Re: Re: Reasons and Persons
The importance of gradual change in the spectrum argument, is that
since personal identity can be conserved through discontinous changes
(the example you cite here), then any gradual change should not alter
identity either.
The slight flaw in this argument comes again by analogy with the
genetic code with gradual change considered equivalent to point
mutation. However a single point mutation is sufficient to
dramatically alter the phenotype, whereas large changes to the genome
can accrue without change to the phenotype at all (the so called
neutral mutations).
On Thu, Jun 01, 2006 at 02:07:09PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Jesse Mazer writes:
>
> > The strength of the synaptic connections between different > neurons or
> > groups of neurons does change in a fairly continuous way, no? Of > course
> > even if we specify all the synaptic connections and strengths, one's >
> > conscious state can change in the short term as different neurons become >
> > active, but I don't think this is important to Parfit's thought-experiment,
> > > you can imagine a gradual change in the strength and arrangement of
> > synapses > even while over the short term there may be more variation in
> > mood and > thought processes.
> I don't think anyone has questioned the importance of *gradual* transition
> from one person to another in Parfit's argument. After all, we have
> discontinuities in consciousness all the time: when we are asleep, if we
> perform some action in a drunken stupor and later forget that it ever
> happened, following a head injury which may result in the excision of entire
> chunks of our lives from memory. Given this, we can imagine changing from one
> person to another despite discontinuities.
>
> Stathis Papaioannou
> _
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RE: Re: Reasons and Persons
Jesse Mazer writes: > The strength of the synaptic connections between different > neurons or groups of neurons does change in a fairly continuous way, no? Of > course even if we specify all the synaptic connections and strengths, one's > conscious state can change in the short term as different neurons become > active, but I don't think this is important to Parfit's thought-experiment, > you can imagine a gradual change in the strength and arrangement of synapses > even while over the short term there may be more variation in mood and > thought processes. I don't think anyone has questioned the importance of *gradual* transition from one person to another in Parfit's argument. After all, we have discontinuities in consciousness all the time: when we are asleep, if we perform some action in a drunken stupor and later forget that it ever happened, following a head injury which may result in the excision of entire chunks of our lives from memory. Given this, we can imagine changing from one person to another despite discontinuities. Stathis PapaioannouExpress yourself instantly with MSN Messenger! MSN Messenger --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Re: Reasons and Persons
Brent Meeker writes:> Of course such cases already arise in which Alzheimer's or schizophrenia changes a person into> "someone else", i.e. we say he is "no longer himself". Just because there is an continuum of> intermediate states it doesn't follow that there is no "fact of the matter". We say "he is no longer himself", but what we mean is that even though we know he is the same person, he is not like the person he used to be before he got sick. And we know that he *is* the same person despite this fact because he has continuously occupied the same body. So yes, in every situation anyone has ever encountered, there is a simple enough criterion - body identity - which will determine the "fact of the matter" in case there is any doubt. But the challenge is to come up with a criterion that covers all *possible* situations. Body identity will not do if we could teleport from one place to another: I could kill someone, teleport away, then argue in court that it wasn't me who did it because I have a different body now. DNA evidence could then be cited to prove that I was the criminal, even though I had a different body. But I could get around this by genetically modifying all the cells in my body in such a way as to leave my memories and personality intact, or I could upload my mind to a computer and destroy my biological body. What about defining identity in terms of psychological continuity? Apart from it being much harder to prove this, there are other ways to escape punishment. I could deliberately or accidentally excise parts of my memory including any knowledge of the crime, or I could spread my memories of the crime and aspects of my personality to other individuals. On a computer network, how would you show that these electrons over here are descended from the original murderer and deserve punishment, while those electrons over there, which appear to encode the same information, are innocent? I'm sure legislators will try to come up with something, but at this point, it should be obvious that the certainty with which we currently view matters of personal identity is just a consequence of the fact that we live simple, animal lives from birth to death. Stathis PapaioannouExpress yourself instantly with MSN Messenger! MSN Messenger --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Re: Reasons and Persons
I don't see that there have been any scientific developments in the last twenty years which make Parfit's thought experiments more or less plausible. The only exception I can think of is in his favour: there is speculation that teleportation may indeed be theoretically possible. In any case, it is telling that even Parfit's philosophical adversaries do not focus on lack of scientific plausibility as an argument against *philosophical* validity. For the most part, he could have made the same points had he been writing a century ago, drawing on religious mythology rather than science fiction for his thought experiments.
Perhaps a philosopher on the list could comment?
Stathis Papaioannou
Russell Standish writes:
> Sure, and if Parfit's discussion boiled down to "if we assume that a> spectrum of identies is possible for the sake of argument, then..."> > We can also make the opposite assumption, and come to the opposite> conclusions. Not especially edifying, wouldn't you think.> > Parfit was trying to bias the discussion one way by providing some> plausibility arguments. With our extra twenty years of knowledge in> complex systems, neurology and genetics, I argue that these> plausibility arguments are looking a little threadbare. This does not> diminish Parfit's contribution, seen in the context of the time he> wrote his book. But I am not interested in historical relativism, I'm> interested in the best understanding of a topic that can be wrought> using all evidence and arguments available.> > Cheers> > > On Wed, May 31, 2006 at 10:19:56PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:> > > > Of course we have to have a grounding in understood terms if we are to> > have any sort of discussion. But there is a difference between science> > and philosophy. Philosophy need not necessarily deal with> > verifiable/falsifiable facts about the world, which to science is the> > sine qua non. The same thought experiment can lead to completely> > different discussions, depending on which way you look at it. Take the> > idea of making an exact copy of a person. The physicist may look at> > whether it is possible even in principle to make an exact copy of> > something down to the quantum level, and whether this level of fidelity> > would be necessary to yield functionally equivalent brain processes. The> > neurosurgeon may consider what Parfit calls "fission": whether it would> > in fact be possible to get two identical minds by cutting the corpus> > callosum, given the slight differences between hemispheres, the effect> > of the surgical trauma, and so on. To the philosopher, on the other> > hand, these questions are only a side issue. What he is interested in is> > the conditional: IF a person could be perfectly duplicated, THEN which> > of the two copies would we say is the continuation of the> > pre-duplication person? Would it be one, both or neither? What should> > the person about to undergo duplication expect to experience? Can we> > come up with a definition of personal identity which provides a> > satisfactory and unequivocal answer to these questions? If not, what> > does this say about the concept of continuity of personal identity over> > time, which hitherto we all thought we understood? > > > > I suppose there are some scientists (and probably even more laypeople)> > who would regard the purely philosophical questions with contempt: if> > mind duplication etc. is a practical or theoretical impossibility, why> > waste time thinking about such nonsense? My purpose is not to enter into> > that debate, but just to point out that Parfit is a philosopher, and you> > have to keep that in mind when reading his work.> > > > Stathis Papaioannou> > > > > -- > > A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile)> Mathematics 0425 253119 (")> UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks> International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02> > >
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