Re: valuable errors

[Jacques M Mallah]

On 14 xxx -1, Marchal wrote:
 OK, so you agree that a computationalist could, in case it is 
 technologically feasible, use teletransport to move herself.
 Remember that the original is destroyed, and reconstituted elsewhere.
 
 I guess you agree that if someone survives teletransport, she will still
 survives teletransport in case of multiple and independent 
 reconstitutions.
 
 Now, you were saying that the entrenched trivial errors concerns the 
 measure issue.
 
 Could you tell me if there is already an entrenched trivial error for 
 those who believes, like myself, that if people tell us in advance that 
 there will be multiple reconstitutions, then, before teletransportation, 
 their immediate futur is undetermined ?
 
 This is what I like to call Mechanist or Computationnalist Indeterminism. 
 So my question is do you believe in Mechanist Indeterminism ?.

The situation you described is completely deterministic, much like
the MWI of QM.
For all practical purposes, a person who is copied should expect
their future selves to be effectively randomly chosen.
If you want to talk about what is actually going on though, I
don't even accept that 'individual identity' carries over from one time
step of a computation to the next.  It's just that the future self or
selves are sufficiently similar to the current self to motivate an
interest in his (or their) well being.

 - - - - - - -
  Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
   Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
I know what no one else knows - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/

Re: valuable errors

[Jacques M Mallah]

On 13 Mar -1, Marchal wrote:
 Jacques M Mallah wrote:
  Yes, that's why I've enjoyed my discussions with Wei Dai.  My
 problem is with what I see as the trivial errors that are so entrenched in
 many of the opinions.
 
 Could you be a little more explicit ? Could you give examples of 
 trivial errors. I suspect everybody here want to make some progress.
 Or are you just thinking that the trivial errors are so much entrenched 
 that you don't believe you will be able to correct them ?

Yes, that has already been demonstrated - e. g. on the measure
issue - and is consistent with my experience in other forums.

 I know that you present yourself as a computationalist, but just to clear 
 things up, does it mean you are willing to accept a substitution of your 
 brain (or body) by a digital one, at some level of substitution?

I don't know why that would be unclear.  In my view, in principle,
a digital computer could simulate me in all the important respects and
could be conscious.

 - - - - - - -
  Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
   Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
I know what no one else knows - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/