Re: Decoherence and MWI

2005-05-24 Thread Bruno Marchal


Le 23-mai-05, à 22:13, Patrick Leahy a écrit :

There are also those who have thought very carefully about the issue 
and have come to a hyper-sophisticated philosophical position which 
allows them to fudge. I'm thinking particularly of the 
consistent-histories gang, including Murray Gell-Mann. I particularly 
liked Roland Omnes' version of this: quantum mechanics can account 
for everything except actual facts. He thinks this is a *good* thing!



I don't think it is a good thing to abandon trying to answer questions. 
It is the don't ask imperative. Actually I do believe Everett (and 
Finkelstein, Paulette Fevrier, Graham, Hartle, and many others) are on 
the track of succeeding to explain, well, not the actual fact 
themselves, but the correct belief in actual-factness.
Note that Omnes justifies some of his views (in particular on the 
uniqueness of the universe, or of the outcome of experiments), by 
invoking explicitly the abandon of the cartesian program, and accepting 
some form of irrationalism.


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




Re: Decoherence and MWI

2005-05-23 Thread Patrick Leahy



On Mon, 23 May 2005, Hal Finney wrote:


I'd like to take advantage of having a bona fide physicist on the list to
ask a question about decoherence and its implications for the MWI.


SNIP


If this is true, then how can a physicist not accept the MWI?


Beats me...

Isn't that just a matter of taking this decoherence phenomenon to a 
(much) larger degree?  Either you have to believe that at some point 
decoherence stops following the rules of QM, or you have to believe that 
the mathematics describes physical reality.  And the mathematical 
equations predict the theoretical existence of the parallel yet 
unobservable branches.


The physicists who I really respect, but who do not support MWI, do indeed 
believe (or hope) that the rules of QM break down at some point. E.g. 
Roger Penrose, or Tony Leggett. They would point out that to date every 
theory we have has only been an approximation. Penrose would point out 
additionally that QM is inconsistent with GR, and there is no reason to 
suppose that only GR has to be modified.  I support these people to the 
extent that I think it is tremendously important to keep doing 
experiments, especially ones that can test well-formulated alternatives to 
QM.  I'm just not very hopeful that any discrepancy will show up.



Of course, given that they are in practice unobservable, a degree of
agnosticism is perhaps justifiable for the working physicist.  He doesn't
have to trouble himself with such difficult questions, in practice.
But still, if he believes the theory, and he applies it in his day to
day work, shouldn't he believe the implications of the theory?


For most physicists the Copenhagen interpretation (in some half-understood 
way) works perfectly well at the lab bench.


There are also those who have thought very carefully about the issue and 
have come to a hyper-sophisticated philosophical position which allows 
them to fudge. I'm thinking particularly of the consistent-histories gang, 
including Murray Gell-Mann. I particularly liked Roland Omnes' version of 
this: quantum mechanics can account for everything except actual facts. 
He thinks this is a *good* thing!



To me, it almost requires believing a contradiction to expect that
decoherence experiments will follow the predictions of QM, without also
expecting that the more extreme versions of those predictions will be
true as well, which would imply the reality of the MWI.  You either have
to believe that a sufficiently accurate decoherence experiment would
find a violation of QM, or you have to believe in the MWI.

Don't you?


Yes.


Paddy Leahy

PS: this is an endorsement of the MWI of QM, not of any everything 
theory.




Re: Decoherence and MWI

2005-05-23 Thread Russell Standish
On Mon, May 23, 2005 at 09:13:49PM +0100, Patrick Leahy wrote:
 
 For most physicists the Copenhagen interpretation (in some half-understood 
 way) works perfectly well at the lab bench.
 

Having been such a physicist at some point in my past, I would
disagree that you average physicist even uses the Copenhagen
interpretation. What I used to use in my days as an atomic physics
theoretician was the shut up and calculate interpretation. Ie QM is
a mathematical theory - you put your parameters in one end, and crank
out your expected answers at the other end, which you could compare
with experiment.

I remember when being asked to think about it that the notion of wave
function collapse sounded wrong, one couldn't have a physical object
changing at superluminal speeds, which is what this implies. As for
Bohm, his writings were about as meaningful to me as the ravings of a
lunatic (note this is a reflection on me, not a reflection of
Bohm's actual content).

I can say that all experiments I worked on had millions of particles
per second, and we worked with density matrices, which describe the
behaviour of particle ensembles. Such a description is perfectly
deterministic - no collapses or any other funny business going on. It
was only when I heard about Aspect's experiments that I realised there
was more to it. Ultimately, I realised that the MWI was the only
interpretation that made sense (to me).

Cheers

-- 
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may safely ignore this attachment.


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RE: Decoherence and MWI

2005-05-23 Thread Brent Meeker


-Original Message-
From: Patrick Leahy [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Monday, May 23, 2005 8:14 PM
To: Hal Finney
Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com
Subject: Re: Decoherence and MWI




On Mon, 23 May 2005, Hal Finney wrote:

 I'd like to take advantage of having a bona fide physicist on the list to
 ask a question about decoherence and its implications for the MWI.

SNIP

 If this is true, then how can a physicist not accept the MWI?

Beats me...

 Isn't that just a matter of taking this decoherence phenomenon to a
 (much) larger degree?  Either you have to believe that at some point
 decoherence stops following the rules of QM, or you have to believe that
 the mathematics describes physical reality.  And the mathematical
 equations predict the theoretical existence of the parallel yet
 unobservable branches.

The physicists who I really respect, but who do not support MWI, do indeed
believe (or hope) that the rules of QM break down at some point. E.g.
Roger Penrose, or Tony Leggett. They would point out that to date every
theory we have has only been an approximation. Penrose would point out
additionally that QM is inconsistent with GR, and there is no reason to
suppose that only GR has to be modified.  I support these people to the
extent that I think it is tremendously important to keep doing
experiments, especially ones that can test well-formulated alternatives to
QM.  I'm just not very hopeful that any discrepancy will show up.

 Of course, given that they are in practice unobservable, a degree of
 agnosticism is perhaps justifiable for the working physicist.  He doesn't
 have to trouble himself with such difficult questions, in practice.
 But still, if he believes the theory, and he applies it in his day to
 day work, shouldn't he believe the implications of the theory?

For most physicists the Copenhagen interpretation (in some half-understood
way) works perfectly well at the lab bench.

There are also those who have thought very carefully about the issue and
have come to a hyper-sophisticated philosophical position which allows
them to fudge. I'm thinking particularly of the consistent-histories gang,
including Murray Gell-Mann. I particularly liked Roland Omnes' version of
this: quantum mechanics can account for everything except actual facts.
He thinks this is a *good* thing!

I too like Omnes' point.  If QM is a probabilitistic theory, then it must
predict probabilities - not actualities.


 To me, it almost requires believing a contradiction to expect that
 decoherence experiments will follow the predictions of QM, without also
 expecting that the more extreme versions of those predictions will be
 true as well, which would imply the reality of the MWI.  You either have
 to believe that a sufficiently accurate decoherence experiment would
 find a violation of QM, or you have to believe in the MWI.

 Don't you?

Yes.


Paddy Leahy

PS: this is an endorsement of the MWI of QM, not of any everything
theory.

There are a couple of papers on arXiv, gr-qc/0505052 and gr-qc/0505023, by
Gambini and Pullin discussing discrete models of spacetime.  Most physicist
think that, at the Planck scale, the continuum model of spactime is at best
inelegant and at worst simply wrong.  Gambini and Pullin show that in their
discrete spacetime model decoherence is inherent - so something really does
happen.  This implies a fundamental arrow-of-time.

Brent Meeker