RE: Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-14 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
: A calculus of personal identity StathisPapaioannouwrote: BrentMeekerwrites: Iwouldsaythatwhatmakesastatementlike"we'rethesamepersonfrommomenttomoment"true isthatit'saninferencefrom,orapartof,amodeloftheworldthatis"true"inthe provisionalsenseofscientifictheories,i.e.itsubsumesandpr

RE: Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-14 Thread Lee Corbin
Stathis writes I am not so sure that the standard model of personal identity with which we are familiar would be a universal standard. Imagine intelligent beings evolved from hive insects which go through several radically different life stages, frequently share genetic information with each

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-14 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: I am not so sure that the standard model of personal identity with which we are familiar would be a universal standard. Imagine intelligent beings evolved from hive insects which go through several radically different life stages, frequently share genetic

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-13 Thread James N Rose
Thank you for your responses, Bruno. I will reply in return. As an overview to my original theme, I believe you missed several key notions.First, yes, I am bothered by interpretations of Godel's Incompleteness Theorems, but I avoid getting entangled in debating 'interpretations' by getting

RE: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-13 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Lee Corbin writes: Thereisanimportantdifferencebetweennormativestatementsanddescriptiveorempiricalstatements.QuotingfromWikipedia: "Descriptive(orconstative)statementsarefalsifiablestatementsthatattempttodescribereality.Normative

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-12 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Brent Meeker writes: I would say that what makes a statement like we're the same person from moment to moment true is that it's an inference from, or a part of, a model of the world that is true in the provisional sense of scientific theories, i.e. it subsumes and predicts many emprically

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-12 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent Meeker writes: I would say that what makes a statement like we're the same person from moment to moment true is that it's an inference from, or a part of, a model of the world that is true in the provisional sense of scientific theories, i.e. it

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-11 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 09-juil.-06, à 17:20, James N Rose a écrit : Bruno, I reviewed the archive and found no reply. I will repeat it again, hoping for your thoughts: from July 2, 2006 (lightly amended and then addended) Bruno, I have found myself in this lifetime to be a staunch OP-ponent and

Re: A calculus of personal identity (ERRATA)

2006-07-11 Thread Bruno Marchal
Bruno Marchal a écrit (to Jamie N Rose): Concerning your use of the word proposition, I don't understand exactly what you mean by the words exists accessible perfectly accessible, The whole sentence is rather hard to follow. Godel used this: From A - B and A - ~B, infer ~A. Godel

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-11 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
[Working my way slowly up the list of many excellent posts from the past few days, excuse me if someone else has already answered this...] Lee Corbin writes (quoting SP): If [a] species believed that 2+2=5, or that their kidneys were the organs of respiration, they would be wrong. But

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-11 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: [Working my way slowly up the list of many excellent posts from the past few days, excuse me if someone else has already answered this...] Lee Corbin writes (quoting SP): If [a] species believed that 2+2=5, or that their kidneys were the organs of

RE: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-11 Thread Lee Corbin
Stathis writes There is an important difference between normative statements and descriptive or empirical statements. Quoting from Wikipedia: Descriptive (or constative) statements are falsifiable statements that attempt to describe reality. Normative statements, on the other hand,

RE: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-11 Thread Lee Corbin
Brent wrote I would say that what makes a statement like we're the same person from moment to moment true is that it's an inference from, or a part of, a model of the world that is true in the provisional sense of scientific theories, i.e. it subsumes and predicts many empirically

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-09 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 09-juil.-06, à 06:50, James N Rose a écrit : My email has not gotten through accurately this week. Just wondering if you had replied to my post of July 2nd or just let it go? I think I did. Perhaps you could find it on the archive. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

RE: Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-08 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Brent Meeker writes: LeeCorbinwrote: StathiswritesandBrentevidentlyisnotonetoresistagoodpun StathisPapaioannouwrote: Indeed,Iwouldpersonallyfindtheideaofclonesofmyself thatIcouldrunintoquitedisturbing,andthemorelikeme theywere,theworseitwouldbe. Asoberingreflection.;-)

RE: Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-08 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Lee Corbin writes: Brentwrites Giventhatjustafterthecloning,thecloneswouldquicklydiverge,becomingdifferentpeople;it seemsyoucouldbehappycontemplatingthefuller,richerlifeofallthepeopleyouknowjustas muchasiftheywereclonesofyourself. SoIsupposethatdaybydayyoubecomesomeonedifferent?

RE: Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-08 Thread Lee Corbin
Stathis writes If [a] species believed that 2+2=5, or that their kidneys were the organs of respiration, they would be wrong. But if they believe that they wake up a different person every day, and live their lives based on this belief, they would *not* be wrong; they could hold this

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-08 Thread James N Rose
Bruno, My email has not gotten through accurately this week. Just wondering if you had replied to my post of July 2nd or just let it go? Jamie --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-07 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 07-juil.-06, à 06:45, Lee Corbin a écrit : Bruno writes Actually I was about to say that nominal question are suggestive (anybody can answer by principle of a mailing list), and nominal question when thread interferes makes possible to send less mails. But I agree here I miss

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-07 Thread Stephen Paul King
PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Friday, July 07, 2006 12:30 AM Subject: RE: A calculus of personal identity Stathis writes and Brent evidently is not one to resist a good pun Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Indeed, I would personally find the idea of clones of myself that I

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-07 Thread Stephen Paul King
Dear Lee and Bruno, - Original Message - From: Lee Corbin [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Friday, July 07, 2006 12:45 AM Subject: RE: A calculus of personal identity Bruno writes Actually I was about to say that nominal question are suggestive

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-06 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 04-juil.-06, à 23:37, Lee Corbin a écrit : Bruno had written [Lee wrote] What do you think of your survival chances if you happen to know that after you fall asleep tonight, you will be disintegrated, but the information will be used to create two exact duplicates, and then one of the

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-06 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 06-juil.-06, à 17:02, Bruno Marchal a écrit : Le 04-juil.-06, à 23:37, Lee Corbin a écrit : Bruno had written [Lee wrote] What do you think of your survival chances if you happen to know that after you fall asleep tonight, you will be disintegrated, but the information will be used

RE: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-06 Thread Lee Corbin
Brent writes Given that just after the cloning, the clones would quickly diverge, becoming different people; it seems you could be happy contemplating the fuller, richer life of all the people you know just as much as if they were clones of yourself. So I suppose that day by day you

RE: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-06 Thread Lee Corbin
Stathis writes and Brent evidently is not one to resist a good pun Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Indeed, I would personally find the idea of clones of myself that I could run into quite disturbing, and the more like me they were, the worse it would be. A sobering reflection. ;-) An

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-06 Thread Brent Meeker
Lee Corbin wrote: Brent writes Given that just after the cloning, the clones would quickly diverge, becoming different people; it seems you could be happy contemplating the fuller, richer life of all the people you know just as much as if they were clones of yourself. So I suppose

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-06 Thread Brent Meeker
Lee Corbin wrote: Brent writes Given that just after the cloning, the clones would quickly diverge, becoming different people; it seems you could be happy contemplating the fuller, richer life of all the people you know just as much as if they were clones of yourself. So I suppose

RE: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-06 Thread Lee Corbin
Bruno writes Actually I was about to say that nominal question are suggestive (anybody can answer by principle of a mailing list), and nominal question when thread interferes makes possible to send less mails. But I agree here I miss miserably ... Not sure what mistake you think you made

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-06 Thread Brent Meeker
Lee Corbin wrote: Stathis writes and Brent evidently is not one to resist a good pun Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Indeed, I would personally find the idea of clones of myself that I could run into quite disturbing, and the more like me they were, the worse it would be. A sobering reflection.

RE: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-06 Thread Lee Corbin
Brent writes Given that just after the cloning, the clones would quickly diverge, becoming different people; it seems you could be happy contemplating the fuller, richer life of all the people you know just as much as if they were clones of yourself. So I suppose that day by day

RE: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-06 Thread Lee Corbin
Brent writes I agree - I'd like my clone. I once found some old lab reports and as I was reading through them I found one that struck me as unusually well written and insightful - and then I realized it was one I had written. But we don't know Stathis. ;-) Okay---that makes three

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-05 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Brent Meeker writes (quoting Stathis Papaioannou and Lee Corbin, respectively): Yet another thought experiment for your consideration. You are offered the option of 10 years of normal life, or being cloned 20 times with each clone living one year. I would choose the 10 years; if I chose

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-05 Thread John M
. John Mikes - Original Message - From: Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Tuesday, July 04, 2006 2:49 PM Subject: Re: A calculus of personal identity John M wrote: --- Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: .skip I'm sure your professors

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-05 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Indeed, I would personally find the idea of clones of myself that I could run into quite disturbing, and the more like me they were, the worse it would be. A sobering reflection. ;-) Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-05 Thread Norman Samish
06 4:18 PM Subject: Re: A calculus of personal identity Stathis Papaioannou wrote:Indeed, I would personally find the idea of clones of myself that I could run into quite disturbing, and the more like me they were, the worse it would be. A sobering reflection. ;-) Bre

RE: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-04 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Lee Corbin writes: SoifIunderstandyouright,thisiswherethedifferencebetween abookandapersonarises.Whenabook'slettersarescatteredover thecosmos,theinformationislost,butwhentheobservermoments aresoscattered,thesubjectiveexperiencestillremains.

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-04 Thread John M
--- Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: .skip I'm sure your professors will be disappointed to hear that their hard won theories are inconsistent with thought. JM: and so would be all who's 'working' paradigm changed in the continuation of the epistemic enrichment - and: not

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-04 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 04-juil.-06, à 04:53, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : x-tad-biggerLee Corbin writes:/x-tad-bigger x-tad-bigger  /x-tad-bigger x-tad-bigger > > which is why in symmetrical duplication experiments I anticipate/x-tad-bigger x-tad-bigger> > that I will become one of the duplicates with equal 

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-04 Thread Brent Meeker
John M wrote: --- Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: .skip I'm sure your professors will be disappointed to hear that their hard won theories are inconsistent with thought. JM: and so would be all who's 'working' paradigm changed in the continuation of the epistemic enrichment

RE: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-04 Thread Lee Corbin
Bruno had written [Lee wrote] What do you think of your survival chances if you happen to know that after you fall asleep tonight, you will be disintegrated, but the information will be used to create two exact duplicates, and then one of the duplicates is vaporized and the other

RE: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-04 Thread Lee Corbin
Stathis asks Yet another thought experiment for your consideration. You are offered the option of 10 years of normal life, or being cloned 20 times with each clone living one year. I would choose the 10 years; if I chose the 20 clones, each one of those clones would be kicking

(offlist) RE: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-04 Thread Lee Corbin
Oh, I see you wrote more about that long letter of mine. Thanks for breaking it up! It's really a separate idea. I'll respond today if time. Lee -Original Message-From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]On Behalf Of Stathis PapaioannouSent:

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-04 Thread Brent Meeker
Lee Corbin wrote: Stathis asks Yet another thought experiment for your consideration. You are offered the option of 10 years of normal life, or being cloned 20 times with each clone living one year. I would choose the 10 years; if I chose the 20 clones, each one of those clones would be

RE: Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-03 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Bruno Marchal writes: Itcouldbe,forexample,thatIhavebeenbrainwashedandmymemories ofthepastarepartlyorcompletelyfalsememories. Thereisnofalse1-memories.Onlyanassociationbetweensome1-memory andsome3-realitycanbefalse.Ifsomeonesucceedsinimplementing

RE: Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-03 Thread John M
Stathis and Bruno: I am still perlexed (aren't we all?) about the use of the 1 vs 3. There is no 3rd person 'reality', only the 1st person memory of somebody else communicated to me when it becomes acknowledged as MY 1st person interpretation of it. I feel we rub too close to the solipsist

RE: Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-03 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Quentin Anciaux writes: HiJohn, LeVendredi30Juin200621:06,JohnMaécrit: AninterestingobservationfromSaibalthatincreasing theinfo-inputtoone'sbrainkillsperson(ality?). Iwouldnotsay"dead",rather'changed'asintosome differentone.(Itisagradualchange,deathisbeing thoughtofassomethingmoreabruptand

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-03 Thread jamikes
- Original Message - From: Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Sunday, July 02, 2006 2:54 PM Subject: Re: A calculus of personal identity Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 01-juil.-06, à 19:54, Brent Meeker a écrit : Sure it is. Just because something

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-03 Thread Brent Meeker
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: - Original Message - From: Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Sunday, July 02, 2006 2:54 PM Subject: Re: A calculus of personal identity Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 01-juil.-06, à 19:54, Brent Meeker a écrit

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-03 Thread John M
--- Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: - Original Message - From: Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Sunday, July 02, 2006 2:54 PM Subject: Re: A calculus of personal identity Bruno Marchal

RE: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-03 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Lee Corbin writes: whichiswhyinsymmetricalduplicationexperimentsIanticipate thatIwillbecomeoneoftheduplicateswithequalprobability. Whatdoyouthinkofyoursurvivalchancesifyouhappentoknow thatafteryoufallasleeptonight,youwillbedisintegrated, buttheinformationwillbeusedtocreatetwoexactduplicates,

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-03 Thread Brent Meeker
John M wrote: --- Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: - Original Message - From: Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Sunday, July 02, 2006 2:54 PM Subject: Re: A calculus of personal identity Bruno Marchal wrote

RE: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-03 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
. I take it you would choose the 20 clones, and each of your clones would be smug in the knowledge that they have doubled their effective runtime? Stathis Papaioannou From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: RE: A calculus of personal identity Date: Sat, 1 Jul 2006

RE: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-02 Thread Lee Corbin
Hal writes What I argued was that it would be easier to find the trace of a person's thoughts in a universe where he had a physically continuous record than where there were discontinuities (easier in the sense that a smaller program would suffice). In my framework, this means that the

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-02 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 01-juil.-06, à 19:35, Brent Meeker a écrit : That's not contrary to my conception at all. I certainly do bet on the existence of others, and of chairs and tables and stars and electrons and myself, and all for the essentially the same reasons. OK. I don't understand the

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-02 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 01-juil.-06, à 19:54, Brent Meeker a écrit : Sure it is. Just because something cannot be directly experienced doesn't rule it out of a scienctific model: quarks can't be observed, but their effects can. OK, but we were discussing about theories. general relativity, as a theory does

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-02 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 01-juil.-06, à 19:59, James N Rose a écrit : Math and reductive science ignore and dis-consider collateral co-extancy. The comp assumption leads to the less reductive possible account of the person and person POVs. For example, comp does not guaranties *any* survival, but it

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-02 Thread jamikes
:51 PM Subject: Re: A calculus of personal identity Hi John, Le Vendredi 30 Juin 2006 21:06, John M a écrit : An interesting observation from Saibal that increasing the info-input to one's brain kills person(ality?). I would not say dead, rather 'changed' as into some different one

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-02 Thread jamikes
- Original Message - From: Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Friday, June 30, 2006 3:34 PM Subject: Re: A calculus of personal identity John M wrote: ... Stathis wrote: ... I agree. Other people are part of the model of the world

RE: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-02 Thread Lee Corbin
Stathis also wrote in the same email, Sent: Friday, June 30, 2006 12:24 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: A calculus of personal identity Brent wrote That's why I suggest that OMs are not an adequate ontological basis for a world model. On the other hand, if we

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-02 Thread Brent Meeker
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 01-juil.-06, à 19:54, Brent Meeker a écrit : Sure it is. Just because something cannot be directly experienced doesn't rule it out of a scienctific model: quarks can't be observed, but their effects can. OK, but we were discussing about theories. general

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-02 Thread James N Rose
Bruno, I have found myself in this lifetime to be a staunch OP-ponent and challenger to Godel's incompleteness theorems. In the way that they are structured - with the premises Godel preset, of initial boundaries for what he was about to design by 'proof' - his theorems are both

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-01 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 30-juin-06, à 21:06, John M a écrit : I agree. Other people are part of the model of the world we form. And in the same way the existence of myself, as a durable entity, is also a part of that model. Brent Meeker * Does this agreed double(?) statement not rub too close on

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-01 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 30-juin-06, à 21:34, Brent Meeker a écrit : John M: Does this agreed double(?) statement not rub too close on solipsism? Not if you accept that *all* our ideas of reality are models. The fact that they work well and are coherent makes me believe they are models of an external

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-01 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 30-juin-06, à 20:43, Brent Meeker a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: There is no false 1-memories. Only an association between some 1-memory and some 3-reality can be false. If someone succeeds in implementing correctly (more than just coherently) false beliefs (like I am Napoleon just

RE: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-01 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Hal Finney writes: OK,thisistheoldASSAversusRSSAdistinction.Butleavingthis argumentaside,Idon'tseehowteleportationcouldbeanalogoustoa risky,measurereducingactivityifitseemedtobeareliableprocess fromathirdpersonperspective.IfsomeoneplaysRussianRoulette,we

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-01 Thread Brent Meeker
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 30-juin-06, à 21:06, John M a écrit : I agree. Other people are part of the model of the world we form. And in the same way the existence of myself, as a durable entity, is also a part of that model. Brent Meeker * Does this agreed double(?) statement not rub too

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-01 Thread Brent Meeker
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 30-juin-06, à 21:34, Brent Meeker a écrit : John M: Does this agreed double(?) statement not rub too close on solipsism? Not if you accept that *all* our ideas of reality are models. The fact that they work well and are coherent makes me believe they are models

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-01 Thread James N Rose
The notions of observed/observing, of first vs third, and all such round robin banter .. all fall down as nonsense conversation because -no one- has in any real sense specified the new-functions required to make such concepts ... a calculus. There are conflated criteria involved - as well as a

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-01 Thread Brent Meeker
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 30-juin-06, à 20:43, Brent Meeker a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: There is no false 1-memories. Only an association between some 1-memory and some 3-reality can be false. If someone succeeds in implementing correctly (more than just coherently) false beliefs (like I

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-01 Thread James N Rose
Addendum to my previous: TO make math sensitive to frame of reference distinctions and useful in an expanded way added parameter-dimensions might be useful. Color coding for example. With new translation operators. Equations written in red might indicate that attention be maintained that the

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-01 Thread John M
Jamie, your highly critical post is worthwhile reading. I like your antithesis for 'reductive operands' and would almost like what you wrote: Personal Identity is a de-fault resultant of the structure of the universe. unless I had this idiosyncrasy against axioms, givens, accepted de-faults

RE: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-01 Thread Lee Corbin
Stathis wrote Sent: Wednesday, June 28, 2006 5:53 AM which is why in symmetrical duplication experiments I anticipate that I will become one of the duplicates with equal probability. What do you think of your survival chances if you happen to know that after you fall asleep tonight, you

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-06-30 Thread Saibal Mitra
- Original Message - From: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Friday, June 30, 2006 09:23 AM Subject: Re: A calculus of personal identity Brent Meeker writes: I think it is one of the most profound things about consciousness

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-06-30 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Bruno Marchal writes: Yes,sharingthememoryis*not*thesameashavingtheoriginal experience,butthisappliestorecallingone'sownpastaswell. Areyoureallysure?Whentwopeoplesharememories,theycanonly sharethirdpersoninformation,whichwilltriggertheirrespective unsharablefirstpersonidentities/memories.

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-06-30 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 30-juin-06, à 15:19, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : x-tad-bigger  /x-tad-bigger x-tad-bigger I have the subjective experience of being a person persisting through time because I feel that I know in a 1st person way what I did in the past. If I really did know in a 1st person way what I did in

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-06-30 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent Meeker writes: I think it is one of the most profound things about consciousness that observer moments don't *need* anything to connect them other than their content. They are linked like the novels in a series, not like the carriages of a train. It

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-06-30 Thread Brent Meeker
Saibal Mitra wrote: - Original Message - From: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Friday, June 30, 2006 09:23 AM Subject: Re: A calculus of personal identity Brent Meeker writes: I think it is one of the most profound things

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-06-30 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Bruno Marchal writes: ... This is not to say that my mind can or should overcome [Lee Corbin disagrees on the should] the deeply ingrained belief or illusion that I am a unique, one-track individual living my life from start to finish, Here

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-06-30 Thread Brent Meeker
Bruno Marchal wrote: There is no false 1-memories. Only an association between some 1-memory and some 3-reality can be false. If someone succeeds in implementing correctly (more than just coherently) false beliefs (like I am Napoleon just after Waterloo), then I will believe correctly that I am

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-06-30 Thread John M
--- Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: (unless the final remark with Saibal/s signature underneath comes from him): ... Stathis wrote: ... I would say that the 1st person experience is *not* an illusion in any sense of the word. It is the very opposite, in a way: the most real thing,

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-06-30 Thread Brent Meeker
John M wrote: --- Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: (unless the final remark with Saibal/s signature underneath comes from him): ... Stathis wrote: ... I would say that the 1st person experience is *not* an illusion in any sense of the word. It is the very opposite, in a way: the

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-06-30 Thread Quentin Anciaux
Hi John, Le Vendredi 30 Juin 2006 21:06, John M a écrit : An interesting observation from Saibal that increasing the info-input to one's brain kills person(ality?). I would not say dead, rather 'changed' as into some different one. (It is a gradual change, death is being thought of as

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-06-29 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Brent Meeker writes (quoting SP): Yes,sharingthememoryis*not*thesameashavingtheoriginalexperience,butthisappliesto recallingone'sownpastaswell.Youmayarguethatrecallingourpastisdifferentbecausewe havejusttherightbrainstructure,otherassociatedmemoriesandsoontoputitallin

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-06-29 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 28-juin-06, à 14:52, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : Bruno, I have cut out some of your detailed response to my post where I think we basically agree. Good idea. Of course it will looks like I disagree with all what you say, but just remember we are concentrating on those points where we

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-06-29 Thread John M
Bruno: This thread is more than I could follow in detail at this time, when I am involved with different areas to speculate on - on other lists. I apologize. Not that I assume you're missing my input (usually marginal), but for not being better informed on the details. I pick from time to time a

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-06-29 Thread John M
Thanks, Stathis, for your words not too distant from where I stand. As I wrote to Bruno, I assign my present memory to my present viewing technology, not to 'my' 5-year old as you refer to. You mention sense of identity - I think it is more than just a 'sense': it is a reflective relation of the

RE: A calculus of personal identity

2006-06-29 Thread Hal Finney
Stathis Papaioannou writes: Hal Finney writes: What I argued was that it would be easier to find the trace of a person's thoughts in a universe where he had a physically continuous record than where there were discontinuities (easier in the sense that a smaller program would suffice).

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-06-29 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent Meeker writes (quoting SP): Yes, sharing the memory is *not* the same as having the original experience, but this applies to recalling one's own past as well. You may argue that recalling our past is different because we have just the

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-06-28 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
John Mikes writes (quoting Brent Meeker): Well that's the question isn't it. Is there something besides memories and personality that makes you you... But how much do we (already???) know about our memories which for sure is a concoction with our personality, of which we just as

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-06-28 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Bruno, I have cut out some of your detailed response to my post where I think we basically agree. There remain some differences, and some failings on my part to understand more technical aspects of your work. Memories of our past are generally more vivid and hold more information than

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-06-28 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Bruno, I have cut out some of your detailed response to my post where I think we basically agree. There remain some differences, and some failings on my part to understand more technical aspects of your work. Memories of our past are generally more vivid

RE: A calculus of personal identity

2006-06-28 Thread Hal Finney
Lee Corbin writes: Stathis writes Hal Finney in his recent thread on teleportation thought experiments disagrees with the above view. He suggests that it is possible for a subject to apparently undergo successful teleportation, in that the individual walking out of the receiving

in turn Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-06-27 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Brent Meeker writes: If the duplicate did not feel he was the original, then he wouldn't have all the memories and personality of the original, would he? Well that's the question isn't it. Is there something besides memories and personality that makes you you. Could you feel that

Re: in turn Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-06-27 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent Meeker writes: If the duplicate did not feel he was the original, then he wouldn't have all the memories and personality of the original, would he? Well that's the question isn't it. Is there something besides memories and personality that makes

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-06-27 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Brent Meeker writes: Istheduplicationprocessgoodenoughtomatchorbetterthemechanismsnaturallyinplaceto preservethefunctionalintegrityofthebrainfrommomenttomoment?Thatisthequestionthat needstobeanswered.Itwouldbeunreasonabletospeculatethattheduplicatemaynotbethe

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-06-27 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 26-juin-06, à 14:28, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : x-tad-bigger Bruno Marchal writes (quoting SP):/x-tad-bigger x-tad-bigger  /x-tad-bigger x-tad-bigger > > Of course, it is not possible for a third person observer to be /x-tad-bigger x-tad-bigger> > certain about first person mental 

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-06-27 Thread John M
--- Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: to Stathis (excerpt): Well that's the question isn't it. Is there something besides memories and personality that makes you you... But how much do we (already???) know about our memories which for sure is a concoction with our personality, of

RE: A calculus of personal identity

2006-06-27 Thread Lee Corbin
Stathis writes Lee, It’s perhaps unfortunate that we are arguing about this because I think we basically agree on what Derek Parfit has called a reductionist theory of personal identity (in his 1984 book Reasons and Persons; Yes, I was very relieved to have read portions of that book.

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-06-26 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Bruno Marchal writes (quoting SP): Of course, it is not possible for a third person observer to be certain about first person mental states, and this would apply to our

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-06-26 Thread John M
--- Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: SNIP previous I we actually tried duplication, then as in all communication technologies, there would be errors and the duplication would not be perfect. But then the question arises, could the duplicate have all the memories and personality of

  1   2   >