Le 26-nov.-07, à 20:22, George Levy a écrit :
Bruno
Yes I am particularizing things... But the end justifies the means.
I am being positivist, trying to express these rules as a function of
an observer. In any case, once the specific example is worked out, we
can fall back on the
George, you can do that indeed, but then you are particularizing
things. This can be helpful from a pedagogical point of view, but the
advantage of the axiomatic approach (to a knowledge theory) is that
once you agree on the axioms and rules, then you agree on the
consequences independently
Bruno
Yes I am particularizing things... But the end justifies the means. I
am being positivist, trying to express these rules as a function of an
observer. In any case, once the specific example is worked out, we can
fall back on the general case.
Your feedback about exist not really being
Bruno thank you for this elaborate reply. I would like these three
statements to make use of cybernetic language, that is to be more
explicit in terms of the machine or entity to which they refer. Would it
be correct to rephrase the statements in the active tense, using the
machine as the
Le 22-nov.-07, à 20:50, George Levy a écrit :
Hi Bruno,
I am reopening an old thread ( more than a year old) which I found
very intriguing. It leads to some startling conclusions.
Le 05-août-06, à 02:07, George Levy a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:I think that if you want to
make the
Hi Bruno,
I am reopening an old thread ( more than a year old) which I found very
intriguing. It leads to some startling conclusions.
Le 05-août-06, à 02:07, George Levy a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:I think that if you want to
make the first person primitive, given that neither you nor
One more question: can or should p be the observer?
George
George Levy wrote:
Hi Bruno,
I am reopening an old thread ( more than a year old) which I found
very intriguing. It leads to some startling conclusions.
Le 05-août-06, à 02:07, George Levy a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:I think
Brent Meeker writes:
In a deterministic universe, saying that things could have turned out
differently had initial
conditions or physical laws been different is analogous to saying the sound
coming out of the
speakers could have been different if the grooves on the record or the
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Words like real, physical material needs to be (re)defined or at
least clarify in front of the UDA.
They don't need apriori, rationalist clarity, since
they can be defended by the empiricist-Johnsoinian approach.
Proponents of the argument need to show that the
Brent Meeker writes (quoting SP):
Every physical system contains if-then statements. If the grooves on the
record were different, then the sound coming out of the speakers would
also be
different.
That's not a statement contained in the physical system; it's a statement
about
Le 22-août-06, à 13:45, 1Z a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 21-août-06, à 16:01, 1Z a écrit :
Exactly. And if non-phsyical systems (Plato' Heaven) don't
implement counterfactuals, then they can't run programmes,
and if Plato's heaven can't run programmes, it can't be running us as
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes (quoting SP):
Every physical system contains if-then statements. If the grooves on the
record were different, then the sound coming out of the speakers would
also be
different.
That's not a statement contained in the physical system; it's a
Brent Meeker writes:
If you include the computer's
data in the program then it becomes an inputless system, a self-contained
simulation. If
you include yourself, the rock and everything else that might interact with
it in one system
you have a self-contained, inputless universe.
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:
If you include the computer's
data in the program then it becomes an inputless system, a self-contained
simulation. If
you include yourself, the rock and everything else that might interact with
it in one system
you have a self-contained,
Le 19-août-06, à 16:35, 1Z a écrit :
No, I am suggesting that 0-width slices don't contain
enough information to predict future states in physics.
What about a quantum state?
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this
Le 21-août-06, à 16:01, 1Z a écrit :
Exactly. And if non-phsyical systems (Plato' Heaven) don't
implement counterfactuals, then they can't run programmes,
and if Plato's heaven can't run programmes, it can't be running us as
programmes.
I would say that only non-physical system implement
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 21-août-06, à 16:01, 1Z a écrit :
Exactly. And if non-phsyical systems (Plato' Heaven) don't
implement counterfactuals, then they can't run programmes,
and if Plato's heaven can't run programmes, it can't be running us as
programmes.
I would say that only
Hi,
concerning process and programs, all boils down to the timeless/time argument.
I'm astonished that you accept time as is, I mean if time there is it has been
created at the same time as our universe in the bigbang. Time begin when the
universe begin, so you accept that time can occur in a
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Hi,
concerning process and programs, all boils down to the timeless/time argument.
I'm astonished that you accept time as is, I mean if time there is it has been
created at the same time as our universe in the bigbang. Time begin when the
universe begin, so you
Brent meeker writes (quoting SP):
Every physical system contains if-then statements. If the grooves on the
record were different,
then the sound coming out of the speakers would also be different.
That's not a statement contained in the physical system; it's a statement
about other
Le 22-août-06, à 14:36, 1Z a écrit :
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Hi,
concerning process and programs, all boils down to the timeless/time
argument.
I'm astonished that you accept time as is, I mean if time there is it
has been
created at the same time as our universe in the bigbang.
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent meeker writes (quoting SP):
Every physical system contains if-then statements. If the grooves on the
record were different, then the sound coming out of the speakers would also
be
different.
That's not a statement contained in the physical system;
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
Computer programmes contain conditional (if-then) statements. A given
run of
the programme will in genreal not explore every branch. yet the
unexplored
branches are part of the programme. A branch of an if-then statement
that is
not
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
Computer programmes contain conditional (if-then) statements. A given
run of
the programme will in genreal not explore every branch. yet the
unexplored
branches are part of the programme. A branch of an if-then statement
that is
not executed on
Peter Jones writes:
Computer programmes contain conditional (if-then) statements. A given
run of
the programme will in genreal not explore every branch. yet the
unexplored
branches are part of the programme. A branch of an if-then statement
that is
not executed on a particular run of a
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
But the important point is that the temporal sequence does not itself
make a difference
to subjective experience.
We don't actually know that it is possible that
there might be some flicker effect.
Not
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
I don't know if block universe theories are true or not, but the
subjective
passage of time is not an argument against them. If mind is
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
I don't know if block universe theories are true or not, but the
subjective
passage of time is not an argument against them. If mind is
Peter Jones writes:
But the important point is that the temporal sequence does not itself
make a difference
to subjective experience.
We don't actually know that it is possible that
there might be some flicker effect.
Not necessarily. I'm suggesting that the actual
David Nyman wrote:
1Z wrote:
What does access to information mean ? In a dynamic
universe, it means causality. In a Barbour-style universe
it means some nows coincidentally contain patterns representing other
nows
just as , in a world consisting of every possible picture, there will
Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
I don't know if block universe theories are true or not, but the
subjective
passage of time is not an argument against them. If mind is
computation, do
you believe that a
David Nyman wrote:
1Z wrote:
On 8/13/06, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
but as I say, I can't help 'taking
personally' the existent thing from which I and all persons are
emanating. I think, imaginatvely, that if one pictures a 'block
universe', Platonia, MW, or any non-process
1Z wrote:
What does access to information mean ? In a dynamic
universe, it means causality. In a Barbour-style universe
it means some nows coincidentally contain patterns representing other
nows
just as , in a world consisting of every possible picture, there will
be pictures containing
1Z wrote:
What does access to information mean ? In a dynamic
universe, it means causality. In a Barbour-style universe
it means some nows coincidentally contain patterns representing other
nows
just as , in a world consisting of every possible picture, there will
be pictures containing
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
I don't know if block universe theories are true or not, but the
subjective
passage of time is not an argument against them. If mind is computation,
do
you believe that a conscious computation can
: Re: Are First Person prime?
George Levy wrote:
Colin Hales remarks seem to agree with what I say. However, I do not
deny the existence of a third person perspective. I only say that
it is
secondary and an illusion brought about by having several observers
share the same frame of reference
Le 10-août-06, à 22:44, 1Z a écrit :
With the materialist hypothesis there is also no dualism.
This is defensible but necessitates a solution of the mind-body
problem, to explain the relation between sensations and matter.
The traditional implicit or explicit solution of the materialist is
Le 10-août-06, à 22:59, 1Z a écrit :
So we should understand that you would criticize any notion, sometimes
brought by physicists, of block-universe.
Yes, I certainly would! It is unable to explain the subjective
passage of time. Dismissing the subjective sensation of the passge of
time
Le 11-août-06, à 18:50, David Nyman a écrit :
I had an interesting exchange with Julian Barbour about this a while
back. Originally I was convinced he was wrong that a time capsule was
sufficient to produce the subjective experience of the passage of time.
I called it a 'sleight of
Brent,
That's an interesting explanation of a zero-information
universe, which you suggest is implicit in the MWI of QM - yet (like me) you
don't necessarily buy MWI.In your view, are there other explanations
for quantum mysteries that are more credible?
Norman Samish
Norman Samish wrote:
Brent,
That's an interesting explanation of a zero-information universe, which
you suggest is implicit in the MWI of QM - yet (like me) you don't
necessarily buy MWI. In your view, are there other explanations for
quantum mysteries that are more credible?
Peter Jones writes:
Timeless universe, universes where everything that can exist
does exist, are not well founded empirically.
So we should understand that you would criticize any notion, sometimes
brought by physicists, of block-universe.
Yes, I certainly would! It is unable to
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
I don't know if block universe theories are true or not, but the subjective
passage of time is not an argument against them. If mind is computation, do
you believe that a conscious computation can tell if it is being run as a
sequential
series of steps or in
Brent Meeker wrote:
1Z wrote:
David Nyman wrote:
...
Well, if 'experience' is the fact of *being* differentiable existence,
and 'the physical' is the observable relations thereof, then both
ultimately 'supervene' on there being something rather than nothing.
No. There being
1Z wrote:
Brent Meeker wrote:
1Z wrote:
David Nyman wrote:
...
Well, if 'experience' is the fact of *being* differentiable existence,
and 'the physical' is the observable relations thereof, then both
ultimately 'supervene' on there being something rather than nothing.
No. There being
Brent Meeker wrote:
It's a somewhat beyond my expertise, but as I understand these theories of
cosmogony it's analogous to Hawking radiation: Pair production produces a
virtual quantum particle/anti-particle pair. Inflation is so rapid that it
pulls them apart and provides the energy to
Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
I don't know if block universe theories are true or not, but the subjective
passage of time is not an argument against them. If mind is computation, do
you believe that a conscious computation can tell if it is being run as a
sequential
David Nyman wrote:
1Z wrote:
Why shouldn't they denote that ? And what has that to do with
substances ?
The inside/outside distinction can be asserted is a single-substance
universe. The inside/outside distinction is enough to found the 1st/3rd
person divide, what
do you need a
1Z wrote:
1) the don't seem to have, and they *are* what they seem
2) they are incommunicable in mathematical, and hence
sructrural terms.
1) Well, this obviously depends on the subject of the seeming. To me,
'red', 'middle C', or 'bitter' all *do* seem to possess a sort of
directly sensed
David Nyman wrote:
1Z wrote:
1) the don't seem to have, and they *are* what they seem
2) they are incommunicable in mathematical, and hence
sructrural terms.
1) Well, this obviously depends on the subject of the seeming. To me,
'red', 'middle C', or 'bitter' all *do* seem to possess
1Z wrote:
David Nyman wrote:
...
Well, if 'experience' is the fact of *being* differentiable existence,
and 'the physical' is the observable relations thereof, then both
ultimately 'supervene' on there being something rather than nothing.
No. There being something rather than nothing is
Brent Meeker wrote:
1Z wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 09-août-06, à 12:46, 1Z a écrit :
Timeless universe, universes where everything that can exist
does exist, are not well founded empirically.
So we should understand that you would criticize any notion, sometimes
brought by
1Z wrote:
Brent Meeker wrote:
1Z wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 09-août-06, à 12:46, 1Z a écrit :
Timeless universe, universes where everything that can exist
does exist, are not well founded empirically.
So we should understand that you would criticize any notion, sometimes
brought
1Z wrote:
Without an A series, there is nothing to justify the idea that only one
time capsule is conscious at a time. Either they all are, or none
are. We know we are conscious, so we must reject the none are option.
The Block Universe therefore predicts that all time capsules are
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 09-août-06, à 18:12, Tom Caylor a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Of course I have a problem with the word universe and especially
with
the expression being inside a universe. The reason is that I think
comp forces us to accept we are supported by an
David Nyman wrote:
1Z wrote:
Not only is it not necessary to
treat such a 1st person as ontologically primative, it is
hardly even coherent , since such a 1st person is clearly complex.
I think I see where the confusion lies. My definitions rely on there
being a unique ontologogical
1Z wrote:
Why shouldn't they denote that ? And what has that to do with
substances ?
The inside/outside distinction can be asserted is a single-substance
universe. The inside/outside distinction is enough to found the 1st/3rd
person divide, what
do you need a multiplicity of substances
Le 09-août-06, à 12:46, 1Z a écrit :
Timeless universe, universes where everything that can exist
does exist, are not well founded empirically.
So we should understand that you would criticize any notion, sometimes
brought by physicists, of block-universe. Time would be a primitive?
What
Le 09-août-06, à 18:08, Colin Geoffrey Hales a écrit :
Platonia has not been instantiated. Our universe has.
The problem with such a conception is that it seems to need a form of
dualism between Plato Heaven and terrestrial realities.
With the comp hyp, all there is is (arithmetical)
Le 09-août-06, à 18:12, Tom Caylor a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Of course I have a problem with the word universe and especially
with
the expression being inside a universe. The reason is that I think
comp forces us to accept we are supported by an infinity of
computations and that
virtual reality', and
those elements held in common by a community of 1st persons (common
frame of reference) constitute 'consensual virtual reality'.
David
David Nyman:
Sent: Thursday, August 10, 2006 11:20 AM
To: Everything List
Subject: Re: Are First Person prime?
George Levy wrote
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
Misc responses to 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Colin Hales wrote:
David Nyman:
snip
An _abstract_ computation/model X implemented symbolically on a of
Sort of...but I think the word 'hardware' is loaded with assumption.
I'd
say
that universe literally is a
Bruno Marchal wrote:
The problem with such a conception is that it seems to need a form of
dualism between Plato Heaven and terrestrial realities.
With the comp hyp, all there is is (arithmetical) Platonia.
Instanciation is relative and appears from inside.
With the materialist hypothesis
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 09-août-06, à 12:46, 1Z a écrit :
Timeless universe, universes where everything that can exist
does exist, are not well founded empirically.
So we should understand that you would criticize any notion, sometimes
brought by physicists, of block-universe.
Yes, I
1Z:
Why shouldn't it just *be* time ?
A structure evolves from state to state in a regular way. The fact that an
observer built of that structure inside that structure can formulate
mathematical descriptions with a t in them that correlate well with what
is observed does not mean that there is
Bruno Marchal
Le 09-août-06, à 18:08, Colin Geoffrey Hales a écrit :
Platonia has not been instantiated. Our universe has.
The problem with such a conception is that it seems to need a form of
dualism between Plato Heaven and terrestrial realities.
With the comp hyp, all there is is
1Z wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 09-août-06, à 12:46, 1Z a écrit :
Timeless universe, universes where everything that can exist
does exist, are not well founded empirically.
So we should understand that you would criticize any notion, sometimes
brought by physicists, of block-universe.
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Bruno, I spent some (!) time on speculating on 'timelessness' - Let me tell
up front: I did not solve it.
Hi John
For example, we can conceive of a consciousness generated by a computer
operating in a time share mode where the time share occur every
thousand
1Z wrote:
Not only is it not necessary to
treat such a 1st person as ontologically primative, it is
hardly even coherent , since such a 1st person is clearly complex.
I think I see where the confusion lies. My definitions rely on there
being a unique ontologogical 'substance' because of my
Brent Meeker:
1Z wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 09-août-06, à 12:46, 1Z a écrit :
Timeless universe, universes where everything that can exist
does exist, are not well founded empirically.
So we should understand that you would criticize any notion, sometimes
brought by
George Levy wrote:
Not at all. A bidirectional contingency is superfluous. The only
relevent contingency is: If the observed event will result in different
probabilities of survival for myself and for others observing me, then
our perceptions will be different.
I understand this way of
Le 09-août-06, à 01:49, Colin Hales a écrit :
Why is everyone talking about abstract computation? Of _course_ 1st
person
is prime = Has primacy in description of the universe. Being a portion
of
any structure (ME) trying to model the structure (the UNIVERSE) from
within
it (ME as
Colin Hales wrote:
David Nyman:
snip
An _abstract_ computation/model X implemented symbolically on a of a
portion
of the structure (a COMPUTER) inside the structure (the UNIVERSE) will
see
the universe as NOT COMPUTER, not some function of the machinations of
X,
the model.
David Nyman wrote:
1Z wrote:
(PS could you write *less* next time ? I find tha the more you write,
the less
I understand!)
I sympathise!
However, I'm not sure how much further we're destined to get with this
particular dialogue. Each time we have another go I think I see where
Misc responses to 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Colin Hales wrote:
David Nyman:
snip
An _abstract_ computation/model X implemented symbolically on a of
a
portion
of the structure (a COMPUTER) inside the structure (the UNIVERSE)
will
see
the universe as NOT COMPUTER, not some function of
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Of course I have a problem with the word universe and especially with
the expression being inside a universe. The reason is that I think
comp forces us to accept we are supported by an infinity of
computations and that the 1-(plural and singular) appearance of the
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
I'm hoping this also addresses some of David Nyman's queries.
Thanks, yes it does. However, for the sake of clarity:
Why not? What *does* implementation consist of ?
Being the stuff, the substrate. It's the only thing actually instantiated.
So, given your
David Nyman wrote:
Third person perception comes about when several observers share the
same perception because they share the same environmental contingencies
on their existence. In effect these observers share the same "frame of
reference." I see many similarities with relativity
George
Yes, it is getting quite prolix!
The relevant posts are 9, 11 and 14
David
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David Nyman wrote:
George Levy wrote:
Not at all. A bidirectional contingency is superfluous. The only
relevent contingency is: If the observed event will result in different
probabilities of survival for myself and for others observing me, then
our perceptions will be
Prolixing on regardless! David Nyman:
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
I'm hoping this also addresses some of David Nyman's queries.
Thanks, yes it does. However, for the sake of clarity:
Why not? What *does* implementation consist of ?
Being the stuff, the substrate. It's the only
George Levy wrote:
Colin Hales remarks seem to agree with what I say. However, I do not
deny the existence of a third person perspective. I only say that it is
secondary and an illusion brought about by having several observers
share the same frame of reference. This frame of reference
David Nyman:
Sent: Thursday, August 10, 2006 11:20 AM
To: Everything List
Subject: Re: Are First Person prime?
George Levy wrote:
Colin Hales remarks seem to agree with what I say. However, I do not
deny the existence of a third person perspective. I only say that it is
secondary
Le 07-août-06, à 20:59, 1Z a écrit :
George Levy wrote:
1Z wrote:
George Levy wrote:
A conscious entity is also information.
I am assuming here that a conscious entity is essentially software.
You can assume it of you like. It isn't computationalism, which
is the claim that
David Nyman wrote:
1Z wrote:
I'll try to nail this here. I take 'ontology' to refer to issues of
existence or being, where 'epistemology' refers to knowledge, or 'what
and how we know'. When I say that our 'ontology' is manifest, I'm
claiming (perhaps a little more cautiously
1Z wrote:
I don't even know what you mean by first person.
Peter
It's a bit late in the day perhaps to tell me you 'don't even know what
I mean by first person'! However, I'll have another go. I'm concerned
to distinguish two basic meanings, which failing to specify IMO causes
a lot of
1Z wrote:
I don't even know what you mean by "first person".
David Nyman wrote:
Peter
It's a bit late in the day perhaps to tell me you 'don't even know what
I mean by first person'! However, I'll have another go. I'm concerned
to distinguish two basic meanings, which
David Nyman wrote:
1Z wrote:
I don't even know what you mean by first person.
Peter
It's a bit late in the day perhaps to tell me you 'don't even know what
I mean by first person'!
Haven't I been saying that all along.
However, I'll have another go. I'm concerned
to distinguish
George Levy wrote:
Thus first person perception of the world comes about when our own
existence is contingent on our observation.
Hi George
I think I agree with this. It could correspond with what I'm trying to
model in terms of FP1 etc. Perhaps it might be expressed as:
First person
1Z wrote:
(PS could you write *less* next time ? I find tha the more you write,
the less
I understand!)
I sympathise!
However, I'm not sure how much further we're destined to get with this
particular dialogue. Each time we have another go I think I see where
we're going past each other,
Why is everyone talking about abstract computation? Of _course_ 1st person
is prime = Has primacy in description of the universe. Being a portion of
any structure (ME) trying to model the structure (the UNIVERSE) from within
it (ME as scientist inside/part of the universe) is intrinsically and
1Z wrote:
It is only directly manifest inasmuch as it how the brain
seems to itself. That does not make it ontologically fundamental.
What is epistemologically basic -- subjective expereince -- is
ontologically very complex and very far from basic. A lot
of philosophy goes into the weeds
Colin Hales wrote:
Of _course_ 1st person
is prime = Has primacy in description of the universe. Being a portion of
any structure (ME) trying to model the structure (the UNIVERSE) from within
it (ME as scientist inside/part of the universe) is intrinsically and
innately presented with that
David Nyman:
snip
An _abstract_ computation/model X implemented symbolically on a of a
portion
of the structure (a COMPUTER) inside the structure (the UNIVERSE) will
see
the universe as NOT COMPUTER, not some function of the machinations of
X,
the model. Eg The first person
Colin Hales wrote:
Sort of...but I think the word 'hardware' is loaded with assumption. I'd say
that universe literally is a relational construct and that it's appearance
as 'physical' is what it is like when you are in it. .ie. There's no such
'thing' as a 'thing'. :-) It doesn't mean that
David Nyman wrote:
George Levy wrote:
Thus first person perception of the world comes about when our own
existence is contingent on our observation.
Hi George
I think I agree with this. It could correspond with what I'm trying to
model in terms of FP1 etc. Perhaps it
Le 05-août-06, à 17:03, David Nyman a écrit :
Hi Bruno
I think you're right about the complexity. It's because at this stage
I'm just trying to discover whether this is a distinction that any of
us think is true or useful, so I'm deliberately (but perhaps not always
helpfully alas)
Bruno Marchal wrote:
All right. (I hope you realize that you are very ambitious, but then
that is how we learn).
Yes, learning is my aim here.
My terminological problem here is that experience and knowledge
are usually put in the epistemology instead of ontology. Of course I
know that
George Levy wrote:
A conscious entity is also information.
Really ? Why is that ?
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Bruno Marchal wrote:
All right. (I hope you realize that you are very ambitious, but then
that is how we learn).
Yes, learning is my aim here.
My terminological problem here is that experience and knowledge
are usually put in the epistemology instead of ontology. Of course I
know that
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