Re: 3-PoV from 1 PoV?
Hi Stephen, Ok, Robinson Arithmatic is ... or Q, is a finitely axiomatized fragment of Peano arithmetic (PA). ...Q is essentially PA without the axiom schema of induction. Even though Q is much weaker than PA, it is still incomplete in the sense of Gödel. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robinson_arithmetic_Q It does not tell me where the assumption of implementation of the addition and multiplication obtain. I don't use the assumption of implementation of the addition and multiplication. I use only the fact that some relations among numbers are true or false. You could as well ask a physical realist in what he implements the physical laws ... Just because one can define X does not mean that one has produced X; unless we are assuming that the act of defining a representational system is co-creative of its objects. I think you are confusing numbers and their representations. Arithmetical truth is independent of the representation used for numbers. Are we to consider that an object, physical or platonic, is one and the same as its representations? Of course not. And that is why I don't need, at the ontological level, any representation. Of course I need some to talk with you, but that's different. Oh, I forgot, it has been proposed that a book containing a symbolic representation of Einstein's Brain is equal/equivalent to Einstein's Mind. OK! ... Moving on. Where? In the book Mind's I, Hofstadter just argues that if comp is true then you can converse with Einstein through the manipulation of a book describing (at the right level) the brain of Einstein at some moment. To proceed we have to be careful in all those little nuances. The devil is in the details. [BM] You can entirely define in arithmetic statements of the kind The machine x on input y has not yet stop after z steps. The notion of time used here through the notion of computational steps can be deined entirely from the notion of natural numbers successor (which can be taken as primitive or defined through addition and multiplication). [SPK] Ok, time (pun intended!) for a thought experiment. I go the Library of Babel and pull out the Einstein's Brain and bring it home with me. I sit down and ask it: what are your latest thoughts on the nature of Unified Fields?. How long am I going to wait before I realize that I will never get an answer? You might say:Stephen, you are going about it all wrong! You have to first create a well-formed question in the language of Eintein's Brain and then look up the appropriate responce inthe book. I answer, Ah, So Einstein's Brain can answer my question after all; it can only sit there on the table until I opening and use my own computational implementation to get my answer. Of course, if you want that Einstein answers relatively to you, you have to implement it relatively to you. Either with a Mac, or a PC, or an IBM, or with your hands, whatever. Come on Stephen ... So where is Einstein's Mind? Nowhere... The 3-OMs of Einstein are distributed in the whole of Arithmetic (assuming comp this is quasi trivial to show, yet tedious. The 1-OMs of Einstein appears from inside arithmetic (only Einstein knows them) and their relative statistics are defined by a relative measure (which has to exist or comp is false) pertaining on the 2^aleph_zero computations going through its states. Ask any precise question on this if you have any difficulties. What is it that distinguishes a random sequence of scratches on a plane of sand from the sequence of symbols of the equation representing the Grand Unified Theory of Everything? Well, one person might say: I can read the one that is an equation... Meaningfullness necessitates a subject to whom meaning obtains. Sure. Computational states, symbolic scratches or patterns of concurrent neuron firings or distributions of voltage potentials, mean something because their existance is such that situations would be different otherwise for some system other than that of the states, scratches, patterns, etc.. Sure. Remember the notion of Causation? There are plenty notion of causation derivable from inside arithmetic when you assume comp. Most would collapse to classical logic if the incompleteness did not exist. But machines are incomplete and reflect that incompleteness. This entails not only causation, but also responsibility and I would even argue it implies a form of strong, but partial, (free)-will. X is the Cause of Y if and only if X would not occur without the occurence of Y. David Deutsch defines it more pointedly: ...an event X causes an event Y in our universe if both X and Y occur in our universe, but in most variants of our universe in which X does not happen, Y does not happen either. The
Re: 3-PoV from 1 PoV?
Hi Bruno, - Original Message - From: Bruno Marchal To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Thursday, May 14, 2009 10:35 AM Subject: Re: 3-PoV from 1 PoV? Hi Stephen, On 13 May 2009, at 22:20, Stephen Paul King wrote: snip By relagating the notion of implementation, to Robinson Arithmatic, etc., one only moves the problem further away from the focus of how even the appearence of change, dynamics, etc. obtain. The basic idea that you propose, while wonderfully sophisticated and nuanced, is in essense no different from that of Bishop Berkeley or Plato; it simply does not answer the basic question: Where does the appearence of change obtain from primitives that by definition do not allow for its existence? [BM] Because you can define in arithmetic, using only addition and multiplication symbols, and logic, the notion of computation, or of pieces of computation, like you can define provability (by PA, by ZF, or by any effective theory) already in the very weak (yet Turing universal) Robinson Arithmetic. [SPK] Ok, Robinson Arithmatic is ... or Q, is a finitely axiomatized fragment of Peano arithmetic (PA). ...Q is essentially PA without the axiom schema of induction. Even though Q is much weaker than PA, it is still incomplete in the sense of Gödel. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robinson_arithmetic_Q It does not tell me where the assumption of implementation of the addition and multiplication obtain. Just because one can define X does not mean that one has produced X; unless we are assuming that the act of defining a representational system is co-creative of its objects. Are we to consider that an object, physical or platonic, is one and the same as its representations? Oh, I forgot, it has been proposed that a book containing a symbolic representation of Einstein's Brain is equal/equivalent to Einstein's Mind. OK! ... Moving on. [BM] You can entirely define in arithmetic statements of the kind The machine x on input y has not yet stop after z steps. The notion of time used here through the notion of computational steps can be deined entirely from the notion of natural numbers successor (which can be taken as primitive or defined through addition and multiplication). [SPK] Ok, time (pun intended!) for a thought experiment. I go the Library of Babel and pull out the Einstein's Brain and bring it home with me. I sit down and ask it: what are your latest thoughts on the nature of Unified Fields?. How long am I going to wait before I realize that I will never get an answer? You might say:Stephen, you are going about it all wrong! You have to first create a well-formed question in the language of Eintein's Brain and then look up the appropriate responce inthe book. I answer, Ah, So Einstein's Brain can answer my question after all; it can only sit there on the table until I opening and use my own computational implementation to get my answer. So where is Einstein's Mind? Nowhere... What is it that distinguishes a random sequence of scratches on a plane of sand from the sequence of symbols of the equation representing the Grand Unified Theory of Everything? Well, one person might say: I can read the one that is an equation... Meaningfullness necessitates a subject to whom meaning obtains. Computational states, symbolic scratches or patterns of concurrent neuron firings or distributions of voltage potentials, mean something because their existance is such that situations would be different otherwise for some system other than that of the states, scratches, patterns, etc.. Remember the notion of Causation? X is the Cause of Y if and only if X would not occur without the occurence of Y. David Deutsch defines it more pointedly: ...an event X causes an event Y in our universe if both X and Y occur in our universe, but in most variants of our universe in which X does not happen, Y does not happen either. The trouble is that unless there exists a unique measure on the space where in events are coded in the Universe of possible statements or sentences of Robinson Arithmatic, it is undecidable if X happens or Y happens because one can not distinguish between actual computational steps that would generate a means to distinguish X from Y or strings that code some other computational string. Remember how Goedel numbering works... Only if the number of possible statements that can be coded with the same string are computationally isomorphic (generate the same output per input) can one obtain a means to distinguish X from Y, but if we require this it will be no longer possible to code any variants of our universe. Variants would not be allowed. Without the possibility of variants, how does one obtain a notion of contrafactuality? To claim that the ordering of natural numbers from the notion of succession allow for us
Re: 3-PoV from 1 PoV?
Hi Stephen, On 13 May 2009, at 22:20, Stephen Paul King wrote: Hi Bruno, I see the goal that you have, as best I can understand your writtings and discussions. I salute your valiant efforts. The ideas that I have expressed so far, such as those in this exchange, are merely the misgivings and thoughts that I have based on my long study of philosophy, I can claim no certification nor degree. I am merely an amateur. You are welcome. I still do not understand how it is conscivable to obtain a property that is not implicit as a primitive from an assumption that is its contrary. I can not obtain free energy from any machine and I can not obtain change from any static structure. While it is true that one can agrue that the property of saltiness can not be found in the properties of Clorine nor Sodium, this does not invalidate the question of origin because we can show that there is a similarity of kind and mere difference in degree between saltiness and chemical make up. Change and Staticness are categorically different in kind. You are right, you cannot obtain change from staticness. I don't think I am pretending that. This proplem is not unique to many monists attempts. The eliminatists, such as D.C. Dennett and other to refuse the existense of consciousness as a mere epiphenomena or illusion tells us nothing about the unavoidability, modulo Salvia for example, of qualia. Eliminativism is dangerous. It is insulting. It is like saying you are a zombie. Even Thorgny recognize that this is not too kind to tell to others. By relagating the notion of implementation, to Robinson Arithmatic, etc., one only moves the problem further away from the focus of how even the appearence of change, dynamics, etc. obtain. The basic idea that you propose, while wonderfully sophisticated and nuanced, is in essense no different from that of Bishop Berkeley or Plato; it simply does not answer the basic question: Where does the appearence of change obtain from primitives that by definition do not allow for its existence? Because you can define in arithmetic, using only addition and multiplication symbols, and logic, the notion of computation, or of pieces of computation, like you can define provability (by PA, by ZF, or by any effective theory) already in the very weak (yet Turing universal) Robinson Arithmetic. You can entirely define in arithmetic statements of the kind The machine x on input y has not yet stop after z steps. The notion of time used here through the notion of computational steps can be deined entirely from the notion of natural numbers successor (which can be taken as primitive or defined through addition and multiplication). If you prefer, I could tell you that in arithmetic we have a very notion of time: the natural number sequence. Then we can define in arithmetic the notion of computation, and the notion of next step for a computation made by such or such machine. And from that, we can explain how the subjective appearance of physical times and spaces occur. UDA explains why we have to proceed that way, and AUDA explains how we can do, and actually, it has been done concretely. Of course the extraction of physics is technically demanding. I should test on new machine the quantum tautologies (and some people are trying recently to do so, we will see). Up to now quantum mechanics confirms the comp self-referential statistics. You should keep in mind that, due to incompleteness, from the point of view of the machine, although Bp, Bp p, Bp Dp, Bp Dp p, all define the same extensional provability notion (G* knows that), they differ intensionally for the machine, and, for the machine they obeys quite different logic. The incompleteness nuances forces the arithmetical reality to *appear* very differently from inside. The Theatetical knower Bp p, for example, gives a knowledge operator, and can be used to explain why machine can know many things, but also why they can not define knowledge, why the first person knower has really no name, etc. The logic of Bp Dp p gives a logic of qualia, or perceptive fields, etc. Don't hesitate to ask question. Normally UDA is much simpler to understand than AUDA. I will reexplain the step seven to Kim, soon or later. Bruno Time is an illusion, but the illusion of time is not an illusion. It is a theorem that all self-referentially correct machines are confronted with such an illusion, and they make precise discourses about them. UDA forbids to take such arithmetical machine as mere zombie, or you have to abandon the comp hypothesis. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to
Re: 3-PoV from 1 PoV?
Hi Stephen, On 12 May 2009, at 19:53, Stephen Paul King wrote: Falsifiable bets. ;) Not all. You bet the number zero makes sense, but you can hardly refute this. You bet there is a reality, but you can't falsify this. Falsifiability just accelerate the evolution of theories. Works by John Case and its students make this a sort of law in theoretical inductive inference: in a sense the Popper falsifiability theory has been falsified :) I agree it is a fundamental criterion of interestingness. It is not by chance that I worked on showing digital mechanism to be an experimentally refutable theory. Leibniz' Monadology is difficult to comprehend because he starts off with an inversion of the usual way of thinking about the world. By assuming that the observer's point of view is the primitive, it follows that the notions of space and time are secondary, orderings, and not some independent substance or container. That would be too nice to be true. Leibniz would be captured by the 3h and 5th arithmetical hypostases. I have already tried, but I fail, and I cannot conclude. A synchronization of many such 1PoV, given some simple consistensy requirements, would in the large number limit lead to a notion of a common world of experience. Don't you need some common world of experience to have a notion of synchronization? [spk] No, not if all of the structure that one might attribute to a commn world of experience is already within the notion of a monad. A Monad, considered in isolation, is exactly like an infinite quantum mechanical system. ? It has no definite set of particular properties, it has *all properties* as possibilities. What I am considering is to replace Leibniz' notion of a pre- ordained harmony, his version of a a priori existing measure, I propose a notion of local ongoing process. A generalized notion of information processing or computation, for example. We see this idea expressed by David Deutsch in his book, The Fabric of Reality: ...think of all of our knowledge-generating processes, , and indeed the entire evolving biosphere as well, as being a gigantic computation. The whole thing is executiong a self-motivated, self- generating computer program. ... it is a virtual-reality program in the process of rendering, with ever increasing accuracy, the whole of existence. pg. 317-318 When we consider an infinity of Monads, each, unless it is identical to some other, is at least infinitesimably different. All of the aspects of a collections of Monads that are identical collapse into a single state, a notion of a background emerges from this. This idea is not different from the notion of a collective unconsciousness that some thinkers like Karl Jung have proposed. This leave us with finite distinctions between monads. Finite distictions leads us to notions of distinguishing finite processes, etc. The notion of synchronization is a figure of speach, a stand in, for that is called decoherence in QM theory. By seeing that the phase relations of many small QM systems tend to become entangled and no longed localizable, we get the notion of a classical finite world. This is a bottom up explanation. Remember that with comp we just cannot take physics for granted. It is the whole point. BTW: Notions, such as finitism, might be explained by intensionally neglecting any continuance of thought that takes one to the conclusion that infinities might actually exist! Comp is the most finitist theory possible in which you can still give a name to the natural numbers. It is not ultrafinitist in the sense that it shows machines can speed-up relatively to each other by giving name to infinities. But the infinities are epistemological, yet fundamental (physics is also epistemological here!). But here is the problem I have, merely agreeing that all dynamics are contained in the block-arithmatic truth will require me to neglect the computational complexity of that Block Truth. It is not so much a question of agreement than of seeing the point. I don't see either why accepting that the dynamics are just emerging from some statistical relations between numbers (as treated by numbers) would in any way require you to neglect the computational complexity. On the contrary the realities are explicitly emerging from that complexity, but not ONLY from that complexity, it arises from the topologies of each self-referencial modalities and other mathematical constraints. Of course this makes the work technic. The idea of a Platonic Universe of Arithmetical truth is a notion that is only coherent given the tacit assumption to some non- static process, such as that implicit in thought, also co-exists. A What requires a To Whom. Being is the Fixed-Point of Becoming. To avoid
Re: 3-PoV from 1 PoV?
Hi Bruno, I see the goal that you have, as best I can understand your writtings and discussions. I salute your valiant efforts. The ideas that I have expressed so far, such as those in this exchange, are merely the misgivings and thoughts that I have based on my long study of philosophy, I can claim no certification nor degree. I am merely an amateur. I still do not understand how it is conscivable to obtain a property that is not implicit as a primitive from an assumption that is its contrary. I can not obtain free energy from any machine and I can not obtain change from any static structure. While it is true that one can agrue that the property of saltiness can not be found in the properties of Clorine nor Sodium, this does not invalidate the question of origin because we can show that there is a similarity of kind and mere difference in degree between saltiness and chemical make up. Change and Staticness are categorically different in kind. This proplem is not unique to many monists attempts. The eliminatists, such as D.C. Dennett and other to refuse the existense of consciousness as a mere epiphenomena or illusion tells us nothing about the unavoidability, modulo Salvia for example, of qualia. By relagating the notion of implementation, to Robinson Arithmatic, etc., one only moves the problem further away from the focus of how even the appearence of change, dynamics, etc. obtain. The basic idea that you propose, while wonderfully sophisticated and nuanced, is in essense no different from that of Bishop Berkeley or Plato; it simply does not answer the basic question: Where does the appearence of change obtain from primitives that by definition do not allow for its existence? Kindest regards, Stephen - Original Message - From: Bruno Marchal To: everything-list Sent: Wednesday, May 13, 2009 11:11 AM Subject: Re: 3-PoV from 1 PoV? Hi Stephen, On 12 May 2009, at 19:53, Stephen Paul King wrote: Falsifiable bets. ;) Not all. You bet the number zero makes sense, but you can hardly refute this. You bet there is a reality, but you can't falsify this. Falsifiability just accelerate the evolution of theories. Works by John Case and its students make this a sort of law in theoretical inductive inference: in a sense the Popper falsifiability theory has been falsified :) I agree it is a fundamental criterion of interestingness. It is not by chance that I worked on showing digital mechanism to be an experimentally refutable theory. Leibniz' Monadology is difficult to comprehend because he starts off with an inversion of the usual way of thinking about the world. By assuming that the observer's point of view is the primitive, it follows that the notions of space and time are secondary, orderings, and not some independent substance or container. That would be too nice to be true. Leibniz would be captured by the 3h and 5th arithmetical hypostases. I have already tried, but I fail, and I cannot conclude. A synchronization of many such 1PoV, given some simple consistensy requirements, would in the large number limit lead to a notion of a common world of experience. Don't you need some common world of experience to have a notion of synchronization? [spk] No, not if all of the structure that one might attribute to a commn world of experience is already within the notion of a monad. A Monad, considered in isolation, is exactly like an infinite quantum mechanical system. ? It has no definite set of particular properties, it has *all properties* as possibilities. What I am considering is to replace Leibniz' notion of a pre-ordained harmony, his version of a a priori existing measure, I propose a notion of local ongoing process. A generalized notion of information processing or computation, for example. We see this idea expressed by David Deutsch in his book, The Fabric of Reality: ...think of all of our knowledge-generating processes, , and indeed the entire evolving biosphere as well, as being a gigantic computation. The whole thing is executiong a self-motivated, self-generating computer program. ... it is a virtual-reality program in the process of rendering, with ever increasing accuracy, the whole of existence. pg. 317-318 When we consider an infinity of Monads, each, unless it is identical to some other, is at least infinitesimably different. All of the aspects of a collections of Monads that are identical collapse into a single state, a notion of a background emerges from this. This idea is not different from the notion of a collective unconsciousness that some thinkers like Karl Jung have proposed. This leave us with finite distinctions between monads. Finite distictions leads us to notions of distinguishing finite processes, etc. The notion
Re: 3-PoV from 1 PoV?
Hi Bruno, Interleaving some comments. - Original Message - From: Bruno Marchal To: everything-list@googlegroups.com ; Stephen Paul King Sent: Sunday, May 10, 2009 1:51 PM Subject: Re: 3-PoV from 1 PoV? On 08 May 2009, at 17:49, Stephen Paul King wrote: I came upon the idea after considering how is it that the notion of an objective reality when we know for a fact that all of our knowledge does not come from any kind of direct contact with an objective reality, at best it is infered. Yes. Even at the deepest level. Science transforms knowledge into belief by making us aware of the hypothetical nature of our mental construction. I would say that science is the condition of genuine faith or bets. [spk] Falsifiable bets. ;) Leibniz' Monadology can be considered as a way to think of this idea where each monad represents a 1-PoV. Difficult to make sense. Leibniz is a complex and variable author. I have read the Monadology and consult some expert of Leibniz, but it remains hard to figure out how it works. [spk] Leibniz' Monadology is difficult to comprehend because he starts off with an inversion of the usual way of thinking about the world. By assuming that the observer's point of view is the primitive, it follows that the notions of space and time are secondary, orderings, and not some independent substance or container. A synchronization of many such 1PoV, given some simple consistensy requirements, would in the large number limit lead to a notion of a common world of experience. Don't you need some common world of experience to have a notion of synchronization? [spk] No, not if all of the structure that one might attribute to a commn world of experience is already within the notion of a monad. A Monad, considered in isolation, is exactly like an infinite quantum mechanical system. It has no definite set of particular properties, it has *all properties* as possibilities. What I am considering is to replace Leibniz' notion of a pre-ordained harmony, his version of a a priori existing measure, I propose a notion of local ongoing process. A generalized notion of information processing or computation, for example. We see this idea expressed by David Deutsch in his book, The Fabric of Reality: ...think of all of our knowledge-generating processes, , and indeed the entire evolving biosphere as well, as being a gigantic computation. The whole thing is executiong a self-motivated, self-generating computer program. ... it is a virtual-reality program in the process of rendering, with ever increasing accuracy, the whole of existence. pg. 317-318 When we consider an infinity of Monads, each, unless it is identical to some other, is at least infinitesimably different. All of the aspects of a collections of Monads that are identical collapse into a single state, a notion of a background emerges from this. This idea is not different from the notion of a collective unconsciousness that some thinkers like Karl Jung have proposed. This leave us with finite distinctions between monads. Finite distictions leads us to notions of distinguishing finite processes, etc. The notion of synchronization is a figure of speach, a stand in, for that is called decoherence in QM theory. By seeing that the phase relations of many small QM systems tend to become entangled and no longed localizable, we get the notion of a classical finite world. This is a bottom up explanation. BTW: Notions, such as finitism, might be explained by intensionally neglecting any continuance of thought that takes one to the conclusion that infinities might actually exist! The 3PoV would follow from a form of inversion or reflection of a 1PoV. For example, we form thoughts of or fellow humans from our own experiences of ourselves. BTW: it seems to me that consciousness, at least, requires some form of dynamic self- modeling process. This implies that there is no such a thing as a static consciousness. I can agree. And you know the way I proceed. I start from elementary arithmetic, the 3-elementary ontology. If only because 99,9% of the humans agree on it, and it is already Turing universal and contains the whole universal deployment. The epistemology is given by adding some induction schema to the machine in there. It is illustrated by the going from Robinson arithmetic to Peano Arithmetic (emulated by Robinson arithmetic). It is enough to generate all finite piece of histories, and we can get the many 1-pov by the Theaetetical variant of the logic of provability/consistency ... So, if you agree that all dynamics are contained in the block-arithmetical truth, consciousness is indeed related to internal information flux, and so we can say there is no static consciousness, in that sense. But here we mix the 3-description with the 1-description, and from this we cannot
Re: 3-PoV from 1 PoV?
On 08 May 2009, at 17:49, Stephen Paul King wrote: I came upon the idea after considering how is it that the notion of an objective reality when we know for a fact that all of our knowledge does not come from any kind of direct contact with an objective reality, at best it is infered. Yes. Even at the deepest level. Science transforms knowledge into belief by making us aware of the hypothetical nature of our mental construction. I would say that science is the condition of genuine faith or bets. Leibniz' Monadology can be considered as a way to think of this idea where each monad represents a 1-PoV. Difficult to make sense. Leibniz is a complex and variable author. I have read the Monadology and consult some expert of Leibniz, but it remains hard to figure out how it works. A synchronization of many such 1PoV, given some simple consistensy requirements, would in the large number limit lead to a notion of a common world of experience. Don't you need some common world of experience to have a notion of synchronization? The 3PoV would follow from a form of inversion or reflection of a 1PoV. For example, we form thoughts of or fellow humans from our own experiences of ourselves. BTW: it seems to me that consciousness, at least, requires some form of dynamic self- modeling process. This implies that there is no such a thing as a static consciousness. I can agree. And you know the way I proceed. I start from elementary arithmetic, the 3-elementary ontology. If only because 99,9% of the humans agree on it, and it is already Turing universal and contains the whole universal deployment. The epistemology is given by adding some induction schema to the machine in there. It is illustrated by the going from Robinson arithmetic to Peano Arithmetic (emulated by Robinson arithmetic). It is enough to generate all finite piece of histories, and we can get the many 1-pov by the Theaetetical variant of the logic of provability/consistency ... So, if you agree that all dynamics are contained in the block- arithmetical truth, consciousness is indeed related to internal information flux, and so we can say there is no static consciousness, in that sense. But here we mix the 3-description with the 1- description, and from this we cannot conclude that we cannot have a conscious experience of static-ity or static-ness. With comp, just because it remains a lot of work, the question of traveling in many different physical directions is just open (obviously). Re the UD Measure problem: The idea i have is that we either have our infinity within each Monad or try to find a way to derive a measure of the infinity without reference to the only source of definiteness that we have available: our conscious experience. If I interpret favorably what you say, this is the passage from UDA to AUDA, where I substitute you working on UDA, by the lobian universal machine working on UDA. I don't insist on this because it can be misunderstood. AUDA looks like an elimination of the need to refer to consciousness, but AUDA without a prior understanding of UDA, would be like a confusion between theology and computer science, comp can only relate them, not identify them it would be an error, explainable in AUDA (!), to confuse them. Only God confuses them; in sense, but a creature which confuses them is either a zombie, or a fake zombie, or a person eliminativist. You can regain consciousness in AUDA, by defining consciousness by the belief (hope, bet, faith) in a reality. But the bet is unconscious itself, and this is partially why we are bounded, at some level, to confuse this very basic belief with a knowledge. Of course it is a knowledge, but only at the G* level, *we* cannot know that, once we bet there is a reality (whatever it is). All this does not mean that you could not try an alternate theory were the 3-pov emerge from the 1-pov, but with comp, the basic ontology is very simple (numbers, addition and multiplication). And then 1-pov, or OMs, appears very sophisticated. They are given intuitively by all possible computations passing to a current state, together with a topology derivable from the self-reference logic (I think you know that). Bruno From: Bruno Marchal To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Tuesday, May 05, 2009 6:23 PM Subject: Re: Consciousness is information? On 05 May 2009, at 20:13, Stephen Paul King wrote: Hi Bruno and Members, The comment that is made below seems to only involve a single consciousness and an exterior reality. Could we not recover a very similar situation if we consider the 1-PoV and 3-PoV relation to hold to some degree over a multitude of consciouness (plurality). In the plurality case, the objective doubtful but sharable possible reality would be composed of a large intersection of sorts of 3-PoV
Re: 3-PoV from 1 PoV?
Hi Bruno, I came upon the idea after considering how is it that the notion of an objective reality when we know for a fact that all of our knowledge does not come from any kind of direct contact with an objective reality, at best it is infered. Leibniz' Monadology can be considered as a way to think of this idea where each monad represents a 1-PoV. A synchronization of many such 1PoV, given some simple consistensy requirements, would in the large number limit lead to a notion of a common world of experience. The 3PoV would follow from a form of inversion or reflection of a 1PoV. For example, we form thoughts of or fellow humans from our own experiences of ourselves. BTW: it seems to me that consciousness, at least, requires some form of dynamic self- modeling process. This implies that there is no such a thing as a static consciousness. Re the UD Measure problem: The idea i have is that we either have our infinity within each Monad or try to find a way to derive a measure of the infinity without reference to the only source of definiteness that we have available: our conscious experience. Onward! Stephen - Original Message - From: Bruno Marchal To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Tuesday, May 05, 2009 6:23 PM Subject: Re: Consciousness is information? On 05 May 2009, at 20:13, Stephen Paul King wrote: Hi Bruno and Members, The comment that is made below seems to only involve a single consciousness and an exterior reality. Could we not recover a very similar situation if we consider the 1-PoV and 3-PoV relation to hold to some degree over a multitude of consciouness (plurality). In the plurality case, the objective doubtful but sharable possible reality would be composed of a large intersection of sorts of 3-PoV aspects that can be recognized by or mapped to a statistical or generic notion of a 1-PoV. No? Yes. May be. Why? You need something like that for the first person plural, but you have to extract it in some precise way for solving the UD measure problem. You could elaborate perhaps. Bruno --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
