Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees

2006-08-14 Thread Bruno Marchal


Le 13-août-06, à 12:57, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :






 Bruno Marchal writes:

 I know it looks counterintuitive, but an AI can know which computer 
 is
 running and how many they are. It is a consequence of comp, and the
 UDA
 shows why. The answer is:
 the computer which is running are the relative universal number 
 which
 exist in arithmetical platonia (arithmetical truth is already a
 universal video game, if you want, and it is the simplest). How many
 are they? 2^aleph_zero.
 I have already explain it here:
 http://www.mail-archive.com/everything-list@eskimo.com/msg05272.html

 It is a key point and we can come back on it if you have some
 difficulties.

 Well now I'm confused! I thought the whole point of the earlier part
 of the UDA
 as discussed in the cited post (and many others of yours) is that you
 *can't*
 know the details of your implementation, such as what type of 
 computer
 you are
 being run on, how fast it is running, if there are arbitrary delays 
 in
 the program,
 and so on. Are you now saying that if I am being run on the 3rd of 
 100
 PC's in
 the basement of the local university computer science department, but
 everyone
 is keeping this a secret from me, there is a way I can figure out
 what's going on
 all by myself?!



 Did you read my old post to Brett Hall:
 http://www.mail-archive.com/everything-list@eskimo.com/msg05272.html
 Perhaps you could comment it and tell me what does not convince you. 
 It
 is indeed correct that the earlier parts of the UD Argument show that 
 a
 machine cannot know about comp-delays, or about the real/virtual 
 nature
 of a computer which would support the machine's computation until ...
 you realize that for exactly those reasons the machine first person
 expectations can only be computed (exactly and in principle) through a
 measure on all possible computations (reducing physics to searching
 such a measure). But then the first person can no more be associated
 with *any* particular computations. Read the Brett Hall post where I
 explain more, again in a steppy fashion (but the point is different
 from the UDA).
 To sum up that point:
 1) comp shows we cannot know which computations supported us.
 2) digging deeper in comp, this means eventually we are supported by
 *all* (relative) computations (relative to some actual state; the
 actuality itself is handled in the traditional indexical way, and
 eventually indexicality is treated through the logic of
 self-reference (G and G*).

 I did read the cited post. I can see that given step 7 - from the 
 inside, we
 cannot tell if we are in a physical world emulation or a Platonia 
 emulation -
 we could say that we are emulated by all appropriate computations.

OK. Even in a sort of simultaneous way. In a *probabilistic* sense we 
are in all those appropriate computations. Like I said to Peter, even 
if we are in a material universe (if that means something), then one 
instant later we are not (with probability 1 minus epsilon).


  [I think
 it is still logically possible that we are emulated at any instant by 
 one
 computation in the ensemble, and that there might still be a separate
 physical world, at this point at least.]


Yes. It is logically possible. But arithmetically or probabilistically 
quasi-improbable.




 I can see that step 8 is right:
 if we are simulated in a massive real world computer, to make a 
 prediction
 about the future we must take into account all the computations passing
 through our present state and define a measure on them.

All right, but then you should see that physics (let us see it as a 
science of concrete and exact prediction) is already given by a purely 
mathematical measure on a mathematical set (the set of computations 
going through my actual comp state).


 I will accept step
 9 on your authority, although this seems amazing: we can derive the 
 laws of
 physics from a measure on first person computational histories.

I guess you mean that you don't see how to make the extraction. UDA 
just shows that IF comp is true, then physics has to be derivable from 
computer science/number theory.
To see how we can do the extraction is another matter. I do it by 
asking UDA, no more to *you*, but to an universal machine.



 Now, step 10
 is my problem: if the laws of physics as per step 9 turn out to match 
 our
 experimentally verifiable reality, then we are no more simulated by 
 the physical
 computer than by any of the non-physical ones in Platonia.

 Why does it mean that we are no more simulated by the physical computer
 than one of the non-physical ones if the laws of physics match the 
 prediction
 from the assumption that we are being simulated? Surely all that it 
 suggests is
 that we are indeed being simulated - somewhere.

I was using the weak form of OCCAM.  With comp we must always take into 
account all simulations.



 You also state in step 10 that ...to say we belong to the massive 
 computer has
 no real meaning: if it stops, 

RE: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees

2006-08-13 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

Russell Standish writes:

 Precisely my point!
 
 On Tue, Aug 08, 2006 at 08:42:04AM -0700, 1Z wrote:
  
  
  Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
  
   By increasing the measure locally in our universe, are you making no 
   difference, or only a
   small amount of difference to the measure overall in Platonia?
  
  You can't make a difference in Platonia. There is no time there,
  no change, and no causality.

It's like making a difference in a material, deterministic world, which we 
assume has time, change 
and causality aplenty. 

Stathis Papaioannou
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RE: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees

2006-08-13 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

Russell Standish writes:

 Precisely my point!
 
 On Tue, Aug 08, 2006 at 08:42:04AM -0700, 1Z wrote:
  
  
  Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
  
   By increasing the measure locally in our universe, are you making no 
   difference, or only a
   small amount of difference to the measure overall in Platonia?
  
  You can't make a difference in Platonia. There is no time there,
  no change, and no causality.

It's like making a difference in a material, deterministic world, which we 
assume has time, change 
and causality aplenty. 

Stathis Papaioannou
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RE: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees

2006-08-13 Thread Stathis Papaioannou





Bruno Marchal writes:

  I know it looks counterintuitive, but an AI can know which computer is
  running and how many they are. It is a consequence of comp, and the 
  UDA
  shows why. The answer is:
  the computer which is running are the relative universal number which
  exist in arithmetical platonia (arithmetical truth is already a
  universal video game, if you want, and it is the simplest). How many
  are they? 2^aleph_zero.
  I have already explain it here:
  http://www.mail-archive.com/everything-list@eskimo.com/msg05272.html
 
  It is a key point and we can come back on it if you have some
  difficulties.
 
  Well now I'm confused! I thought the whole point of the earlier part 
  of the UDA
  as discussed in the cited post (and many others of yours) is that you 
  *can't*
  know the details of your implementation, such as what type of computer 
  you are
  being run on, how fast it is running, if there are arbitrary delays in 
  the program,
  and so on. Are you now saying that if I am being run on the 3rd of 100 
  PC's in
  the basement of the local university computer science department, but 
  everyone
  is keeping this a secret from me, there is a way I can figure out 
  what's going on
  all by myself?!
 
 
 
 Did you read my old post to Brett Hall:
  http://www.mail-archive.com/everything-list@eskimo.com/msg05272.html
 Perhaps you could comment it and tell me what does not convince you. It 
 is indeed correct that the earlier parts of the UD Argument show that a 
 machine cannot know about comp-delays, or about the real/virtual nature 
 of a computer which would support the machine's computation until ... 
 you realize that for exactly those reasons the machine first person 
 expectations can only be computed (exactly and in principle) through a 
 measure on all possible computations (reducing physics to searching 
 such a measure). But then the first person can no more be associated 
 with *any* particular computations. Read the Brett Hall post where I 
 explain more, again in a steppy fashion (but the point is different 
 from the UDA).
 To sum up that point:
 1) comp shows we cannot know which computations supported us.
 2) digging deeper in comp, this means eventually we are supported by 
 *all* (relative) computations (relative to some actual state; the 
 actuality itself is handled in the traditional indexical way, and 
 eventually indexicality is treated through the logic of 
 self-reference (G and G*).
 
I did read the cited post. I can see that given step 7 - from the inside, we 
cannot tell if we are in a physical world emulation or a Platonia emulation - 
we could say that we are emulated by all appropriate computations. [I think 
it is still logically possible that we are emulated at any instant by one 
computation in the ensemble, and that there might still be a separate 
physical world, at this point at least.]  I can see that step 8 is right: 
if we are simulated in a massive real world computer, to make a prediction 
about the future we must take into account all the computations passing 
through our present state and define a measure on them. I will accept step 
9 on your authority, although this seems amazing: we can derive the laws of 
physics from a measure on first person computational histories. Now, step 10 
is my problem: if the laws of physics as per step 9 turn out to match our 
experimentally verifiable reality, then we are no more simulated by the 
physical 
computer than by any of the non-physical ones in Platonia.

Why does it mean that we are no more simulated by the physical computer 
than one of the non-physical ones if the laws of physics match the prediction 
from the assumption that we are being simulated? Surely all that it suggests is 
that we are indeed being simulated - somewhere.

You also state in step 10 that ...to say we belong to the massive computer has 
no real meaning: if it stops, nothing can happen to us for example That 
is 
true, but it does not mean that we are not actually being simulated in a 
particular computer, just that we cannot *know* which computer it is unless 
we have external knowledge. But in any case, this is just what I was saying 
before: you can't know which computer you are being simulated on. Are you 
disagreeing with this statement because you believe you *can* narrow it down 
to knowing that you are not being simulated on a physical computer?

Stathis Papaioannou
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RE: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees

2006-08-10 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

Bruno Marchal writes (quoting SP):

  ...a controlled
  experiment in which measure can be turned up and down leaving
  everything else
  the same, such as having an AI running on several computers in 
  perfect
  lockstep.
 
 
  I think that the idea that a lower measure OM will appear more complex
  is a consequence of Komogorov like ASSA theories (a-la Hal Finney,
  Mallah, etc.). OK?
 
  I understand the basic principle, but I have trouble getting my mind 
  around
  the idea of defining a measure when every possible computation exists.
 
 
 I am not sure I understand. All real number exist, for example, and it 
 is the reason why we can put a measure on it. All computations exist 
 (this is equivalent with arithmetical realism) yet some are or at least 
 could be relatively more frequent than others.

Sure, but it's the details that are mind-boggling. Why do dog-computations 
bark and cat-computations meow? If there is a definite mathematical answer 
how do we even begin to fathom it? Or would you go the reductionist route 
of starting with basic physical laws, on which chemistry, biology, psychology 
etc. are built, the more basic sciences supporting the less basic?

 
  I agree from some 1 pov. But 1 plural pov here would lead to some 
  Bell
  inequalities violation. That is: sharable experiments which shows
  indirectly the presence of some alternate computations.
 
  I don't understand this statement. I am suggesting that the computers 
  are
  running exactly the same program - same circuitry, same software, same
  initial conditions, all on a classical scale. I don't see that there 
  is any way
  for the AI to know which computer he was running on (if that question 
  is
  even meaningful) or how many computers were running.
 
 
 I know it looks counterintuitive, but an AI can know which computer is 
 running and how many they are. It is a consequence of comp, and the UDA 
 shows why. The answer is:
 the computer which is running are the relative universal number which 
 exist in arithmetical platonia (arithmetical truth is already a 
 universal video game, if you want, and it is the simplest). How many 
 are they? 2^aleph_zero.
 I have already explain it here:
 http://www.mail-archive.com/everything-list@eskimo.com/msg05272.html
 
 It is a key point and we can come back on it if you have some 
 difficulties.

Well now I'm confused! I thought the whole point of the earlier part of the UDA 
as discussed in the cited post (and many others of yours) is that you *can't* 
know the details of your implementation, such as what type of computer you are 
being run on, how fast it is running, if there are arbitrary delays in the 
program, 
and so on. Are you now saying that if I am being run on the 3rd of 100 PC's in 
the basement of the local university computer science department, but everyone 
is keeping this a secret from me, there is a way I can figure out what's going 
on 
all by myself?!


  If I
  were the AI the only advantage I can think of in having multiple
  computers running
  is for backup in case some of them broke down; beyond that, I 
  wouldn't
  care if there
  were one copy or a million copies of me running in parallel.
 
  Except, as I said above, for the relative probabilities. But this is
  equivalent with accepting a well done back-up will not change your
  normal measure.
 
  Yes, I think what you mean by relative probabilities is that if 
  there were
  several possible versions of me next moment, then I would be more 
  likely
  to experience the one with higher measure. It is only relative to the 
  other
  possibilities that measure makes a subjective difference.
 
 
 Ah but you get the point now!

So, as long as this *relative* measure does not come into play, the absolute 
measure makes no difference?

Stathis Papaioannou
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Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees

2006-08-10 Thread Bruno Marchal


Le 10-août-06, à 14:16, Stathis Papaioannou wrote :



 Bruno: I am not sure I understand. All real number exist, for 
 example, and it
 is the reason why we can put a measure on it. All computations exist
 (this is equivalent with arithmetical realism) yet some are or at 
 least
 could be relatively more frequent than others.

 Stathis: Sure, but it's the details that are mind-boggling. Why do 
 dog-computations
 bark and cat-computations meow? If there is a definite mathematical 
 answer
 how do we even begin to fathom it?


I think there is a definite (but necessarily partial)  mathematical 
answer once we assume the comp hyp. It seems to me that the UD argument 
explains informally what shape this mathematical answer could have: a 
measure problem. Now I am not sure I understand why you don't see it. 
This is because I can infer by most of your posts that you handle well 
the relevant thought experiments. You certainly convince me I should 
explain more about the UDA in the roadmap-summary, before explaining 
the lobian interview.



 Or would you go the reductionist route
 of starting with basic physical laws, on which chemistry, biology, 
 psychology
 etc. are built, the more basic sciences supporting the less basic?


Except that the UDA is supposed to help to understand that the 
basic-ness of science could be the other way round: psychology/theology 
being more fundamental than physics. I hope I will be clear on that.
I have put a first version of the roadmap in the trash, because it 
was too long and at the same time it was not even addressing some 
difficulties which I am guessing many people have through your post. It 
is hard because I try to write a short text, and simultaneously I try 
to anticipate the sort of objections I find reasonable through my 
reading of the current many posts on the notion of persons.




 I know it looks counterintuitive, but an AI can know which computer is
 running and how many they are. It is a consequence of comp, and the 
 UDA
 shows why. The answer is:
 the computer which is running are the relative universal number which
 exist in arithmetical platonia (arithmetical truth is already a
 universal video game, if you want, and it is the simplest). How many
 are they? 2^aleph_zero.
 I have already explain it here:
 http://www.mail-archive.com/everything-list@eskimo.com/msg05272.html

 It is a key point and we can come back on it if you have some
 difficulties.

 Well now I'm confused! I thought the whole point of the earlier part 
 of the UDA
 as discussed in the cited post (and many others of yours) is that you 
 *can't*
 know the details of your implementation, such as what type of computer 
 you are
 being run on, how fast it is running, if there are arbitrary delays in 
 the program,
 and so on. Are you now saying that if I am being run on the 3rd of 100 
 PC's in
 the basement of the local university computer science department, but 
 everyone
 is keeping this a secret from me, there is a way I can figure out 
 what's going on
 all by myself?!



Did you read my old post to Brett Hall:
 http://www.mail-archive.com/everything-list@eskimo.com/msg05272.html
Perhaps you could comment it and tell me what does not convince you. It 
is indeed correct that the earlier parts of the UD Argument show that a 
machine cannot know about comp-delays, or about the real/virtual nature 
of a computer which would support the machine's computation until ... 
you realize that for exactly those reasons the machine first person 
expectations can only be computed (exactly and in principle) through a 
measure on all possible computations (reducing physics to searching 
such a measure). But then the first person can no more be associated 
with *any* particular computations. Read the Brett Hall post where I 
explain more, again in a steppy fashion (but the point is different 
from the UDA).
To sum up that point:
1) comp shows we cannot know which computations supported us.
2) digging deeper in comp, this means eventually we are supported by 
*all* (relative) computations (relative to some actual state; the 
actuality itself is handled in the traditional indexical way, and 
eventually indexicality is treated through the logic of 
self-reference (G and G*).





 Yes, I think what you mean by relative probabilities is that if
 there were
 several possible versions of me next moment, then I would be more
 likely
 to experience the one with higher measure. It is only relative to the
 other
 possibilities that measure makes a subjective difference.


 Ah but you get the point now!

 So, as long as this *relative* measure does not come into play, the 
 absolute
 measure makes no difference?


But physics arise (or should arise, with the comp hyp.) from the 
*relative* measure, and physics will be what makes possible for 
consciousness to be able to manifest itself. George asked me to explain 
this like if I was talking to some grandmother, but it is tricky to do 
that. The reason is 

Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees

2006-08-09 Thread Bruno Marchal


Le 08-août-06, à 15:54, W. C. a écrit :


 From: Bruno Marchal

 ...
 I just said you were deadly wrong here, but rereading your post I 
 find it
 somehow ambiguous.
 Let me comment anyway.
 Human classical teleportation, although possible in principle, will 
 not be
 possible in our life time (except  for those who will succeed in some 
 lucky
 cryogenisation process). Artificial brain will first be developed with
 graft of genetically engineered animals neurons, through progress in
 harnessing the immune system and prion diseases (that will take 
 time). Only
 latter will come purely artificial digital brain, and even this 
 will be a
 matter of piece by piece progress (artificial hypocampus, artificial 
 limbic
 system,  until artificial cortex (this one will take perhaps a
 millenium), and pionner of immortality will have hard time for many
 technical but also social and ethical reasons.

 Thanks for your patience. I can see that you are really very patient 
 because
 you often reply many similar
 questions that you may have replied hundreds of times before.
 Although I appreciate your patience, I still don't agree with you 
 about the
 teleportation.
 When we say teleportation, we mean we send someone from location A to
 location B *like a magic* (Start Trek stuff).
 The person at A is *exactly* the same as the one at B. This really has
 little to do with digital or artificial stuff.
 Human body and brain are analog, same for A  B. It's useless to use 
 digital
 or artificial conversion (since I assume no substitution level).


But then there is really no problem between us. We just have a 
different starting hypothesis.
You assume the negation of comp. That's all.
But analog machine can in general be simulated by digital machine. Only 
analog machine using explicitly infinite thrid person information in 
finite time will be non turing emulable. It is up to you to explain us 
why you think infinite third person information is needed for having 
a genuine person.
(First person infinite information will not work given that comp 
predicts that first person are associated directly to a continuum (high 
infinite) of information flows.



 If I have a scar on my left hand, you need to teleport this scar also. 
 Same
 for any of my old memories.
 We are not talking about the teleportation of some *standard PC parts* 
 (like
 the CPU/HDD) from A to B.

 But where I think you are wrong is that articial brain and body, even 
 if it
 needs a millenium of work to succeed with some reasonable 
 probability, will
 not really help us in understanding the brain and its functioning. It 
 just
 happens that, even if it is *very* difficult, the copy of a brain is 
 almost
 infinitely easier that the understanding of how a brain work (even 
 assuming
 some high substitution level).

 Assume no substitution level, if you can teleport me (a male) from A 
 to B
 and let me agree completely that I am *exactly* (body, memory, 
 consciousness
 etc.) the same me,
 I think it will let us own the complete understanding of the so-called
 consciousness, existence of soul? ... such big questions.

 To be sure here comp says something rather negative: humans brains 
 will
 never completely understand the human brain. It is true that the 3000 
 AD
 humans will perhaps eventually understand the basics of 2000 AD 
 human's
 brain, but only true their own bigger brain (including 
 self-developing
 machine) which will be beyond their comprehension. A little like 
 bacteria
 and amoeba learns to reproduce themselves without any higher level
 understanding of what is going on.

 See my comment above. Sooner or later, I think human beings will have
 answers.

No problem per se (withouit comp). With comp, I can explain why we can 
have better and better answers, but there is no last answer. But then 
comp explains why.





 Of course if comp is correct we can understand very fundamental 
 principles
 which are at the logical origin of the realities  (that's what 
 we are
 discussing now).



Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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RE: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees

2006-08-09 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

WC writes:

 Classical teleportation cannot copy something exact to the quantum level, 
 but rather involves making a close enough copy. It is obvious, I think, 
 that this is theoretically possible, but it is not immediately obvious how 
 good the copy of a person would have to be (what Bruno calls the 
 substitution level) in order to feel himself to be the same person. But 
 as mentioned above, I don't think we need to insist on perfect duplication 
 to the quantum level, because this doesn't even happen from moment to 
 moment in everyday life.
 
 
 Thanks for the info. although I still don't think substitution level exists.
 If teleportation of human beings is real (I hope I can see it in my life),
 I think all biggest questions (such as consciousness, soul? Creator? the 
 origin of the universe, meaning of life ... etc.)
 of this universe should have been solved.

Are you saying that you believe a copy of a person must be *exactly* the same 
to be the same person? (Note that even this is more than some people would 
concede, as there are some who hold that even an exact copy would not suffice.) 
But what about the fact that people do change, physically and mentally, from 
moment to moment? Surely this implies that we don't need the copy to be exact, 
but we need to determine how close to exact it has to be. Also, I don't see how 
practical teleportation would solve the other problems you mention. It is 
useful as 
a thought experiment in the philosophy of personal identity, in particular, but 
all 
that is required in these arguments is the *theoretical* possibility. I think 
this is 
where you err: the sorts of arguments we have been discussing would be neither 
more nor less convincing if teleportation became a practical reality tomorrrow.

Stathis Papaioannou
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RE: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees

2006-08-08 Thread W. C.

From: W. C.

 From: Bruno Marchal
 ...
 Not at all. I mean it in the operational physical sense. Like observing 
 your hand with a microscope, or looking closely to the path of an 
 electron.
 ...

Any microscope (optical or electron type)? What's the min. magnification  
resolution to see it?
I need to find one to try what you said.


I tried to check my finger as you said with different resolutions of 
microscopes.
But I still can't see that matter is the result of a sum on an infinity 
of interfering computations.
Can you tell me why?

Thanks.

WC.

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RE: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees

2006-08-08 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

Bruno Marchal writes:

 Le 07-août-06, à 15:52, W. C. a écrit :
 
 
  From: Bruno Marchal
  ...
  Comp says that there is a level of description of yourself such that 
  you
  survive through an emulation done at that level. But the UD will 
  simulate
  not only that level but all level belows. So comp makes the following
  prediction: if you look at yourself or at you neighborhood 
  sufficiently
  close enough, you can in principle detect, indirectly, (by computing 
  the
  relative comp histories) the presence of all the sublevel 
  computations.
 
  Are you talking about meditation?
 
 
 Not at all. I mean it in the operational physical sense. Like observing 
 your hand with a microscope, or looking closely to the path of an 
 electron.

Could you say more about this? If you examine an object more and more 
closely you see more and more detail, and I understand that you have other 
arguments suggesting that this is all due to the ensemble of computations 
underpinning the physical reality, but are you suggesting that the fact that 
you can observe these levels is *by itself* evidence for these levels and 
sublevels of computation? 

Stathis Papaioannou
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Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees

2006-08-08 Thread Quentin Anciaux

Le Mardi 8 Août 2006 08:00, W. C. a écrit :
 Can you tell me why?

Because you are bad faith and don't read correctly what others tell you.

If you have some more stupid questions like this, don't hesitate and go 
continue polluting the mailing list.

Quentin

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Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees

2006-08-08 Thread Bruno Marchal


Le 08-août-06, à 10:10, Quentin Anciaux a écrit :


 Le Mardi 8 Août 2006 08:00, W. C. a écrit :
 Can you tell me why?

 Because you are bad faith and don't read correctly what others tell 
 you.

 If you have some more stupid questions like this, don't hesitate and go
 continue polluting the mailing list.


Hi Quentin,

Take it easy. Perhaps you are just quicker than me, but up to now I 
would say W. C. has some *genuine* misunderstanding, perhaps shared by 
other people too who are too shy to send a post (I know some).
Apparently W. C. does not believe in comp (he said he does not believe 
in the existence of a substitution level), nor does he believe in the 
QM-MWI (he said he read the FOR book a long time ago and that he has 
not been convinced).
This makes him (or her?) quite coherent. W. C. seems to defend 
Naturalism, but the fact that he/she follows the list shows that he/she 
is at least open to some doubt and that he/she has some open-mindness. 
I have met bad faith people in comparison with which W. C. is still 
quite reasonable, imo. Conversation with him or her  can help to 
understand difficulties.
Nevertheless, there is one important point in one of his/her recent 
message where he/she is deadly wrong, and that is the subject of my 
next message.

Best,

Bruno





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Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees

2006-08-08 Thread Bruno Marchal


Le 08-août-06, à 05:49, W. C. a écrit :


 From: Stathis Papaioannou

 ...
 Classical teleportation cannot copy something exact to the quantum 
 level,
 but rather involves making a close enough copy. It is obvious, I 
 think,
 that this is theoretically possible, but it is not immediately 
 obvious how
 good the copy of a person would have to be (what Bruno calls the
 substitution level) in order to feel himself to be the same 
 person. But
 as mentioned above, I don't think we need to insist on perfect 
 duplication
 to the quantum level, because this doesn't even happen from moment to
 moment in everyday life.


 Thanks for the info. although I still don't think substitution level 
 exists.
 If teleportation of human beings is real (I hope I can see it in my 
 life),
 I think all biggest questions (such as consciousness, soul? Creator? 
 the
 origin of the universe, meaning of life ... etc.)
 of this universe should have been solved.


I just said you were deadly wrong here, but rereading your post I find 
it somehow ambiguous.
Let me comment anyway.
Human classical teleportation, although possible in principle, will not 
be possible in our life time (except  for those who will succeed in 
some lucky cryogenisation process). Artificial brain will first be 
developed with graft of genetically engineered animals neurons, through 
progress in harnessing the immune system and prion diseases (that will 
take time). Only latter will come purely artificial digital brain, 
and even this will be a matter of piece by piece progress (artificial 
hypocampus, artificial limbic system,  until artificial cortex 
(this one will take perhaps a millenium), and pionner of immortality 
will have hard time for many technical but also social and ethical 
reasons.

But where I think you are wrong is that articial brain and body, even 
if it needs a millenium of work to succeed with some reasonable 
probability, will not really help us in understanding the brain and its 
functioning. It just happens that, even if it is *very* difficult, the 
copy of a brain is almost infinitely easier that the understanding of 
how a brain work (even assuming some high substitution level). To be 
sure here comp says something rather negative: humans brains will never 
completely understand the human brain. It is true that the 3000 AD 
humans will perhaps eventually understand the basics of 2000 AD human's 
brain, but only true their own bigger brain (including 
self-developing machine) which will be beyond their comprehension. A 
little like bacteria and amoeba learns to reproduce themselves 
without any higher level understanding of what is going on.

Of course if comp is correct we can understand very fundamental 
principles which are at the logical origin of the realities  
(that's what we are discussing now).

Bruno





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Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees

2006-08-08 Thread Bruno Marchal


Le 08-août-06, à 08:00, W. C. a écrit :

 But I still can't see that matter is the result of a sum on an 
 infinity
 of interfering computations.
 Can you tell me why?


My opinion here is that you should (re)read the FOR book. We do have 
empirical reasons (quantum mechanics) that physical reality is the 
result of interfering computable waves.
Now, why comp makes this necessary (not just empirically inferable) is 
what I try to explain to the list since sometime (and that relies in 
fine on some not so well known results in theoretical computer 
science). I can only ask you to read carefully either old posts, or my 
papers, or to follow carefully futures explanations.

Bruno


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Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees

2006-08-08 Thread Bruno Marchal


Le 08-août-06, à 05:34, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :


 Bruno Marchal writes (quoting SP):

 ...a controlled
 experiment in which measure can be turned up and down leaving
 everything else
 the same, such as having an AI running on several computers in 
 perfect
 lockstep.


 I think that the idea that a lower measure OM will appear more complex
 is a consequence of Komogorov like ASSA theories (a-la Hal Finney,
 Mallah, etc.). OK?

 I understand the basic principle, but I have trouble getting my mind 
 around
 the idea of defining a measure when every possible computation exists.


I am not sure I understand. All real number exist, for example, and it 
is the reason why we can put a measure on it. All computations exist 
(this is equivalent with arithmetical realism) yet some are or at least 
could be relatively more frequent than others.





 I agree from some 1 pov. But 1 plural pov here would lead to some 
 Bell
 inequalities violation. That is: sharable experiments which shows
 indirectly the presence of some alternate computations.

 I don't understand this statement. I am suggesting that the computers 
 are
 running exactly the same program - same circuitry, same software, same
 initial conditions, all on a classical scale. I don't see that there 
 is any way
 for the AI to know which computer he was running on (if that question 
 is
 even meaningful) or how many computers were running.


I know it looks counterintuitive, but an AI can know which computer is 
running and how many they are. It is a consequence of comp, and the UDA 
shows why. The answer is:
the computer which is running are the relative universal number which 
exist in arithmetical platonia (arithmetical truth is already a 
universal video game, if you want, and it is the simplest). How many 
are they? 2^aleph_zero.
I have already explain it here:
http://www.mail-archive.com/everything-list@eskimo.com/msg05272.html

It is a key point and we can come back on it if you have some 
difficulties.






 If I
 were the AI the only advantage I can think of in having multiple
 computers running
 is for backup in case some of them broke down; beyond that, I 
 wouldn't
 care if there
 were one copy or a million copies of me running in parallel.

 Except, as I said above, for the relative probabilities. But this is
 equivalent with accepting a well done back-up will not change your
 normal measure.

 Yes, I think what you mean by relative probabilities is that if 
 there were
 several possible versions of me next moment, then I would be more 
 likely
 to experience the one with higher measure. It is only relative to the 
 other
 possibilities that measure makes a subjective difference.


Ah but you get the point now!

Bruno

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Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees

2006-08-08 Thread Russell Standish

On Tue, Aug 08, 2006 at 01:11:19PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
 
 Is it still correct to say that a computation running on two physical 
 computers (that is, what 
 we think of as physical computers, whatever the underlying reality may be) 
 has almost twice 
 the measure as it would have if it were running on one computer? Otherwise, 
 there would 
 be no point backing up anything, relying instead on Platonia's infinite hard 
 disk.
 
 Stathis Papaioannou

It does not change the measure of the computation in Platonia. I think
that is the clear message from COMP. But it does change the measure
within the physical universe that we inhabit.

Backing up things is to improve robustness in the face of noise (or
equivalently the second law). I don't know of anybody doing it to
increase measure per se.

On the other hand printing 100 copies of my book is all about
increasing the measure of my book within our physical universe, and
not backing it up (5 copies distributed to the main libraries of the
world would suffice for that!)

Cheers

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RE: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees

2006-08-08 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

Russell Standish writes:

  Is it still correct to say that a computation running on two physical 
  computers (that is, what 
  we think of as physical computers, whatever the underlying reality may be) 
  has almost twice 
  the measure as it would have if it were running on one computer? Otherwise, 
  there would 
  be no point backing up anything, relying instead on Platonia's infinite 
  hard disk.
  
  Stathis Papaioannou
 
 It does not change the measure of the computation in Platonia. I think
 that is the clear message from COMP. But it does change the measure
 within the physical universe that we inhabit.
 
 Backing up things is to improve robustness in the face of noise (or
 equivalently the second law). I don't know of anybody doing it to
 increase measure per se.
 
 On the other hand printing 100 copies of my book is all about
 increasing the measure of my book within our physical universe, and
 not backing it up (5 copies distributed to the main libraries of the
 world would suffice for that!)

By increasing the measure locally in our universe, are you making no 
difference, or only a 
small amount of difference to the measure overall in Platonia? For example, if 
all the matter 
in the universe were converted to computers repeatedly calculating 2+2=4 
would that give 
2+2=4 a bit of an edge over 3+3=6 in Platonia? What about the far more 
complex 
computations underlying human consciousness: my understanding was that the 
appearance 
of an orderly physical world that goes along with these is not an optional 
extra, but a necessary 
consequence of the type of computation under consideration. That would mean 
that all of the 
measure attributed to a conscious moment is in fact tied up in the (apparent) 
physical world, 
because there are no computations of the required type possible that don't give 
the appearance 
of a physical world. (If there are, we have to explain why we don't experience 
them.) So if you 
increase the measure locally by duplicating and running a sentient program, you 
are increasing the 
measure in Platonia as a whole, since there isn't anywhere else where sentient 
programs of the 
sort with which we are familiar might be hiding. 

Stathis Papaioannou
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RE: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees

2006-08-08 Thread W. C.

From: Bruno Marchal

...
I just said you were deadly wrong here, but rereading your post I find it 
somehow ambiguous.
Let me comment anyway.
Human classical teleportation, although possible in principle, will not be 
possible in our life time (except  for those who will succeed in some lucky 
cryogenisation process). Artificial brain will first be developed with 
graft of genetically engineered animals neurons, through progress in 
harnessing the immune system and prion diseases (that will take time). Only 
latter will come purely artificial digital brain, and even this will be a 
matter of piece by piece progress (artificial hypocampus, artificial limbic 
system,  until artificial cortex (this one will take perhaps a 
millenium), and pionner of immortality will have hard time for many 
technical but also social and ethical reasons.

Thanks for your patience. I can see that you are really very patient because 
you often reply many similar
questions that you may have replied hundreds of times before.
Although I appreciate your patience, I still don't agree with you about the 
teleportation.
When we say teleportation, we mean we send someone from location A to 
location B *like a magic* (Start Trek stuff).
The person at A is *exactly* the same as the one at B. This really has 
little to do with digital or artificial stuff.
Human body and brain are analog, same for A  B. It's useless to use digital 
or artificial conversion (since I assume no substitution level).
If I have a scar on my left hand, you need to teleport this scar also. Same 
for any of my old memories.
We are not talking about the teleportation of some *standard PC parts* (like 
the CPU/HDD) from A to B.

But where I think you are wrong is that articial brain and body, even if it 
needs a millenium of work to succeed with some reasonable probability, will 
not really help us in understanding the brain and its functioning. It just 
happens that, even if it is *very* difficult, the copy of a brain is almost 
infinitely easier that the understanding of how a brain work (even assuming 
some high substitution level).

Assume no substitution level, if you can teleport me (a male) from A to B 
and let me agree completely that I am *exactly* (body, memory, consciousness 
etc.) the same me,
I think it will let us own the complete understanding of the so-called 
consciousness, existence of soul? ... such big questions.

To be sure here comp says something rather negative: humans brains will 
never completely understand the human brain. It is true that the 3000 AD 
humans will perhaps eventually understand the basics of 2000 AD human's 
brain, but only true their own bigger brain (including self-developing 
machine) which will be beyond their comprehension. A little like bacteria 
and amoeba learns to reproduce themselves without any higher level 
understanding of what is going on.

See my comment above. Sooner or later, I think human beings will have 
answers.


Of course if comp is correct we can understand very fundamental principles 
which are at the logical origin of the realities  (that's what we are 
discussing now).


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Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees

2006-08-08 Thread Bruno Marchal


Le 08-août-06, à 08:58, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :


 Not at all. I mean it in the operational physical sense. Like 
 observing
 your hand with a microscope, or looking closely to the path of an
 electron.

 Could you say more about this? If you examine an object more and more
 closely you see more and more detail, and I understand that you have 
 other
 arguments suggesting that this is all due to the ensemble of 
 computations
 underpinning the physical reality, but are you suggesting that the 
 fact that
 you can observe these levels is *by itself* evidence for these levels 
 and
 sublevels of computation?

Comp predicts that if you look closely enough you will see reality 
blurring. The evidence from empirical science (quantum physics) is that 
indeed reality blurs, but of course informal comp does not give the 
details of the blurring process. (That is why I get technical at some 
point). When we look at an electron in some well defined state of 
energy around the nucleus, we see literally a map of accessible 
worlds. The electron behaves as if it blurs around the nucleus, and 
what chemists call an orbital is really a map of where you can find the 
position of the electron would you decide to measure it.
The microscope image is somehow misleading, because both with comp and 
already with the quantum, the many histories can manifest themselves 
through *isolation* only, like the Schroedinger cat in its box. 
Practically a hot macroscopic box does interact too heavily with the 
environment so that we cannot really isolate it, so we cannot make our 
comp history completely independent of what happen in the box, and 
thats why confirmation or refutation of comp or of the quantum needs 
the microscopic world. But macro-effects are not excluded and are 
arguably already present for the quantum (superfluid, 
superconductivity, violation of Bell's inequality on large distance, 
etc.)

Bruno

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Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees

2006-08-08 Thread 1Z


W. C. wrote:

 Thanks for the info. although I still don't think substitution level exists.
 If teleportation of human beings is real (I hope I can see it in my life),
 I think all biggest questions (such as consciousness, soul? Creator? the
 origin of the universe, meaning of life ... etc.)
 of this universe should have been solved.

If you can first solve the How To Detect A Zombie problem...


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Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees

2006-08-08 Thread 1Z


Bruno Marchal wrote:
 Le 08-août-06, à 08:58, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :

 
  Not at all. I mean it in the operational physical sense. Like
  observing
  your hand with a microscope, or looking closely to the path of an
  electron.
 
  Could you say more about this? If you examine an object more and more
  closely you see more and more detail, and I understand that you have
  other
  arguments suggesting that this is all due to the ensemble of
  computations
  underpinning the physical reality, but are you suggesting that the
  fact that
  you can observe these levels is *by itself* evidence for these levels
  and
  sublevels of computation?

 Comp predicts that if you look closely enough you will see reality
 blurring. The evidence from empirical science (quantum physics) is that
 indeed reality blurs, but of course informal comp does not give the
 details of the blurring process.

One thing we *do* know for sure is that Harry Potter universes --
*literal* HP universes -- are computable, since the special effects
in the Harry Potter movies were computer generated!

Therefore the problem with everythingism is that it predicts *too much*
weirdness. (And, as I am forever pointing out,
materialism-contingency-empiricism [*] doesn't exclude quantum
fuzziness or many
worlds, providing there are contingent facts about how much fuzziness
and how many worlds).

[*] my term for the non-everythingist philosophy.


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Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees

2006-08-08 Thread 1Z


Bruno Marchal wrote:

 My opinion here is that you should (re)read the FOR book. We do have
 empirical reasons (quantum mechanics) that physical reality is the
 result of interfering computable waves.

Quantum weirdness is entirely compatible with
materialism-contingency-empiricism.

Schrodinger's equation is a contingent fact about the world, derived
from observation, which describs what matter can and can't do.


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Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees

2006-08-08 Thread 1Z


Bruno Marchal wrote:
 Le 08-août-06, à 05:34, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :

 
  Bruno Marchal writes (quoting SP):
 
  ...a controlled
  experiment in which measure can be turned up and down leaving
  everything else
  the same, such as having an AI running on several computers in
  perfect
  lockstep.
 
 
  I think that the idea that a lower measure OM will appear more complex
  is a consequence of Komogorov like ASSA theories (a-la Hal Finney,
  Mallah, etc.). OK?
 
  I understand the basic principle, but I have trouble getting my mind
  around
  the idea of defining a measure when every possible computation exists.


 I am not sure I understand. All real number exist, for example, and it
 is the reason why we can put a measure on it.


I'm confused. In previous conversations you have claimed not to
known what exists means.

 All computations exist
 (this is equivalent with arithmetical realism) yet some are or at least
 could be relatively more frequent than others.

If computation are simply integers, they all have the same measure.

If there is some more complex relation, the existence of computations
is not guaranteed by the existence of integers. Any computer
progamme can be represented as a sting of 1's and 0's, but only
int the context of some particular computer.


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Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees

2006-08-08 Thread 1Z


Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

 By increasing the measure locally in our universe, are you making no 
 difference, or only a
 small amount of difference to the measure overall in Platonia?

You can't make a difference in Platonia. There is no time there,
no change, and no causality.


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Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees

2006-08-08 Thread Russell Standish

Precisely my point!

On Tue, Aug 08, 2006 at 08:42:04AM -0700, 1Z wrote:
 
 
 Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
 
  By increasing the measure locally in our universe, are you making no 
  difference, or only a
  small amount of difference to the measure overall in Platonia?
 
 You can't make a difference in Platonia. There is no time there,
 no change, and no causality.
 
 
 
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Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees

2006-08-07 Thread Bruno Marchal


Le 06-août-06, à 15:59, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :


 Russell Standish writes:

 This is one of those truly cracked ideas that is not wise to air in
 polite company. Nevertheless, it can be fun to play around with in
 this forum. I had a similarly cracked idea a few years ago about 1st
 person experienced magic, which we batted around a bit at the tiome
 without getting anywhere.

 The trouble I have with this idea is that I can't see the connection
 between OM measure and the sensation of passage of time. In contrast
 to your statement of nothing however, a lower measure OM will appear
 more complex - so we experience growth in knowledge as our measure
 decreases. Increasing measure OM's will correspond to memory
 erasure, in the sense of quantum erasure.

 My thought was that if there are twice as many copies of you running  
 in parallel,
 you are in a sense cramming twice as much experience into a given  
 objective time
 period, so maybe this stretches out the time period to seem twice as  
 long.


I certainly doubt that!



 There
 is admittedly no good reason to accept that this is so (that's why  
 it's a cracked
 idea, as you say!), and I would bet that it *isn't* so, but it's the  
 only half-plausible
 subjective effect I can think of due to change in measure alone.


The (relative) number or proportion of emulation will never change a  
content of an experience, but could change the relative probabilities,  
both in comp and in QM.



 I believe that what you mean when you say that a lower measure OM will  
 appear
 more complex is somewhat different to the scenario I had in mind: a  
 controlled
 experiment in which measure can be turned up and down leaving  
 everything else
 the same, such as having an AI running on several computers in perfect  
 lockstep.


I think that the idea that a lower measure OM will appear more complex  
is a consequence of Komogorov like ASSA theories (a-la Hal Finney,  
Mallah, etc.). OK?



 (I realise this is not the same as changing measure in the multiverse,  
 which would
 not lend itself so easily to experiment.) Would the AI notice anything  
 if half the
 computers were turned off then on again? I think it would be  
 impossible for the AI
 to notice that anything had changed without receiving external  
 information.


I agree from some 1 pov. But 1 plural pov here would lead to some Bell  
inequalities violation. That is: sharable experiments which shows  
indirectly the presence of some alternate computations.



 If I
 were the AI the only advantage I can think of in having multiple  
 computers running
 is for backup in case some of them broke down; beyond that, I wouldn't  
 care if there
 were one copy or a million copies of me running in parallel.

Except, as I said above, for the relative probabilities. But this is  
equivalent with accepting a well done back-up will not change your  
normal measure.

Bruno




 Stathis Papaioannou

 On Sat, Aug 05, 2006 at 10:44:49PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


 I have asked the question before, what do I experience if my measure
 in the multiverse increases or decreases? My preferred answer, contra
 the ASSA/ QTI skeptics, is nothing. However, the interesting  
 observation
 that our perception of time changes with age, so that an hour seems
 subjectively much longer for a young child than for an older person,  
 would
 seem to correlate with decreasing measure as a person grows older.  
 One
 explanation for this could be that if there are more copies of us  
 around
 in the multiverse, we have more subjective experience per unit time.  
 This
 would mean that if we lived forever, the years then the centuries  
 and millenia
 would fly past at a subjectively faster and faster rate as we age  
 and our
 measure continuously drops.

 I actually believe that a psychological explanation for this  
 phenomenon is more
 likely correct (an hour is a greater proportion of your life if you  
 are a young child)
 but it's an interesting idea.

 Stathis Papaioannou

 
 Date: Fri, 4 Aug 2006 02:10:53 +1000
 From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
 Subject: Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees


 Someone called me to task for this posting (I forget who, and I've
 lost the posting now). I tried to formulate the notion I expressed
 here more precisely, and failed! So I never responded.

 What I had in mind was that future observer moment of my current one
 will at some point have a total measure diminishing at least as fast
 as an exponental function of OM age. This is simply a statement that
 it becomes increasingly improbable for humans to live longer than a
 certain age.

 Whilst individual OMs will have exponentially decreasing measure due
 to the linear increase in complexity as a function of universe age,
 total OM measure requires summing over all OMs of a given age (which
 can compensate). This total OM measure

Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees

2006-08-07 Thread Bruno Marchal


Le 07-août-06, à 01:44, W. C. a écrit :


 From: Bruno Marchal
 ...
 But it is easy to explain that this is already a simple consequence 
  of
 comp. Any piece of matter is the result of a sum on an infinity of
 interfering computations: there is no reason to expect this to be
 clonable without cloning the whole UD, but this would not change any
 internal measures (by Church thesis and machine independence).
 ...

 I remember you said comp can be tested experimentally due to others
 consequences (like the observable interference among many computations,
 etc.).
 Can you provide more details on how to do the experiment to see 
 matter is
 the result of a sum on an infinity of  interfering computations???


Comp says that there is a level of description of yourself such that 
you survive through an emulation done at that level. But the UD will 
simulate not only that level but all level belows. So comp makes the 
following prediction: if you look at yourself or at you neighborhood 
sufficiently close enough, you can in principle detect, indirectly, (by 
computing the relative comp histories) the presence of all the sublevel 
computations.
So it is enough to observe closely your neighborhood. But of course 
experimental physicists does exactly that, and the fact that they infer 
Many-Worlds (many Histories/many computations) from their observations 
can be seen retrospectively as a confirmation of comp.
(This explains that up to now, only people with a good grasp of the 
conceptual difficulties of the quantum theory can swallow the 
consequences of comp, more or less).
To be sure negative interferences remains quite astonishing (after 
such an informal reasoning), but then if you take into account the 
results in computer science and mathematical logic, there are evidence 
that negative interference appears as related to some variant of the 
incompleteness phenomena. This is somehow counter-intuitive and hard to 
justify in french. More in a summary which should come asap. I hope 
this already helps.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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RE: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees

2006-08-07 Thread W. C.

From: Bruno Marchal
...
Comp says that there is a level of description of yourself such that you 
survive through an emulation done at that level. But the UD will simulate 
not only that level but all level belows. So comp makes the following 
prediction: if you look at yourself or at you neighborhood sufficiently 
close enough, you can in principle detect, indirectly, (by computing the 
relative comp histories) the presence of all the sublevel computations.

Are you talking about meditation?
I still can't see how matter is the result of a sum on an infinity of  
interfering computations.
Common people can touch and feel the matter (this physical universe). They 
don't need this strange process to see it.
Your explanation is rather strange.
As said before, I don't think substitution level exists. So Comp. and UDA 
won't work here.

So it is enough to observe closely your neighborhood. But of course 
experimental physicists does exactly that, and the fact that they infer 
Many-Worlds (many Histories/many computations) from their observations can 
be seen retrospectively as a confirmation of comp.
(This explains that up to now, only people with a good grasp of the 
conceptual difficulties of the quantum theory can swallow the consequences 
of comp, more or less).

I think many good physicist won't agree with you.

To be sure negative interferences remains quite astonishing (after such 
an informal reasoning), but then if you take into account the results in 
computer science and mathematical logic, there are evidence that negative 
interference appears as related to some variant of the incompleteness 
phenomena. This is somehow counter-intuitive and hard to justify in 
french. More in a summary which should come asap. I hope this already 
helps.


Please provide more explanation.

Thanks.

WC.

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Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees

2006-08-07 Thread Bruno Marchal


Le 07-août-06, à 15:52, W. C. a écrit :


 From: Bruno Marchal
 ...
 Comp says that there is a level of description of yourself such that 
 you
 survive through an emulation done at that level. But the UD will 
 simulate
 not only that level but all level belows. So comp makes the following
 prediction: if you look at yourself or at you neighborhood 
 sufficiently
 close enough, you can in principle detect, indirectly, (by computing 
 the
 relative comp histories) the presence of all the sublevel 
 computations.

 Are you talking about meditation?


Not at all. I mean it in the operational physical sense. Like observing 
your hand with a microscope, or looking closely to the path of an 
electron.


 I still can't see how matter is the result of a sum on an infinity of
 interfering computations.
 Common people can touch and feel the matter (this physical universe). 
 They
 don't need this strange process to see it.

I would say that here we are trying to explain those touch and feel 
the matter without begging the question. My working hypothesis is 
comp.



 Your explanation is rather strange.
 As said before, I don't think substitution level exists. So Comp. and 
 UDA
 won't work here.

Are you saying that your hypothesis is some negation of comp. Then 
there is no problem with my work of course. (Except that many 
consequences that I extract from comp remains derivable by much weaker 
version of comp).




 So it is enough to observe closely your neighborhood. But of course
 experimental physicists does exactly that, and the fact that they 
 infer
 Many-Worlds (many Histories/many computations) from their 
 observations can
 be seen retrospectively as a confirmation of comp.
 (This explains that up to now, only people with a good grasp of the
 conceptual difficulties of the quantum theory can swallow the 
 consequences
 of comp, more or less).

 I think many good physicist won't agree with you.


Of course those physicist would believe in the wave collapse will have 
more reason than Everett followers to swallow what I say.
To be sure I don't take a many or even all physicists think this or 
that as an argument for this or that. Of course it is nice to justify 
why such wrong belief can rise.




 To be sure negative interferences remains quite astonishing (after 
 such
 an informal reasoning), but then if you take into account the results 
 in
 computer science and mathematical logic, there are evidence that 
 negative
 interference appears as related to some variant of the incompleteness
 phenomena. This is somehow counter-intuitive and hard to justify in
 french. More in a summary which should come asap. I hope this 
 already
 helps.


 Please provide more explanation.

 Thanks.

Asap.


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees

2006-08-07 Thread 1Z


Bruno Marchal wrote:

 Of course those physicist would believe in the wave collapse will have
 more reason than Everett followers to swallow what I say.

Not much more. Physical MWI is a materialist-contingent-empiricst
theory
and therefore just as much opposed to your
idealist-necessitarian-rationalist
approach as single-universe physics.


 To be sure I don't take a many or even all physicists think this or
 that as an argument for this or that.

Because you don't believe in empriricism, but that is all rather
circular.

 Of course it is nice to justify
 why such wrong belief can rise.


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RE: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees

2006-08-07 Thread W. C.

From: Bruno Marchal
...
Not at all. I mean it in the operational physical sense. Like observing 
your hand with a microscope, or looking closely to the path of an 
electron.
...

Any microscope (optical or electron type)? What's the min. magnification  
resolution to see it?
I need to find one to try what you said.

Thanks.

WC.

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RE: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees

2006-08-07 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

Russell Standish:

 On Sun, Aug 06, 2006 at 11:59:42PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
  My thought was that if there are twice as many copies of you running in 
  parallel, 
  you are in a sense cramming twice as much experience into a given objective 
  time 
  period, so maybe this stretches out the time period to seem twice as 
  long. There 
  is admittedly no good reason to accept that this is so (that's why it's a 
  cracked 
  idea, as you say!), and I would bet that it *isn't* so, but it's the only 
  half-plausible 
  subjective effect I can think of due to change in measure alone.
  
  I believe that what you mean when you say that a lower measure OM will 
  appear 
  more complex is somewhat different to the scenario I had in mind: a 
  controlled 
  experiment in which measure can be turned up and down leaving everything 
  else 
  the same, such as having an AI running on several computers in perfect 
  lockstep. 
  (I realise this is not the same as changing measure in the multiverse, 
  which would 
  not lend itself so easily to experiment.) Would the AI notice anything if 
  half the 
  computers were turned off then on again? I think it would be impossible for 
  the AI 
  to notice that anything had changed without receiving external information. 
  If I 
  were the AI the only advantage I can think of in having multiple computers 
  running 
  is for backup in case some of them broke down; beyond that, I wouldn't care 
  if there 
  were one copy or a million copies of me running in parallel.
  
  Stathis Papaioannou 
 
 This thought experiment has been discussed a few times in this
 list. I agree with you that one wouldn't expect there to be any
 difference in subjective experience, but more than that wrt Bruno's
 work, assuming COMP  (which you have to anyway to consider the thought
 experiment), there is actually no way to change the measure of a
 particular computation - computations exist in Platonia wuth
 presumably some measure (measure is fixed in my approach by the
 actions of the observer, but others do not necessarily have an answer
 to what the measure is). That is why Bruno can eliminate the concrete
 universe hypothesis altogether.

Is it still correct to say that a computation running on two physical computers 
(that is, what 
we think of as physical computers, whatever the underlying reality may be) has 
almost twice 
the measure as it would have if it were running on one computer? Otherwise, 
there would 
be no point backing up anything, relying instead on Platonia's infinite hard 
disk.

Stathis Papaioannou
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RE: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees

2006-08-07 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

Bruno Marchal writes (quoting SP):

  ...a controlled
  experiment in which measure can be turned up and down leaving  
  everything else
  the same, such as having an AI running on several computers in perfect  
  lockstep.
 
 
 I think that the idea that a lower measure OM will appear more complex  
 is a consequence of Komogorov like ASSA theories (a-la Hal Finney,  
 Mallah, etc.). OK?

I understand the basic principle, but I have trouble getting my mind around 
the idea of defining a measure when every possible computation exists.

 
  (I realise this is not the same as changing measure in the multiverse,  
  which would
  not lend itself so easily to experiment.) Would the AI notice anything  
  if half the
  computers were turned off then on again? I think it would be  
  impossible for the AI
  to notice that anything had changed without receiving external  
  information.
 
 
 I agree from some 1 pov. But 1 plural pov here would lead to some Bell  
 inequalities violation. That is: sharable experiments which shows  
 indirectly the presence of some alternate computations.

I don't understand this statement. I am suggesting that the computers are 
running exactly the same program - same circuitry, same software, same 
initial conditions, all on a classical scale. I don't see that there is any way 
for the AI to know which computer he was running on (if that question is 
even meaningful) or how many computers were running.

  If I
  were the AI the only advantage I can think of in having multiple  
  computers running
  is for backup in case some of them broke down; beyond that, I wouldn't  
  care if there
  were one copy or a million copies of me running in parallel.
 
 Except, as I said above, for the relative probabilities. But this is  
 equivalent with accepting a well done back-up will not change your  
 normal measure.

Yes, I think what you mean by relative probabilities is that if there were 
several possible versions of me next moment, then I would be more likely 
to experience the one with higher measure. It is only relative to the other 
possibilities that measure makes a subjective difference.

Stathis Papaioannou
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RE: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees

2006-08-07 Thread W. C.

From: Stathis Papaioannou

...
Classical teleportation cannot copy something exact to the quantum level, 
but rather involves making a close enough copy. It is obvious, I think, 
that this is theoretically possible, but it is not immediately obvious how 
good the copy of a person would have to be (what Bruno calls the 
substitution level) in order to feel himself to be the same person. But 
as mentioned above, I don't think we need to insist on perfect duplication 
to the quantum level, because this doesn't even happen from moment to 
moment in everyday life.


Thanks for the info. although I still don't think substitution level exists.
If teleportation of human beings is real (I hope I can see it in my life),
I think all biggest questions (such as consciousness, soul? Creator? the 
origin of the universe, meaning of life ... etc.)
of this universe should have been solved.

Thanks.

WC..

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RE: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees

2006-08-06 Thread Stathis Papaioannou







 Date: Fri, 4 Aug 2006 19:17:21 +1000
 From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
 Subject: Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
 
 
 This is one of those truly cracked ideas that is not wise to air in
 polite company. Nevertheless, it can be fun to play around with in
 this forum. I had a similarly cracked idea a few years ago about 1st
 person experienced magic, which we batted around a bit at the tiome
 without getting anywhere.
 
 The trouble I have with this idea is that I can't see the connection
 between OM measure and the sensation of passage of time. In contrast
 to your statement of nothing however, a lower measure OM will appear
 more complex - so we experience growth in knowledge as our measure
 decreases. Increasing measure OM's will correspond to memory
 erasure, in the sense of quantum erasure.
 
 Cheers
 
 On Sat, Aug 05, 2006 at 10:44:49PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
  
  
  I have asked the question before, what do I experience if my measure 
  in the multiverse increases or decreases? My preferred answer, contra 
  the ASSA/ QTI skeptics, is nothing. However, the interesting observation 
  that our perception of time changes with age, so that an hour seems 
  subjectively much longer for a young child than for an older person, would 
  seem to correlate with decreasing measure as a person grows older. One 
  explanation for this could be that if there are more copies of us around 
  in the multiverse, we have more subjective experience per unit time. This 
  would mean that if we lived forever, the years then the centuries and 
  millenia 
  would fly past at a subjectively faster and faster rate as we age and our 
  measure continuously drops.
  
  I actually believe that a psychological explanation for this phenomenon is 
  more 
  likely correct (an hour is a greater proportion of your life if you are a 
  young child) 
  but it's an interesting idea.
  
  Stathis Papaioannou
  
  
   Date: Fri, 4 Aug 2006 02:10:53 +1000
   From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
   To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
   Subject: Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
   
   
   Someone called me to task for this posting (I forget who, and I've
   lost the posting now). I tried to formulate the notion I expressed
   here more precisely, and failed! So I never responded.
   
   What I had in mind was that future observer moment of my current one
   will at some point have a total measure diminishing at least as fast
   as an exponental function of OM age. This is simply a statement that
   it becomes increasingly improbable for humans to live longer than a
   certain age.
   
   Whilst individual OMs will have exponentially decreasing measure due
   to the linear increase in complexity as a function of universe age,
   total OM measure requires summing over all OMs of a given age (which
   can compensate). This total OM measure is a 3rd person type of
   quantity - equivalent to asking what is the probability of a conscious
   organism existing at universe age t. It seems plausible that this
   might diminish in some exponential or faster fashion after a few
   standard deviation beyond the mean time it takes to evolve
   consciousness, but I do not have any basis for making this claim. If
   we assume a normal distribution of times required for evolving
   consciousness, then the statement is true for example, but I'm wise
   enough to know that this assumption needs further justification. The
   distribution may be a meanless thing like a power law for example.
   
   So sorry if I piqued someones interest too much - but then we can leave
   this notion as a conjecture :)
   
   Cheers
   
   On Fri, Jul 28, 2006 at 12:07:37AM +1000, Russell Standish wrote:
Thanks for giving a digested explanation of the argument. This paper
was discussed briefly on A-Void a few weeks ago, but I must admit to
not following the argument too well, nor RTFA.

My comment on the observer moment issue, is that in a Multiverse, the
measure of older observer moments is less that younger ones. After a
certain point in time, the measure probably decreases exponentially or
faster, so there will be a mean observer moment age.

So contra all these old OMs dominating the calculation, and giving
rise to an expected value of Lambda close to zero, we should expect
only a finite contribution, leading to an expected finite value of
Lambda.

We don't know what the mean age for an observer moment should be, but
presumably one could argue anthropically that is around 10^{10}
years. What does this give for an expected value of Lambda?

Of course their argument does sound plausible for a single universe -
is this observational evidence in favour of a Multiverse?

Cheers
   
   -- 
   *PS: A number of people ask me

RE: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees

2006-08-06 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

Russell Standish writes:

 This is one of those truly cracked ideas that is not wise to air in
 polite company. Nevertheless, it can be fun to play around with in
 this forum. I had a similarly cracked idea a few years ago about 1st
 person experienced magic, which we batted around a bit at the tiome
 without getting anywhere.
 
 The trouble I have with this idea is that I can't see the connection
 between OM measure and the sensation of passage of time. In contrast
 to your statement of nothing however, a lower measure OM will appear
 more complex - so we experience growth in knowledge as our measure
 decreases. Increasing measure OM's will correspond to memory
 erasure, in the sense of quantum erasure.

My thought was that if there are twice as many copies of you running in 
parallel, 
you are in a sense cramming twice as much experience into a given objective 
time 
period, so maybe this stretches out the time period to seem twice as long. 
There 
is admittedly no good reason to accept that this is so (that's why it's a 
cracked 
idea, as you say!), and I would bet that it *isn't* so, but it's the only 
half-plausible 
subjective effect I can think of due to change in measure alone.

I believe that what you mean when you say that a lower measure OM will appear 
more complex is somewhat different to the scenario I had in mind: a controlled 
experiment in which measure can be turned up and down leaving everything else 
the same, such as having an AI running on several computers in perfect 
lockstep. 
(I realise this is not the same as changing measure in the multiverse, which 
would 
not lend itself so easily to experiment.) Would the AI notice anything if half 
the 
computers were turned off then on again? I think it would be impossible for the 
AI 
to notice that anything had changed without receiving external information. If 
I 
were the AI the only advantage I can think of in having multiple computers 
running 
is for backup in case some of them broke down; beyond that, I wouldn't care if 
there 
were one copy or a million copies of me running in parallel.

Stathis Papaioannou 
 
 On Sat, Aug 05, 2006 at 10:44:49PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
  
  
  I have asked the question before, what do I experience if my measure 
  in the multiverse increases or decreases? My preferred answer, contra 
  the ASSA/ QTI skeptics, is nothing. However, the interesting observation 
  that our perception of time changes with age, so that an hour seems 
  subjectively much longer for a young child than for an older person, would 
  seem to correlate with decreasing measure as a person grows older. One 
  explanation for this could be that if there are more copies of us around 
  in the multiverse, we have more subjective experience per unit time. This 
  would mean that if we lived forever, the years then the centuries and 
  millenia 
  would fly past at a subjectively faster and faster rate as we age and our 
  measure continuously drops.
  
  I actually believe that a psychological explanation for this phenomenon is 
  more 
  likely correct (an hour is a greater proportion of your life if you are a 
  young child) 
  but it's an interesting idea.
  
  Stathis Papaioannou
  
  
   Date: Fri, 4 Aug 2006 02:10:53 +1000
   From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
   To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
   Subject: Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
   
   
   Someone called me to task for this posting (I forget who, and I've
   lost the posting now). I tried to formulate the notion I expressed
   here more precisely, and failed! So I never responded.
   
   What I had in mind was that future observer moment of my current one
   will at some point have a total measure diminishing at least as fast
   as an exponental function of OM age. This is simply a statement that
   it becomes increasingly improbable for humans to live longer than a
   certain age.
   
   Whilst individual OMs will have exponentially decreasing measure due
   to the linear increase in complexity as a function of universe age,
   total OM measure requires summing over all OMs of a given age (which
   can compensate). This total OM measure is a 3rd person type of
   quantity - equivalent to asking what is the probability of a conscious
   organism existing at universe age t. It seems plausible that this
   might diminish in some exponential or faster fashion after a few
   standard deviation beyond the mean time it takes to evolve
   consciousness, but I do not have any basis for making this claim. If
   we assume a normal distribution of times required for evolving
   consciousness, then the statement is true for example, but I'm wise
   enough to know that this assumption needs further justification. The
   distribution may be a meanless thing like a power law for example.
   
   So sorry if I piqued someones interest too much - but then we can leave
   this notion as a conjecture

Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees

2006-08-06 Thread Russell Standish

On Sun, Aug 06, 2006 at 11:59:42PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
 My thought was that if there are twice as many copies of you running in 
 parallel, 
 you are in a sense cramming twice as much experience into a given objective 
 time 
 period, so maybe this stretches out the time period to seem twice as long. 
 There 
 is admittedly no good reason to accept that this is so (that's why it's a 
 cracked 
 idea, as you say!), and I would bet that it *isn't* so, but it's the only 
 half-plausible 
 subjective effect I can think of due to change in measure alone.
 
 I believe that what you mean when you say that a lower measure OM will appear 
 more complex is somewhat different to the scenario I had in mind: a 
 controlled 
 experiment in which measure can be turned up and down leaving everything else 
 the same, such as having an AI running on several computers in perfect 
 lockstep. 
 (I realise this is not the same as changing measure in the multiverse, which 
 would 
 not lend itself so easily to experiment.) Would the AI notice anything if 
 half the 
 computers were turned off then on again? I think it would be impossible for 
 the AI 
 to notice that anything had changed without receiving external information. 
 If I 
 were the AI the only advantage I can think of in having multiple computers 
 running 
 is for backup in case some of them broke down; beyond that, I wouldn't care 
 if there 
 were one copy or a million copies of me running in parallel.
 
 Stathis Papaioannou 

This thought experiment has been discussed a few times in this
list. I agree with you that one wouldn't expect there to be any
difference in subjective experience, but more than that wrt Bruno's
work, assuming COMP  (which you have to anyway to consider the thought
experiment), there is actually no way to change the measure of a
particular computation - computations exist in Platonia wuth
presumably some measure (measure is fixed in my approach by the
actions of the observer, but others do not necessarily have an answer
to what the measure is). That is why Bruno can eliminate the concrete
universe hypothesis altogether.

Cheers

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RE: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees

2006-08-06 Thread W. C.

From: Bruno Marchal
...
But it is easy to explain that this is already a simple consequence  of 
comp. Any piece of matter is the result of a sum on an infinity of  
interfering computations: there is no reason to expect this to be  
clonable without cloning the whole UD, but this would not change any  
internal measures (by Church thesis and machine independence).
...

I remember you said comp can be tested experimentally due to others 
consequences (like the observable interference among many computations, 
etc.).
Can you provide more details on how to do the experiment to see matter is 
the result of a sum on an infinity of  interfering computations???

Thanks.

WC.

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Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees

2006-08-05 Thread Russell Standish

Someone called me to task for this posting (I forget who, and I've
lost the posting now). I tried to formulate the notion I expressed
here more precisely, and failed! So I never responded.

What I had in mind was that future observer moment of my current one
will at some point have a total measure diminishing at least as fast
as an exponental function of OM age. This is simply a statement that
it becomes increasingly improbable for humans to live longer than a
certain age.

Whilst individual OMs will have exponentially decreasing measure due
to the linear increase in complexity as a function of universe age,
total OM measure requires summing over all OMs of a given age (which
can compensate). This total OM measure is a 3rd person type of
quantity - equivalent to asking what is the probability of a conscious
organism existing at universe age t. It seems plausible that this
might diminish in some exponential or faster fashion after a few
standard deviation beyond the mean time it takes to evolve
consciousness, but I do not have any basis for making this claim. If
we assume a normal distribution of times required for evolving
consciousness, then the statement is true for example, but I'm wise
enough to know that this assumption needs further justification. The
distribution may be a meanless thing like a power law for example.

So sorry if I piqued someones interest too much - but then we can leave
this notion as a conjecture :)

Cheers

On Fri, Jul 28, 2006 at 12:07:37AM +1000, Russell Standish wrote:
 Thanks for giving a digested explanation of the argument. This paper
 was discussed briefly on A-Void a few weeks ago, but I must admit to
 not following the argument too well, nor RTFA.
 
 My comment on the observer moment issue, is that in a Multiverse, the
 measure of older observer moments is less that younger ones. After a
 certain point in time, the measure probably decreases exponentially or
 faster, so there will be a mean observer moment age.
 
 So contra all these old OMs dominating the calculation, and giving
 rise to an expected value of Lambda close to zero, we should expect
 only a finite contribution, leading to an expected finite value of
 Lambda.
 
 We don't know what the mean age for an observer moment should be, but
 presumably one could argue anthropically that is around 10^{10}
 years. What does this give for an expected value of Lambda?
 
 Of course their argument does sound plausible for a single universe -
 is this observational evidence in favour of a Multiverse?
 
 Cheers

-- 
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is of type application/pgp-signature. Don't worry, it is not a
virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this
email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you
may safely ignore this attachment.


A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 8308 3119 (mobile)
Mathematics0425 253119 ()
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
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RE: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees

2006-08-05 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

CW writes:

 c) Accepting a) and b) you assume physical laws making time travel 
 possible (which is of course controversial;  this could be in principle 
 possible with very special assumption, which could also be false in 
 principle with other assumption).
 
 Time travel is as possible as teleportation of human beings.
 
 If you do theoretical reasonings you have to make clear the assumptions 
 which are making things possible in principle. Up to here, I can follow 
 you (I can imagine such fundamental assumptions).
 
 Of course, there are many details and assumptions to say PUA is possible.
 My point is that PUA is possible just like teleportation of human beings.
 I think they have similar possibility.

Not at all. There is a *huge* difference between what is possible in theory and 
what is possible practically. A person wearing down a mountain with his fingers 
is a practical impossibility, but there is nothing in the laws of physics 
making it a 
theoretical impossibility. A person flying to Alpha Centauri in 5 minutes is 
logically 
possible, but the laws of physics make it theoretically impossible. A person 
being 
simultaneously taller than 180cm and shorter than 170cm is a logical 
impossibility. 
These three examples for everyday purposes are equally unlikely to happen, but 
they are fundamentally different from a philosophical standpoint. In the case 
of 
classical teleportation, there is nothing in the laws of physics making it 
theoretically 
impossible, and it is certainly not logically impossible. Time travel is much 
more 
dubious: it may be a physical impossibility, and it may even be a logical 
impossibility.

Stathis Papaioannou
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RE: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees

2006-08-05 Thread W. C.

From: Stathis Papaioannou

Not at all. There is a *huge* difference between what is possible in theory 
and what is possible practically. A person wearing down a mountain with his 
fingers is a practical impossibility, but there is nothing in the laws of 
physics making it a theoretical impossibility. A person flying to Alpha 
Centauri in 5 minutes is logically possible, but the laws of physics make 
it theoretically impossible. A person being simultaneously taller than 
180cm and shorter than 170cm is a logical impossibility. These three 
examples for everyday purposes are equally unlikely to happen, but they are 
fundamentally different from a philosophical standpoint. In the case of 
classical teleportation, there is nothing in the laws of physics making it 
theoretically impossible, and it is certainly not logically impossible. 
Time travel is much more dubious: it may be a physical impossibility, and 
it may even be a logical impossibility.


Thank you for a very clear explanation of these 3 
theoretical/practical/logical possibility differences.
I remember I saw some papers before saying that time travel is theoretically 
possible, although it remains an open question.
It's like teleportation. Maybe you can demonstrate with 1 or 2 particles in 
QM.
But it's another very different thing when we are talking about human beings 
(or simple animals).
Maybe other very knowledgeable prof. (like scerir???) in this list can 
provide useful ref.

Thanks.

WC.

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Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees

2006-08-05 Thread Bruno Marchal


Le 04-août-06, à 15:18, W. C. a écrit :


 I remember other people mentioned before. *Normal* people can't accept 
 that
 there is no physical universe.
 Even Buddhists won't say that.


Sorry. I was short. All what I say is that IF we take the comp hyp 
seriously enough THEN we can see that physical is not a primitive 
things (this follows from the UD reasoning, you can ask question). I 
was meaning there is no primitive or substantial or primary 
physicalness. Naïve primitive Matter is a form of ether (assuming 
comp). On the contrary physics, as the science of observable patterns 
reemerge as a study of relative measure on computations (more exactly 
quotient of set of computations by a relation of undistinguishability 
related to person's point of view). Those are well defined through the 
Church thesis in computer science. Now the objective idealist (not 
solipsist) type of reality we are lead to from the comp assumption has 
been defended by many buddhist schools (mainly from the Mahayana), and 
has been more or less the orthodox way to consider reality during a 
millennium of greek philosophy/theology. You are right it hurts common 
sense.

The rest of your post has been well answered by Stathis and Quentin, 
imo. I have nothing to add.
Recall that nobody asks you to believe that comp is correct, just to 
assume it for the sake of the argument.

Bruno



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RE: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees

2006-08-05 Thread Stathis Papaioannou


I have asked the question before, what do I experience if my measure 
in the multiverse increases or decreases? My preferred answer, contra 
the ASSA/ QTI skeptics, is nothing. However, the interesting observation 
that our perception of time changes with age, so that an hour seems 
subjectively much longer for a young child than for an older person, would 
seem to correlate with decreasing measure as a person grows older. One 
explanation for this could be that if there are more copies of us around 
in the multiverse, we have more subjective experience per unit time. This 
would mean that if we lived forever, the years then the centuries and millenia 
would fly past at a subjectively faster and faster rate as we age and our 
measure continuously drops.

I actually believe that a psychological explanation for this phenomenon is more 
likely correct (an hour is a greater proportion of your life if you are a young 
child) 
but it's an interesting idea.

Stathis Papaioannou


 Date: Fri, 4 Aug 2006 02:10:53 +1000
 From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
 Subject: Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
 
 
 Someone called me to task for this posting (I forget who, and I've
 lost the posting now). I tried to formulate the notion I expressed
 here more precisely, and failed! So I never responded.
 
 What I had in mind was that future observer moment of my current one
 will at some point have a total measure diminishing at least as fast
 as an exponental function of OM age. This is simply a statement that
 it becomes increasingly improbable for humans to live longer than a
 certain age.
 
 Whilst individual OMs will have exponentially decreasing measure due
 to the linear increase in complexity as a function of universe age,
 total OM measure requires summing over all OMs of a given age (which
 can compensate). This total OM measure is a 3rd person type of
 quantity - equivalent to asking what is the probability of a conscious
 organism existing at universe age t. It seems plausible that this
 might diminish in some exponential or faster fashion after a few
 standard deviation beyond the mean time it takes to evolve
 consciousness, but I do not have any basis for making this claim. If
 we assume a normal distribution of times required for evolving
 consciousness, then the statement is true for example, but I'm wise
 enough to know that this assumption needs further justification. The
 distribution may be a meanless thing like a power law for example.
 
 So sorry if I piqued someones interest too much - but then we can leave
 this notion as a conjecture :)
 
 Cheers
 
 On Fri, Jul 28, 2006 at 12:07:37AM +1000, Russell Standish wrote:
  Thanks for giving a digested explanation of the argument. This paper
  was discussed briefly on A-Void a few weeks ago, but I must admit to
  not following the argument too well, nor RTFA.
  
  My comment on the observer moment issue, is that in a Multiverse, the
  measure of older observer moments is less that younger ones. After a
  certain point in time, the measure probably decreases exponentially or
  faster, so there will be a mean observer moment age.
  
  So contra all these old OMs dominating the calculation, and giving
  rise to an expected value of Lambda close to zero, we should expect
  only a finite contribution, leading to an expected finite value of
  Lambda.
  
  We don't know what the mean age for an observer moment should be, but
  presumably one could argue anthropically that is around 10^{10}
  years. What does this give for an expected value of Lambda?
  
  Of course their argument does sound plausible for a single universe -
  is this observational evidence in favour of a Multiverse?
  
  Cheers
 
 -- 
 *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which
 is of type application/pgp-signature. Don't worry, it is not a
 virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this
 email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you
 may safely ignore this attachment.
 
 
 A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 8308 3119 (mobile)
 Mathematics  0425 253119 ()
 UNSW SYDNEY 2052   [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
 Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
 International prefix  +612, Interstate prefix 02
 
 
 
  

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RE: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees

2006-08-05 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

CW writes:

 It's like teleportation. Maybe you can demonstrate with 1 or 2 particles in 
 QM.
 But it's another very different thing when we are talking about human beings 
 (or simple animals).
 Maybe other very knowledgeable prof. (like scerir???) in this list can 
 provide useful ref.

There is a distinction between quantum teleportation and classical 
teleportation. 
Quantum teleportation involves transmitting the exact quantum state of an entity
and has actually been demonstrated experimentally with handfuls of particles in 
the past decade. Here is reasonably simple summary: 

http://www.research.ibm.com/quantuminfo/teleportation/

The cited article states that for reasons of *engineering* difficulty we won't 
be 
teleporting people around in the near future, but there is no theoretical 
reason 
why it couldn't eventually be done. A person who quantum teleports from A to 
B would arrive at B in an *identical* physical state, which is actually more 
than 
can be said if he had walked, since our quantum state changes every moment. 
So, if we remain the same person when walking, we should remain the same 
person when quantum teleporting. It is theoretically possible that there is 
some 
non-physical factor necessary for consciousness which does not survive perfect 
physical duplication but there is no reason whatsoever to believe this. It 
would be 
like saying that there is some non-physical factor in my computer, and a 
perfect 
physical copy of it would not be functionally equivalent because it would lack 
this 
factor.

Classical teleportation cannot copy something exact to the quantum level, but 
rather involves making a close enough copy. It is obvious, I think, that this 
is 
theoretically possible, but it is not immediately obvious how good the copy of 
a 
person would have to be (what Bruno calls the substitution level) in order to 
feel himself to be the same person. But as mentioned above, I don't think we 
need to insist on perfect duplication to the quantum level, because this 
doesn't 
even happen from moment to moment in everyday life.

Stathis Papaioannou
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Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees

2006-08-05 Thread Bruno Marchal

Hi Stathis,

I agree with what you say. Note that quantum information is very  
different from classical information. Quantum information in general  
cannot be copied or cloned, so that there is no relative local back-up  
possible. That is why in quantum teleportation, the annihilation of the  
original is unavoidable.

But it is easy to explain that this is already a simple consequence  
of comp. Any piece of matter is the result of a sum on an infinity of  
interfering computations: there is no reason to expect this to be  
clonable without cloning the whole UD, but this would not change any  
internal measures (by Church thesis and machine independence).

Of course we can prepare quantum identical states, as the UD cannot not  
emulates them all, or their rational approximations, which by linearity  
of the quantum laws, are enough (from the 1-person point of view).

QM explains well how bits emerge from qubits, but comp promises a  
reversed transformation: how qubits are necessarily dreamed by bits.

Bruno



Le 05-août-06, à 15:34, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :


 CW writes:

 It's like teleportation. Maybe you can demonstrate with 1 or 2  
 particles in
 QM.
 But it's another very different thing when we are talking about human  
 beings
 (or simple animals).
 Maybe other very knowledgeable prof. (like scerir???) in this list  
 can
 provide useful ref.

 There is a distinction between quantum teleportation and classical  
 teleportation.
 Quantum teleportation involves transmitting the exact quantum state of  
 an entity
 and has actually been demonstrated experimentally with handfuls of  
 particles in
 the past decade. Here is reasonably simple summary:

 http://www.research.ibm.com/quantuminfo/teleportation/

 The cited article states that for reasons of *engineering* difficulty  
 we won't be
 teleporting people around in the near future, but there is no  
 theoretical reason
 why it couldn't eventually be done. A person who quantum teleports  
 from A to
 B would arrive at B in an *identical* physical state, which is  
 actually more than
 can be said if he had walked, since our quantum state changes every  
 moment.
 So, if we remain the same person when walking, we should remain the  
 same
 person when quantum teleporting. It is theoretically possible that  
 there is some
 non-physical factor necessary for consciousness which does not survive  
 perfect
 physical duplication but there is no reason whatsoever to believe  
 this. It would be
 like saying that there is some non-physical factor in my computer, and  
 a perfect
 physical copy of it would not be functionally equivalent because it  
 would lack this
 factor.

 Classical teleportation cannot copy something exact to the quantum  
 level, but
 rather involves making a close enough copy. It is obvious, I think,  
 that this is
 theoretically possible, but it is not immediately obvious how good the  
 copy of a
 person would have to be (what Bruno calls the substitution level) in  
 order to
 feel himself to be the same person. But as mentioned above, I don't  
 think we
 need to insist on perfect duplication to the quantum level, because  
 this doesn't
 even happen from moment to moment in everyday life.

 Stathis Papaioannou
 _
 Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail.
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 -9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d
 

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Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees

2006-08-05 Thread Russell Standish

This is one of those truly cracked ideas that is not wise to air in
polite company. Nevertheless, it can be fun to play around with in
this forum. I had a similarly cracked idea a few years ago about 1st
person experienced magic, which we batted around a bit at the tiome
without getting anywhere.

The trouble I have with this idea is that I can't see the connection
between OM measure and the sensation of passage of time. In contrast
to your statement of nothing however, a lower measure OM will appear
more complex - so we experience growth in knowledge as our measure
decreases. Increasing measure OM's will correspond to memory
erasure, in the sense of quantum erasure.

Cheers

On Sat, Aug 05, 2006 at 10:44:49PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
 
 
 I have asked the question before, what do I experience if my measure 
 in the multiverse increases or decreases? My preferred answer, contra 
 the ASSA/ QTI skeptics, is nothing. However, the interesting observation 
 that our perception of time changes with age, so that an hour seems 
 subjectively much longer for a young child than for an older person, would 
 seem to correlate with decreasing measure as a person grows older. One 
 explanation for this could be that if there are more copies of us around 
 in the multiverse, we have more subjective experience per unit time. This 
 would mean that if we lived forever, the years then the centuries and 
 millenia 
 would fly past at a subjectively faster and faster rate as we age and our 
 measure continuously drops.
 
 I actually believe that a psychological explanation for this phenomenon is 
 more 
 likely correct (an hour is a greater proportion of your life if you are a 
 young child) 
 but it's an interesting idea.
 
 Stathis Papaioannou
 
 
  Date: Fri, 4 Aug 2006 02:10:53 +1000
  From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
  To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
  Subject: Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
  
  
  Someone called me to task for this posting (I forget who, and I've
  lost the posting now). I tried to formulate the notion I expressed
  here more precisely, and failed! So I never responded.
  
  What I had in mind was that future observer moment of my current one
  will at some point have a total measure diminishing at least as fast
  as an exponental function of OM age. This is simply a statement that
  it becomes increasingly improbable for humans to live longer than a
  certain age.
  
  Whilst individual OMs will have exponentially decreasing measure due
  to the linear increase in complexity as a function of universe age,
  total OM measure requires summing over all OMs of a given age (which
  can compensate). This total OM measure is a 3rd person type of
  quantity - equivalent to asking what is the probability of a conscious
  organism existing at universe age t. It seems plausible that this
  might diminish in some exponential or faster fashion after a few
  standard deviation beyond the mean time it takes to evolve
  consciousness, but I do not have any basis for making this claim. If
  we assume a normal distribution of times required for evolving
  consciousness, then the statement is true for example, but I'm wise
  enough to know that this assumption needs further justification. The
  distribution may be a meanless thing like a power law for example.
  
  So sorry if I piqued someones interest too much - but then we can leave
  this notion as a conjecture :)
  
  Cheers
  
  On Fri, Jul 28, 2006 at 12:07:37AM +1000, Russell Standish wrote:
   Thanks for giving a digested explanation of the argument. This paper
   was discussed briefly on A-Void a few weeks ago, but I must admit to
   not following the argument too well, nor RTFA.
   
   My comment on the observer moment issue, is that in a Multiverse, the
   measure of older observer moments is less that younger ones. After a
   certain point in time, the measure probably decreases exponentially or
   faster, so there will be a mean observer moment age.
   
   So contra all these old OMs dominating the calculation, and giving
   rise to an expected value of Lambda close to zero, we should expect
   only a finite contribution, leading to an expected finite value of
   Lambda.
   
   We don't know what the mean age for an observer moment should be, but
   presumably one could argue anthropically that is around 10^{10}
   years. What does this give for an expected value of Lambda?
   
   Of course their argument does sound plausible for a single universe -
   is this observational evidence in favour of a Multiverse?
   
   Cheers
  
  -- 
  *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which
  is of type application/pgp-signature. Don't worry, it is not a
  virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this
  email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you
  may safely ignore this attachment

RE: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees

2006-08-04 Thread W. C.

From: Bruno Marchal
All we need to *reason* for getting consequence of comp is that such 
substitution is *in principle* possible. Theoreticians does that, in many  
fields. I insist that the UDA (Universal Dovetailer Argument) is based on 
the notion of generalized brain: you could say that your brain in the 
entire galaxy. By comp this entails the entire galaxy is turing emulable, 
then, this is enough to say the platonic UD will go through your 
generalized brain soon or later (in term of number of steps), and that is 
enough to understand that comp makes obligatory that the laws of physics 
emerge from the relation existing among numbers (that + other steps of the 
reasoning of course). The impracticality of substitution is just not 
relevant to throw out the theoretical consequences. Then comp can be tested 
experimentally due to others consequences (like the observable interference 
among many computations, etc.). OK?

I have an idea (or dream) for some time. Let's call it the perfect universe 
argument (PUA).
The purpose of PUA is to produce a perfect universe (a perfect world without 
any crimes, any bad things, any natural disasters ... etc.).
It's as follows:
(1) I teleport myself to the origin of the universe.
(2) I adjust some parameters of the universe. (This is like adjusting some 
parameters in a modern PC program
so that you can get the perfect result when running the program.)
(3) The adjustment changes the whole universe immediately and the universe 
becomes perfect.
PUA is possible in principle, right? Does it agree to Comp. and UDA?

From: Stathis Papaioannou
Do you believe that IF you vanished at point A and a copy of you created at 
point B who was physically and mentally similar to the original to the same 
extent as if you had walked from A to B you would have survived? If you 
answer no then you are opening yourself up to the possibility that would 
not survive the walk either. If you argue that the copy might be 
physiacally the same but mentally different then you are saying there is 
some non-physical basis to identity which survives walking but not 
teleportation, which I suppose is possible, but there is no reason to 
believe that such a strange thing would or could have evolved.

I can't compare teleportation of human beings with walking since 
teleportation is still a fiction now.
It's also unknown if there is something non-physical in human (or living) 
beings.

Thanks.

WC.

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RE: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees

2006-08-04 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

CW writes:

 From: Stathis Papaioannou
 Do you believe that IF you vanished at point A and a copy of you created at 
 point B who was physically and mentally similar to the original to the same 
 extent as if you had walked from A to B you would have survived? If you 
 answer no then you are opening yourself up to the possibility that would 
 not survive the walk either. If you argue that the copy might be 
 physiacally the same but mentally different then you are saying there is 
 some non-physical basis to identity which survives walking but not 
 teleportation, which I suppose is possible, but there is no reason to 
 believe that such a strange thing would or could have evolved.
 
 I can't compare teleportation of human beings with walking since 
 teleportation is still a fiction now.
 It's also unknown if there is something non-physical in human (or living) 
 beings.

Yes, but it's still possible to imagine what would happen *if* something were 
done that at the moment seems impossible. If sodium chloride were produced 
by a machine which causes the transmutation of hydrogen into other elements, 
would it still taste salty? I would say that the answer is of course, whether 
or 
not such a machine could ever be built. I don't even see how it is *logically* 
possible that pure NaCl could taste different depending on where it came from.

Stathis Papaioannou
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Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees

2006-08-04 Thread Bruno Marchal


Le 04-août-06, à 08:03, W. C. a écrit :


 From: Bruno Marchal
 All we need to *reason* for getting consequence of comp is that such
 substitution is *in principle* possible. Theoreticians does that, in 
 many 
 fields. I insist that the UDA (Universal Dovetailer Argument) is 
 based on
 the notion of generalized brain: you could say that your brain in the
 entire galaxy. By comp this entails the entire galaxy is turing 
 emulable,
 then, this is enough to say the platonic UD will go through your
 generalized brain soon or later (in term of number of steps), and 
 that is
 enough to understand that comp makes obligatory that the laws of 
 physics
 emerge from the relation existing among numbers (that + other steps 
 of the
 reasoning of course). The impracticality of substitution is just not
 relevant to throw out the theoretical consequences. Then comp can be 
 tested
 experimentally due to others consequences (like the observable 
 interference
 among many computations, etc.). OK?

 I have an idea (or dream) for some time. Let's call it the perfect 
 universe
 argument (PUA).
 The purpose of PUA is to produce a perfect universe (a perfect world 
 without
 any crimes, any bad things, any natural disasters ... etc.).
 It's as follows:
 (1) I teleport myself to the origin of the universe.


Are you sure that this is possible, even just in principle? Actually, 
just to show me that it could be possible in principle you have to give 
me your fundamental assumptions. Actually it looks like you are 
assuming the following:
a) there is a physical universe (well, with comp this is already 
impossible)
b) accepting a) you assume that that universe has an origin (this 
would be impossible even in principle in case there is no origin)
c) Accepting a) and b) you assume physical laws making time 
travel possible (which is of course controversial;  this could be in 
principle possible with very special assumption, which could also be 
false in principle with other assumption).
If you do theoretical reasonings you have to make clear the assumptions 
which are making things possible in principle. Up to here, I can 
follow you (I can imagine such fundamental assumptions).



 (2) I adjust some parameters of the universe. (This is like adjusting 
 some
 parameters in a modern PC program
 so that you can get the perfect result when running the program.)
 (3) The adjustment changes the whole universe immediately and the 
 universe
 becomes perfect.

Your 2 and 3 are unfortunately definitely impossible with comp 
without deciding your PU (your Perfect Universe) being trivial. This is 
not obvious (but follows from diagonalization similar to those I have 
already illustrated). Let me just say that it can be shown that if you 
want your PU enough rich for Universal machine to appear, then you 
cannot, even in principle, filter those bad machines will easily 
makes your PU unperfect.


 PUA is possible in principle, right? Does it agree to Comp. and UDA?

So the PUA *is* incompatible with comp. The most basic contradiction is 
given by the consequence of the UDA: there is no physical universe: 
only computations/dreams some of which coheres so as to provides 
local first person plural notion supervening on them. But even in the 
case those coherence would define for all practical purposes a 
physical universe, and even if it has some sort of physical origin 
and you can teleport yourself to its origin, the laws of computer 
science will eventually prevent you of reprogramming the universe to 
satisfy your goal of making it perfect.

Now, honestly this is a good news. Perfection is a virtue, and comp 
makes it impossible to define any virtue from inside the universe, 
and this saves our freeness, and explains why even Gods cannot conceive 
sufficiently rich universe with build-in perfection.



 From: Stathis Papaioannou
 Do you believe that IF you vanished at point A and a copy of you 
 created at
 point B who was physically and mentally similar to the original to 
 the same
 extent as if you had walked from A to B you would have survived? If 
 you
 answer no then you are opening yourself up to the possibility that 
 would
 not survive the walk either. If you argue that the copy might be
 physiacally the same but mentally different then you are saying there 
 is
 some non-physical basis to identity which survives walking but not
 teleportation, which I suppose is possible, but there is no reason to
 believe that such a strange thing would or could have evolved.

 I can't compare teleportation of human beings with walking since
 teleportation is still a fiction now.


But classical teleportation is possible in principle once we assume 
comp. Now I don't want to argue for comp, but there is no contradiction 
between comp and any known facts. To be sure I did believe in non-comp 
at the time I thought that classical mechanics was valid, but the 
quantum kills all the non-comp aspect of physics, until now.



 It's also unknown 

RE: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees

2006-08-04 Thread W. C.

From: Bruno Marchal
Are you sure that this is possible, even just in principle? Actually, just 
to show me that it could be possible in principle you have to give me your 
fundamental assumptions. Actually it looks like you are assuming the 
following:
a) there is a physical universe (well, with comp this is already 
impossible)

I remember other people mentioned before. *Normal* people can't accept that 
there is no physical universe.
Even Buddhists won't say that.

b) accepting a) you assume that that universe has an origin (this would 
be impossible even in principle in case there is no origin)

Just like everything, it's more reasonable that there was an origin than no 
origin, even for the universe.

c) Accepting a) and b) you assume physical laws making time travel 
possible (which is of course controversial;  this could be in principle 
possible with very special assumption, which could also be false in 
principle with other assumption).

Time travel is as possible as teleportation of human beings.

If you do theoretical reasonings you have to make clear the assumptions 
which are making things possible in principle. Up to here, I can follow 
you (I can imagine such fundamental assumptions).

Of course, there are many details and assumptions to say PUA is possible.
My point is that PUA is possible just like teleportation of human beings.
I think they have similar possibility.

Your 2 and 3 are unfortunately definitely impossible with comp without 
deciding your PU (your Perfect Universe) being trivial. This is not obvious 
(but follows from diagonalization similar to those I have already 
illustrated). Let me just say that it can be shown that if you want your PU 
enough rich for Universal machine to appear, then you cannot, even in 
principle, filter those bad machines will easily makes your PU unperfect.

Just like I can make a PC program running perfectly. I don't see why *this* 
universe can't be perfect.

So the PUA *is* incompatible with comp. The most basic contradiction is 
given by the consequence of the UDA: there is no physical universe: only 
computations/dreams some of which coheres so as to provides local first 
person plural notion supervening on them. But even in the case those 
coherence would define for all practical purposes a physical universe, 
and even if it has some sort of physical origin and you can teleport 
yourself to its origin, the laws of computer science will eventually 
prevent you of reprogramming the universe to satisfy your goal of making 
it perfect.

Which laws of computer science? My computer science says I can make a 
perfect program.

From: Stathis Papaioannou
Yes, but it's still possible to imagine what would happen *if* something 
were done that at the moment seems impossible. If sodium chloride were 
produced by a machine which causes the transmutation of hydrogen into other 
elements, would it still taste salty? I would say that the answer is of 
course, whether or not such a machine could ever be built. I don't even 
see how it is *logically* possible that pure NaCl could taste different 
depending on where it came from.

I still can't compare teleportation of human beings with NaCl. Too far away!

Thanks.

WC.

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Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees

2006-08-03 Thread Bruno Marchal

Le 02-août-06, à 10:20, C. W. a écrit :

Hi, Bruno,

Sorry for my na鴳e question.
Common people would think that UDA is just imagination since you use the 
teleportation
example and teleportation of human beings is still a science fiction.
Nobody can show that the substitution level really exists and teleportation 
of human beings is really workable.
I really wonder if it's OK to use teleportation as thought experiment.


All we need to *reason* for getting consequence of comp is that such substitution is *in principle* possible. Theoreticians does that, in many fields.
I insist that the UDA (Universal Dovetailer Argument) is based on the notion of generalized brain: you could say that your brain in the entire galaxy. By comp this entails the entire galaxy is turing emulable, then, this is enough to say the platonic UD will go through your generalized brain soon or later (in term of number of steps), and that is enough to understand that comp makes obligatory that the laws of physics emerge from the relation existing among numbers (that + other steps of the reasoning of course).
The impracticality of substitution is just not relevant to throw out the theoretical consequences. 
Then comp can be tested experimentally due to others consequences (like the observable interference among many computations, etc.). OK?

Bruno

PS (I am alas again busy. Please be patient for the replies).

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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RE: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees

2006-08-03 Thread Stathis Papaioannou



CW writes:

 Hi, Bruno,
 
 Sorry for my na鴳e question.
 Common people would think that UDA is just imagination since you use the 
 teleportation
 example and teleportation of human beings is still a science fiction.
 Nobody can show that the substitution level really exists and teleportation 
 of human beings is really workable.
 I really wonder if it's OK to use teleportation as thought experiment.

Do you believe that IF you vanished at point A and a copy of you created 
at point B who was physically and mentally similar to the original to the same 
extent as if you had walked from A to B you would have survived? If you 
answer no then you are opening yourself up to the possibility that would 
not survive the walk either. If you argue that the copy might be physiacally 
the same but mentally different then you are saying there is some 
non-physical basis to identity which survives walking but not teleportation, 
which I suppose is possible, but there is no reason to believe that such a 
strange thing would or could have evolved. 

Stathis Papaioannou
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Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees

2006-08-02 Thread C. W.

Hi, Bruno,

Sorry for my na鴳e question.
Common people would think that UDA is just imagination since you use the 
teleportation
example and teleportation of human beings is still a science fiction.
Nobody can show that the substitution level really exists and teleportation 
of human beings is really workable.
I really wonder if it's OK to use teleportation as thought experiment.

Thanks.

WC.

-Original Message-
From: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Bruno Marchal
Sent: Friday, July 28, 2006 5:38 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees

Le 26-juil.-06, ?13:34, Russell Standish wrote :


 Yes, although you do have a different perception of theology to Rees,
 and indeed practically all other scientists I know of. I won't comment
 on theologians of course, I don't really know any all that well.

 Not to say your perception is wrong, but it will take a Herculean
 effort to get other to think along your lines.

All what I say is that IF we assume the Comp Hypothesis then there is 
no choice in the matter.
I have already done the Herculean effort under the UDA. I don't think 
there is problem with that. Even in this list, if you look carefully, 
critics always converge toward a critics of COMP, not of the reasoning. 
I would say in the average 50% of those who really doesn't like the 
idea of the reversal Physics/psycho-bio-theo-logy-number-theory will 
criticize the yes doctor or the Arithmetical realism (until they see 
what I mean by it). I have never met a critics of Church thesis, except 
the physicalist reinterpretation done by David Deutsch (which does not 
work).
...
...
...

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Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees

2006-07-28 Thread Bruno Marchal


Le 26-juil.-06, à 13:34, Russell Standish wrote :


 Yes, although you do have a different perception of theology to Rees,
 and indeed practically all other scientists I know of. I won't comment
 on theologians of course, I don't really know any all that well.

 Not to say your perception is wrong, but it will take a Herculean
 effort to get other to think along your lines.


All what I say is that IF we assume the Comp Hypothesis then there is 
no choice in the matter.
I have already done the Herculean effort under the UDA. I don't think 
there is problem with that. Even in this list, if you look carefully, 
critics always converge toward a critics of COMP, not of the reasoning. 
I would say in the average 50% of those who really doesn't like the 
idea of the reversal Physics/psycho-bio-theo-logy-number-theory will 
criticize the yes doctor or the Arithmetical realism (until they see 
what I mean by it). I have never met a critics of Church thesis, except 
the physicalist reinterpretation done by David Deutsch (which does not 
work).

Let me quote Danny who send this message sometime ago, + an answer I 
wrote at that time but never send, and which can give clue why the 
reversal will ndeed take time to be swallowed. In one word: it is just 
that theology is a taboo field since the Roman made theology reserved 
for political purposes. Dogmatic Materialist and Atheist has always 
benefit of this by an apparent reaction which really goes in the same 
Aristotelian direction.


Danny wrote (some times ago):

  I doubt Marchal's ideas will be made widely known or popularized in 
 the foreseeable future.  The problem isn't with the name of his 
 theory, or with any problem with Bruno per se beyond this:  There 
 doesn't seem to be an easily reducible way to summarize the theory in 
 a manner that is digestible to anyone beyond the highly specialized in 
 similar fields.  I certainly understand the basics of some of his 
 ideas, but when it gets into all his logical analysis I just have 
 never found myself willing to devote myself to the time required to 
 really get into the detail of where he is coming from.  And I would 
 consider myself highly interested in these topics and at least 
 reasonably intelligent.

  Even something as mundane as the MWI (to this group at least) runs 
 into a brickwall when presented to the layperson.  You should see the 
 conversations I have with my wife.  Tell people everything is made of 
 strings.  Or space and time can be warped and curved.  They may not 
 understand the science and math behind it at all, but at least you are 
 speaking their language. 

  The world is not ready for his ideas.  Even for the most part the 
 world of scientists in my opinion. 

An old attempt toward an answer:




Let us go back at the eve of humanity ...

Since humans are humans, mainly two very opposite ways to handle 
fundamental questions has been developed. Note that ten thousand 
intermediate positions between those two ways exists.

Those two ways are:

1) Close your eyes, and think.
2) Open your eyes, and think.

We could call the first way the mystical way, and the second the 
empirical way. Unfortunately today we are living with some prejudices, 
and many scientist would say that the mystical way are unscientific 
and that only the empirical way would be scientific.
Personally I doubt very much that such a separation should be done 
there. Empirist can be as irrational as some mystics can be. And 
history tells us that mysticism can lead to rationalism. Indeed,  in 
our civilization mystical rationalism has lead to about one millenium 
of *rational* mysticism or rational theology from Pythagoras to 
Proclus: it can be called platonism. The main gift of that rational 
mysticism (platonism) has been the *science* of mathematics (as opposed 
as its art and technic which Pythagoras knew by its many travels in the 
east and south).
Today 1) is close to the theoretical minded mind, and 2) is close 
to the experimentalist minded mind, and I don't think it would be an 
exaggeration to say everybody believes science has developed through a 
perpetuating back and forth between both theories and experimentations.
And a darwinist could add that we have now empirical reasons to believe 
that such a back and forth between theory/representation and 
experiment/practice has begun well before humanity. Our evolved genome 
and brain is already reflecting the presence of build-in theories 
(innate ideas) an trials.

Nevertheless, although locally 1) and 2) are both necessary for 
surviving, it seems to me that at a deeper level, with respect to the 
fundamental inquiries, the difference between 1) and 2) cannot been 
neglected. The difference culminated through the work of Plato and 
Aristotle with their very different conceptions of reality.

For Plato (and many eastern researchers) , grosso modo, reality should 
explain what we see without taking it for granted. In particular matter 
and nature are 

Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees

2006-07-28 Thread Hal Finney

Russell Standish writes, regarding http://arxiv.org/abs/astro-ph/0607227 :

 Thanks for giving a digested explanation of the argument. This paper
 was discussed briefly on A-Void a few weeks ago, but I must admit to
 not following the argument too well, nor RTFA.

 My comment on the observer moment issue, is that in a Multiverse, the
 measure of older observer moments is less that younger ones. After a
 certain point in time, the measure probably decreases exponentially or
 faster, so there will be a mean observer moment age.

I had a similar thought. I am curious to know your reasoning or
justification for why this should be true.

I have not read the papers referenced by this one, but the authors allude
to previous work: Given some a priori distribution of the values of
the fundamental constants across the ensemble, the probability for a
'typical' obserer to measure a certain value of one or more of these
constants is usually taken to be proportional to the number of observers
(or the number of observers per baryon).

It is this last parenthetical comment I found interesting.  Apparently
there has been a difference in previous work about whether the measure
should be proportional to observers vs observers per baryon.  Consider
two cases: one observer in a universe of a given size, or one observer
in a universe twice that big.  These would be considered the same by a
number-of-observers measure, but the first would have twice the measure
if it was observers per baryon.

I argued some time past, based on some hand-wavey arguments, that the
latter measure is better - we attribute a portion of a universe's measure
to an observer, proportional to the fraction of the universe that the
observer takes up.  This came from the UDASSA concept I was describing
in detail last year.  It amounts to the observers-per-baryon measure.
It's interesting that physicists have considered a similar idea.

In terms of time, like Russell I would say that ancient observer-moments
should get less measure than early ones, for the same basic reason -
it takes more information to specify the location of the physical
system that instantiates the OM within the universe.  My reasoning
though would imply that measure should be inversely proportional to
age, rather than Russell's suggestion of an exponential decay.  So I am
curious where he got that.  I could describe my reasoning in more detail
if there is interest.

 So contra all these old OMs dominating the calculation, and giving
 rise to an expected value of Lambda close to zero, we should expect
 only a finite contribution, leading to an expected finite value of
 Lambda.

 We don't know what the mean age for an observer moment should be, but
 presumably one could argue anthropically that is around 10^{10}
 years. What does this give for an expected value of Lambda?

I don't know if I know enough physics to figure that out.  I'll take
another look at the paper.

I see that I misstated the reason why the CC limits observation.
It's not that the universe becomes uninhabitable.  Rather, computation
and observation is assumed to be proportional to internal energy divided
by external universe temperature.  It turns out that the optimal strategy
is to accumulate and store up as much energy as you can, as the universe
expands and cools.  Then, when the universe is all cooled down, you go
ahead and do all your observations and calculations.

In a universe with a high CC, you can't accumulate as much energy,
because it expands more quickly and hence mass-energy thins out faster.
It cools down sooner and you don't have as much stored up at that time,
so you can't do as much.

So what we would have to say is that that strategy is no longer optimal
because such distant observer-moments will have low measure, and we care
more about OMs which have high measure.  (I admit that few people take
the idea seriously that seemingly undetectable OM measure changes should
matter, but I can assume that this is a super-advanced civilization and
everyone is smart, so of course they will agree with me!)

Instead, the optimal strategy maximizes the total measure of OM-
computations, and that requires doing more computations early.  OTOH,
it is more efficient to wait until the universe is cooler, we can do more
computing with the same amount of energy.  Maximizing the product of these
two effects would require a detailed model for how quickly measure decays
with time.  (We'd also have to consider whether measure should change with
temperature, which it might in my model, I have to think about it more.)

 Of course their argument does sound plausible for a single universe -
 is this observational evidence in favour of a Multiverse?

I think what you're saying is that if this is the only universe, and if
civilizations adopt the strategies advocated in this paper, then most
OMs will be far in the future, hence by the ASSA we are unlikely to be
experiencing present-day OMs.  This was the basic concept of a paper 

Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees

2006-07-27 Thread Hal Finney

Saibal Mitra writes:
 From: Hal Finney [EMAIL PROTECTED]
  The real problem is not just that it is a philosophical speculation,
  it is that it does not lead to any testable physical predictions.
  The string theory landscape, even if finite, is far too large for
  systematic exploration.  Our ideas, with an infinite number of possible
  universes, are even worse.

 I'm not so sure that our ideas are worse.

I should clarify, I meant that our ideas are even worse in terms of
systematic exploration of all the possibilities, because we generally
consider an infinity of possible universes, while the string theory
landscape predicts (some people say) about 10^500 possible universes.

 If you read some recent articles,
 e.g.:

 http://arxiv.org/abs/astro-ph/0607227

 you see that they haven't really formulated rigorous theories about measure,
 probabilities etc. of the multiverse. It's still very much in the
 handwaving stage.

This is actually a very interesting paper, by Starkman and Trotta.  I had
seen some mention of it but hadn't tracked it down.  Here is the abstract:

We revisit anthropic arguments purporting to explain the measured value
of the cosmological constant. We argue that different ways of assigning
probabilities to candidate universes lead to totally different anthropic
predictions. As an explicit example, we show that weighting different
universes by the total number of possible observations leads to an
extremely small probability for observing a value of Lambda equal to or
greater than what we now measure. We conclude that anthropic reasoning
within the framework of probability as frequency is ill-defined and
that it cannot be used to explain the value of Lambda, nor, likely,
any other physical parameters.

The paper is pretty technical but I thought I could understand the gist
of it.  The cosmological constant (Lambda) is a repulsive force which
drives galaxies apart in the Big Bang model.  Until a few years ago it was
thought to be entirely theoretical, but since then observations indicate
that it is real, and that the universal expansion is accelerating.
The question then becomes what would happen in universes with different
values of the CC.

The paper basically shows that observers (or civilizations) can last
longer in universes with smaller CC's.  The CC eventually puts an end
to the observations that can be made, because the expansion gets too
fast and there is no longer enough energy density.  The higher the CC,
the sooner this happens.  With CC's as high as what we observe, the
theoretical lifetime of civilization is much shorter than in universes
with smaller CC's.

The authors choose to use as their measure, the number of times the
CC can be measured in a given universe.  This makes low-CC universes
have a much higher measure, because the window for CC observations is
longer in those.  Hence they conclude that the highest probability is
for a CC much smaller than we observe, and so our own CC value cannot
be explained anthropically.

This is in contrast to earlier results which used different measures, such
as the number of galaxies, and found that our CC results were consistent
with anthropic considerations.  The authors argue that their measure is
at least as philosphically justifiable as those earlier papers, and their
real point is that no measure can be justified as better than another,
hence all anthropic reasoning is just hand-waving.

In our terms we might put it like this.  The new paper essentially uses a
measure which is the number of possible observer-moments in the universe.
Universes with a high CC go through a big rip process eventually,
accelerating to a super-expansion mode and presumably putting an end
to observers.  Universes with a low or zero CC go through this much
later or not at all, allowing for more observer-moments.  Hence this
measure gives a bonus to universes that last a long time.

Earlier papers apparently looked at a snapshot of time similar to the
present day, and in effect based the measure on the number of observers
(assumed to be proportional to the number of galaxies).  So we have a
distinction between an observer-moment measure and an observer measure.
The two apparently give very different results, the OM measure preferring
long-lasting universes while the observer measure is more interested in
the size of the universe.

I guess I'll stop here and see if there is more interest.  To leave with
a few questions: Is there any fundamental way to decide which measure
is best?  Do the OM measure and the observer measure really give
different results, and is that significant?  Are there other measures
that might be used, and what results would they get?  And finally, will
this apparent failure of anthropic reasoning discredit the concept among
working physicists?  As I mentioned, I've already seen it used in a blog
common on Woit's blog that I pointed to the other day, in just that way.

Hal Finney


Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees

2006-07-27 Thread Russell Standish

Thanks for giving a digested explanation of the argument. This paper
was discussed briefly on A-Void a few weeks ago, but I must admit to
not following the argument too well, nor RTFA.

My comment on the observer moment issue, is that in a Multiverse, the
measure of older observer moments is less that younger ones. After a
certain point in time, the measure probably decreases exponentially or
faster, so there will be a mean observer moment age.

So contra all these old OMs dominating the calculation, and giving
rise to an expected value of Lambda close to zero, we should expect
only a finite contribution, leading to an expected finite value of
Lambda.

We don't know what the mean age for an observer moment should be, but
presumably one could argue anthropically that is around 10^{10}
years. What does this give for an expected value of Lambda?

Of course their argument does sound plausible for a single universe -
is this observational evidence in favour of a Multiverse?

Cheers

On Thu, Jul 27, 2006 at 11:08:04AM -0700, Hal Finney wrote:
 This is actually a very interesting paper, by Starkman and Trotta.  I had
 seen some mention of it but hadn't tracked it down.  Here is the abstract:
 
 The paper basically shows that observers (or civilizations) can last
 longer in universes with smaller CC's.  The CC eventually puts an end
 to the observations that can be made, because the expansion gets too
 fast and there is no longer enough energy density.  The higher the CC,
 the sooner this happens.  With CC's as high as what we observe, the
 theoretical lifetime of civilization is much shorter than in universes
 with smaller CC's.
 
 The authors choose to use as their measure, the number of times the
 CC can be measured in a given universe.  This makes low-CC universes
 have a much higher measure, because the window for CC observations is
 longer in those.  Hence they conclude that the highest probability is
 for a CC much smaller than we observe, and so our own CC value cannot
 be explained anthropically.
 

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Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees

2006-07-26 Thread Hal Finney

Danny Mayes writes:
 Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
 Which approximates my ideas on the nature of reality and the possible role
 of intelligence.

Well, no offense to Martin or you, but that's pretty ordinary stuff which
we have been discussing on this list since 1998.  There is an entire
website devoted to the speculation that Rees describes, the possibility
that we live in a simulation: simulation-argument.com, by former list
member Nick Bostrom.

It's always kind of disconcerting to read popularizations of the kinds
of ideas we discuss here.  Writers have to approach them so delicately,
taking such pains to marvel at the amazing and perhaps outlandish
imagination it takes to consider them seriously.  I always read these
articles with a sinking feeling, knowing that they aren't going to
say anything new to me and frustrated that the concepts can't just be
delivered straight, the way we take them here.

I've been wanting to write something about the collision between physics
and the anthropic principle, and maybe this is a good time.  As Rees
describes, recent developments in string theory, have introduced the idea
of a landscape of possible stable models.  Each point on the landscape
would correspond to a possible set of particles and physical laws.
I haven't gotten a clear picture of whether this landscape is actually
infinite or merely very large; most writers seem to think the distinction
is unimportant, because the large is so very.  Rees is typical in
how he inconsistently says first one and then the other.  (I imagine
that most of us would see the distinction as rather more important.)

Anyway, as Rees describes, this is forcing physicists to consider the
possibility that the fundamental physics of our universe is no more
meaningful than the distance from the earth to the sun: a mere accident
of nature, with the anthropic principle explaining why we are here to
see it and ask about it.  I've seen this same earth-sun analogy used in
talks by other physicists.

But what Rees does not say is that many or most physicists are being
dragged down this path kicking and screaming.  Physics is not going gently
into the anthropic night.  Most physicists, I think, see this as the
death of physics.  Rees himself admits that it in effect blurs the line
between physics and philosophy.  It calls into question the entire program
of fundamental physics, to explain why the universe is the way it is.

The real problem is not just that it is a philosophical speculation,
it is that it does not lead to any testable physical predictions.
The string theory landscape, even if finite, is far too large for
systematic exploration.  Our ideas, with an infinite number of possible
universes, are even worse.  Physicists see acceptance of anthropic
explanations as the end of physics because there is no way to make
quantitative predictions when there are so many degrees of freedom.

Now, granted, predictions may still be possible in principle - given
that the string theory landscape is finite, you could in theory explore
every part of it and create probabilistic predictions contingent on what
has been observed so far.  The problem is that there is no prospect of
actually being able to do this.  Clearly it can't be done by brute force.
Maybe someone will come up with some kind of clever sampling approach,
or perhaps some structure can eventually be found in the landscape.
But at this point there is no reason to believe that such efforts will
amount to anything.

The result is that string theory in particular has reached a dead end.
This is what physicists have been banking on for twenty years to achieve
a grand unification, a theory of everything.  And instead, they have
found within the past couple of years that it is more like a theory of
anything, in the sense that seemingly any hypothetical universe might
be consistent with string theory.  Such a theory is no theory at all,
to physicists.

The situation has gotten so bad that there is a growing backlash
against string theory.  Proponents of rival theories, who have labored
in obscurity for decades, are coming out of the woodwork and demanding
their share of attention (and the substantial research funding of which
string theory has long received the lion's share).  Two major books
are coming out this fall which proclaim the death of string theory.
One is Not Even Wrong: The Failure of String Theory And the Search for
Unity in Physical Law by Peter Woit (his blog of the same name is here,
http://www.math.columbia.edu/~woit/wordpress/ ).  The other is by Lee
Smolin: The Trouble With Physics: The Rise of String Theory, The Fall
of a Science, and What Comes Next.  Amazon even pairs the books for
you so you can get a double dose of anti-string theory.  These books
have been well reviewed and there seems to be a sense that indeed,
the general approach of physics needs to be substantially rethought.

So the bottom line is that Rees leaves us with a highly 

Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees

2006-07-26 Thread Bruno Marchal

Le 26-juil.-06, à 06:29, Danny Mayes quoted Rees:

x-tad-biggerSo I favor peaceful coexistence rather than constructive dialogue between science and theology
/x-tad-bigger

With comp (or just with deep enough introspection) you can understand that science is just modesty, and that it is not domain dependent. I favor collaboration of scientists from many disciplines on the fundamental questions which by their very nature ask for interdisciplinary open mindness. You can do theology with a 100% scientific attitude.  Not doing that is the same as abandoning theology to authoritative argument. In that case, it is not astosnihing that theology looks irrational and unscientific.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees

2006-07-26 Thread Russell Standish

Yes, although you do have a different perception of theology to Rees,
and indeed practically all other scientists I know of. I won't comment
on theologians of course, I don't really know any all that well.

Not to say your perception is wrong, but it will take a Herculean
effort to get other to think along your lines.

Cheers

On Wed, Jul 26, 2006 at 04:21:28PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
  
 Le 26-juil.-06, à 06:29, Danny Mayes quoted Rees: 
 
 
  So I favor peaceful coexistence rather than constructive dialogue 
  between science and theology 
  
  
 
 With comp (or just with deep enough introspection) you can understand 
 that science is just modesty, and that it is not domain dependent. I 
 favor collaboration of scientists from many disciplines on the 
 fundamental questions which by their very nature ask for 
 interdisciplinary open mindness. You can do theology with a 100% 
 scientific attitude.  Not doing that is the same as abandoning theology 
 to authoritative argument. In that case, it is not astosnihing that 
 theology looks irrational and unscientific. 
 
 Bruno 
 
 
 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 
 
 
  

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Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees

2006-07-26 Thread Saibal Mitra


- Original Message - 
From: Hal Finney [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Wednesday, July 26, 2006 08:28 AM
Subject: Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees



 The real problem is not just that it is a philosophical speculation,
 it is that it does not lead to any testable physical predictions.
 The string theory landscape, even if finite, is far too large for
 systematic exploration.  Our ideas, with an infinite number of possible
 universes, are even worse.  Physicists see acceptance of anthropic
 explanations as the end of physics because there is no way to make
 quantitative predictions when there are so many degrees of freedom.


I'm not so sure that our ideas are worse. If you read some recent articles,
e.g.:

http://arxiv.org/abs/astro-ph/0607227

you see that they haven't really formulated rigorous theories about measure,
probabilities etc. of the multiverse. It's still very much in the
handwaving stage.

Saibal


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