Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-09 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 08 Oct 2013, at 20:12, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, October 8, 2013 12:34:57 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Oct 2013, at 17:59, Craig Weinberg wrote: Why isn't computationalism the consequence of quanta though? Human computationalism does. But I want the simplest

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-09 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Wednesday, October 9, 2013 3:18:52 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Oct 2013, at 20:12, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, October 8, 2013 12:34:57 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Oct 2013, at 17:59, Craig Weinberg wrote: Why isn't computationalism the consequence of

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-09 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 09 Oct 2013, at 15:43, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Wednesday, October 9, 2013 3:18:52 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Oct 2013, at 20:12, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, October 8, 2013 12:34:57 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Oct 2013, at 17:59, Craig Weinberg wrote:

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-09 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Wednesday, October 9, 2013 11:18:03 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Oct 2013, at 15:43, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Wednesday, October 9, 2013 3:18:52 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Oct 2013, at 20:12, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, October 8, 2013 12:34:57 PM UTC-4,

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-09 Thread Platonist Guitar Cowboy
On Wed, Oct 9, 2013 at 8:39 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote: On Wednesday, October 9, 2013 11:18:03 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Oct 2013, at 15:43, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Wednesday, October 9, 2013 3:18:52 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Oct 2013, at

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-09 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Wednesday, October 9, 2013 4:56:45 PM UTC-4, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: On Wed, Oct 9, 2013 at 8:39 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: On Wednesday, October 9, 2013 11:18:03 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Oct 2013, at 15:43, Craig Weinberg wrote: On

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-08 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 07 Oct 2013, at 17:20, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, October 7, 2013 3:56:55 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 06 Oct 2013, at 22:00, Craig Weinberg wrote: Qualia is experience which contains the felt relation to all other experiences; specific experiences which directly relate,

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-08 Thread Jason Resch
On Sun, Oct 6, 2013 at 3:00 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote: On Sunday, October 6, 2013 5:06:31 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 06 Oct 2013, at 03:17, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 5 October 2013 00:40, Bruno Marchal mar...@ulb.ac.be wrote: The argument is simply

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-08 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Tuesday, October 8, 2013 3:40:53 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 07 Oct 2013, at 17:20, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, October 7, 2013 3:56:55 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 06 Oct 2013, at 22:00, Craig Weinberg wrote: Qualia is experience which contains the felt relation

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-08 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Tuesday, October 8, 2013 10:10:25 AM UTC-4, Jason wrote: On Sun, Oct 6, 2013 at 3:00 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: On Sunday, October 6, 2013 5:06:31 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 06 Oct 2013, at 03:17, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 5

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-08 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 08 Oct 2013, at 17:59, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, October 8, 2013 3:40:53 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 07 Oct 2013, at 17:20, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, October 7, 2013 3:56:55 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 06 Oct 2013, at 22:00, Craig Weinberg wrote: Qualia

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-08 Thread Jason Resch
On Tue, Oct 8, 2013 at 11:18 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote: On Tuesday, October 8, 2013 10:10:25 AM UTC-4, Jason wrote: On Sun, Oct 6, 2013 at 3:00 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comwrote: On Sunday, October 6, 2013 5:06:31 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 06

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-08 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Tuesday, October 8, 2013 12:41:26 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote: Craig, I agree with you that there is some building up required to create a full and rich human experience, which cannot happen in a single instance or with a single CPU instruction being executed. However, where I disagree

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-08 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Tuesday, October 8, 2013 12:34:57 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Oct 2013, at 17:59, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, October 8, 2013 3:40:53 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 07 Oct 2013, at 17:20, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, October 7, 2013 3:56:55 AM UTC-4, Bruno

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-07 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 06 Oct 2013, at 22:00, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Sunday, October 6, 2013 5:06:31 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 06 Oct 2013, at 03:17, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 5 October 2013 00:40, Bruno Marchal mar...@ulb.ac.be wrote: The argument is simply summarised thus: it is impossible

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-07 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Monday, October 7, 2013 3:56:55 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 06 Oct 2013, at 22:00, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Sunday, October 6, 2013 5:06:31 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 06 Oct 2013, at 03:17, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 5 October 2013 00:40, Bruno Marchal

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-07 Thread Platonist Guitar Cowboy
On Craig’s use of the term “Aesthetic”. One of the hindrances preventing me from understanding Craig’s statements is the pluralistic use of the term “aesthetics”. Sorry for not being able to produce a proper account but the following conflicts will just be stream of consciousness for 15 minutes:

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-07 Thread Craig Weinberg
I can understand why it seems that my use of 'aesthetic' (and sense) is all over the place, and part of that is because I am trying to prompt others to make a connection between all of the different uses of the word. What I like about aesthetic is: Anesthetic is used to refer to both general

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-06 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 06 Oct 2013, at 03:17, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 5 October 2013 00:40, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: The argument is simply summarised thus: it is impossible even for God to make a brain prosthesis that reproduces the I/O behaviour but has different qualia. This is a proof

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-06 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Sunday, October 6, 2013 5:06:31 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 06 Oct 2013, at 03:17, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 5 October 2013 00:40, Bruno Marchal mar...@ulb.ac.be javascript: wrote: The argument is simply summarised thus: it is impossible even for God to make a

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-05 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 04 Oct 2013, at 19:22, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Friday, October 4, 2013 10:39:44 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 02 Oct 2013, at 19:20, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Wednesday, October 2, 2013 12:26:45 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 02 Oct 2013, at 06:56, Pierz wrote: On

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-05 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 04 Oct 2013, at 20:06, meekerdb wrote: On 10/4/2013 7:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: When a consciousness is not manifested, what is it's content? Good question. Difficult. Sometimes ago, I would have said that consciousness exists only in manifested form. That's what I would say. I

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-05 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On 5 October 2013 15:25, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: The question is whether swapping out part of the system for a functional equivalent will change the qualia the system experiences without changing the behaviour. I don't think this is possible, for if the qualia change the subject

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-05 Thread meekerdb
On 10/5/2013 5:38 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 5 October 2013 15:25, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: The question is whether swapping out part of the system for a functional equivalent will change the qualia the system experiences without changing the behaviour. I don't think this is

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-05 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On 6 Oct 2013, at 7:03 am, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 10/5/2013 5:38 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 5 October 2013 15:25, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: The question is whether swapping out part of the system for a functional equivalent will change the qualia the

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-05 Thread meekerdb
On 10/5/2013 1:25 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 6 Oct 2013, at 7:03 am, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 10/5/2013 5:38 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 5 October 2013 15:25, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: The question is whether swapping out part of the system for a

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-05 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On 6 October 2013 08:13, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: So you agree that there could be minor or subtle changes that went unnoticed? Yes, but it makes no difference to the argument, since subtle changes may be missed with a normal brain. To disprove functionalism you would have to show

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-05 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On 5 October 2013 00:40, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: The argument is simply summarised thus: it is impossible even for God to make a brain prosthesis that reproduces the I/O behaviour but has different qualia. This is a proof of comp, Hmm... I can agree, but eventually no God can

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-04 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Thursday, October 3, 2013 11:48:40 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote: On 10/3/2013 4:36 PM, Pierz wrote: The universe doesn't seem to be too fussed about immense and inescapable redundancy. Of course the universe doesn't care when the immense and inescapable redundancy is in our

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-04 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 02 Oct 2013, at 19:20, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Wednesday, October 2, 2013 12:26:45 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 02 Oct 2013, at 06:56, Pierz wrote: On Wednesday, October 2, 2013 12:46:17 AM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal wrote: Then the reasoning shows (at a meta-level, made possible

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-04 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 02 Oct 2013, at 20:48, meekerdb wrote: On 10/2/2013 2:04 AM, Russell Standish wrote: On Tue, Oct 01, 2013 at 10:09:03AM -0700, meekerdb wrote: On 10/1/2013 4:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Note also that the expression computation have qualia can be misleading. A computation has no qualia,

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-04 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 02 Oct 2013, at 21:30, meekerdb wrote: On 10/2/2013 6:35 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 Oct 2013, at 19:09, meekerdb wrote: On 10/1/2013 4:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Note also that the expression computation have qualia can be misleading. A computation has no qualia, strictly

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-04 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 02 Oct 2013, at 22:12, meekerdb wrote: On 10/2/2013 9:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: I agree with Brent though on this. Your UDA proceeds on the basis that a computer in a single reality (not an infinite sum of calculations - that comes later) can have a 1p. Yes. It has 1p, it is not a

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-04 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 03 Oct 2013, at 02:23, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 2 October 2013 00:46, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 01 Oct 2013, at 15:31, Pierz wrote: Maybe. It would be a lot more profound if we definitely *could* reproduce the brain's behaviour. The devil is in the detail as they

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-04 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Friday, October 4, 2013 10:39:44 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 02 Oct 2013, at 19:20, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Wednesday, October 2, 2013 12:26:45 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 02 Oct 2013, at 06:56, Pierz wrote: On Wednesday, October 2, 2013 12:46:17 AM

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-04 Thread meekerdb
On 10/4/2013 7:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: When a consciousness is not manifested, what is it's content? Good question. Difficult. Sometimes ago, I would have said that consciousness exists only in manifested form. That's what I would say. But I am much less sure about that, and such

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-04 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
I On Friday, October 4, 2013, meekerdb wrote: On 10/3/2013 5:07 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: You seem to be agreeing with Craig that each neuron alone is conscious. The experiment relates to replacement of neurons which play some part in consciousness. The 1% remaining neurons are

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-04 Thread meekerdb
On 10/4/2013 7:18 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: I On Friday, October 4, 2013, meekerdb wrote: On 10/3/2013 5:07 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: You seem to be agreeing with Craig that each neuron alone is conscious. The experiment relates to replacement of neurons which play some

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-04 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On 5 October 2013 12:53, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 10/4/2013 7:18 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: I On Friday, October 4, 2013, meekerdb wrote: On 10/3/2013 5:07 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: You seem to be agreeing with Craig that each neuron alone is conscious. The

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-04 Thread meekerdb
On 10/4/2013 9:46 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 5 October 2013 12:53, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 10/4/2013 7:18 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: I On Friday, October 4, 2013, meekerdb wrote: On 10/3/2013 5:07 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: You seem to be agreeing with Craig

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-03 Thread Telmo Menezes
On Tue, Oct 1, 2013 at 6:26 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 01 Oct 2013, at 17:09, Telmo Menezes wrote: On Tue, Oct 1, 2013 at 1:13 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 30 Sep 2013, at 14:05, Telmo Menezes wrote to Craig: The comp assumption that computations have

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-03 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Thursday, October 3, 2013 9:30:13 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote: On Tue, Oct 1, 2013 at 6:10 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: I think that evil continues to flourish, precisely because science has not integrated privacy into an authoritative worldview.

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-03 Thread Pierz
On Friday, October 4, 2013 4:10:02 AM UTC+10, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Thursday, October 3, 2013 9:30:13 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote: On Tue, Oct 1, 2013 at 6:10 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: I think that evil continues to flourish, precisely because science has

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-03 Thread Pierz
On Thursday, October 3, 2013 4:59:17 AM UTC+10, Brent wrote: On 10/1/2013 11:49 PM, Pierz wrote: On Wednesday, October 2, 2013 3:15:01 PM UTC+10, Brent wrote: On 10/1/2013 9:56 PM, Pierz wrote: Yes, I understand that to be Chalmer's main point. Although, if the qualia can be

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-03 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On 3 October 2013 10:33, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 10/2/2013 5:15 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 1 October 2013 23:31, Pierz pier...@gmail.com wrote: Maybe. It would be a lot more profound if we definitely *could* reproduce the brain's behaviour. The devil is in the detail

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-03 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Thursday, October 3, 2013 7:36:10 PM UTC-4, Pierz wrote: On Friday, October 4, 2013 4:10:02 AM UTC+10, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Thursday, October 3, 2013 9:30:13 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote: On Tue, Oct 1, 2013 at 6:10 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: I think

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-03 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On 3 October 2013 14:40, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: The argument is simply summarised thus: it is impossible even for God to make a brain prosthesis that reproduces the I/O behaviour but has different qualia. This is a proof of comp, provided that brain physics is computable,

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-03 Thread meekerdb
On 10/3/2013 4:36 PM, Pierz wrote: The universe doesn't seem to be too fussed about immense and inescapable redundancy. Of course the universe doesn't care when the immense and inescapable redundancy is in our model of it. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-03 Thread meekerdb
On 10/3/2013 5:07 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: You seem to be agreeing with Craig that each neuron alone is conscious. The experiment relates to replacement of neurons which play some part in consciousness. The 1% remaining neurons are part of a system which will notice that the qualia are

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-03 Thread meekerdb
On 10/3/2013 4:53 PM, Pierz wrote: On Thursday, October 3, 2013 4:59:17 AM UTC+10, Brent wrote: On 10/1/2013 11:49 PM, Pierz wrote: On Wednesday, October 2, 2013 3:15:01 PM UTC+10, Brent wrote: On 10/1/2013 9:56 PM, Pierz wrote: Yes, I understand that to be

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-02 Thread Pierz
On Wednesday, October 2, 2013 3:15:01 PM UTC+10, Brent wrote: On 10/1/2013 9:56 PM, Pierz wrote: Yes, I understand that to be Chalmer's main point. Although, if the qualia can be different, it does present issues - how much and in what way can it vary? Yes, that's a question that

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-02 Thread Russell Standish
On Tue, Oct 01, 2013 at 10:09:03AM -0700, meekerdb wrote: On 10/1/2013 4:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Note also that the expression computation have qualia can be misleading. A computation has no qualia, strictly speaking. Only a person supported by an infinity of computation can be said to

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-02 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 01 Oct 2013, at 18:46, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, October 1, 2013 7:13:17 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 30 Sep 2013, at 14:05, Telmo Menezes wrote to Craig: The comp assumption that computations have qualia hidden inside them is not much of an answer either in my view.

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-02 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 01 Oct 2013, at 19:09, meekerdb wrote: On 10/1/2013 4:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Note also that the expression computation have qualia can be misleading. A computation has no qualia, strictly speaking. Only a person supported by an infinity of computation can be said to have qualia,

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-02 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 02 Oct 2013, at 06:56, Pierz wrote: On Wednesday, October 2, 2013 12:46:17 AM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 Oct 2013, at 15:31, Pierz wrote: Maybe. It would be a lot more profound if we definitely *could* reproduce the brain's behaviour. The devil is in the detail as they say.

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-02 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 02 Oct 2013, at 11:04, Russell Standish wrote: On Tue, Oct 01, 2013 at 10:09:03AM -0700, meekerdb wrote: On 10/1/2013 4:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Note also that the expression computation have qualia can be misleading. A computation has no qualia, strictly speaking. Only a person

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-02 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Wednesday, October 2, 2013 12:26:45 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 02 Oct 2013, at 06:56, Pierz wrote: On Wednesday, October 2, 2013 12:46:17 AM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal wrote: Then the reasoning shows (at a meta-level, made possible with the assumption used) how consciousness and

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-02 Thread meekerdb
On 10/2/2013 2:04 AM, Russell Standish wrote: On Tue, Oct 01, 2013 at 10:09:03AM -0700, meekerdb wrote: On 10/1/2013 4:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Note also that the expression computation have qualia can be misleading. A computation has no qualia, strictly speaking. Only a person supported by

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-02 Thread meekerdb
On 10/1/2013 11:49 PM, Pierz wrote: On Wednesday, October 2, 2013 3:15:01 PM UTC+10, Brent wrote: On 10/1/2013 9:56 PM, Pierz wrote: Yes, I understand that to be Chalmer's main point. Although, if the qualia can be different, it does present issues - how much and in what way

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-02 Thread meekerdb
On 10/2/2013 6:35 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 Oct 2013, at 19:09, meekerdb wrote: On 10/1/2013 4:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Note also that the expression computation have qualia can be misleading. A computation has no qualia, strictly speaking. Only a person supported by an infinity of

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-02 Thread meekerdb
On 10/2/2013 9:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: I agree with Brent though on this. Your UDA proceeds on the basis that a computer in a single reality (not an infinite sum of calculations - that comes later) can have a 1p. Yes. It has 1p, it is not a zombie. But that 1p, for him, is really defined

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-02 Thread John Mikes
Brent: ***But no matter how smart I make it, it won't experience lust.* * * 1. lust is not the universal criterion that makes us human, it is only one of our humanly circumscribed paraphernalia we apply in HUMAN thinking and HUMAN complexity with HUMAN language. Can you apply a similar criterion

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-02 Thread meekerdb
On 10/2/2013 2:06 PM, John Mikes wrote: Brent: *//*/But no matter how smart I make it, it won't experience lust./ / / 1. lust is not the universal criterion that makes us human, it is only one of our humanly circumscribed paraphernalia we apply in HUMAN thinking and HUMAN complexity with

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-02 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On 1 October 2013 23:31, Pierz pier...@gmail.com wrote: Maybe. It would be a lot more profound if we definitely *could* reproduce the brain's behaviour. The devil is in the detail as they say. But a challenge to Chalmer's position has occurred to me. It seems to me that Bruno has

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-02 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On 2 October 2013 00:46, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 01 Oct 2013, at 15:31, Pierz wrote: Maybe. It would be a lot more profound if we definitely *could* reproduce the brain's behaviour. The devil is in the detail as they say. But a challenge to Chalmer's position has occurred

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-02 Thread meekerdb
On 10/2/2013 5:15 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 1 October 2013 23:31, Pierz pier...@gmail.com wrote: Maybe. It would be a lot more profound if we definitely *could* reproduce the brain's behaviour. The devil is in the detail as they say. But a challenge to Chalmer's position has occurred

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-02 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Wednesday, October 2, 2013 2:59:17 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote: On 10/1/2013 11:49 PM, Pierz wrote: On Wednesday, October 2, 2013 3:15:01 PM UTC+10, Brent wrote: On 10/1/2013 9:56 PM, Pierz wrote: Yes, I understand that to be Chalmer's main point. Although, if the qualia can be

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-02 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Wednesday, October 2, 2013 8:23:36 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On 2 October 2013 00:46, Bruno Marchal mar...@ulb.ac.be javascript: wrote: On 01 Oct 2013, at 15:31, Pierz wrote: Maybe. It would be a lot more profound if we definitely *could* reproduce the brain's behaviour.

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-01 Thread Telmo Menezes
On Mon, Sep 30, 2013 at 3:44 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Monday, September 30, 2013 6:12:45 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote: On Fri, Sep 27, 2013 at 7:49 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: On Friday, September 27, 2013 8:00:11 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-01 Thread Telmo Menezes
Hi Liz, On Tue, Oct 1, 2013 at 12:30 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 1 October 2013 08:44, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 9/30/2013 5:05 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote: Even under functionalist assumptions, I still find the Turing test to be misguided because it require the machine

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-01 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 30 Sep 2013, at 14:05, Telmo Menezes wrote to Craig: The comp assumption that computations have qualia hidden inside them is not much of an answer either in my view. I have the same problem. The solution is in the fact that all machines have that problem. More exactly: all persons

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-01 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 30 Sep 2013, at 14:00, Pierz wrote: Yes indeed, and it is compelling. Fading qualia and all that. It's the absurdity of philosophical zombies. Those arguments did have an influence on my thinking. On the other hand the idea that we *can* replicate all the brain's outputs remains an

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-01 Thread Pierz
Maybe. It would be a lot more profound if we definitely *could* reproduce the brain's behaviour. The devil is in the detail as they say. But a challenge to Chalmer's position has occurred to me. It seems to me that Bruno has convincingly argued that *if* comp holds, then consciousness

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-01 Thread Pierz
Sorry, this list behaves strangely on my iPad. I can't reply to individual posts. The post above was meant to be a reply to stathis and his remark that it is possible to prove that it is impossible to replicate its observable behaviour (a brain's) without also replicating its consciousness.

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-01 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 01 Oct 2013, at 15:31, Pierz wrote: Maybe. It would be a lot more profound if we definitely *could* reproduce the brain's behaviour. The devil is in the detail as they say. But a challenge to Chalmer's position has occurred to me. It seems to me that Bruno has convincingly argued that

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-01 Thread Telmo Menezes
On Tue, Oct 1, 2013 at 1:13 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 30 Sep 2013, at 14:05, Telmo Menezes wrote to Craig: The comp assumption that computations have qualia hidden inside them is not much of an answer either in my view. I have the same problem. The solution is in

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-01 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 01 Oct 2013, at 17:09, Telmo Menezes wrote: On Tue, Oct 1, 2013 at 1:13 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 30 Sep 2013, at 14:05, Telmo Menezes wrote to Craig: The comp assumption that computations have qualia hidden inside them is not much of an answer either in my view.

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-01 Thread Craig Weinberg
I had a similar thought about a chameleon brain (I call a p-Zelig instead of a p-zombie), which would impersonate behaviors of whatever environment it was placed into. Unlike a philosophical zombie, which would have no personal qualia but seem like it does from the outside, the chameleon brain

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-01 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Tuesday, October 1, 2013 7:13:17 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 30 Sep 2013, at 14:05, Telmo Menezes wrote to Craig: The comp assumption that computations have qualia hidden inside them is not much of an answer either in my view. I have the same problem. The solution is in

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-01 Thread meekerdb
On 10/1/2013 4:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Note also that the expression computation have qualia can be misleading. A computation has no qualia, strictly speaking. Only a person supported by an infinity of computation can be said to have qualia, or to live qualia. Why an infinity of

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-01 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 01 Oct 2013, at 18:10, Craig Weinberg wrote: Bruno's UDA eventually removes the requirement for a copy being primitively real. That's one of the things that impressed me about the argument. I think your position requires that you find a way to refute the UDA. I think that it does so by

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-01 Thread Pierz
On Wednesday, October 2, 2013 12:46:17 AM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 Oct 2013, at 15:31, Pierz wrote: Maybe. It would be a lot more profound if we definitely *could* reproduce the brain's behaviour. The devil is in the detail as they say. But a challenge to Chalmer's

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-01 Thread meekerdb
On 10/1/2013 9:56 PM, Pierz wrote: Yes, I understand that to be Chalmer's main point. Although, if the qualia can be different, it does present issues - how much and in what way can it vary? Yes, that's a question that interests me because I want to be able to build intelligent machines and

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-09-30 Thread Telmo Menezes
On Fri, Sep 27, 2013 at 7:49 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Friday, September 27, 2013 8:00:11 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote: On Thu, Sep 26, 2013 at 9:28 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: On Thursday, September 26, 2013 11:49:29 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-09-30 Thread Pierz
Yes indeed, and it is compelling. Fading qualia and all that. It's the absurdity of philosophical zombies. Those arguments did have an influence on my thinking. On the other hand the idea that we *can* replicate all the brain's outputs remains an article of faith. I remember that almost the

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-09-30 Thread Telmo Menezes
On Mon, Sep 30, 2013 at 3:36 AM, Pierz pier...@gmail.com wrote: If I might just butt in (said the barman)... The more the merrier! It seems to me that Craig's insistence that nothing is Turing emulable, only the measurements are expresses a different ontological assumption from the one that

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-09-30 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On 30 September 2013 22:00, Pierz pier...@gmail.com wrote: Yes indeed, and it is compelling. Fading qualia and all that. It's the absurdity of philosophical zombies. The absurd thing is not philosophical zombies, which are at least conceivable, it is partial zombies. Those arguments did have

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-09-30 Thread Richard Ruquist
Stathis Could you provide the proof or a link to it? Richard On Mon, Sep 30, 2013 at 9:00 AM, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.comwrote: On 30 September 2013 22:00, Pierz pier...@gmail.com wrote: Yes indeed, and it is compelling. Fading qualia and all that. It's the absurdity of

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-09-30 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On 30 Sep 2013, at 11:07 pm, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: Stathis Could you provide the proof or a link to it? Richard It's the Chalmers Fading Qualia paper cited before. The paper refers to computer chips replacing neurons. The objection could be made that we do not know

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-09-30 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Sunday, September 29, 2013 9:36:28 PM UTC-4, Pierz wrote: If I might just butt in (said the barman)... It seems to me that Craig's insistence that nothing is Turing emulable, only the measurements are expresses a different ontological assumption from the one that computationalists

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-09-30 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Monday, September 30, 2013 8:00:11 AM UTC-4, Pierz wrote: Yes indeed, and it is compelling. Fading qualia and all that. It's the absurdity of philosophical zombies. Those arguments did have an influence on my thinking. On the other hand the idea that we *can* replicate all the brain's

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-09-30 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 30 Sep 2013, at 03:36, Pierz wrote: If I might just butt in (said the barman)... It seems to me that Craig's insistence that nothing is Turing emulable, only the measurements are expresses a different ontological assumption from the one that computationalists take for granted. It's

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-09-30 Thread meekerdb
On 9/30/2013 5:05 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote: Even under functionalist assumptions, I still find the Turing test to be misguided because it require the machine to lie, while a human can pass it by telling the truth. Actually Turing already thought of this. If you read his paper you find that the

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-09-30 Thread LizR
On 1 October 2013 08:44, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 9/30/2013 5:05 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote: Even under functionalist assumptions, I still find the Turing test to be misguided because it require the machine to lie, while a human can pass it by telling the truth. Actually

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-09-29 Thread Pierz
If I might just butt in (said the barman)... It seems to me that Craig's insistence that nothing is Turing emulable, only the measurements are expresses a different ontological assumption from the one that computationalists take for granted. It's evident that if we make a flight simulator, we

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-09-29 Thread LizR
Fascinating post. The illusion of qualia is perhaps something like the illusion of consciousness - who is being fooled? (Who is the Master who makes the grass green?) My 2c on the Turing Test is that ELIZA passed it, so if you're being pernickety that was solved in the 60s (I think it was) - but

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-09-29 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On 30 September 2013 11:36, Pierz pier...@gmail.com wrote: If I might just butt in (said the barman)... It seems to me that Craig's insistence that nothing is Turing emulable, only the measurements are expresses a different ontological assumption from the one that computationalists take for

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-09-27 Thread Telmo Menezes
On Thu, Sep 26, 2013 at 9:28 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Thursday, September 26, 2013 11:49:29 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote: On Thu, Sep 26, 2013 at 2:38 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: On Thursday, September 26, 2013 6:17:04 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-09-26 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Thursday, September 26, 2013 6:17:04 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote: Hi Craig (and all), Now that I have a better understanding of your ideas, I would like to confront you with a thought experiment. Some of the stuff you say looks completely esoteric to me, so I imagine there are

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-09-26 Thread Telmo Menezes
On Thu, Sep 26, 2013 at 2:38 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Thursday, September 26, 2013 6:17:04 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote: Hi Craig (and all), Now that I have a better understanding of your ideas, I would like to confront you with a thought experiment. Some of the

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