Re: Searles' Fundamental Error
On 2/22/07, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: A patient says that his leg is paralysed, behaves as if his leg is paralysed, but the clinical signs and investigations are not consistent with a paralysed leg. The diagnosis of hysterical paralysis is made. A patient claims to hear voices of people nobody else sees, responds to the voices as if they are there, but the clinical signs and response to antipsychotic treatment is not consistent with the auditory hallucinations experienced by peopel with psychotic illness. The diagnosis of hysterical hallucinations is made: that is, they aren't hearing voices that aren't there, they only *think* they're hearing voices that aren't there. How is this diagnosis made? It sounds like an impossible distinction - a scientific resolution of the zombie question. The diagnosis of pseudohallucinations is made if they don't have the characteristics typical of hallucinations in schizophrenia - that is, there are third person observable differences. Without these differences it would be impossible to tell and, since psychiatry at least aspires to be an empirical science, the possibility is generally ignored. However, you can have delusions about anything, so it should be at least theoretically possible to have a delusion that you are having a perception. Patients frequently report delusional memories of perceptions: that is, they insist that they had a conversation or experience that they could not even have hallucinated, because they were under observation at the time of the alleged incident. Suppose this process is happening live, so that they believe they are hearing a voice and responding as if they are hearing a voice even though they are not even hallucinating such a thing. We might speculate that the actual experience would surely feel different to the mere belief that they are having the experience, but if they could notice such a difference they would not be deluded. Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Searles' Fundamental Error
On 2/22/07, Mark Peaty [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Stathis: Stathis [from the other posting again]: 'There is good reason to believe that the third person observable behaviour of the brain can be emulated, because the brain is just chemical reactions and chemistry is a well-understood field.' MP: Once again it depends what you mean. Does 'Third person observable behaviour of the brain' include EEG recordings and the output of MRI imaging? Or do you mean just the movements of muscles which is the main indicator of brain activity? If the former then I think that would be very hard, perhaps impossible; if the latter however, that just might be achievable. Huh? I think it would be a relatively trivial matter to emulate MRI and EEG data, certainly compared to emulating behaviour as evidenced by muscle activity (complex, intelligent behaviour such as doing science or writing novels is after all just muscle activity, which is just chemical reactions in the muscles triggered by chemical reactions in the brain). MP: 'relatively trivial'? I think perhaps you underestimate what it involved; '... the brain is just chemical reactions, and chemistry is a well-understood field' reinforces this view. My point is that it is NOT just chemical reactions, but chemical reactions which take place in embodiment of multiple overlapping, inter-penetrating and self-organising hierarchies of dynamic structures. I think that various avenues of research are showing that a key feature of brain functioning which 'binds' together the 'just chemical' activities of multiple brain regions at any given moment and simultaneously at multiple scales of size, intensity and frequencies, is the harmonic resonance and interference patterns generated by wave forms which are made up of the combined actions of billions of neurons propagating thousands of impulses per second to form dynamic interaction patterns. How could it not be chemical reactions? The fact that they are large and complex macromolecules with some very complex physical chemistry involved does not mean it's not chemistry, and neither does the fact that it is easier to look at the emergent behaviour of the brain as a whole. If all the relevant chemical reactions occur in the right order and the right configuration, that is necessary and sufficient for a functioning brain. I think the only way to truly grasp the scope of what is occurring is through visual imagination but linking one's ideas also to the experience of musical polyphony and rhythms. The trick is to 'see' in the mind's eye that the *effective* structures which make things happen and which constitute our experiences are in fact the wave patterns composed of swarms [or flocks, herds, shoals, clouds] of depolarisations. The neurons, ganglia, and whatever other 'physical' structural features you like to think about, are WHERE the dynamic interaction structures take place. Much work has been done to show that synapses vary in a metastable way in response to how they are used by the interaction patterns in which they participate, as also do dendrites which may move, extend, contract or die off in response to how they are used. The figurative nature of these patterns is embodied in the multiple, distributed locations in which most of their activity takes place and also in the characteristic temporal consistency of interaction between the spatially discrete or contiguous but contrastive locations. Furthermore it seems very likely, if not yet certain, that many synergistic effects will be occurring such as the occurrence of electric fields oscillating in directions orthogonal to the propagation of impulses. Sure, but it's still just chemical reactions underlying all this. MRI scans may be very good for pinpointing the topological features of this dynamic activity but not so the temporal details. On the other hand EEG records can give much better detail for some temporal features but the spatial resolution is very course and confined to areas near the skull. New techniques using laser beams passed through parts of the brain are capable of giving millisecond resolution to some events occurring deeper within. So also can very thin electrodes which report events within or near individual neurons, but here the problem is the limit to how many needles are allowed to be inserted into a human cortical pin cushion: not many! One day though someone is going to develop a kind of nanobot which can migrate unobtrusively through brain tissue and broadcast radio pulses describing the activity of neurons near by as well as key features of electric fields and other ambient conditions. OK, but I thought you said that MRI and EEG data is difficult to emulate, which it is not. Stathis:'As for scientific research, I never managed to understand why Colin thought this was more than just a version of the Turing test. ' MP: I think the key point is that successful basic
Re: Searles' Fundamental Error
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 2/22/07, *Brent Meeker* [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: A patient says that his leg is paralysed, behaves as if his leg is paralysed, but the clinical signs and investigations are not consistent with a paralysed leg. The diagnosis of hysterical paralysis is made. A patient claims to hear voices of people nobody else sees, responds to the voices as if they are there, but the clinical signs and response to antipsychotic treatment is not consistent with the auditory hallucinations experienced by peopel with psychotic illness. The diagnosis of hysterical hallucinations is made: that is, they aren't hearing voices that aren't there, they only *think* they're hearing voices that aren't there. How is this diagnosis made? It sounds like an impossible distinction - a scientific resolution of the zombie question. The diagnosis of pseudohallucinations is made if they don't have the characteristics typical of hallucinations in schizophrenia - that is, there are third person observable differences. Without these differences it would be impossible to tell and, since psychiatry at least aspires to be an empirical science, the possibility is generally ignored. However, you can have delusions about anything, so it should be at least theoretically possible to have a delusion that you are having a perception. Patients frequently report delusional memories of perceptions: that is, they insist that they had a conversation or experience that they could not even have hallucinated, because they were under observation at the time of the alleged incident. Suppose this process is happening live, so that they believe they are hearing a voice and responding as if they are hearing a voice even though they are not even hallucinating such a thing. We might speculate that the actual experience would surely feel different to the mere belief that they are having the experience, but if they could notice such a difference they would not be deluded. Stathis Papaioannou This comports with the idea that consciousness is a process of making up a narrative history of what the brain's various functional modules considered most important at a given time in order to commit it to memory. I first learned of this theory from John McCarthy's discussion of how to make a conscious robot - but I don't know that he originated it. If it is correct then a malfunction of the brain might cause a narrative to be confabulated that had nothing to do with perception - even perceptions that were acted on appropriately. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Searles' Fundamental Error
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 2/22/07, *Mark Peaty* [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: ... The idea of the Turing test is that an algorithmic implementation of rules will give the required degree of spontaneous creativity. If you don't believe in this, then you don't even believe in weak AI, let alone strong AI or computationalism. That is not a common position among scientists and philosophers of mind; even John - anticomputationalism - Searle agrees that the laws of physics necessitate that human-indistinguishable AI should be theoretically possible. Roger Penrose, and Colin, are very much in the minority. Stathis: 'I can meaningfully talk about seeing red to a blind person who has no idea what the experience is like ... ' MP: OK, but can he or she meaningfully understand you? They can understand many things about sight without actually understanding what it is like to have it, just as we can understand many things about a bat's sonar, in many ways much more than the bat understands. But that part of vision or bat sonar which cannot be understood unless the observer has it himself, no matter how good the collected empirical data, is what is meant by first person experience. Stathis Papaioannou I'm not convinced that there is any such first person experience. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Searles' Fundamental Error
Stathis: Stathis [from the other posting again]: 'There is good reason to believe that the third person observable behaviour of the brain can be emulated, because the brain is just chemical reactions and chemistry is a well-understood field.' MP: Once again it depends what you mean. Does 'Third person observable behaviour of the brain' include EEG recordings and the output of MRI imaging? Or do you mean just the movements of muscles which is the main indicator of brain activity? If the former then I think that would be very hard, perhaps impossible; if the latter however, that just might be achievable. Huh? I think it would be a relatively trivial matter to emulate MRI and EEG data, certainly compared to emulating behaviour as evidenced by muscle activity (complex, intelligent behaviour such as doing science or writing novels is after all just muscle activity, which is just chemical reactions in the muscles triggered by chemical reactions in the brain). MP: 'relatively trivial'? I think perhaps you underestimate what it involved; '... the brain is just chemical reactions, and chemistry is a well-understood field' reinforces this view. My point is that it is NOT just chemical reactions, but chemical reactions which take place in embodiment of multiple overlapping, inter-penetrating and self-organising hierarchies of dynamic structures. I think that various avenues of research are showing that a key feature of brain functioning which 'binds' together the 'just chemical' activities of multiple brain regions at any given moment and simultaneously at multiple scales of size, intensity and frequencies, is the harmonic resonance and interference patterns generated by wave forms which are made up of the combined actions of billions of neurons propagating thousands of impulses per second to form dynamic interaction patterns. I think the only way to truly grasp the scope of what is occurring is through visual imagination but linking one's ideas also to the experience of musical polyphony and rhythms. The trick is to 'see' in the mind's eye that the *effective* structures which make things happen and which constitute our experiences are in fact the wave patterns composed of swarms [or flocks, herds, shoals, clouds] of depolarisations. The neurons, ganglia, and whatever other 'physical' structural features you like to think about, are WHERE the dynamic interaction structures take place. Much work has been done to show that synapses vary in a metastable way in response to how they are used by the interaction patterns in which they participate, as also do dendrites which may move, extend, contract or die off in response to how they are used. The figurative nature of these patterns is embodied in the multiple, distributed locations in which most of their activity takes place and also in the characteristic temporal consistency of interaction between the spatially discrete or contiguous but contrastive locations. Furthermore it seems very likely, if not yet certain, that many synergistic effects will be occurring such as the occurrence of electric fields oscillating in directions orthogonal to the propagation of impulses. MRI scans may be very good for pinpointing the topological features of this dynamic activity but not so the temporal details. On the other hand EEG records can give much better detail for some temporal features but the spatial resolution is very course and confined to areas near the skull. New techniques using laser beams passed through parts of the brain are capable of giving millisecond resolution to some events occurring deeper within. So also can very thin electrodes which report events within or near individual neurons, but here the problem is the limit to how many needles are allowed to be inserted into a human cortical pin cushion: not many! One day though someone is going to develop a kind of nanobot which can migrate unobtrusively through brain tissue and broadcast radio pulses describing the activity of neurons near by as well as key features of electric fields and other ambient conditions. Stathis:'As for scientific research, I never managed to understand why Colin thought this was more than just a version of the Turing test. ' MP: I think the key point is that successful basic science involves a degree of spontaneous creativity that is not merely an algorithmic implementation of rules, as opposed to, say, a competent chess-playing program or a merely classificatory program. It involves the construction of a new way of looking at the world, and then the testing of predictions which arise from the construct. In passing I would say this also is a key test for defining what is a REAL world. I tend to think that a Matrix of the eponymous Hollywood movie type, would suffer from being a Zenoverse: the resolution of time and space would be so lumpy as to REQUIRE a belief in a designer.
Re: Searles' Fundamental Error
Jesse, you differentiate between 'real' (I think you refer to physically measureable) and 'hallucinatorally (excuse for the substitute vocabulary) ((visual)) input to the mind. I wonder if it is right: we acknowledge an nth transformation result of inputs reaching the understanding organ (whatever that may be). It does not make a difference whether such input originated from an outside effect through the eye-mechanism and propagated from there, or was generated from somewhere else and propagated from there. This is why you cannot 'explain' a hallucination to someone - vs. the 'reality'. Yours, that is. We live by a complexity and chopping it off into distinct models leads us to questionable conclusions. A 'virtual' world is 'real' and vice versa. I don't know about 'epiphenomenalia' (I think that refers to effects outside) because we are within the interefficiency of the totality. What we consider 'outside' is part of the complexity we are in. There are different 'levels' of the intensity(?) we recognize, this is part of the study of the 'self'. I am not ready to speak about it. You wrote to Stathis ...people who are deluded... - are they really? Do we have a priviledged standard of saneness (ref: G. Levy)? John Mikes On 2/20/07, Jesse Mazer [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 2/20/07, Jesse Mazer [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I would bet on functionalism as the correct theory of mind for various reasons, but I don't see that there is anything illogical the possibility that consciousness is substrate-dependent. Let's say that when you rub two carbon atoms together they have a scratchy experience, whereas when you rub two silicon atoms together they have a squirmy experience. This could just be a mundane fact about the universe, no more mysterious than any other basic physical fact. What is illogical, however, is the no causal effect criterion if this is called epiphenomenalism. If the effect is purely and necessarily on first person experience, it's no less an effect; we might not notice if the carbon atoms were zombified, but the carbon atoms would certainly notice. I think it all comes down to the deep-seated and very obviously wrong idea that only third person empirical data is genuine empirical data. It is a legitimate concern of science that data should be verifiable and experiments repeatable, but it's taking it a bit far to conclude from this that we are therefore all zombies. Stathis Papaioannou One major argument against the idea that qualia and/or consciousness could be substrate-dependent is what philosopher David Chalmers refers to as the dancing qualia and fading qualia arguments, which you can read more about at http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html . As a thought-experiment, imagine gradually replacing neurons in my brain with functionally identical devices whose physical construction was quite different from neurons (silicon chips emulating the input and output of the neurons they replaced, perhaps). If one believes that this substrate is associated with either different qualia or absent qualia, then as one gradually replaces more and more of my brain, they'll either have to be a sudden discontinuous change (and it seems implausible that the replacement of a single neuron would cause such a radical change) or else a gradual shift or fade-out of the qualia my brain experiences...but if I were noticing such a shift or fade-out, I would expect to be able to comment on it, and yet the assumption that the new parts are functionally identical means my behavior should be indistinguishable from what it would be if my neurons were left alone. And if we suppose that I might be having panicked thoughts about a change in my perceptions yet find that my voice and body are acting as if nothing is wrong, and there is no neural activity associated with these panicked thoughts, then there would have to be a radical disconnect between subjective experiences and physical activity in my brain, which would contradict the assumption of supervenience (see http://philosophy.uwaterloo.ca/MindDict/supervenience.html ) and lead to the possibility of radical mind/body disconnects like rocks and trees having complex thoughts and experiences that have nothing to do with any physical activity within them. Jesse It's a persuasive argument, but I can think of a mechanism whereby your qualia can fade away and you wouldn't notice. In some cases of cortical blindness, in which the visual cortex is damaged but the rest of the visual pathways intact, patients insist that they are not blind and come up with explanations as to why they fall over and walk into things, eg. they accuse people of putting obstacles in their way while their back is turned. This isn't just denial
Re: Searles' Fundamental Error
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 2/21/07, *Jesse Mazer* [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: It is a complicated issue. Patients with psychotic illnesses can sometimes reflect on a past episode and see that they were unwell then even though they insisted they were not at the time. They then might say something like, I don't know I'm unwell when I'm unwell, but when I'm well I know I'm well. OK, but then how do you know that you're not unwell now? How do I know I'm not unwell now? We rely on other people telling us (although of course we won't believe them if we lack insight into our own illness), but in the example of fading qualia we would (a) not notice that the qualia were fading, a kind of delusion or anosognosia, and (b) no-one else would notice either, because by whatever mechanism the external appearance of conscious behaviour would be kept up. So how do I know I'm not that special kind of zombie or partial zombie now? I feel absolutely sure that I am not but then I would think that, wouldn't I? The fact is, it happens all the time, to at least 1% of the population. Stathis Papaioannou But are you claiming that psychotic patients not only are mistaken about what's going on in the external world, but are mistaken about the actual qualia they experience? i.e. if a psychotic says he's hearing voices and thinks they are martians sending him messages via microwaves, not only is he mistaken that the voices come from martians as opposed to being hallucinations, but he's mistaken that he's having the subjective experience of hearing voices in the first place? I've never heard of a condition like that...your example of recognizing one was unwell in the past is more like recognizing the things one was hearing and seeing were hallucinatory rather than accurate perceptions of the external world, not recognizing that one was not hearing and seeing anything at all, even hallucinations. Jesse A patient says that his leg is paralysed, behaves as if his leg is paralysed, but the clinical signs and investigations are not consistent with a paralysed leg. The diagnosis of hysterical paralysis is made. A patient claims to hear voices of people nobody else sees, responds to the voices as if they are there, but the clinical signs and response to antipsychotic treatment is not consistent with the auditory hallucinations experienced by peopel with psychotic illness. The diagnosis of hysterical hallucinations is made: that is, they aren't hearing voices that aren't there, they only *think* they're hearing voices that aren't there. How is this diagnosis made? It sounds like an impossible distinction - a scientific resolution of the zombie question. As with the leg, some of these patients may be malingering for various reasons, but there will be some who genuinely experience the symptom. However, that's a digression. My point was simply that people can be deluded, for example thinking that they can see when they in fact are blind, despite extremely strong evidence that they are deluded. If this is the case, then surely it would be possible to maintain the delusion that nothing remarkable is happening as your qualia gradually fade if there were *no* external evidence of your blindness, because electronic chips are taking over your brain function. I don't actually think this is likely to happen, and the real examples I gave are presumably due to specific (though ill-understood) neurological dysfunction causing lack of insight, since generally we *do* notice when our perceptions are affected due to neurological lesions. Nevertheless, the examples do show that it is possible for qualia to fade away without the patient/victim noticing, and presumably without anyone else noticing if the unconscious component of the functionality of the neuron is replaced. But how, exactly, do you know that the deluded person has NO visual qualia? as opposed to delusional visual qualia? Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Searles' Fundamental Error
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 2/21/07, Jesse Mazer [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: It is a complicated issue. Patients with psychotic illnesses can sometimes reflect on a past episode and see that they were unwell then even though they insisted they were not at the time. They then might say something like, I don't know I'm unwell when I'm unwell, but when I'm well I know I'm well. OK, but then how do you know that you're not unwell now? How do I know I'm not unwell now? We rely on other people telling us (although of course we won't believe them if we lack insight into our own illness), but in the example of fading qualia we would (a) not notice that the qualia were fading, a kind of delusion or anosognosia, and (b) no-one else would notice either, because by whatever mechanism the external appearance of conscious behaviour would be kept up. So how do I know I'm not that special kind of zombie or partial zombie now? I feel absolutely sure that I am not but then I would think that, wouldn't I? The fact is, it happens all the time, to at least 1% of the population. Stathis Papaioannou But are you claiming that psychotic patients not only are mistaken about what's going on in the external world, but are mistaken about the actual qualia they experience? i.e. if a psychotic says he's hearing voices and thinks they are martians sending him messages via microwaves, not only is he mistaken that the voices come from martians as opposed to being hallucinations, but he's mistaken that he's having the subjective experience of hearing voices in the first place? I've never heard of a condition like that...your example of recognizing one was unwell in the past is more like recognizing the things one was hearing and seeing were hallucinatory rather than accurate perceptions of the external world, not recognizing that one was not hearing and seeing anything at all, even hallucinations. Jesse A patient says that his leg is paralysed, behaves as if his leg is paralysed, but the clinical signs and investigations are not consistent with a paralysed leg. The diagnosis of hysterical paralysis is made. A patient claims to hear voices of people nobody else sees, responds to the voices as if they are there, but the clinical signs and response to antipsychotic treatment is not consistent with the auditory hallucinations experienced by peopel with psychotic illness. The diagnosis of hysterical hallucinations is made: that is, they aren't hearing voices that aren't there, they only *think* they're hearing voices that aren't there. But where did you get the idea that hysterics are thought to be incorrect about their own qualia? Is this something you've read in an authoritative source, or your own inference, or something else? I had always understood hysterical illnesses to be something like auto-hypnosis, and if you put someone under hypnosis and tell them that they are hearing voices or that a limb is paralyzed, even after they are taken out of hypnosis they will report that they were really hearing the voices and really feeling nothing in the limb (it is even sometimes possible to use hypnosis as an alternative to anaesthesia during surgery--certainly the people who do this don't later claim that they really were in excruciating pain but were just temporarily deluded into acting as if they weren't!) Also, some early attempts to scan the brains of people under hypnosis seem consistent with the idea that there brain is responding as if they really were experiencing whatever they were hypnotized to experience--in the experiment I read about, when given the Stroop task where subjects have to identify the colors of words even when the words themselves stand for different colors (like the word 'red' with the letters in blue), if the subjects were hypnotized to see the words as gibberish, then there was decreased activity in the part of the brain that deals with conflict resolution and they were able to complete the task significantly faster (see http://www.bioedonline.org/news/news.cfm?art=1865 for some more details). It would be interesting to do a similar experiment where a patient was hypnotized into feeling blind or paralyzed, and then expose them to visual or tactile stimuli--I would predict that activity in the corresponding sensory areas of the brain would be at least suppressed, even if not necessarily quite as low as in a person who had actually been blinded or paralyzed. Jesse _ Find what you need at prices youll love. Compare products and save at MSN® Shopping. http://shopping.msn.com/default/shp/?ptnrid=37,ptnrdata=24102tcode=T001MSN20A0701 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to
Re: Searles' Fundamental Error
I was referring to my own clinical observation treating psychiatric patients. Patients with schizophrenia undoubtedly have perceptions in the absence of stimuli: they have certain stereotypical features which make them instantly recognisable, get better with antipsychotics and fMRI studies show that the appropriate part of the temporal cortex is active during hallucinations (although this is a research rather than a clinical tool). But some patients claim to hear voices with none of the correct psychotic features; similarly, they have delusions without the classic features of paranoid delusions, which do not respond to antipsychotic treatment. These patients are sometimes persecuted by the system, accused of malingering (usually not to their face), but although some are just making it up there are those who are absolutely consistent over time and whose life is affected as much by the symptoms as people with real psychosis. It's very difficult to even conceptualise this state where someone is not deliberately lying about experiencing a psychosis but does not have the well-recognised features of psychosis: it's like having the delusion that you have a delusion, or hallucinating that you're hallucinating. Long term follow-up of these patients show that some of them do eventually develop real psychosis, and others end up doing as poorly in terms of relationships, employment, suicide etc. as patients with schizophrenia. Stathis Papaioannou On 2/22/07, Jesse Mazer [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 2/21/07, Jesse Mazer [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: It is a complicated issue. Patients with psychotic illnesses can sometimes reflect on a past episode and see that they were unwell then even though they insisted they were not at the time. They then might say something like, I don't know I'm unwell when I'm unwell, but when I'm well I know I'm well. OK, but then how do you know that you're not unwell now? How do I know I'm not unwell now? We rely on other people telling us (although of course we won't believe them if we lack insight into our own illness), but in the example of fading qualia we would (a) not notice that the qualia were fading, a kind of delusion or anosognosia, and (b) no-one else would notice either, because by whatever mechanism the external appearance of conscious behaviour would be kept up. So how do I know I'm not that special kind of zombie or partial zombie now? I feel absolutely sure that I am not but then I would think that, wouldn't I? The fact is, it happens all the time, to at least 1% of the population. Stathis Papaioannou But are you claiming that psychotic patients not only are mistaken about what's going on in the external world, but are mistaken about the actual qualia they experience? i.e. if a psychotic says he's hearing voices and thinks they are martians sending him messages via microwaves, not only is he mistaken that the voices come from martians as opposed to being hallucinations, but he's mistaken that he's having the subjective experience of hearing voices in the first place? I've never heard of a condition like that...your example of recognizing one was unwell in the past is more like recognizing the things one was hearing and seeing were hallucinatory rather than accurate perceptions of the external world, not recognizing that one was not hearing and seeing anything at all, even hallucinations. Jesse A patient says that his leg is paralysed, behaves as if his leg is paralysed, but the clinical signs and investigations are not consistent with a paralysed leg. The diagnosis of hysterical paralysis is made. A patient claims to hear voices of people nobody else sees, responds to the voices as if they are there, but the clinical signs and response to antipsychotic treatment is not consistent with the auditory hallucinations experienced by peopel with psychotic illness. The diagnosis of hysterical hallucinations is made: that is, they aren't hearing voices that aren't there, they only *think* they're hearing voices that aren't there. But where did you get the idea that hysterics are thought to be incorrect about their own qualia? Is this something you've read in an authoritative source, or your own inference, or something else? I had always understood hysterical illnesses to be something like auto-hypnosis, and if you put someone under hypnosis and tell them that they are hearing voices or that a limb is paralyzed, even after they are taken out of hypnosis they will report that they were really hearing the voices and really feeling nothing in the limb (it is even sometimes possible to use hypnosis as an alternative to anaesthesia during surgery--certainly the people who do this don't later claim that they really were in excruciating pain but
Re: Searles' Fundamental Error
On 2/20/07, John Mikes [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Stathis (barging in to your post to Mark); Your premis is redundant, a limited model (machine) cannot be (act, perform, sense, react etc.) identical to the total it was cut out from. So you cannot prove it eitherG. As i GOT the difference lately, so I would use 'simulated' instead of 'emulated' if I got it right. Even the 3rd p and as you restrict it: observable behavior is prone to MY 1st p. interpretation (distortion). Of the brain? if you extend it into the tool of mental behavior it refers to more than just the tissue-machine up to our today's level of knowledge. Penrose (though not a friendly correspondent) is smart (happens to Nobelist also) in assuming more than computable. His (if he used it really) brain must be that all inclusive total complexity of all related networks. Whatever today's level of knowledge about it, the brain does what the brain does inside the skull, no? If you remove the brain, then you remove the consciousness. Also, Roger Penrose has not received a Nobel prize; neither has Stephen Hawking. What I really wanted to stress is your expression purpose in evolution. (I am not 'in' for the 'zombie craze' because a person without *anything* belonging to 'it' is not the person), but the *purpose* in conventional 'evolution-talk' points to the ID camouflage of creationism. Evolutionary mutation does not occur 'in order to' better sustainability (a purpose) - rather 'because of'' - in variations induced by the changes in the totality (an entailment). I agree in general, we have to be careful when using words such as purpose when discussing evolution. We can talk about evolution choosing animals with heavier coats when the climate gets colder, because the heavier coats serve a purpose in increasing the animal's survival advantage. Of course, this is just convenient talk: evolution is blind and stupid. How intensely some change may influence 'us' is still my terra incognita to be explored. (In my 'evolution' term i.e. the history of a universe from occurring from the plenitude all the way to re-smoothening into it I include a 'purpose: to facilitate such 're-smoothening from the incipient unavoidable complexity-formation from the plenitude's infinite invariant symmetry - see my 'Multiverse-narrative). John I often find your posts difficult to understand, John, although that puts you in good company :) On 2/18/07, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On 2/18/07, Mark Peaty [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: My main problem with Comp is that it needs several unprovable assumptions to be accepted. For example the Yes Doctor hypothesis, wherein it is assumed that it must be possible to digitally emulate some or all of a person's body/brain function and the person will not notice any difference. The Yes Doctor hypothesis is a particular case of the digital emulation hypothesis in which it is asserted that, basically, ANYTHING can be digitally emulated if one had enough computational resources available. As this seems to me to be almost a version of Comp [at least as far as I have got with reading Bruno's exposition] then from my simple minded perspective it looks rather like assuming the very thing that needs to be demonstrated. You can't prove that a machine will be conscious in the same way you are. There is good reason to believe that the third person observable behaviour of the brain can be emulated, because the brain is just chemical reactions and chemistry is a well-understood field. (Roger Penrose believes that something fundamentally non-computable may be happening in the brain but he is almost on his own in this view.) However, it is possible that the actual chemical reactions are needed for consciousness, and a computer emulation would be a philosophical zombie. I think it is very unlikely that something as elaborate as consciousness could have developed with no evolutionary purpose (evolution cannot distinguish between me and my zombie twin if zombies are possible), but it is a logical possibility. Stathis Papaioannou Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Searles' Fundamental Error
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 2/20/07, *Mark Peaty* [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Stathis:'Would any device that can create a representation of the world, itself and the relationship between the world and itself be conscious?' MP: Well that, in a nutshell, is how I understand it; with the proviso that it is dynamic: that all representations of all salient features and relationships are being updated sufficiently often to deal with all salient changes in the environment and self. In the natural world this occurs because all the creatures in the past who/which failed significantly in this respect got eaten by something that stalked its way in between the updates, or the creature in effect did not pay enough attention to its environment and in consequence lost out somehow in ever contributing to the continuation of its specie's gene pool. Stathis [in another response to me in this thread]: 'You can't prove that a machine will be conscious in the same way you are.' MP: Well, that depends what you mean; 1. to what extent does it matter what I can prove anyway? 2. exactly what or, rather, what range of sufficiently complex systems are you referring to as 'machines'; 3. what do you mean by 'conscious in the same way you are'?; I'm sure others can think of equally or more interesting questions than these, but I can respond to these. 1. I am sure I couldn't prove whether or not a machine was conscious, but it the 'machine' was, and it was smart enough and interested enough IT could, by engaging us in conversation about its experiences, what it felt like to be what/who it is, and questioning us about what it is like to be us. Furthermore, as Colin Hales has pointed out, if the machine was doing real science it would be pretty much conclusive that it was conscious. 2. By the word machine I could refer to many of the biological entities that are significantly less complex than humans. What ever one says in this respect, someone somewhere is going to disagree, but I think maybe insects and the like could be quite reasonably be classed as sentient machines with near Zombie status. 3. If we accept a rough and ready type of physicalism, and naturalism maybe the word I am looking for here, then it is pretty much axiomatic that the consciousness of a creature/machine will differ from mine in the same degree that its body, instinctive behaviour, and environmental niche differ from mine. I think this must be true of all sentient entities. Some of the people I know are 'colour blind'; about half the people I know are female; many of the people I know exhibit quite substantial differences in temperament and predispositions. I take it that these differences from me are real and entail various real differences in the quality of what it is like to be them [or rather their brain's updating of the model of them in their worlds]. I am interested in birds [and here is meant the feathered variety] and often speculate about why they are doing what they do and what it may be like to be them. They have very small heads compared to mine so their brains can update their models of self in the world very much faster than mine can. This must mean that their perceptions of time and changes are very different. To them I must be a very slow and stupid seeming terrestrial giant. Also many birds can see by means of ultra violet light. This means that many things such as flowers and other birds will look very different compared to what I see. [Aside: I am psyching myself up slowly to start creating a flight simulator program that flies birds rather than aircraft. One of the challenges - by no mean the hardest though - will be to represent UV reflectance in a meaningful way.] 1. If it behaved as if it were conscious *and* it did this using the same sort of hardware as I am using (i.e. a human brain) then I would agree that almost certainly it is conscious. If the hardware were on a different substrate but a direct analogue of a human brain and the result was a functionally equivalent machine then I would be almost as confident, but if the configuration were completely different I would not be confident that it was conscious and I would bet that at least it was differently conscious. As for scientific research, I never managed to understand why Colin thought this was more than just a version of the Turing test. 2. I don't consider biological
Re: Searles' Fundamental Error
Le 19-févr.-07, à 20:14, Brent Meeker a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 18-févr.-07, à 13:57, Mark Peaty a écrit : My main problem with Comp is that it needs several unprovable assumptions to be accepted. For example the Yes Doctor hypothesis, wherein it is assumed that it must be possible to digitally emulate some or all of a person's body/brain function and the person will not notice any difference. The Yes Doctor hypothesis is a particular case of the digital emulation hypothesis in which it is asserted that, basically, ANYTHING can be digitally emulated if one had enough computational resources available. As this seems to me to be almost a version of Comp [at least as far as I have got with reading Bruno's exposition] then from my simple minded perspective it looks rather like assuming the very thing that needs to be demonstrated. I disagree. The main basic lesson from the UDA is that IF I am a machine (whatever I am) then the universe (whatever the universe is) cannot be a machine. Except if I am (literaly) the universe (which I assume to be false). If I survive classical teleportation, then the physical appearances emerge from a randomization of all my consistent continuations, What characterizes a consistent continuation? It is a continuation in which I am unable to prove 0 = 1. I can only hope *that* exists. Does this refer to one's memory and self-identity or does it mean consistent with the unfolding of some algorithm or does it mean consistent with some physical law like unitary evolution in Hilbert space? One's memory and self-identity. This is difficult to define for arbitrary machine, and that is why I limit myself with correct and recursively enumerable extensions of Peano Arithmetic. It is enough for finding the comp-correct physical laws. and this is enough for explaining why comp predicts that the physical appearance cannot be entirely computational (cf first person indeterminacy, etc.). You can remember it by a slogan: If I am a machine, then (not-I) is not a machine. Of course something like arithmetical truth is not a machine, or cannot be produced by a machine. Remember that one of my goal is to show that the comp hyp is refutable. A priori it entails some highly non computable things, but then computer science makes it less easy to refute quickly comp, and empiry (the quantum) seems to assess comp, until now. However, as far as I can see it is inherent in the nature of consciousness to reify something. Well, it depends what you mean by reifying. I take it as a high level intellectual error. When a cat pursues a mouse, it plausible that the cat believes in the mouse, and reify it in a sense. If that is your sense of reifying, then I am ok with the idea that consciousness reifies things. But I prefer to use reifying more technically for making existing something primitively, despite existence of phenomenological explanation. Let me be clear, because it could be confusing. A computationalist can guess there is a universe, atoms, etc. He cannot remain consistent if he believes the universe emerge from its parts, that the universe is made of atoms, etc. You are saying that these beliefs entail a logical contradiction. What is that contradiction? OK. I was quick. As I have explained to Peter Jones, it is an epistemological contradiction. Primary Matter looses all its apparent explanative power, given that with or without matter, we have only the arithmetical relation to justify or next OM (by UDA). It is a bit like the particles in Bohm's interpretation of QM. With comp they are totally useless. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Searles' Fundamental Error
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 2/20/07, *Jesse Mazer* [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I would bet on functionalism as the correct theory of mind for various reasons, but I don't see that there is anything illogical the possibility that consciousness is substrate-dependent. Let's say that when you rub two carbon atoms together they have a scratchy experience, whereas when you rub two silicon atoms together they have a squirmy experience. This could just be a mundane fact about the universe, no more mysterious than any other basic physical fact. What is illogical, however, is the no causal effect criterion if this is called epiphenomenalism. If the effect is purely and necessarily on first person experience, it's no less an effect; we might not notice if the carbon atoms were zombified, but the carbon atoms would certainly notice. I think it all comes down to the deep-seated and very obviously wrong idea that only third person empirical data is genuine empirical data. It is a legitimate concern of science that data should be verifiable and experiments repeatable, but it's taking it a bit far to conclude from this that we are therefore all zombies. Stathis Papaioannou One major argument against the idea that qualia and/or consciousness could be substrate-dependent is what philosopher David Chalmers refers to as the dancing qualia and fading qualia arguments, which you can read more about at http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html . As a thought-experiment, imagine gradually replacing neurons in my brain with functionally identical devices whose physical construction was quite different from neurons (silicon chips emulating the input and output of the neurons they replaced, perhaps). If one believes that this substrate is associated with either different qualia or absent qualia, then as one gradually replaces more and more of my brain, they'll either have to be a sudden discontinuous change (and it seems implausible that the replacement of a single neuron would cause such a radical change) or else a gradual shift or fade-out of the qualia my brain experiences...but if I were noticing such a shift or fade-out, I would expect to be able to comment on it, and yet the assumption that the new parts are functionally identical means my behavior should be indistinguishable from what it would be if my neurons were left alone. And if we suppose that I might be having panicked thoughts about a change in my perceptions yet find that my voice and body are acting as if nothing is wrong, and there is no neural activity associated with these panicked thoughts, then there would have to be a radical disconnect between subjective experiences and physical activity in my brain, which would contradict the assumption of supervenience (see http://philosophy.uwaterloo.ca/MindDict/supervenience.html ) and lead to the possibility of radical mind/body disconnects like rocks and trees having complex thoughts and experiences that have nothing to do with any physical activity within them. Jesse It's a persuasive argument, but I can think of a mechanism whereby your qualia can fade away and you wouldn't notice. In some cases of cortical blindness, in which the visual cortex is damaged but the rest of the visual pathways intact, patients insist that they are not blind and come up with explanations as to why they fall over and walk into things, eg. they accuse people of putting obstacles in their way while their back is turned. This isn't just denial because it is specific to cortical lesions, not blindness due to other reasons. If these patients had advanced cyborg implants they could presumably convince the world, and be convinced themselves, that their visual perception had not suffered when in fact they can't see a thing. Perhaps gradual cyborgisation of the brain as per Hans Moravec would lead to a similar, gradual fading of thoughts and perceptions; the external observer would not notice any change and the subject would not notice any change either, until he was dead, replaced by a zombie. Stathis Papaioannou An interesting example. Are these people completely blind? Do they describe seeing things? Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
Re: Searles' Fundamental Error
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 19-févr.-07, à 20:14, Brent Meeker a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 18-févr.-07, à 13:57, Mark Peaty a écrit : My main problem with Comp is that it needs several unprovable assumptions to be accepted. For example the Yes Doctor hypothesis, wherein it is assumed that it must be possible to digitally emulate some or all of a person's body/brain function and the person will not notice any difference. The Yes Doctor hypothesis is a particular case of the digital emulation hypothesis in which it is asserted that, basically, ANYTHING can be digitally emulated if one had enough computational resources available. As this seems to me to be almost a version of Comp [at least as far as I have got with reading Bruno's exposition] then from my simple minded perspective it looks rather like assuming the very thing that needs to be demonstrated. I disagree. The main basic lesson from the UDA is that IF I am a machine (whatever I am) then the universe (whatever the universe is) cannot be a machine. Except if I am (literaly) the universe (which I assume to be false). If I survive classical teleportation, then the physical appearances emerge from a randomization of all my consistent continuations, What characterizes a consistent continuation? It is a continuation in which I am unable to prove 0 = 1. I can only hope *that* exists. OK, it means logical consistency relative to some initial axioms (which you take to be Peano's for the integers). But I take it that there are many continuations which branch. Is a continuation a consistent continuation up to the last branching vertex before 0=1 is proven - or do only infinite continuations count as consistent? I also wonder about basing this on Peano's axioms. Would it matter if we took arithmetic mod some very large integer instead, i.e. finite arithmetic as done is real compters? Wouldn't this ruin some of your diagonalizations? Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Searles' Fundamental Error
On 2/21/07, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: A human with an intact brain behaving like an awake human could not really be a zombie unless you believe in magic. However, it is possible to conceive of intelligently-behaving beings who do not have an internal life because they lack the right sort of brains. I am not suggesting that this is the case and there are reasons to think it is unlikely to be the case, but it is not ruled out by any empirical observation. Stathis Papaioannou The problem is that there doesn't seem to be any conceivable observation that could rule it out. So by Popper's rule it is a not a scientific proposition but rather a metaphysical one. This is another way of saying that there is no agreed upon way of assigning a truth or probability value to it. Brent Meeker This is the usual accusation, but in one sense first person experience is perfectly easily verified - by the first person. This is a problem for science because we want our experiments to be third person repeatable and verifiable, otherwise anyone could make up anything, but arguably this is a practical rather than philosophical requirement. Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Searles' Fundamental Error
On 2/21/07, Jesse Mazer [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 2/20/07, Jesse Mazer [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I would bet on functionalism as the correct theory of mind for various reasons, but I don't see that there is anything illogical the possibility that consciousness is substrate-dependent. Let's say that when you rub two carbon atoms together they have a scratchy experience, whereas when you rub two silicon atoms together they have a squirmy experience. This could just be a mundane fact about the universe, no more mysterious than any other basic physical fact. What is illogical, however, is the no causal effect criterion if this is called epiphenomenalism. If the effect is purely and necessarily on first person experience, it's no less an effect; we might not notice if the carbon atoms were zombified, but the carbon atoms would certainly notice. I think it all comes down to the deep-seated and very obviously wrong idea that only third person empirical data is genuine empirical data. It is a legitimate concern of science that data should be verifiable and experiments repeatable, but it's taking it a bit far to conclude from this that we are therefore all zombies. Stathis Papaioannou One major argument against the idea that qualia and/or consciousness could be substrate-dependent is what philosopher David Chalmers refers to as the dancing qualia and fading qualia arguments, which you can read more about at http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html . As a thought-experiment, imagine gradually replacing neurons in my brain with functionally identical devices whose physical construction was quite different from neurons (silicon chips emulating the input and output of the neurons they replaced, perhaps). If one believes that this substrate is associated with either different qualia or absent qualia, then as one gradually replaces more and more of my brain, they'll either have to be a sudden discontinuous change (and it seems implausible that the replacement of a single neuron would cause such a radical change) or else a gradual shift or fade-out of the qualia my brain experiences...but if I were noticing such a shift or fade-out, I would expect to be able to comment on it, and yet the assumption that the new parts are functionally identical means my behavior should be indistinguishable from what it would be if my neurons were left alone. And if we suppose that I might be having panicked thoughts about a change in my perceptions yet find that my voice and body are acting as if nothing is wrong, and there is no neural activity associated with these panicked thoughts, then there would have to be a radical disconnect between subjective experiences and physical activity in my brain, which would contradict the assumption of supervenience (see http://philosophy.uwaterloo.ca/MindDict/supervenience.html ) and lead to the possibility of radical mind/body disconnects like rocks and trees having complex thoughts and experiences that have nothing to do with any physical activity within them. Jesse It's a persuasive argument, but I can think of a mechanism whereby your qualia can fade away and you wouldn't notice. In some cases of cortical blindness, in which the visual cortex is damaged but the rest of the visual pathways intact, patients insist that they are not blind and come up with explanations as to why they fall over and walk into things, eg. they accuse people of putting obstacles in their way while their back is turned. This isn't just denial because it is specific to cortical lesions, not blindness due to other reasons. If these patients had advanced cyborg implants they could presumably convince the world, and be convinced themselves, that their visual perception had not suffered when in fact they can't see a thing. Perhaps gradual cyborgisation of the brain as per Hans Moravec would lead to a similar, gradual fading of thoughts and perceptions; the external observer would not notice any change and the subject would not notice any change either, until he was dead, replaced by a zombie. Stathis Papaioannou That's an interesting analogy, but it seems to me there's an important difference between this real case and the hypothetical fading qualia case since presumably the brain activity associated with inventing false visual sensations is different from the activity associated with visual sensations that are based on actual signals from the optic nerve. Additionally, we'd still assume it's true that their reports of what they are seeing match the visual qualia they are having, even if these visual qualia have no relation to the outside world as in dreams or hallucinations. In the case of replacing the visual cortex with functionally identical computer
Re: Searles' Fundamental Error
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: It is a complicated issue. Patients with psychotic illnesses can sometimes reflect on a past episode and see that they were unwell then even though they insisted they were not at the time. They then might say something like, I don't know I'm unwell when I'm unwell, but when I'm well I know I'm well. OK, but then how do you know that you're not unwell now? How do I know I'm not unwell now? We rely on other people telling us (although of course we won't believe them if we lack insight into our own illness), but in the example of fading qualia we would (a) not notice that the qualia were fading, a kind of delusion or anosognosia, and (b) no-one else would notice either, because by whatever mechanism the external appearance of conscious behaviour would be kept up. So how do I know I'm not that special kind of zombie or partial zombie now? I feel absolutely sure that I am not but then I would think that, wouldn't I? The fact is, it happens all the time, to at least 1% of the population. Stathis Papaioannou But are you claiming that psychotic patients not only are mistaken about what's going on in the external world, but are mistaken about the actual qualia they experience? i.e. if a psychotic says he's hearing voices and thinks they are martians sending him messages via microwaves, not only is he mistaken that the voices come from martians as opposed to being hallucinations, but he's mistaken that he's having the subjective experience of hearing voices in the first place? I've never heard of a condition like that...your example of recognizing one was unwell in the past is more like recognizing the things one was hearing and seeing were hallucinatory rather than accurate perceptions of the external world, not recognizing that one was not hearing and seeing anything at all, even hallucinations. Jesse _ Mortgage rates as low as 4.625% - Refinance $150,000 loan for $579 a month. Intro*Terms http://www.NexTag.com --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Searles' Fundamental Error
On 2/21/07, Jesse Mazer [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: It is a complicated issue. Patients with psychotic illnesses can sometimes reflect on a past episode and see that they were unwell then even though they insisted they were not at the time. They then might say something like, I don't know I'm unwell when I'm unwell, but when I'm well I know I'm well. OK, but then how do you know that you're not unwell now? How do I know I'm not unwell now? We rely on other people telling us (although of course we won't believe them if we lack insight into our own illness), but in the example of fading qualia we would (a) not notice that the qualia were fading, a kind of delusion or anosognosia, and (b) no-one else would notice either, because by whatever mechanism the external appearance of conscious behaviour would be kept up. So how do I know I'm not that special kind of zombie or partial zombie now? I feel absolutely sure that I am not but then I would think that, wouldn't I? The fact is, it happens all the time, to at least 1% of the population. Stathis Papaioannou But are you claiming that psychotic patients not only are mistaken about what's going on in the external world, but are mistaken about the actual qualia they experience? i.e. if a psychotic says he's hearing voices and thinks they are martians sending him messages via microwaves, not only is he mistaken that the voices come from martians as opposed to being hallucinations, but he's mistaken that he's having the subjective experience of hearing voices in the first place? I've never heard of a condition like that...your example of recognizing one was unwell in the past is more like recognizing the things one was hearing and seeing were hallucinatory rather than accurate perceptions of the external world, not recognizing that one was not hearing and seeing anything at all, even hallucinations. Jesse A patient says that his leg is paralysed, behaves as if his leg is paralysed, but the clinical signs and investigations are not consistent with a paralysed leg. The diagnosis of hysterical paralysis is made. A patient claims to hear voices of people nobody else sees, responds to the voices as if they are there, but the clinical signs and response to antipsychotic treatment is not consistent with the auditory hallucinations experienced by peopel with psychotic illness. The diagnosis of hysterical hallucinations is made: that is, they aren't hearing voices that aren't there, they only *think* they're hearing voices that aren't there. As with the leg, some of these patients may be malingering for various reasons, but there will be some who genuinely experience the symptom. However, that's a digression. My point was simply that people can be deluded, for example thinking that they can see when they in fact are blind, despite extremely strong evidence that they are deluded. If this is the case, then surely it would be possible to maintain the delusion that nothing remarkable is happening as your qualia gradually fade if there were *no* external evidence of your blindness, because electronic chips are taking over your brain function. I don't actually think this is likely to happen, and the real examples I gave are presumably due to specific (though ill-understood) neurological dysfunction causing lack of insight, since generally we *do* notice when our perceptions are affected due to neurological lesions. Nevertheless, the examples do show that it is possible for qualia to fade away without the patient/victim noticing, and presumably without anyone else noticing if the unconscious component of the functionality of the neuron is replaced. Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Searles' Fundamental Error
On Feb 18, 5:46 pm, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On 2/18/07, Mark Peaty [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: My main problem with Comp is that it needs several unprovable assumptions to be accepted. For example the Yes Doctor hypothesis, wherein it is assumed that it must be possible to digitally emulate some or all of a person's body/brain function and the person will not notice any difference. The Yes Doctor hypothesis is a particular case of the digital emulation hypothesis in which it is asserted that, basically, ANYTHING can be digitally emulated if one had enough computational resources available. As this seems to me to be almost a version of Comp [at least as far as I have got with reading Bruno's exposition] then from my simple minded perspective it looks rather like assuming the very thing that needs to be demonstrated. You can't prove that a machine will be conscious in the same way you are. There is good reason to believe that the third person observable behaviour of the brain can be emulated, because the brain is just chemical reactions and chemistry is a well-understood field. (Roger Penrose believes that something fundamentally non-computable may be happening in the brain but he is almost on his own in this view.) However, it is possible that the actual chemical reactions are needed for consciousness, and a computer emulation would be a philosophical zombie. I think it is very unlikely that something as elaborate as consciousness could have developed with no evolutionary purpose (evolution cannot distinguish between me and my zombie twin if zombies are possible), but it is a logical possibility. Stathis Papaioannou I believe that to say that some special substrate is needed for consciousness, be it chemical reactions or anything else, is subscribing to an epiphenominal view. For example, there should be no difference in behavior between a brain that operates chemically and one which has its chemical reactions simulated on a computer; however if it is the chemicals themselves that are responsible for consciousness, this consciousness can have no effect on the brain because the net result will be identical whether the brain is simulated or not. To me, epiphenominalism is a logical contradiction, because if consciousness has no effect on the mind, we wouldn't wonder about the mind-body problem because the mystery of consciousness would have no way of communicating itself to the brain. Therefore, I don't see how anything external to the functioning of the brain could be responsible for consciousness. Jason --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Searles' Fundamental Error
On 2/18/07, Mark Peaty [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: MP: Well at least I can say now that I have some inkling of what 'machine's theology' means. However, as far as I can see it is inherent in the nature of consciousness to reify something. I have not seen anywhere a refutation of my favoured understanding of consciousness which is that a brain is creating a representation of its world and a representation of itself and representations of the relationships between self and world. The 'world' in question is reified by the maintenance and updating of these representations, this is what the brain does, this is what it is FOR. Our contemplation of numbers and other mathematical objects or the abstract entities posited as particles and energy packets etc., by modern physics is experientially and logically second to the pre-linguistic/non-linguistic representation of self in the world, mediated by cell assemblies constituting basic qualia. [In passing; a quale must embody this triple aspect of representing something about the world, something about oneself and something significant about relationships *between* that piece of the world and that rendition of 'self'.] Would any device that can create a representation of the world, itself and the relationship between the world and itself be conscious? If you believe that it would, then you are thereby very close to computationalism, the thing you seem to be questioning. Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Searles' Fundamental Error
Pls see after Jason's remark John - Original Message - From: Jason To: Everything List Sent: Monday, February 19, 2007 3:42 AM Subject: Re: Searles' Fundamental Error On Feb 18, 5:46 pm, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On 2/18/07, Mark Peaty [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: My main problem with Comp is that it needs several unprovable assumptions to be accepted. I believe that to say that some special substrate is needed for consciousness, be it chemical reactions or anything else, is subscribing to an epiphenominal view. For example, there should be no difference in behavior between a brain that operates chemically and one which has its chemical reactions simulated on a computer; however if it is the chemicals themselves that are responsible for consciousness, this consciousness can have no effect on the brain because the net result will be identical whether the brain is simulated or not. To me, epiphenominalism is a logical contradiction, because if consciousness has no effect on the mind, we wouldn't wonder about the mind-body problem because the mystery of consciousness would have no way of communicating itself to the brain. Therefore, I don't see how anything external to the functioning of the brain could be responsible for consciousness. Jason --- JM: I think you are in a limitation and draw conclusions from this limited model to beyond it. Whatever we can 'simulate' is from within the up-to-date knowledge base: our cognitive inventory. That is OK - and the way how humanity developed over the eras of the epistemic enrichment since dawn. Topics are added and views change as we learn more. We are not (yet?) at the end with omniscience. So our today's simulation is valid only to the extent of today's level of knowables. Nobody can include the yet unknown into a simulation. (see the remark of Stathis: You can't prove that a machine will be conscious in the same way you are.) If you insist of considering the brain, it is OK with me (I go further in my views into a total interconnection) but from even the brain you can include into your simulation only what was learnt about it to date. The computer cannot go beyond it either. The brain does. So our model-simulation is just that: a limited model. Are we ready for surprizes? John M --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Searles' Fundamental Error
Stathis:'Would any device that can create a representation of the world, itself and the relationship between the world and itself be conscious?' MP: Well that, in a nutshell, is how I understand it; with the proviso that it is dynamic: that all representations of all salient features and relationships are being updated sufficiently often to deal with all salient changes in the environment and self. In the natural world this occurs because all the creatures in the past who/which failed significantly in this respect got eaten by something that stalked its way in between the updates, or the creature in effect did not pay enough attention to its environment and in consequence lost out somehow in ever contributing to the continuation of its specie's gene pool. Stathis [in another response to me in this thread]: 'You can't prove that a machine will be conscious in the same way you are.' MP: Well, that depends what you mean; 1. to what extent does it matter what I can prove anyway? 2. exactly what or, rather, what range of sufficiently complex systems are you referring to as 'machines'; 3. what do you mean by 'conscious in the same way you are'?; I'm sure others can think of equally or more interesting questions than these, but I can respond to these. 1. I am sure I couldn't prove whether or not a machine was conscious, but it the 'machine' was, and it was smart enough and interested enough IT could, by engaging us in conversation about its experiences, what it felt like to be what/who it is, and questioning us about what it is like to be us. Furthermore, as Colin Hales has pointed out, if the machine was doing real science it would be pretty much conclusive that it was conscious. 2. By the word machine I could refer to many of the biological entities that are significantly less complex than humans. What ever one says in this respect, someone somewhere is going to disagree, but I think maybe insects and the like could be quite reasonably be classed as sentient machines with near Zombie status. 3. If we accept a rough and ready type of physicalism, and naturalism maybe the word I am looking for here, then it is pretty much axiomatic that the consciousness of a creature/machine will differ from mine in the same degree that its body, instinctive behaviour, and environmental niche differ from mine. I think this must be true of all sentient entities. Some of the people I know are 'colour blind'; about half the people I know are female; many of the people I know exhibit quite substantial differences in temperament and predispositions. I take it that these differences from me are real and entail various real differences in the quality of what it is like to be them [or rather their brain's updating of the model of them in their worlds]. I am interested in birds [and here is meant the feathered variety] and often speculate about why they are doing what they do and what it may be like to be them. They have very small heads compared to mine so their brains can update their models of self in the world very much faster than mine can. This must mean that their perceptions of time and changes are very different. To them I must be a very slow and stupid seeming terrestrial giant. Also many birds can see by means of ultra violet light. This means that many things such as flowers and other birds will look very different compared to what I see. [Aside: I am psyching myself up slowly to start creating a flight simulator program that flies birds rather than aircraft. One of the challenges - by no mean the hardest though - will be to represent UV reflectance in a meaningful way.] Stathis [from the other posting again]: 'There is good reason to believe that the third person observable behaviour of the brain can be emulated, because the brain is just chemical reactions and chemistry is a well-understood field.' MP: Once again it depends what you mean. Does 'Third person observable behaviour of the brain' include EEG recordings and the output of MRI imaging? Or do you mean just the movements of muscles which is the main indicator of brain activity? If the former then I think that would be very hard, perhaps impossible; if the latter however, that just might be achievable. Stathis: 'I think it is very unlikely that something as elaborate as consciousness could have developed with no evolutionary purpose (evolution cannot distinguish between me and my zombie twin if zombies are possible), but it is a logical possibility.' MP: I agree with the first bit, but I do not agree with the last bit. If you adopt what I call UMSITW [the Updating Model of Self In The World], then anything which impinges on consciousness, has a real effect on the brain. In effect the only feasible zombie like persons you will
Re: Searles' Fundamental Error
On Feb 19, 7:50 am, John M [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Pls see after Jason's remark John - Original Message - From: Jason To: Everything List Sent: Monday, February 19, 2007 3:42 AM Subject: Re: Searles' Fundamental Error On Feb 18, 5:46 pm, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On 2/18/07, Mark Peaty [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: My main problem with Comp is that it needs several unprovable assumptions to be accepted. I believe that to say that some special substrate is needed for consciousness, be it chemical reactions or anything else, is subscribing to an epiphenominal view. For example, there should be no difference in behavior between a brain that operates chemically and one which has its chemical reactions simulated on a computer; however if it is the chemicals themselves that are responsible for consciousness, this consciousness can have no effect on the brain because the net result will be identical whether the brain is simulated or not. To me, epiphenominalism is a logical contradiction, because if consciousness has no effect on the mind, we wouldn't wonder about the mind-body problem because the mystery of consciousness would have no way of communicating itself to the brain. Therefore, I don't see how anything external to the functioning of the brain could be responsible for consciousness. Jason --- JM: I think you are in a limitation and draw conclusions from this limited model to beyond it. Whatever we can 'simulate' is from within the up-to-date knowledge base: our cognitive inventory. That is OK - and the way how humanity developed over the eras of the epistemic enrichment since dawn. Topics are added and views change as we learn more. We are not (yet?) at the end with omniscience. So our today's simulation is valid only to the extent of today's level of knowables. Nobody can include the yet unknown into a simulation. (see the remark of Stathis: You can't prove that a machine will be conscious in the same way you are.) If you insist of considering the brain, it is OK with me (I go further in my views into a total interconnection) but from even the brain you can include into your simulation only what was learnt about it to date. The computer cannot go beyond it either. The brain does. So our model-simulation is just that: a limited model. Are we ready for surprizes? John M John, Today I would agree, we probably don't know enough about the brain and physcis to make an accurate simulation, nor do we have anywhere near the computational power necessary for such a simulation. My point however is outside of that, it is: If you have two minds (one physical and one simulated) if their states evolve identically and indistinguishably then the simulation must be taking into account all necessary aspects related to the mind's functoning. If some unknown aspect of physics were responsible for consciousness in the physical mind but not the simulated one, it would be detected, as the simulation would diverge from the physical mind (assuming consciousness effects the brain, i.e. a non epiphenominal view) To put in another way, if consciousness effects the mind (which I think is necessary for us to be having this discussion), how could one have a perfect simulation if the simulation is not also concious? If one brain is conscious and there is a perfect simulation of it, the simulation must be conscious. Otherwise the effects of consciousness would cause a divergence in the simulation. Jason --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Searles' Fundamental Error
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 18-févr.-07, à 13:57, Mark Peaty a écrit : My main problem with Comp is that it needs several unprovable assumptions to be accepted. For example the Yes Doctor hypothesis, wherein it is assumed that it must be possible to digitally emulate some or all of a person's body/brain function and the person will not notice any difference. The Yes Doctor hypothesis is a particular case of the digital emulation hypothesis in which it is asserted that, basically, ANYTHING can be digitally emulated if one had enough computational resources available. As this seems to me to be almost a version of Comp [at least as far as I have got with reading Bruno's exposition] then from my simple minded perspective it looks rather like assuming the very thing that needs to be demonstrated. I disagree. The main basic lesson from the UDA is that IF I am a machine (whatever I am) then the universe (whatever the universe is) cannot be a machine. Except if I am (literaly) the universe (which I assume to be false). If I survive classical teleportation, then the physical appearances emerge from a randomization of all my consistent continuations, What characterizes a consistent continuation? Does this refer to one's memory and self-identity or does it mean consistent with the unfolding of some algorithm or does it mean consistent with some physical law like unitary evolution in Hilbert space? and this is enough for explaining why comp predicts that the physical appearance cannot be entirely computational (cf first person indeterminacy, etc.). You can remember it by a slogan: If I am a machine, then (not-I) is not a machine. Of course something like arithmetical truth is not a machine, or cannot be produced by a machine. Remember that one of my goal is to show that the comp hyp is refutable. A priori it entails some highly non computable things, but then computer science makes it less easy to refute quickly comp, and empiry (the quantum) seems to assess comp, until now. However, as far as I can see it is inherent in the nature of consciousness to reify something. Well, it depends what you mean by reifying. I take it as a high level intellectual error. When a cat pursues a mouse, it plausible that the cat believes in the mouse, and reify it in a sense. If that is your sense of reifying, then I am ok with the idea that consciousness reifies things. But I prefer to use reifying more technically for making existing something primitively, despite existence of phenomenological explanation. Let me be clear, because it could be confusing. A computationalist can guess there is a universe, atoms, etc. He cannot remain consistent if he believes the universe emerge from its parts, that the universe is made of atoms, etc. You are saying that these beliefs entail a logical contradiction. What is that contradiction? Brent Meeker I appreciate that the UDA and related treatments in mathematical philosophy, can be rigorous, and enormously potent in their implications for further speculation and development within their universe of discourse, but I remain very sceptical of any advertised potential to bootstrap the rest of the universe. I agree with you. But a thorough understanding of UDA would add substance to your skepticism. With comp, the more we know about the universe, the more we know we are ignorant about it. It is related with the G* minus G gap. Although you can go from G (science) toward G* (correct faith), when you do that, you will discover many genuine new things, but the gap between G and G* will be made greater too. In computerland, it is like each time you see a new star or galaxy, then necessarily bigger things are forced to exist. The more you explore, the more it remains to be explored, necessarily so. Understanding comp and uda makes you infinitely more modest than we are used to think. I must go, Regards, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Searles' Fundamental Error
I would bet on functionalism as the correct theory of mind for various reasons, but I don't see that there is anything illogical the possibility that consciousness is substrate-dependent. Let's say that when you rub two carbon atoms together they have a scratchy experience, whereas when you rub two silicon atoms together they have a squirmy experience. This could just be a mundane fact about the universe, no more mysterious than any other basic physical fact. What is illogical, however, is the no causal effect criterion if this is called epiphenomenalism. If the effect is purely and necessarily on first person experience, it's no less an effect; we might not notice if the carbon atoms were zombified, but the carbon atoms would certainly notice. I think it all comes down to the deep-seated and very obviously wrong idea that only third person empirical data is genuine empirical data. It is a legitimate concern of science that data should be verifiable and experiments repeatable, but it's taking it a bit far to conclude from this that we are therefore all zombies. Stathis Papaioannou One major argument against the idea that qualia and/or consciousness could be substrate-dependent is what philosopher David Chalmers refers to as the dancing qualia and fading qualia arguments, which you can read more about at http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html . As a thought-experiment, imagine gradually replacing neurons in my brain with functionally identical devices whose physical construction was quite different from neurons (silicon chips emulating the input and output of the neurons they replaced, perhaps). If one believes that this substrate is associated with either different qualia or absent qualia, then as one gradually replaces more and more of my brain, they'll either have to be a sudden discontinuous change (and it seems implausible that the replacement of a single neuron would cause such a radical change) or else a gradual shift or fade-out of the qualia my brain experiences...but if I were noticing such a shift or fade-out, I would expect to be able to comment on it, and yet the assumption that the new parts are functionally identical means my behavior should be indistinguishable from what it would be if my neurons were left alone. And if we suppose that I might be having panicked thoughts about a change in my perceptions yet find that my voice and body are acting as if nothing is wrong, and there is no neural activity associated with these panicked thoughts, then there would have to be a radical disconnect between subjective experiences and physical activity in my brain, which would contradict the assumption of supervenience (see http://philosophy.uwaterloo.ca/MindDict/supervenience.html ) and lead to the possibility of radical mind/body disconnects like rocks and trees having complex thoughts and experiences that have nothing to do with any physical activity within them. Jesse _ Refi Now: Rates near 39yr lows! $430,000 Mortgage for $1,399/mo - Calculate new payment http://www.lowermybills.com/lre/index.jsp?sourceid=lmb-9632-17727moid=7581 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Searles' Fundamental Error
As I wrote in my response to Russell Standish: * I think [Russell's] 'kicks back' = physical = measurable in some way, and * I think 'exists' is a generic, irreducible, ultimate value. In fact it is THE generic, irreducible, ultimate value and it underlies mathematical objects such as numbers as well as everything else. I think also [something of the waggy tail of this dog] that we are beset by irreducible paradox in our experience as conscious beings, which does not have to be terminally traumatic but does mean that we will always be prone to potentially embarrassing mistakes of perception and thought. NB: I will be happy to be proven wrong, but this will require that the proof is translatable into 'plain-English' :-) and, preferably points to clear empirical evidence for backup. My main problem with Comp is that it needs several unprovable assumptions to be accepted. For example the Yes Doctor hypothesis, wherein it is assumed that it must be possible to digitally emulate some or all of a person's body/brain function and the person will not notice any difference. The Yes Doctor hypothesis is a particular case of the digital emulation hypothesis in which it is asserted that, basically, ANYTHING can be digitally emulated if one had enough computational resources available. As this seems to me to be almost a version of Comp [at least as far as I have got with reading Bruno's exposition] then from my simple minded perspective it looks rather like assuming the very thing that needs to be demonstrated. Bruno:'All this provides mathematical clean interpretation of neoplatonist researchers (like Plato, Plotinus, Proclus). If you want I show that concerning machine's theology it is wrong to reify matter or nature. Note that I am using the term materialism in a weaker sense than its use in philosophy of mind. But materialism I mean the metaphysical reification of Matter. The idea that some primitive matter exists. ' MP: Well at least I can say now that I have some inkling of what 'machine's theology' means. However, as far as I can see it is inherent in the nature of consciousness to reify something. I have not seen anywhere a refutation of my favoured understanding of consciousness which is that a brain is creating a representation of its world and a representation of itself and representations of the relationships between self and world. The 'world' in question is reified by the maintenance and updating of these representations, this is what the brain does, this is what it is FOR. Our contemplation of numbers and other mathematical objects or the abstract entities posited as particles and energy packets etc., by modern physics is experientially and logically second to the pre-linguistic/non-linguistic representation of self in the world, mediated by cell assemblies constituting basic qualia. [In passing; a quale must embody this triple aspect of representing something about the world, something about oneself and something significant about relationships *between* that piece of the world and that rendition of 'self'.] I appreciate that the UDA and related treatments in mathematical philosophy, can be rigorous, and enormously potent in their implications for further speculation and development within their universe of discourse, but I remain very sceptical of any advertised potential to bootstrap the rest of the universe. I have been trying to create a worthy reply to Jason's posting of 14 Jan 07 on the Evidence for the simulation argument. In it I am trying to confront this very issue I think .I guess my basic complaint comes down to these things: * actual existence is an irreducible value or Values * structure entails more than just the existence of mathematical objects of/with numerically representable values, it entails differences and separation which are not just conceptual but ontological, so maybe what I am saying is that structure is in some way irreducible, which might be better put in some minimalist formula like: structuring has an irreducible minimum ontological dimensionality * this seems to require that we acknowledge that things which really exist ARE SOMEWHERE now - and I know Bruno has already asserted that this is not so 'if Comp is true' but I have certainly not encountered any kind of plain-English exposition that refutes the problem as I see it * the Church Thesis, as I understand it, is an assertion about digital computations saying, more or less, that any kind of digital computation can be emulated by and within another digital computation system, and this is fine as far as it goes but I have seen an argument put that there are various aspects of physical existence which cannot be translated exactly into digital representation, so any digital *emulation* will be a
Re: Searles' Fundamental Error
My apologies if my replying seems a bit slow. I *have* been thinking about these things though. I thought to try and make excuses, but really all that is necessary, amongst ethical correspondents anyway, is a forthright confession of mental inadequacy, n'est ce pas? :-) I think 'kicks back' = measurable in some way. I think 'exists' is a generic, irreducible, ultimate value. In fact it is THE generic, irreducible, ultimate value and it underlies mathematical objects such as numbers as well as everything else. I will try and give an account of this assertion in my reply to Bruno on this thread because Bruno has provided the biggest challenge to my, uhhh, maturing brain. I have no real hopes of discovering a/the 'killer' argument, apart from claiming that 'Comp' always begs the question. Regards Mark Peaty CDES [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/ Russell Standish wrote: On Wed, Feb 07, 2007 at 06:10:34PM -0500, John M wrote: I can't wait for Bruno's (and others') versions. John M My take on physical and existence. Physical: that which kicks back in the Samuel Johnson sense. It doesn't rule out idealism, because the virtual reality in a VR simulation also kicks back. Existence: This is a word with many meanings. To use it, one should first say what type of existence you mean. For instance mathematical existence means a property of a number that is true - eg 47 is prime. Anthropic existence might mean something that kicks back to some observer somewhere in the plenitude of possibilities. There is another type of existence referring to that which kicks back to me here, right now. And so on. It is possible to say physical existence = mathematical existence as Tegmark does, but this is almost a definition, rather than a statement of metaphysics. Cheers --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Searles' Fundamental Error
Le 07-févr.-07, à 17:34, Mark Peaty a écrit : Bruno: 'Dont hesitate to ask why, I am sure few people have understand the whole point. Some are close to it, perhaps by having figure this out by themselves.' MP: Don't look at me boss ... I'm just glad I don't have to understand 'it' to be able to exist within it! Of course! Like babies can use their brain without understanding it ... SO, yes I will ask: What do you mean by 'physical'? It concerns the stable appearance described by hypothetical physical theories (like classical mechanics, QM, etc.). I found an argument showing that IF comp(*) is correct THEN those stable appearances emerge from arithmetic as seen from internalized point of views. Those can be described in computer science, and It makes the comp hyp falsifiable: just extract the physical appearance from comp and compare with nature. I will say more in a reply to Stathis. (*) comp means there exist a tuiring emulable level of description of myself (whatever I am), meaning I would notice a functional substitution made at that level). And next: what do you mean by 'exist'? There are mainly two sort of existence. The absolute fundamental one, and the internal or phenomenological one. If you understand the Universal Dovetailer Argument, you can understand that, assuming the comp hypothesis, it is enough to interpret existence by the existential quantifier in some first order logic description of arithmetic. (like when you say it exist a prime number). All the other existence (like headache, but also bosons, fermions, anyons, ...) are phenomelogical, and can be described by It exist a stable and coherent collection of machines correctly believing from their point of view in bosons, etc. (I simplify a bit). If you want, I say that IF comp is true, only numbers exist, all the rest are dreams with relative degree of stability. These are very basic questions, and in our context here, 'dumb' questions for sure, but without some clarification on how people are using these words, I don't think I can go any further. You are welcome, and I don't believe there is dumb questions. I have developed the Universal dovetailer argument, in the seventies, and it was a pedagogical tools for explaining the mathematical theory which consist in interviewing an universal machine on its possible physics. I have published all this in the eighties and defend it as a thesis in the nineties. I am aware it goes against materialism (based on the concept of primary (aristotelian) materialism. All this provides mathematical clean interpretation of neoplatonist researchers (like Plato, Plotinus, Proclus). If you want I show that concerning machine's theology it is wrong to reify matter or nature. Note that I am using the term materialism in a weaker sense than its use in philosophy of mind. But materialism I mean the metaphysical reification of Matter. The idea that some primitive matter exists. Hope this helps a bit. Perhaps you could study my last version of UDA in my SANE04 paper to see the point. You can ask question for any step. Then if you are willing to invest in mathematical logic, you will see how the UDA can be made entirely mathematical *and* falsifiable. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Searles' Fundamental Error
Le 07-févr.-07, à 18:06, Torgny Tholerus a écrit : Mark Peaty skrev: And next: what do you mean by 'exist'? Our Universe is a mathemathical possibility. That is why our Universe exists. Every mathematically possible Universe exists in the same way. But we can not get in touch with any of the other Universes, so from our point of view does the other Universes not exist. If comp is true, the physical universe is not a mathematical possibility. It is something much more deeply related to mathematics. With the comp hyp physical universes emerge necessarily from the interference of all mathematical possibilities, and the physical laws are the invariant of such possibilities for their internal local observers. This entails we *are* in touch with the other universes, and they do exist from our point of view. It is just an open problem if QM really confirms this easily (cf UDA+movie-graph) derivable, from comp, fact. This is what I try to explain in this list since the beginning (and elsewhere before). Tegmark and Schmidhuber have missed this fundamental point. Schmidhuber missed it by his refusal to distinguish between 1 and 3 person points of view, and Tegmark missed it by not postulating the comp hyp (making a little bit physics just a geography. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Searles' Fundamental Error
Le 08-févr.-07, à 00:10, John M a écrit : Mark: fascinating. I like to ask such stupid questions myself. On my question 'what is consciousness' the best answer I got was: everybody knows it from a prof-fessional. (Yes, but everybody knows it differently). Existence??? I wonder how the honored listers will vote, I would resort to the process (we think) we are in. What process? I can't see it from the inside. See my posts to Mark and Torgny. With 'physical' I take a more primitive stance: I consider it epistemological over our past history, to put primitive and unsatisfactory experiences (observations?) into position of the premature image we formed about the world in the past (including now). Matter-concept is still an imprtant part of it, even in E~m relations. Sensorial - in it - still has the upper hand over mental. Then, all what I say, is that comp would be false. I am open to that idea, and that is why I try to show comp being falsifiable (but surely not yet falsified). I try to include ideation into matterly. And (after Planck) in the reverse order. My firm opinion is: I dunno. We are not yet epistemized enough to form an educated guess. I think a excellent epistemization has been done from Pythagorus to Proclus, but then on this matter (!) we have been brainwashed by 1500 years of authoritative aristotelianism. the scientific field of theology has regressed, but at the same time I would like to insist that even christian theology has been able to keep intact a large part of Plotinus. Alas, christian theology is incorrect on the part where they agree with the atheists. * If I combine the two: physical existence (no 'primitive' included, rather implying it to ourselves) I visualize the unrestricted complexity of 'everything' (already known or not) so any teleported remnant of 'us' sounds impossible without 'all' of the combined ingredients we are part of. Yes. That is provably comp-correct (if I understand you well). * I carry an intrauniverse view as a human, product of the churnings here and now and a BIG complexity-view as a spaceless-timeless multiverse OK. BY the 'plenitude' about which we cannot know much. In between I allow a 'small' complexity-view as pertinent to our universe. For this I violate my scepticism against the Big Bang fable - and consider our universe from BB to dissipation, the entire history, as evolution. H. To be sure comp is not enough developed so as to say anything precise on the big bang, but it is hard to believe the big bang could be a beginning, with comp. I am nowhere ready to outline these superstitions. I'm not sure why. Bruno I can't wait for Bruno's (and others') versions. John M and let me join Angelica [Rugrat](???) - Original Message - From: Mark Peaty To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Wednesday, February 07, 2007 11:34 AM Subject: Re: Searles' Fundamental Error Bruno: 'Dont hesitate to ask why, I am sure few people have understand the whole point. Some are close to it, perhaps by having figure this out by themselves.' MP: Don't look at me boss ... I'm just glad I don't have to understand 'it' to be able to exist within it! SO, yes I will ask: What do you mean by 'physical'? And next: what do you mean by 'exist'? These are very basic questions, and in our context here, 'dumb' questions for sure, but without some clarification on how people are using these words, I don't think I can go any further. Regards Mark Peaty CDES [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/ I think therefore I am right! - Angelica [Rugrat] Bruno Marchal wrote:Hi Mark, Le 03-févr.-07, à 17:12, Mark Peaty a écrit : John, I share your apparent perplexity. No matter which way up I look at the things being discussed on this list, I always end up back in the same place [and yes it is always 'here' :-] which is that clearly prior to anything else is the fact of existence. I have to take this at too levels: 1/ firstly as sloganised by Mr R Descartes: 'I think therefore I am', although because I am naturally timid I tend more often to say something like: 'I think therefore I cannot escape the idea that if I say I don't exist it doesn't seem to sound quite right', That is good for you. I would say that Descartes gives a correct but useless proof of the existence of Descartes' first person. It is useless because He knew it before his argument. 2/ the macroscopic corollary of the subjective microcosm just mentioned is that it I try to assert that nothing exists that just seems to be plain wrong, and if I dwell on the situations I find myself in - beset as I am with ceaseless domestic responsibilities and work related bureaucratic constraints, the clearest simple intuition about it all is that the universe exists whether I know it or not. Nobody has ever
Re: Searles' Fundamental Error
Bruno, I 'may' come back to your (appreciated) remarks, to the last 'why' I respond: Because I feel my head in all these ideas - back-and-forth - like looking at a busy beehive and trying to follow ONE particular bee in it. John On 2/9/07, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Le 08-févr.-07, ŕ 00:10, John M a écrit : Mark: fascinating. I like to ask such stupid questions myself. On my question 'what is consciousness' the best answer I got was: everybody knows it from a prof-fessional. (Yes, but everybody knows it differently). Existence??? I wonder how the honored listers will vote, I would resort to the process (we think) we are in. What process? I can't see it from the inside. See my posts to Mark and Torgny. With 'physical' I take a more primitive stance:I consider it epistemological over our past history, to put primitive and unsatisfactory experiences (observations?) into position of the premature image we formed about the world in the past (including now). Matter-concept is still an imprtant part of it, even in E~m relations. Sensorial - in it- still has the upper hand over mental. Then, all what I say, is that comp would be false. I am open to that idea, and that is why I try to show comp being falsifiable (but surely not yet falsified). I try to include ideation into matterly. And (after Planck) in the reverseorder. My firm opinion is: I dunno. We are not yet epistemized enough to form an educated guess. I think a excellent epistemization has been done from Pythagorus to Proclus, but then on this matter (!) we have been brainwashed by 1500 years of authoritative aristotelianism. the scientific field of theology has regressed, but at the same time I would like to insist that even christian theology has been able to keep intact a large part of Plotinus. Alas, christian theology is incorrect on the part where they agree with the atheists. * If I combine the two: physical existence (no 'primitive' included, rather implying it to ourselves) I visualize the unrestricted complexity of 'everything' (already known or not) so any teleported remnant of 'us' sounds impossible without 'all' of the combinedingredients we are part of. Yes. That is provably comp-correct (if I understand you well). * I carry an intrauniverse view as a human, product of the churningshereand now and a BIGcomplexity-view as a spaceless-timelessmultiverse OK. BY the 'plenitude' about which we cannot know much. In between I allow a 'small' complexity-view as pertinent to our universe. For this I violate my scepticism against the Big Bang fable - and consider our universe from BB to dissipation, the entire history, as evolution. H. To be sure comp is not enough developed so as to say anything precise on the big bang, but it is hard to believe the big bang could be a beginning, with comp. I am nowhere ready to outline these superstitions. I'm not sure why. Bruno I can't wait for Bruno's (and others') versions. John M and let me join Angelica [Rugrat](???) - Original Message - From: Mark Peaty To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Wednesday, February 07, 2007 11:34 AM Subject: Re: Searles' Fundamental Error Bruno: 'Dont hesitate to ask why, I am sure few people have understand the whole point. Some are close to it, perhaps by having figure this out by themselves.' MP: Don't look at me boss ... I'm just glad I don't have to understand 'it' to be able to exist within it! SO, yes I will ask: What do you mean by 'physical'? And next: what do you mean by 'exist'? These are very basic questions, and in our context here, 'dumb' questions for sure, but without some clarification on how people are using these words, I don't think I can go any further. Regards Mark Peaty CDES [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/ I think therefore I am right! - Angelica [Rugrat] Bruno Marchal wrote:Hi Mark, Le 03-févr.-07, ŕ 17:12, Mark Peaty a écrit : John, I share your apparent perplexity. No matter which way up I look at the things being discussed on this list, I always end up back in the same place [and yes it is always 'here' :-] which is that clearly prior to anything else is the fact of existence. I have to take this at too levels: 1/ firstly as sloganised by Mr R Descartes: 'I think therefore I am', although because I am naturally timid I tend more often to say something like: 'I think therefore I cannot escape the idea that if I say I don't exist it doesn't seem to sound quite right', That is good for you. I would say that Descartes gives a correct but useless proof of the existence of Descartes' first person. It is useless because He knew it before his argument. 2/ the macroscopic corollary of the subjective microcosm just mentioned is that it I try to assert
Re: Searles' Fundamental Error
Bruno: 'Dont hesitate to ask why, I am sure few people have understand the whole point. Some are close to it, perhaps by having figure this out by themselves.' MP: Don't look at me boss ... I'm just glad I don't have to understand 'it' to be able to exist within it! SO, yes I will ask: What do you mean by 'physical'? And next: what do you mean by 'exist'? These are very basic questions, and in our context here, 'dumb' questions for sure, but without some clarification on how people are using these words, I don't think I can go any further. Regards Mark Peaty CDES [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/ I think therefore I am right! - Angelica [Rugrat] Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi Mark, Le 03-févr.-07, à 17:12, Mark Peaty a écrit : John, I share your apparent perplexity. No matter which way up I look at the things being discussed on this list, I always end up back in the same place [and yes it is always 'here' :-] which is that clearly prior to anything else is the fact of existence. I have to take this at too levels: 1/ firstly as sloganised by Mr R Descartes: 'I think therefore I am', although because I am naturally timid I tend more often to say something like: 'I think therefore I cannot escape the idea that if I say I don't exist it doesn't seem to sound quite right', That is good for you. I would say that Descartes gives a correct but useless proof of the existence of Descartes' first person. It is useless because He knew it before his argument. 2/ the macroscopic corollary of the subjective microcosm just mentioned is that it I try to assert that nothing exists that just seems to be plain wrong, and if I dwell on the situations I find myself in - beset as I am with ceaseless domestic responsibilities and work related bureaucratic constraints, the clearest simple intuition about it all is that the universe exists whether I know it or not. Nobody has ever said that nothing exist. I do insist that even me has a strong belief in the existence of a universe, even in a physical universe. But then I keep insisting that IF the comp hyp is correct, then materialism is false, and that physical universe is neither material nor primitively physical. I am just saying to the computationalist that they have to explain the physical laws, without assuming any physics at the start. It is a technical point. If we are digital machine then we must explain particles and waves from the relation between numbers, knots, and other mathematical object. Dont hesitate to ask why, I am sure few people have understand the whole point. Some are close to it, perhaps by having figure this out by themselves. In short, being anything at all seems to entail being somewhere now, and even though numbers and mathematical operations seem to be wonderfully effective at representing many aspects of things going on in the world, there seems to be no way of knowing if the universe should be described as ultimately numeric in nature. You are right. Actually if comp is correct, what you are saying here can be justified. I must say too, that I am finding this and other consciousness/deep and meaningful discussion groups somewhat akin to the astronomer Hubble's view of the universe; the threads and discourses seem to be expanding away from me at great speed, so that every time I try to follow and respond to something, everything seems to have proliferated AND gone just that little bit further out of reach! Keep asking. Have you understood the first seven steps of the UD Argument ? Look at my SANE paper. I think this makes available the necessity of the reversal physics/math without technics. Most in this list were already open to the idea that a theory of everything has the shape of a probability calculus on observer moment. Then some of us believe it is a relative measure, and some of us accept the comp hyp which adds many constraints, which is useful for making things more precise, actually even falsifiable in Popper sense. I must go. I am busy this week, but this just means I will be more slow than usual. Keep asking if you are interested. Don't let you abuse by possible jargon ... Just don't let things go out of reach ... (but keep in mind that consciousness/reality questions are deep and complex, so it is normal to be stuck on some post, etc.). Best, Bruno Regards Mark Peaty CDES [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/ John Mikes wrote: Bruno: has anybody ever seen numbers? (except for Aunt Milly who dreamed up the 5 numbers she saw in her dream - for the lottery). Where is the universe - good question, but: Has anybody ever seen Other universes? Have we learned or developed (advanced)
Re: Searles' Fundamental Error
Mark Peaty skrev: And next: what do you mean by 'exist'? 'Exist' is exactly the same as 'mathematical possibility'. Our Universe is a mathemathical possibility. That is why our Universe exists. Every mathematically possible Universe exists in the same way. But we can not get in touch with any of the other Universes, so from our point of view does the other Universes not exist. -- Torgny Tholerus --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Searles' Fundamental Error
Torgny Tholerus wrote: Mark Peaty skrev: And next: what do you mean by 'exist'? 'Exist' is exactly the same as 'mathematical possibility'. Our Universe is a mathemathical possibility. That is why our Universe exists. Every mathematically possible Universe exists in the same way. But we can not get in touch with any of the other Universes, so from our point of view does the other Universes not exist. -- Torgny Tholerus But what is mathematical possibility? Is it the same as logically possible? Does it rule out, The book is green and the book is red.? Or does it only rule out, The book is green and the book is not green.? Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Searles' Fundamental Error
Brent Meeker skrev: Torgny Tholerus wrote: Mark Peaty skrev: And next: what do you mean by 'exist'? 'Exist' is exactly the same as 'mathematical possibility'. Our Universe is a mathemathical possibility. That is why our Universe exists. Every mathematically possible Universe exists in the same way. But we can not get in touch with any of the other Universes, so from our point of view does the other Universes not exist. But what is mathematical possibility? Is it the same as logically possible? Does it rule out, The book is green and the book is red.? Or does it only rule out, The book is green and the book is not green.? Yes, it is the same as logically possible. One simple Universe is the Game of Life, with some starting configuration. This simple Universe exists in the same way as our Universe, even if nobody ever tries this starting configuration. -- Torgny Tholerus --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Searles' Fundamental Error
Torgny Tholerus wrote: Brent Meeker skrev: Torgny Tholerus wrote: Mark Peaty skrev: And next: what do you mean by 'exist'? 'Exist' is exactly the same as 'mathematical possibility'. Our Universe is a mathemathical possibility. That is why our Universe exists. Every mathematically possible Universe exists in the same way. But we can not get in touch with any of the other Universes, so from our point of view does the other Universes not exist. But what is mathematical possibility? Is it the same as logically possible? Does it rule out, The book is green and the book is red.? Or does it only rule out, The book is green and the book is not green.? Yes, it is the same as logically possible. One simple Universe is the Game of Life, with some starting configuration. This simple Universe exists in the same way as our Universe, even if nobody ever tries this starting configuration. But that doesn't answer the question. Can a thing be both red and green? Is that logically impossible or only nomologically impossible? It seems to me there is a problem with talking about logically possible. I can adopt some axioms including an axiom that says a thing can be any two different colors at the same time and then proceed with logical inferences to derive a lot of theorems and so long as I don't have another axiom that says a thing can only be one color at a time I won't run into an inconsistency. Does that mean it is possible for the a thing to be two different colors at the same time - I don't think so. But the reason I don't think so is an inductive inference about the physical world and the meaning of words by reference to it (as Bruno would say, the absence of white rabbits), not with logic. Also, logically possible is the same as logically consistent (at least under most rules of inference). But except for simple systems you cannot know when a logical system is consistent. I think that's why Bruno builds on arithmetic; because he can ask you to bet it is true and you probably will even though it cannot be proven consistent (internally). If he asked you to bet on metric manifolds over the octonions you might bet the other way. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Searles' Fundamental Error
By who's logic? John M - Original Message - From: Torgny Tholerus To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Wednesday, February 07, 2007 1:35 PM Subject: Re: Searles' Fundamental Error Brent Meeker skrev: Torgny Tholerus wrote: Mark Peaty skrev: And next: what do you mean by 'exist'? 'Exist' is exactly the same as 'mathematical possibility'. Our Universe is a mathemathical possibility. That is why our Universe exists. Every mathematically possible Universe exists in the same way. But we can not get in touch with any of the other Universes, so from our point of view does the other Universes not exist. But what is mathematical possibility? Is it the same as logically possible? Does it rule out, The book is green and the book is red.? Or does it only rule out, The book is green and the book is not green.? Yes, it is the same as logically possible. One simple Universe is the Game of Life, with some starting configuration. This simple Universe exists in the same way as our Universe, even if nobody ever tries this starting configuration. -- Torgny Tholerus --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Searles' Fundamental Error
Mark: fascinating. I like to ask such stupid questions myself. On my question 'what is consciousness' the best answer I got was: everybody knows it from a prof-fessional. (Yes, but everybody knows it differently). Existence??? I wonder how the honored listers will vote, I would resort to the process (we think) we are in. What process? I can't see it from the inside. With 'physical' I take a more primitive stance: I consider it epistemological over our past history, to put primitive and unsatisfactory experiences (observations?) into position of the premature image we formed about the world in the past (including now). Matter-concept is still an imprtant part of it, even in E~m relations. Sensorial - in it - still has the upper hand over mental. I try to include ideation into matterly. And (after Planck) in the reverse order. My firm opinion is: I dunno. We are not yet epistemized enough to form an educated guess. * If I combine the two: physical existence (no 'primitive' included, rather implying it to ourselves) I visualize the unrestricted complexity of 'everything' (already known or not) so any teleported remnant of 'us' sounds impossible without 'all' of the combined ingredients we are part of. * I carry an intrauniverse view as a human, product of the churnings here and now and a BIG complexity-view as a spaceless-timeless multiverse BY the 'plenitude' about which we cannot know much. In between I allow a 'small' complexity-view as pertinent to our universe. For this I violate my scepticism against the Big Bang fable - and consider our universe from BB to dissipation, the entire history, as evolution. I am nowhere ready to outline these superstitions. I can't wait for Bruno's (and others') versions. John M and let me join Angelica [Rugrat](???) - Original Message - From: Mark Peaty To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Wednesday, February 07, 2007 11:34 AM Subject: Re: Searles' Fundamental Error Bruno: 'Dont hesitate to ask why, I am sure few people have understand the whole point. Some are close to it, perhaps by having figure this out by themselves.' MP: Don't look at me boss ... I'm just glad I don't have to understand 'it' to be able to exist within it! SO, yes I will ask: What do you mean by 'physical'? And next: what do you mean by 'exist'? These are very basic questions, and in our context here, 'dumb' questions for sure, but without some clarification on how people are using these words, I don't think I can go any further. Regards Mark Peaty CDES [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/ I think therefore I am right! - Angelica [Rugrat] Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi Mark, Le 03-févr.-07, à 17:12, Mark Peaty a écrit : John, I share your apparent perplexity. No matter which way up I look at the things being discussed on this list, I always end up back in the same place [and yes it is always 'here' :-] which is that clearly prior to anything else is the fact of existence. I have to take this at too levels: 1/ firstly as sloganised by Mr R Descartes: 'I think therefore I am', although because I am naturally timid I tend more often to say something like: 'I think therefore I cannot escape the idea that if I say I don't exist it doesn't seem to sound quite right', That is good for you. I would say that Descartes gives a correct but useless proof of the existence of Descartes' first person. It is useless because He knew it before his argument. 2/ the macroscopic corollary of the subjective microcosm just mentioned is that it I try to assert that nothing exists that just seems to be plain wrong, and if I dwell on the situations I find myself in - beset as I am with ceaseless domestic responsibilities and work related bureaucratic constraints, the clearest simple intuition about it all is that the universe exists whether I know it or not. Nobody has ever said that nothing exist. I do insist that even me has a strong belief in the existence of a universe, even in a physical universe. But then I keep insisting that IF the comp hyp is correct, then materialism is false, and that physical universe is neither material nor primitively physical. I am just saying to the computationalist that they have to explain the physical laws, without assuming any physics at the start. It is a technical point. If we are digital machine then we must explain particles and waves from the relation between numbers, knots, and other mathematical object. Dont hesitate to ask why, I am sure few people have understand the whole point. Some are close to it, perhaps by having figure this out by themselves. In short, being anything at all seems to entail being somewhere now, and even though numbers and mathematical operations seem to be wonderfully effective at representing many aspects of things going on in the world
Re: Searles' Fundamental Error
On Wed, Feb 07, 2007 at 06:10:34PM -0500, John M wrote: I can't wait for Bruno's (and others') versions. John M My take on physical and existence. Physical: that which kicks back in the Samuel Johnson sense. It doesn't rule out idealism, because the virtual reality in a VR simulation also kicks back. Existence: This is a word with many meanings. To use it, one should first say what type of existence you mean. For instance mathematical existence means a property of a number that is true - eg 47 is prime. Anthropic existence might mean something that kicks back to some observer somewhere in the plenitude of possibilities. There is another type of existence referring to that which kicks back to me here, right now. And so on. It is possible to say physical existence = mathematical existence as Tegmark does, but this is almost a definition, rather than a statement of metaphysics. Cheers -- A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Searles' Fundamental Error
Hi Mark, Le 03-févr.-07, à 17:12, Mark Peaty a écrit : John, I share your apparent perplexity. No matter which way up I look at the things being discussed on this list, I always end up back in the same place [and yes it is always 'here' :-] which is that clearly prior to anything else is the fact of existence. I have to take this at too levels: 1/ firstly as sloganised by Mr R Descartes: 'I think therefore I am', although because I am naturally timid I tend more often to say something like: 'I think therefore I cannot escape the idea that if I say I don't exist it doesn't seem to sound quite right', That is good for you. I would say that Descartes gives a correct but useless proof of the existence of Descartes' first person. It is useless because He knew it before his argument. 2/ the macroscopic corollary of the subjective microcosm just mentioned is that it I try to assert that nothing exists that just seems to be plain wrong, and if I dwell on the situations I find myself in - beset as I am with ceaseless domestic responsibilities and work related bureaucratic constraints, the clearest simple intuition about it all is that the universe exists whether I know it or not. Nobody has ever said that nothing exist. I do insist that even me has a strong belief in the existence of a universe, even in a physical universe. But then I keep insisting that IF the comp hyp is correct, then materialism is false, and that physical universe is neither material nor primitively physical. I am just saying to the computationalist that they have to explain the physical laws, without assuming any physics at the start. It is a technical point. If we are digital machine then we must explain particles and waves from the relation between numbers, knots, and other mathematical object. Dont hesitate to ask why, I am sure few people have understand the whole point. Some are close to it, perhaps by having figure this out by themselves. In short, being anything at all seems to entail being somewhere now, and even though numbers and mathematical operations seem to be wonderfully effective at representing many aspects of things going on in the world, there seems to be no way of knowing if the universe should be described as ultimately numeric in nature. You are right. Actually if comp is correct, what you are saying here can be justified. I must say too, that I am finding this and other consciousness/deep and meaningful discussion groups somewhat akin to the astronomer Hubble's view of the universe; the threads and discourses seem to be expanding away from me at great speed, so that every time I try to follow and respond to something, everything seems to have proliferated AND gone just that little bit further out of reach! Keep asking. Have you understood the first seven steps of the UD Argument ? Look at my SANE paper. I think this makes available the necessity of the reversal physics/math without technics. Most in this list were already open to the idea that a theory of everything has the shape of a probability calculus on observer moment. Then some of us believe it is a relative measure, and some of us accept the comp hyp which adds many constraints, which is useful for making things more precise, actually even falsifiable in Popper sense. I must go. I am busy this week, but this just means I will be more slow than usual. Keep asking if you are interested. Don't let you abuse by possible jargon ... Just don't let things go out of reach ... (but keep in mind that consciousness/reality questions are deep and complex, so it is normal to be stuck on some post, etc.). Best, Bruno Regards Mark Peaty CDES [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/ John Mikes wrote: Bruno: has anybody ever seen numbers? (except for Aunt Milly who dreamed up the 5 numbers she saw in her dream - for the lottery). Where is the universe - good question, but: Has anybody ever seen Other universes? Have we learned or developed (advanced) NOTHING since Pl Ar? It is amazing what learned savant scientists posted over the past days. Where are they indeed? John On 2/1/07, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Le 29-janv.-07, à 21:33, 1Z a écrit : On 24 Jan, 11:42, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Le 23-janv.-07, à 15:59, 1Z a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: Also, nobody has proved the existence of a primitive physical universe. Or of a PlatoniaCall it Platonia, God, Universe, or Glass-of-Beer, we don' t care. But we have to bet on a reality, if we want some progress. Now, here is what I do. For each lobian machine Where are these machines? Platonia? Where is the universe? I prefer to assume what I can see. Fair enough. I think we can sum up the main difference between Platonists and Aristotelians like that: Aristotelians
Re: Searles' Fundamental Error
John, I share your apparent perplexity. No matter which way up I look at the things being discussed on this list, I always end up back in the same place [and yes it is always 'here' :-] which is that clearly prior to anything else is the fact of existence. I have to take this at too levels: 1/ firstly as sloganised by Mr R Descartes: 'I think therefore I am', although because I am naturally timid I tend more often to say something like: 'I think therefore I cannot escape the idea that if I say I don't exist it doesn't seem to sound quite right', 2/ the macroscopic corollary of the subjective microcosm just mentioned is that it I try to assert that nothing exists that just seems to be plain wrong, and if I dwell on the situations I find myself in - beset as I am with ceaseless domestic responsibilities and work related bureaucratic constraints, the clearest simple intuition about it all is that the universe exists whether I know it or not. In short, being anything at all seems to entail being somewhere now, and even though numbers and mathematical operations seem to be wonderfully effective at representing many aspects of things going on in the world, there seems to be no way of knowing if the universe should be described as ultimately numeric in nature. I must say too, that I am finding this and other consciousness/deep and meaningful discussion groups somewhat akin to the astronomer Hubble's view of the universe; the threads and discourses seem to be expanding away from me at great speed, so that every time I try to follow and respond to something, everything seems to have proliferated AND gone just that little bit further out of reach! Regards Mark Peaty CDES [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/ John Mikes wrote: Bruno: has anybody ever seen numbers? (except for Aunt Milly who dreamed up the 5 numbers she saw in her dream - for the lottery). Where is the universe - good question, but: Has anybody ever seen Other universes? Have we learned or developed (advanced) NOTHING since Pl Ar? It is amazing what learned savant scientists posted over the past days. Where are they indeed? John On 2/1/07, *Bruno Marchal* [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Le 29-janv.-07, à 21:33, 1Z a écrit : On 24 Jan, 11:42, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Le 23-janv.-07, à 15:59, 1Z a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: Also, nobody has proved the existence of a primitive physical universe. Or of a PlatoniaCall it Platonia, God, Universe, or Glass-of-Beer, we don' t care. But we have to bet on a reality, if we want some progress. Now, here is what I do. For each lobian machine Where are these machines? Platonia? Where is the universe? I prefer to assume what I can see. Fair enough. I think we can sum up the main difference between Platonists and Aristotelians like that: Aristotelians believe in what they see, measure, etc. But platonists believe that what they see is the shadow of the shadow of the shadow ... of what could *perhaps* ultimately exists. The deeper among the simplest argument for platonism, is the dream argument. Indeed, dreaming can help us to take some distance with the idea that seeing justifies beliefs. Put in another way, I believe in what I understand, and I am agnostic (and thus open minded) about everything else. Now to be sure, I am not convinced that someone has ever seen *primary matter*. Bruno --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Searles' Fundamental Error
Mark, a profound THANKS! I did not reflect lately to your posts (good for you?) because you seemed to merge into the topics on hand. Descartes? a funny story. He was under the thumb of the Inquisition-times and HAD to write idealistically. My version is not so humble as yours: I think, therefore I think I am. Speaking of HUMBLE reminds me of HUBBLE you mentioned. His ingenious (unconfirmed) idea to simulate the redshift with an (optical) Doppler infected the minds of all 20th c. scientists into an extensive(?) cosmology religion. You even dream up a psych metaphor from it. (I like it). Accurately: just as those millions of experiments slanted to prove the BB-related tale led to 'accurate' scientific conclusions. Circularity: 'I' design an experiment within the 'expanding' circumstances and indeed find that the universe expands.(If not: the experiment was wrong). With Hubble invoking magnetic/electric (or whatever) fields(?) to slow down the alleged (= calculated upon primitive measurements) 'wavelength' (whatever that is) would have altered not only our cosmic, but also the other -including philosophical- sciences by now. 'Being' anything? maybe 'becoming' part of a process... Where? space is just a motion-coordinate in our (explanatory) view as time. Motion (change) is harder to catch. I agree with describing the universe numerically: if someone takes such position, it is a fair description - I just don't know of what. (Map vs. the territory). I think you set your goals too high: I want to speculate as well as I can within the cognitive inventory we achieved by today, irrespective of the TRUTH which is unattainable. So far. Less-tenaciously yours John M On 2/3/07, Mark Peaty [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: John, I share your apparent perplexity. No matter which way up I look at the things being discussed on this list, I always end up back in the same place [and yes it is always 'here' :-] which is that clearly prior to anything else is the fact of existence. I have to take this at too levels: 1/ firstly as sloganised by Mr R Descartes: 'I think therefore I am', although because I am naturally timid I tend more often to say something like: 'I think therefore I cannot escape the idea that if I say I don't exist it doesn't seem to sound quite right', 2/ the macroscopic corollary of the subjective microcosm just mentioned is that it I try to assert that nothing exists that just seems to be plain wrong, and if I dwell on the situations I find myself in - beset as I am with ceaseless domestic responsibilities and work related bureaucratic constraints, the clearest simple intuition about it all is that the universe exists whether I know it or not. In short, being anything at all seems to entail being somewhere now, and even though numbers and mathematical operations seem to be wonderfully effective at representing many aspects of things going on in the world, there seems to be no way of knowing if the universe should be described as ultimately numeric in nature. I must say too, that I am finding this and other consciousness/deep and meaningful discussion groups somewhat akin to the astronomer Hubble's view of the universe; the threads and discourses seem to be expanding away from me at great speed, so that every time I try to follow and respond to something, everything seems to have proliferated AND gone just that little bit further out of reach! Regards Mark Peaty CDES [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/ http://www.arach.net.au/%7Empeaty/ John Mikes wrote: Bruno: has anybody ever seen numbers? (except for Aunt Milly who dreamed up the 5 numbers she saw in her dream - for the lottery). Where is the universe - good question, but: Has anybody ever seen Other universes? Have we learned or developed (advanced) NOTHING since Pl Ar? It is amazing what learned savant scientists posted over the past days. Where are they indeed? John On 2/1/07, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Le 29-janv.-07, à 21:33, 1Z a écrit : On 24 Jan, 11:42, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Le 23-janv.-07, à 15:59, 1Z a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: Also, nobody has proved the existence of a primitive physical universe. Or of a PlatoniaCall it Platonia, God, Universe, or Glass-of-Beer, we don' t care. But we have to bet on a reality, if we want some progress. Now, here is what I do. For each lobian machine Where are these machines? Platonia? Where is the universe? I prefer to assume what I can see. Fair enough. I think we can sum up the main difference between Platonists and Aristotelians like that: Aristotelians believe in what they see, measure, etc. But platonists believe that what they see is the shadow of the shadow of the shadow ... of what could *perhaps* ultimately exists. The deeper among the simplest argument for platonism, is the
RE: Searles' Fundamental Error
Mark,As Bertrand Russell comented on Descartes' cogito, it's even going a bit far to deduce I think, therefore I am; all you can say with certainty is I think, therefore there is a thought. There is a difference in kind between certainty and a reasonable model, as there is a difference in kind between zero and a very small number or infinity and a very large number. Stathis PapaioannouDate: Sun, 4 Feb 2007 01:12:42 +0900From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Re: Searles' Fundamental Error John, I share your apparent perplexity. No matter which way up I look at the things being discussed on this list, I always end up back in the same place [and yes it is always 'here' :-] which is that clearly prior to anything else is the fact of existence. I have to take this at too levels: 1/ firstly as sloganised by Mr R Descartes: 'I think therefore I am', although because I am naturally timid I tend more often to say something like: 'I think therefore I cannot escape the idea that if I say I don't exist it doesn't seem to sound quite right', 2/ the macroscopic corollary of the subjective microcosm just mentioned is that it I try to assert that nothing exists that just seems to be plain wrong, and if I dwell on the situations I find myself in - beset as I am with ceaseless domestic responsibilities and work related bureaucratic constraints, the clearest simple intuition about it all is that the universe exists whether I know it or not. In short, being anything at all seems to entail being somewhere now, and even though numbers and mathematical operations seem to be wonderfully effective at representing many aspects of things going on in the world, there seems to be no way of knowing if the universe should be described as ultimately numeric in nature. I must say too, that I am finding this and other consciousness/deep and meaningful discussion groups somewhat akin to the astronomer Hubble's view of the universe; the threads and discourses seem to be expanding away from me at great speed, so that every time I try to follow and respond to something, everything seems to have proliferated AND gone just that little bit further out of reach! Regards Mark Peaty CDES [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/ John Mikes wrote: Bruno: has anybody ever seen numbers? (except for Aunt Milly who dreamed up the 5 numbers she saw in her dream - for the lottery). Where is the universe - good question, but: Has anybody ever seen Other universes? Have we learned or developed (advanced) NOTHING since Pl Ar? It is amazing what learned savant scientists posted over the past days. Where are they indeed? John On 2/1/07, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Le 29-janv.-07, à 21:33, 1Z a écrit : On 24 Jan, 11:42, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Le 23-janv.-07, à 15:59, 1Z a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: Also, nobody has proved the existence of a primitive physical universe. Or of a PlatoniaCall it Platonia, God, Universe, or Glass-of-Beer, we don' t care. But we have to bet on a reality, if we want some progress. Now, here is what I do. For each lobian machine Where are these machines? Platonia? Where is the universe? I prefer to assume what I can see. Fair enough. I think we can sum up the main difference between Platonists and Aristotelians like that: Aristotelians believe in what they see, measure, etc. But platonists believe that what they see is the shadow of the shadow of the shadow ... of what could *perhaps* ultimately exists. The deeper among the simplest argument for platonism, is the dream argument. Indeed, dreaming can help us to take some distance with the idea that seeing justifies beliefs. Put in another way, I believe in what I understand, and I am agnostic (and thus open minded) about everything else. Now to be sure, I am not convinced that someone has ever seen *primary matter*. Bruno _ Live Search: Better results, fast http://get.live.com/search/overview --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Searles' Fundamental Error
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 29-janv.-07, à 21:33, 1Z a écrit : On 24 Jan, 11:42, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Le 23-janv.-07, à 15:59, 1Z a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: Also, nobody has proved the existence of a primitive physical universe. Or of a PlatoniaCall it Platonia, God, Universe, or Glass-of-Beer, we don' t care. But we have to bet on a reality, if we want some progress. Now, here is what I do. For each lobian machine Where are these machines? Platonia? Where is the universe? Here. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Searles' Fundamental Error
On Thursday 01 February 2007 19:28:07 Brent Meeker wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 29-janv.-07, à 21:33, 1Z a écrit : On 24 Jan, 11:42, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Le 23-janv.-07, à 15:59, 1Z a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: Also, nobody has proved the existence of a primitive physical universe. Or of a PlatoniaCall it Platonia, God, Universe, or Glass-of-Beer, we don' t care. But we have to bet on a reality, if we want some progress. Now, here is what I do. For each lobian machine Where are these machines? Platonia? Where is the universe? Here. Where is here ? where are you in this here ? Quentin Anciaux --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Searles' Fundamental Error
On Thursday 01 February 2007 19:34:41 Brent Meeker wrote: Quentin Anciaux wrote: On Thursday 01 February 2007 19:28:07 Brent Meeker wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 29-janv.-07, à 21:33, 1Z a écrit : On 24 Jan, 11:42, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Le 23-janv.-07, à 15:59, 1Z a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: Also, nobody has proved the existence of a primitive physical universe. Or of a PlatoniaCall it Platonia, God, Universe, or Glass-of-Beer, we don' t care. But we have to bet on a reality, if we want some progress. Now, here is what I do. For each lobian machine Where are these machines? Platonia? Where is the universe? Here. Where is here ? where are you in this here ? Quentin Anciaux I'm right here. Mouarf... I don't see you around... strange, maybe you're somewhere else. That remind me of my post about my impression of the locality of the mind inside the body... it is right inside the phenomenal scene... the phenomenal scene is right here or here is the phenomenal scene itself... Quentin --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Searles' Fundamental Error
Quentin Anciaux wrote: On Thursday 01 February 2007 19:34:41 Brent Meeker wrote: Quentin Anciaux wrote: On Thursday 01 February 2007 19:28:07 Brent Meeker wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 29-janv.-07, à 21:33, 1Z a écrit : On 24 Jan, 11:42, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Le 23-janv.-07, à 15:59, 1Z a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: Also, nobody has proved the existence of a primitive physical universe. Or of a PlatoniaCall it Platonia, God, Universe, or Glass-of-Beer, we don' t care. But we have to bet on a reality, if we want some progress. Now, here is what I do. For each lobian machine Where are these machines? Platonia? Where is the universe? Here. Where is here ? where are you in this here ? Quentin Anciaux I'm right here. Mouarf... I don't see you around... strange, maybe you're somewhere else. No. It's because you're not here. That remind me of my post about my impression of the locality of the mind inside the body... it is right inside the phenomenal scene... the phenomenal scene is right here or here is the phenomenal scene itself... Space and time are attributes of our model of the world - as is our concept of self and our locality. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Searles' Fundamental Error
On Thursday 01 February 2007 19:34:41 Brent Meeker wrote: Quentin Anciaux wrote: On Thursday 01 February 2007 19:28:07 Brent Meeker wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 29-janv.-07, à 21:33, 1Z a écrit : On 24 Jan, 11:42, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Le 23-janv.-07, à 15:59, 1Z a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: Also, nobody has proved the existence of a primitive physical universe. Or of a PlatoniaCall it Platonia, God, Universe, or Glass-of-Beer, we don' t care. But we have to bet on a reality, if we want some progress. Now, here is what I do. For each lobian machine Where are these machines? Platonia? Where is the universe? Here. Where is here ? where are you in this here ? Quentin Anciaux I'm right here. In the same though... where are you where you're dead or before you're born... does it have meaning ? Or the reverse, where will be/was the universe after your death/before your birth ? Quentin --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Searles' Fundamental Error (was: rep: rep: the meaning of life)
On 24 Jan, 11:42, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Le 23-janv.-07, à 15:59, 1Z a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: Also, nobody has proved the existence of a primitive physical universe. Or of a PlatoniaCall it Platonia, God, Universe, or Glass-of-Beer, we don' t care. But we have to bet on a reality, if we want some progress. Now, here is what I do. For each lobian machine Where are these machines? Platonia? I prefer to assume what I can see. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
