Hi George,
I think that we agree on the main line. Note that I never have
pretended that the conjunction of comp and weak materialism (the
doctrine which asserts the existence of primary matter) gives a
contradiction. What the filmed-graph and/or Maudlin shows is that comp
makes materialism
Ho Bruno
Sorry, I have been unclear with myself and with you. I have been lumping
together the assumption of an objective physical world and an
objective platonic world. So you are right, I do reject the objective
physical world, but why stop there? Is there a need for an objective
platonic
Hi George,
Le 03-oct.-07, à 01:52, George Levy a écrit :
Hi Bruno,
Yes I am still on the list, barely trying to keep up, but I have been
very busy. Actually the ball was in my court and I was supposed to
answer to your last post to me about a year ago!!!. Generally I agree
with you
Oops: replace Newton's demon by Maxwell's demon.
George
George Levy wrote:
Hi Bruno,
Yes I am still on the list, barely trying to keep up, but I have been
very busy. Actually the ball was in my court and I was supposed to
answer to your last post to me about a year ago!!!. Generally I
Hi George,
Are you still there on the list?
I am really sorry to (re)discover your post just now, with a label
saying that I have to answer it, but apparently I didn't. So here is
the answer, with a delay of about one year :(
Le 08-oct.-06, à 08:00, George Levy wrote :
Finally I read
Hi Bruno,
Yes I am still on the list, barely trying to keep up, but I have been
very busy. Actually the ball was in my court and I was supposed to
answer to your last post to me about a year ago!!!. Generally I agree
with you on many things but here I am just playing the devils' advocate.
The
Le 11-oct.-06, à 05:46, George Levy a écrit :
snip: I will comment at ease later>
Therefore from the point of view of the second machine, the first machine appears conscious. Note that for the purpose of the argument WE don't have to assume initially that the second machine IS conscious, only
Le 09-oct.-06, à 21:54, George Levy a écrit :
To observe a split consciousness, you need an observer who is also split,
?
in sync with the split consciousness, across time, space, substrate and level (a la Zelazny - Science Fiction writer). In your example, for an observer to see
--- Original Message -
From:
George Levy
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Monday, October 09, 2006 5:55
PM
Subject: Re: Maudlin's Demon
(Argument)
David Nyman wrote:
On Oct 9, 8:54 pm, George Levy [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
To observe a split con
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 09-oct.-06, 21:54, George Levy a crit :
To observe a split consciousness, you need an observer
who
is also split,
?
This is simple. The time/space/substrate/level of the observer must
match the time/space/substrate/level of what he observes. The
Le 08-oct.-06, à 08:00, George Levy a écrit :
Bruno,
Finally I read your filmed graph argument which I have stored in my
computer. (The original at the Iridia web site
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/bxlthesis/Volume3CC/3%20%202%20.pdf
is not accessible anymore. I am not sure why.)
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 08-oct.-06, 08:00, George Levy a crit :
Bruno,
Finally I read your filmed graph argument which I have stored in my
computer. (The original at the Iridia web site
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/bxlthesis/Volume3CC/3%20%202%20.pdf
is not accessible
On Oct 9, 8:54 pm, George Levy [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
To observe a split consciousness, you need an observer who is also
split, in sync with the split consciousness, across time, space,
substrate and level (a la Zelazny - Science Fiction writer). In your
example, for an observer to see
Bruno,
Finally I read your filmed graph argument which I have stored in my
computer. (The original at the Iridia web site
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/bxlthesis/Volume3CC/3%20%202%20.pdf
is not accessible anymore. I am not sure why.)
In page TROIS -61 you describe an experience of
Le 07-oct.-06, à 22:24, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
my reductionism is simple: we have a circle of knowledge base
and view
the world as limited INTO such model. Well, it is not. The
reductionist view
enabled homo to step up into technological prowess but did not support
an
against new theories (enlarged models).
John
- Original Message -
From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Sunday, October 08, 2006 10:15 AM
Subject: Re: Maudlin's Demon (Argument)
Le 07-oct.-06, à 22:24, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
my
Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Friday, October 06, 2006 8:09 AM
Subject: RE: Maudlin's Demon (Argument)
John,
I should have been more precise with the terms copy and emulate.
What I was asking is whether a robot which experiences something while
it is shovelling
Please see some remarks interleft between -lines.
John M
- Original Message -
From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Friday, October 06, 2006 9:43 AM
Subject: Re: Maudlin's Demon (Argument)
Le 05-oct.-06, à 13:55, [EMAIL PROTECTED
.
- Original Message -
From: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Wednesday, October 04, 2006 11:41 PM
Subject: RE: Maudlin's Demon (Argument)
You wrote:
Do you believe it is possible to copy a particular consciousness by
emulating it, along
with sham inputs (i.e. in virtual
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
John Mikes writes:
Stathis, your post is 'logical', 'professional', 'smart', - good.
It shows why we have so many posts on this list and why we get nowhere.
You handle an assumption (robot) - its qualia, characteristics, make up a
thought-situation and ASK about
Brent Meeker writes:
I did put in parentheses this of course assumes a robot can have
experiences.
We can't know that this is so, but it seems a reasonable assumption to me.
If we
had evolution with digital processors rather than biological processors do
you think
it would
question.
- Original Message -
From: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Wednesday, October 04, 2006 11:41 PM
Subject: RE: Maudlin's Demon (Argument)
You wrote:
Do you believe it is possible to copy a particular consciousness by
emulating it, along
with sham inputs (i.e
Le 05-oct.-06, à 13:55, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
Can we 'emulate' totality? I don't think so.
I don't always insist on that but with just the Church thesis part of
comp, it can be argued that we can emulate the third person describable
totality, and indeed this is what the Universal
Le 05-oct.-06, à 04:01, Brent Meeker a écrit :
There is another possibility: that consciousness is relative to what
it is conscious
*of* and any computation that implements consciousness must also
implement the whole
world which the consciousness is conscious of. In that case there may
Brent Meeker wrote:
There is another possibility: that consciousness is relative to what it is
conscious
*of* and any computation that implements consciousness must also implement
the whole
world which the consciousness is conscious of. In that case there may be
only one,
unique
- Original Message -
Subject: Re: Maudlin's Demon (Argument)
(Brent's quote):
David Nyman wrote:
(I skip the discussion...)
In other words, a 'computation' can be
anything I say it is (cf. Hofstadter for some particularly egregious
examples).
David, could you give us 'some
Stathis:
let me skip the quoted texts and ask a particular question.
- Original Message -
From: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Wednesday, October 04, 2006 11:41 PM
Subject: RE: Maudlin's Demon (Argument)
You wrote:
Do you believe it is possible to copy a particular
reductios (like Schroedinger
with his cat apparently) or whether he was actually serious. I'll have
to re-read the book.
David
- Original Message -
Subject: Re: Maudlin's Demon (Argument)
(Brent's quote):
David Nyman wrote:
(I skip the discussion...)
In other words
' and 'consciousness).
John
- Original Message -
From: David Nyman [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Thursday, October 05, 2006 10:38 AM
Subject: Re: Maudlin's Demon (Argument)
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
In other words, a 'computation' can
George Levy wrote:
The correct conclusion IMHO is that consciousness is independent of
time, space, substrate and level and in fact can span all of these just
as Maudlin partially demonstrated - but you still need an implementation
-- so what is left? Like the Cheshire cat, nothing except
Le 03-oct.-06, à 21:33, George Levy a écrit :
Bruno,
I looked on the web but could not find Maudlin's paper.
Mmh... for those working in an institution affiliated to JSTOR, it is available here:
http://www.jstor.org/view/0022362x/di973301/97p04115/0
I will search if some free version are
Bruno, Stathis,
Thank you Stathis for the summary. I do have the paper now and I will
read it carefully. Based on Sathis summary I still believe that Maudlin
is fallacious. A computer program equivalent to Maudlin's construction
can be written as:
IF (Input =
Oops. Read: IF (Input = 27098217872180483080234850309823740127)
George
George Levy wrote:
Bruno, Stathis,
Thank you Stathis for the summary. I do have the paper now and I will
read it carefully. Based on Sathis summary I still believe that Maudlin
is fallacious. A computer program
If I can sumarise George's summary as this:
In order to generate a recording, one must physically instantiate the
conscious computation. Consciousness supervenes on this, presumably.
Maudlin say aha - lets take the recording, and add to it an inert
machine that handles the counterfactuals. This
Russell Standish wrote:
Maudlin say aha - lets take the recording, and add to it an inert
machine that handles the counterfactuals. This combined machine is
computationally equivalent to the original. But since the new machine
is physically equivalent to a recording, how could consciousness
David Nyman wrote:
Russell Standish wrote:
Maudlin say aha - lets take the recording, and add to it an inert
machine that handles the counterfactuals. This combined machine is
computationally equivalent to the original. But since the new machine
is physically equivalent to a recording, how
---
Date: Wed, 4 Oct 2006 11:26:44 -0700
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Maudlin's Demon (Argument)
Bruno, Stathis,
Thank you Stathis for the summary. I do have the paper now and I will read it
carefully. Based
List members
I scanned Maudlin's paper. Thank you Russell. As I suspected I found a
few questionable passages:
Page417: line 14:
"So the spatial sequence of the troughs need not reflect their
'computational sequence'. We may so contrive that any sequence of
address lie next to each other
Brent Meeker writes:
David Nyman wrote:
Russell Standish wrote:
Maudlin say aha - lets take the recording, and add to it an inert
machine that handles the counterfactuals. This combined machine is
computationally equivalent to the original. But since the new machine
is physically
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:
David Nyman wrote:
Russell Standish wrote:
Maudlin say aha - lets take the recording, and add to it an inert
machine that handles the counterfactuals. This combined machine is
computationally equivalent to the original. But since the new
40 matches
Mail list logo
