Hi Bruno,
2009/3/15 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
Hi Günther,
Hi Bruno,
thanks for your interesting answer, I have some questions though.
course, as I said, this will depend of what you mean by you. In
case
you accept the idea of surviving with amnesia, you can even get to
Hi Günther,
Hi Bruno,
thanks for your interesting answer, I have some questions though.
course, as I said, this will depend of what you mean by you. In
case
you accept the idea of surviving with amnesia, you can even get to a
state where you know you are immortal, because your
Hi Günther,
1-OM, (by step 7, correspond to infinity (aleph_zero) of 3-OMs,
themselves embedded in bigger infinities (2^aleph_zero) of
computations going trough their corresponding states.
Between you-in-the-living room, and you-in-the-kitchen there is
already a continuum of
Hi Bruno,
thanks for your interesting answer, I have some questions though.
course, as I said, this will depend of what you mean by you. In case
you accept the idea of surviving with amnesia, you can even get to a
state where you know you are immortal, because your immortality is a
past
Gunther wrote:
...assuming that _every_ computation is conscious qua computation?
brings up in my mind: thinking in comp (at least: in numbers) translates
'conscious' into 'computed' ??
(That would imply an elevation from the binary embryonic contraption as our
computer into more
On 11 Mar 2009, at 02:25, Günther Greindl wrote:
Hi Bruno,
The idea was that the numbers encode moments which don't have
successors
(the guy who transports), that's why there exist alien-OMs encoded
in
numbers which destroy all the machines (if we assume that arithmetic
is
Hi Bruno,
1-OM, (by step 7, correspond to infinity (aleph_zero) of 3-OMs,
themselves embedded in bigger infinities (2^aleph_zero) of
computations going trough their corresponding states.
Between you-in-the-living room, and you-in-the-kitchen there is
already a continuum of
Hi Bruno,
The idea was that the numbers encode moments which don't have
successors
(the guy who transports), that's why there exist alien-OMs encoded in
numbers which destroy all the machines (if we assume that arithmetic
is
consistent).
Hmmm (Not to clear for me, I guess I miss
Bruno, - again the bartender...
*
Initial remark:
I like Gunther's parenthetical condition of arithmetic consistency - which I
find not assured in DIFFERENT universes. As I said axioms (2+2=4) are
in my opinion *thought - conditions* to make one's theory workable and so
they are conditioned by
On 06 Mar 2009, at 18:06, Günther Greindl wrote:
The idea was that the numbers encode moments which don't have
successors
(the guy who transports), that's why there exist alien-OMs encoded in
numbers which destroy all the machines (if we assume that arithmetic
is
consistent).
On 06 Mar 2009, at 18:09, Günther Greindl wrote:
Hi Bruno,
With COMP it is not so clear.
explicit appeal to self-consistency (= the move from Bp to Bp Dt;
the
Dt suppresses the cul-de-sac). With comp, to believe in a next
instant or in a successor state is already based on an act of
Bruno,
My idea was rather that the instantiations would not correspond to
numbers in the first place
But that would violate the comp assumption.
No, you still misunderstand me ;-) not correspond in the sense of
non-existing, not in the sense of existing but not number.
- that is why the
Hi Bruno,
With COMP it is not so clear.
explicit appeal to self-consistency (= the move from Bp to Bp Dt; the
Dt suppresses the cul-de-sac). With comp, to believe in a next
instant or in a successor state is already based on an act of faith.
Please bear in mind that I have not yet
Hi Günther,
On 05 Mar 2009, at 00:50, Günther Greindl wrote:
Bruno,
Indeed, that would be like if a number could make disappear another
number. Even a God cannot do that!
The idea would be rather that some continuations would correspond
to non-existent numbers, like, say, the natural
HI Bruno,
Indeed, that would be like if a number could make disappear another
number. Even a God cannot do that!
The idea would be rather that some continuations would correspond
to non-existent numbers, like, say, the natural number between 3 and
4.
I am not sure I understand. If the
Le 05-mars-09, à 11:10, Günther Greindl a écrit :
HI Bruno,
Indeed, that would be like if a number could make disappear another
number. Even a God cannot do that!
The idea would be rather that some continuations would correspond
to non-existent numbers, like, say, the natural number
Le 05-mars-09, à 11:15, Günther Greindl a écrit :
Hi Stathis,
It is at least conceivable that the collection of particles that is
me
could undergo some environmental interaction such that *all* the
following entangled branches decohere into states that do *not* map
to
the emergent
On 05 Mar 2009, at 12:43, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/3/5 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:
Sure. But note that a lot of things happens, including the white
rabbits and aberrant histories. Quantum intefrence and decoherence
explains why those aberrant histories are relatively rare.
On 04 Mar 2009, at 07:13, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/3/4 Günther Greindl guenther.grei...@gmail.com:
Imagine the sequence:
Scan - Annihilate - Signal - Reconstitute
Now consider that the Signal travels for 100 000 lightyears
before it hits the reconstitution chamber (just to
have
On 04 Mar 2009, at 07:08, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/3/4 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:
That is why the B people made a law, for helping those who
misunderstand the probability. If you decide (before duplication) to
kill the copy, the choice of victim/torturer is still decided
On Wed, 2009-03-04 at 12:25 +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The no-cul-de-sac hypothesis is false if you allow that there is some
means of destroying all copies in the multiverse. But there is
probably no such means, no matter how advanced the aliens.
Indeed, that would be like if a number
Stathis,
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Imagine the sequence:
Scan - Annihilate - Signal - Reconstitute
The no-cul-de-sac hypothesis is false if you allow that there is some
means of destroying all copies in the multiverse. But there is
probably no such means, no matter how advanced the
2009/3/3 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:
I think that comp practitioners will divide, in the long run, along
three classes:
A: majority. Accept teleportation but disallow overlap of
individuals: annihilation first, reconstitution after. No right to
self-infliction. In case of accidental
2009/3/3 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:
I think that comp practitioners will divide, in the long run, along
three classes:
A: majority. Accept teleportation but disallow overlap of
individuals: annihilation first, reconstitution after. No right to
self-infliction. In case of accidental
Stathis
This was mentioned in the TNG technical manual. I do not recall,
right, now, which post TOS episodes mentioned it.
Ronald
On Mar 2, 8:42 am, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/3/2 ronaldheld ronaldh...@gmail.com:
On 03 Mar 2009, at 13:40, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/3/3 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:
I think that comp practitioners will divide, in the long run, along
three classes:
A: majority. Accept teleportation but disallow overlap of
individuals: annihilation first, reconstitution
Hi,
better: this is just the usual comp-suicide self-selection (assuming
of course we can really kill the copies, which is in itself not an
obvious proposition).
I have been thinking along these lines lately, in a somewhat different
context: the teleportation with annihilation
Maybe the terminology does not fit here, to make a copy of my brain,
wouldn't you need more than memories, but the state of the brain at
one time to quantum resolution (TNG transporter term).
Ronald
On Feb 23, 9:04 pm, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/3/2 ronaldheld ronaldh...@gmail.com:
Maybe the terminology does not fit here, to make a copy of my brain,
wouldn't you need more than memories, but the state of the brain at
one time to quantum resolution (TNG transporter term).
The question is what level of resolution is needed in
To have strict continuity you would certainly need the state, but not
at the quantum level, see Tegmark's paper. But you could probably do
without most of the state information if you were willing to accept a
gap - as in anesthesia.
Brent
ronaldheld wrote:
Maybe the terminology does not
2009/2/28 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:
It leads to a very complex question: should we allow people to torture
their doppelganger, for example as a ritual or sexual practice? Of
course not without their consent, given that the golden ethical rule
with comp is don't do to the other what
On 01 Mar 2009, at 09:54, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/2/28 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:
It leads to a very complex question: should we allow people to
torture
their doppelganger, for example as a ritual or sexual practice? Of
course not without their consent, given that the
Stathis, Bruno,
It leads to a very complex question: should we allow people to torture
their doppelganger, for example as a ritual or sexual practice? Of
course not without their consent, given that the golden ethical rule
with comp is don't do to the other what the other does not want you
2009/3/2 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:
All right, I understand. The question now is: are you sure it is in
your interest to be that selfish. It is not a moral question: can
you be coherent, take the full piece of botter dead is not big deal
of the midazolam argument, and keep that sort of
On 28 Feb 2009, at 03:02, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/2/28 Günther Greindl guenther.grei...@gmail.com:
The issue that we are very reluctant to die if our backup is ten
years
old but need not worry so much if we backed up one hour ago is simply
the heuristic that in one hour we
2009/2/27 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
On 26 Feb 2009, at 18:41, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
There is no identity without memories... makes no sense to me.
I take it as a superficial part of identity, with respect to surviving.
Personal identity, I think is more and less than personal
Brent:
who is making that 'backup' or 'replica' of you? and why?
you people take it for granted that a (supernatural???) authority has
nothing else to do except making replicas of members of the Everything List.
And you observe, how good - or bad - its work is.
Some teleological view of pantheism
Bruno, List,
in awaked state. Yet I do distinguish dying and forgetting.
Let us say that we have a measure of continuation (of psychological)
identity from 1 to 0, where 1=full continuation and 0=death, and we
apply this measure from one OM to the next.
Then forgetting would be everything
Stathis, List,
if a backup was made an hour ago, since I (the presently speaking I)
will not be able to anticipate any future experiences. Only if there
As Bruno said in a previous post, what we should care about in personal
survival is not concrete memories (although memories are essential
John Mikes wrote:
Brent:
who is making that 'backup' or 'replica' of you? and why?
Ask Bruno, he's the one who brought it up.
Brent
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John Mikes wrote:
Brent:
who is making that 'backup' or 'replica' of you? and why?
It is only a thought experiment to make clear what we care about
regarding personal identity.
And if computationalism is true, this thought experiment will be
practically quite relevant in the near(?) future
On Fri, Feb 27, 2009 at 08:34:48PM +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/2/27 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:
Gosh! And what if the backup has been done last year, or one minute ago? I
will be dead too? Less dead?
This shows a potential problem the psychological criterion for
2009/2/28 Günther Greindl guenther.grei...@gmail.com:
The issue that we are very reluctant to die if our backup is ten years
old but need not worry so much if we backed up one hour ago is simply
the heuristic that in one hour we don't change so much, but in ten years
we often change so much
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/2/28 Günther Greindl guenther.grei...@gmail.com:
The issue that we are very reluctant to die if our backup is ten years
old but need not worry so much if we backed up one hour ago is simply
the heuristic that in one hour we don't change so much, but in ten
2009/2/26 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
If they are all distinct, then in what sense does S1-S2-S3 form a stream
of consciousness, rather than S1-S2-B3 or even S1-B1-S3-B2. Supposedly
it is that S3 includes some memory of S1 (or earlier Si), but in that
case why couldn't B3 also
On 23 Feb 2009, at 17:15, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you even in
the case where he loses some memory, all memories, or in case he got
new memories, including false souvenirs. But then it is
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 23 Feb 2009, at 17:15, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be
The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you even in
the case where he loses some memory, all memories, or in case he got
Hi,
2009/2/26 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
On 23 Feb 2009, at 17:15, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you even in
the case where he loses some memory, all memories, or in case he got
new
Hi,
Personal identity and memory could be a useful fiction for living. Here
I was alluding to possible deeper sense of the self, which makes me
conceive that indeed there is only one person playing a trick to itself.
Like if our bodies where just disconnected windows giving to that unique
On 26 Feb 2009, at 18:32, Brent Meeker wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 23 Feb 2009, at 17:15, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be
The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you
even in
the case where
On 27 Feb 2009, at 01:57, Günther Greindl wrote:
Hi,
Personal identity and memory could be a useful fiction for living.
Here
I was alluding to possible deeper sense of the self, which makes me
conceive that indeed there is only one person playing a trick to
itself.
Like if our
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 27 Feb 2009, at 01:57, Günther Greindl wrote:
Hi,
Personal identity and memory could be a useful fiction for living.
Here
I was alluding to possible deeper sense of the self, which makes me
conceive that indeed there is only one person playing a trick to
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 26 Feb 2009, at 18:32, Brent Meeker wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 23 Feb 2009, at 17:15, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be
The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you
even in
2009/2/25 meekerdb @dslextreme.com meeke...@dslextreme.com:
It is the potential fusion that bothers me. It would seem to imply that
after Stathis and I have a simultaneous moment of thinking of nothing our
closest continuations might be mixtures, each having some memories
belonging to
On 25 Feb 2009, at 03:39, russell standish wrote:
On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 05:51:49PM -0800, meekerdb @dslextreme.com
wrote:
On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 7:16 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
Exactly (assuming comp). That is even the reason why amnesia can led
to fusion of first
russell standish wrote:
On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 07:00:39PM -0800, meekerdb @dslextreme.com wrote:
I think I am often *not* self-aware. But aside from that, I have definitely
been unconscious several times in my life and I'm sure other people (though
probably not Stathis) were unconscious
2009/2/24 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:
From a logical point of view Shoemaker is right. You can say no for
many reasons to the doctor.
The copy will not even behave as you.
The copy will behave like you, but is a phi-zombie.
The copy behaves like you and as a
On 24 Feb 2009, at 03:04, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/2/24 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
I tend to agree with Quentin that memories are an essential
component of
personal identity. But that also raises a problem with ideas like
observer moments and continuity. Almost all
On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 7:16 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 24 Feb 2009, at 03:04, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/2/24 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
I tend to agree with Quentin that memories are an essential
component of
personal identity. But that also
On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 05:51:49PM -0800, meekerdb @dslextreme.com wrote:
On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 7:16 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Exactly (assuming comp). That is even the reason why amnesia can led
to fusion of first persons.
And given that there is (or should be) a notion
On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 6:39 PM, russell standish li...@hpcoders.com.auwrote:
On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 05:51:49PM -0800, meekerdb @dslextreme.com wrote:
On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 7:16 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
Exactly (assuming comp). That is even the reason why amnesia can
On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 07:00:39PM -0800, meekerdb @dslextreme.com wrote:
I think I am often *not* self-aware. But aside from that, I have definitely
been unconscious several times in my life and I'm sure other people (though
probably not Stathis) were unconscious at the same time. So an
On 23 Feb 2009, at 00:39, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:
From a logical point of view Shoemaker is right. You can say no for
many reasons to the doctor.
The copy will not even behave as you.
The copy will behave like you, but is a phi-zombie.
The
2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you even in
the case where he loses some memory, all memories, or in case he got
new memories, including false souvenirs. But then it is like in the
movie the prestige, your brother can be
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be
The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you even in
the case where he loses some memory, all memories, or in case he got
new memories, including false souvenirs. But
2009/2/24 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
I tend to agree with Quentin that memories are an essential component of
personal identity. But that also raises a problem with ideas like
observer moments and continuity. Almost all my memories are not
being remembered at an given time.
On 20 Feb 2009, at 14:01, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/2/20 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
Review of a book that may be of interest to the list.
Brent Meeker
Original Message
Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
2009-02-26 : View this Review Online
2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:
From a logical point of view Shoemaker is right. You can say no for
many reasons to the doctor.
The copy will not even behave as you.
The copy will behave like you, but is a phi-zombie.
The copy behaves like you and as a
Hi Stathis, Bruno, List,
the copy can be you in deeper and deeper senses (roughly speaking up
to the unspeakable you = ONE).
I talk here on the first person you. It is infinite and unnameable.
Here computer science can makes those term (like unnameable) much
more precise.
I don't see how
2009/2/20 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
Review of a book that may be of interest to the list.
Brent Meeker
Original Message
Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
2009-02-26 : View this Review Online
http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=15326 : View Other NDPR
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