Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-03-16 Thread Quentin Anciaux
Hi Bruno, 2009/3/15 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be Hi Günther, Hi Bruno, thanks for your interesting answer, I have some questions though. course, as I said, this will depend of what you mean by you. In case you accept the idea of surviving with amnesia, you can even get to

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-03-15 Thread Bruno Marchal
Hi Günther, Hi Bruno, thanks for your interesting answer, I have some questions though. course, as I said, this will depend of what you mean by you. In case you accept the idea of surviving with amnesia, you can even get to a state where you know you are immortal, because your

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-03-13 Thread Bruno Marchal
Hi Günther, 1-OM, (by step 7, correspond to infinity (aleph_zero) of 3-OMs, themselves embedded in bigger infinities (2^aleph_zero) of computations going trough their corresponding states. Between you-in-the-living room, and you-in-the-kitchen there is already a continuum of

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-03-13 Thread Günther Greindl
Hi Bruno, thanks for your interesting answer, I have some questions though. course, as I said, this will depend of what you mean by you. In case you accept the idea of surviving with amnesia, you can even get to a state where you know you are immortal, because your immortality is a past

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-03-12 Thread John Mikes
Gunther wrote: ...assuming that _every_ computation is conscious qua computation? brings up in my mind: thinking in comp (at least: in numbers) translates 'conscious' into 'computed' ?? (That would imply an elevation from the binary embryonic contraption as our computer into more

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-03-11 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 11 Mar 2009, at 02:25, Günther Greindl wrote: Hi Bruno, The idea was that the numbers encode moments which don't have successors (the guy who transports), that's why there exist alien-OMs encoded in numbers which destroy all the machines (if we assume that arithmetic is

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-03-11 Thread Günther Greindl
Hi Bruno, 1-OM, (by step 7, correspond to infinity (aleph_zero) of 3-OMs, themselves embedded in bigger infinities (2^aleph_zero) of computations going trough their corresponding states. Between you-in-the-living room, and you-in-the-kitchen there is already a continuum of

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-03-10 Thread Günther Greindl
Hi Bruno, The idea was that the numbers encode moments which don't have successors (the guy who transports), that's why there exist alien-OMs encoded in numbers which destroy all the machines (if we assume that arithmetic is consistent). Hmmm (Not to clear for me, I guess I miss

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-03-09 Thread John Mikes
Bruno, - again the bartender... * Initial remark: I like Gunther's parenthetical condition of arithmetic consistency - which I find not assured in DIFFERENT universes. As I said axioms (2+2=4) are in my opinion *thought - conditions* to make one's theory workable and so they are conditioned by

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-03-08 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 06 Mar 2009, at 18:06, Günther Greindl wrote: The idea was that the numbers encode moments which don't have successors (the guy who transports), that's why there exist alien-OMs encoded in numbers which destroy all the machines (if we assume that arithmetic is consistent).

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-03-08 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 06 Mar 2009, at 18:09, Günther Greindl wrote: Hi Bruno, With COMP it is not so clear. explicit appeal to self-consistency (= the move from Bp to Bp Dt; the Dt suppresses the cul-de-sac). With comp, to believe in a next instant or in a successor state is already based on an act of

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-03-06 Thread Günther Greindl
Bruno, My idea was rather that the instantiations would not correspond to numbers in the first place But that would violate the comp assumption. No, you still misunderstand me ;-) not correspond in the sense of non-existing, not in the sense of existing but not number. - that is why the

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-03-06 Thread Günther Greindl
Hi Bruno, With COMP it is not so clear. explicit appeal to self-consistency (= the move from Bp to Bp Dt; the Dt suppresses the cul-de-sac). With comp, to believe in a next instant or in a successor state is already based on an act of faith. Please bear in mind that I have not yet

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-03-05 Thread Bruno Marchal
Hi Günther, On 05 Mar 2009, at 00:50, Günther Greindl wrote: Bruno, Indeed, that would be like if a number could make disappear another number. Even a God cannot do that! The idea would be rather that some continuations would correspond to non-existent numbers, like, say, the natural

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-03-05 Thread Günther Greindl
HI Bruno, Indeed, that would be like if a number could make disappear another number. Even a God cannot do that! The idea would be rather that some continuations would correspond to non-existent numbers, like, say, the natural number between 3 and 4. I am not sure I understand. If the

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-03-05 Thread Günther Greindl
Hi Stathis, It is at least conceivable that the collection of particles that is me could undergo some environmental interaction such that *all* the following entangled branches decohere into states that do *not* map to the emergent class of me, being conscious. Then I would be dead. It

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-03-05 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 05-mars-09, à 11:10, Günther Greindl a écrit : HI Bruno, Indeed, that would be like if a number could make disappear another number. Even a God cannot do that! The idea would be rather that some continuations would correspond to non-existent numbers, like, say, the natural number

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-03-05 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 05-mars-09, à 11:15, Günther Greindl a écrit : Hi Stathis, It is at least conceivable that the collection of particles that is me could undergo some environmental interaction such that *all* the following entangled branches decohere into states that do *not* map to the emergent

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-03-05 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
2009/3/5 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: Sure. But note that a lot of things happens, including the white rabbits and aberrant histories. Quantum intefrence and decoherence explains why those aberrant histories are relatively rare. Could it be that some things which seem physically

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-03-05 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 05 Mar 2009, at 12:43, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/3/5 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: Sure. But note that a lot of things happens, including the white rabbits and aberrant histories. Quantum intefrence and decoherence explains why those aberrant histories are relatively rare.

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-03-05 Thread russell standish
On Thu, Mar 05, 2009 at 04:10:15PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: Of course keyboard-dragon types of transformations are utterly NOT verifiable, even in the ironical first person way of quantum or comp suicide. If you decide to kill yourself until your keyboard transforms itself into a

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-03-05 Thread Brent Meeker
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Mar 2009, at 12:43, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/3/5 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: Sure. But note that a lot of things happens, including the white rabbits and aberrant histories. Quantum intefrence and decoherence explains why those aberrant histories

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-03-04 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 04 Mar 2009, at 07:13, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/3/4 Günther Greindl guenther.grei...@gmail.com: Imagine the sequence: Scan - Annihilate - Signal - Reconstitute Now consider that the Signal travels for 100 000 lightyears before it hits the reconstitution chamber (just to have

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-03-04 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 04 Mar 2009, at 07:08, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/3/4 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: That is why the B people made a law, for helping those who misunderstand the probability. If you decide (before duplication) to kill the copy, the choice of victim/torturer is still decided

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-03-04 Thread Johnathan Corgan
On Wed, 2009-03-04 at 12:25 +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: The no-cul-de-sac hypothesis is false if you allow that there is some means of destroying all copies in the multiverse. But there is probably no such means, no matter how advanced the aliens. Indeed, that would be like if a number

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-03-04 Thread Günther Greindl
Stathis, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Imagine the sequence: Scan - Annihilate - Signal - Reconstitute The no-cul-de-sac hypothesis is false if you allow that there is some means of destroying all copies in the multiverse. But there is probably no such means, no matter how advanced the

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-03-04 Thread Günther Greindl
Bruno, Indeed, that would be like if a number could make disappear another number. Even a God cannot do that! The idea would be rather that some continuations would correspond to non-existent numbers, like, say, the natural number between 3 and 4. Cheers, Günther

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-03-04 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
2009/3/5 Johnathan Corgan jcor...@aeinet.com: It is at least conceivable that the collection of particles that is me could undergo some environmental interaction such that *all* the following entangled branches decohere into states that do *not* map to the emergent class of me, being

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-03-03 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
2009/3/3 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: I think that comp practitioners will divide, in the long run,  along three classes: A:  majority. Accept teleportation but disallow overlap of individuals: annihilation first, reconstitution after. No right to self-infliction. In case of accidental

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-03-03 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
2009/3/3 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: I think that comp practitioners will divide, in the long run,  along three classes: A:  majority. Accept teleportation but disallow overlap of individuals: annihilation first, reconstitution after. No right to self-infliction. In case of accidental

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-03-03 Thread ronaldheld
Stathis This was mentioned in the TNG technical manual. I do not recall, right, now, which post TOS episodes mentioned it. Ronald On Mar 2, 8:42 am, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/3/2 ronaldheld ronaldh...@gmail.com:

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-03-03 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 03 Mar 2009, at 13:40, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/3/3 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: I think that comp practitioners will divide, in the long run, along three classes: A: majority. Accept teleportation but disallow overlap of individuals: annihilation first, reconstitution

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-03-03 Thread Günther Greindl
Hi, better: this is just the usual comp-suicide self-selection (assuming of course we can really kill the copies, which is in itself not an obvious proposition). I have been thinking along these lines lately, in a somewhat different context: the teleportation with annihilation

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-03-03 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
2009/3/4 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: That is why the B people made a law, for helping those who misunderstand the probability. If you decide (before duplication) to kill the copy, the choice of victim/torturer is still decided through a throw of a fair coin. This makes the decision

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-03-03 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
2009/3/4 Günther Greindl guenther.grei...@gmail.com: Imagine the sequence: Scan - Annihilate - Signal - Reconstitute Now consider that the Signal travels for 100 000 lightyears before it hits the reconstitution chamber (just to have a big distance, the concern is causal disconnection in

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-03-02 Thread ronaldheld
Maybe the terminology does not fit here, to make a copy of my brain, wouldn't you need more than memories, but the state of the brain at one time to quantum resolution (TNG transporter term). Ronald On Feb 23, 9:04 pm, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-03-02 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
2009/3/2 ronaldheld ronaldh...@gmail.com: Maybe the terminology does not fit here, to make a copy of my brain, wouldn't you need more than memories, but the state of the brain at one time to quantum resolution (TNG transporter term). The question is what level of resolution is needed in

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-03-02 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 01 Mar 2009, at 23:48, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/3/2 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: All right, I understand. The question now is: are you sure it is in your interest to be that selfish. It is not a moral question: can you be coherent, take the full piece of botter dead is not

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-03-02 Thread Brent Meeker
To have strict continuity you would certainly need the state, but not at the quantum level, see Tegmark's paper. But you could probably do without most of the state information if you were willing to accept a gap - as in anesthesia. Brent ronaldheld wrote: Maybe the terminology does not

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-03-01 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
2009/2/28 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: It leads to a very complex question: should we allow people to torture their doppelganger, for example as a ritual or sexual practice? Of course not without their consent, given that the golden ethical rule with comp is don't do to the other what

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-03-01 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 01 Mar 2009, at 09:54, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/2/28 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: It leads to a very complex question: should we allow people to torture their doppelganger, for example as a ritual or sexual practice? Of course not without their consent, given that the

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-03-01 Thread Günther Greindl
Stathis, Bruno, It leads to a very complex question: should we allow people to torture their doppelganger, for example as a ritual or sexual practice? Of course not without their consent, given that the golden ethical rule with comp is don't do to the other what the other does not want you

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-03-01 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
2009/3/2 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: All right, I understand. The question now is: are you sure it is in your interest to be that selfish. It is not a moral question: can you be coherent, take the full piece of botter dead is not big deal of the midazolam argument, and keep that sort of

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-02-28 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 28 Feb 2009, at 03:02, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/2/28 Günther Greindl guenther.grei...@gmail.com: The issue that we are very reluctant to die if our backup is ten years old but need not worry so much if we backed up one hour ago is simply the heuristic that in one hour we

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-02-27 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
2009/2/27 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: Gosh!  And what if the backup has been done last year, or one minute ago? I will be dead too? Less dead? This shows a potential problem the psychological criterion for personal identity. If I am facing death it is little consolation to me if a backup

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-02-27 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2009/2/27 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be On 26 Feb 2009, at 18:41, Quentin Anciaux wrote: There is no identity without memories... makes no sense to me. I take it as a superficial part of identity, with respect to surviving. Personal identity, I think is more and less than personal

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-02-27 Thread John Mikes
Brent: who is making that 'backup' or 'replica' of you? and why? you people take it for granted that a (supernatural???) authority has nothing else to do except making replicas of members of the Everything List. And you observe, how good - or bad - its work is. Some teleological view of pantheism

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-02-27 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 27 Feb 2009, at 15:57, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2009/2/27 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be On 26 Feb 2009, at 18:41, Quentin Anciaux wrote: There is no identity without memories... makes no sense to me. I take it as a superficial part of identity, with respect to surviving. Personal

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-02-27 Thread Günther Greindl
Bruno, List, in awaked state. Yet I do distinguish dying and forgetting. Let us say that we have a measure of continuation (of psychological) identity from 1 to 0, where 1=full continuation and 0=death, and we apply this measure from one OM to the next. Then forgetting would be everything

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-02-27 Thread Günther Greindl
Stathis, List, if a backup was made an hour ago, since I (the presently speaking I) will not be able to anticipate any future experiences. Only if there As Bruno said in a previous post, what we should care about in personal survival is not concrete memories (although memories are essential

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-02-27 Thread Brent Meeker
John Mikes wrote: Brent: who is making that 'backup' or 'replica' of you? and why? Ask Bruno, he's the one who brought it up. Brent --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-02-27 Thread Günther Greindl
John Mikes wrote: Brent: who is making that 'backup' or 'replica' of you? and why? It is only a thought experiment to make clear what we care about regarding personal identity. And if computationalism is true, this thought experiment will be practically quite relevant in the near(?) future

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-02-27 Thread russell standish
On Fri, Feb 27, 2009 at 08:34:48PM +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/2/27 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: Gosh!  And what if the backup has been done last year, or one minute ago? I will be dead too? Less dead? This shows a potential problem the psychological criterion for

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-02-27 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
2009/2/28 Günther Greindl guenther.grei...@gmail.com: The issue that we are very reluctant to die if our backup is ten years old but need not worry so much if we backed up one hour ago is simply the heuristic that in one hour we don't change so much, but in ten years we often change so much

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-02-27 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/2/28 Günther Greindl guenther.grei...@gmail.com: The issue that we are very reluctant to die if our backup is ten years old but need not worry so much if we backed up one hour ago is simply the heuristic that in one hour we don't change so much, but in ten

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-02-26 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
2009/2/26 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: If they are all distinct, then in what sense does S1-S2-S3 form a stream of consciousness, rather than S1-S2-B3 or even S1-B1-S3-B2.  Supposedly it is that S3 includes some memory of S1 (or earlier Si), but in that case why couldn't B3 also

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-02-26 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 23 Feb 2009, at 17:15, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you even in the case where he loses some memory, all memories, or in case he got new memories, including false souvenirs. But then it is

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-02-26 Thread Brent Meeker
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 23 Feb 2009, at 17:15, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you even in the case where he loses some memory, all memories, or in case he got

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-02-26 Thread Quentin Anciaux
Hi, 2009/2/26 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be On 23 Feb 2009, at 17:15, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you even in the case where he loses some memory, all memories, or in case he got new

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-02-26 Thread Günther Greindl
Hi, Personal identity and memory could be a useful fiction for living. Here I was alluding to possible deeper sense of the self, which makes me conceive that indeed there is only one person playing a trick to itself. Like if our bodies where just disconnected windows giving to that unique

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-02-26 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 26 Feb 2009, at 18:41, Quentin Anciaux wrote: There is no identity without memories... makes no sense to me. I take it as a superficial part of identity, with respect to surviving. Personal identity, I think is more and less than personal memories. By loosing memory I would be wounded,

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-02-26 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 26 Feb 2009, at 18:32, Brent Meeker wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 23 Feb 2009, at 17:15, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you even in the case where

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-02-26 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 27 Feb 2009, at 01:57, Günther Greindl wrote: Hi, Personal identity and memory could be a useful fiction for living. Here I was alluding to possible deeper sense of the self, which makes me conceive that indeed there is only one person playing a trick to itself. Like if our

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-02-26 Thread Brent Meeker
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 27 Feb 2009, at 01:57, Günther Greindl wrote: Hi, Personal identity and memory could be a useful fiction for living. Here I was alluding to possible deeper sense of the self, which makes me conceive that indeed there is only one person playing a trick to

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-02-26 Thread Brent Meeker
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 26 Feb 2009, at 18:32, Brent Meeker wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 23 Feb 2009, at 17:15, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you even in

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-02-25 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 25 Feb 2009, at 02:51, meekerdb @dslextreme.com wrote: On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 7:16 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 24 Feb 2009, at 03:04, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/2/24 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: I tend to agree with Quentin that memories are

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-02-25 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
2009/2/25 meekerdb @dslextreme.com meeke...@dslextreme.com: It is the potential fusion that bothers me.  It would seem to imply that after Stathis and I have a simultaneous moment of thinking of nothing our closest continuations might be mixtures, each having some memories belonging to

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-02-25 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 25 Feb 2009, at 03:39, russell standish wrote: On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 05:51:49PM -0800, meekerdb @dslextreme.com wrote: On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 7:16 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Exactly (assuming comp). That is even the reason why amnesia can led to fusion of first

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-02-25 Thread Brent Meeker
russell standish wrote: On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 07:00:39PM -0800, meekerdb @dslextreme.com wrote: I think I am often *not* self-aware. But aside from that, I have definitely been unconscious several times in my life and I'm sure other people (though probably not Stathis) were unconscious

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-02-25 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/2/25 meekerdb @dslextreme.com meeke...@dslextreme.com: It is the potential fusion that bothers me. It would seem to imply that after Stathis and I have a simultaneous moment of thinking of nothing our closest continuations might be mixtures, each having

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-02-24 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
2009/2/24 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: From a logical point of view Shoemaker is right. You can say no for many reasons to the doctor. The copy will not even behave as you. The copy will behave like you, but is a phi-zombie. The copy behaves like you and as a

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-02-24 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 24 Feb 2009, at 13:22, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/2/24 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: From a logical point of view Shoemaker is right. You can say no for many reasons to the doctor. The copy will not even behave as you. The copy will behave like you, but is a phi-zombie.

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-02-24 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 24 Feb 2009, at 03:04, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/2/24 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: I tend to agree with Quentin that memories are an essential component of personal identity. But that also raises a problem with ideas like observer moments and continuity. Almost all

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-02-24 Thread meekerdb @dslextreme.com
On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 7:16 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 24 Feb 2009, at 03:04, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/2/24 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: I tend to agree with Quentin that memories are an essential component of personal identity. But that also

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-02-24 Thread russell standish
On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 05:51:49PM -0800, meekerdb @dslextreme.com wrote: On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 7:16 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Exactly (assuming comp). That is even the reason why amnesia can led to fusion of first persons. And given that there is (or should be) a notion

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-02-24 Thread meekerdb @dslextreme.com
On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 6:39 PM, russell standish li...@hpcoders.com.auwrote: On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 05:51:49PM -0800, meekerdb @dslextreme.com wrote: On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 7:16 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Exactly (assuming comp). That is even the reason why amnesia can

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-02-24 Thread russell standish
On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 07:00:39PM -0800, meekerdb @dslextreme.com wrote: I think I am often *not* self-aware. But aside from that, I have definitely been unconscious several times in my life and I'm sure other people (though probably not Stathis) were unconscious at the same time. So an

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-02-23 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 23 Feb 2009, at 00:39, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: From a logical point of view Shoemaker is right. You can say no for many reasons to the doctor. The copy will not even behave as you. The copy will behave like you, but is a phi-zombie. The

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-02-23 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you even in the case where he loses some memory, all memories, or in case he got new memories, including false souvenirs. But then it is like in the movie the prestige, your brother can be

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-02-23 Thread Brent Meeker
Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you even in the case where he loses some memory, all memories, or in case he got new memories, including false souvenirs. But

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-02-23 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
2009/2/24 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: I tend to agree with Quentin that memories are an essential component of personal identity. But that also raises a problem with ideas like observer moments and continuity. Almost all my memories are not being remembered at an given time.

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-02-22 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 20 Feb 2009, at 14:01, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/2/20 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Review of a book that may be of interest to the list. Brent Meeker Original Message Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009-02-26 : View this Review Online

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-02-22 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: From a logical point of view Shoemaker is right. You can say no for many reasons to the doctor. The copy will not even behave as you. The copy will behave like you, but is a phi-zombie. The copy behaves like you and as a

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-02-22 Thread Günther Greindl
Hi Stathis, Bruno, List, the copy can be you in deeper and deeper senses (roughly speaking up to the unspeakable you = ONE). I talk here on the first person you. It is infinite and unnameable. Here computer science can makes those term (like unnameable) much more precise. I don't see how

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-02-20 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
2009/2/20 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Review of a book that may be of interest to the list. Brent Meeker Original Message Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009-02-26 : View this Review Online http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=15326 : View Other NDPR