Le 04-sept.-06, à 16:12, 1Z a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 04-sept.-06, à 02:56, 1Z a écrit :
Why should a belief in other minds (which I do not directly
experience)
be more reasonable thant a belief in unexperienced primary matter ?
It's a question of consistency.
Attributing
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 04-sept.-06, à 02:56, 1Z a écrit :
Why should a belief in other minds (which I do not directly experience)
be more reasonable thant a belief in unexperienced primary matter ?
It's a question of consistency.
Attributing mind to others explains many things.
Le 30-août-06, à 21:26, 1Z (Peter D. Jones) a écrit :
How do you escape solipsism without embracing materialism ?
You can escape solipsism by embracing *any* kind of *objective*
idealism (inspired by mathematical structures or not).
Objective idealisms are not in fashion today, I know,
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 30-août-06, à 21:26, 1Z (Peter D. Jones) a écrit :
How do you escape solipsism without embracing materialism ?
You can escape solipsism by embracing *any* kind of *objective*
idealism (inspired by mathematical structures or not).
Why should a belief in other
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
Saying that there is a material substrate which has certain
properties is just a working
assumption to facilitate thinking about the real world. It may turn
out that if we dig into
quarks very deeply there is nothing
Le Wednesday 30 Août 2006 21:26, 1Z a écrit :
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
Saying that there is a material substrate which has certain
properties is just a working assumption to facilitate thinking
about the real world. It may turn out that if we dig into
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le Wednesday 30 Août 2006 21:26, 1Z a écrit :
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
Saying that there is a material substrate which has certain
properties is just a working assumption to facilitate thinking
about the real world. It may
Peter Jones writes:
Saying that there is a material substrate which has certain properties
is just a working
assumption to facilitate thinking about the real world. It may turn out
that if we dig into
quarks very deeply there is nothing substantial there at all, but
Peter Jones writes:
Saying that there is a material substrate which has certain properties is
just a working
assumption to facilitate thinking about the real world. It may turn out
that if we dig into
quarks very deeply there is nothing substantial there at all, but solid
matter
Peter Jones writes:
By youur definitions, it's a straight choice between metaphysics and
solipsism.
I choose metaphsyics.
We can posit the unobservable to expalint he observable.
Solipsism is a metaphysical position.
(BTW: it it is wrong to posit an unobserved substrate, why is it
OK
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:
Saying that there is a material substrate which has certain properties is
just a working
assumption to facilitate thinking about the real world. It may turn out
that if we dig into
quarks very deeply there is nothing substantial
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
Saying that there is a material substrate which has certain properties is
just a working
assumption to facilitate thinking about the real world. It may turn out
that if we dig into
quarks very deeply there is nothing substantial
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
By youur definitions, it's a straight choice between metaphysics and
solipsism.
I choose metaphsyics.
We can posit the unobservable to expalint he observable.
Solipsism is a metaphysical position.
A minimal one, that refuses to posit
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
There is good reason to believe that there is some sort of reality out there
as opposed to the
solipsistic alternative, but there is less reason to believe that there is
some basic material substrate
on which the various properties of physical objects are hung.
Le 27-août-06, à 19:36, 1Z a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 26-août-06, à 22:44, Brent Meeker a écrit :
I understand Peters objection to regarding a mere bundle of
properties as existent. But I don't understand why one needs a
propertyless
substrate. Why not just say that some
Le 27-août-06, à 19:41, 1Z a écrit :
But you don't really address the existence question. You just loosely
assume it is the
same thing as truth.
I just assume that the existence of a number is equivalent with the
intended truth of an existential
proposition written in a theory about
Le 27-août-06, à 21:41, Brent Meeker a écrit :
I put working assumption in scare quotes because I think the fact
that we can
create models of the world that are successful over a wide domain of
phenomena is
evidence for an underlying reality. It's not conclusive evidence, but
reality
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
By youur definitions, it's a straight choice between metaphysics and
solipsism.
I choose metaphsyics.
We can posit the unobservable to expalint he observable.
Solipsism is a metaphysical position.
(BTW: it it is wrong to posit an
Brent Meeker wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
By youur definitions, it's a straight choice between metaphysics and
solipsism.
I choose metaphsyics.
We can posit the unobservable to expalint he observable.
Solipsism is a metaphysical position.
(BTW: it
1Z wrote:
Brent Meeker wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
By youur definitions, it's a straight choice between metaphysics and
solipsism.
I choose metaphsyics.
We can posit the unobservable to expalint he observable.
Solipsism is a metaphysical position.
(BTW: it
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent meeker writes:
But even existence can be defined as a bundle of properties. If I am
wondering whether the pencil on my desk exists I can look at it, pick it up,
tap it and so on. If my hand passes through it when I try to pick it up
then maybe it is just
Brent Meeker writes:
Saying that there is a material substrate which has certain properties is
just a working
assumption to facilitate thinking about the real world. It may turn out
that if we dig into
quarks very deeply there is nothing substantial there at all, but solid
Le 25-août-06, à 23:24, 1Z a écrit :
AR as a claim about truth is implied by comoputationalism, and is
not enough to support the real (=as real as I am) existence
of the UD.
It is you who come up with a notion of real existence. You are reifying
I don't know which theory.
AR as a
Le 26-août-06, à 22:44, Brent Meeker a écrit :
I understand Peters objection to regarding a mere bundle of
properties as existent. But I don't understand why one needs a
propertyless
substrate. Why not just say that some bundles of properties are
instantiated and
some aren't.
I
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent meeker writes:
But even existence can be defined as a bundle of properties. If I am
wondering whether the pencil on my desk exists I can look at it, pick it
up,
tap it and so on. If my hand passes through it when I try to pick it up
then maybe
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:
Saying that there is a material substrate which has certain properties is
just a working
assumption to facilitate thinking about the real world. It may turn out
that if we dig into
quarks very deeply there is nothing substantial
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 25-août-06, à 23:24, 1Z a écrit :
AR as a claim about truth is implied by comoputationalism, and is
not enough to support the real (=as real as I am) existence
of the UD.
It is you who come up with a notion of real existence.
I am starting with the reality my
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:
Saying that there is a material substrate which has certain properties is
just a working
assumption to facilitate thinking about the real world. It may turn out that
if we dig into
quarks very deeply there is nothing substantial there at
- Original Message -
From: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Brent Meeker everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Sunday, August 27, 2006 7:52 AM
Subject: RE: Rép: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Brent Meeker writes:
Saying that there is a material substrate which has
1Z wrote:
AR as a claim about truth is implied by comoputationalism, and is
not enough to support the real (=as real as I am) existence
of the UD.
It is you who come up with a notion of real existence.
I am starting with the reality my own existence.
That is an *empirical*
Peter Jones writes:
Matter is a bare substrate with no properties of its own. The question
may well be asked at this point: what roles does it perform ? Why not
dispense with matter and just have bundles of properties -- what does
matter add to a merely abstract set of properties? The answer
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
Matter is a bare substrate with no properties of its own. The question
may well be asked at this point: what roles does it perform ? Why not
dispense with matter and just have bundles of properties -- what does
matter add to a merely abstract
Brent meeker writes:
But even existence can be defined as a bundle of properties. If I am
wondering whether the pencil on my desk exists I can look at it, pick it
up,
tap it and so on. If my hand passes through it when I try to pick it up
then maybe it is just an illusion.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 21-août-06, à 16:23, 1Z a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 21-août-06, à 13:34, 1Z a écrit :
If Plato's heaven doesn't exist, I can't be in it.
I can hardly not agree with that.
If numbers do not explain my existence -- explaining
how a
Le 21-août-06, à 16:23, 1Z a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 21-août-06, à 13:34, 1Z a écrit :
If Plato's heaven doesn't exist, I can't be in it.
I can hardly not agree with that.
If numbers do not explain my existence -- explaining
how a strucuture like a physial world would
Le 22-août-06, à 18:06, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
So where is the key to translate number-monsters into
thought-monsters?
In front of you. Computer or universal machine, or universal numbers.
More explanation in the posts.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
- Original Message -
From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Wednesday, August 23, 2006 7:56 AM
Subject: Re: Rép: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Le 22-août-06, à 18:06, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
So where is the key to translate number
tad-biggereverything-list@googlegroups.com/x-tad-biggerx-tad-bigger /x-tad-bigger
x-tad-biggerSent:/x-tad-biggerx-tad-bigger Monday, August 21, 2006 6:39 AM/x-tad-bigger
x-tad-biggerSubject:/x-tad-biggerx-tad-bigger Re: Rép: ROADMAP (well, not yet really.../x-tad-bigger
skip
I already told you tha
oups.com
Sent: Tuesday, August 22, 2006 6:10
AM
Subject: Re: Rép: ROADMAP (well, not yet
really...
Le 22-août-06, à 05:32, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit
:
- Original
Message -From:
Bruno
Marchal To:
everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent:
Monday,
Le 20-août-06, à 21:09, 1Z a écrit :
If minds are made of Platonically existing comptutations
or numbers, they don't need to be made of matter as
well. In that sense matter would we without purpose.
But that depends on the assumption that there is such
a thing as Platonic existence in the first
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 20-août-06, à 21:09, 1Z a écrit :
If minds are made of Platonically existing comptutations
or numbers, they don't need to be made of matter as
well. In that sense matter would we without purpose.
But that depends on the assumption that there is such
a thing
Le 21-août-06, à 13:34, 1Z a écrit :
If Plato's heaven doesn't exist, I can't be in it.
I can hardly not agree with that.
If numbers do not explain my existence -- explaining
how a strucuture like a physial world would emerge from
a UD if a UD existed does not explain my *existence*
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 21-août-06, à 13:34, 1Z a écrit :
If Plato's heaven doesn't exist, I can't be in it.
I can hardly not agree with that.
If numbers do not explain my existence -- explaining
how a strucuture like a physial world would emerge from
a UD if a UD existed does
- Original Message -
From:
Bruno Marchal
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Monday, August 21, 2006 6:39
AM
Subject: Re: Rép: ROADMAP (well, not yet
really...
skip
I already told you that I interpretThere exists a prime
number "in
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Hi Peter,
I am no more sure you read the post, nor am I sure you really search
understanding.
Le 18-août-06, à 17:38, 1Z a écrit :
That is an explanation of mind-independence, not of existence.
The anti-Platonist (e.g. the formalist) can claim that
the truth
Le 18-août-06, à 19:01, 1Z a écrit :
That is quite different from conjuring up existential conclusions
from non-existential premises.
I believe there exist numbers, prime numbers, even numbers, etc. and in
relative universal numbers, ... (with Church Thesis universal need
not to be
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 17-août-06, à 17:30, 1Z a écrit :
The argument has to assume the necessary existence of the UD.
(If it is possible that the UD doesn't exist, it is possible
that physics is emerging from semething else)
It is difficult to see what would entail that except
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Note that if you understand the whole UDA, you should realize that the
price of assuming a physical universe (and wanting it to be related
with our experiences *and* our experiments) is to postulate that you
(and us, if you are not solipsistic) are not turing
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