoid this  paradox in
this case ... That is the paradox I was referring to and  there are similar
birth moment.You're 45 and God suddenly decides to make the copies when you
turn 50. Will you suddenly find yourself turning 50 or will you live through
the years 45-49 first? Once you get to 50 how fast will your clock run? What
will you experience as the end of the minute approaches - will you loop back to
the start of the minute or somehow stay suspended at the end? Will you get a
funny feeling in your head as the minute of zillionfold copying starts and
ends? If God decides to make 2 zillion copies at age 51 will you be twice as
likely to find yourself aged 51 as 50, and if so what testable consequences
might this have? If it has no testable consequences then in what sense is it
meaningful? According to the RSSA, *nothing* happens from your POV when you
turn 50. Given that you are already alive, you are going to experience the
moments of your life in order and each one will last the same amount of time,
however many copies of you are extant. The significance of measure is that if
in the next moment there will be n copies of you who will have experience x and
2n copies which will have experience y, then you will have twice as much chance
of experiencing y as of experiencing x. The value of n cannot make any
difference; if it did, then an empirical test would be possible demonstrating
your absolute measure at each stage of life.Stathis Papaioannou
_
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### Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Thanks, Russell.
I believe my slip is showing that I did not follow the Mallah related
posts.
If someone concentrates on just certain topics, may miss something.
You are very kind
John

On 1/24/07, Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

On Fri, Jan 26, 2007 at 03:54:32PM -0500, John M wrote:

PS I still would appreciate to be directed to a short text explaining
the essence of ASSA (RSSA?). J

It is in my book. Here is the relevant excerpt:

\section[ASSA vs RSSA]{Absolute vs Relative Self Sampl\-ing Assumption}

In the course of a lengthy, and at times heated debate between Jacques
Mallah and myself, it became clear we were always arguing from
disparate positions\cite{Mallah-Standish}. At the heart of our
difference of opinion was how the strong self sampling
assumption\index{self sampling assumption!strong|emph} should be
applied. Jacques Mallah assumed that each observer moment had an
absolute positive measure, and that our current observer moment is
selected at random from that distribution.

Since I accept the TIME postulate,\index{TIME postulate} only the
birth moment is selected at random, according to the self sampling
assumption. Thereafter, each observer moment's measure can be
determined {\em relative} to its predecessor by means of Born's
rule\index{Born rule}
(\ref{proj-prob}). Arguing with this notion of observer measure, first
person immortality follows provided the no cul-de-sac conjecture\index{no
cul-de-sac conjecture} is
true.

The Everything List adopted the term {\em Absolute Self Sampling
Assumption}\index{self sampling assumption!absolute|emph} to
refer to Mallah's use of strong self sampling, and the {\em Relative
Self Sampling Assumption}\index{self sampling assumption!relative|emph}
for the version I use.  Since this
debate took place, other debates have taken place between members of
the absolute'' camp, which includes such names as Jacques
Mallah,\index{Mallah, Jacques}
Saibal Mitra,\index{Mitra, Saibal} Hal Finney\index{Finney, Hal} and the
relative'' camp which includes
Bruno Marchal,\index{Marchal, Bruno} Stathis
Papaioannou, and myself.

\index{Papaioannou, Stathis}\index{Standish, Russell}

Both of these camps'' appear to have internally consistent pictures.
The fact that I'm not currently experiencing childhood, is for me
strong evidence that the ASSA is an incorrect application of the
strong self sampling assumption.

A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Mathematics
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au

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### Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:

Perhaps even in a minimally conscious state your experiences are
specific enough to distinguish them from those of everyone else in a
superficially similar state. But what if, through amazing coincidence,
you had a 5 second period of consciousness which exactly matched
that of
a stranger on the other side of the world? During that period it would
be impossible to say (from a 1st person perspective) where you were
being run or which person you were, in the same way as it would be
impossible to say where you were being run if your consciousness were
implemented on two computers running in perfect lockstep.

Stathis Papaioannou

Which is to say there is no you, or at least you are not your
consciousness.

This raises the question again of what is the minimum duration of a
conscious state? You mention 5sec as being a long time for a
coincidental match (would there still be two consciousnesses for that
5sec - I think not), but what about 300msec, or 100msec. There's not
much consciousness in 100msec; so little that it may be occuring
hundreds of times over in different brains.

Brent Meeker

I think the minimum duration of a conscious experience is of the order
of 100 msec, so if you are shown a red flash it will take at least this
long before you perceive a red flash. This implies a minimum duration
for an observer moment, although the interval can be divided up
arbitrarily (for example, in teleportation thought experiments) leaving
the experience intact. However, this raises a difficulty. Suppose you
are shown a red flash and 99 msec later you are teleported to a distant
place. Once you materialise, your neurons will continue their processing
of the red flash for another 1 msec and at that point (i.e. 100 msec
after being shown the flash) you will perceive it. Next, suppose that
you have no past but are created at the teleportation receiving station
from information *as if* you had been shown a red flash 99 msec ago.
Your newly-created brain will process information for another 1 msec and
then you should perceive the red flash. However, in this case you have
only been alive for 1 msec, and we can easily change the experiment to
make this interval as short as we want. Does this mean that an observer
moment can actually be instantaneous?

Stathis Papaioannou

This example implicitly assumes a kind of dualism or cartesian theatre in which
the brain does some processing *and then* you (the really real you) perceives
it.  This is the idea Dennett criticizes in Consciousness Explained.  The
perception must be the processing and even if the flash is very short and it's
perceived duration is very short, the brain processes producing that perception
can be much longer.

Brent Meeker

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### Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

On 1/27/07, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

According to the RSSA, *nothing* happens from your POV when you turn 50.
Given that you are already alive, you are going to experience the moments
of
your life in order and each one will last the same amount of time, however

many copies of you are extant. The significance of measure is that if in
the next
moment there will be n copies of you who will have experience x and 2n
copies
which will have experience y, then you will have twice as much chance of
experiencing y as of experiencing x. The value of n cannot make any
difference;
if it did, then an empirical test would be possible demonstrating your
absolute
measure at each stage of life.

I don't think ASSA (At least my understanding of it) predicts there would be
any
noticeable difference to the observer on their 50th birthday.  It does
not predict for example, that none of the prior or
later years are experienced, in fact they certainly are experienced because
they exist with a postive measure.  What ASSA implies is that simply a
statistical argument, which is this: The observer moment you currently
experience is more likely a common one than an uncommon one.  For example,
at 33 this observer could think according to ASSA, I am experiencing this
observer moment, therefore I am likely to be a common observer moment.  At
33 this would be false, but then statistics are never 100% accurate.  Now
consider the observer holds on to ASSA and so when he is 50 he still assumes
that his currently perceived observer moment is probable.  At this time
there are zillions of him, and zillions of him are correct.  This
large number of observer moments that are correct vastly outweigh the
number of
observer moments that were incorrect, and hence ASSA is a reasonable belief,
as it leads to a true conclusion more often than not.

Jason

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### Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Stathis,

maybe it is a postulate that (in my mind) what you write does not make sense?

A Cc generated/operated by tissue - partially transferred to parts unknown
without (the?) tissue and still functions? I am a simpleminded primitive
peasant, cannot condone that you, a 'thinking' person (no insult meant) accept
the drawing of final conclusions upon our present insufficient knowledge base.
50 years ago everything was explained as a telephone switchboard, 150 years ago
as a steam-engine.
Always by metaphors we did not (yet) quite know and science was happy. Even
things like phlogiston or vitality survived for some time. Today it is comp on
equipment and process exceeding the present technique and things borrowed from
sci-fi. And people take it SSOOO seriously!
E.g. your calculation of the speed of thought upon the physical registrations
of visual measurements. It is the inertia of the tool we use. Thought,  by all
metaphors, is timeless/spaceless, you can experimentally proove it to yourself
by 'thinking' of Dzhingis Kahn, Cleopatra and Hitler around a table in South
america. Or: on the  Moon.

... *if I found myself* continuing to have similar experiences despite
teleportation, ... -- what I would read as  corrected into::
... *if I think about myself as*  making a difference for me in drawing
conclusions. And you emphasized this in your subsequent sentence in
IF... THEN -  by the capitalization. So: if not, not.  A typical 'sowhat'.

I was hoping that you refer a bit to my ideas, not just repeat yours.
But, alas, so are the lists

Have a good weekend

John
- Original Message -
From: Stathis Papaioannou
Sent: Friday, January 26, 2007 10:55 PM
Subject: RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds

John,

I guess my brain is generating my consciousness, but I regard this as a
contingent fact. My conciousness is that which I experience, and if I found
myself continuing to have similar experiences despite teleportation, brain
transplant, resurrection in Heaven or whatever, then I would have survived as
me. Note that I am not saying these things are possible (perhaps this is where
you are scornful of the fantastic scenarios), just that IF in these situations
I continued to think I was me, THEN ipso facto, I would still be me, despite
losing the original body and brain.

Stathis Papaioannou

From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds
Date: Fri, 26 Jan 2007 15:54:32 -0500

Stathis:
John
- Original Message -
From: Stathis Papaioannou
Sent: Friday, January 26, 2007 9:03 AM
Subject: RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds

John Mikes writes:

Stathis:
But my brain just won't let me think this way.
*
Have you been carried away?
Who is your brain to make decisions upon you? (maybe you mean only
that the mechanism of your brain, the main tool YOU  use in mental activity,
is not predesigned for such action?) So: is there a pre-design (ha ha)?
More importantly: who is that me in conflict with 'your'  brain?
How do you 'want' to 'think' something (which involves your brain) when
'your brain' won't let it happen?
OK, let's introduce you, the homunculus, who wants to think some way
and your 'brain' did not reach the sophistication of the design (yet?) to
comply - as a reason for won't let me.
With what 'tool' did you WANT to think this way? How many people
are you indeed?
*
I am asking these stupid qiestions in the line of my search for SELF
(I), vs. the total interconnectedness of our personal existence with 'the
rest of the world'. I expect that you may provide useful hooks for me in such
respect.
John

I am the product of a consciousness-generating mechanism, my brain, in
the same way as walking is the product of a locomotion-generating mechanism,
my legs. I am not identical to my brain just as walking is not identical to
my legs. Now, of course I can only think what my brain will let me think, and
of course I can only walk where my legs will let me walk, but these
statements are not tautologies in the way that saying I can only think what I
can think or I can only walk where I can walk are.

Stathis Papaioannou
---
JM:

so you consider the biologic tissue-grown (stem-cell initiated) BRAIN the
origin of a thinking person? Life growing out from 'matter' - which is the
figment of our explanatory effort to poorly and incompletely observed impact
received from parts unknown? Funny: you invested so many posts

### RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Brent Meeker writes:This raises the question again of what is the
minimum duration of a   conscious state? You mention 5sec as being a long
time for a   coincidental match (would there still be two consciousnesses for
that   5sec - I think not), but what about 300msec, or 100msec. There's not
much consciousness in 100msec; so little that it may be occuring   hundreds
of times over in different brains.   Brent MeekerI think the
minimum duration of a conscious experience is of the order   of 100 msec, so
if you are shown a red flash it will take at least this   long before you
perceive a red flash. This implies a minimum duration   for an observer
moment, although the interval can be divided up   arbitrarily (for example,
in teleportation thought experiments) leaving   the experience intact.
However, this raises a difficulty. Suppose you   are shown a red flash and 99
msec later you are teleported to a distant   place. Once you materialise,
your neurons will continue their processing   of the red flash for another 1
msec and at that point (i.e. 100 msec   after being shown the flash) you will
perceive it. Next, suppose that   you have no past but are created at the
teleportation receiving station   from information *as if* you had been shown
a red flash 99 msec ago.   Your newly-created brain will process information
for another 1 msec and   then you should perceive the red flash. However, in
this case you have   only been alive for 1 msec, and we can easily change the
experiment to   make this interval as short as we want. Does this mean that
an observer   moment can actually be instantaneous?Stathis
Papaioannou  This example implicitly assumes a kind of dualism or cartesian
theatre in which the brain does some processing *and then* you (the really real
you) perceives it.  This is the idea Dennett criticizes in Consciousness
Explained.  The perception must be the processing and even if the flash is
very short and it's perceived duration is very short, the brain processes
producing that perception can be much longer.  Brent MeekerDo you doubt that
you would perceive the red flash in the case where you have not had 100 msec to
process it? At the least you would remember seeing the flash, implying that the
stream of consciousness will survive division into arbitrarily small
intervals.Stathis Papaioannou
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### RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds

It's true that if every entity assumes it is common, more entities overall are
going to be correct. However, what is the relevance of this to first person
experience? The ASSA has been used on this list as an argument against quantum
immortality, on the grounds that since the measure of versions of you under 100
in the multiverse will be much greater than the measure of versions over 1000,
you are unlikely to make it to 1000. But this is simply looking at the
situation from the third person perspective, and QTI explicitly aknowledges
that you are unlikely to live forever from someone else's point of view. The
point is, the ASSA has no effect on your first person experience. You can
expect to experience your 33rd, 50th and 1000th year with absolute certainty as
long as there is a single copy of you extant, and they will subjectively last
exactly one year regardless of the number of copies. Stathis PapaioannouJason
Resch writes:On 1/27/07, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
According to the RSSA, *nothing* happens from your POV when you turn 50. Given
that you are already alive, you are going to experience the moments of your
life in order and each one will last the same amount of time, however
many copies of you are extant. The significance of measure is that if in the
next moment there will be n copies of you who will have experience x and 2n
copies which will have experience y, then you will have twice as much chance of
experiencing y as of experiencing x. The value of n cannot make any difference;
if it did, then an empirical test would be possible demonstrating your absolute
measure at each stage of life.
I don't think ASSA (At least my understanding of it) predicts there would be
any noticeable difference to the observer on their 50th birthday.  It does not
predict for example, that none of the prior or later years are experienced, in
fact they certainly are experienced because they exist with a postive measure.
What ASSA implies is that simply a statistical argument, which is this: The
observer moment you currently experience is more likely a common one than an
uncommon one.  For example, at 33 this observer could think according to ASSA,
I am experiencing this observer moment, therefore I am likely to be a common
observer moment.  At 33 this would be false, but then statistics are never 100%
accurate.  Now consider the observer holds on to ASSA and so when he is 50 he
still assumes that his currently perceived observer moment is probable.  At
this time there are zillions of him, and zillions of him are correct.  This
large number of observer moments that are correct vastly outweigh the number of
observer moments that were incorrect, and hence ASSA is a reasonable belief, as
it leads to a true conclusion more often than not.
Jason

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### RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds

John, It's not a scientific question, it's a philosophical question. Early
Christian thinkers such as Augustine considered preservation of personal
identity when you died and went to heaven. The fact that there is no heaven
does not invalidate the *philosophical* point any more than the scientific
impossibility of teleportation would invalidate conclusions drawn from such
thought experiments. So, suppose God destroyed your body at A and then created
a perfect copy at B: would you survive the procedure? If not, then in what
sense have you survived the last few years given that all the atoms in your
body have been replaced by natural processes?Stathis PapaioannouFrom: [EMAIL
PROTECTED]: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Re: ASSA and Many-WorldsDate: Sat, 27 Jan 2007
17:00:11 -0500

Stathis,

maybe it is a postulate that (in my mind) what you write
does not make sense?

A Cc generated/operated by tissue - partially transferred
to parts unknown  without (the?) tissue and still
functions? I am a simpleminded primitive peasant, cannot condone that you, a
'thinking' person (no insult meant) accept the drawing of final conclusions
upon
our present insufficient knowledge base. 50 years ago everything was explained
as a telephone switchboard, 150 years ago as a steam-engine.
Always by metaphors we did not (yet) quite know and
science was happy. Even things like phlogiston or vitality survived for some
time. Today it is comp on equipment and process exceeding the present technique
and things borrowed from sci-fi. And people take it SSOOO seriously!

E.g. your calculation of the speed of thought upon the
physical registrations of visual measurements. It is the inertia of the tool we
use. Thought,  by all metaphors, is timeless/spaceless, you can
experimentally proove it to yourself by 'thinking' of Dzhingis Kahn, Cleopatra
and Hitler around a table in South america. Or: on the  Moon.

... *if I found myself*
continuing to have similar experiences despite teleportation, ... -- what
I would read as  corrected into::
... *if I think about myself as*  making a
difference for me in drawing conclusions. And you emphasized this in your
subsequent sentence in
IF... THEN -  by the capitalization. So: if
not, not.  A typical 'sowhat'.

I was hoping that you refer a bit to my ideas, not just repeat yours.

But, alas, so are the lists

Have a good weekend

John

- Original Message -
From:
Stathis Papaioannou

Sent: Friday, January 26, 2007 10:55
PM
Subject: RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds
John, I guess my brain is generating my consciousness,
but I regard this as a contingent fact. My conciousness is that which I
experience, and if I found myself continuing to have similar experiences
despite teleportation, brain transplant, resurrection in Heaven or whatever,
then I would have survived as me. Note that I am not saying these things are
possible (perhaps this is where you are scornful of the fantastic scenarios),
just that IF in these situations I continued to think I was me, THEN ipso
facto, I would still be me, despite losing the original body and
brain.Stathis Papaioannou

From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
[EMAIL PROTECTED]: Re: ASSA and
Many-WorldsDate: Fri, 26 Jan 2007 15:54:32 -0500
Stathis:
John

-
Original Message -
From:
Stathis Papaioannou

To:

Sent:
Friday, January 26, 2007 9:03 AM
Subject:
RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds

concluding sentence is  But my brain just won't let me think this
way. * Have you been carried away? Who is your
brain to make decisions upon you? (maybe you mean only that the
mechanism
of your brain, the main tool YOU  use in mental activity, is not
predesigned for such action?) So: is there a pre-design (ha ha)?
More importantly: who is that me in conflict with 'your'
brain? How do you 'want' to 'think' something (which involves your
brain) when 'your brain' won't let it happen? OK, let's introduce
you, the homunculus, who wants to think some way and your 'brain' did
not reach the sophistication of the design (yet?) to comply - as a reason
for won't let me. With what 'tool' did you WANT to think this
way? How many people are you indeed? * I am asking these
stupid qiestions in the line of my search for SELF (I), vs. the total
interconnectedness of our personal existence with 'the rest of the
world'.
I expect that you may provide useful hooks for me in such respect.
JohnI am the product of a consciousness-generating mechanism, my
brain, in the same way as walking is the product

### Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

On Sat, Jan 27, 2007 at 04:11:00AM -0800, William wrote:

wrong in their formatting.

Me too!

ASSA predicts you are most likely to be thinking that you are 50, and
if any random consciousness thinks he is 50 years of age, he will be
correct in zillion/(zillion+99) cases, but there is no way to actually
know to know this no ... The real question is what happens if an
infinite number of copies are created, then ASSA states you will
actually be thinking you are 50 for sure, and RSSA may avoid this
paradox in this case ... That is the paradox I was referring to and

There is good reason to suppose that the absolute measure of an
observer moment is inversely proportional to the exponential of the
OM's complexity (this is discussed elsewhere in my book). In such a
case, newborn OM's have vastly greater liklihood of being experienced
than (say) 40 year old adult OMs.

Now of course if you throw in a mischievous deity and you can make up whatever
scenario you like. This is a favourite pastime of the God moves in
mysterious ways folk. However, there is no reason for me take any such
proposal seriously until such time as there is some evidence
supporting such mechanisms.

there are similar paradoxes which are not avoided by the above

Multiverse context in other everything-list postings, and the original
Doomsday Argument is not a paradox AFAICT.

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### RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Russell Standish writes: There is good reason to suppose that the absolute
measure of an observer moment is inversely proportional to the exponential of
the OM's complexity (this is discussed elsewhere in my book). In such a case,
newborn OM's have vastly greater likelihood of being experienced than (say) 40
year old adult OMs.But was is the relevance of this from a first person
perspective? It's like saying you are vastly more likely to find yourself a
bacterium than a human. This is the case if you consider youself standing
ouside of the universe, trying to predict whether you will end up a bacterium,
human neonate or 40 year old - which I guess is what you mean when you say the
ASSA is a predictor of birth order - but obviously if you have any stance at
all, you are already embedded in the universe, not a disembodied mind
contemplating its possible futures.Stathis Papaiaonnou
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### Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

On Jan 27, 9:02 pm, Stathis Papaioannou
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
It's true that if every entity assumes it is common, more entities overall
are going to be correct. However, what is the relevance of this to first
person experience? The ASSA has been used on this list as an argument against
quantum immortality, on the grounds that since the measure of versions of you
under 100 in the multiverse will be much greater than the measure of versions
over 1000, you are unlikely to make it to 1000. But this is simply looking at
the situation from the third person perspective, and QTI explicitly
aknowledges that you are unlikely to live forever from someone else's point
of view.  The point is, the ASSA has no effect on your first person
experience. You can expect to experience your 33rd, 50th and 1000th year with
absolute certainty as long as there is a single copy of you extant, and they
will subjectively last exactly one year regardless of the number of copies.
Stathis Papaioannou

I agree that regardless of the creation or destruction of other
copies, there is no reason for there ever to be any effect on first
person experience, that means no funny feelings, no loss of
consciousness, etc.

Many-worlds implies there are always branched histories where an
observer survives to experience another observer-moment.

ASSA Proponents:
Observer-moments that find themselves as extremely and abnormally long-
lived observers should be exceedingly rare.

I fail to see how the above descriptions are mutually exclusive.  I
would say if one finds themself experiencing an observer moment of a
1,000 year old human they should consider such an experience to be
extremely rare.  I believe he point of dispute is centered on the
nature of consciousness, I think some RSSA proponents are tied to the
idea that consciousness is continuous, or otherwise tied to each
observer.  However, if consciousness can be simulated by a digital
machine, then there must be discrete time intervals representing each
state, and if time is discrete, how can consciousness be continuous?
Some ASSA proponents seem to believe that consciousness is like taking
random samples among all observer moments, with the exceedingly rare
observer moments never experiencing consciousness.  This too is an
error in my opinion.

I see reality's first person as the set of all observer moments.
Every experience that can exist does, and by definition is
experienced.  The fact that some of these experiences exist in greater
numbers than others has no consequence on any of the individual
subjective experiences, but it does mean that most observer-moments
can use their existance to make reasonable estimates regarding what
types of observer moments are likely to be most probable.  ASSA might
be applicable in determing properties of universes that observers are
likely to find themselves in.  The difficulty in this regard is
separating what properties of this universe are here due to necessary
anthropic reasons, and what properties of this universe are here only
because they increase the measure of its inhabitant observer moments.

The reason I started this thread was to discuss the possibility that
Many-Worlds is a property of this universe for purely ASSA reasons, I
see no reason for it to exist for any anthropic reasons, but due to
the exponential growth in observer moments defined by many-world
universes, it makes great sense.

Jason

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### Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:

This raises the question again of what is the minimum duration of a
conscious state? You mention 5sec as being a long time for a
coincidental match (would there still be two consciousnesses for that
5sec - I think not), but what about 300msec, or 100msec. There's not
much consciousness in 100msec; so little that it may be occuring
hundreds of times over in different brains.

Brent Meeker

I think the minimum duration of a conscious experience is of the order
of 100 msec, so if you are shown a red flash it will take at least
this
long before you perceive a red flash. This implies a minimum duration
for an observer moment, although the interval can be divided up
arbitrarily (for example, in teleportation thought experiments)
leaving
the experience intact. However, this raises a difficulty. Suppose you
are shown a red flash and 99 msec later you are teleported to a
distant
place. Once you materialise, your neurons will continue their
processing
of the red flash for another 1 msec and at that point (i.e. 100 msec
after being shown the flash) you will perceive it. Next, suppose that
you have no past but are created at the teleportation receiving
station
from information *as if* you had been shown a red flash 99 msec ago.
Your newly-created brain will process information for another 1
msec and
then you should perceive the red flash. However, in this case you have
only been alive for 1 msec, and we can easily change the experiment to
make this interval as short as we want. Does this mean that an
observer
moment can actually be instantaneous?

Stathis Papaioannou

This example implicitly assumes a kind of dualism or cartesian
theatre in which the brain does some processing *and then* you (the
really real you) perceives it. This is the idea Dennett criticizes in
Consciousness Explained. The perception must be the processing and
even if the flash is very short and it's perceived duration is very
short, the brain processes producing that perception can be much longer.

Brent Meeker

Do you doubt that you would perceive the red flash in the case where you
have not had 100 msec to process it? At the least you would remember
seeing the flash, implying that the stream of consciousness will survive
division into arbitrarily small intervals.

Stathis Papaioannou

Assuming that consciousness supervenes on the physics, this follows just from
the continuity of the physics.  But it doesn't follow that there is some
experience corresponding to 1msec of brain processing - it might be that
seeing the flash spans some time interval.

Brent Meeker

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### Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Stathis:
But my brain just won't let me think this way.
*
Have you been carried away?
Who is your brain to make decisions upon you? (maybe you mean only that the
mechanism of your brain, the main tool YOU  use in mental activity, is not
predesigned for such action?) So: is there a pre-design (ha ha)?
More importantly: who is that me in conflict with 'your'  brain?
How do you 'want' to 'think' something (which involves your brain) when 'your
brain' won't let it happen?
OK, let's introduce you, the homunculus, who wants to think some way and your
'brain' did not reach the sophistication of the design (yet?) to comply - as a
reason for won't let me.
With what 'tool' did you WANT to think this way? How many people are you
indeed?
*
I am asking these stupid qiestions in the line of my search for SELF (I), vs.
the total interconnectedness of our personal existence with 'the rest of the
world'. I expect that you may provide useful hooks for me in such respect.

John

- Original Message -
From: Stathis Papaioannou
Sent: Thursday, January 25, 2007 7:08 AM
Subject: RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Jason Resch writes:

Jason Resch writes:

My appologies to those on this list, this is how I should have worded
my conclusion:
Positive spared lives = Take replication
Neutral spared lives = Take coin flip
Negative spared lives = Take coin flip

[SP]
This is an analysis from an altruistic viewpoint, i.e. which choice will
increase
the net happiness in the world. What I am asking is the selfish question,
what
should I do to avoid being tortured? If I choose the replication it won't
worry
me from a selfish point of view if one person will definitely be tortured
because
I am unlikely to be that person. Indeed, after the replication it won't
affect me
if *all* the other copies are tortured, because despite sharing the same
psychology
up to the point of replication, I am not going to experience their pain.

[JR]
I think our disagreement stems from our different conceptions of
consciousness.  You seem to believe that once you experience an observer
moment, that you are destined to experience all future observer moments of that
observer.  While this is the way most people see the world, I consider that to
be an illusion caused by memory.  i.e. We remember past observer moments so we
must be moving into the future.
I believe that its is just as beneficial to do something that will improve
someone else's observer moments as it is to improve one's future observer
moments. Just think: your current observer moment never gets to experience the
fruits of its current labors, it remains in that observer moment for all time.
Yet we still go to work.  That is why altruism is indistinguishable from
selfish behavior in my philosophy.  There is no consciousness outside of brain
states, brain states are consciousness, since they exist they are experienced,
no one can say by who or by what, their existance is experience.  Therefore it
is in everyone's interest to improve reality's first person, of which every
observer moment is a part.
It's easy to see how evolution taught us to work for one individual's
future observer moments, we defer gratification all time in order to increase
the average quality of all future observer moments.  I'm not advocating we all
become like Mother Teresa, but I think we should understand that we are no more
(or less) our future observer moments than we are other individual's observer
moments.

I completely agree with your view of observer moments: the person who wakes
up
in my bed tomorrow won't be me-now, he'll just be someone who shares most of
my
memories and believes he is me. In fact, if I were killed with an axe during
the night
and replaced with an exact copy, it wouldn't make any difference to me or
anyone
else, because I die every moment anyway. But the problem is, I am very
attached to
the illusion of continuity of conscious and personal identity even though I
know how it
is generated. If I give in to it, I might decide to treat everyone the same
as I do myself,
but just as likely I might decide to be completely reckless with my life, or
even with
everyone else's life. But my brain just won't let me think this way.

Stathis Papaioannou
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### RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds

John Mikes writes:

Stathis:
But my brain just won't let me think this way.
*
Have you been carried away?
Who is your brain to make decisions upon you? (maybe you mean only that the
mechanism of your brain, the main tool YOU  use in mental activity, is not
predesigned for such action?) So: is there a pre-design (ha ha)?
More importantly: who is that me in conflict with 'your'  brain?
How do you 'want' to 'think' something (which involves your brain) when 'your
brain' won't let it happen?
OK, let's introduce you, the homunculus, who wants to think some way and
your 'brain' did not reach the sophistication of the design (yet?) to comply
- as a reason for won't let me.
With what 'tool' did you WANT to think this way? How many people are you
indeed?
*
I am asking these stupid qiestions in the line of my search for SELF (I),
vs. the total interconnectedness of our personal existence with 'the rest of
the world'. I expect that you may provide useful hooks for me in such respect.
John

I am the product of a consciousness-generating mechanism, my brain, in the
same way as walking is the product of a locomotion-generating mechanism, my
legs. I am not identical to my brain just as walking is not identical to my
legs. Now, of course I can only think what my brain will let me think, and of
course I can only walk where my legs will let me walk, but these statements
are not tautologies in the way that saying I can only think what I can think
or I can only walk where I can walk are.

Stathis Papaioannou
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### Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:

Date: Thu, 25 Jan 2007 17:00:11 -0800
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

Johnathan Corgan writes:

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

If some multiverse theory happens to be true then by your way of
argument we
should all be extremely anxious all the time, because every
moment terrible things
are definitely happening to some copy of us. For example, we
should be constantly
be worrying that we will be struck by lightning, because we
*will* be struck by lightning.
If MWI is true, *and* there isn't a lowest quantum of
probability/measure as Brent Meeker speculates, there is an
interesting
corollary to the quantum theory of immortality.

While one branch always exists which continues our consciousness
forward, indeed we are constantly shedding branches where the most
brutal and horrific things happen to us and result in our death. Their
measure is extremely small, so from a subjectively probability
perspective, we don't worry about them.

I'd speculate that there are far more logically possible ways to
experience an agonizing, lingering death than to live. Some have a
relatively high measure, like getting hit by a car, or getting lung
cancer (if you're a smoker), so we take steps to avoid these (though
they still happen in some branch.) Others, like having all our
particles spontaneously quantum tunnel into the heart of a burning
furnace, are so low in measure, we can blissfully ignore the
possibility. Yet if MWI is true, there is some branch where this has
just happened to us. (modulo Brent's probability quantum.)

If there are many more ways to die than to live, even of low
individual
measure, I wonder how the integral of the measure across all of them
comes out.

It's not death that is the problem (you always get out of that),
it's suffering. Final death
would be better than a living hell, but QTI denies you final death.
I take comfort in the
speculation that if I'm still alive in a few hundred years, most
likely this will be as a result
of some advanced medical or cybernetic intervention, and if science
understands the brain
well enough to do that, it would be a relatively simple matter by
comparison to ensure that I
am content. I think the hellish routes to immortality would occur
mostly by chance and would
be of much lower total measure than the deliberate, happy routes.

I think Bruno already remarked that it may well be more probable that
a continuation of your consciousness arises in some other branch of the
multiverse by chance, rather than as a state of your erstwhile body.
This would seem particularly more probable as your consciousness
simplifies due to deterioration of your brain - how hard can it be to
find a continuation of a near coma. Perhaps this continuation is the
consciousness of a fish - and it's the Hindus rather than the Bhuddists
who are right.

Then we come up against the question of what we can expect to experience
in the case of duplication with partial memory loss. For example, if you
are duplicated 101 times such that one copy has 100% of your memories
while the other 100 copies each have 1% of your memories, does this mean
that you have an even chance of ending up as either the 100% or the 1%
version of yourself? We need not invoke duplication experiments or the
MWI to ask this question either. Suppose there are a billion people in
the world each with 1/billion of my memories: does this mean I will find
myself becoming one of these people either now or after I have died?

As I understand it, Bruno's theory is that you are all the consistent
continuations of your consciousness.  I'm not exactly sure what constitutes a
consistent continuation, but it must be something other than just sharing
memories.  At any given time my consciousness is accessing only a tiny fraction
of my memories.  Further I'm continually  forming and forgetting short-term
memories as well as forgetting some long-term memories.

Basing identity on memory seems inconsistent with supposing that identity is
some property of consciousness alone.  A digital computation doesn't depend on
memory/data that isn't accessed.

Brent Meeker

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### Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Stathis:
John
- Original Message -
From: Stathis Papaioannou
Sent: Friday, January 26, 2007 9:03 AM
Subject: RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds

John Mikes writes:

Stathis:
But my brain just won't let me think this way.
*
Have you been carried away?
Who is your brain to make decisions upon you? (maybe you mean only that
the mechanism of your brain, the main tool YOU  use in mental activity, is
not predesigned for such action?) So: is there a pre-design (ha ha)?
More importantly: who is that me in conflict with 'your'  brain?
How do you 'want' to 'think' something (which involves your brain) when
'your brain' won't let it happen?
OK, let's introduce you, the homunculus, who wants to think some way and
your 'brain' did not reach the sophistication of the design (yet?) to comply -
as a reason for won't let me.
With what 'tool' did you WANT to think this way? How many people are
you indeed?
*
I am asking these stupid qiestions in the line of my search for SELF (I),
vs. the total interconnectedness of our personal existence with 'the rest of
the world'. I expect that you may provide useful hooks for me in such respect.
John

I am the product of a consciousness-generating mechanism, my brain, in the
same way as walking is the product of a locomotion-generating mechanism, my
legs. I am not identical to my brain just as walking is not identical to my
legs. Now, of course I can only think what my brain will let me think, and of
course I can only walk where my legs will let me walk, but these statements
are not tautologies in the way that saying I can only think what I can think
or I can only walk where I can walk are.

Stathis Papaioannou
---
JM:

so you consider the biologic tissue-grown (stem-cell initiated) BRAIN the
origin of a thinking person? Life growing out from 'matter' - which is the
figment of our explanatory effort to poorly and incompletely observed impact
received from parts unknown? Funny: you invested so many posts into the
(partial) teleportation and copying into other universes - did you really MEAN
the transfer of tissues (like in StarTrek?) How 'bout the multiple  'copying'
of matter?  How can you duplicate the atoms for copying? StarTrek had only 1
copy and that, too, by 'physical' transfer.
Save the wrong conclusion: I am not defending this line, I find it unreal and
just mention the position of yours and others on this list for argument's sake.
I find it 'interesting, but amazing' that different brains (see: the
multiplicity of humans and other animals among themselves) behave like mental
clones in accepting very similar 3rd person views into their 1st person
ideas, to form images of the 'material world' etc. Mental images, that is,
which, however you would make into their own origination? Are we all (and the
world, the existnce etc.) only fiction of ourselves?

Then again I feel that the 'consciousness' you generate by the brain may be
very close to personality, self, the I we are talking about. Which would
close the loop:  there must be the 'primitive matter' forming the brain and
out of that comes the 'not-so-primitive' matter, the mental complexity and
all???

I agree withBruno to disagree in the absolute primitive matter concept. IMO
It is only an explanatory imaging in this universe's consciousness activity
to order the part of the system we so far detected. Together with space-time
and OUR pet-causality - the 'within model' ordering.

John

PS I still would appreciate to be directed to a short text explaining the

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### Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

On Fri, Jan 26, 2007 at 03:54:32PM -0500, John M wrote:

PS I still would appreciate to be directed to a short text explaining the

It is in my book. Here is the relevant excerpt:

\section[ASSA vs RSSA]{Absolute vs Relative Self Sampl\-ing Assumption}

In the course of a lengthy, and at times heated debate between Jacques
Mallah and myself, it became clear we were always arguing from
disparate positions\cite{Mallah-Standish}. At the heart of our
difference of opinion was how the strong self sampling
assumption\index{self sampling assumption!strong|emph} should be
applied. Jacques Mallah assumed that each observer moment had an
absolute positive measure, and that our current observer moment is
selected at random from that distribution.

Since I accept the TIME postulate,\index{TIME postulate} only the
birth moment is selected at random, according to the self sampling
assumption. Thereafter, each observer moment's measure can be
determined {\em relative} to its predecessor by means of Born's
rule\index{Born rule}
(\ref{proj-prob}). Arguing with this notion of observer measure, first
person immortality follows provided the no cul-de-sac conjecture\index{no
cul-de-sac conjecture} is
true.

The Everything List adopted the term {\em Absolute Self Sampling
Assumption}\index{self sampling assumption!absolute|emph} to
refer to Mallah's use of strong self sampling, and the {\em Relative
Self Sampling Assumption}\index{self sampling assumption!relative|emph} for
the version I use.  Since this
debate took place, other debates have taken place between members of
the absolute'' camp, which includes such names as Jacques
Mallah,\index{Mallah, Jacques}
Saibal Mitra,\index{Mitra, Saibal} Hal Finney\index{Finney, Hal} and the
relative'' camp which includes
Bruno Marchal,\index{Marchal, Bruno} Stathis
Papaioannou, and myself.

\index{Papaioannou, Stathis}\index{Standish, Russell}

Both of these camps'' appear to have internally consistent pictures.
The fact that I'm not currently experiencing childhood, is for me
strong evidence that the ASSA is an incorrect application of the
strong self sampling assumption.

A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Mathematics
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au

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### RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Brent Meeker writes:I think Bruno already remarked that it may well be
more probable that   a continuation of your consciousness arises in some
other branch of the   multiverse by chance, rather than as a state of
consciousness   simplifies due to deterioration of your brain - how hard can
it be to   find a continuation of a near coma. Perhaps this continuation is
the   consciousness of a fish - and it's the Hindus rather than the Bhuddists
who are right.Then we come up against the question of what we can
expect to experience   in the case of duplication with partial memory loss.
For example, if you   are duplicated 101 times such that one copy has 100% of
your memories   while the other 100 copies each have 1% of your memories,
does this mean   that you have an even chance of ending up as either the 100%
or the 1%   version of yourself? We need not invoke duplication experiments
or the   MWI to ask this question either. Suppose there are a billion people
in   the world each with 1/billion of my memories: does this mean I will find
myself becoming one of these people either now or after I have died?  As
I understand it, Bruno's theory is that you are all the consistent
continuations of your consciousness.  I'm not exactly sure what constitutes a
consistent continuation, but it must be something other than just sharing
memories.  At any given time my consciousness is accessing only a tiny fraction
of my memories.  Further I'm continually  forming and forgetting short-term
memories as well as forgetting some long-term memories.Basing identity on
memory seems inconsistent with supposing that identity is some property of
consciousness alone.  A digital computation doesn't depend on memory/data that
isn't accessed.Identity from moment to moment is not just memory, it is the
entire content of conscious experience, perhaps accessing at any one time only
a small portion of memory. It may be just a sense that I am the same person
continuing the same thought as I was a moment ago, or even less than this when
I am waking up from sleep, for example. At such sufficiently vague moments, my
consciousness may even be indistinguishable with that of many other people in
the world, such that if I ceased to exist momentarily I would still experience
continuity of consciousness as if nothing had happened, piggy-backing on
someone else's thoughts: all equivalent observer moments are internally
indistinguishable, by definition. However, such a thing could only happen
momentarily, because very quickly I might reflect on my situation, and it is
here that having a store of memories, motivations, personality style etc.
instantly accessible (even if not continuously accessed) makes me, me.Stathis
Papaioannou
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### RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds

John, I guess my brain is generating my consciousness, but I regard this as a
contingent fact. My conciousness is that which I experience, and if I found
myself continuing to have similar experiences despite teleportation, brain
transplant, resurrection in Heaven or whatever, then I would have survived as
me. Note that I am not saying these things are possible (perhaps this is where
you are scornful of the fantastic scenarios), just that IF in these situations
I continued to think I was me, THEN ipso facto, I would still be me, despite
losing the original body and brain.Stathis PapaioannouFrom: [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
[EMAIL PROTECTED]: Re: ASSA and Many-WorldsDate: Fri, 26 Jan 2007 15:54:32 -0500

Stathis:
John

- Original Message -
From:
Stathis Papaioannou

Sent: Friday, January 26, 2007 9:03
AM
Subject: RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds

concluding sentence is  But my brain just won't let me think this
way. * Have you been carried away? Who is your
brain to make decisions upon you? (maybe you mean only that the mechanism of
your brain, the main tool YOU  use in mental activity, is not
predesigned for such action?) So: is there a pre-design (ha ha)? More
importantly: who is that me in conflict with 'your'  brain? How
do you 'want' to 'think' something (which involves your brain) when 'your
brain' won't let it happen? OK, let's introduce you, the homunculus,
who wants to think some way and your 'brain' did not reach the sophistication
of the design (yet?) to comply - as a reason for won't let me. With
what 'tool' did you WANT to think this way? How many people are you
indeed? * I am asking these stupid qiestions in the line of my
search for SELF (I), vs. the total interconnectedness of our personal
existence with 'the rest of the world'. I expect that you may provide useful
hooks for me in such respect. JohnI am the product of a
consciousness-generating mechanism, my brain, in the same way as walking is
the product of a locomotion-generating mechanism, my legs. I am not
identical to my brain just as walking is not identical to my legs. Now, of
course I can only think what my brain will let me think, and of course I
can only walk where my legs will let me walk, but these statements are not
tautologies in the way that saying I can only think what I can think or I
can only walk where I can walk are. Stathis
Papaioannou---
JM:

so you consider the biologic tissue-grown (stem-cell
initiated) BRAIN the origin of a thinking person? Life growing out from
'matter' - which is the figment of our explanatory effort to poorly and
incompletely observed impact received from parts unknown? Funny: you invested
so many posts into the (partial) teleportation and copying into other
universes - did you really MEAN
the transfer of tissues (like in StarTrek?) How 'bout the
multiple  'copying' of matter?  How can you duplicate the atoms for
copying? StarTrek had only 1 copy and that, too, by 'physical'
transfer.
Save the wrong conclusion: I am not defending this line, I
find it unreal and just mention the position of yours and others on this list
for argument's sake.
I find it 'interesting, but amazing' that different brains
(see: the multiplicity of humans and other animals among themselves) behave
like mental clones in accepting very similar 3rd person views into their
1st
person ideas, to form images of the 'material world' etc. Mental images, that
is, which, however you would make into their own origination? Are we
all (and the world, the existnce etc.) only fiction of ourselves?

Then again I feel that the 'consciousness' you generate by
the brain may be very close to personality, self, the I we are talking
about. Which would close the loop:  there must be the 'primitive matter'
forming the brain and out of that comes the 'not-so-primitive' matter, the
mental complexity and all???

I agree withBruno to disagree in the absolute primitive
matter concept. IMO
It is only an explanatory imaging in this universe's
consciousness activity to order the part of the system we so far detected.
Together with space-time and OUR pet-causality - the 'within model'
ordering.

John

PS I still would appreciate to be directed to a short text
explaining the essence of ASSA (RSSA?). J

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### Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:

I think Bruno already remarked that it may well be more probable
that
a continuation of your consciousness arises in some other branch of
the
multiverse by chance, rather than as a state of your erstwhile
body.
This would seem particularly more probable as your consciousness
simplifies due to deterioration of your brain - how hard can it be to
find a continuation of a near coma. Perhaps this continuation is the
consciousness of a fish - and it's the Hindus rather than the
Bhuddists
who are right.

Then we come up against the question of what we can expect to
experience
in the case of duplication with partial memory loss. For example,
if you
are duplicated 101 times such that one copy has 100% of your memories
while the other 100 copies each have 1% of your memories, does this
mean
that you have an even chance of ending up as either the 100% or the 1%
version of yourself? We need not invoke duplication experiments or the
MWI to ask this question either. Suppose there are a billion people in
the world each with 1/billion of my memories: does this mean I will
find
myself becoming one of these people either now or after I have died?

As I understand it, Bruno's theory is that you are all the
consistent continuations of your consciousness. I'm not exactly sure
what constitutes a consistent continuation, but it must be something
other than just sharing memories. At any given time my consciousness is
accessing only a tiny fraction of my memories. Further I'm continually
forming and forgetting short-term memories as well as forgetting some
long-term memories.

Basing identity on memory seems inconsistent with supposing that
identity is some property of consciousness alone. A digital computation
doesn't depend on memory/data that isn't accessed.

Identity from moment to moment is not just memory, it is the entire
content of conscious experience, perhaps accessing at any one time only
a small portion of memory. It may be just a sense that I am the same
person continuing the same thought as I was a moment ago, or even less
than this when I am waking up from sleep, for example. At such
sufficiently vague moments, my consciousness may even be
indistinguishable with that of many other people in the world, such that
if I ceased to exist momentarily I would still experience continuity of
consciousness as if nothing had happened, piggy-backing on someone
else's thoughts: all equivalent observer moments are internally
indistinguishable, by definition. However, such a thing could only
happen momentarily, because very quickly I might reflect on my
situation, and it is here that having a store of memories, motivations,
personality style etc. instantly accessible (even if not continuously
accessed) makes me, me.

Yes I understand that you would eventually, say when waking from anesthesia,
have some memories unique to Stathis Papaioannou.  But in the meantime I think
you are still you - and not all those other people who shared those vague
thoughts in the recovery room.  And it can't be because your memories are
instantly accessible; that's a mere potentiality not a state.  If we start to
reify potentialities in a multi-verse where we already have a white rabbit
problem, we'll really be in trouble.

Brent Meeker

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### RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Moreover, even if we constrain the definition of computer to include only the
operations of factory-made devices plugged in and appropriately programmed, the
fact that a digital computation at any instant does not access all of memory
and data allows for the computation to be distributed over multiple machines in
a network which accidentally have the appropriate configuration for that part
of the computation. The only requirement is that the network be large enough in
space and time to provide these configurations: from its point of view, the
computation cannot be aware that the various steps of its implementation are
disjointed and not causally connnected.Stathis PapaioannouFrom: [EMAIL
PROTECTED]: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: RE: ASSA and Many-WorldsDate: Sat, 27 Jan 2007
14:41:07 +1100

Brent Meeker writes:I think Bruno already remarked that it may well be
more probable that   a continuation of your consciousness arises in some
other branch of the   multiverse by chance, rather than as a state of
consciousness   simplifies due to deterioration of your brain - how hard can
it be to   find a continuation of a near coma. Perhaps this continuation is
the   consciousness of a fish - and it's the Hindus rather than the Bhuddists
who are right.Then we come up against the question of what we can
expect to experience   in the case of duplication with partial memory loss.
For example, if you   are duplicated 101 times such that one copy has 100% of
your memories   while the other 100 copies each have 1% of your memories,
does this mean   that you have an even chance of ending up as either the 100%
or the 1%   version of yourself? We need not invoke duplication experiments
or the   MWI to ask this question either. Suppose there are a billion people
in   the world each with 1/billion of my memories: does this mean I will find
myself becoming one of these people either now or after I have died?  As
I understand it, Bruno's theory is that you are all the consistent
continuations of your consciousness.  I'm not exactly sure what constitutes a
consistent continuation, but it must be something other than just sharing
memories.  At any given time my consciousness is accessing only a tiny fraction
of my memories.  Further I'm continually  forming and forgetting short-term
memories as well as forgetting some long-term memories.Basing identity on
memory seems inconsistent with supposing that identity is some property of
consciousness alone.  A digital computation doesn't depend on memory/data that
isn't accessed.Identity from moment to moment is not just memory, it is the
entire content of conscious experience, perhaps accessing at any one time only
a small portion of memory. It may be just a sense that I am the same person
continuing the same thought as I was a moment ago, or even less than this when
I am waking up from sleep, for example. At such sufficiently vague moments, my
consciousness may even be indistinguishable with that of many other people in
the world, such that if I ceased to exist momentarily I would still experience
continuity of consciousness as if nothing had happened, piggy-backing on
someone else's thoughts: all equivalent observer moments are internally
indistinguishable, by definition. However, such a thing could only happen
momentarily, because very quickly I might reflect on my situation, and it is
here that having a store of memories, motivations, personality style etc.
instantly accessible (even if not continuously accessed) makes me, me.Stathis
Papaioannou Live Search: Better results, fast Try it now!

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### RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Brent meeker writes:As I understand it, Bruno's theory is that you are
all the   consistent continuations of your consciousness. I'm not exactly
sure   what constitutes a consistent continuation, but it must be something
other than just sharing memories. At any given time my consciousness is
accessing only a tiny fraction of my memories. Further I'm continually
forming and forgetting short-term memories as well as forgetting some
long-term memories.   Basing identity on memory seems inconsistent
with supposing that   identity is some property of consciousness alone. A
digital computation   doesn't depend on memory/data that isn't accessed.
Identity from moment to moment is not just memory, it is the entire
content of conscious experience, perhaps accessing at any one time only   a
small portion of memory. It may be just a sense that I am the same   person
continuing the same thought as I was a moment ago, or even less   than this
when I am waking up from sleep, for example. At such   sufficiently vague
moments, my consciousness may even be   indistinguishable with that of many
other people in the world, such that   if I ceased to exist momentarily I
would still experience continuity of   consciousness as if nothing had
happened, piggy-backing on someone   else's thoughts: all equivalent observer
moments are internally   indistinguishable, by definition. However, such a
thing could only   happen momentarily, because very quickly I might reflect
on my   situation, and it is here that having a store of memories,
motivations,   personality style etc. instantly accessible (even if not
continuously   accessed) makes me, me.  Yes I understand that you would
eventually, say when waking from anesthesia, have some memories unique to
Stathis Papaioannou.  But in the meantime I think you are still you - and not
all those other people who shared those vague thoughts in the recovery room.
And it can't be because your memories are instantly accessible; that's a mere
potentiality not a state.  If we start to reify potentialities in a multi-verse
where we already have a white rabbit problem, we'll really be in
trouble.Perhaps even in a minimally conscious state your experiences are
specific enough to distinguish them from those of everyone else in a
superficially similar state. But what if, through amazing coincidence, you had
a 5 second period of consciousness which exactly matched that of a stranger on
the other side of the world? During that period it would be impossible to say
(from a 1st person perspective) where you were being run or which person you
were, in the same way as it would be impossible to say where you were being run
if your consciousness were implemented on two computers running in perfect
lockstep. Stathis Papaioannou
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### Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent meeker writes:

As I understand it, Bruno's theory is that you are all the
consistent continuations of your consciousness. I'm not exactly sure
what constitutes a consistent continuation, but it must be something
other than just sharing memories. At any given time my
consciousness is
accessing only a tiny fraction of my memories. Further I'm continually
forming and forgetting short-term memories as well as forgetting some
long-term memories.

Basing identity on memory seems inconsistent with supposing that
identity is some property of consciousness alone. A digital
computation
doesn't depend on memory/data that isn't accessed.

Identity from moment to moment is not just memory, it is the entire
content of conscious experience, perhaps accessing at any one time
only
a small portion of memory. It may be just a sense that I am the same
person continuing the same thought as I was a moment ago, or even less
than this when I am waking up from sleep, for example. At such
sufficiently vague moments, my consciousness may even be
indistinguishable with that of many other people in the world, such
that
if I ceased to exist momentarily I would still experience
continuity of
consciousness as if nothing had happened, piggy-backing on someone
else's thoughts: all equivalent observer moments are internally
indistinguishable, by definition. However, such a thing could only
happen momentarily, because very quickly I might reflect on my
situation, and it is here that having a store of memories,
motivations,
personality style etc. instantly accessible (even if not continuously
accessed) makes me, me.

Yes I understand that you would eventually, say when waking from
anesthesia, have some memories unique to Stathis Papaioannou. But in the
meantime I think you are still you - and not all those other people who
shared those vague thoughts in the recovery room. And it can't be
because your memories are instantly accessible; that's a mere
potentiality not a state. If we start to reify potentialities in a
multi-verse where we already have a white rabbit problem, we'll really
be in trouble.

Perhaps even in a minimally conscious state your experiences are
specific enough to distinguish them from those of everyone else in a
superficially similar state. But what if, through amazing coincidence,
you had a 5 second period of consciousness which exactly matched that of
a stranger on the other side of the world? During that period it would
be impossible to say (from a 1st person perspective) where you were
being run or which person you were, in the same way as it would be
impossible to say where you were being run if your consciousness were
implemented on two computers running in perfect lockstep.

Stathis Papaioannou

Which is to say there is no you, or at least you are not your consciousness.

This raises the question again of what is the minimum duration of a conscious
state?  You mention 5sec as being a long time for a coincidental match (would
there still be two consciousnesses for that 5sec - I think not), but what about
300msec, or 100msec.  There's not much consciousness in 100msec; so little that
it may be occuring hundreds of times over in different brains.

Brent Meeker

Brent Meeker

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### RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Johnathan Corgan writes:

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

If some multiverse theory happens to be true then by your way of argument
we
should all be extremely anxious all the time, because every moment terrible
things
are definitely happening to some copy of us. For example, we should be
constantly
be worrying that we will be struck by lightning, because we *will* be
struck by lightning.

If MWI is true, *and* there isn't a lowest quantum of
probability/measure as Brent Meeker speculates, there is an interesting
corollary to the quantum theory of immortality.

While one branch always exists which continues our consciousness
forward, indeed we are constantly shedding branches where the most
brutal and horrific things happen to us and result in our death.  Their
measure is extremely small, so from a subjectively probability
perspective, we don't worry about them.

I'd speculate that there are far more logically possible ways to
experience an agonizing, lingering death than to live.  Some have a
relatively high measure, like getting hit by a car, or getting lung
cancer (if you're a smoker), so we take steps to avoid these (though
they still happen in some branch.)  Others, like having all our
particles spontaneously quantum tunnel into the heart of a burning
furnace, are so low in measure, we can blissfully ignore the
possibility.  Yet if MWI is true, there is some branch where this has
just happened to us. (modulo Brent's probability quantum.)

If there are many more ways to die than to live, even of low individual
measure, I wonder how the integral of the measure across all of them
comes out.

It's not death that is the problem (you always get out of that), it's
suffering. Final death
would be better than a living hell, but QTI denies you final death. I take
comfort in the
speculation that if I'm still alive in a few hundred years, most likely this
will be as a result
of some advanced medical or cybernetic intervention, and if science understands
the brain
well enough to do that, it would be a relatively simple matter by comparison to
ensure that I
am content. I think the hellish routes to immortality would occur mostly by
chance and would
be of much lower total measure than the deliberate, happy routes.

Stathis Papaioannou
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### RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Jason Resch writes:

Jason Resch writes:

My appologies to those on this list, this is how I should have worded
my conclusion:
Positive spared lives = Take replication
Neutral spared lives = Take coin flip
Negative spared lives = Take coin flip

[SP]
This is an analysis from an altruistic viewpoint, i.e. which choice will
increase
the net happiness in the world. What I am asking is the selfish question, what
should I do to avoid being tortured? If I choose the replication it won't
worry
me from a selfish point of view if one person will definitely be tortured
because
I am unlikely to be that person. Indeed, after the replication it won't
affect me
if *all* the other copies are tortured, because despite sharing the same
psychology
up to the point of replication, I am not going to experience their pain.

[JR]
I think our disagreement stems from our different conceptions of
consciousness.  You seem to believe that once you experience an observer
moment, that you are destined to experience all future observer moments of
that observer.  While this is the way most people see the world, I consider
that to be an illusion caused by memory.  i.e. We remember past observer
moments so we must be moving into the future.
I believe that its is just as beneficial to do something that will improve
someone else's observer moments as it is to improve one's future observer
moments. Just think: your current observer moment never gets to experience
the fruits of its current labors, it remains in that observer moment for all
time.  Yet we still go to work.  That is why altruism is indistinguishable
from selfish behavior in my philosophy.  There is no consciousness outside of
brain states, brain states are consciousness, since they exist they are
experienced, no one can say by who or by what, their existance is experience.
Therefore it is in everyone's interest to improve reality's first person, of
which every observer moment is a part.
It's easy to see how evolution taught us to work for one individual's future
observer moments, we defer gratification all time in order to increase the
average quality of all future observer moments.  I'm not advocating we all
become like Mother Teresa, but I think we should understand that we are no
more (or less) our future observer moments than we are other individual's
observer moments.

I completely agree with your view of observer moments: the person who wakes up
in my bed tomorrow won't be me-now, he'll just be someone who shares most of my
memories and believes he is me. In fact, if I were killed with an axe during
the night
and replaced with an exact copy, it wouldn't make any difference to me or
anyone
else, because I die every moment anyway. But the problem is, I am very
attached to
the illusion of continuity of conscious and personal identity even though I
know how it
is generated. If I give in to it, I might decide to treat everyone the same as
I do myself,
but just as likely I might decide to be completely reckless with my life, or
even with
everyone else's life. But my brain just won't let me think this way.

Stathis Papaioannou
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### Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

Johnathan Corgan writes:

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

If some multiverse theory happens to be true then by your way of argument
we
should all be extremely anxious all the time, because every moment terrible
things
are definitely happening to some copy of us. For example, we should be
constantly
be worrying that we will be struck by lightning, because we *will* be
struck by lightning.
If MWI is true, *and* there isn't a lowest quantum of
probability/measure as Brent Meeker speculates, there is an interesting
corollary to the quantum theory of immortality.

While one branch always exists which continues our consciousness
forward, indeed we are constantly shedding branches where the most
brutal and horrific things happen to us and result in our death.  Their
measure is extremely small, so from a subjectively probability
perspective, we don't worry about them.

I'd speculate that there are far more logically possible ways to
experience an agonizing, lingering death than to live.  Some have a
relatively high measure, like getting hit by a car, or getting lung
cancer (if you're a smoker), so we take steps to avoid these (though
they still happen in some branch.)  Others, like having all our
particles spontaneously quantum tunnel into the heart of a burning
furnace, are so low in measure, we can blissfully ignore the
possibility.  Yet if MWI is true, there is some branch where this has
just happened to us. (modulo Brent's probability quantum.)

If there are many more ways to die than to live, even of low individual
measure, I wonder how the integral of the measure across all of them
comes out.

It's not death that is the problem (you always get out of that), it's
suffering. Final death
would be better than a living hell, but QTI denies you final death. I take
comfort in the
speculation that if I'm still alive in a few hundred years, most likely this
will be as a result
of some advanced medical or cybernetic intervention, and if science
understands the brain
well enough to do that, it would be a relatively simple matter by comparison
to ensure that I
am content. I think the hellish routes to immortality would occur mostly by
chance and would
be of much lower total measure than the deliberate, happy routes.

I think Bruno already remarked that it may well be more probable that a
continuation of your consciousness arises in some other branch of the
multiverse by chance, rather than as a state of your erstwhile body.  This
would seem particularly more probable as your consciousness simplifies due to
deterioration of your brain - how hard can it be to find a continuation of a
near coma.  Perhaps this continuation is the consciousness of a fish - and it's
the Hindus rather than the Bhuddists who are right.

Brent Meeker

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### RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Jason Resch writes:

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Jason Resch writes:

Let's say being spared is neutral while being tortured is obviously bad,
even
if you are tortured for only a few minutes. Also, assume the intensity of
the
torture and the quality of life on being spared is the same in duplication/
coin toss
situations.

What if I change the example and say you will be duplicated a million
times, and
only one of the copies will be tortured? From a selfish point of view, you
can
almost certainly expect to find yourself one of the copies that will be
spared,
and I think you would be crazy to choose the coin flip. The equivalence of
the
coin flip/ duplication example (when the probabilities are equal) is why we
cannot
distinguish between MWI and CI of QM. It makes no difference to me whether
the world splits into two and one copy of me is tortured if I toss the coin
or whether
there is only one version of me with a 50% chance of being tortured.

In the case you laid out you give two choices:

A) The replicator
B) The coin flip

Case A results in 999,999 neutral lifetimes worth of observer moments
and 1 lifetime of excruciating torture filled observer moments.  Net
outcome among all branched universes: -1

Case B results if half of one's future observer moments remebering
torture and half remembering being spared.  Net outcome among all
branched universes: -0.5

Therefore it's still best to take case B, the coin flip.

What makes the result seem so unintuitive is the concept of a lifetime
of observer moments that has a net result being neutral.  That means
that trough all the ups and downs in that life, if one could see it all
laid out before them, they would realize that person had so many
negative events in their life that they might as well never have been
born.  With this consideration, it becomes more apparent that the
999,999 extra neutral lives offer no real advantage in living out,
nor does the spared life in the coin flip need to be figured in.  All
that should be considered in this case is that with replication all
universes will have someone who is tortured, while in the coin flip
only half will.

Most people consider their life to be a positive thing, and few would
say they wouldn't mind if they had never been born.  For most people,
if it came down to a million life times for one person's torture, it
would be a better choice over than the coin flip.

Here the replication is only the optimal choice for neutral life times.
If a lifetime is very positive, the 999,999 good lives outweigh the
one tortured.  If the spared lifetimes were very negative, the 999,999
through the torture, and again the coin flip is best.

and correction:

My appologies to those on this list, this is how I should have worded
my conclusion:

Positive spared lives = Take replication
Neutral spared lives = Take coin flip
Negative spared lives = Take coin flip

This is an analysis from an altruistic viewpoint, i.e. which choice will
increase
the net happiness in the world. What I am asking is the selfish question, what
should I do to avoid being tortured? If I choose the replication it won't worry
me from a selfish point of view if one person will definitely be tortured
because
I am unlikely to be that person. Indeed, after the replication it won't affect
me
if *all* the other copies are tortured, because despite sharing the same
psychology
up to the point of replication, I am not going to experience their pain.

If some multiverse theory happens to be true then by your way of argument we
should all be extremely anxious all the time, because every moment terrible
things
are definitely happening to some copy of us. For example, we should be
constantly
be worrying that we will be struck by lightning, because we *will* be struck by
lightning.
1/million
actual worlds is subjectively equivalent to being struck by lightning in a
single world
with probability 1/million.

Stathis Papaioannou
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### Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

If some multiverse theory happens to be true then by your way of argument we
should all be extremely anxious all the time, because every moment terrible
things
are definitely happening to some copy of us. For example, we should be
constantly
be worrying that we will be struck by lightning, because we *will* be struck
by lightning.

If MWI is true, *and* there isn't a lowest quantum of
probability/measure as Brent Meeker speculates, there is an interesting
corollary to the quantum theory of immortality.

While one branch always exists which continues our consciousness
forward, indeed we are constantly shedding branches where the most
brutal and horrific things happen to us and result in our death.  Their
measure is extremely small, so from a subjectively probability
perspective, we don't worry about them.

I'd speculate that there are far more logically possible ways to
experience an agonizing, lingering death than to live.  Some have a
relatively high measure, like getting hit by a car, or getting lung
cancer (if you're a smoker), so we take steps to avoid these (though
they still happen in some branch.)  Others, like having all our
particles spontaneously quantum tunnel into the heart of a burning
furnace, are so low in measure, we can blissfully ignore the
possibility.  Yet if MWI is true, there is some branch where this has
just happened to us. (modulo Brent's probability quantum.)

If there are many more ways to die than to live, even of low individual
measure, I wonder how the integral of the measure across all of them
comes out.

-Johnathan

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### Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Jason Resch writes:

Let's say being spared is neutral while being tortured is obviously bad,
even
if you are tortured for only a few minutes. Also, assume the intensity of the
torture and the quality of life on being spared is the same in duplication/
coin toss
situations.

What if I change the example and say you will be duplicated a million times,
and
only one of the copies will be tortured? From a selfish point of view, you can
almost certainly expect to find yourself one of the copies that will be
spared,
and I think you would be crazy to choose the coin flip. The equivalence of the
coin flip/ duplication example (when the probabilities are equal) is why we
cannot
distinguish between MWI and CI of QM. It makes no difference to me whether
the world splits into two and one copy of me is tortured if I toss the coin
or whether
there is only one version of me with a 50% chance of being tortured.

In the case you laid out you give two choices:

A) The replicator
B) The coin flip

Case A results in 999,999 neutral lifetimes worth of observer moments
and 1 lifetime of excruciating torture filled observer moments.  Net
outcome among all branched universes: -1

Case B results if half of one's future observer moments remebering
torture and half remembering being spared.  Net outcome among all
branched universes: -0.5

Therefore it's still best to take case B, the coin flip.

What makes the result seem so unintuitive is the concept of a lifetime
of observer moments that has a net result being neutral.  That means
that trough all the ups and downs in that life, if one could see it all
laid out before them, they would realize that person had so many
negative events in their life that they might as well never have been
born.  With this consideration, it becomes more apparent that the
999,999 extra neutral lives offer no real advantage in living out,
nor does the spared life in the coin flip need to be figured in.  All
that should be considered in this case is that with replication all
universes will have someone who is tortured, while in the coin flip
only half will.

Most people consider their life to be a positive thing, and few would
say they wouldn't mind if they had never been born.  For most people,
if it came down to a million life times for one person's torture, it
would be a better choice over than the coin flip.

Here the replication is only the optimal choice for neutral life times.
If a lifetime is very positive, the 999,999 good lives outweigh the
one tortured.  If the spared lifetimes were very negative, the 999,999
through the torture, and again the coin flip is best.

Jason

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### Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds (correction)

Jason wrote:
Here the replication is only the optimal choice for neutral life times.
If a lifetime is very positive, the 999,999 good lives outweigh the
one tortured.  If the spared lifetimes were very negative, the 999,999
through the torture, and again the coin flip is best.

I meant to say the coin flip is only optimal for neutral life times
and that in cases with positive or negative lifetimes, replication is
best.

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### Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds (correction)

Jason wrote:
Jason wrote:
Here the replication is only the optimal choice for neutral life times.
If a lifetime is very positive, the 999,999 good lives outweigh the
one tortured.  If the spared lifetimes were very negative, the 999,999
through the torture, and again the coin flip is best.

I meant to say the coin flip is only optimal for neutral life times
and that in cases with positive or negative lifetimes, replication is
best.

My appologies to those on this list, this is how I should have worded
my conclusion:

Positive spared lives = Take replication
Neutral spared lives = Take coin flip
Negative spared lives = Take coin flip

Jason

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### RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Jason Resch writes:

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
What about when multiple equally valid OM's exist? I don't agree that they
are all perceived.
If I am to be duplicated and one of the copies tortured, I am worried,
because this is subjectively
equivalent to expecting torture with 1/2 probability. Post-duplication, I
can only experience
being one of the copies, and if I am not the one who is tortured, I am
relieved, although I feel
sorry for the other copy in the same way I might feel sory about anyone
else who is suffering
(maybe a bit more, given our shared past). This is no more than a
description of how our
psychology as beings who feel themselves to be embedded in linear time
works. Arguments that
this does not reflect the reality of the situation, that it does not make
sense to consider I might
become either copy prior to the duplication but only one copy after the
duplication, do not change
the way my brain forces me to feel about it. Lee Corbin on this list has
argued that I should consider
both copies as selves at all times, and perhaps we would evolve to think
this way in a world where
duplication was commonplace, but our brains aren't wired that way at
present.

In saying you disagree that duplicate OM's perspectives are perceived,
I take it that you mean their collective divergent experiences are not
integrated in a consistent memory, not that they would be non-conscious
zombies.  If this was your point, I agree.

That's what I meant.

However, I see a difference of opinion in how we understand the
probabilities.  Whereas you say prior to the duplication and torture,
one has a 1/2 probability of being tortured and 1/2 probability of
being spared, I see it as one having a 100% probability of being
tortured AND a 100% probability of being spared, as both experiences
occur with 100% certainty.  The probability that an observer-moment
sampled from both perspectives post-duplication will remember being
tortured would be 1/2.

OK, but I am looking at it from the perspective of going into the replicator.
Suppose you were offered either the above choice - you are duplicated and
one of the copies will be tortured - or a biased coin will be tosed and you
will have a 51% chance of being tortured and a 49% chance of being spared.
From a selfish perspective, it would be best to go for the duplication, because
since you can only experience being one person at a time, you can expect to
come out of the duplicator with a 50% chance of being tortured as opposed
to the 51% chance in the case of the coin toss.

Our brains may not be wired for experiencing total empathy for others
who are suffering, but this is a result of evolutionary psychology.
Perhaps a species whose brains were wired this way would be maximally
moral, as they would be intolerant to any suffering and would operate
at great risk to themselves to aid other individuals.

Sure, we are only contigently wired to consider our own future selfish
interests.
It is possible to conceive of other evolutionary paths where, for example, we
regard our kin as selves in the way social insects seem to do, or we regard
future and past selves as other and live selfishly for the moment. There is
nothing
irrational about either of these positions, because the relationship betwen the
observer moments is a contingent fact of evolution.

Stathis Papaioannou
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### Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
What about when multiple equally valid OM's exist? I don't agree that they
are all perceived.
If I am to be duplicated and one of the copies tortured, I am worried,
because this is subjectively
equivalent to expecting torture with 1/2 probability. Post-duplication, I can
only experience
being one of the copies, and if I am not the one who is tortured, I am
relieved, although I feel
sorry for the other copy in the same way I might feel sory about anyone else
who is suffering
(maybe a bit more, given our shared past). This is no more than a description
of how our
psychology as beings who feel themselves to be embedded in linear time works.
Arguments that
this does not reflect the reality of the situation, that it does not make
sense to consider I might
become either copy prior to the duplication but only one copy after the
duplication, do not change
the way my brain forces me to feel about it. Lee Corbin on this list has
argued that I should consider
both copies as selves at all times, and perhaps we would evolve to think this
way in a world where
duplication was commonplace, but our brains aren't wired that way at present.

In saying you disagree that duplicate OM's perspectives are perceived,
I take it that you mean their collective divergent experiences are not
integrated in a consistent memory, not that they would be non-conscious
zombies.  If this was your point, I agree.

However, I see a difference of opinion in how we understand the
probabilities.  Whereas you say prior to the duplication and torture,
one has a 1/2 probability of being tortured and 1/2 probability of
being spared, I see it as one having a 100% probability of being
tortured AND a 100% probability of being spared, as both experiences
occur with 100% certainty.  The probability that an observer-moment
sampled from both perspectives post-duplication will remember being
tortured would be 1/2.

Our brains may not be wired for experiencing total empathy for others
who are suffering, but this is a result of evolutionary psychology.
Perhaps a species whose brains were wired this way would be maximally
moral, as they would be intolerant to any suffering and would operate
at great risk to themselves to aid other individuals.

Jason

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### Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Hi,

Le Vendredi 19 Janvier 2007 12:20, William a écrit :
I have been reading up on this subject a little bit and about the
quantum immortality, I believe it is a common misconception that this
means you will never die; if all future branches involve your death,
then you will die ... Quantum immortality does not imply that you can
dodge every bullet and that the you of today will still live
tomorrow, although the you of yesterday could still live tomorrow
whilst the you of today does not.

It would be the case if the multiverse contains cul-de-sac places... If you
take the approach that every moments have a successor moment, then quantum
immortality predict you'll never loose conscioussness.

Could you explain it a bit more to me because I am still in
disagreement with this, even when assuming RSSA ... Once every future
branch involves your death; you will loose conscioussness, IMO. If you
do not eat for 100 or 1000 years, you can still continue living
according to you ?

Also I personally do not believe ASSA favours a MWI interpretation of
quantum mechanics over a deterministic one because a single MWI
universe will be less probable than a single deterministic universe.
But it might favour MWI over Copenhagen interpretation.

I personnaly believe ASSA is broken... because for one thing it cannot explain
stream of consciousness, arrow of time and so on... RSSA can.

With RSSA you don't assume that you is sampled from all moments, but only
sampled from moments consistent where the current you is in.

Do you believe that one can convince oneself that MWI is true, by doing
a quantum suicide ?

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### Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Le 19-janv.-07, à 17:44, Brent Meeker a écrit :

William wrote:
I have been reading up on this subject a little bit and about the
quantum immortality, I believe it is a common misconception that this
means you will never die; if all future branches involve your death,
then you will die ... Quantum immortality does not imply that you can
dodge every bullet and that the you of today will still live
tomorrow, although the you of yesterday could still live tomorrow
whilst the you of today does not.
Also I personally do not believe ASSA favours a MWI interpretation of
quantum mechanics over a deterministic one because a single MWI
universe will be less probable than a single deterministic
universe.
But it might favour MWI over Copenhagen interpretation.
If the universe splits into 2 universes each second; I do not
necissarily see an issue as explained by Stathis Papaioannou in his
post. And it is even a fact that you are more probable to live in the
year 2000 than in the year 1000 because the human population has
grown;
but once we go to infinities, the same approach might not work anymore
Anyway, I do not believe that MWI favours later moments in time over
earlier moments in time. Although the number of universes increases,
their individual probability decreases, keeping the total probability
equal (although relativity might complicate a more rigorous approach).
A simple way of picturing this, would be that at the big bang; the
universe is 1 piece of paper, and from then on, every second, the
piece(s) of paper is cut in half; giving 1, 2, 4, 8, ... universes.
The
total area of paper remains the same and all the pieces get smaller
all
the time, this means that the chance of being in a particular universe
as the universe splitting progresses, even decreases :).

That's a good way to look at it.  Everett originally called his
interpretation a 'relative state'; emphasizing that observed states
were relative to the observer.  'Multiple universes' is a convenient
way of talking, but the idea comes from holding onto the unitary
evolution of the state vector in a Hilbert space describing states of
the universe.  So there is only one universe and it is the projection
onto different semi-classical subspaces (the only kind we can
experience) that correspond to different 'universes'.  In QM you can
have negative information (due to the correlations of entanglement)
and so from the Hilbert space view the total information may be zero,
even though the projection onto subspaces is very complex.

OK.

I also think that the modeling of the inner product in Hilbert space
as real number is probably and approximation.  QM and general
relativity together  imply that there are smallest units of time and
space, the Planck units.

Perhaps.

When a quantum theory of gravity is invented I think it may imply a
smallest unit of probability - so that the arbitrarily small
probabilities required for Tegmark to survive his machine gun will not
exist.

Such a quantum theory of gravity would make wrong both QM, and comp. I
think. But what could be a smallest unit of probability? If they apply
to a smallest primitive event, they would make that event non
repeatable, but then what would mean probability in this case?
Does not the UDA illustrate that all betting lobian machines are
confronted to a continuum of partially computable and partially
uncomputable  first person histories?

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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### Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Dear Jason,

what William wrote is the best we, humans in 2007AD can find out for the
subject matter. Before 1922 (Hubble's redshift) of course the best was
different. Before...and so on. Considering the best of 2325AD...???
Is Mother Nature (or call her as you wish) really restricted to our today's
speculations?
*
American Steam Ship Association everything came up in 3,700,000+ entries,
Wikipedia finally advised me to the old archive 'eskimo' of this list with Wei
Dai, H. Finley, et al. posts. Since I browse the list for more than a decade,
it must have been in posts too technical for me. Do you know about a 'simple'
yet  informative source? I find the idea (maybe) useful now for my speculations
about the 'self' ('I'?), separable in the total interefficient world as
grouping for more relevantly interrelated networks to be considered as
self-referential?
*
I am not for a linear multiplication of our one-type universe as 'all possible'
variations (as beyond even what we can think about today).  I enjoy your input
and the replies even if I do not agree with the model-position of the reigning
physical sciences in spite of the fantastic results it produced as compared to
the tools and housing of birds and beaver.

JohnMikes

The caveman said: the best ever technical advancement in our weaponry is the
hand-ax. ATOMIC BOMB IS A HOAX.  - j

- Original Message -
From: Jason
To: Everything List
Sent: Saturday, January 20, 2007 12:58 AM
Subject: Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

William wrote:
A simple way of picturing this, would be that at the big bang; the
universe is 1 piece of paper, and from then on, every second, the
piece(s) of paper is cut in half; giving 1, 2, 4, 8, ... universes. The
total area of paper remains the same and all the pieces get smaller all
the time, this means that the chance of being in a particular universe
as the universe splitting progresses, even decreases :).

I consider this a very insightful way of looking at it.  Starting with
the universe's intitial conditions defined to have probability 1, every
branched history that follows will occur with some fractional
probability, and the sum of all the histories in any single point of
time will all have equal probabilities.  In effect every point of time
would be equally weighted statistically.

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### RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds

William Vandenberghe writes:

I have been reading up on this subject a little bit and about the
quantum immortality, I believe it is a common misconception that this
means you will never die; if all future branches involve your death,
then you will die ... Quantum immortality does not imply that you can
dodge every bullet and that the you of today will still live
tomorrow, although the you of yesterday could still live tomorrow
whilst the you of today does not.

The key is if all future branches involve your death. The idea of multiverse
theories (MWI of QM and others of which this is a subset) is that there will
always be a branch in which you survive.

Also, what do you mean by you of today/yesterday/tomorow? Of course
the you of today will die, in a single world cosmology as wel as in a
multiverse.
You-today are a collection of matter in a specific spacetime configuration.
All that survival as commonly understood entails is that tomorow there be a
collection of matter in a similar enough configuration to give its owner the
impression of continuity of identity. It doesn't have to be the same matter
any more than your reading of this email has to be the same electrons that
are leaving my computer as I write this. In fact, almost all the matter in your
body (including your brain) today will be replaced within a few months.

Also I personally do not believe ASSA favours a MWI interpretation of
quantum mechanics over a deterministic one because a single MWI
universe will be less probable than a single deterministic universe.
But it might favour MWI over Copenhagen interpretation.

What do you mean? The MWI is perfectly deterministic from a 3rd person
perspective, although it is probabilistic the same as CI for anyone embedded
in a single world.

If the universe splits into 2 universes each second; I do not
necissarily see an issue as explained by Stathis Papaioannou in his
post. And it is even a fact that you are more probable to live in the
year 2000 than in the year 1000 because the human population has grown;
but once we go to infinities, the same approach might not work anymore

Anyway, I do not believe that MWI favours later moments in time over
earlier moments in time. Although the number of universes increases,
their individual probability decreases, keeping the total probability
equal (although relativity might complicate a more rigorous approach).
A simple way of picturing this, would be that at the big bang; the
universe is 1 piece of paper, and from then on, every second, the
piece(s) of paper is cut in half; giving 1, 2, 4, 8, ... universes. The
total area of paper remains the same and all the pieces get smaller all
the time, this means that the chance of being in a particular universe
as the universe splitting progresses, even decreases :).

That is actually a more common criticism of the QTI: although there may be
more copies of you in future due to the splitting, these copies have lower
measurewithin their time period. However, even if your next conscious moment
is contained in a single copy in the continuum, I see no reason why you should
not experience that copy, because I see no reason why I should suddenly lose
consciousness should God suddenly decide to amplify the not-me universe
aleph-whatever times reducing my measure to zero. I can't be certain about
this,
but no-one has ben able to convince me that I would experience anything strange
if my measure were to increase or decrease.

Stathis Papaioanou
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### RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds

I agree with what you say about the fragmentation of the first person. This is
where the
idea of the observer moment comes to the rescue as the smallest posible unit of
conscious
experience (are you aware that there have ben long discussions on this list in
the past
about OM's?). While there may be ambiguity as to whether this particular moment
of
consciousness is me, you, half me and half you, or whatever, we can at least
describe its
objective content; rather like falling back on a latitude and longtitude
description when there is
a dispute about which side of the border a piece of land belongs.

Having said that, there is a sense in which I remain me from moment to moment
even though
it cannot be made objective in the light of thought experiments such as you
describe: I'm me
insofar as I believe I am me, have my memories, and so on. Surviving to the
next moment
entails that there be at least one OM extant then (by whatever means this may
which thinks it is me in the same way that I think I am the same person of a
moment ago.

What about when multiple equally valid OM's exist? I don't agree that they are
all perceived.
If I am to be duplicated and one of the copies tortured, I am worried, because
this is subjectively
equivalent to expecting torture with 1/2 probability. Post-duplication, I can
only experience
being one of the copies, and if I am not the one who is tortured, I am
relieved, although I feel
sorry for the other copy in the same way I might feel sory about anyone else
who is suffering
(maybe a bit more, given our shared past). This is no more than a description
of how our
psychology as beings who feel themselves to be embedded in linear time works.
Arguments that
this does not reflect the reality of the situation, that it does not make sense
to consider I might
become either copy prior to the duplication but only one copy after the
duplication, do not change
the way my brain forces me to feel about it. Lee Corbin on this list has argued
that I should consider
both copies as selves at all times, and perhaps we would evolve to think this
way in a world where
duplication was commonplace, but our brains aren't wired that way at present.

Stathis Papaioanou

From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds
Date: Sat, 20 Jan 2007 05:52:52 +

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
That is, once you are a conscious entity, you will follow a constrained
branching
path through the multiverse giving the illusion of a single linear history.
Measure is
redefined at every branching point: the subjective probability of your next
moment.
Since the branches of the multiverse will never come to an abrupt stop,
there will always
be a next moment and your stream of consciousness will never end. This
the quantum
immortality idea, underpinned by what this list has called the relative
self-sampling

Stathis Papaioannou

I think a lot of confusion comes from the use of pronounds such as
you.  In the realm of multiverses, block time, and many-worlds, the
word you becomes much harder to define.  Consider time: since your
brain is in a different state from one moment to the next how can you
be said to be the same person?  As you examine your branched selves in
more and more distantly branched universes, you will find a greater and
greater discrepancy.  You could even imagine at the moment of your
conception a different sperm may have fertalized you, would a copy of
you with only one gene's difference still be enough like you to be
you?  Where can the line be drawn as to who you are and who you are
not?

I believe that if one accepts that he or she will be conscious of their
perspective five minutes from now, they must accept that they will
perceive conscious perspectives of their selves in other branched
universes.  If one accepts they will be conscious of and perceive these
other perspecties, they must also therefore be conscious of everyone
else's perspective.  And if you accept that, then you must be conscious
of every conscious creatures perspective, in every point of time, in
every branched history, in every universe.

To illustrate problems with personal identity, consider these thought
experiments:

1. Imagine a technologically advanced race that created simulations of
their brains that run on computers. If two brains were being simulated
on the same computer by sharing time on the CPU, both individuals would
be conscious within the computer at the same time, but neither
simulated individual remembers being the other because the programs are
restricted from accessing each other's memory space. In the same way
those brains were simulated on the same computer, our brains are
computed by the physics of this universe. The universe experiences all
conscious perspectives

### RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Jason writes:

William wrote:
A simple way of picturing this, would be that at the big bang; the
universe is 1 piece of paper, and from then on, every second, the
piece(s) of paper is cut in half; giving 1, 2, 4, 8, ... universes. The
total area of paper remains the same and all the pieces get smaller all
the time, this means that the chance of being in a particular universe
as the universe splitting progresses, even decreases :).

I consider this a very insightful way of looking at it.  Starting with
the universe's intitial conditions defined to have probability 1, every
branched history that follows will occur with some fractional
probability, and the sum of all the histories in any single point of
time will all have equal probabilities.  In effect every point of time
would be equally weighted statistically.

But your measure in the forward time direction will still be decreasing as
versions of you die off.

Stathis Papaioannou
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### RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Wiliam writes:

Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Hi,

Le Vendredi 19 Janvier 2007 12:20, William a écrit :
I have been reading up on this subject a little bit and about the
quantum immortality, I believe it is a common misconception that this
means you will never die; if all future branches involve your death,
then you will die ... Quantum immortality does not imply that you can
dodge every bullet and that the you of today will still live
tomorrow, although the you of yesterday could still live tomorrow
whilst the you of today does not.

It would be the case if the multiverse contains cul-de-sac places... If
you
take the approach that every moments have a successor moment, then quantum
immortality predict you'll never loose conscioussness.

Could you explain it a bit more to me because I am still in
disagreement with this, even when assuming RSSA ... Once every future
branch involves your death; you will loose conscioussness, IMO. If you
do not eat for 100 or 1000 years, you can still continue living
according to you ?

No problem, unless as Brent Meeker suggests there is a minimum quantum of
probability.
In some branch of the multiverse, aliens have secretly altered you so that
although you
think you need to eat, your physiology is actually powered through radiated
energy that
they beam at you from high orbit... or something like that.

Also I personally do not believe ASSA favours a MWI interpretation of
quantum mechanics over a deterministic one because a single MWI
universe will be less probable than a single deterministic universe.
But it might favour MWI over Copenhagen interpretation.

I personnaly believe ASSA is broken... because for one thing it cannot
explain
stream of consciousness, arrow of time and so on... RSSA can.

With RSSA you don't assume that you is sampled from all moments, but only
sampled from moments consistent where the current you is in.

Do you believe that one can convince oneself that MWI is true, by doing
a quantum suicide ?

Tegmark's paper suggests that you could prove MWI to yourself in this way, but
not to
anyone else, who is likely to see you die. If you survived and published the
results, the
next person who tried it would die from your point of view and everyone else's,
so the
conclusion would be that your survival was due to fantastic luck. However,
shouldn't
*you* also conclude that your survival was due to fantastic luck on the same
basis?

Stathis Papaioannou
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### Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

I have been reading up on this subject a little bit and about the
quantum immortality, I believe it is a common misconception that this
means you will never die; if all future branches involve your death,
then you will die ... Quantum immortality does not imply that you can
dodge every bullet and that the you of today will still live
tomorrow, although the you of yesterday could still live tomorrow
whilst the you of today does not.

Also I personally do not believe ASSA favours a MWI interpretation of
quantum mechanics over a deterministic one because a single MWI
universe will be less probable than a single deterministic universe.
But it might favour MWI over Copenhagen interpretation.

If the universe splits into 2 universes each second; I do not
necissarily see an issue as explained by Stathis Papaioannou in his
post. And it is even a fact that you are more probable to live in the
year 2000 than in the year 1000 because the human population has grown;
but once we go to infinities, the same approach might not work anymore

Anyway, I do not believe that MWI favours later moments in time over
earlier moments in time. Although the number of universes increases,
their individual probability decreases, keeping the total probability
equal (although relativity might complicate a more rigorous approach).
A simple way of picturing this, would be that at the big bang; the
universe is 1 piece of paper, and from then on, every second, the
piece(s) of paper is cut in half; giving 1, 2, 4, 8, ... universes. The
total area of paper remains the same and all the pieces get smaller all
the time, this means that the chance of being in a particular universe
as the universe splitting progresses, even decreases :).

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### Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Hi,

Le Vendredi 19 Janvier 2007 12:20, William a écrit :

I have been reading up on this subject a little bit and about the
quantum immortality, I believe it is a common misconception that this
means you will never die; if all future branches involve your death,
then you will die ... Quantum immortality does not imply that you can
dodge every bullet and that the you of today will still live
tomorrow, although the you of yesterday could still live tomorrow
whilst the you of today does not.

It would be the case if the multiverse contains cul-de-sac places... If you
take the approach that every moments have a successor moment, then quantum
immortality predict you'll never loose conscioussness.

Also I personally do not believe ASSA favours a MWI interpretation of
quantum mechanics over a deterministic one because a single MWI
universe will be less probable than a single deterministic universe.
But it might favour MWI over Copenhagen interpretation.

I personnaly believe ASSA is broken... because for one thing it cannot explain
stream of consciousness, arrow of time and so on... RSSA can.

With RSSA you don't assume that you is sampled from all moments, but only
sampled from moments consistent where the current you is in.

If the universe splits into 2 universes each second; I do not
necissarily see an issue as explained by Stathis Papaioannou in his
post. And it is even a fact that you are more probable to live in the
year 2000 than in the year 1000 because the human population has grown;
but once we go to infinities, the same approach might not work anymore

Anyway, I do not believe that MWI favours later moments in time over
earlier moments in time. Although the number of universes increases,
their individual probability decreases, keeping the total probability
equal (although relativity might complicate a more rigorous approach).
A simple way of picturing this, would be that at the big bang; the
universe is 1 piece of paper, and from then on, every second, the
piece(s) of paper is cut in half; giving 1, 2, 4, 8, ... universes. The
total area of paper remains the same and all the pieces get smaller all
the time, this means that the chance of being in a particular universe
as the universe splitting progresses, even decreases :).

All of this is to kept ASSA which I don't think is true (not even logically
true).

Quentin

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