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On Mon, 15 May 2000, Jacques Mallah wrote:
Another way to go is to consider an implementation
of a computation, extended over time, as you. You
can't tell which implementation you are just from the
available information in an observer-moment.
I
--- Higgo James [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
the ideas Bruno, Jacques and I put forward are
idealist.
My view is that math is fundamental. Ideas should
be derivable from the math of computations. The
physical world is real in that it is mathematical.
=
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From: Scott D. Yelich [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Alastair Malcolm [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: 13 May 2000 20:35
Subject: Re: this very moment
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On Sat, 13 May 2000, Alastair Malcolm wrote:
One way is to try
Fabien Besnard wrote:
I surely am [materialist], as anyone should be when dealing about a
scientific subject.
This is a rather dogmatic assertion. See my posts, or my thesis* for a
proof
that computationnalism entails materialism contradict very weak form
of Occam.
Bruno
* which you can
From: Higgo James [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: '[EMAIL PROTECTED]' [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: RE: this very moment
Date: Thu, 11 May 2000 17:26:35 +0100
Jacques is right: there is no first person, so the distinction is spurious.
'you' have no 'future' so it's meaningless to try to predict it
Well
- Original Message -
From: Scott D. Yelich [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Jacques Mallah wrote:
--- Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
There needs to be psychological time in which to
unravel the history embedded in a single observer
moment. Once one has psychological time, one may as
well go the whole hog and have a complete history,
with an
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On Wed, 3 May 2000, Higgo James wrote:
'Psychological time' is a concept of time, part of your current psychology.
Occam would disapprove of assuming that psychological events are real
events; assuming a hard, physical world when there is no need for one.
I
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