Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-09 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 08 Oct 2013, at 20:12, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Tuesday, October 8, 2013 12:34:57 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 08 Oct 2013, at 17:59, Craig Weinberg wrote:



Why isn't computationalism the consequence of quanta though?


Human computationalism does.

But I want the simplest conceptual theory, and integers are easier  
to define than human integers.


I'm not sure how that relates to computationalism being something  
other than quanta. Humans are easier to define to themselves than  
integers. A baby can be themselves for years before counting to 10.


Phenomenologically? Yes.
Fundamentally? That does not follow. It took a long time before  
discovering the Higgs-Englert-Brout Boson.












What can be computed other than quantities?


Quantities are easily computed by stopping machines, but most  
machines does not stop, and when they introspect, the theory  
explains why they get troubled by consciousness, qualia, etc. Those  
qualia are not really computed, they are part of non computable  
truth, but which still bear on machines or machine's perspective.


Then you still have an explanatory gap.


But that is a good point for comp, as it explains why there is a gap,  
and it imposes on it a precise mathematical structure.




How can anything which is non-computable bear on the computation of  
an ideal machine?


That is the whole subject of en entire field: recursion theory, or  
theoretical computer science.





What connects the qualia to the quanta, and why isn't the qualia  
just quantitative summaries of quanta?


Qualia are not connected to quanta. Quanta are appearances in the  
qualia theory, and they are not quantitative, they are lived at the  
first person plural views.





If Arithmetic truth is full of non nameable things, what nameable  
things does it also contain,


The numbers, the recursive properties, the recursively enumarable  
properties, the Sigma_i truth, well a lot of things.
You have the recursive (the simplest in our comp setting), then the  
recursively enumerable (the universal machines, notably), then a  
whole hierarchy of non computable, but still nameable set of  
numbers, or machine's properties,


You say they are nameable, but I don't believe you. It is not as if  
a number would ever need to go by some other name. Why not refer to  
it by its precise coordinate within Arithmetic Truth?


Because it is independent of the choice of the computational base,  
like volume in geometry. If you can name something with fortran, then  
you can name it with numbers, combinators, etc. Nameability is  
machine independent, like the modal logics G, G*, Z, etc;






then you got the non nameable properties, like true (for number  
relations) but very plausibly, things like consciousness, persons,  
etc.
Some of those non nameable things can still be studied by machines,  
through assumptions, and approximations.

Above that you have the truth that you cannot even approximated, etc.
Arithmetical truth is big, *very* big.

Big, sure, but that's exactly why it needs no names at all.


It is worst than that. Many things cannot have a name.


Each feature and meta-feature of Arithmetic truth can only be found  
at its own address. What point would there be in adding a fictional  
label on something that is pervasively and factually true?


In science it is not a matter of decision, but of verifiable facts.







and what or who is naming them?


The machines. (in the comp setting, despite the machines theology  
does refer to higher non-machine entities capable of naming things.  
That's the case for the first order logical G* (which I note usually  
qG*, this one needs more than arithmetical truth, but it is normal  
as it describes an intensional (modal) views by a sort of God  
(Truth) about the machine. here the miracle is that its zero order  
logical (propositional) part is decidable.


I don't think that names and machines are compatible in any way.  
Programmers of machines might use names, but once compiled, all high  
level terms are crushed into the digital sand that the machine can  
digest. No trace of proprietary intent remains.


Not at all. The whole point is that such proprietary are invariant for  
the high or low level implementations.









Otherwise wouldn't it be tautological to say that it is full of non  
nameable things, as it would be to say that water is full of non  
dry things.


? (here you stretch an analogy to far, I think).

Could be, but I don't know until I hear the counter-argument.


(Stretched) analogy are immune to argumentation.













It seems to me that we can use arithmetic truth to locate a number  
within the infinity of computable realtions, but any 'naming' is  
only our own attempt to attach a proprietary first person sense to  
that which is irreducibly generic and nameless. The thing about  
qualia is not that it is non-nameable, it is the specific  
aesthetic presence that is manifested. Names are 

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-09 Thread Craig Weinberg


On Wednesday, October 9, 2013 3:18:52 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 08 Oct 2013, at 20:12, Craig Weinberg wrote:



 On Tuesday, October 8, 2013 12:34:57 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 08 Oct 2013, at 17:59, Craig Weinberg wrote:



 Why isn't computationalism the consequence of quanta though? 


 Human computationalism does.

 But I want the simplest conceptual theory, and integers are easier to 
 define than human integers.


 I'm not sure how that relates to computationalism being something other 
 than quanta. Humans are easier to define to themselves than integers. A 
 baby can be themselves for years before counting to 10. 


 Phenomenologically? Yes.
 Fundamentally? That does not follow. It took a long time before 
 discovering the Higgs-Englert-Brout Boson.


It doesn't have to follow, but it can be a clue. The Higgs is a particular 
type of elementary phenomenon which is not accessible to us directly. That 
would not be the case with Comp if we were in fact using only computation. 
If our world was composed on every level by computation alone, it wouldn't 
make much sense for people to have to learn to count integers only after 
years of aesthetic saturation.
 




  






 What can be computed other than quantities?


 Quantities are easily computed by stopping machines, but most machines 
 does not stop, and when they introspect, the theory explains why they get 
 troubled by consciousness, qualia, etc. Those qualia are not really 
 computed, they are part of non computable truth, but which still bear on 
 machines or machine's perspective.


 Then you still have an explanatory gap.


 But that is a good point for comp, as it explains why there is a gap, and 
 it imposes on it a precise mathematical structure.


But there's nothing on the other side of the gap from the comp view. You're 
still just finding a gap in comp that comp says is supposed to be there and 
then presuming that the entire universe other than comp must fit in there. 
If there is nothing within comp to specifically indicate color or flavor or 
kinesthetic sensations, or even the lines and shapes of geometry, then I 
don't see how comp can claim to be a theory that relates to consciousness.




 How can anything which is non-computable bear on the computation of an 
 ideal machine? 


 That is the whole subject of en entire field: recursion theory, or 
 theoretical computer science.


Ok, so what is an example of something that specifically bridges a kind of 
computation with something personal that comp claims to produce?
 





 What connects the qualia to the quanta, and why isn't the qualia just 
 quantitative summaries of quanta?


 Qualia are not connected to quanta.


Then what is even the point of Comp? To me quanta = all that relates to 
quantity and certain measurement. If they are not connected to quanta then 
a machine that is made of quanta can't possibly produce qualia that has no 
connection to it. That's no better than Descartes.
 

 Quanta are appearances in the qualia theory, and they are not 
 quantitative, they are lived at the first person plural views.


Quanta aren't quantitative?
 




 If Arithmetic truth is full of non nameable things, what nameable things 
 does it also contain, 


 The numbers, the recursive properties, the recursively enumarable 
 properties, the Sigma_i truth, well a lot of things.
 You have the recursive (the simplest in our comp setting), then the 
 recursively enumerable (the universal machines, notably), then a whole 
 hierarchy of non computable, but still nameable set of numbers, or 
 machine's properties, 


 You say they are nameable, but I don't believe you. It is not as if a 
 number would ever need to go by some other name. Why not refer to it by its 
 precise coordinate within Arithmetic Truth?


 Because it is independent of the choice of the computational base, like 
 volume in geometry. If you can name something with fortran, then you can 
 name it with numbers, combinators, etc. Nameability is machine 
 independent, like the modal logics G, G*, Z, etc;


What you are calling names should be made of binary numbers though. I'm 
asking why binary numbers should ever need any non-binary, non-digtial, 
non-quantitative names.
 




  

 then you got the non nameable properties, like true (for number 
 relations) but very plausibly, things like consciousness, persons, etc. 
 Some of those non nameable things can still be studied by machines, 
 through assumptions, and approximations.
 Above that you have the truth that you cannot even approximated, etc.
 Arithmetical truth is big, *very* big.


 Big, sure, but that's exactly why it needs no names at all. 


 It is worst than that. Many things cannot have a name.


what can they have?
 



 Each feature and meta-feature of Arithmetic truth can only be found at its 
 own address. What point would there be in adding a fictional label on 
 something that is pervasively and factually true?


 In science it is 

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-09 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 09 Oct 2013, at 15:43, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Wednesday, October 9, 2013 3:18:52 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 08 Oct 2013, at 20:12, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Tuesday, October 8, 2013 12:34:57 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 08 Oct 2013, at 17:59, Craig Weinberg wrote:



Why isn't computationalism the consequence of quanta though?


Human computationalism does.

But I want the simplest conceptual theory, and integers are easier  
to define than human integers.


I'm not sure how that relates to computationalism being something  
other than quanta. Humans are easier to define to themselves than  
integers. A baby can be themselves for years before counting to 10.


Phenomenologically? Yes.
Fundamentally? That does not follow. It took a long time before  
discovering the Higgs-Englert-Brout Boson.


It doesn't have to follow, but it can be a clue. The Higgs is a  
particular type of elementary phenomenon which is not accessible to  
us directly. That would not be the case with Comp if we were in fact  
using only computation. If our world was composed on every level by  
computation alone,


Hmm It is not obvious, and not well known, but if comp is true,  
then our world is not made of computations.
Our world is only an appearance in a multi-user arithmetical video  
game or dream.






it wouldn't make much sense for people to have to learn to count  
integers only after years of aesthetic saturation.













What can be computed other than quantities?


Quantities are easily computed by stopping machines, but most  
machines does not stop, and when they introspect, the theory  
explains why they get troubled by consciousness, qualia, etc. Those  
qualia are not really computed, they are part of non computable  
truth, but which still bear on machines or machine's perspective.


Then you still have an explanatory gap.


But that is a good point for comp, as it explains why there is a  
gap, and it imposes on it a precise mathematical structure.


But there's nothing on the other side of the gap from the comp view.  
You're still just finding a gap in comp that comp says is supposed  
to be there and then presuming that the entire universe other than  
comp must fit in there. If there is nothing within comp to  
specifically indicate color or flavor or kinesthetic sensations, or  
even the lines and shapes of geometry, then I don't see how comp can  
claim to be a theory that relates to consciousness.


There is something in the comp theory which specifically indicate  
qualia.

The gaps in the intensional nuances could very well do that.







How can anything which is non-computable bear on the computation of  
an ideal machine?


That is the whole subject of en entire field: recursion theory, or  
theoretical computer science.


Ok, so what is an example of something that specifically bridges a  
kind of computation with something personal that comp claims to  
produce?


That is technical, and you need to study AUDA. I would say that *all*  
statements in X1* minus X1 produces that. No doubt many open problems  
have to be solved to progress here.
But even if that fails, you have not produced an argument that it is  
not possible.











What connects the qualia to the quanta, and why isn't the qualia  
just quantitative summaries of quanta?


Qualia are not connected to quanta.

Then what is even the point of Comp? To me quanta = all that relates  
to quantity and certain measurement. If they are not connected to  
quanta then a machine that is made of quanta can't possibly produce  
qualia that has no connection to it. That's no better than Descartes.


I realize that you have not yet really study comp. Physical Machine  
are not made of quanta. Quanta appears only as first person plural  
sharable qualia. They are observable pattern common to people  
belonging to highly splitting or differentiating computations, most  
plausibly the linear computations (like in QM).






Quanta are appearances in the qualia theory, and they are not  
quantitative, they are lived at the first person plural views.


Quanta aren't quantitative?


They might be. The fact that they come from qualia does not prevent  
that they have quantitative aspect.










If Arithmetic truth is full of non nameable things, what nameable  
things does it also contain,


The numbers, the recursive properties, the recursively enumarable  
properties, the Sigma_i truth, well a lot of things.
You have the recursive (the simplest in our comp setting), then the  
recursively enumerable (the universal machines, notably), then a  
whole hierarchy of non computable, but still nameable set of  
numbers, or machine's properties,


You say they are nameable, but I don't believe you. It is not as if  
a number would ever need to go by some other name. Why not refer to  
it by its precise coordinate within Arithmetic Truth?


Because it is independent of the choice of the computational base,  
like volume 

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-09 Thread Craig Weinberg


On Wednesday, October 9, 2013 11:18:03 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 09 Oct 2013, at 15:43, Craig Weinberg wrote:



 On Wednesday, October 9, 2013 3:18:52 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 08 Oct 2013, at 20:12, Craig Weinberg wrote:



 On Tuesday, October 8, 2013 12:34:57 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 08 Oct 2013, at 17:59, Craig Weinberg wrote:



 Why isn't computationalism the consequence of quanta though? 


 Human computationalism does.

 But I want the simplest conceptual theory, and integers are easier to 
 define than human integers.


 I'm not sure how that relates to computationalism being something other 
 than quanta. Humans are easier to define to themselves than integers. A 
 baby can be themselves for years before counting to 10. 


 Phenomenologically? Yes.
 Fundamentally? That does not follow. It took a long time before 
 discovering the Higgs-Englert-Brout Boson.


 It doesn't have to follow, but it can be a clue. The Higgs is a particular 
 type of elementary phenomenon which is not accessible to us directly. That 
 would not be the case with Comp if we were in fact using only computation. 
 If our world was composed on every level by computation alone,


 Hmm It is not obvious, and not well known, but if comp is true, then 
 our world is not made of computations. 
 Our world is only an appearance in a multi-user arithmetical video game 
 or dream. 


That's the problem though, what is an appearance? How can an arithmetic 
game become video or dreamlike in any way? This is what I keep talking 
about - the Presentation problem. Comp is pulling aesthetic experiences out 
of thin air. without a specific theory of what they are or how they are 
manufactured by computation or arithmetic. 
 






 it wouldn't make much sense for people to have to learn to count integers 
 only after years of aesthetic saturation.
  




  






 What can be computed other than quantities?


 Quantities are easily computed by stopping machines, but most machines 
 does not stop, and when they introspect, the theory explains why they get 
 troubled by consciousness, qualia, etc. Those qualia are not really 
 computed, they are part of non computable truth, but which still bear on 
 machines or machine's perspective.


 Then you still have an explanatory gap.


 But that is a good point for comp, as it explains why there is a gap, and 
 it imposes on it a precise mathematical structure.


 But there's nothing on the other side of the gap from the comp view. 
 You're still just finding a gap in comp that comp says is supposed to be 
 there and then presuming that the entire universe other than comp must fit 
 in there. If there is nothing within comp to specifically indicate color or 
 flavor or kinesthetic sensations, or even the lines and shapes of geometry, 
 then I don't see how comp can claim to be a theory that relates to 
 consciousness.


 There is something in the comp theory which specifically indicate qualia.
 The gaps in the intensional nuances could very well do that. 


But flavors and colors aren't gaps. It would be like painting with 
invisible paint. How does theory become visible to itself, and why would it?
 







 How can anything which is non-computable bear on the computation of an 
 ideal machine? 


 That is the whole subject of en entire field: recursion theory, or 
 theoretical computer science.


 Ok, so what is an example of something that specifically bridges a kind of 
 computation with something personal that comp claims to produce?


 That is technical, and you need to study AUDA. I would say that *all* 
 statements in X1* minus X1 produces that. No doubt many open problems have 
 to be solved to progress here.
 But even if that fails, you have not produced an argument that it is not 
 possible.


What is an example of an X1* minus X1 statement that produces something 
personal and non-computable?





  





 What connects the qualia to the quanta, and why isn't the qualia just 
 quantitative summaries of quanta?


 Qualia are not connected to quanta.


 Then what is even the point of Comp? To me quanta = all that relates to 
 quantity and certain measurement. If they are not connected to quanta then 
 a machine that is made of quanta can't possibly produce qualia that has no 
 connection to it. That's no better than Descartes.


 I realize that you have not yet really study comp. Physical Machine are 
 not made of quanta. Quanta appears only as first person plural sharable 
 qualia. They are observable pattern common to people belonging to highly 
 splitting or differentiating computations, most plausibly the linear 
 computations (like in QM).


I can agree with all of that, I would say that quanta is the splitting of 
qualia. Arithmetic truth, computation,.etc is all the splitting of 
primordial qualia. The split is generic and universal, but that which has 
been split - qualia, is diffracted - smeared across the split like the 
visible spectrum. 

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-09 Thread Platonist Guitar Cowboy
On Wed, Oct 9, 2013 at 8:39 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote:



 On Wednesday, October 9, 2013 11:18:03 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 09 Oct 2013, at 15:43, Craig Weinberg wrote:



 On Wednesday, October 9, 2013 3:18:52 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 08 Oct 2013, at 20:12, Craig Weinberg wrote:



 On Tuesday, October 8, 2013 12:34:57 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 08 Oct 2013, at 17:59, Craig Weinberg wrote:



 Why isn't computationalism the consequence of quanta though?


 Human computationalism does.

 But I want the simplest conceptual theory, and integers are easier to
 define than human integers.


 I'm not sure how that relates to computationalism being something other
 than quanta. Humans are easier to define to themselves than integers. A
 baby can be themselves for years before counting to 10.


 Phenomenologically? Yes.
 Fundamentally? That does not follow. It took a long time before
 discovering the Higgs-Englert-Brout Boson.


 It doesn't have to follow, but it can be a clue. The Higgs is a
 particular type of elementary phenomenon which is not accessible to us
 directly. That would not be the case with Comp if we were in fact using
 only computation. If our world was composed on every level by computation
 alone,


 Hmm It is not obvious, and not well known, but if comp is true, then
 our world is not made of computations.
 Our world is only an appearance in a multi-user arithmetical video game
 or dream.


 That's the problem though, what is an appearance? How can an arithmetic
 game become video or dreamlike in any way? This is what I keep talking
 about - the Presentation problem. Comp is pulling aesthetic experiences out
 of thin air. without a specific theory of what they are or how they are
 manufactured by computation or arithmetic.


No, that is you and your personalized definition of aesthetic experience
that has nothing to do with any standard interpretation of the term, and
where you default to what I like about aesthetic... free association to
fit your current mood and the exchange you're involved in, when prompted
these days.

Comp doesn't need to pull aesthetic experience, in it's standard
interpretations from anywhere. In the case of music, the vast majority of
music theories, if not all, are number based. Multisense realism is puling
aesthetic experience from thin air, as you constantly evade the question:

I can see how I can derive music and improvisation from counting and
numbers; can multisense realism show me how to do the same? Because given
all the claims on how central aesthetic experience is, it should at least
offer some clues, if not be even better than numbers.











 it wouldn't make much sense for people to have to learn to count integers
 only after years of aesthetic saturation.












 What can be computed other than quantities?


 Quantities are easily computed by stopping machines, but most machines
 does not stop, and when they introspect, the theory explains why they get
 troubled by consciousness, qualia, etc. Those qualia are not really
 computed, they are part of non computable truth, but which still bear on
 machines or machine's perspective.


 Then you still have an explanatory gap.


 But that is a good point for comp, as it explains why there is a gap,
 and it imposes on it a precise mathematical structure.


 But there's nothing on the other side of the gap from the comp view.
 You're still just finding a gap in comp that comp says is supposed to be
 there and then presuming that the entire universe other than comp must fit
 in there. If there is nothing within comp to specifically indicate color or
 flavor or kinesthetic sensations, or even the lines and shapes of geometry,
 then I don't see how comp can claim to be a theory that relates to
 consciousness.


 There is something in the comp theory which specifically indicate qualia.
 The gaps in the intensional nuances could very well do that.


 But flavors and colors aren't gaps.


You do not know what Bruno is referring to and are changing the question.
If you do know which intensional nuances he is referring to, then explain
them and why gaps as colors would be inappropriate.


 It would be like painting with invisible paint.


UV paint. 5.40$ at Ebay.


 How does theory become visible to itself, and why would it?


Black lights. To party and have indiscriminate fun, in this case. PGC




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Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-09 Thread Craig Weinberg


On Wednesday, October 9, 2013 4:56:45 PM UTC-4, Platonist Guitar Cowboy 
wrote:




 On Wed, Oct 9, 2013 at 8:39 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote:



 On Wednesday, October 9, 2013 11:18:03 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 09 Oct 2013, at 15:43, Craig Weinberg wrote:



 On Wednesday, October 9, 2013 3:18:52 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 08 Oct 2013, at 20:12, Craig Weinberg wrote:



 On Tuesday, October 8, 2013 12:34:57 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 08 Oct 2013, at 17:59, Craig Weinberg wrote:



 Why isn't computationalism the consequence of quanta though? 


 Human computationalism does.

 But I want the simplest conceptual theory, and integers are easier to 
 define than human integers.


 I'm not sure how that relates to computationalism being something other 
 than quanta. Humans are easier to define to themselves than integers. A 
 baby can be themselves for years before counting to 10. 


 Phenomenologically? Yes.
 Fundamentally? That does not follow. It took a long time before 
 discovering the Higgs-Englert-Brout Boson.


 It doesn't have to follow, but it can be a clue. The Higgs is a 
 particular type of elementary phenomenon which is not accessible to us 
 directly. That would not be the case with Comp if we were in fact using 
 only computation. If our world was composed on every level by computation 
 alone,


 Hmm It is not obvious, and not well known, but if comp is true, then 
 our world is not made of computations. 
 Our world is only an appearance in a multi-user arithmetical video 
 game or dream. 


 That's the problem though, what is an appearance? How can an arithmetic 
 game become video or dreamlike in any way? This is what I keep talking 
 about - the Presentation problem. Comp is pulling aesthetic experiences out 
 of thin air. without a specific theory of what they are or how they are 
 manufactured by computation or arithmetic.


 No, that is you and your personalized definition of aesthetic experience 
 that has nothing to do with any standard interpretation of the term


It's not a personalized definition, it is an uncontroversial comment about 
the nature of appearance versus the nature of that which has no appearance. 
If your arm is in pain, you can have a local *anesthetic* at the site so 
that the pain disappears, or you can have a general *anesthetic* and your 
entire experience disappears. When you wake up and your experience appears, 
or when your arm appears to hurt again, it should not be a problem to 
describe that* what has returned is a non-an-esthetic, therefore aesthetic*. 
It's not a definition, it's a description.
 

 , and where you default to what I like about aesthetic... free 
 association to fit your current mood and the exchange you're involved in, 
 when prompted these days.


Let the unsupported accusations begin.
 


 Comp doesn't need to pull aesthetic experience, in it's standard 
 interpretations from anywhere. 


Why would that be true? Aesthetics exist, do they not? There is a 
difference between feeling pain and pain relief, right? So why would a 
computation hurt? Before you answer, you have to ask whether your 
justification for the existence of pain isn't based entirely in experience 
rather than computation. Certainly, were it not for your own experience of 
pain, there would be no reason to invent such a thing to explain anything 
that happens in a computation.
 

 In the case of music, the vast majority of music theories, if not all, are 
 number based. 


Music theory is not music though. Numbers do not create music. Music, like 
computation, can only exist as a consequence of awareness, not as a 
replacement for it.
 

 Multisense realism is puling aesthetic experience from thin air, as you 
 constantly evade the question: 


Just the opposite. Sense is in the name. I start from aesthetic experience. 
It could just as easily be called 'Pan-aesthetic Realism'. By aesthetic I 
mean sense - experiential contents.


 I can see how I can derive music and improvisation from counting and 
 numbers; 


Can you teach a pocket calculator to make music without adding anything? 
Why not?
 

 can multisense realism show me how to do the same?


You can't derive music from anything except human experience. MSR begins by 
acknowledging that instead of denying it.

There is no theory of non-human music. Numbers do not turn into sounds when 
they leave Platonia and teleport into our eardrums. 
 

 Because given all the claims on how central aesthetic experience is, it 
 should at least offer some clues, if not be even better than numbers.


The clues that MSR offers lie in the superposition of the totality of 
experience (eternity) and particular experience. Music is an irreducibly 
anthropological qualia. It is of the moment and it is timeless. It exploits 
metric isomorphisms between qualia on the personal level and the 
sub-personal physiological levels and the super-personal archetypal levels. 
Music is indeed 

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-08 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 07 Oct 2013, at 17:20, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Monday, October 7, 2013 3:56:55 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 06 Oct 2013, at 22:00, Craig Weinberg wrote:



Qualia is experience which contains the felt relation to all other  
experiences; specific experiences which directly relate, and  
extended experiential contexts which extent to eternity (totality  
of manifested events so far relative to the participant plus semi- 
potential events which relate to higher octaves of their  
participation...the bigger picture with the larger now.)


Then qualia are infinite. This contradict some of your previous  
statement.


It's not qualia that is finite or infinite, it is finity-infinity  
itself that is an intellectual quale.


OK. But this does not mean it is not also objective. The set of  
dividers of 24 is finite. The set of multiple of 24 is infinite. For  
example.



Quanta is derived from qualia, so quantitative characteristics have  
ambiguous application outside of quanta.


Yes, quanta comes from the Löbian qualia, in a 100% verifiable way.  
Indeed. But that is again a consequence of computationalism.








Qualia is what we are made of. As human beings at this stage of  
human civilization, our direct qualia is primarily cognitive- 
logical-verbal. We identify with our ability to describe with words  
- to qualify other qualia as verbal qualia. We name our perceptions  
and name our naming power 'mind', but that is not consciousness.  
Logic and intellect can only name public-facing reductions of  
certain qualia (visible and tangible qualia - the stuff of public  
bodies). The name for those public-facing reductions is quanta, or  
numbers, and the totality of the playing field which can be used  
for the quanta game is called arithmetic truth.


Arithmetical truth is full of non nameable things. Qualia refer to  
non verbally describable first person truth.


Can arithmetical truth really name anything?


I am not sure Arithmetical Truth can be seen as a person, or anything  
capable of naming things. You are stretching the words too much. I  
guess that if you make your statement more precise, it will lead to an  
open problem in comp.




It seems to me that we can use arithmetic truth to locate a number  
within the infinity of computable realtions, but any 'naming' is  
only our own attempt to attach a proprietary first person sense to  
that which is irreducibly generic and nameless. The thing about  
qualia is not that it is non-nameable, it is the specific aesthetic  
presence that is manifested. Names are just qualia of mental  
association - a rose by any other name, etc.


I think this could be made more precise by taking our in the Löbian  
sense.


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-08 Thread Jason Resch
On Sun, Oct 6, 2013 at 3:00 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote:



 On Sunday, October 6, 2013 5:06:31 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 06 Oct 2013, at 03:17, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

  On 5 October 2013 00:40, Bruno Marchal mar...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
 
  The argument is simply summarised thus: it is impossible even for
  God
  to make a brain prosthesis that reproduces the I/O behaviour but has
  different qualia. This is a proof of comp,
 
 
  Hmm... I can agree, but eventually no God can make such a
  prothesis, only
  because the qualia is an attribute of the immaterial person, and
  not of
  the brain, body, or computer.  Then the prosthesis will manifest
  the person
  if it emulates the correct level.
 
  But if the qualia are attributed to the substance of the physical
  brain then where is the problem making a prosthesis that replicates
  the behaviour but not the qualia?
  The problem is that it would allow
  one to make a partial zombie, which I think is absurd. Therefore, the
  qualia cannot be attributed to the substance of the physical brain.

 I agree.

 Note that in that case the qualia is no more attributed to an
 immaterial person, but to a piece of primary matter.
 In that case, both comp and functionalism (in your sense, not in
 Putnam's usual sense of functionalism which is a particular case of
 comp) are wrong.

 Then, it is almost obvious that an immaterial being cannot distinguish
 between a primarily material incarnation, and an immaterial one, as it
 would need some magic (non Turing emulable) ability to make the
 difference.  People agreeing with this do no more need the UDA step 8
 (which is an attempt to make this more rigorous or clear).

 I might criticize, as a devil's advocate, a little bit the partial-
 zombie argument. Very often some people pretend that they feel less
 conscious after some drink of vodka, but that they are still able to
 behave normally. Of course those people are notoriously wrong. It is
 just that alcohol augments a fake self-confidence feeling, which
 typically is not verified (in the laboratory, or more sadly on the
 roads). Also, they confuse less conscious with blurred
 consciousness,


 Why wouldn't less consciousness have the effect of seeming blurred? If
 your battery is dying in a device, the device might begin to fail in
 numerous ways, but those are all symptoms of the battery dying - of the
 device becoming less reliable as different parts are unavailable at
 different times.

 Think of qualia as a character in a long story, which is divided into
 episodes. If, for instance, someone starts watching a show like Breaking
 Bad only in the last season, they have no explicit understanding of who
 Walter White is or why he behaves like he does, where Jesse came from, etc.
 They can only pick up what is presented directly in that episode, so his
 character is relatively flat. The difference between the appreciation of
 the last episode by someone who has seen the entire series on HDTV and
 someone who has only read the closed captioning of the last episode on
 Twitter is like the difference between a human being's qualia and the
 qualia which is available through a logical imitation of a human bring.

 Qualia is experience which contains the felt relation to all other
 experiences; specific experiences which directly relate, and extended
 experiential contexts which extent to eternity (totality of manifested
 events so far relative to the participant plus semi-potential events which
 relate to higher octaves of their participation...the bigger picture with
 the larger now.)



Craig,

I agree with you that there is some building up required to create a full
and rich human experience, which cannot happen in a single instance or with
a single CPU instruction being executed. However, where I disagree with you
is in how long it takes for all the particulars of the experience to be
generated from the computation.  I don't think it requires re-calculating
the entire history of the human race, or life itself on some planet.  I
think it can be done by comparing relations to memories and data stored
entirely within the brain itself; say within 0.1 to 0.5 seconds of
computation by the brain, not the eons of life's evolution.

So perhaps we are on the same page, but merely disagree on how detailed the
details of the computation need to be.  i.e., what is the substitution
layer (atomic interactions, or the history of atomic interactions on a
global scale?).

Jason

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Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-08 Thread Craig Weinberg


On Tuesday, October 8, 2013 3:40:53 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 07 Oct 2013, at 17:20, Craig Weinberg wrote:



 On Monday, October 7, 2013 3:56:55 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 06 Oct 2013, at 22:00, Craig Weinberg wrote:



 Qualia is experience which contains the felt relation to all other 
 experiences; specific experiences which directly relate, and extended 
 experiential contexts which extent to eternity (totality of manifested 
 events so far relative to the participant plus semi-potential events which 
 relate to higher octaves of their participation...the bigger picture with 
 the larger now.)


 Then qualia are infinite. This contradict some of your previous 
 statement. 


 It's not qualia that is finite or infinite, it is finity-infinity itself 
 that is an intellectual quale. 


 OK. But this does not mean it is not also objective. The set of dividers 
 of 24 is finite. The set of multiple of 24 is infinite. For example.


It might not be objective, just common and consistent because it ultimately 
reflects itself, and because it reflects reflection. It may be the essence 
of objectivity, but from the absolute perspective, objectivity is the 
imposter - the power of sense to approximate itself without genuine 
embodiment.

Is the statement that the set of dividers is finite objectively true, or is 
it contingent upon ruling out rational numbers? Can't we just designate a 
variable, k = {the imaginary set of infinite dividers of 24}? 



 Quanta is derived from qualia, so quantitative characteristics have 
 ambiguous application outside of quanta.


 Yes, quanta comes from the Löbian qualia, in a 100% verifiable way. 
 Indeed. But that is again a consequence of computationalism.


Why isn't computationalism the consequence of quanta though? What can be 
computed other than quantities?
 







 Qualia is what we are made of. As human beings at this stage of human 
 civilization, our direct qualia is primarily cognitive-logical-verbal. We 
 identify with our ability to describe with words - to qualify other qualia 
 as verbal qualia. We name our perceptions and name our naming power 'mind', 
 but that is not consciousness. Logic and intellect can only name 
 public-facing reductions of certain qualia (visible and tangible qualia - 
 the stuff of public bodies). The name for those public-facing reductions is 
 quanta, or numbers, and the totality of the playing field which can be used 
 for the quanta game is called arithmetic truth.


 Arithmetical truth is full of non nameable things. Qualia refer to non 
 verbally describable first person truth.


 Can arithmetical truth really name anything? 


 I am not sure Arithmetical Truth can be seen as a person, or anything 
 capable of naming things. You are stretching the words too much. I guess 
 that if you make your statement more precise, it will lead to an open 
 problem in comp.


If Arithmetic truth is full of non nameable things, what nameable things 
does it also contain, and what or who is naming them? Otherwise wouldn't it 
be tautological to say that it is full of non nameable things, as it would 
be to say that water is full of non dry things.
 




 It seems to me that we can use arithmetic truth to locate a number within 
 the infinity of computable realtions, but any 'naming' is only our own 
 attempt to attach a proprietary first person sense to that which is 
 irreducibly generic and nameless. The thing about qualia is not that it is 
 non-nameable, it is the specific aesthetic presence that is manifested. 
 Names are just qualia of mental association - a rose by any other name, 
 etc. 


 I think this could be made more precise by taking our in the Löbian 
 sense.


If quanta is Löbian qualia, why would it need any non-quantitative names?

Craig


 Bruno



 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/





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Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-08 Thread Craig Weinberg


On Tuesday, October 8, 2013 10:10:25 AM UTC-4, Jason wrote:




 On Sun, Oct 6, 2013 at 3:00 PM, Craig Weinberg 
 whats...@gmail.comjavascript:
  wrote:



 On Sunday, October 6, 2013 5:06:31 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

  
 On 06 Oct 2013, at 03:17, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 

  On 5 October 2013 00:40, Bruno Marchal mar...@ulb.ac.be wrote: 
  
  The argument is simply summarised thus: it is impossible even for   
  God 
  to make a brain prosthesis that reproduces the I/O behaviour but has 
  different qualia. This is a proof of comp, 
  
  
  Hmm... I can agree, but eventually no God can make such a   
  prothesis, only 
  because the qualia is an attribute of the immaterial person, and   
  not of 
  the brain, body, or computer.  Then the prosthesis will manifest   
  the person 
  if it emulates the correct level. 
  
  But if the qualia are attributed to the substance of the physical 
  brain then where is the problem making a prosthesis that replicates 
  the behaviour but not the qualia? 
  The problem is that it would allow 
  one to make a partial zombie, which I think is absurd. Therefore, the 
  qualia cannot be attributed to the substance of the physical brain. 

 I agree. 

 Note that in that case the qualia is no more attributed to an   
 immaterial person, but to a piece of primary matter. 
 In that case, both comp and functionalism (in your sense, not in   
 Putnam's usual sense of functionalism which is a particular case of   
 comp) are wrong. 

 Then, it is almost obvious that an immaterial being cannot distinguish   
 between a primarily material incarnation, and an immaterial one, as it   
 would need some magic (non Turing emulable) ability to make the   
 difference.  People agreeing with this do no more need the UDA step 8   
 (which is an attempt to make this more rigorous or clear). 

 I might criticize, as a devil's advocate, a little bit the partial- 
 zombie argument. Very often some people pretend that they feel less   
 conscious after some drink of vodka, but that they are still able to   
 behave normally. Of course those people are notoriously wrong. It is   
 just that alcohol augments a fake self-confidence feeling, which   
 typically is not verified (in the laboratory, or more sadly on the   
 roads). Also, they confuse less conscious with blurred   
 consciousness,


 Why wouldn't less consciousness have the effect of seeming blurred? If 
 your battery is dying in a device, the device might begin to fail in 
 numerous ways, but those are all symptoms of the battery dying - of the 
 device becoming less reliable as different parts are unavailable at 
 different times.

 Think of qualia as a character in a long story, which is divided into 
 episodes. If, for instance, someone starts watching a show like Breaking 
 Bad only in the last season, they have no explicit understanding of who 
 Walter White is or why he behaves like he does, where Jesse came from, etc. 
 They can only pick up what is presented directly in that episode, so his 
 character is relatively flat. The difference between the appreciation of 
 the last episode by someone who has seen the entire series on HDTV and 
 someone who has only read the closed captioning of the last episode on 
 Twitter is like the difference between a human being's qualia and the 
 qualia which is available through a logical imitation of a human bring. 

 Qualia is experience which contains the felt relation to all other 
 experiences; specific experiences which directly relate, and extended 
 experiential contexts which extent to eternity (totality of manifested 
 events so far relative to the participant plus semi-potential events which 
 relate to higher octaves of their participation...the bigger picture with 
 the larger now.) 



 Craig,

 I agree with you that there is some building up required to create a 
 full and rich human experience, which cannot happen in a single instance or 
 with a single CPU instruction being executed. However, where I disagree 
 with you is in how long it takes for all the particulars of the experience 
 to be generated from the computation.  I don't think it requires 
 re-calculating the entire history of the human race, or life itself on some 
 planet.  I think it can be done by comparing relations to memories and data 
 stored entirely within the brain itself; say within 0.1 to 0.5 seconds of 
 computation by the brain, not the eons of life's evolution.


That could be true in theory but it does not seem to be supported by 
nature. In reality, there is no way to watch a movie in less time than the 
movie takes to be watched without sacrificing some qualities of the 
experience. Experience is nothing like data, as data is compressible since 
it has no qualitative content to be lost in translation. In all cases, 
calculation is used to eliminate experience - to automate and anesthetize. 
It cannot imitate experience, any more than an HSV coordinate can look like 
a particular 

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-08 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 08 Oct 2013, at 17:59, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Tuesday, October 8, 2013 3:40:53 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 07 Oct 2013, at 17:20, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Monday, October 7, 2013 3:56:55 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 06 Oct 2013, at 22:00, Craig Weinberg wrote:



Qualia is experience which contains the felt relation to all other  
experiences; specific experiences which directly relate, and  
extended experiential contexts which extent to eternity (totality  
of manifested events so far relative to the participant plus semi- 
potential events which relate to higher octaves of their  
participation...the bigger picture with the larger now.)


Then qualia are infinite. This contradict some of your previous  
statement.


It's not qualia that is finite or infinite, it is finity-infinity  
itself that is an intellectual quale.


OK. But this does not mean it is not also objective. The set of  
dividers of 24 is finite. The set of multiple of 24 is infinite. For  
example.


It might not be objective, just common and consistent because it  
ultimately reflects itself, and because it reflects reflection. It  
may be the essence of objectivity, but from the absolute  
perspective, objectivity is the imposter - the power of sense to  
approximate itself without genuine embodiment.


Is the statement that the set of dividers is finite objectively  
true, or is it contingent upon ruling out rational numbers? Can't we  
just designate a variable, k = {the imaginary set of infinite  
dividers of 24}?


Absolute can be used once we agree on the definition. The fact that  
some alien write 1+1=4 for our 1+1=2, just because they define 4 by  
s(s(0)), would not made 1+1=2 less absolute.


The fact that we are interested in integers dividing integers might be  
contingent, but that does not make contingent the fact that the set of  
dividers of 24 is a finite set of integers.








Quanta is derived from qualia, so quantitative characteristics have  
ambiguous application outside of quanta.


Yes, quanta comes from the Löbian qualia, in a 100% verifiable way.  
Indeed. But that is again a consequence of computationalism.


Why isn't computationalism the consequence of quanta though?


Human computationalism does.

But I want the simplest conceptual theory, and integers are easier to  
define than human integers.







What can be computed other than quantities?


Quantities are easily computed by stopping machines, but most machines  
does not stop, and when they introspect, the theory explains why they  
get troubled by consciousness, qualia, etc. Those qualia are not  
really computed, they are part of non computable truth, but which  
still bear on machines or machine's perspective.
















Qualia is what we are made of. As human beings at this stage of  
human civilization, our direct qualia is primarily cognitive- 
logical-verbal. We identify with our ability to describe with  
words - to qualify other qualia as verbal qualia. We name our  
perceptions and name our naming power 'mind', but that is not  
consciousness. Logic and intellect can only name public-facing  
reductions of certain qualia (visible and tangible qualia - the  
stuff of public bodies). The name for those public-facing  
reductions is quanta, or numbers, and the totality of the playing  
field which can be used for the quanta game is called arithmetic  
truth.


Arithmetical truth is full of non nameable things. Qualia refer to  
non verbally describable first person truth.


Can arithmetical truth really name anything?


I am not sure Arithmetical Truth can be seen as a person, or  
anything capable of naming things. You are stretching the words too  
much. I guess that if you make your statement more precise, it will  
lead to an open problem in comp.


If Arithmetic truth is full of non nameable things, what nameable  
things does it also contain,


The numbers, the recursive properties, the recursively enumarable  
properties, the Sigma_i truth, well a lot of things.
You have the recursive (the simplest in our comp setting), then the  
recursively enumerable (the universal machines, notably), then a whole  
hierarchy of non computable, but still nameable set of numbers, or  
machine's properties, then you got the non nameable properties, like  
true (for number relations) but very plausibly, things like  
consciousness, persons, etc.
Some of those non nameable things can still be studied by machines,  
through assumptions, and approximations.

Above that you have the truth that you cannot even approximated, etc.
Arithmetical truth is big, *very* big.




and what or who is naming them?


The machines. (in the comp setting, despite the machines theology does  
refer to higher non-machine entities capable of naming things. That's  
the case for the first order logical G* (which I note usually qG*,  
this one needs more than arithmetical truth, but it is normal as it  
describes an intensional (modal) views 

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-08 Thread Jason Resch
On Tue, Oct 8, 2013 at 11:18 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote:



 On Tuesday, October 8, 2013 10:10:25 AM UTC-4, Jason wrote:




 On Sun, Oct 6, 2013 at 3:00 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comwrote:



 On Sunday, October 6, 2013 5:06:31 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 06 Oct 2013, at 03:17, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

  On 5 October 2013 00:40, Bruno Marchal mar...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
 
  The argument is simply summarised thus: it is impossible even for
  God
  to make a brain prosthesis that reproduces the I/O behaviour but
 has
  different qualia. This is a proof of comp,
 
 
  Hmm... I can agree, but eventually no God can make such a
  prothesis, only
  because the qualia is an attribute of the immaterial person, and
  not of
  the brain, body, or computer.  Then the prosthesis will manifest
  the person
  if it emulates the correct level.
 
  But if the qualia are attributed to the substance of the physical
  brain then where is the problem making a prosthesis that replicates
  the behaviour but not the qualia?
  The problem is that it would allow
  one to make a partial zombie, which I think is absurd. Therefore, the
  qualia cannot be attributed to the substance of the physical brain.

 I agree.

 Note that in that case the qualia is no more attributed to an
 immaterial person, but to a piece of primary matter.
 In that case, both comp and functionalism (in your sense, not in
 Putnam's usual sense of functionalism which is a particular case of
 comp) are wrong.

 Then, it is almost obvious that an immaterial being cannot distinguish

 between a primarily material incarnation, and an immaterial one, as it

 would need some magic (non Turing emulable) ability to make the
 difference.  People agreeing with this do no more need the UDA step 8
 (which is an attempt to make this more rigorous or clear).

 I might criticize, as a devil's advocate, a little bit the partial-
 zombie argument. Very often some people pretend that they feel less
 conscious after some drink of vodka, but that they are still able to
 behave normally. Of course those people are notoriously wrong. It is
 just that alcohol augments a fake self-confidence feeling, which
 typically is not verified (in the laboratory, or more sadly on the
 roads). Also, they confuse less conscious with blurred
 consciousness,


 Why wouldn't less consciousness have the effect of seeming blurred? If
 your battery is dying in a device, the device might begin to fail in
 numerous ways, but those are all symptoms of the battery dying - of the
 device becoming less reliable as different parts are unavailable at
 different times.

 Think of qualia as a character in a long story, which is divided into
 episodes. If, for instance, someone starts watching a show like Breaking
 Bad only in the last season, they have no explicit understanding of who
 Walter White is or why he behaves like he does, where Jesse came from, etc.
 They can only pick up what is presented directly in that episode, so his
 character is relatively flat. The difference between the appreciation of
 the last episode by someone who has seen the entire series on HDTV and
 someone who has only read the closed captioning of the last episode on
 Twitter is like the difference between a human being's qualia and the
 qualia which is available through a logical imitation of a human bring.

 Qualia is experience which contains the felt relation to all other
 experiences; specific experiences which directly relate, and extended
 experiential contexts which extent to eternity (totality of manifested
 events so far relative to the participant plus semi-potential events which
 relate to higher octaves of their participation...the bigger picture with
 the larger now.)



 Craig,

 I agree with you that there is some building up required to create a
 full and rich human experience, which cannot happen in a single instance or
 with a single CPU instruction being executed. However, where I disagree
 with you is in how long it takes for all the particulars of the experience
 to be generated from the computation.  I don't think it requires
 re-calculating the entire history of the human race, or life itself on some
 planet.  I think it can be done by comparing relations to memories and data
 stored entirely within the brain itself; say within 0.1 to 0.5 seconds of
 computation by the brain, not the eons of life's evolution.


 That could be true in theory but it does not seem to be supported by
 nature. In reality, there is no way to watch a movie in less time than the
 movie takes to be watched without sacrificing some qualities of the
 experience.


But when you watch the last 5 seconds of the movie, your brain has the
context/memories of all the previous parts of the movie.  If you
instantiated a brain from scratch with all the same memories of someone who
watched the first 2 hours of the movie, and then showed them the last 5
seconds, they would understand the ending as well as anyone 

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-08 Thread Craig Weinberg


On Tuesday, October 8, 2013 12:41:26 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote:






 Craig,

 I agree with you that there is some building up required to create a 
 full and rich human experience, which cannot happen in a single instance or 
 with a single CPU instruction being executed. However, where I disagree 
 with you is in how long it takes for all the particulars of the experience 
 to be generated from the computation.  I don't think it requires 
 re-calculating the entire history of the human race, or life itself on some 
 planet.  I think it can be done by comparing relations to memories and data 
 stored entirely within the brain itself; say within 0.1 to 0.5 seconds of 
 computation by the brain, not the eons of life's evolution.


 That could be true in theory but it does not seem to be supported by 
 nature. In reality, there is no way to watch a movie in less time than the 
 movie takes to be watched without sacrificing some qualities of the 
 experience. 


 But when you watch the last 5 seconds of the movie, your brain has the 
 context/memories of all the previous parts of the movie.  If you 
 instantiated a brain from scratch with all the same memories of someone who 
 watched the first 2 hours of the movie,


That's what I am saying is not necessarily possible. A brain is not a 
receptacle of memories any more than a body is a person's autobiography. We 
are not a brain - the brain mostly does things that have nothing to do with 
our awareness, and we do things which have mostly nothing to do with our 
brains. Filling someone's library with books they have never read does not 
give them the experience of having read them. You are assuming that 
experience is in fact unnecessary and can be transplanted out of context 
into another life. If that could happen, I think that no living organism 
would ever forget anything, and there would never be any desire to repeat 
any experience. Why eat an apple when you can remember eating one in the 
past? Why have any experiences at all if we can just compute data? What is 
the benefit of experience?
 

 and then showed them the last 5 seconds, they would understand the ending 
 as well as anyone made to sit through the whole thing.


You wouldn't need to show them anything, just implant the memory of having 
seen the whole thing. That would work if the universe was based on 
mechanism instead of experience, but a universe based on mechanism makes 
experience redundant and superfluous.
 

  

 Experience is nothing like data, as data is compressible since it has no 
 qualitative content to be lost in translation. In all cases, calculation is 
 used to eliminate experience - to automate and anesthetize. 


 For you to make such a claim, you would have to experience life as one of 
 those automatons.  But you have not, so I don't see where you get this 
 knowledge about what entities are or or are not conscious.


It's knowledge, it's an understanding about what data can be used for and 
what it can't be. There are no entities which are not conscious. 
Consciousness is what defines an entity. We have only to look at our uses 
of computations and machines - how they relieve us of our conscious burdens 
with automatic and impersonal service. We have to look at our confirmation 
bias in the desire to animate puppets, in pareidolia, apophenia, and the 
pathetic fallacy. I like science fiction and technology as much as anyone, 
but if we are serious about turning a program into a person, we would have 
a lot of absurdities to overcome. Why is anything presented instead of just 
computed invisibly? Why do we care about individuality or authenticity? Why 
do we care about anything? So many dead ends with Comp.

 

 It cannot imitate experience, any more than an HSV coordinate can look 
 like a particular color. 


 I believe it is the machine's interpretation of the input (however it is 
 represented), and in the context of the rest of its mind, which manifests 
 as the experience of color.  You could say an HSV coordinate is not a 
 color, but neither is the electrical signaling of the optic nerve a color.


Right, but I would never say that the electrical signaling of the optic 
nerve is a color any more than I would say that the Eiffel Tower has a 
French accent. We can't look assume that a brain is a complete description 
of a human life, otherwise the human life would be redundant. The brain 
would simply be there, running computations, measuring acoustic and optical 
vibrations, analyzing aerosol chemistry, etc - all in complete blind 
silence. Memories would simply be logs of previous computations, not 
worldly fictions.

If you start from the perspective that what is outside of your personal 
experience must be the only reality, then you are taking a description of 
yourself from something that knows almost nothing about you. Trying to 
recreate yourself from that description, from the outside in, is like 
trying to resurrect Jim Morrison by encoding The Doors in 

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-08 Thread Craig Weinberg


On Tuesday, October 8, 2013 12:34:57 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 08 Oct 2013, at 17:59, Craig Weinberg wrote:



 On Tuesday, October 8, 2013 3:40:53 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 07 Oct 2013, at 17:20, Craig Weinberg wrote:



 On Monday, October 7, 2013 3:56:55 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 06 Oct 2013, at 22:00, Craig Weinberg wrote:



 Qualia is experience which contains the felt relation to all other 
 experiences; specific experiences which directly relate, and extended 
 experiential contexts which extent to eternity (totality of manifested 
 events so far relative to the participant plus semi-potential events which 
 relate to higher octaves of their participation...the bigger picture with 
 the larger now.)


 Then qualia are infinite. This contradict some of your previous 
 statement. 


 It's not qualia that is finite or infinite, it is finity-infinity itself 
 that is an intellectual quale. 


 OK. But this does not mean it is not also objective. The set of dividers 
 of 24 is finite. The set of multiple of 24 is infinite. For example.


 It might not be objective, just common and consistent because it 
 ultimately reflects itself, and because it reflects reflection. It may be 
 the essence of objectivity, but from the absolute perspective, objectivity 
 is the imposter - the power of sense to approximate itself without genuine 
 embodiment.

 Is the statement that the set of dividers is finite objectively true, or 
 is it contingent upon ruling out rational numbers? Can't we just designate 
 a variable, k = {the imaginary set of infinite dividers of 24}? 


 Absolute can be used once we agree on the definition. The fact that some 
 alien write 1+1=4 for our 1+1=2, just because they define 4 by s(s(0)), 
 would not made 1+1=2 less absolute.

 The fact that we are interested in integers dividing integers might be 
 contingent, but that does not make contingent the fact that the set of 
 dividers of 24 is a finite set of integers.


Sure, but anything that is natural has self-consistent wholeness and can 
seem like a universal given if we focus our attention only on that. If it 
were truly not contingent it would be impossible for anyone to get a math 
problem wrong. As far as I can tell, the idea of an integer is an 
abstraction of countable solid objects that we use to objectify our own 
cognitive products. It doesn't seem very useful when it comes to 
representing non-solids, non-objects, or non-cognitive phenomenology.







 Quanta is derived from qualia, so quantitative characteristics have 
 ambiguous application outside of quanta.


 Yes, quanta comes from the Löbian qualia, in a 100% verifiable way. 
 Indeed. But that is again a consequence of computationalism.


 Why isn't computationalism the consequence of quanta though? 


 Human computationalism does.

 But I want the simplest conceptual theory, and integers are easier to 
 define than human integers.


I'm not sure how that relates to computationalism being something other 
than quanta. Humans are easier to define to themselves than integers. A 
baby can be themselves for years before counting to 10. 
 






 What can be computed other than quantities?


 Quantities are easily computed by stopping machines, but most machines 
 does not stop, and when they introspect, the theory explains why they get 
 troubled by consciousness, qualia, etc. Those qualia are not really 
 computed, they are part of non computable truth, but which still bear on 
 machines or machine's perspective.


Then you still have an explanatory gap. How can anything which is 
non-computable bear on the computation of an ideal machine? What connects 
the qualia to the quanta, and why isn't the qualia just quantitative 
summaries of quanta?
 







  







 Qualia is what we are made of. As human beings at this stage of human 
 civilization, our direct qualia is primarily cognitive-logical-verbal. We 
 identify with our ability to describe with words - to qualify other qualia 
 as verbal qualia. We name our perceptions and name our naming power 'mind', 
 but that is not consciousness. Logic and intellect can only name 
 public-facing reductions of certain qualia (visible and tangible qualia - 
 the stuff of public bodies). The name for those public-facing reductions is 
 quanta, or numbers, and the totality of the playing field which can be used 
 for the quanta game is called arithmetic truth.


 Arithmetical truth is full of non nameable things. Qualia refer to non 
 verbally describable first person truth.


 Can arithmetical truth really name anything? 


 I am not sure Arithmetical Truth can be seen as a person, or anything 
 capable of naming things. You are stretching the words too much. I guess 
 that if you make your statement more precise, it will lead to an open 
 problem in comp.


 If Arithmetic truth is full of non nameable things, what nameable things 
 does it also contain, 


 The numbers, the recursive properties, 

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-07 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 06 Oct 2013, at 22:00, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Sunday, October 6, 2013 5:06:31 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 06 Oct 2013, at 03:17, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

 On 5 October 2013 00:40, Bruno Marchal mar...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 The argument is simply summarised thus: it is impossible even for
 God
 to make a brain prosthesis that reproduces the I/O behaviour but  
has

 different qualia. This is a proof of comp,


 Hmm... I can agree, but eventually no God can make such a
 prothesis, only
 because the qualia is an attribute of the immaterial person, and
 not of
 the brain, body, or computer.  Then the prosthesis will manifest
 the person
 if it emulates the correct level.

 But if the qualia are attributed to the substance of the physical
 brain then where is the problem making a prosthesis that replicates
 the behaviour but not the qualia?
 The problem is that it would allow
 one to make a partial zombie, which I think is absurd. Therefore,  
the

 qualia cannot be attributed to the substance of the physical brain.

I agree.

Note that in that case the qualia is no more attributed to an
immaterial person, but to a piece of primary matter.
In that case, both comp and functionalism (in your sense, not in
Putnam's usual sense of functionalism which is a particular case of
comp) are wrong.

Then, it is almost obvious that an immaterial being cannot distinguish
between a primarily material incarnation, and an immaterial one, as it
would need some magic (non Turing emulable) ability to make the
difference.  People agreeing with this do no more need the UDA step 8
(which is an attempt to make this more rigorous or clear).

I might criticize, as a devil's advocate, a little bit the partial-
zombie argument. Very often some people pretend that they feel less
conscious after some drink of vodka, but that they are still able to
behave normally. Of course those people are notoriously wrong. It is
just that alcohol augments a fake self-confidence feeling, which
typically is not verified (in the laboratory, or more sadly on the
roads). Also, they confuse less conscious with blurred
consciousness,

Why wouldn't less consciousness have the effect of seeming blurred?  
If your battery is dying in a device, the device might begin to fail  
in numerous ways, but those are all symptoms of the battery dying -  
of the device becoming less reliable as different parts are  
unavailable at different times.


Think of qualia as a character in a long story, which is divided  
into episodes. If, for instance, someone starts watching a show like  
Breaking Bad only in the last season, they have no explicit  
understanding of who Walter White is or why he behaves like he does,  
where Jesse came from, etc. They can only pick up what is presented  
directly in that episode, so his character is relatively flat. The  
difference between the appreciation of the last episode by someone  
who has seen the entire series on HDTV and someone who has only read  
the closed captioning of the last episode on Twitter is like the  
difference between a human being's qualia and the qualia which is  
available through a logical imitation of a human bring.


Qualia is experience which contains the felt relation to all other  
experiences; specific experiences which directly relate, and  
extended experiential contexts which extent to eternity (totality of  
manifested events so far relative to the participant plus semi- 
potential events which relate to higher octaves of their  
participation...the bigger picture with the larger now.)


Then qualia are infinite. This contradict some of your previous  
statement.







Human psychology is not a monolith. Blindsight already *proves* that  
'we can be a partial zombie' from our 1p perspective. I have tried  
to make my solution to the combination problem here: http://multisenserealism.com/thesis/6-panpsychism/eigenmorphism/


What it means is that it is a mistake to say we can be a partial  
zombie - rather the evidence of brain injuries and surgeries  
demonstrate that the extent to which we are who we expect ourselves  
to be, or that others expect a person to be, can be changed in many  
quantitative and qualitative ways. We may not be less conscious  
after a massive debilitating stroke, but what is conscious after  
that is less of us.


OK.
As Chardin said, we are not human beings having from time to time some  
divine experiences, but we are divine beings having from time to time  
human experiences ...





This is because consciousness is not a function or a process,


OK



it is the sole source of presence.

Qualia is what we are made of. As human beings at this stage of  
human civilization, our direct qualia is primarily cognitive-logical- 
verbal. We identify with our ability to describe with words - to  
qualify other qualia as verbal qualia. We name our perceptions and  
name our naming power 'mind', but that is not consciousness. Logic  
and intellect can only name 

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-07 Thread Craig Weinberg


On Monday, October 7, 2013 3:56:55 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 06 Oct 2013, at 22:00, Craig Weinberg wrote:



 On Sunday, October 6, 2013 5:06:31 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 06 Oct 2013, at 03:17, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 

  On 5 October 2013 00:40, Bruno Marchal mar...@ulb.ac.be wrote: 
  
  The argument is simply summarised thus: it is impossible even for   
  God 
  to make a brain prosthesis that reproduces the I/O behaviour but has 
  different qualia. This is a proof of comp, 
  
  
  Hmm... I can agree, but eventually no God can make such a   
  prothesis, only 
  because the qualia is an attribute of the immaterial person, and   
  not of 
  the brain, body, or computer.  Then the prosthesis will manifest   
  the person 
  if it emulates the correct level. 
  
  But if the qualia are attributed to the substance of the physical 
  brain then where is the problem making a prosthesis that replicates 
  the behaviour but not the qualia? 
  The problem is that it would allow 
  one to make a partial zombie, which I think is absurd. Therefore, the 
  qualia cannot be attributed to the substance of the physical brain. 

 I agree. 

 Note that in that case the qualia is no more attributed to an   
 immaterial person, but to a piece of primary matter. 
 In that case, both comp and functionalism (in your sense, not in   
 Putnam's usual sense of functionalism which is a particular case of   
 comp) are wrong. 

 Then, it is almost obvious that an immaterial being cannot distinguish   
 between a primarily material incarnation, and an immaterial one, as it   
 would need some magic (non Turing emulable) ability to make the   
 difference.  People agreeing with this do no more need the UDA step 8   
 (which is an attempt to make this more rigorous or clear). 

 I might criticize, as a devil's advocate, a little bit the partial- 
 zombie argument. Very often some people pretend that they feel less   
 conscious after some drink of vodka, but that they are still able to   
 behave normally. Of course those people are notoriously wrong. It is   
 just that alcohol augments a fake self-confidence feeling, which   
 typically is not verified (in the laboratory, or more sadly on the   
 roads). Also, they confuse less conscious with blurred   
 consciousness,


 Why wouldn't less consciousness have the effect of seeming blurred? If 
 your battery is dying in a device, the device might begin to fail in 
 numerous ways, but those are all symptoms of the battery dying - of the 
 device becoming less reliable as different parts are unavailable at 
 different times.

 Think of qualia as a character in a long story, which is divided into 
 episodes. If, for instance, someone starts watching a show like Breaking 
 Bad only in the last season, they have no explicit understanding of who 
 Walter White is or why he behaves like he does, where Jesse came from, etc. 
 They can only pick up what is presented directly in that episode, so his 
 character is relatively flat. The difference between the appreciation of 
 the last episode by someone who has seen the entire series on HDTV and 
 someone who has only read the closed captioning of the last episode on 
 Twitter is like the difference between a human being's qualia and the 
 qualia which is available through a logical imitation of a human bring. 

 Qualia is experience which contains the felt relation to all other 
 experiences; specific experiences which directly relate, and extended 
 experiential contexts which extent to eternity (totality of manifested 
 events so far relative to the participant plus semi-potential events which 
 relate to higher octaves of their participation...the bigger picture with 
 the larger now.)


 Then qualia are infinite. This contradict some of your previous statement. 


It's not qualia that is finite or infinite, it is finity-infinity itself 
that is an intellectual quale. Quanta is derived from qualia, so 
quantitative characteristics have ambiguous application outside of quanta.
 






 Human psychology is not a monolith. Blindsight already *proves* that 'we 
 can be a partial zombie' from our 1p perspective. I have tried to make my 
 solution to the combination problem here: 
 http://multisenserealism.com/thesis/6-panpsychism/eigenmorphism/ 

 What it means is that it is a mistake to say we can be a partial zombie 
 - rather the evidence of brain injuries and surgeries demonstrate that the 
 extent to which we are who we expect ourselves to be, or that others expect 
 a person to be, can be changed in many quantitative and qualitative ways. 
 We may not be less conscious after a massive debilitating stroke, but what 
 is conscious after that is less of us. 


 OK.
 As Chardin said, we are not human beings having from time to time some 
 divine experiences, but we are divine beings having from time to time human 
 experiences ...


Right, although I would go further to say that 'here' are experiences which 

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-07 Thread Platonist Guitar Cowboy
On Craig’s use of the term “Aesthetic”.

One of the hindrances preventing me from understanding Craig’s statements
is the pluralistic use of the term “aesthetics”. Sorry for not being able
to produce a proper account but the following conflicts will just be stream
of consciousness for 15 minutes:

Often you use aesthetics in a pre 19th century enlightenment way, as in
rigorous theory of sense, beauty, and harmony in nature and art. At the
same time you use the term as synonymous for qualifying taste, which is
reflected in everyday language use, but has little relation, if any, to
aesthetics as theory.

At other times you use it in Kantian way of transcendental, implying it to
be a source for knowledge (“Ästhetische Erkenntnis” in German) about
ourselves; but then at the same time you ditch distinguishing between form,
existing a priori as transcendental structure which theory studies, and the
impressions created for Kant a posteriori as experience, which is limited
by contexts of time, space, language, and perceptual apparatus in its
potential for us to grasp and study.

So you take the Kantian transcendental idea in part, but make experience by
perceptual apparatus primary to which Kant would reply: “without study and
evolution of timeless form, the arts and our ability to engage new forms of
transcendental experience with the sensory apparatus would stagnate.”

In other words, his objection would be: if we reduce sensory experience to
be the primary aesthetic mode, instead of the bonus and fruits of labors
and histories of theory, then we’d all be waiting for the next movie to be
projected in a theater, but nobody would produce new movies anymore. I’ve
never seen you address this quagmire convincingly. Where does novelty or
its appearance come from if everything makes sense? Why are some aesthetic
objects and presences more self-evident than others?

Then another use you make is aesthetics in semiotic interpretation, i.e.
that we can only sense what is pre-ordained by symbolic systems. This
however robs your use of aesthetics of the primary status you often assert
it to have via sense.

Further, it is not clear whether your use of the term corresponds to
mystical traditions of antique (Beauty as expression of universality,
divinity, or spirituality) or if it is the secular version including and
post Baumgarten.

Then, if sense is universal with aesthetic experience in primary tow, how
do you explain the unique contributions of a Beethoven or Bach? Why can’t
anybody write/find such well crafted triple fuges if sense and aesthetic
experience are universal and give rise to the whole thing in the first
place: everybody should be at least as good as Bach because all engage the
world via sense. So you have to struggle with the 19th century genius
problem, if you reject the primacy of forms beyond sense.

It is also unclear where your model stands in more modern contexts, such as
psychological aesthetics or the route of Fiedler. Sometimes you oppose
aesthetics and rationality (maths and music) but when convenient this is
unified when talking “sense primary”, which produces further obscurity.

Would you agree with G. T. Fechner’s distinctions of “from above” and “from
below” in your approach? If sense and material world experience have
primary status, then you have to accept that we can hone in on the
beautiful via experiment and study beauty empirically. Your model suggests
sense is primary, but I have no way of studying and verifying your claims
other than believing you. Your model is full of explanations, but I find no
avenues for inquiry when I read you, other than that you have your
positions sorted and they are correct.

These are the kind of of conflicts that bar me from understanding your use
of aesthetics. The list isn’t exhaustive and I don’t demand you explain
these. They’re just illustrative of some difficulties I have with
understanding your use. So when you throw around sense, qualia, aesthetic
experience; I have difficulty following because of the jungle of possible
complex interpretations. Which ones Craig? - is what this boils down to
somewhere, I guess. PGC


On Mon, Oct 7, 2013 at 5:20 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote:



 On Monday, October 7, 2013 3:56:55 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 06 Oct 2013, at 22:00, Craig Weinberg wrote:



 On Sunday, October 6, 2013 5:06:31 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 06 Oct 2013, at 03:17, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

  On 5 October 2013 00:40, Bruno Marchal mar...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
 
  The argument is simply summarised thus: it is impossible even for
  God
  to make a brain prosthesis that reproduces the I/O behaviour but has
  different qualia. This is a proof of comp,
 
 
  Hmm... I can agree, but eventually no God can make such a
  prothesis, only
  because the qualia is an attribute of the immaterial person, and
  not of
  the brain, body, or computer.  Then the prosthesis will manifest
  the person
  if it emulates the correct 

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-07 Thread Craig Weinberg
I can understand why it seems that my use of 'aesthetic' (and sense) is all 
over the place, and part of that is because I am trying to prompt others to 
make a connection between all of the different uses of the word. What I 
like about aesthetic is:

Anesthetic is used to refer to both general unconsciousness and local 
numbness. This hints at a natural link between sensitivity and 
consciousness. The loss of consciousness is a general an-aesthesia.

Aesthetic also has a connotation of patterns which are intended to be 
appreciated artistically or decoratively rather than for function. For 
example, there is a specific difference between red and green that is not 
reflected in the difference between wavelength measurements. We might 
explain the fact *that* there seem to be X number of functional breakpoints 
within the E-M continuum because of the function of our optical system, but 
there is no functional accounting for the the aesthetic presence of red or 
green. The aesthetic of red or green is far more than a recognition that 
there is a functional difference between E-M wavelengths associated with 
one part of the continuum or another.

Aesthetic then is a synonym for qualia, but without the nebulous baggage of 
that term. It just means something that is experienced directly as a 
presentation of sight, sound, touch, taste, etc - whether as a dream or 
imagined shape or a public object. When we hook up a video monitor to a 
computer, we are giving ourselves an aesthetic interface with which to 
display the anesthetic functions of software. Of course, I think that the 
entire cosmos is aesthetic, so that the functions of software are not 
absolutely anesthetic, but whatever aesthetic dimensions they have arise at 
the level of physics, not on the logical level that we have abstracted on 
top of it. A computer made of gears and pumps has no common aesthetic with 
an electronic computer, even though they may be running what we think is 
the same program, the program itself is an expectation, not a presence. 

There are common aesthetic themes within physics which give computation a 
ready medium in any group of rigid bodies that can be controlled reliably, 
but they cannot be made to scale up qualitatively from the outside in. If 
they could, we might expect the pixels of a video screen to realize that 
they are all contributing to a coherent image and merge into a more 
intelligent unified pixel-less screen. The fact that we can take a set of 
data in a computer and make it play as music or an image or text output is 
evidence that computation is blind to of higher aesthetic qualities.


On Monday, October 7, 2013 1:24:58 PM UTC-4, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:

 On Craig’s use of the term “Aesthetic”.

 One of the hindrances preventing me from understanding Craig’s statements 
 is the pluralistic use of the term “aesthetics”. Sorry for not being able 
 to produce a proper account but the following conflicts will just be stream 
 of consciousness for 15 minutes:

 Often you use aesthetics in a pre 19th century enlightenment way, as in 
 rigorous theory of sense, beauty, and harmony in nature and art. At the 
 same time you use the term as synonymous for qualifying taste, which is 
 reflected in everyday language use, but has little relation, if any, to 
 aesthetics as theory. 

 At other times you use it in Kantian way of transcendental, implying it to 
 be a source for knowledge (“Ästhetische Erkenntnis” in German) about 
 ourselves; but then at the same time you ditch distinguishing between form, 
 existing a priori as transcendental structure which theory studies, and the 
 impressions created for Kant a posteriori as experience, which is limited 
 by contexts of time, space, language, and perceptual apparatus in its 
 potential for us to grasp and study.

 So you take the Kantian transcendental idea in part, but make experience 
 by perceptual apparatus primary to which Kant would reply: “without study 
 and evolution of timeless form, the arts and our ability to engage new 
 forms of transcendental experience with the sensory apparatus would 
 stagnate.” 

 In other words, his objection would be: if we reduce sensory experience to 
 be the primary aesthetic mode, instead of the bonus and fruits of labors 
 and histories of theory, then we’d all be waiting for the next movie to be 
 projected in a theater, but nobody would produce new movies anymore. I’ve 
 never seen you address this quagmire convincingly. Where does novelty or 
 its appearance come from if everything makes sense? Why are some aesthetic 
 objects and presences more self-evident than others?

 Then another use you make is aesthetics in semiotic interpretation, i.e. 
 that we can only sense what is pre-ordained by symbolic systems. This 
 however robs your use of aesthetics of the primary status you often assert 
 it to have via sense.

 Further, it is not clear whether your use of the term corresponds to 
 mystical traditions 

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-06 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 06 Oct 2013, at 03:17, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


On 5 October 2013 00:40, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

The argument is simply summarised thus: it is impossible even for  
God

to make a brain prosthesis that reproduces the I/O behaviour but has
different qualia. This is a proof of comp,



Hmm... I can agree, but eventually no God can make such a  
prothesis, only
because the qualia is an attribute of the immaterial person, and  
not of
the brain, body, or computer.  Then the prosthesis will manifest  
the person

if it emulates the correct level.


But if the qualia are attributed to the substance of the physical
brain then where is the problem making a prosthesis that replicates
the behaviour but not the qualia?
The problem is that it would allow
one to make a partial zombie, which I think is absurd. Therefore, the
qualia cannot be attributed to the substance of the physical brain.


I agree.

Note that in that case the qualia is no more attributed to an  
immaterial person, but to a piece of primary matter.
In that case, both comp and functionalism (in your sense, not in  
Putnam's usual sense of functionalism which is a particular case of  
comp) are wrong.


Then, it is almost obvious that an immaterial being cannot distinguish  
between a primarily material incarnation, and an immaterial one, as it  
would need some magic (non Turing emulable) ability to make the  
difference.  People agreeing with this do no more need the UDA step 8  
(which is an attempt to make this more rigorous or clear).


I might criticize, as a devil's advocate, a little bit the partial- 
zombie argument. Very often some people pretend that they feel less  
conscious after some drink of vodka, but that they are still able to  
behave normally. Of course those people are notoriously wrong. It is  
just that alcohol augments a fake self-confidence feeling, which  
typically is not verified (in the laboratory, or more sadly on the  
roads). Also, they confuse less conscious with blurred  
consciousness, I think.

So I think we are in agreement.
(I usually use functionalism in Putnam's sense, but your's or  
Chalmers' use is more logical, yet more rarely used in the community  
of philosopher of mind, but that's a vocabulary issue).


Bruno





If not, even me, can do a brain prothesis that reproduce the  
consciousness

of a sleeping dreaming person, ...
OK, I guess you mean the full I/O behavior, but for this, I am not  
even sure
that my actual current brain can be enough, ... if only because I  
from the
first person point of view is distributed in infinities of  
computations, and
I cannot exclude that the qualia (certainly stable lasting qualia)  
might

rely on that.






provided that brain physics
is computable, or functionalism if brain physics is not computable.
Non-comp functionalism may entail, for example, that the replacement
brain contain a hypercomputer.



OK.

Bruno



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Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-06 Thread Craig Weinberg


On Sunday, October 6, 2013 5:06:31 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 06 Oct 2013, at 03:17, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 

  On 5 October 2013 00:40, Bruno Marchal mar...@ulb.ac.be javascript: 
 wrote: 
  
  The argument is simply summarised thus: it is impossible even for   
  God 
  to make a brain prosthesis that reproduces the I/O behaviour but has 
  different qualia. This is a proof of comp, 
  
  
  Hmm... I can agree, but eventually no God can make such a   
  prothesis, only 
  because the qualia is an attribute of the immaterial person, and   
  not of 
  the brain, body, or computer.  Then the prosthesis will manifest   
  the person 
  if it emulates the correct level. 
  
  But if the qualia are attributed to the substance of the physical 
  brain then where is the problem making a prosthesis that replicates 
  the behaviour but not the qualia? 
  The problem is that it would allow 
  one to make a partial zombie, which I think is absurd. Therefore, the 
  qualia cannot be attributed to the substance of the physical brain. 

 I agree. 

 Note that in that case the qualia is no more attributed to an   
 immaterial person, but to a piece of primary matter. 
 In that case, both comp and functionalism (in your sense, not in   
 Putnam's usual sense of functionalism which is a particular case of   
 comp) are wrong. 

 Then, it is almost obvious that an immaterial being cannot distinguish   
 between a primarily material incarnation, and an immaterial one, as it   
 would need some magic (non Turing emulable) ability to make the   
 difference.  People agreeing with this do no more need the UDA step 8   
 (which is an attempt to make this more rigorous or clear). 

 I might criticize, as a devil's advocate, a little bit the partial- 
 zombie argument. Very often some people pretend that they feel less   
 conscious after some drink of vodka, but that they are still able to   
 behave normally. Of course those people are notoriously wrong. It is   
 just that alcohol augments a fake self-confidence feeling, which   
 typically is not verified (in the laboratory, or more sadly on the   
 roads). Also, they confuse less conscious with blurred   
 consciousness,


Why wouldn't less consciousness have the effect of seeming blurred? If your 
battery is dying in a device, the device might begin to fail in numerous 
ways, but those are all symptoms of the battery dying - of the device 
becoming less reliable as different parts are unavailable at different 
times.

Think of qualia as a character in a long story, which is divided into 
episodes. If, for instance, someone starts watching a show like Breaking 
Bad only in the last season, they have no explicit understanding of who 
Walter White is or why he behaves like he does, where Jesse came from, etc. 
They can only pick up what is presented directly in that episode, so his 
character is relatively flat. The difference between the appreciation of 
the last episode by someone who has seen the entire series on HDTV and 
someone who has only read the closed captioning of the last episode on 
Twitter is like the difference between a human being's qualia and the 
qualia which is available through a logical imitation of a human bring. 

Qualia is experience which contains the felt relation to all other 
experiences; specific experiences which directly relate, and extended 
experiential contexts which extent to eternity (totality of manifested 
events so far relative to the participant plus semi-potential events which 
relate to higher octaves of their participation...the bigger picture with 
the larger now.)

Human psychology is not a monolith. Blindsight already *proves* that 'we 
can be a partial zombie' from our 1p perspective. I have tried to make my 
solution to the combination problem here: 
http://multisenserealism.com/thesis/6-panpsychism/eigenmorphism/ 

What it means is that it is a mistake to say we can be a partial zombie - 
rather the evidence of brain injuries and surgeries demonstrate that the 
extent to which we are who we expect ourselves to be, or that others expect 
a person to be, can be changed in many quantitative and qualitative ways. 
We may not be less conscious after a massive debilitating stroke, but what 
is conscious after that is less of us. This is because consciousness is not 
a function or a process, it is the sole source of presence. 

Qualia is what we are made of. As human beings at this stage of human 
civilization, our direct qualia is primarily cognitive-logical-verbal. We 
identify with our ability to describe with words - to qualify other qualia 
as verbal qualia. We name our perceptions and name our naming power 'mind', 
but that is not consciousness. Logic and intellect can only name 
public-facing reductions of certain qualia (visible and tangible qualia - 
the stuff of public bodies). The name for those public-facing reductions is 
quanta, or numbers, and the totality of the playing field which can be used 
for 

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-05 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 04 Oct 2013, at 19:22, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Friday, October 4, 2013 10:39:44 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 02 Oct 2013, at 19:20, Craig Weinberg wrote:



 On Wednesday, October 2, 2013 12:26:45 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:


 On 02 Oct 2013, at 06:56, Pierz wrote:



 On Wednesday, October 2, 2013 12:46:17 AM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal
 wrote:
 Then the reasoning shows (at a meta-level, made possible with the
 assumption used) how consciousness and beliefs (more or less
 deluded) in physical realities develop in arithmetic.

 Are 'beliefs in' physical realities the same as experiencing the
 realism of public physics though? For instance, I believe that if I
 should avoid driving recklessly in the same way as I would in a
 driving game as I would in my actual car. Because my belief that the
 consequences of a real life collision are more severe than a game
 collision, I would drive more conservatively in real life. That's
 all ok, but a belief about consequences would not generate realistic
 qualia. If someone held a gun to my head while I play the racing
 game, the game would not become any more realistic. I always feel
 like there is an equivalence between belief and qualia which is
 being implied here that is not the case. It's along the lines of
 assuming that a hypnotic state can fully replace reality. If that
 were the case, of course, everybody would be lining up to get
 hypnotized.There is some permeability there, but I think it's
 simplistic to imply that the aggregate of all qualia arises purely
 from the arbitrary tokenization of beliefs.


Unless the tokenization is made explicit, and then your nuance should
be catured by the nuance between (Bp  Dt, inteeligible matter) and
(Bp  Dt  p, sensible matter).

Can't you just add an  p flag to your token? It need not be  
sensible or intelligible, just consistent.


Consistent = ~[] f = t = Dt. It is in the  Dt.
But  p is needed to get the sensibility, or the connection with  
God (truth). It is what makes some dream being true, in some sense.










 But that's the mathematical (arithmetical) part. In UDA it is just
 shown that if comp is true (an hypothesis on consciousness) then
 physics is a branch of arithmetic. More precisely a branch of the
 ideally self-referentially correct machine's theology. (always in
 the Greek sense).

 There is no pretense that comp is true, but if it is true, the
 correct QM cannot postulate the wave, it has to derive the wave
 from the numbers. That's what UDA shows: a problem. AUDA (the
 machine's interview) provides the only path (by Gödel, Löb, Solovay)
 capable of relating the truth and all machine's points of view.

 There will be many ways to extract physics from the numbers, but
 interviewing the self-introspecting universal machine is the only
 way to get not just the laws of physics, but also why it can hurt,
 and why a part of that seems to be necessarily not functional.

 I don't think that an interview with anyone can explain why they can
 hurt, unless you have already naturalized an expectation of pain. In
 other words, if we don't presume that universal machine experiences
 anything, there is no need to invent qualia or experience to justify
 any mathematical relation. If mathematically all that you need is
 non-functional, secret kinds of variable labels to represent machine
 states, I don't see why we should assume they are qualitative. If
 anything, the unity of arithmetic truth would demand a single
 sensory channel that constitutes all possible I/O.

But then you get zombies, which make no sense with comp.

Because comp is blind to authenticity, which works perfectly: Zombie- 
hood make no sense to zombies.


?




But you are
right, I have to attribute consciousness to all universal machines, at
the start. That consciousness will be a computer science theoretical
semantical fixed point, that is something that the machine can know,
but cannot prove (know in a larger sense than the Theaetetus'
notion, it is more an unconscious bet than a belief or proof). (Cf
also Helmholtz, and the idea that perception is a form of
extrapolation).

It seems to me that treating consciousness as a zero dimensional point


?



intersecting two logical sets (known data and unprovable data) is  
accurate from the point of view of Comp, but that's only because  
Comp is by definition blind to qualia.


It is not. The arithmetical definition (the Bp  Dt  p) recovers  
qualia theories (notably the Bell's quantum logic) right where we can  
expect it.





If you are blind, you can define sight as a capacity that you know  
you are lacking, but you can't prove it (since you can't literally  
see what you are missing).


OK. But you beg the question of why a machine needs to be blind (or  
needs to be unable to instantiate a non blind person).






The Comp perspective can't account for feeling for what it actually  
is (a direct aesthetic appreciation),


In the case of ideally correct machine, it is 

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-05 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 04 Oct 2013, at 20:06, meekerdb wrote:


On 10/4/2013 7:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

When a consciousness is not manifested, what is it's content?


Good question. Difficult. Sometimes ago, I would have said that  
consciousness exists only in manifested form.


That's what I would say.


I have to confess that salvia has put a doubt on this. I cannot reject  
this as an hallucination, because the experience does not depend on  
the fact that it is an hallucination.
A bit like a blind person cannot say that he saw something but that is  
was an hallucination.


I have no certainty at all in those matter.





But I am much less sure about that, and such consciousness state   
might be something like heavenly bliss or hellish terror, depending  
on the path where you would lost the ability of manifesting yourself.


Recognizing that consciousness means different things: perception,  
self-modeling, awareness of self-modeling, self-evaluation,... I  
think we can at least see what it is like to not have some of these  
forms of consciousness because we generally have at most one at a  
given time - and sometimes we don't have any of them.


Here the salvia experience is tremendously interesting, as we loose  
many things, like memory, sense of self, body, notions of time and  
space, etc. yet we remain conscious, with the weird feeling that we  
are conscious for the first time, and the last time, and that we  
remember something that we know better than everything we might have  
believed to know.
It is a quite paradoxical state of mind, and coming back from it, it  
gives a sense that consciousness is fundamentally something statical,  
making time illusory. I thought that consciousness needed that time  
illusion, but now I am less sure about that.


Bruno




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-05 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On 5 October 2013 15:25, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

 The question is whether swapping out part of the system for a
 functional equivalent will change the qualia the system experiences
 without changing the behaviour. I don't think this is possible, for if
 the qualia change the subject would (at least) notice


 That's the point I find questionable.  Why couldn't some qualia change in
 minor ways and the system *not* notice because the system doesn't have any
 absolute memory to which it can compare qualia. Have you ever gone back to a
 house you lived in as a small child? Looks a lot smaller doesn't it.

 Brent

If a normal brain does not notice changes or falsely notices changes
then a brain with functionally identical implants will also fail to
notice or falsely notice these changes.

 and say that the
 qualia have changed, which constitutes a change in behaviour.
 Therefore, the qualia and the behaviour are somehow inextricably
 linked. The alternative, that the qualia are substrate dependent,
 can't work.



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Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-05 Thread meekerdb

On 10/5/2013 5:38 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 5 October 2013 15:25, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:


The question is whether swapping out part of the system for a
functional equivalent will change the qualia the system experiences
without changing the behaviour. I don't think this is possible, for if
the qualia change the subject would (at least) notice


That's the point I find questionable.  Why couldn't some qualia change in
minor ways and the system *not* notice because the system doesn't have any
absolute memory to which it can compare qualia. Have you ever gone back to a
house you lived in as a small child? Looks a lot smaller doesn't it.

Brent

If a normal brain does not notice changes or falsely notices changes
then a brain with functionally identical implants will also fail to
notice or falsely notice these changes.


But now this is a circular definition of functional.  It no longer refers just to what 
is 3p observable; now functionally identical is to include 1p qualia and the argument 
purporting to prove qualia must be preserved if behavior is preserved is turned into a 
tautology.


Brent




and say that the
qualia have changed, which constitutes a change in behaviour.
Therefore, the qualia and the behaviour are somehow inextricably
linked. The alternative, that the qualia are substrate dependent,
can't work.



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Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-05 Thread Stathis Papaioannou




 On 6 Oct 2013, at 7:03 am, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
 
 On 10/5/2013 5:38 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
 On 5 October 2013 15:25, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
 
 The question is whether swapping out part of the system for a
 functional equivalent will change the qualia the system experiences
 without changing the behaviour. I don't think this is possible, for if
 the qualia change the subject would (at least) notice
 
 That's the point I find questionable.  Why couldn't some qualia change in
 minor ways and the system *not* notice because the system doesn't have any
 absolute memory to which it can compare qualia. Have you ever gone back to a
 house you lived in as a small child? Looks a lot smaller doesn't it.
 
 Brent
 If a normal brain does not notice changes or falsely notices changes
 then a brain with functionally identical implants will also fail to
 notice or falsely notice these changes.
 
 But now this is a circular definition of functional.  It no longer refers 
 just to what is 3p observable; now functionally identical is to include 1p 
 qualia and the argument purporting to prove qualia must be preserved if 
 behavior is preserved is turned into a tautology.

No, it refers only to externally observable behaviour. If your qualia are 
different this may affect your behaviour even if it's just to report that your 
qualia are different. But how could your behaviour be affected if the 
replacement is functionally identical? And if the qualia can change without 
behaviour changing then in what sense have the qualia changed? Not a minor 
change that doesn't get noticed but a gross change, like going completely blind 
or losing the ability to understand language. If consciousness is substrate 
dependent then such a thing should be possible.

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Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-05 Thread meekerdb

On 10/5/2013 1:25 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:





On 6 Oct 2013, at 7:03 am, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:


On 10/5/2013 5:38 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 5 October 2013 15:25, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:


The question is whether swapping out part of the system for a
functional equivalent will change the qualia the system experiences
without changing the behaviour. I don't think this is possible, for if
the qualia change the subject would (at least) notice

That's the point I find questionable.  Why couldn't some qualia change in
minor ways and the system *not* notice because the system doesn't have any
absolute memory to which it can compare qualia. Have you ever gone back to a
house you lived in as a small child? Looks a lot smaller doesn't it.

Brent

If a normal brain does not notice changes or falsely notices changes
then a brain with functionally identical implants will also fail to
notice or falsely notice these changes.

But now this is a circular definition of functional.  It no longer refers just to what 
is 3p observable; now functionally identical is to include 1p qualia and the argument 
purporting to prove qualia must be preserved if behavior is preserved is turned into a tautology.

No, it refers only to externally observable behaviour. If your qualia are 
different this may affect your behaviour even if it's just to report that your 
qualia are different. But how could your behaviour be affected if the 
replacement is functionally identical? And if the qualia can change without 
behaviour changing then in what sense have the qualia changed? Not a minor 
change that doesn't get noticed but a gross change, like going completely blind 
or losing the ability to understand language. If consciousness is substrate 
dependent then such a thing should be possible.


So you agree that there could be minor or subtle changes that went unnoticed?

Brent

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Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-05 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On 6 October 2013 08:13, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

 So you agree that there could be minor or subtle changes that went
 unnoticed?

Yes, but it makes no difference to the argument, since subtle changes
may be missed with a normal brain. To disprove functionalism you would
have to show that it is possible to have an arbitrarily large change
in consciousness and yet the subject would be unable, under any
circumstances, to notice a change, nor would any change be externally
observable.


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Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-05 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On 5 October 2013 00:40, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 The argument is simply summarised thus: it is impossible even for God
 to make a brain prosthesis that reproduces the I/O behaviour but has
 different qualia. This is a proof of comp,


 Hmm... I can agree, but eventually no God can make such a prothesis, only
 because the qualia is an attribute of the immaterial person, and not of
 the brain, body, or computer.  Then the prosthesis will manifest the person
 if it emulates the correct level.

But if the qualia are attributed to the substance of the physical
brain then where is the problem making a prosthesis that replicates
the behaviour but not the qualia? The problem is that it would allow
one to make a partial zombie, which I think is absurd. Therefore, the
qualia cannot be attributed to the substance of the physical brain.

 If not, even me, can do a brain prothesis that reproduce the consciousness
 of a sleeping dreaming person, ...
 OK, I guess you mean the full I/O behavior, but for this, I am not even sure
 that my actual current brain can be enough, ... if only because I from the
 first person point of view is distributed in infinities of computations, and
 I cannot exclude that the qualia (certainly stable lasting qualia) might
 rely on that.





 provided that brain physics
 is computable, or functionalism if brain physics is not computable.
 Non-comp functionalism may entail, for example, that the replacement
 brain contain a hypercomputer.


 OK.

 Bruno


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Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-04 Thread Craig Weinberg


On Thursday, October 3, 2013 11:48:40 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:

  On 10/3/2013 4:36 PM, Pierz wrote:
  
   
  
 The universe doesn't seem to be too fussed about immense and inescapable 
 redundancy.


 Of course the universe doesn't care when the immense and inescapable 
 redundancy is in our model of it.


Yet under MWI, the multiverse would have to 'care' enough to know the 
difference between unity and multiplicity. The idea of a multiverse or 
universe is also in our model of it, but since we too are made of the same 
elementary physics that everything else in the universe is made of, then 
the difference between any model we have of the universe and any modeling 
capacity that can exist in the universe could only be one of degree not of 
kind. 

All models make sense because they are based on some sense that the 
universe makes. Whatever that elementary sense is cannot be a blind 
statistical exhaustion. As far as I can tell, it must be coherent, 
consistent, sensitive and creative. Once you have coherence and 
sensitivity, then you can mask it with insensitivity to generate 
multiplicity, but it might be more like perceptual fill-in on every level - 
a pseudo-multiplicity rather than a Planck level, granular realism. 
Granularity is a model generated by visual and tactile perception as far as 
I know.

Craig

 


 Brent
  

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Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-04 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 02 Oct 2013, at 19:20, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Wednesday, October 2, 2013 12:26:45 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 02 Oct 2013, at 06:56, Pierz wrote:




On Wednesday, October 2, 2013 12:46:17 AM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:
Then the reasoning shows (at a meta-level, made possible with the  
assumption used) how consciousness and beliefs (more or less  
deluded) in physical realities develop in arithmetic.


Are 'beliefs in' physical realities the same as experiencing the  
realism of public physics though? For instance, I believe that if I  
should avoid driving recklessly in the same way as I would in a  
driving game as I would in my actual car. Because my belief that the  
consequences of a real life collision are more severe than a game  
collision, I would drive more conservatively in real life. That's  
all ok, but a belief about consequences would not generate realistic  
qualia. If someone held a gun to my head while I play the racing  
game, the game would not become any more realistic. I always feel  
like there is an equivalence between belief and qualia which is  
being implied here that is not the case. It's along the lines of  
assuming that a hypnotic state can fully replace reality. If that  
were the case, of course, everybody would be lining up to get  
hypnotized.There is some permeability there, but I think it's  
simplistic to imply that the aggregate of all qualia arises purely  
from the arbitrary tokenization of beliefs.



Unless the tokenization is made explicit, and then your nuance should  
be catured by the nuance between (Bp  Dt, inteeligible matter) and  
(Bp  Dt  p, sensible matter).







But that's the mathematical (arithmetical) part. In UDA it is just  
shown that if comp is true (an hypothesis on consciousness) then  
physics is a branch of arithmetic. More precisely a branch of the  
ideally self-referentially correct machine's theology. (always in  
the Greek sense).


There is no pretense that comp is true, but if it is true, the  
correct QM cannot postulate the wave, it has to derive the wave  
from the numbers. That's what UDA shows: a problem. AUDA (the  
machine's interview) provides the only path (by Gödel, Löb, Solovay)  
capable of relating the truth and all machine's points of view.


There will be many ways to extract physics from the numbers, but  
interviewing the self-introspecting universal machine is the only  
way to get not just the laws of physics, but also why it can hurt,  
and why a part of that seems to be necessarily not functional.


I don't think that an interview with anyone can explain why they can  
hurt, unless you have already naturalized an expectation of pain. In  
other words, if we don't presume that universal machine experiences  
anything, there is no need to invent qualia or experience to justify  
any mathematical relation. If mathematically all that you need is  
non-functional, secret kinds of variable labels to represent machine  
states, I don't see why we should assume they are qualitative. If  
anything, the unity of arithmetic truth would demand a single  
sensory channel that constitutes all possible I/O.


But then you get zombies, which make no sense with comp. But you are  
right, I have to attribute consciousness to all universal machines, at  
the start. That consciousness will be a computer science theoretical  
semantical fixed point, that is something that the machine can know,  
but cannot prove (know in a larger sense than the Theaetetus'  
notion, it is more an unconscious bet than a belief or proof). (Cf  
also Helmholtz, and the idea that perception is a form of  
extrapolation).


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-04 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 02 Oct 2013, at 20:48, meekerdb wrote:


On 10/2/2013 2:04 AM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Tue, Oct 01, 2013 at 10:09:03AM -0700, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/1/2013 4:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Note also that the expression computation have qualia can be
misleading. A computation has no qualia, strictly speaking. Only a
person supported by an infinity of computation can be said to have
qualia, or to live qualia.

Why an infinity of computation??  That would preclude my building an
intelligent robot having qualia, since it's computations would
always be finite.  And I doubt there is room in my head for infinite
computations - certainly not digital ones.


He is alluding to the universal dovetailer here, which contains an
infinite number of distinct computations that implement any given
conscious state.

However, it is not clear that it is necessary for it to be infinite -
in a nonrebust world that doesn't contain a UD, we still consider the
possbility of conscious computations in the MGA.


Yes, I know what he is alluding to.  But if it really does take all  
those infinite threads of computation to realize conscious states,  
then I think that is the same as saying it takes the underlying  
physics of a brain (or computer) to realize consciousness.  But then  
Bruno's program of explaining things from computation hasn't avoided  
relying on the physical. ??


It just mean that human consciousness rely on the physical, but the  
physical itself relies on relative statistics made on infinities of  
computation + the self-referential logical view point. I gave the  
equation; when on the left side you have something defining the  
physical, and on the right side, purely logico-arithmetical notions.
I guess we will come back (as I have already given those equations)  
soon or later. It is quite technical (as we can expected).


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-04 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 02 Oct 2013, at 21:30, meekerdb wrote:


On 10/2/2013 6:35 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 01 Oct 2013, at 19:09, meekerdb wrote:


On 10/1/2013 4:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Note also that the expression computation have qualia can be  
misleading. A computation has no qualia, strictly speaking. Only  
a person supported by an infinity of computation can be said to  
have qualia, or to live qualia.


Why an infinity of computation??


Because the FPI bears on arithmetic, which contains the running of  
all universal machine implementing your code, below your  
substitution level.


With comp you can attach a mind to some body, but you cannot attach  
one token body to a mind, you can attach only an infinities of such  
bodies, through the interference of all computations which realize  
them in arithmetic.






That would preclude my building an intelligent robot having  
qualia, since it's computations would always be finite.  And I  
doubt there is room in my head for infinite computations -  
certainly not digital ones.


You are right. We cannot build intelligent being with qualia. The  
computer, and the 3p-robot, does not create that consciousness, it  
will only help a consciousness, which is already in Platonia, to be  
able to manifest itself relatively  to you, with the same  
statistic for your and the robot continuations.


When a consciousness is not manifested, what is it's content?


Good question. Difficult. Sometimes ago, I would have said that  
consciousness exists only in manifested form.
But I am much less sure about that, and such consciousness state   
might be something like heavenly bliss or hellish terror, depending on  
the path where you would lost the ability of manifesting yourself.


Bruno





Brent



It is confusing, but this is because we tend to associate mind to  
brain or robot, but mind is an attribute of person, and a brain or  
a body is only needed for a relative purpose.


Bruno




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-04 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 02 Oct 2013, at 22:12, meekerdb wrote:


On 10/2/2013 9:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I agree with Brent though on this. Your UDA proceeds on the basis  
that a computer in a single reality (not an infinite sum of  
calculations - that comes later) can have a 1p.


Yes. It has 1p, it is not a zombie. But that 1p, for him, is really  
defined by a cloud of similar and variant corresponding to its  
indeterminacy domain in the universal dovetailing (= already in a  
tiny part of arithmetic).


And doesn't this cloud correspond to the fuzzy, quantum description  
of the underlying physics, i.e. the quantum state of the brain.  And  
isn't it, per Tegmark, quasi-classical.


Hopefully. because if it is not, it means that either  
computationalism, or quantum mechanics is wrong.


Bruno



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Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-04 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 03 Oct 2013, at 02:23, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


On 2 October 2013 00:46, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


On 01 Oct 2013, at 15:31, Pierz wrote:

Maybe. It would be a lot more profound if we definitely *could*  
reproduce

the brain's behaviour. The devil is in the detail as they say. But a
challenge to Chalmer's position has occurred to me. It seems to me  
that
Bruno has convincingly argued that *if* comp holds, then  
consciousness
supervenes on the computation, not on the physical matter. But  
functionalism
suggests that what counts is the output, not the manner in which  
it as
arrived at. That is to say, the brain or whatever neural subunit  
or computer
is doing the processing is a black box. You input something and  
then read
the output, but the intervening steps don't matter. Consider what  
this might

mean in terms of a brain.




That's not clear to me. The question is output of what. If it is  
the entie

subject, this is more behaviorism than functionalism.
Putnam's functionalism makes clear that we have to take the output  
of the

neurons into account.
Comp is functionalism, but with the idea that we don't know the  
level of
substitution, so it might be that we have to take into account the  
oputput
of the gluons in our atoms (so comp makes clear that it only ask  
for the
existence of a level of substitution, and then show that no machine  
can know
for sure its subst. level, making Putnam's sort of functionalism a  
bit

fuzzy).





Let's say a vastly advanced alien species comes to earth. It looks  
at our
puny little brains and decides to make one to fool us. This  
constructed
person/brain receives normal conversational input and outputs  
conversation
that it knows will perfectly mimic a human being. But in fact the  
computer
doing this processing is vastly superior to the human brain. It's  
like a
modern PC emulating a TRS-80, except much more so. When it  
computes/thinks
up a response, it draws on a vast amount of knowledge,  
intelligence and
creativity and accesses qualia undreamed of by a human. Yet its  
response
will completely fool any normal human and will pass Turing tests  
till the

cows come home. What this thought experiment shows is that, while
half-qualia may be absurd, it most certainly is possible to  
reproduce the
outputs of a brain without replicating its qualia. It might have  
completely

different qualia, just as a very good actor's emotions can't be
distinguished from the real thing, even though his or her internal
experience is quite different. And if qualia can be quite  
different even

though the functional outputs are the same, this does seem to leave
functionalism in something of a quandary. All we can say is that  
there must
be some kind of qualia occurring, rather a different result from  
what
Chalmers is claiming. When we extend this type of scenario to  
artificial
neurons or partial brain prostheses as in Chamer's paper, we  
quickly run up
against perplexing problems. Imagine the advanced alien provides  
these
prostheses. It takes the same inputs and generates the same  
correct outputs,
but it processes those inputs within a much vaster, more complex  
system.
Does the brain utilizing this advanced prosthesis experience a  
kind of
expanded consciousness because of this, without that difference  
being
detectable? Or do the qualia remain somehow confined to the  
prosthesis
(whatever that means)? These crazy quandaries suggest to me that  
basically,

we don't know shit.



Hmm, I am not convinced. Chalmers argument  is that to get a  
philosophical
zombie, the fading argument shows that you have to go through half- 
qualia,
which is absurd. His goal (here) is to show that no qualia is  
absurd.


That the qualia can be different is known in the qualia literature,  
and is a

big open problem per se. But Chalmers argues only that no qualia is
absurd, indeed because it would needs some absurd notion of  
intermediate

half qualia.

My be I miss a point. Stathis can clarify this furher.


The argument is simply summarised thus: it is impossible even for God
to make a brain prosthesis that reproduces the I/O behaviour but has
different qualia. This is a proof of comp,


Hmm... I can agree, but eventually no God can make such a prothesis,  
only because the qualia is an attribute of the immaterial person,  
and not of the brain, body, or computer.  Then the prosthesis will  
manifest the person if it emulates the correct level.
If not, even me, can do a brain prothesis that reproduce the  
consciousness of a sleeping dreaming person, ...
OK, I guess you mean the full I/O behavior, but for this, I am not  
even sure that my actual current brain can be enough, ... if only  
because I from the first person point of view is distributed in  
infinities of computations, and I cannot exclude that the qualia  
(certainly stable lasting qualia) might rely on that.






provided that brain physics
is computable, or functionalism if 

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-04 Thread Craig Weinberg


On Friday, October 4, 2013 10:39:44 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 02 Oct 2013, at 19:20, Craig Weinberg wrote: 

  
  
  On Wednesday, October 2, 2013 12:26:45 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
  
  On 02 Oct 2013, at 06:56, Pierz wrote: 
  
  
  
  On Wednesday, October 2, 2013 12:46:17 AM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal   
  wrote: 
  Then the reasoning shows (at a meta-level, made possible with the   
  assumption used) how consciousness and beliefs (more or less   
  deluded) in physical realities develop in arithmetic. 
  
  Are 'beliefs in' physical realities the same as experiencing the   
  realism of public physics though? For instance, I believe that if I   
  should avoid driving recklessly in the same way as I would in a   
  driving game as I would in my actual car. Because my belief that the   
  consequences of a real life collision are more severe than a game   
  collision, I would drive more conservatively in real life. That's   
  all ok, but a belief about consequences would not generate realistic   
  qualia. If someone held a gun to my head while I play the racing   
  game, the game would not become any more realistic. I always feel   
  like there is an equivalence between belief and qualia which is   
  being implied here that is not the case. It's along the lines of   
  assuming that a hypnotic state can fully replace reality. If that   
  were the case, of course, everybody would be lining up to get   
  hypnotized.There is some permeability there, but I think it's   
  simplistic to imply that the aggregate of all qualia arises purely   
  from the arbitrary tokenization of beliefs. 


 Unless the tokenization is made explicit, and then your nuance should   
 be catured by the nuance between (Bp  Dt, inteeligible matter) and   
 (Bp  Dt  p, sensible matter). 


Can't you just add an  p flag to your token? It need not be sensible or 
intelligible, just consistent.
 




  
  
  But that's the mathematical (arithmetical) part. In UDA it is just   
  shown that if comp is true (an hypothesis on consciousness) then   
  physics is a branch of arithmetic. More precisely a branch of the   
  ideally self-referentially correct machine's theology. (always in   
  the Greek sense). 
  
  There is no pretense that comp is true, but if it is true, the   
  correct QM cannot postulate the wave, it has to derive the wave   
  from the numbers. That's what UDA shows: a problem. AUDA (the   
  machine's interview) provides the only path (by Gödel, Löb, Solovay)   
  capable of relating the truth and all machine's points of view. 
  
  There will be many ways to extract physics from the numbers, but   
  interviewing the self-introspecting universal machine is the only   
  way to get not just the laws of physics, but also why it can hurt,   
  and why a part of that seems to be necessarily not functional. 
  
  I don't think that an interview with anyone can explain why they can   
  hurt, unless you have already naturalized an expectation of pain. In   
  other words, if we don't presume that universal machine experiences   
  anything, there is no need to invent qualia or experience to justify   
  any mathematical relation. If mathematically all that you need is   
  non-functional, secret kinds of variable labels to represent machine   
  states, I don't see why we should assume they are qualitative. If   
  anything, the unity of arithmetic truth would demand a single   
  sensory channel that constitutes all possible I/O. 

 But then you get zombies, which make no sense with comp.


Because comp is blind to authenticity, which works perfectly: Zombie-hood 
make no sense to zombies.

 

 But you are   
 right, I have to attribute consciousness to all universal machines, at   
 the start. That consciousness will be a computer science theoretical   
 semantical fixed point, that is something that the machine can know,   
 but cannot prove (know in a larger sense than the Theaetetus'   
 notion, it is more an unconscious bet than a belief or proof). (Cf   
 also Helmholtz, and the idea that perception is a form of   
 extrapolation). 


It seems to me that treating consciousness as a zero dimensional point 
intersecting two logical sets (known data and unprovable data) is accurate 
from the point of view of Comp, but that's only because Comp is by 
definition blind to qualia. If you are blind, you can define sight as a 
capacity that you know you are lacking, but you can't prove it (since you 
can't literally see what you are missing). 

The Comp perspective can't account for feeling for what it actually is (a 
direct aesthetic appreciation), it can only describe what kinds of things 
happen as a consequence of unprovable knowledge.

Pansensitivity (P) proposes that sensation is a universal property. 


Primordial Pansensitivity (PP) proposes that because sensation is 
primitive, mechanism is derived from insensitivity. Whether it is mechanism 
that assumes form without sensibility 

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-04 Thread meekerdb

On 10/4/2013 7:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

When a consciousness is not manifested, what is it's content?


Good question. Difficult. Sometimes ago, I would have said that consciousness exists 
only in manifested form.


That's what I would say.

But I am much less sure about that, and such consciousness state  might be something 
like heavenly bliss or hellish terror, depending on the path where you would lost the 
ability of manifesting yourself.


Recognizing that consciousness means different things: perception, self-modeling, 
awareness of self-modeling, self-evaluation,... I think we can at least see what it is 
like to not have some of these forms of consciousness because we generally have at most 
one at a given time - and sometimes we don't have any of them.


Brent

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Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-04 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
I

On Friday, October 4, 2013, meekerdb wrote:

  On 10/3/2013 5:07 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

  You seem to be agreeing with Craig that each neuron alone is conscious.

  The experiment relates to replacement of neurons which play some part
 in consciousness. The 1% remaining neurons are part of a system which
 will notice that the qualia are different.


 That assumes that 1% are sufficient to remember all the prior qualia with
 enough fidelity to notice they are different.


No, I assume the system of which the neurons are a part will notice a
difference. If not, then the replacement has not changed the qualia.

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Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-04 Thread meekerdb

On 10/4/2013 7:18 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

I

On Friday, October 4, 2013, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/3/2013 5:07 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

You seem to be agreeing with Craig that each neuron alone is conscious.

The experiment relates to replacement of neurons which play some part
in consciousness. The 1% remaining neurons are part of a system which
will notice that the qualia are different.


That assumes that 1% are sufficient to remember all the prior qualia with 
enough
fidelity to notice they are different.


No, I assume the system of which the neurons are a part will notice a difference. If 
not, then the replacement has not changed the qualia.


I don't understand that.  If the system can notice a difference, why does it need that 
1%?  Why can't it detect a difference with 0% of the original remaining?  What's the 1% doing?


Brent

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Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-04 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On 5 October 2013 12:53, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
 On 10/4/2013 7:18 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

 I

 On Friday, October 4, 2013, meekerdb wrote:

 On 10/3/2013 5:07 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

 You seem to be agreeing with Craig that each neuron alone is conscious.

 The experiment relates to replacement of neurons which play some part
 in consciousness. The 1% remaining neurons are part of a system which
 will notice that the qualia are different.


 That assumes that 1% are sufficient to remember all the prior qualia with
 enough fidelity to notice they are different.


 No, I assume the system of which the neurons are a part will notice a
 difference. If not, then the replacement has not changed the qualia.


 I don't understand that.  If the system can notice a difference, why does it
 need that 1%?  Why can't it detect a difference with 0% of the original
 remaining?  What's the 1% doing?

The question is whether swapping out part of the system for a
functional equivalent will change the qualia the system experiences
without changing the behaviour. I don't think this is possible, for if
the qualia change the subject would (at least) notice and say that the
qualia have changed, which constitutes a change in behaviour.
Therefore, the qualia and the behaviour are somehow inextricably
linked. The alternative, that the qualia are substrate dependent,
can't work.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-04 Thread meekerdb

On 10/4/2013 9:46 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 5 October 2013 12:53, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

On 10/4/2013 7:18 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

I

On Friday, October 4, 2013, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/3/2013 5:07 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

You seem to be agreeing with Craig that each neuron alone is conscious.

The experiment relates to replacement of neurons which play some part
in consciousness. The 1% remaining neurons are part of a system which
will notice that the qualia are different.


That assumes that 1% are sufficient to remember all the prior qualia with
enough fidelity to notice they are different.


No, I assume the system of which the neurons are a part will notice a
difference. If not, then the replacement has not changed the qualia.


I don't understand that.  If the system can notice a difference, why does it
need that 1%?  Why can't it detect a difference with 0% of the original
remaining?  What's the 1% doing?

The question is whether swapping out part of the system for a
functional equivalent will change the qualia the system experiences
without changing the behaviour. I don't think this is possible, for if
the qualia change the subject would (at least) notice


That's the point I find questionable.  Why couldn't some qualia change in minor ways and 
the system *not* notice because the system doesn't have any absolute memory to which it 
can compare qualia. Have you ever gone back to a house you lived in as a small child? 
Looks a lot smaller doesn't it.


Brent


and say that the
qualia have changed, which constitutes a change in behaviour.
Therefore, the qualia and the behaviour are somehow inextricably
linked. The alternative, that the qualia are substrate dependent,
can't work.




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Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-03 Thread Telmo Menezes
On Tue, Oct 1, 2013 at 6:26 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 On 01 Oct 2013, at 17:09, Telmo Menezes wrote:

 On Tue, Oct 1, 2013 at 1:13 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 30 Sep 2013, at 14:05, Telmo Menezes wrote to Craig:


 The comp assumption that computations have

 qualia hidden inside them is not much of an answer either in my view.


 I have the same problem.


 The solution is in the fact that all machines have that problem. More
 exactly: all persons capable of surviving a digital substitution must
 have
 that and similar problems. It is a sort of meta-solution explaining that
 we
 are indeed confronted to something which is simply totally unexplainable.

 Note also that the expression computation have qualia can be
 misleading. A
 computation has no qualia, strictly speaking. Only a person supported by
 an
 infinity of computation can be said to have qualia, or to live qualia.
 Then
 the math of self-reference can be used to explain why the qualia have to
 escape the pure third person type of explanations.


 Thanks Bruno. Is there some formal proof of this? Can it be followed
 by a mere mortal?


 It follows from comp, the classical definition of knowledge (the agreement
 that the modal logic S4 defines an axiomatic of knowledge) and then from
 Solovay theorem, and the fact that

 (Bp - Bp  p) belongs to G* minus G.

  It is explained in details in the long version conscience et mécanisme,
 and with less detail in the short Lille thesis (that you have).

Ok, I'm preparing to start chapter 4, the movie graph argument.

 It is also
 explained in the second part of sane04.

 Formally a key text is the S4 provability chapter in Boolos 79 and 93, and
 the articles referred too.

 We can come back on this. It is the heart of the Arithmeticalization of the
 UDA. It *is¨probably very naive, and I was sure this would be refuted, but
 it is not, yet.

 I think it can be understood by mere mortals, having enough times and
 motivation.

 For the sigma_1 restriction, you need also a good understanding around Gödel
 and Mechanism. One of the best good is the book by Judson Webb. Torkel
 Franzen's two books are quite good also. If you read the french I summarize
 a big part of the literature on that in conscience  mécanisme.

 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/bxlthesis/consciencemecanisme.html

Thanks!


 Bruno




 A good exercise consists in trying to think about what could like an
 explanation of what a qualia is. Even without comp, that will seem
 impossible, and that explains why some people, like Craig, estimate that
 we
 have to take them as primitive. here comp explains, why there are things
 like qualia, which can emerge only in the frist person points of view,
 and
 admit irreductible components.

 Bruno




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Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-03 Thread Craig Weinberg


On Thursday, October 3, 2013 9:30:13 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote:

 On Tue, Oct 1, 2013 at 6:10 PM, Craig Weinberg 
 whats...@gmail.comjavascript: 
 wrote: 

  
  I think that evil continues to flourish, precisely because science has 
 not 
  integrated privacy into an authoritative worldview. As long as 
 subjectivity 
  remains the primary concern of most ordinary people, any view that 
 denies or 
  diminishes it will be held at arms length. I think it secretly erodes 
  support for all forms of progress and inspires fundamentalist politics 
 as 
  well. 

 I agree. Taking privacy literally, this is in fact one of the most 
 creepy consequences of total surveillance: denial of privacy is, in a 
 sense, a denial of the right to existence. Can one truly exist as a 
 human being as an undistinguishable part of some mass? No secrets, no 
 mysteries, what you see is what you get to the extreme. This sounds 
 like hell. 


Right. I think that it is no coincidence that the major concerns of 
ubiquitous computing revolve around privacy, propreity, and security. 
Computers don't know what privacy is, they don't know who we are, and they 
can't care who owns what. That's all part of private physics and computers 
can only exploit the lowest common denominator of privacy  - that level 
which refers only to itself as a digitally quantified object.
 




  Once we have a worldview which makes sense of all phenomena and 
  experience, even the mystical and personal, then we can move forward in 
 a 
  more mature and sensible way. Right now, what is being offered is 'you 
 can 
  know the truth about the universe, but only if you agree that you aren't 
  really part of it'. 

 I believe more than this is being offered in this mailing list. I feel 
 your objections apply mostly to mainstream views, and to that degree I 
 agree with you. 


I agree, I wasn't really talking about specialized groups like this.
 



  
  Why would MWI or evolution place a high value on leadership or success? 
 It 
  seems just the opposite. What difference does it make if you succeed 
 here 
  and now, if you implicitly fail elsewhere? MWI doesn't seem to describe 
 any 
  universe that could ever matter to anyone. It's the Occam's catastrophe 
  factor. 

 Highly speculative and non-rigorous: 
 You can see it differently if you can assume self-sampling. Let's 
 assume everything is conscious, even rocks. A rock is so simple that, 
 for it, a millennia probably feels like a second. It does not contain 
 a variety of conscious states like humans do. Then, you would expect 
 to find yourself as a complex being. Certain branches of the 
 multiverse contain such complex beings, and this would make evolution 
 appear more effective/purposeful than it really is, from the vantage 
 point of these branches. 


Even so, why would uniqueness or firstness be of value in a universe based 
on such immense and inescapable redundancy as MWI suggests?
 



   
Thanks, 
Craig 



Cheers, 
Telmo. 



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Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-03 Thread Pierz


On Friday, October 4, 2013 4:10:02 AM UTC+10, Craig Weinberg wrote:



 On Thursday, October 3, 2013 9:30:13 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote:

 On Tue, Oct 1, 2013 at 6:10 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com 
 wrote: 

  
  I think that evil continues to flourish, precisely because science has 
 not 
  integrated privacy into an authoritative worldview. As long as 
 subjectivity 
  remains the primary concern of most ordinary people, any view that 
 denies or 
  diminishes it will be held at arms length. I think it secretly erodes 
  support for all forms of progress and inspires fundamentalist politics 
 as 
  well. 

 I agree. Taking privacy literally, this is in fact one of the most 
 creepy consequences of total surveillance: denial of privacy is, in a 
 sense, a denial of the right to existence. Can one truly exist as a 
 human being as an undistinguishable part of some mass? No secrets, no 
 mysteries, what you see is what you get to the extreme. This sounds 
 like hell. 


 Right. I think that it is no coincidence that the major concerns of 
 ubiquitous computing revolve around privacy, propreity, and security. 
 Computers don't know what privacy is, they don't know who we are, and they 
 can't care who owns what. That's all part of private physics and computers 
 can only exploit the lowest common denominator of privacy  - that level 
 which refers only to itself as a digitally quantified object.
  




  Once we have a worldview which makes sense of all phenomena and 
  experience, even the mystical and personal, then we can move forward in 
 a 
  more mature and sensible way. Right now, what is being offered is 'you 
 can 
  know the truth about the universe, but only if you agree that you 
 aren't 
  really part of it'. 

 I believe more than this is being offered in this mailing list. I feel 
 your objections apply mostly to mainstream views, and to that degree I 
 agree with you. 


 I agree, I wasn't really talking about specialized groups like this.
  



  
  Why would MWI or evolution place a high value on leadership or success? 
 It 
  seems just the opposite. What difference does it make if you succeed 
 here 
  and now, if you implicitly fail elsewhere? MWI doesn't seem to describe 
 any 
  universe that could ever matter to anyone. It's the Occam's catastrophe 
  factor. 

 Highly speculative and non-rigorous: 
 You can see it differently if you can assume self-sampling. Let's 
 assume everything is conscious, even rocks. A rock is so simple that, 
 for it, a millennia probably feels like a second. It does not contain 
 a variety of conscious states like humans do. Then, you would expect 
 to find yourself as a complex being. Certain branches of the 
 multiverse contain such complex beings, and this would make evolution 
 appear more effective/purposeful than it really is, from the vantage 
 point of these branches. 


 Even so, why would uniqueness or firstness be of value in a universe based 
 on such immense and inescapable redundancy as MWI suggests?
  

The universe doesn't seem to be too fussed about immense and inescapable 
redundancy. Have you noticed all the *space* out there?? The progress of 
scientific knowledge has proceeded so far in the same direction: the 
revelation of a context ever vaster and more impersonal. MWI does strike me 
as quite horrifying too. But that is based on a false perspective in which 
one imagine occupying all the branches of the universe and feels naturally 
appalled. But nobody experiences the multiverse as such thank god. As for 
what has value, again that is a matter for the first person perspective, 
the limited horizon of thoughts and feelings of the individual. From the 
god's eye view, any individual entity is utterly insignificant. You can't 
look to a cosmological theory for validation of personal significance. 
You're posing the same argument against MWI as Christians posed against 
Darwinism and before that the Copernican revolution. What is *my*significance 
in this picture of the world? Well sorry bud, but the news 
ain't good...



   
Thanks, 
Craig 



Cheers, 
Telmo. 



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Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-03 Thread Pierz


On Thursday, October 3, 2013 4:59:17 AM UTC+10, Brent wrote:

  On 10/1/2013 11:49 PM, Pierz wrote:
  


 On Wednesday, October 2, 2013 3:15:01 PM UTC+10, Brent wrote: 

 On 10/1/2013 9:56 PM, Pierz wrote: 
  Yes, I understand that to be Chalmer's main point. Although, if the 
 qualia can be 
  different, it does present issues - how much and in what way can it 
 vary? 

 Yes, that's a question that interests me because I want to be able to 
 build intelligent 
 machines and so I need to know what qualia they will have, if any.  I 
 think it will depend 
 on their sensors and on their values/goals.  If I build a very 
 intelligent Mars Rover, 
 capable of learning and reasoning, with a goal of discovering whether 
 there was once life 
 on Mars; then I expect it will experience pleasure in finding evidence 
 regarding this.   
 But no matter how smart I make it, it won't experience lust. 

  Reasoning being what exactly? The ability to circumnavigate an 
 obstacle for instance? There are no rewards in an algorithm. There are 
 just paths which do or don't get followed depending on inputs. Sure, the 
 argument that there must be qualia in a sufficiently sophisticated computer 
 seems compelling. But the argument that there can't be seems equally so. As 
 a programmer I have zero expectation that the computer I am programming 
 will feel pleasure or suffering. It's just as happy to throw an exception 
 as it is to complete its assigned task. *I* am the one who experiences pain 
 when it hits an error! I just can't conceive of the magical point at which 
 the computer goes from total indifference to giving a damn. That's the 
 point Craig keeps pushing and which I agree with. Something is missing from 
 our understanding.
  

 What's missing is you're considering a computer, not a robot.  As robot 
 has to have values and goals in order to act and react in the world.  It 
 has complex systems and subsystems that may have conflicting subgoals, and 
 in order to learn from experience it keeps a narrative history about what 
 it considers significant events.  At that level it may have the 
 consciousness of a mouse.  If it's a social robot, one that needs to 
 cooperate and compete in a society of other persons, then it will need a 
 self-image and model of other people.  In that case it's quite reasonable 
 to suppose it also has qualia.

 Really? You believe that a robot can experience qualia but a computer 
can't? Well that just makes no sense at all. A robot is a computer with 
peripherals. When I write the code to represent its self image, I will 
probably write a class called Self. But once compiled, the name of the 
class will be just another string of bits, and only the programmer will 
understand that it is supposed to represent the position, attitude and 
other states of the physical robot. Do the peripherals need to be real or 
can they just be simulated? Does a brain in a Futurama-style jar lose its 
qualia because it's now a computer not a robot? Come on. 

   
  I'm curious what the literature has to say about that. And if 
 functionalism means 
  reproducing more than the mere functional output of a system, if it 
 potentially means 
  replication down to the elementary particles and possibly their quantum 
 entanglements, 
  then duplication becomes impossible, not merely technically but in 
 principle. That seems 
  against the whole point of functionalism - as the idea of function is 
 reduced to 
  something almost meaningless. 

 I think functionalism must be confined to the classical functions, 
 discounting the quantum 
 level effects.  But it must include some behavior that is almost entirely 
 internal - e.g. 
 planning, imagining.  Excluding quantum entanglements isn't arbitrary; 
 there cannot have 
 been any evolution of goals and values based on quantum entanglement 
 (beyond the 
 statistical effects that produce decoherence and quasi-classical 
 behavior). 

  But what do planning and imagining mean except their functional 
 outputs? It shouldn't matter to you how the planning occurs - it's an 
 implementation detail in development speak. 
  

 You can ask a person about plans and imaginings, and speech in response is 
 an action.

  Your argument may be valid regarding quantum entanglement, but it is 
 still an argument based on what seems to make sense rather than on 
 genuine understanding of the relationship between functions and their 
 putative qualia.
  

 But I suspect that there is no understanding that would satisfy Craig as 
 genuine.  Do we have a genuine understanding of electrodynamics?  of 
 computation?  What we have is the ability to manipulate them for our 
 purposes.  So when we can make an intelligent robot that interacts with 
 people AS IF it experiences qualia and we can manipulate and anticipate 
 that behavior, then we'll have just as genuine an understanding of qualia 
 as we do of electrodynamics.

 Well if my daughter has a doll that cries until it's 

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-03 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On 3 October 2013 10:33, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
 On 10/2/2013 5:15 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

 On 1 October 2013 23:31, Pierz pier...@gmail.com wrote:

 Maybe. It would be a lot more profound if we definitely *could* reproduce
 the brain's behaviour. The devil is in the detail as they say. But a
 challenge to Chalmer's position has occurred to me. It seems to me that
 Bruno has convincingly argued that *if* comp holds, then consciousness
 supervenes on the computation, not on the physical matter.

 When I say comp holds I mean in the first instance that my physical
 brain could be replaced with an appropriate computer and I would still
 be me. But this assumption leads to the conclusion that the computer
 is not actually needed, just the computation as platonic object.


 But what if you were just slightly different or different only in some rare
 circumstances (like being in an MRI), which seems very likely?

If the replacement were slightly different then under particular
circumstances the consciousness would be different. It's like any
other prosthesis that might function well in most situations but fail
if pushed beyond a certain limit.

 So if
 it's true that my brain could be replaced with a physical computer
 then my brain and the computer were not physical in a fundamental
 sense in the first place!


 But this depends on the MGA or Olympia argument, which find suspect.

Yes, but the point I wanted to make was that the case for
functionalism is not destroyed even if this argument is valid.

 While this is circular-sounding I don't
 think that it's actually contradictory. It is not a necessary premise
 of Chalmer's argument (or indeed, for most scientific arguments) that
 there be a fundamental physical reality.

 As for reproducing the brain's behaviour, it comes down to whether
 brain physics is computable. It probably *is* computable, since we
 have not found evidence of non-computable physics of which I am aware.


 Suppose it was not Turing computable, but was computable in some other sense
 (e.g. hypercomputable).  Aren't you just setting up a tautology in which
 whatever the brain does, whatever the universe does, we'll call it
 X-computable.  Already we have one good model of the universe, Copenhagen
 QM, that says it's not Turing computable.

I think the usual meaning of computable is Turing computable.

 If it is not, then computationalism is false. But even if
 computationalism is false, Chalmer's argument still shows that
 *functionalism* is true. Computationalism is a subset of
 functionalism.

 But functionalism suggests that what counts is the output, not the manner
 in which it as arrived at. That is to say, the brain or whatever neural
 subunit or computer is doing the processing is a black box. You input
 something and then read the output, but the intervening steps don't matter.
 Consider what this might mean in terms of a brain. Let's say a vastly
 advanced alien species comes to earth. It looks at our puny little brains
 and decides to make one to fool us. This constructed person/brain receives
 normal conversational input and outputs conversation that it knows will
 perfectly mimic a human being. But in fact the computer doing this
 processing is vastly superior to the human brain. It's like a modern PC
 emulating a TRS-80, except much more so. When it computes/thinks up a
 response, it draws on a vast amount of knowledge, intelligence and
 creativity and accesses qualia undreamed of by a human. Yet its response
 will completely fool any normal human and will pass Turing tests till the
 cows come home. What this thought experiment shows is that, while
 half-qualia may be absurd, it most certainly is possible to reproduce the
 outputs of a brain without replicating its qualia. It might have completely
 different qualia, just as a very good actor's emotions can't be
 distinguished from the real thing, even though his or her internal
 experience is quite different. And if qualia can be quite different even
 though the functional outputs are the same, this does seem to leave
 functionalism in something of a quandary. All we can say is that there must
 be some kind of qualia occurring, rather a different result from what
 Chalmers is claiming. When we extend this type of scenario to artificial
 neurons or partial brain prostheses as in Chamer's paper, we quickly run up
 against perplexing problems. Imagine the advanced alien provides these
 prostheses. It takes the same inputs and generates the same correct outputs,
 but it processes those inputs within a much vaster, more complex system.
 Does the brain utilizing this advanced prosthesis experience a kind of
 expanded consciousness because of this, without that difference being
 detectable? Or do the qualia remain somehow confined to the prosthesis
 (whatever that means)? These crazy quandaries suggest to me that basically,
 we don't know shit.

 Essentially, I think that if the alien computer reproduces human
 

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-03 Thread Craig Weinberg


On Thursday, October 3, 2013 7:36:10 PM UTC-4, Pierz wrote:



 On Friday, October 4, 2013 4:10:02 AM UTC+10, Craig Weinberg wrote:



 On Thursday, October 3, 2013 9:30:13 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote:

 On Tue, Oct 1, 2013 at 6:10 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com 
 wrote: 

  
  I think that evil continues to flourish, precisely because science has 
 not 
  integrated privacy into an authoritative worldview. As long as 
 subjectivity 
  remains the primary concern of most ordinary people, any view that 
 denies or 
  diminishes it will be held at arms length. I think it secretly erodes 
  support for all forms of progress and inspires fundamentalist politics 
 as 
  well. 

 I agree. Taking privacy literally, this is in fact one of the most 
 creepy consequences of total surveillance: denial of privacy is, in a 
 sense, a denial of the right to existence. Can one truly exist as a 
 human being as an undistinguishable part of some mass? No secrets, no 
 mysteries, what you see is what you get to the extreme. This sounds 
 like hell. 


 Right. I think that it is no coincidence that the major concerns of 
 ubiquitous computing revolve around privacy, propreity, and security. 
 Computers don't know what privacy is, they don't know who we are, and they 
 can't care who owns what. That's all part of private physics and computers 
 can only exploit the lowest common denominator of privacy  - that level 
 which refers only to itself as a digitally quantified object.
  




  Once we have a worldview which makes sense of all phenomena and 
  experience, even the mystical and personal, then we can move forward 
 in a 
  more mature and sensible way. Right now, what is being offered is 'you 
 can 
  know the truth about the universe, but only if you agree that you 
 aren't 
  really part of it'. 

 I believe more than this is being offered in this mailing list. I feel 
 your objections apply mostly to mainstream views, and to that degree I 
 agree with you. 


 I agree, I wasn't really talking about specialized groups like this.
  



  
  Why would MWI or evolution place a high value on leadership or 
 success? It 
  seems just the opposite. What difference does it make if you succeed 
 here 
  and now, if you implicitly fail elsewhere? MWI doesn't seem to 
 describe any 
  universe that could ever matter to anyone. It's the Occam's 
 catastrophe 
  factor. 

 Highly speculative and non-rigorous: 
 You can see it differently if you can assume self-sampling. Let's 
 assume everything is conscious, even rocks. A rock is so simple that, 
 for it, a millennia probably feels like a second. It does not contain 
 a variety of conscious states like humans do. Then, you would expect 
 to find yourself as a complex being. Certain branches of the 
 multiverse contain such complex beings, and this would make evolution 
 appear more effective/purposeful than it really is, from the vantage 
 point of these branches. 


 Even so, why would uniqueness or firstness be of value in a universe 
 based on such immense and inescapable redundancy as MWI suggests?
  

 The universe doesn't seem to be too fussed about immense and inescapable 
 redundancy. Have you noticed all the *space* out there??


Sure, there's a ridiculous amount of most things, but even so, the idea 
that every step that every boson or fermion needs its own collection of 
universes for every interaction it has seems to be really bending over 
backward. It seems to me like an excuse for your teacher I need to be 
excused from having to explain the universe, because the universe could 
just be one of a fantastic number of universes being created constantly, 
none of which I can explain either.
 

 The progress of scientific knowledge has proceeded so far in the same 
 direction: the revelation of a context ever vaster and more impersonal. 


Statistically that pattern is no more likely to continue than it is to be 
reversed. I think that Relativity gave us the chance to reverse, but since 
that time we have overshot the mark and pursued a path of unrealism and 
arithmetic supremacy that has already become dysfunctional but we are in 
denial about it.
 

 MWI does strike me as quite horrifying too. But that is based on a false 
 perspective in which one imagine occupying all the branches of the universe 
 and feels naturally appalled. But nobody experiences the multiverse as such 
 thank god.


In my understanding, if nobody can ever experience the multiverse, then the 
multiverse is identical to that which can never exist. The idea of a 
context which simply 'is' without being described as an experience is just 
the default image of a God that is inverted to become the Absolute object. 
It's a confirmation bias rooted in how soothing it is for us to imagine 
that there is a reliable universal machine which we can learn to exist 
within using intelligence.

As for what has value, again that is a matter for the first person 
 perspective, the limited horizon 

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-03 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On 3 October 2013 14:40, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:

 The argument is simply summarised thus: it is impossible even for God
 to make a brain prosthesis that reproduces the I/O behaviour but has
 different qualia. This is a proof of comp, provided that brain physics
 is computable, or functionalism if brain physics is not computable.
 Non-comp functionalism may entail, for example, that the replacement
 brain contain a hypercomputer.



 It's like saying that if the same rent is paid for every apartment in the
 same building, then the same person must be living there, and that proves
 that rent payments are people.

The hypothesis is that if we replicate the rent then we necessarily
replicate the people. But we can think of an experiment where the rent
is replicated but the person is not replicated - there is no
contradiction here. However, if we can replicate the I/O behaviour of
the neurons but not the associated qualia there is a contradiction,
since that would allow partial zombies, which you have agreed are
absurd. Therefore, it is impossible to replicate the I/O behaviour of
the neurons without replicating the qualia. To refute this, you either
have to show that 1) replicating the I/O behaviour of the neurons
without replicating the qualia does not lead to partial zombies, or 2)
that partial zombies are not absurd.

A partial zombie is a person whose qualia change, for example he
becomes blind, but his behaviour does not change and he does not
notice that his qualia change.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-03 Thread meekerdb

On 10/3/2013 4:36 PM, Pierz wrote:



The universe doesn't seem to be too fussed about immense and inescapable 
redundancy.


Of course the universe doesn't care when the immense and inescapable redundancy is in our 
model of it.


Brent

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Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-03 Thread meekerdb

On 10/3/2013 5:07 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

You seem to be agreeing with Craig that each neuron alone is conscious.

The experiment relates to replacement of neurons which play some part
in consciousness. The 1% remaining neurons are part of a system which
will notice that the qualia are different.


That assumes that 1% are sufficient to remember all the prior qualia with enough fidelity 
to notice they are different.


Brent

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Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-03 Thread meekerdb

On 10/3/2013 4:53 PM, Pierz wrote:



On Thursday, October 3, 2013 4:59:17 AM UTC+10, Brent wrote:

On 10/1/2013 11:49 PM, Pierz wrote:



On Wednesday, October 2, 2013 3:15:01 PM UTC+10, Brent wrote:

On 10/1/2013 9:56 PM, Pierz wrote:
 Yes, I understand that to be Chalmer's main point. Although, if the 
qualia
can be
 different, it does present issues - how much and in what way can it 
vary?

Yes, that's a question that interests me because I want to be able to 
build
intelligent
machines and so I need to know what qualia they will have, if any.  I 
think it
will depend
on their sensors and on their values/goals.  If I build a very 
intelligent Mars
Rover,
capable of learning and reasoning, with a goal of discovering whether 
there was
once life
on Mars; then I expect it will experience pleasure in finding evidence
regarding this.
But no matter how smart I make it, it won't experience lust.

Reasoning being what exactly? The ability to circumnavigate an obstacle 
for
instance? There are no rewards in an algorithm. There are just paths 
which do or
don't get followed depending on inputs. Sure, the argument that there must 
be
qualia in a sufficiently sophisticated computer seems compelling. But the 
argument
that there can't be seems equally so. As a programmer I have zero 
expectation that
the computer I am programming will feel pleasure or suffering. It's just as 
happy
to throw an exception as it is to complete its assigned task. *I* am the 
one who
experiences pain when it hits an error! I just can't conceive of the 
magical point
at which the computer goes from total indifference to giving a damn. That's 
the
point Craig keeps pushing and which I agree with. Something is missing from 
our
understanding.


What's missing is you're considering a computer, not a robot.  As robot has 
to have
values and goals in order to act and react in the world.  It has complex 
systems and
subsystems that may have conflicting subgoals, and in order to learn from 
experience
it keeps a narrative history about what it considers significant events.  
At that
level it may have the consciousness of a mouse.  If it's a social robot, 
one that
needs to cooperate and compete in a society of other persons, then it will 
need a
self-image and model of other people.  In that case it's quite reasonable 
to suppose
it also has qualia.

Really? You believe that a robot can experience qualia but a computer can't? Well that 
just makes no sense at all. A robot is a computer with peripherals. When I write the 
code to represent its self image, I will probably write a class called Self. But 
once compiled, the name of the class will be just another string of bits, and only the 
programmer will understand that it is supposed to represent the position, attitude and 
other states of the physical robot.


But does the robot understand the class; i.e. does it use it in it's planning and modeling 
of actions, in learning, does it reason about itself.  Sure it's not enough to just label 
something self - it has to be something represented just as the robot represents the world 
in order to interact successfully.



Do the peripherals need to be real or can they just be simulated?


They can be simulated if they only have to interact with a simulated world.

Brent

Does a brain in a Futurama-style jar lose its qualia because it's now a computer not a 
robot? Come on.




 I'm curious what the literature has to say about that. And if 
functionalism
means
 reproducing more than the mere functional output of a system, if it
potentially means
 replication down to the elementary particles and possibly their 
quantum
entanglements,
 then duplication becomes impossible, not merely technically but in 
principle.
That seems
 against the whole point of functionalism - as the idea of function 
is
reduced to
 something almost meaningless.

I think functionalism must be confined to the classical functions, 
discounting
the quantum
level effects.  But it must include some behavior that is almost 
entirely
internal - e.g.
planning, imagining.  Excluding quantum entanglements isn't arbitrary; 
there
cannot have
been any evolution of goals and values based on quantum entanglement 
(beyond the
statistical effects that produce decoherence and quasi-classical 
behavior).

But what do planning and imagining mean except their functional 
outputs? It
shouldn't matter to you how the planning occurs - it's an implementation 
detail
in development speak.


You can ask a person about plans and imaginings, and speech in response is 
an action.


Your argument may be valid regarding quantum 

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-02 Thread Pierz


On Wednesday, October 2, 2013 3:15:01 PM UTC+10, Brent wrote:

 On 10/1/2013 9:56 PM, Pierz wrote: 
  Yes, I understand that to be Chalmer's main point. Although, if the 
 qualia can be 
  different, it does present issues - how much and in what way can it 
 vary? 

 Yes, that's a question that interests me because I want to be able to 
 build intelligent 
 machines and so I need to know what qualia they will have, if any.  I 
 think it will depend 
 on their sensors and on their values/goals.  If I build a very intelligent 
 Mars Rover, 
 capable of learning and reasoning, with a goal of discovering whether 
 there was once life 
 on Mars; then I expect it will experience pleasure in finding evidence 
 regarding this.   
 But no matter how smart I make it, it won't experience lust. 

 Reasoning being what exactly? The ability to circumnavigate an obstacle 
for instance? There are no rewards in an algorithm. There are just paths 
which do or don't get followed depending on inputs. Sure, the argument that 
there must be qualia in a sufficiently sophisticated computer seems 
compelling. But the argument that there can't be seems equally so. As a 
programmer I have zero expectation that the computer I am programming will 
feel pleasure or suffering. It's just as happy to throw an exception as it 
is to complete its assigned task. *I* am the one who experiences pain when 
it hits an error! I just can't conceive of the magical point at which the 
computer goes from total indifference to giving a damn. That's the point 
Craig keeps pushing and which I agree with. Something is missing from our 
understanding.


  I'm curious what the literature has to say about that. And if 
 functionalism means 
  reproducing more than the mere functional output of a system, if it 
 potentially means 
  replication down to the elementary particles and possibly their quantum 
 entanglements, 
  then duplication becomes impossible, not merely technically but in 
 principle. That seems 
  against the whole point of functionalism - as the idea of function is 
 reduced to 
  something almost meaningless. 

 I think functionalism must be confined to the classical functions, 
 discounting the quantum 
 level effects.  But it must include some behavior that is almost entirely 
 internal - e.g. 
 planning, imagining.  Excluding quantum entanglements isn't arbitrary; 
 there cannot have 
 been any evolution of goals and values based on quantum entanglement 
 (beyond the 
 statistical effects that produce decoherence and quasi-classical 
 behavior). 

 But what do planning and imagining mean except their functional 
outputs? It shouldn't matter to you how the planning occurs - it's an 
implementation detail in development speak. Your argument may be valid 
regarding quantum entanglement, but it is still an argument based on what 
seems to make sense rather than on genuine understanding of the 
relationship between functions and their putative qualia. 
 

 Brent 



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Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-02 Thread Russell Standish
On Tue, Oct 01, 2013 at 10:09:03AM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
 On 10/1/2013 4:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 Note also that the expression computation have qualia can be
 misleading. A computation has no qualia, strictly speaking. Only a
 person supported by an infinity of computation can be said to have
 qualia, or to live qualia.
 
 Why an infinity of computation??  That would preclude my building an
 intelligent robot having qualia, since it's computations would
 always be finite.  And I doubt there is room in my head for infinite
 computations - certainly not digital ones.
 

He is alluding to the universal dovetailer here, which contains an
infinite number of distinct computations that implement any given
conscious state.

However, it is not clear that it is necessary for it to be infinite -
in a nonrebust world that doesn't contain a UD, we still consider the
possbility of conscious computations in the MGA.

Cheers
-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-02 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 01 Oct 2013, at 18:46, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Tuesday, October 1, 2013 7:13:17 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 30 Sep 2013, at 14:05, Telmo Menezes wrote to Craig:



The comp assumption that computations have
qualia hidden inside them is not much of an answer either in my  
view.


I have the same problem.


The solution is in the fact that all machines have that problem.  
More exactly: all persons capable of surviving a digital  
substitution must have that and similar problems. It is a sort of  
meta-solution explaining that we are indeed confronted to something  
which is simply totally unexplainable.


Note also that the expression computation have qualia can be  
misleading. A computation has no qualia, strictly speaking. Only a  
person supported by an infinity of computation can be said to have  
qualia, or to live qualia. Then the math of self-reference can be  
used to explain why the qualia have to escape the pure third person  
type of explanations.


A good exercise consists in trying to think about what could like an  
explanation of what a qualia is. Even without comp, that will seem  
impossible, and that explains why some people, like Craig, estimate  
that we have to take them as primitive. here comp explains, why  
there are things like qualia, which can emerge only in the frist  
person points of view, and admit irreductible components.


Explaining why X is local to a certain perspective, or why X is  
irreducible does not explain why X is an aesthetic presence though.


Good. This means comp gives job. Nobody pretends that comp solves  
everything at once, and on the contrary, I specifically explains that  
he leads to new problem, like explaining the laws of physics from a  
statistic on computation-seen-from inside (to be short).




You can have numerical expressions which are irreducible and local  
to a machine without there being any such thing as flavor or color.  
As long as we are saying that both qualia and quanta are real, I  
don't see any advantage of making qualia supervene on quanta instead  
of the other way around, especially when we can understand that the  
nature of counting is to create figurative reductions which are  
nameless and homeless.


It is easier to explain something immaterial from something  
immaterial, than to explain something immaterial from primary matter,  
which is a quite speculative notion (nobody has ever provided any  
evidence for it, except a niave extrapolation from our familiarity  
with the neighborhood).




We can't turn a wavelength into a color without color vision and  
real illumination,


No doubt.


but we can turn color into a wavelength simply by discarding all of  
the actual color experience and looking at general patterns within  
optics analytically (abstractly).


Sure. Goethe said this already, but was wrong in deducing from this  
that Newton theory of color was wrong. It was just not handling the  
qualia aspect.




The irreducibility and 1p locality are hints, but they are neither  
necessary nor sufficient to access any specific qualia.


This is what you should justify.



I really don't think that I am missing something here. I can easily  
see it the other way around, I just don't think that it is true of  
the universe that we live in. Yes, it makes sense why a machine  
would not be able to tell that its experience is the result of a  
machine, but it doesn't make sense that Santa Claus would make that  
experience into tongues that taste that are different from eyes that  
see. All that matters is information transfer, so that difference  
would not engender any qualia, just clever addressing.


The modal intensional variant of the self-reference is not related to  
addressing. Even G ([]p) is not, or quite indirectly with some  
imagination, but the subject (S4Grz, []p  p)) blows up any addressing  
and naming issues in this context. No machines, like us, can give a  
description of who they are.


Bruno



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Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-02 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 01 Oct 2013, at 19:09, meekerdb wrote:


On 10/1/2013 4:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Note also that the expression computation have qualia can be  
misleading. A computation has no qualia, strictly speaking. Only a  
person supported by an infinity of computation can be said to have  
qualia, or to live qualia.


Why an infinity of computation??


Because the FPI bears on arithmetic, which contains the running of all  
universal machine implementing your code, below your substitution level.


With comp you can attach a mind to some body, but you cannot attach  
one token body to a mind, you can attach only an infinities of such  
bodies, through the interference of all computations which realize  
them in arithmetic.






That would preclude my building an intelligent robot having qualia,  
since it's computations would always be finite.  And I doubt there  
is room in my head for infinite computations - certainly not digital  
ones.


You are right. We cannot build intelligent being with qualia. The  
computer, and the 3p-robot, does not create that consciousness, it  
will only help a consciousness, which is already in Platonia, to be  
able to manifest itself relatively to you, with the same statistic for  
your and the robot continuations.


It is confusing, but this is because we tend to associate mind to  
brain or robot, but mind is an attribute of person, and a brain or a  
body is only needed for a relative purpose.


Bruno




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Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-02 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 02 Oct 2013, at 06:56, Pierz wrote:




On Wednesday, October 2, 2013 12:46:17 AM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 01 Oct 2013, at 15:31, Pierz wrote:

 Maybe. It would be a lot more profound if we definitely *could*
 reproduce the brain's behaviour. The devil is in the detail as they
 say. But a challenge to Chalmer's position has occurred to me. It
 seems to me that Bruno has convincingly argued that *if* comp holds,
 then consciousness supervenes on the computation, not on the
 physical matter. But functionalism suggests that what counts is the
 output, not the manner in which it as arrived at. That is to say,
 the brain or whatever neural subunit or computer is doing the
 processing is a black box. You input something and then read the
 output, but the intervening steps don't matter. Consider what this
 might mean in terms of a brain.


That's not clear to me. The question is output of what. If it is the
entie subject, this is more behaviorism than functionalism.
Putnam's functionalism makes clear that we have to take the output of
the neurons into account.
Comp is functionalism, but with the idea that we don't know the level
of substitution, so it might be that we have to take into account the
oputput of the gluons in our atoms (so comp makes clear that it only
ask for the existence of a level of substitution, and then show that
no machine can know for sure its subst. level, making Putnam's sort of
functionalism a bit fuzzy).

I was going on stathis's post. He stated that reproducing the  
brain's functions meant reproducing the qualia, but I refuted that  
(I think).


I am not entirely sure.
There is a problem as the notion of reproducing brain's functions is  
ambiguous, and reproducing qualia is too.












 Let's say a vastly advanced alien species comes to earth. It looks
 at our puny little brains and decides to make one to fool us. This
 constructed person/brain receives normal conversational input and
 outputs conversation that it knows will perfectly mimic a human
 being. But in fact the computer doing this processing is vastly
 superior to the human brain. It's like a modern PC emulating a
 TRS-80, except much more so. When it computes/thinks up a response,
 it draws on a vast amount of knowledge, intelligence and creativity
 and accesses qualia undreamed of by a human. Yet its response will
 completely fool any normal human and will pass Turing tests till the
 cows come home. What this thought experiment shows is that, while
 half-qualia may be absurd, it most certainly is possible to
 reproduce the outputs of a brain without replicating its qualia. It
 might have completely different qualia, just as a very good actor's
 emotions can't be distinguished from the real thing, even though his
 or her internal experience is quite different. And if qualia can be
 quite different even though the functional outputs are the same,
 this does seem to leave functionalism in something of a quandary.
 All we can say is that there must be some kind of qualia occurring,
 rather a different result from what Chalmers is claiming. When we
 extend this type of scenario to artificial neurons or partial brain
 prostheses as in Chamer's paper, we quickly run up against
 perplexing problems. Imagine the advanced alien provides these
 prostheses. It takes the same inputs and generates the same correct
 outputs, but it processes those inputs within a much vaster, more
 complex system. Does the brain utilizing this advanced prosthesis
 experience a kind of expanded consciousness because of this, without
 that difference being detectable? Or do the qualia remain somehow
 confined to the prosthesis (whatever that means)? These crazy
 quandaries suggest to me that basically, we don't know shit.

Hmm, I am not convinced. Chalmers argument  is that to get a
philosophical zombie, the fading argument shows that you have to go
through half-qualia, which is absurd. His goal (here) is to show that
no qualia is absurd.

That the qualia can be different is known in the qualia literature,
and is a big open problem per se. But Chalmers argues only that no
qualia is absurd, indeed because it would needs some absurd notion of
intermediate half qualia.

My be I miss a point. Stathis can clarify this furher.

Yes, I understand that to be Chalmer's main point. Although, if the  
qualia can be different, it does present issues - how much and in  
what way can it vary? I'm curious what the literature has to say  
about that. And if functionalism means reproducing more than the  
mere functional output of a system, if it potentially means  
replication down to the elementary particles and possibly their  
quantum entanglements, then duplication becomes impossible, not  
merely technically but in principle. That seems against the whole  
point of functionalism - as the idea of function is reduced to  
something almost meaningless.


This shows only that computationalism admits a great variety of  
possible practice 

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-02 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 02 Oct 2013, at 11:04, Russell Standish wrote:


On Tue, Oct 01, 2013 at 10:09:03AM -0700, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/1/2013 4:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Note also that the expression computation have qualia can be
misleading. A computation has no qualia, strictly speaking. Only a
person supported by an infinity of computation can be said to have
qualia, or to live qualia.


Why an infinity of computation??  That would preclude my building an
intelligent robot having qualia, since it's computations would
always be finite.  And I doubt there is room in my head for infinite
computations - certainly not digital ones.



He is alluding to the universal dovetailer here, which contains an
infinite number of distinct computations that implement any given
conscious state.


OK.

Strictly speaking the UD is the program, which is finite. But its  
running (UD*) is infinite, and it runs all computations, those who  
stop and those who does not stop.






However, it is not clear that it is necessary for it to be infinite -
in a nonrebust world that doesn't contain a UD,


Cannot run integrally the UD, OK.



we still consider the
possbility of conscious computations in the MGA.


Yes, but without (the interesting leasure problem), and we lost the  
ability to expalin where matter come from, indeed that move  
reintroduce the primary matter, which then appear as a matter of the  
gap. I think.


Best,

Bruno





Cheers
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Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
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Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-02 Thread Craig Weinberg


On Wednesday, October 2, 2013 12:26:45 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 02 Oct 2013, at 06:56, Pierz wrote:



 On Wednesday, October 2, 2013 12:46:17 AM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal wrote:

 Then the reasoning shows (at a meta-level, made possible with the 
 assumption used) how consciousness and beliefs (more or less deluded) in 
 physical realities develop in arithmetic.


Are 'beliefs in' physical realities the same as experiencing the realism of 
public physics though? For instance, I believe that if I should avoid 
driving recklessly in the same way as I would in a driving game as I would 
in my actual car. Because my belief that the consequences of a real life 
collision are more severe than a game collision, I would drive more 
conservatively in real life. That's all ok, but a belief about consequences 
would not generate realistic qualia. If someone held a gun to my head while 
I play the racing game, the game would not become any more realistic. I 
always feel like there is an equivalence between belief and qualia which is 
being implied here that is not the case. It's along the lines of assuming 
that a hypnotic state can fully replace reality. If that were the case, of 
course, everybody would be lining up to get hypnotized.There is some 
permeability there, but I think it's simplistic to imply that the aggregate 
of all qualia arises purely from the arbitrary tokenization of beliefs.
 


 But that's the mathematical (arithmetical) part. In UDA it is just shown 
 that if comp is true (an hypothesis on consciousness) then physics is a 
 branch of arithmetic. More precisely a branch of the ideally 
 self-referentially correct machine's theology. (always in the Greek sense).

 There is no pretense that comp is true, but if it is true, the correct 
 QM cannot postulate the wave, it has to derive the wave from the numbers. 
 That's what UDA shows: a problem. AUDA (the machine's interview) provides 
 the only path (by Gödel, Löb, Solovay) capable of relating the truth and 
 all machine's points of view. 

 There will be many ways to extract physics from the numbers, but 
 interviewing the self-introspecting universal machine is the only way to 
 get not just the laws of physics, but also why it can hurt, and why a part 
 of that seems to be necessarily not functional.


I don't think that an interview with anyone can explain why they can hurt, 
unless you have already naturalized an expectation of pain. In other words, 
if we don't presume that universal machine experiences anything, there is 
no need to invent qualia or experience to justify any mathematical 
relation. If mathematically all that you need is non-functional, secret 
kinds of variable labels to represent machine states, I don't see why we 
should assume they are qualitative. If anything, the unity of arithmetic 
truth would demand a single sensory channel that constitutes all possible 
I/O.

Craig


 Bruno



  


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Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-02 Thread meekerdb

On 10/2/2013 2:04 AM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Tue, Oct 01, 2013 at 10:09:03AM -0700, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/1/2013 4:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Note also that the expression computation have qualia can be
misleading. A computation has no qualia, strictly speaking. Only a
person supported by an infinity of computation can be said to have
qualia, or to live qualia.

Why an infinity of computation??  That would preclude my building an
intelligent robot having qualia, since it's computations would
always be finite.  And I doubt there is room in my head for infinite
computations - certainly not digital ones.


He is alluding to the universal dovetailer here, which contains an
infinite number of distinct computations that implement any given
conscious state.

However, it is not clear that it is necessary for it to be infinite -
in a nonrebust world that doesn't contain a UD, we still consider the
possbility of conscious computations in the MGA.


Yes, I know what he is alluding to.  But if it really does take all those infinite threads 
of computation to realize conscious states, then I think that is the same as saying it 
takes the underlying physics of a brain (or computer) to realize consciousness.  But then 
Bruno's program of explaining things from computation hasn't avoided relying on the 
physical. ??


Brent

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Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-02 Thread meekerdb

On 10/1/2013 11:49 PM, Pierz wrote:



On Wednesday, October 2, 2013 3:15:01 PM UTC+10, Brent wrote:

On 10/1/2013 9:56 PM, Pierz wrote:
 Yes, I understand that to be Chalmer's main point. Although, if the 
qualia can be
 different, it does present issues - how much and in what way can it vary?

Yes, that's a question that interests me because I want to be able to build 
intelligent
machines and so I need to know what qualia they will have, if any.  I think 
it will
depend
on their sensors and on their values/goals.  If I build a very intelligent 
Mars Rover,
capable of learning and reasoning, with a goal of discovering whether there 
was once
life
on Mars; then I expect it will experience pleasure in finding evidence 
regarding this.
But no matter how smart I make it, it won't experience lust.

Reasoning being what exactly? The ability to circumnavigate an obstacle for instance? 
There are no rewards in an algorithm. There are just paths which do or don't get 
followed depending on inputs. Sure, the argument that there must be qualia in a 
sufficiently sophisticated computer seems compelling. But the argument that there can't 
be seems equally so. As a programmer I have zero expectation that the computer I am 
programming will feel pleasure or suffering. It's just as happy to throw an exception as 
it is to complete its assigned task. *I* am the one who experiences pain when it hits an 
error! I just can't conceive of the magical point at which the computer goes from total 
indifference to giving a damn. That's the point Craig keeps pushing and which I agree 
with. Something is missing from our understanding.


What's missing is you're considering a computer, not a robot.  As robot has to have values 
and goals in order to act and react in the world.  It has complex systems and subsystems 
that may have conflicting subgoals, and in order to learn from experience it keeps a 
narrative history about what it considers significant events.  At that level it may have 
the consciousness of a mouse.  If it's a social robot, one that needs to cooperate and 
compete in a society of other persons, then it will need a self-image and model of other 
people.  In that case it's quite reasonable to suppose it also has qualia.




 I'm curious what the literature has to say about that. And if 
functionalism means
 reproducing more than the mere functional output of a system, if it 
potentially means
 replication down to the elementary particles and possibly their quantum
entanglements,
 then duplication becomes impossible, not merely technically but in 
principle. That
seems
 against the whole point of functionalism - as the idea of function is 
reduced to
 something almost meaningless.

I think functionalism must be confined to the classical functions, 
discounting the
quantum
level effects.  But it must include some behavior that is almost entirely 
internal -
e.g.
planning, imagining.  Excluding quantum entanglements isn't arbitrary; 
there cannot
have
been any evolution of goals and values based on quantum entanglement 
(beyond the
statistical effects that produce decoherence and quasi-classical behavior).

But what do planning and imagining mean except their functional outputs? It 
shouldn't matter to you how the planning occurs - it's an implementation detail in 
development speak.


You can ask a person about plans and imaginings, and speech in response is an 
action.

Your argument may be valid regarding quantum entanglement, but it is still an argument 
based on what seems to make sense rather than on genuine understanding of the 
relationship between functions and their putative qualia.


But I suspect that there is no understanding that would satisfy Craig as genuine.  Do we 
have a genuine understanding of electrodynamics?  of computation?  What we have is the 
ability to manipulate them for our purposes.  So when we can make an intelligent robot 
that interacts with people AS IF it experiences qualia and we can manipulate and 
anticipate that behavior, then we'll have just as genuine an understanding of qualia as we 
do of electrodynamics.


Brent

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Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-02 Thread meekerdb

On 10/2/2013 6:35 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 01 Oct 2013, at 19:09, meekerdb wrote:


On 10/1/2013 4:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Note also that the expression computation have qualia can be misleading. A 
computation has no qualia, strictly speaking. Only a person supported by an infinity 
of computation can be said to have qualia, or to live qualia.


Why an infinity of computation??


Because the FPI bears on arithmetic, which contains the running of all universal machine 
implementing your code, below your substitution level.


With comp you can attach a mind to some body, but you cannot attach one token body to a 
mind, you can attach only an infinities of such bodies, through the interference of all 
computations which realize them in arithmetic.






That would preclude my building an intelligent robot having qualia, since it's 
computations would always be finite.  And I doubt there is room in my head for infinite 
computations - certainly not digital ones.


You are right. We cannot build intelligent being with qualia. The computer, and the 
3p-robot, does not create that consciousness, it will only help a consciousness, which 
is already in Platonia, to be able to manifest itself relatively to you, with the same 
statistic for your and the robot continuations.


When a consciousness is not manifested, what is it's content?

Brent



It is confusing, but this is because we tend to associate mind to brain or robot, but 
mind is an attribute of person, and a brain or a body is only needed for a relative 
purpose.


Bruno




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/



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Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-02 Thread meekerdb

On 10/2/2013 9:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I agree with Brent though on this. Your UDA proceeds on the basis that a computer in a 
single reality (not an infinite sum of calculations - that comes later) can have a 1p.


Yes. It has 1p, it is not a zombie. But that 1p, for him, is really defined by a cloud 
of similar and variant corresponding to its indeterminacy domain in the universal 
dovetailing (= already in a tiny part of arithmetic).


And doesn't this cloud correspond to the fuzzy, quantum description of the underlying 
physics, i.e. the quantum state of the brain.  And isn't it, per Tegmark, quasi-classical.


Brent

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Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-02 Thread John Mikes
Brent:
***But no matter how smart I make it, it won't experience lust.*
*
*
1. lust is not the universal criterion that makes us human, it is only
one of our humanly circumscribed paraphernalia we apply in HUMAN thinking
and HUMAN complexity with HUMAN language. Can you apply a similar criterion
for the robot in 'it's' characteristics?

2. A N D if *YOU * cannot make it 'smarter', is that a general statement?

John M


On Wed, Oct 2, 2013 at 1:15 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

 On 10/1/2013 9:56 PM, Pierz wrote:

 Yes, I understand that to be Chalmer's main point. Although, if the
 qualia can be different, it does present issues - how much and in what way
 can it vary?


 Yes, that's a question that interests me because I want to be able to
 build intelligent machines and so I need to know what qualia they will
 have, if any.  I think it will depend on their sensors and on their
 values/goals.  If I build a very intelligent Mars Rover, capable of
 learning and reasoning, with a goal of discovering whether there was once
 life on Mars; then I expect it will experience pleasure in finding evidence
 regarding this.  But no matter how smart I make it, it won't experience
 lust.



  I'm curious what the literature has to say about that. And if
 functionalism means reproducing more than the mere functional output of a
 system, if it potentially means replication down to the elementary
 particles and possibly their quantum entanglements, then duplication
 becomes impossible, not merely technically but in principle. That seems
 against the whole point of functionalism - as the idea of function is
 reduced to something almost meaningless.


 I think functionalism must be confined to the classical functions,
 discounting the quantum level effects.  But it must include some behavior
 that is almost entirely internal - e.g. planning, imagining.  Excluding
 quantum entanglements isn't arbitrary; there cannot have been any evolution
 of goals and values based on quantum entanglement (beyond the statistical
 effects that produce decoherence and quasi-classical behavior).

 Brent


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Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-02 Thread meekerdb

On 10/2/2013 2:06 PM, John Mikes wrote:


Brent:
*//*/But no matter how smart I make it, it won't experience lust./
/
/
1. lust is not the universal criterion that makes us human, it is only one of our 
humanly circumscribed paraphernalia we apply in HUMAN thinking and HUMAN complexity with 
HUMAN language.


I don't think so.  I think it's a qualia experienced by sexually reproducing species.  My 
dog seems to experience it when in the presence of a receptive female.


But of course I picked lust, just because it's not something a robot, that doesn't 
reproduce sexually, and might not reproduce at all, would need to have.



Can you apply a similar criterion for the robot in 'it's' characteristics?


I think that the robot could feel some qualia analogous to humans, e.g. frustration, fear, 
too cold, too hot, tired,...




2. A N D if _YOU _ cannot make it 'smarter', is that a general statement?


?? I didn't state that I cannot make it smarter.

Brent



John M


On Wed, Oct 2, 2013 at 1:15 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net 
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:


On 10/1/2013 9:56 PM, Pierz wrote:

Yes, I understand that to be Chalmer's main point. Although, if the 
qualia can
be different, it does present issues - how much and in what way can it 
vary?


Yes, that's a question that interests me because I want to be able to build
intelligent machines and so I need to know what qualia they will have, if 
any.  I
think it will depend on their sensors and on their values/goals.  If I 
build a very
intelligent Mars Rover, capable of learning and reasoning, with a goal of
discovering whether there was once life on Mars; then I expect it will 
experience
pleasure in finding evidence regarding this.  But no matter how smart I 
make it, it
won't experience lust.



I'm curious what the literature has to say about that. And if 
functionalism
means reproducing more than the mere functional output of a system, if 
it
potentially means replication down to the elementary particles and 
possibly
their quantum entanglements, then duplication becomes impossible, not 
merely
technically but in principle. That seems against the whole point of
functionalism - as the idea of function is reduced to something almost
meaningless.


I think functionalism must be confined to the classical functions, 
discounting the
quantum level effects.  But it must include some behavior that is almost 
entirely
internal - e.g. planning, imagining.  Excluding quantum entanglements isn't
arbitrary; there cannot have been any evolution of goals and values based 
on quantum
entanglement (beyond the statistical effects that produce decoherence and
quasi-classical behavior).

Brent



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Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-02 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On 1 October 2013 23:31, Pierz pier...@gmail.com wrote:
 Maybe. It would be a lot more profound if we definitely *could* reproduce the 
 brain's behaviour. The devil is in the detail as they say. But a challenge to 
 Chalmer's position has occurred to me. It seems to me that Bruno has 
 convincingly argued that *if* comp holds, then consciousness supervenes on 
 the computation, not on the physical matter.

When I say comp holds I mean in the first instance that my physical
brain could be replaced with an appropriate computer and I would still
be me. But this assumption leads to the conclusion that the computer
is not actually needed, just the computation as platonic object. So if
it's true that my brain could be replaced with a physical computer
then my brain and the computer were not physical in a fundamental
sense in the first place! While this is circular-sounding I don't
think that it's actually contradictory. It is not a necessary premise
of Chalmer's argument (or indeed, for most scientific arguments) that
there be a fundamental physical reality.

As for reproducing the brain's behaviour, it comes down to whether
brain physics is computable. It probably *is* computable, since we
have not found evidence of non-computable physics of which I am aware.
If it is not, then computationalism is false. But even if
computationalism is false, Chalmer's argument still shows that
*functionalism* is true. Computationalism is a subset of
functionalism.

 But functionalism suggests that what counts is the output, not the manner in 
 which it as arrived at. That is to say, the brain or whatever neural subunit 
 or computer is doing the processing is a black box. You input something and 
 then read the output, but the intervening steps don't matter. Consider what 
 this might mean in terms of a brain. Let's say a vastly advanced alien 
 species comes to earth. It looks at our puny little brains and decides to 
 make one to fool us. This constructed person/brain receives normal 
 conversational input and outputs conversation that it knows will perfectly 
 mimic a human being. But in fact the computer doing this processing is vastly 
 superior to the human brain. It's like a modern PC emulating a TRS-80, except 
 much more so. When it computes/thinks up a response, it draws on a vast 
 amount of knowledge, intelligence and creativity and accesses qualia 
 undreamed of by a human. Yet its response will completely fool any normal 
 human and will pass Turing tests till the cows come home. What this thought 
 experiment shows is that, while half-qualia may be absurd, it most certainly 
 is possible to reproduce the outputs of a brain without replicating its 
 qualia. It might have completely different qualia, just as a very good 
 actor's emotions can't be distinguished from the real thing, even though his 
 or her internal experience is quite different. And if qualia can be quite 
 different even though the functional outputs are the same, this does seem to 
 leave functionalism in something of a quandary. All we can say is that there 
 must be some kind of qualia occurring, rather a different result from what 
 Chalmers is claiming. When we extend this type of scenario to artificial 
 neurons or partial brain prostheses as in Chamer's paper, we quickly run up 
 against perplexing problems. Imagine the advanced alien provides these 
 prostheses. It takes the same inputs and generates the same correct outputs, 
 but it processes those inputs within a much vaster, more complex system. Does 
 the brain utilizing this advanced prosthesis experience a kind of expanded 
 consciousness because of this, without that difference being detectable? Or 
 do the qualia remain somehow confined to the prosthesis (whatever that 
 means)? These crazy quandaries suggest to me that basically, we don't know 
 shit.

Essentially, I think that if the alien computer reproduces human
behaviour then it will also reproduce human qualia. Start with a
prosthesis that replaces 1% of the brain. If it has different qualia
despite copying the original neurons' I/O behaviour then very quickly
the system will deteriorate: the brain's owner will notice that the
qualia are different and behave differently, which is impossible if
the original assumption about copying the original neurons' I/O
behaviour is true. The same is the case if the prosthesis replaces 99%
of the neurons - the 1% remaining neurons would notice that the qualia
were different and deviate from normal behaviour, and the same would
be the case if only one of the original neurons were present. If you
assume it is possible that the prosthesis reproduces the I/O behaviour
but not the qualia you get a contradiction, and a contradiction is
worse than a crazy quandary.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-02 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On 2 October 2013 00:46, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 On 01 Oct 2013, at 15:31, Pierz wrote:

 Maybe. It would be a lot more profound if we definitely *could* reproduce
 the brain's behaviour. The devil is in the detail as they say. But a
 challenge to Chalmer's position has occurred to me. It seems to me that
 Bruno has convincingly argued that *if* comp holds, then consciousness
 supervenes on the computation, not on the physical matter. But functionalism
 suggests that what counts is the output, not the manner in which it as
 arrived at. That is to say, the brain or whatever neural subunit or computer
 is doing the processing is a black box. You input something and then read
 the output, but the intervening steps don't matter. Consider what this might
 mean in terms of a brain.



 That's not clear to me. The question is output of what. If it is the entie
 subject, this is more behaviorism than functionalism.
 Putnam's functionalism makes clear that we have to take the output of the
 neurons into account.
 Comp is functionalism, but with the idea that we don't know the level of
 substitution, so it might be that we have to take into account the oputput
 of the gluons in our atoms (so comp makes clear that it only ask for the
 existence of a level of substitution, and then show that no machine can know
 for sure its subst. level, making Putnam's sort of functionalism a bit
 fuzzy).





 Let's say a vastly advanced alien species comes to earth. It looks at our
 puny little brains and decides to make one to fool us. This constructed
 person/brain receives normal conversational input and outputs conversation
 that it knows will perfectly mimic a human being. But in fact the computer
 doing this processing is vastly superior to the human brain. It's like a
 modern PC emulating a TRS-80, except much more so. When it computes/thinks
 up a response, it draws on a vast amount of knowledge, intelligence and
 creativity and accesses qualia undreamed of by a human. Yet its response
 will completely fool any normal human and will pass Turing tests till the
 cows come home. What this thought experiment shows is that, while
 half-qualia may be absurd, it most certainly is possible to reproduce the
 outputs of a brain without replicating its qualia. It might have completely
 different qualia, just as a very good actor's emotions can't be
 distinguished from the real thing, even though his or her internal
 experience is quite different. And if qualia can be quite different even
 though the functional outputs are the same, this does seem to leave
 functionalism in something of a quandary. All we can say is that there must
 be some kind of qualia occurring, rather a different result from what
 Chalmers is claiming. When we extend this type of scenario to artificial
 neurons or partial brain prostheses as in Chamer's paper, we quickly run up
 against perplexing problems. Imagine the advanced alien provides these
 prostheses. It takes the same inputs and generates the same correct outputs,
 but it processes those inputs within a much vaster, more complex system.
 Does the brain utilizing this advanced prosthesis experience a kind of
 expanded consciousness because of this, without that difference being
 detectable? Or do the qualia remain somehow confined to the prosthesis
 (whatever that means)? These crazy quandaries suggest to me that basically,
 we don't know shit.


 Hmm, I am not convinced. Chalmers argument  is that to get a philosophical
 zombie, the fading argument shows that you have to go through half-qualia,
 which is absurd. His goal (here) is to show that no qualia is absurd.

 That the qualia can be different is known in the qualia literature, and is a
 big open problem per se. But Chalmers argues only that no qualia is
 absurd, indeed because it would needs some absurd notion of intermediate
 half qualia.

 My be I miss a point. Stathis can clarify this furher.

The argument is simply summarised thus: it is impossible even for God
to make a brain prosthesis that reproduces the I/O behaviour but has
different qualia. This is a proof of comp, provided that brain physics
is computable, or functionalism if brain physics is not computable.
Non-comp functionalism may entail, for example, that the replacement
brain contain a hypercomputer.

 Eventually the qualia is determined by infinitely many number relations, and
 a brain filters them. It does not create them, like no machine can create
 PI, only re-compute it, somehow. The anlogy here break sown as qualia are
 purely first person notion, which explains why they are distributed on the
 whole universal dovetailing (sigma_1 arithmetic).


 Bruno




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Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-02 Thread meekerdb

On 10/2/2013 5:15 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 1 October 2013 23:31, Pierz pier...@gmail.com wrote:

Maybe. It would be a lot more profound if we definitely *could* reproduce the 
brain's behaviour. The devil is in the detail as they say. But a challenge to 
Chalmer's position has occurred to me. It seems to me that Bruno has 
convincingly argued that *if* comp holds, then consciousness supervenes on the 
computation, not on the physical matter.

When I say comp holds I mean in the first instance that my physical
brain could be replaced with an appropriate computer and I would still
be me. But this assumption leads to the conclusion that the computer
is not actually needed, just the computation as platonic object.


But what if you were just slightly different or different only in some rare circumstances 
(like being in an MRI), which seems very likely?



So if
it's true that my brain could be replaced with a physical computer
then my brain and the computer were not physical in a fundamental
sense in the first place!


But this depends on the MGA or Olympia argument, which find suspect.


While this is circular-sounding I don't
think that it's actually contradictory. It is not a necessary premise
of Chalmer's argument (or indeed, for most scientific arguments) that
there be a fundamental physical reality.

As for reproducing the brain's behaviour, it comes down to whether
brain physics is computable. It probably *is* computable, since we
have not found evidence of non-computable physics of which I am aware.


Suppose it was not Turing computable, but was computable in some other sense (e.g. 
hypercomputable).  Aren't you just setting up a tautology in which whatever the brain 
does, whatever the universe does, we'll call it X-computable.  Already we have one good 
model of the universe, Copenhagen QM, that says it's not Turing computable.



If it is not, then computationalism is false. But even if
computationalism is false, Chalmer's argument still shows that
*functionalism* is true. Computationalism is a subset of
functionalism.


But functionalism suggests that what counts is the output, not the manner in 
which it as arrived at. That is to say, the brain or whatever neural subunit or 
computer is doing the processing is a black box. You input something and then 
read the output, but the intervening steps don't matter. Consider what this 
might mean in terms of a brain. Let's say a vastly advanced alien species comes 
to earth. It looks at our puny little brains and decides to make one to fool 
us. This constructed person/brain receives normal conversational input and 
outputs conversation that it knows will perfectly mimic a human being. But in 
fact the computer doing this processing is vastly superior to the human brain. 
It's like a modern PC emulating a TRS-80, except much more so. When it 
computes/thinks up a response, it draws on a vast amount of knowledge, 
intelligence and creativity and accesses qualia undreamed of by a human. Yet 
its response will completely fool any normal human and will pass Turing tests 
till the cows come home. What this thought experiment shows is that, while 
half-qualia may be absurd, it most certainly is possible to reproduce the 
outputs of a brain without replicating its qualia. It might have completely 
different qualia, just as a very good actor's emotions can't be distinguished 
from the real thing, even though his or her internal experience is quite 
different. And if qualia can be quite different even though the functional 
outputs are the same, this does seem to leave functionalism in something of a 
quandary. All we can say is that there must be some kind of qualia occurring, 
rather a different result from what Chalmers is claiming. When we extend this 
type of scenario to artificial neurons or partial brain prostheses as in 
Chamer's paper, we quickly run up against perplexing problems. Imagine the 
advanced alien provides these prostheses. It takes the same inputs and 
generates the same correct outputs, but it processes those inputs within a much 
vaster, more complex system. Does the brain utilizing this advanced prosthesis 
experience a kind of expanded consciousness because of this, without that 
difference being detectable? Or do the qualia remain somehow confined to the 
prosthesis (whatever that means)? These crazy quandaries suggest to me that 
basically, we don't know shit.

Essentially, I think that if the alien computer reproduces human
behaviour then it will also reproduce human qualia. Start with a
prosthesis that replaces 1% of the brain. If it has different qualia
despite copying the original neurons' I/O behaviour then very quickly
the system will deteriorate: the brain's owner will notice that the
qualia are different and behave differently


I don't see how you can be sure of that.  How will he compare his qualia of red now with 
his qualia of red before?  And why would small differences imply the system will quickly 

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-02 Thread Craig Weinberg


On Wednesday, October 2, 2013 2:59:17 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:

  On 10/1/2013 11:49 PM, Pierz wrote:
  


 On Wednesday, October 2, 2013 3:15:01 PM UTC+10, Brent wrote: 

 On 10/1/2013 9:56 PM, Pierz wrote: 
  Yes, I understand that to be Chalmer's main point. Although, if the 
 qualia can be 
  different, it does present issues - how much and in what way can it 
 vary? 

 Yes, that's a question that interests me because I want to be able to 
 build intelligent 
 machines and so I need to know what qualia they will have, if any.  I 
 think it will depend 
 on their sensors and on their values/goals.  If I build a very 
 intelligent Mars Rover, 
 capable of learning and reasoning, with a goal of discovering whether 
 there was once life 
 on Mars; then I expect it will experience pleasure in finding evidence 
 regarding this.   
 But no matter how smart I make it, it won't experience lust. 

  Reasoning being what exactly? The ability to circumnavigate an 
 obstacle for instance? There are no rewards in an algorithm. There are 
 just paths which do or don't get followed depending on inputs. Sure, the 
 argument that there must be qualia in a sufficiently sophisticated computer 
 seems compelling. But the argument that there can't be seems equally so. As 
 a programmer I have zero expectation that the computer I am programming 
 will feel pleasure or suffering. It's just as happy to throw an exception 
 as it is to complete its assigned task. *I* am the one who experiences pain 
 when it hits an error! I just can't conceive of the magical point at which 
 the computer goes from total indifference to giving a damn. That's the 
 point Craig keeps pushing and which I agree with. Something is missing from 
 our understanding.
  

 What's missing is you're considering a computer, not a robot.  As robot 
 has to have values and goals in order to act and react in the world.  


Not necessarily. I think that a robot could be programmed to simulate goals 
or to avoid goals entirely, both with equal chance of success. A robot 
could be programmed to imitate the behaviors of others in their 
environment. Even in the case where a robot would naturally accumulate 
goal-like circuits, there is no reason to presume that there is any binding 
of those circuits into an overall goal. What we think of as a robot could 
just as easily be thousands of unrelated sub-units, just as a person with 
multiple personalities could navigate a single life if each personality 
handed off information to the next personality.
 

 It has complex systems and subsystems that may have conflicting subgoals, 
 and in order to learn from experience it keeps a narrative history about 
 what it considers significant events. 


We don't know that there is any such thing as 'it' though. To me it's seems 
more likely to me that assuming such a unified and intentional presence is 
1) succumbing to the pathetic fallacy, and 2) begging the question. It is 
to say We know that robots must be alive because otherwise they would not 
be as happy as we know they are.
 

 At that level it may have the consciousness of a mouse.  If it's a social 
 robot, one that needs to cooperate and compete in a society of other 
 persons, then it will need a self-image and model of other people.  In that 
 case it's quite reasonable to suppose it also has qualia.


It's no more reasonable than supposing that a baseball diamond is rooting 
for the home team. Machines need not have any kind of model or self-image 
which is experienced in any way. It doesn't necessarily appear like 'Field 
of Dreams'. What is needed is simply a complex tree of unconscious logical 
relations. There is no image or model, only records which are compressed to 
the point of arithmetic generalization - this is the opposite of any kind 
of aesthetic presence (qualia). If that were not the case, we wouldn't need 
sense organs, we would simply collect data in its native form, compress it 
quantitatively, and execute reactions against it with Bayesian regressions. 
No qualia required.
 


   
  I'm curious what the literature has to say about that. And if 
 functionalism means 
  reproducing more than the mere functional output of a system, if it 
 potentially means 
  replication down to the elementary particles and possibly their quantum 
 entanglements, 
  then duplication becomes impossible, not merely technically but in 
 principle. That seems 
  against the whole point of functionalism - as the idea of function is 
 reduced to 
  something almost meaningless. 

 I think functionalism must be confined to the classical functions, 
 discounting the quantum 
 level effects.  But it must include some behavior that is almost entirely 
 internal - e.g. 
 planning, imagining.  Excluding quantum entanglements isn't arbitrary; 
 there cannot have 
 been any evolution of goals and values based on quantum entanglement 
 (beyond the 
 statistical effects that produce decoherence and quasi-classical 
 

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-02 Thread Craig Weinberg


On Wednesday, October 2, 2013 8:23:36 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:

 On 2 October 2013 00:46, Bruno Marchal mar...@ulb.ac.be javascript: 
 wrote: 
  
  On 01 Oct 2013, at 15:31, Pierz wrote: 
  
  Maybe. It would be a lot more profound if we definitely *could* 
 reproduce 
  the brain's behaviour. The devil is in the detail as they say. But a 
  challenge to Chalmer's position has occurred to me. It seems to me that 
  Bruno has convincingly argued that *if* comp holds, then consciousness 
  supervenes on the computation, not on the physical matter. But 
 functionalism 
  suggests that what counts is the output, not the manner in which it as 
  arrived at. That is to say, the brain or whatever neural subunit or 
 computer 
  is doing the processing is a black box. You input something and then 
 read 
  the output, but the intervening steps don't matter. Consider what this 
 might 
  mean in terms of a brain. 
  
  
  
  That's not clear to me. The question is output of what. If it is the 
 entie 
  subject, this is more behaviorism than functionalism. 
  Putnam's functionalism makes clear that we have to take the output of 
 the 
  neurons into account. 
  Comp is functionalism, but with the idea that we don't know the level of 
  substitution, so it might be that we have to take into account the 
 oputput 
  of the gluons in our atoms (so comp makes clear that it only ask for the 
  existence of a level of substitution, and then show that no machine can 
 know 
  for sure its subst. level, making Putnam's sort of functionalism a bit 
  fuzzy). 
  
  
  
  
  
  Let's say a vastly advanced alien species comes to earth. It looks at 
 our 
  puny little brains and decides to make one to fool us. This constructed 
  person/brain receives normal conversational input and outputs 
 conversation 
  that it knows will perfectly mimic a human being. But in fact the 
 computer 
  doing this processing is vastly superior to the human brain. It's like 
 a 
  modern PC emulating a TRS-80, except much more so. When it 
 computes/thinks 
  up a response, it draws on a vast amount of knowledge, intelligence and 
  creativity and accesses qualia undreamed of by a human. Yet its 
 response 
  will completely fool any normal human and will pass Turing tests till 
 the 
  cows come home. What this thought experiment shows is that, while 
  half-qualia may be absurd, it most certainly is possible to reproduce 
 the 
  outputs of a brain without replicating its qualia. It might have 
 completely 
  different qualia, just as a very good actor's emotions can't be 
  distinguished from the real thing, even though his or her internal 
  experience is quite different. And if qualia can be quite different 
 even 
  though the functional outputs are the same, this does seem to leave 
  functionalism in something of a quandary. All we can say is that there 
 must 
  be some kind of qualia occurring, rather a different result from what 
  Chalmers is claiming. When we extend this type of scenario to 
 artificial 
  neurons or partial brain prostheses as in Chamer's paper, we quickly 
 run up 
  against perplexing problems. Imagine the advanced alien provides these 
  prostheses. It takes the same inputs and generates the same correct 
 outputs, 
  but it processes those inputs within a much vaster, more complex 
 system. 
  Does the brain utilizing this advanced prosthesis experience a kind of 
  expanded consciousness because of this, without that difference being 
  detectable? Or do the qualia remain somehow confined to the prosthesis 
  (whatever that means)? These crazy quandaries suggest to me that 
 basically, 
  we don't know shit. 
  
  
  Hmm, I am not convinced. Chalmers argument  is that to get a 
 philosophical 
  zombie, the fading argument shows that you have to go through 
 half-qualia, 
  which is absurd. His goal (here) is to show that no qualia is absurd. 
  
  That the qualia can be different is known in the qualia literature, and 
 is a 
  big open problem per se. But Chalmers argues only that no qualia is 
  absurd, indeed because it would needs some absurd notion of intermediate 
  half qualia. 
  
  My be I miss a point. Stathis can clarify this furher. 

 The argument is simply summarised thus: it is impossible even for God 
 to make a brain prosthesis that reproduces the I/O behaviour but has 
 different qualia. This is a proof of comp, provided that brain physics 
 is computable, or functionalism if brain physics is not computable. 
 Non-comp functionalism may entail, for example, that the replacement 
 brain contain a hypercomputer. 



It's like saying that if the same rent is paid for every apartment in the 
same building, then the same person must be living there, and that proves 
that rent payments are people.

Craig


  Eventually the qualia is determined by infinitely many number relations, 
 and 
  a brain filters them. It does not create them, like no machine can 
 create 
  PI, only re-compute it, 

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-01 Thread Telmo Menezes
On Mon, Sep 30, 2013 at 3:44 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:


 On Monday, September 30, 2013 6:12:45 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote:

 On Fri, Sep 27, 2013 at 7:49 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com
 wrote:
 
 
  On Friday, September 27, 2013 8:00:11 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote:
 
  On Thu, Sep 26, 2013 at 9:28 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com
  wrote:
  
  
   On Thursday, September 26, 2013 11:49:29 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes
   wrote:
  
   On Thu, Sep 26, 2013 at 2:38 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com
   wrote:
   
   
On Thursday, September 26, 2013 6:17:04 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes
wrote:
   
Hi Craig (and all),
   
Now that I have a better understanding of your ideas, I would
like
to
confront you with a thought experiment. Some of the stuff you say
looks completely esoteric to me, so I imagine there are three
possibilities: either you are significantly more intelligent than
me
or you're a bit crazy, or both. I'm not joking, I don't know.
   
But I would like to focus on sensory participation as the
fundamental
stuff of reality and your claim that strong AI is impossible
because
the machines we build are just Frankensteins, in a sense. If I
understand correctly, you still believe these machines have
sensory
participation just because they exist, but not in the sense that
they
could emulate our human experiences. They have the sensory
participation level of the stuff they're made of and nothing
else.
Right?
   
   
Not exactly. My view is that there is only sensory participation
on
the
level of what has naturally evolved.
  
   This sounds a bit like vitalism. What's so special about natural
   evolution that can't be captured otherwise?
  
  
   It's not about life or nature being special, it's about recognizing
   that
   nature is an expression of experience, and that experience can't be
   substituted.
 
  Ok. How did you arrive at this belief? How can you believe this
  without proposing some mechanism by which it happens? Or do you
  propose such a thing?
 
 
  Mechanisms are functions of time, but experience would be more primitive
  than time in this view. To have a mechanism, there must already be some
  experience of events, memory, expectation, etc.

 But we know that universal machines can be built with very little:
 simple cellular automata, arithmetics, balls colliding and so on. You
 can then argue that some substrate is necessary for this computation,


 I don't think that I have to argue it, it's a fact that we cannot construct
 universal machines out of uncontrollable materials. We can't use uncontained
 gases or live hamsters to do our computations for us. When we build
 machines, particular electronic computers, materials are refined to a
 pristine degree. Impurities must be removed so that only the most reliable
 and consistent qualities of matter are selected for.

Yes but if we are entities living as part of a computation that is not
surprising. We have to carve a medium somehow to perform our own
computations. It doesn't really tell you anything about the meta-level
computation that might be taking place.

 but it is quite clear that what is necessary to have the possibility
 of a full blown human zombie is theoretically very little. This does
 not refute your main thesis, of course, but I think it does refute
 that experience of events, memory and expectations are necessary for
 mechanism.


 The necessity of experience is easy to refute in theory, but if we do that,
 we must at the same time justify the existence of experience on some
 arbitrary level of description of matter, which I don't think can be done
 convincingly.

But you can doubt matter. What then?

 We know that we can 'play possum' more easily than a dead
 possum can become a zombie. This is not to suggest that inanimate objects
 are pretending to be inanimate, but that it is the constraints of whatever
 kinds of sensation we have access to which hide the scales on which
 animation is taking place (too slow, too fast, too large, too small, too
 unfamiliar = invisible or inanimate).



 Think of the mechanism by
  which you change your attention or open your eyes. Sure, there are
  mechanisms that we can point to in the body, but what mechanism do *you*
  use
  to control yourself?

 Ok, I know what you mean. Yes, I find this mysterious.


 So if we scale down that mystery to every level of the universe (which we
 would sort of have to since our self control involves billions of cells made
 of nothing but molecules), then we have a model for what energy 'really' is
 - primitive sensory-motive interaction.

I don't see how that follows.


  I submit that there is no button to push or crank to
  turn. If there were, then you would already be controlling yourself to
  use
  them. No, at some point something has to directly control something by
  feeling and doing.

 What if the 

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-01 Thread Telmo Menezes
Hi Liz,

On Tue, Oct 1, 2013 at 12:30 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
 On 1 October 2013 08:44, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

 On 9/30/2013 5:05 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:

 Even under functionalist assumptions, I still find the Turing test to
 be misguided because it require the machine to lie, while a human can
 pass it by telling the truth.


 Actually Turing already thought of this.  If you read his paper you find
 that the test is not as usually proposed.  Turing's test was whether an
 person communicating with a computer pretending to be a woman and a man
 pretending to be a woman, would be fooled as to which was which.


 I thought Turing mentioned The Imitation Game in which someone tried to
 tell the other person's gender without any clues (like being able to hear
 their voice, or discussing matters that only a man or woman might be
 expected to know given the social norms at the time), and then extended that
 to involve a computer as one of the participants?

 That is, the TT as normally described involves someone trying to tell if
 they're talking to a computer or a human being. Are you saying that isn't
 how it was meant to be carried out?

 I might also say that the above description of the TT (a computer has to
 lie...) is also innaccurate, imho. The test is intended to indicate whether
 a computer can be a person. For example if you were communicating with HAL
 in 2001, you might easily mistake it for a man (as shown in the film)

Yes, I agree with the spirit of the test and with what you say. I'm
just claiming that, in practice, none of the versions of the test
work. HAL would very quickly fail any of the formulations of the TT
unless he lied. Not just a small lie either, but a major lie,
involving him pretending that he has a human body, human experiences
and so on. He's a person but he's not human.

But if you chatted with HAL for a while, fully knowing that your are a
computer, you would be much more reluctant to terminate it than you
are to kill your browser or whatever program you are using to read
this email. This is, in fact, one of the themes in 2001.

 and
 you would be right to do so, because HAL *is* a person in the story, by any
 reasonable criterion. (In fact he's the most human like person in the film!
 The astronauts act more like robots than he does most of the time!)

No doubt. I think we witness HAL becoming conscious and thus acquiring
the capacity for violence, but that's my interpretation. One of the
astronauts, on the other hand, ends up becoming something else. A lot
of people see the final scene of the movie as beautiful and inspiring,
I see it as possibly horrendous, but this is getting way off track!

Btw, I'm sorry if I'm being rude and not replying to everyone as I
should, but the current volume is more than I can handle. I'm sure I'm
not the only one experiencing the same problem.

 So a computer passing the TT (without hearing its voice or discussing
 matters only a human being/computer is likely to know, of course - as
 mentioned in the original paper, where the judge asks the testee to multiply
 two numbers and it pauses a while, and then makes a mistake, because the
 computer isn't allowed to invoke a calculator function just as a human
 shouldn't use a calculator - not that such things existed at the time!)
 shouldn't be considered to be lying. And it should be treated as a person. I
 think that was Turing's point.

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Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-01 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 30 Sep 2013, at 14:05, Telmo Menezes wrote to Craig:



The comp assumption that computations have
qualia hidden inside them is not much of an answer either in my view.


I have the same problem.


The solution is in the fact that all machines have that problem. More  
exactly: all persons capable of surviving a digital substitution must  
have that and similar problems. It is a sort of meta-solution  
explaining that we are indeed confronted to something which is simply  
totally unexplainable.


Note also that the expression computation have qualia can be  
misleading. A computation has no qualia, strictly speaking. Only a  
person supported by an infinity of computation can be said to have  
qualia, or to live qualia. Then the math of self-reference can be used  
to explain why the qualia have to escape the pure third person type of  
explanations.


A good exercise consists in trying to think about what could like an  
explanation of what a qualia is. Even without comp, that will seem  
impossible, and that explains why some people, like Craig, estimate  
that we have to take them as primitive. here comp explains, why there  
are things like qualia, which can emerge only in the frist person  
points of view, and admit irreductible components.


Bruno




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-01 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 30 Sep 2013, at 14:00, Pierz wrote:

Yes indeed, and it is compelling. Fading qualia and all that. It's  
the absurdity of philosophical zombies. Those arguments did have an  
influence on my thinking. On the other hand the idea that we *can*  
replicate all the brain's outputs remains an article of faith.


OK. That is behavioral mechanism (Be-Me), and I agree that it asks an  
act of faith, despite the strog evidence that nature already exploits  
this.
Comp asks for a nuch bigger act of faith, as you have to believe that  
you survive through the duplication. It is logically conceivable that  
we can replicate ourselves, but fail to survive through that  
replication. Comp - Be-Me, but Be-Me does not imply comp.





I remember that almost the first thing I read in Dennett's book was  
his claim that rich, detailed hallucinations (perceptions in the  
absence of physical stimuli) are impossible. Dennett is either wrong  
on this - or a vast body of research into hallucinogens is. Not to  
mention NDEs and OBEs. Dennett may be right and these reports may  
all be mistakes and lies, but I doubt it. If he is wrong, the his  
arguments become a compelling case in quite the opposite sense to  
what he intended: the brain not as a manufacturer of consciousness  
but as something more like a receptor.


Yes, the brain seems to be (with comp) more a filter of consciousness  
that a producer of consciousness.




My instinct tells me we don't know enough about the brain or  
consciousness to be certain of any conclusions derived from logic  
alone.


In all cases, logic alone is too poor a device to dwelve in the  
matter. But with comp, arithmetic (and its internal meta-arithmetic)  
is enough, especillay for the negative part (the mystery) which has to  
remain a mystery in all possible mechanical extensions of the machine.  
That is what comp explains the better: that there must be a mystery.  
Abstract machines like PA and ZF can be said to know that already.


Bruno



We may be like Newtonians arguing cosmology without the benefit of  
QM and relativity.


On Monday, September 30, 2013 2:08:23 PM UTC+10, stathisp wrote:
On 30 September 2013 11:36, Pierz pie...@gmail.com wrote:
 If I might just butt in (said the barman)...

 It seems to me that Craig's insistence that nothing is Turing  
emulable,
 only the measurements are expresses a different ontological  
assumption from
 the one that computationalists take for granted. It's evident that  
if we
 make a flight simulator, we will never leave the ground,  
regardless of the
 verisimilitude of the simulation. So why would a simulated  
consciousness be

 expected to actually be conscious? Because of different ontological
 assumptions about matter and consciousness. Science has given up  
on the
 notion of consciousness as having being the same way that matter  
is
 assumed to. Because consciousness has no place in an objective  
description
 of the world (i.e., one which is defined purely in terms of the  
measurable),
 contemporary scientific thinking reduces consciousness to those  
apparent
 behavioural outputs of consciousness which *can* be measured. This  
is

 functionalism. Because we can't measure the presence or absence of
 awareness, functionalism gives up on the attempt and presents the  
functional
 outputs as the only things that are really real. Hence we get  
the Turing

 test. If we can't tell the difference, the simulator is no longer a
 simulator: it *is* the thing simulated. This conclusion is shored  
up by the

 apparently water-tight argument that the brain is made of atoms and
 molecules which are Turing emulable (even if it would take the  
lifetime of
 the universe to simulate the behaviour of a protein in a complex  
cellular
 environment, but oh well, we can ignore quantum effects because  
it's too hot
 in there anyway and just fast forward to the neuronal level,  
right?). It's
 also supported by the objectifying mental habit of people  
conditioned
 through years of scientific training. It becomes so natural to  
step into the
 god-level third person perspective that the elision of private  
experience
 starts seems like a small matter, and a step that one has no  
choice but to

 make.

 Of course, the alternative does present problems of its own! Craig
 frequently seems to slip into a kind of naturalism that would have  
it that

 brains possess soft, non-mechanical sense because they are soft and
 non-mechanical seeming. They can't be machines because they don't  
have
 cables and transistors. Wetware can't possibly be hardware. A  
lot of his
 arguments seem to be along those lines — the refusal to accept  
abstractions
 which others accept, as telmo aptly puts it. He claims to solve  
the hard
 problem of consciousness but the solution involves manoeuvres  
like putting

 the whole universe into the explanatory gap between objective and
 subjective: hardly illuminating! I get irritated by neologisms  
like PIP
 

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-01 Thread Pierz
Maybe. It would be a lot more profound if we definitely *could* reproduce the 
brain's behaviour. The devil is in the detail as they say. But a challenge to 
Chalmer's position has occurred to me. It seems to me that Bruno has 
convincingly argued that *if* comp holds, then consciousness supervenes on the 
computation, not on the physical matter. But functionalism suggests that what 
counts is the output, not the manner in which it as arrived at. That is to say, 
the brain or whatever neural subunit or computer is doing the processing is a 
black box. You input something and then read the output, but the intervening 
steps don't matter. Consider what this might mean in terms of a brain. Let's 
say a vastly advanced alien species comes to earth. It looks at our puny little 
brains and decides to make one to fool us. This constructed person/brain 
receives normal conversational input and outputs conversation that it knows 
will perfectly mimic a human being. But in fact the computer doing this 
processing is vastly superior to the human brain. It's like a modern PC 
emulating a TRS-80, except much more so. When it computes/thinks up a response, 
it draws on a vast amount of knowledge, intelligence and creativity and 
accesses qualia undreamed of by a human. Yet its response will completely fool 
any normal human and will pass Turing tests till the cows come home. What this 
thought experiment shows is that, while half-qualia may be absurd, it most 
certainly is possible to reproduce the outputs of a brain without replicating 
its qualia. It might have completely different qualia, just as a very good 
actor's emotions can't be distinguished from the real thing, even though his or 
her internal experience is quite different. And if qualia can be quite 
different even though the functional outputs are the same, this does seem to 
leave functionalism in something of a quandary. All we can say is that there 
must be some kind of qualia occurring, rather a different result from what 
Chalmers is claiming. When we extend this type of scenario to artificial 
neurons or partial brain prostheses as in Chamer's paper, we quickly run up 
against perplexing problems. Imagine the advanced alien provides these 
prostheses. It takes the same inputs and generates the same correct outputs, 
but it processes those inputs within a much vaster, more complex system. Does 
the brain utilizing this advanced prosthesis experience a kind of expanded 
consciousness because of this, without that difference being detectable? Or do 
the qualia remain somehow confined to the prosthesis (whatever that means)? 
These crazy quandaries suggest to me that basically, we don't know shit.

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Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-01 Thread Pierz
Sorry, this list behaves strangely on my iPad. I can't reply to individual 
posts. The post above was meant to be a reply to stathis and his remark that 
it is possible to prove that it is impossible to replicate its observable 
behaviour (a brain's) without also replicating its consciousness. This is a 
very profound result. Maybe someone can show me why I'm wrong, but I think my 
argument above refutes that proof.

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Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-01 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 01 Oct 2013, at 15:31, Pierz wrote:

Maybe. It would be a lot more profound if we definitely *could*  
reproduce the brain's behaviour. The devil is in the detail as they  
say. But a challenge to Chalmer's position has occurred to me. It  
seems to me that Bruno has convincingly argued that *if* comp holds,  
then consciousness supervenes on the computation, not on the  
physical matter. But functionalism suggests that what counts is the  
output, not the manner in which it as arrived at. That is to say,  
the brain or whatever neural subunit or computer is doing the  
processing is a black box. You input something and then read the  
output, but the intervening steps don't matter. Consider what this  
might mean in terms of a brain.



That's not clear to me. The question is output of what. If it is the  
entie subject, this is more behaviorism than functionalism.
Putnam's functionalism makes clear that we have to take the output of  
the neurons into account.
Comp is functionalism, but with the idea that we don't know the level  
of substitution, so it might be that we have to take into account the  
oputput of the gluons in our atoms (so comp makes clear that it only  
ask for the existence of a level of substitution, and then show that  
no machine can know for sure its subst. level, making Putnam's sort of  
functionalism a bit fuzzy).





Let's say a vastly advanced alien species comes to earth. It looks  
at our puny little brains and decides to make one to fool us. This  
constructed person/brain receives normal conversational input and  
outputs conversation that it knows will perfectly mimic a human  
being. But in fact the computer doing this processing is vastly  
superior to the human brain. It's like a modern PC emulating a  
TRS-80, except much more so. When it computes/thinks up a response,  
it draws on a vast amount of knowledge, intelligence and creativity  
and accesses qualia undreamed of by a human. Yet its response will  
completely fool any normal human and will pass Turing tests till the  
cows come home. What this thought experiment shows is that, while  
half-qualia may be absurd, it most certainly is possible to  
reproduce the outputs of a brain without replicating its qualia. It  
might have completely different qualia, just as a very good actor's  
emotions can't be distinguished from the real thing, even though his  
or her internal experience is quite different. And if qualia can be  
quite different even though the functional outputs are the same,  
this does seem to leave functionalism in something of a quandary.  
All we can say is that there must be some kind of qualia occurring,  
rather a different result from what Chalmers is claiming. When we  
extend this type of scenario to artificial neurons or partial brain  
prostheses as in Chamer's paper, we quickly run up against  
perplexing problems. Imagine the advanced alien provides these  
prostheses. It takes the same inputs and generates the same correct  
outputs, but it processes those inputs within a much vaster, more  
complex system. Does the brain utilizing this advanced prosthesis  
experience a kind of expanded consciousness because of this, without  
that difference being detectable? Or do the qualia remain somehow  
confined to the prosthesis (whatever that means)? These crazy  
quandaries suggest to me that basically, we don't know shit.


Hmm, I am not convinced. Chalmers argument  is that to get a  
philosophical zombie, the fading argument shows that you have to go  
through half-qualia, which is absurd. His goal (here) is to show that  
no qualia is absurd.


That the qualia can be different is known in the qualia literature,  
and is a big open problem per se. But Chalmers argues only that no  
qualia is absurd, indeed because it would needs some absurd notion of  
intermediate half qualia.


My be I miss a point. Stathis can clarify this furher.

Eventually the qualia is determined by infinitely many number  
relations, and a brain filters them. It does not create them, like no  
machine can create PI, only re-compute it, somehow. The anlogy here  
break sown as qualia are purely first person notion, which explains  
why they are distributed on the whole universal dovetailing (sigma_1  
arithmetic).



Bruno




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Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-01 Thread Telmo Menezes
On Tue, Oct 1, 2013 at 1:13 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 On 30 Sep 2013, at 14:05, Telmo Menezes wrote to Craig:


 The comp assumption that computations have

 qualia hidden inside them is not much of an answer either in my view.


 I have the same problem.


 The solution is in the fact that all machines have that problem. More
 exactly: all persons capable of surviving a digital substitution must have
 that and similar problems. It is a sort of meta-solution explaining that we
 are indeed confronted to something which is simply totally unexplainable.

 Note also that the expression computation have qualia can be misleading. A
 computation has no qualia, strictly speaking. Only a person supported by an
 infinity of computation can be said to have qualia, or to live qualia. Then
 the math of self-reference can be used to explain why the qualia have to
 escape the pure third person type of explanations.

Thanks Bruno. Is there some formal proof of this? Can it be followed
by a mere mortal?

 A good exercise consists in trying to think about what could like an
 explanation of what a qualia is. Even without comp, that will seem
 impossible, and that explains why some people, like Craig, estimate that we
 have to take them as primitive. here comp explains, why there are things
 like qualia, which can emerge only in the frist person points of view, and
 admit irreductible components.

 Bruno




 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-01 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 01 Oct 2013, at 17:09, Telmo Menezes wrote:

On Tue, Oct 1, 2013 at 1:13 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


On 30 Sep 2013, at 14:05, Telmo Menezes wrote to Craig:


The comp assumption that computations have

qualia hidden inside them is not much of an answer either in my view.


I have the same problem.


The solution is in the fact that all machines have that problem. More
exactly: all persons capable of surviving a digital substitution  
must have
that and similar problems. It is a sort of meta-solution explaining  
that we
are indeed confronted to something which is simply totally  
unexplainable.


Note also that the expression computation have qualia can be  
misleading. A
computation has no qualia, strictly speaking. Only a person  
supported by an
infinity of computation can be said to have qualia, or to live  
qualia. Then
the math of self-reference can be used to explain why the qualia  
have to

escape the pure third person type of explanations.


Thanks Bruno. Is there some formal proof of this? Can it be followed
by a mere mortal?


It follows from comp, the classical definition of knowledge (the  
agreement that the modal logic S4 defines an axiomatic of knowledge)  
and then from Solovay theorem, and the fact that


(Bp - Bp  p) belongs to G* minus G.

 It is explained in details in the long version conscience et  
mécanisme, and with less detail in the short Lille thesis (that you  
have). It is also explained in the second part of sane04.


Formally a key text is the S4 provability chapter in Boolos 79 and 93,  
and the articles referred too.


We can come back on this. It is the heart of the Arithmeticalization  
of the UDA. It *is¨probably very naive, and I was sure this would be  
refuted, but it is not, yet.


I think it can be understood by mere mortals, having enough times and  
motivation.


For the sigma_1 restriction, you need also a good understanding around  
Gödel and Mechanism. One of the best good is the book by Judson Webb.  
Torkel Franzen's two books are quite good also. If you read the french  
I summarize a big part of the literature on that in conscience   
mécanisme.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/bxlthesis/consciencemecanisme.html


Bruno





A good exercise consists in trying to think about what could like an
explanation of what a qualia is. Even without comp, that will seem
impossible, and that explains why some people, like Craig, estimate  
that we
have to take them as primitive. here comp explains, why there are  
things
like qualia, which can emerge only in the frist person points of  
view, and

admit irreductible components.

Bruno




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-01 Thread Craig Weinberg
I had a similar thought about a chameleon brain (I call a p-Zelig instead 
of a p-zombie), which would impersonate behaviors of whatever environment 
it was placed into. Unlike a philosophical zombie, which would have no 
personal qualia but seem like it does from the outside, the chameleon brain 
would explicitly forbid having any particular qualia, since its entire 
processing would be devoted to computing cross-modal generalities. It is 
intentionally not trying to be a person, it is just trying to mirror 
anything - clouds, wolves, dandelion, whatever, according to the 
measurements it takes using a large variety of peripheral detectors.

On Tuesday, October 1, 2013 9:31:24 AM UTC-4, Pierz wrote:

 Maybe. It would be a lot more profound if we definitely *could* reproduce 
 the brain's behaviour. The devil is in the detail as they say. But a 
 challenge to Chalmer's position has occurred to me. It seems to me that 
 Bruno has convincingly argued that *if* comp holds, then consciousness 
 supervenes on the computation, not on the physical matter. But 
 functionalism suggests that what counts is the output, not the manner in 
 which it as arrived at. That is to say, the brain or whatever neural 
 subunit or computer is doing the processing is a black box. You input 
 something and then read the output, but the intervening steps don't matter. 
 Consider what this might mean in terms of a brain. Let's say a vastly 
 advanced alien species comes to earth. It looks at our puny little brains 
 and decides to make one to fool us. This constructed person/brain receives 
 normal conversational input and outputs conversation that it knows will 
 perfectly mimic a human being. But in fact the computer doing this 
 processing is vastly superior to the human brain. It's like a modern PC 
 emulating a TRS-80, except much more so. When it computes/thinks up a 
 response, it draws on a vast amount of knowledge, intelligence and 
 creativity and accesses qualia undreamed of by a human. Yet its response 
 will completely fool any normal human and will pass Turing tests till the 
 cows come home. What this thought experiment shows is that, while 
 half-qualia may be absurd, it most certainly is possible to reproduce the 
 outputs of a brain without replicating its qualia. It might have completely 
 different qualia, just as a very good actor's emotions can't be 
 distinguished from the real thing, even though his or her internal 
 experience is quite different. And if qualia can be quite different even 
 though the functional outputs are the same, this does seem to leave 
 functionalism in something of a quandary. All we can say is that there must 
 be some kind of qualia occurring, rather a different result from what 
 Chalmers is claiming. When we extend this type of scenario to artificial 
 neurons or partial brain prostheses as in Chamer's paper, we quickly run up 
 against perplexing problems. Imagine the advanced alien provides these 
 prostheses. It takes the same inputs and generates the same correct 
 outputs, but it processes those inputs within a much vaster, more complex 
 system. Does the brain utilizing this advanced prosthesis experience a kind 
 of expanded consciousness because of this, without that difference being 
 detectable? Or do the qualia remain somehow confined to the prosthesis 
 (whatever that means)? These crazy quandaries suggest to me that basically, 
 we don't know shit.

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Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-01 Thread Craig Weinberg


On Tuesday, October 1, 2013 7:13:17 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 30 Sep 2013, at 14:05, Telmo Menezes wrote to Craig:


 The comp assumption that computations have

 qualia hidden inside them is not much of an answer either in my view.


 I have the same problem.


 The solution is in the fact that all machines have that problem. More 
 exactly: all persons capable of surviving a digital substitution must have 
 that and similar problems. It is a sort of meta-solution explaining that we 
 are indeed confronted to something which is simply totally unexplainable.

 Note also that the expression computation have qualia can be misleading. 
 A computation has no qualia, strictly speaking. Only a person supported by 
 an infinity of computation can be said to have qualia, or to live qualia. 
 Then the math of self-reference can be used to explain why the qualia have 
 to escape the pure third person type of explanations.

 A good exercise consists in trying to think about what could like an 
 explanation of what a qualia is. Even without comp, that will seem 
 impossible, and that explains why some people, like Craig, estimate that we 
 have to take them as primitive. here comp explains, why there are things 
 like qualia, which can emerge only in the frist person points of view, and 
 admit irreductible components. 


Explaining why X is local to a certain perspective, or why X is irreducible 
does not explain why X is an aesthetic presence though. You can have 
numerical expressions which are irreducible and local to a machine without 
there being any such thing as flavor or color. As long as we are saying 
that both qualia and quanta are real, I don't see any advantage of making 
qualia supervene on quanta instead of the other way around, especially when 
we can understand that the nature of counting is to create figurative 
reductions which are nameless and homeless. We can't turn a wavelength into 
a color without color vision and real illumination, but we can turn color 
into a wavelength simply by discarding all of the actual color experience 
and looking at general patterns within optics analytically (abstractly). 
The irreducibility and 1p locality are hints, but they are neither 
necessary nor sufficient to access any specific qualia. I really don't 
think that I am missing something here. I can easily see it the other way 
around, I just don't think that it is true of the universe that we live in. 
Yes, it makes sense why a machine would not be able to tell that its 
experience is the result of a machine, but it doesn't make sense that Santa 
Claus would make that experience into tongues that taste that are different 
from eyes that see. All that matters is information transfer, so that 
difference would not engender any qualia, just clever addressing.

Thanks,
Craig
 


 Bruno




 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/





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Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-01 Thread meekerdb

On 10/1/2013 4:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Note also that the expression computation have qualia can be misleading. A computation 
has no qualia, strictly speaking. Only a person supported by an infinity of computation 
can be said to have qualia, or to live qualia.


Why an infinity of computation??  That would preclude my building an intelligent robot 
having qualia, since it's computations would always be finite.  And I doubt there is room 
in my head for infinite computations - certainly not digital ones.


Brent

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Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-01 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 01 Oct 2013, at 18:10, Craig Weinberg wrote:


Bruno's UDA eventually removes the requirement for a copy being
primitively real. That's one of the things that impressed me about the
argument. I think your position requires that you find a way to refute
the UDA.

I think that it does so by taking the need for a concrete universe  
for granted. It's a leak in UDA's philosophical vacuum. We can  
explain away the reality of realism, but what of the expectation of  
realistic qualities? Such an expectation would surely be ground to  
dust as each dust-mite's belch demands an infinity of universes to  
house its permutations and interactions. Where would a quality of  
realism arise from? Why is it something we need to explain away?


You are the one treating my sun in law like he was a zombie. Like if  
you knew, and could put away what he might be feeling.


Comp explain away matter, perhaps, not consciousness and mind. UDA  
starts from it, and AUDA recover it by listening to the machines, and  
already not treating them as zombie.


You are the one having a reductionist view of what machines can and  
cannot do, and seem to ignore that their relative representations are  
only the gates through which consciousness can differentiate. Our  
first person are, mathematically, not computable nor duplicable from  
our perspective, but we are 3-multiplied in the extreme, and the waves  
comes from that competition, below our sharable substitution level.


And there is math tools here so we can and will progress.


Bruno




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-01 Thread Pierz


On Wednesday, October 2, 2013 12:46:17 AM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 01 Oct 2013, at 15:31, Pierz wrote: 

  Maybe. It would be a lot more profound if we definitely *could*   
  reproduce the brain's behaviour. The devil is in the detail as they   
  say. But a challenge to Chalmer's position has occurred to me. It   
  seems to me that Bruno has convincingly argued that *if* comp holds,   
  then consciousness supervenes on the computation, not on the   
  physical matter. But functionalism suggests that what counts is the   
  output, not the manner in which it as arrived at. That is to say,   
  the brain or whatever neural subunit or computer is doing the   
  processing is a black box. You input something and then read the   
  output, but the intervening steps don't matter. Consider what this   
  might mean in terms of a brain. 


 That's not clear to me. The question is output of what. If it is the   
 entie subject, this is more behaviorism than functionalism. 
 Putnam's functionalism makes clear that we have to take the output of   
 the neurons into account. 
 Comp is functionalism, but with the idea that we don't know the level   
 of substitution, so it might be that we have to take into account the   
 oputput of the gluons in our atoms (so comp makes clear that it only   
 ask for the existence of a level of substitution, and then show that   
 no machine can know for sure its subst. level, making Putnam's sort of   
 functionalism a bit fuzzy). 

 I was going on stathis's post. He stated that reproducing the brain's 
functions meant reproducing the qualia, but I refuted that (I think). 




  Let's say a vastly advanced alien species comes to earth. It looks   
  at our puny little brains and decides to make one to fool us. This   
  constructed person/brain receives normal conversational input and   
  outputs conversation that it knows will perfectly mimic a human   
  being. But in fact the computer doing this processing is vastly   
  superior to the human brain. It's like a modern PC emulating a   
  TRS-80, except much more so. When it computes/thinks up a response,   
  it draws on a vast amount of knowledge, intelligence and creativity   
  and accesses qualia undreamed of by a human. Yet its response will   
  completely fool any normal human and will pass Turing tests till the   
  cows come home. What this thought experiment shows is that, while   
  half-qualia may be absurd, it most certainly is possible to   
  reproduce the outputs of a brain without replicating its qualia. It   
  might have completely different qualia, just as a very good actor's   
  emotions can't be distinguished from the real thing, even though his   
  or her internal experience is quite different. And if qualia can be   
  quite different even though the functional outputs are the same,   
  this does seem to leave functionalism in something of a quandary.   
  All we can say is that there must be some kind of qualia occurring,   
  rather a different result from what Chalmers is claiming. When we   
  extend this type of scenario to artificial neurons or partial brain   
  prostheses as in Chamer's paper, we quickly run up against   
  perplexing problems. Imagine the advanced alien provides these   
  prostheses. It takes the same inputs and generates the same correct   
  outputs, but it processes those inputs within a much vaster, more   
  complex system. Does the brain utilizing this advanced prosthesis   
  experience a kind of expanded consciousness because of this, without   
  that difference being detectable? Or do the qualia remain somehow   
  confined to the prosthesis (whatever that means)? These crazy   
  quandaries suggest to me that basically, we don't know shit. 

 Hmm, I am not convinced. Chalmers argument  is that to get a   
 philosophical zombie, the fading argument shows that you have to go   
 through half-qualia, which is absurd. His goal (here) is to show that   
 no qualia is absurd. 

 That the qualia can be different is known in the qualia literature,   
 and is a big open problem per se. But Chalmers argues only that no   
 qualia is absurd, indeed because it would needs some absurd notion of   
 intermediate half qualia. 

 My be I miss a point. Stathis can clarify this furher. 


Yes, I understand that to be Chalmer's main point. Although, if the qualia 
can be different, it does present issues - how much and in what way can it 
vary? I'm curious what the literature has to say about that. And if 
functionalism means reproducing more than the mere functional output of a 
system, if it potentially means replication down to the elementary 
particles and possibly their quantum entanglements, then duplication 
becomes impossible, not merely technically but in principle. That seems 
against the whole point of functionalism - as the idea of function is 
reduced to something almost meaningless.


 Eventually the qualia is determined by infinitely many number   
 

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-10-01 Thread meekerdb

On 10/1/2013 9:56 PM, Pierz wrote:
Yes, I understand that to be Chalmer's main point. Although, if the qualia can be 
different, it does present issues - how much and in what way can it vary? 


Yes, that's a question that interests me because I want to be able to build intelligent 
machines and so I need to know what qualia they will have, if any.  I think it will depend 
on their sensors and on their values/goals.  If I build a very intelligent Mars Rover, 
capable of learning and reasoning, with a goal of discovering whether there was once life 
on Mars; then I expect it will experience pleasure in finding evidence regarding this.  
But no matter how smart I make it, it won't experience lust.



I'm curious what the literature has to say about that. And if functionalism means 
reproducing more than the mere functional output of a system, if it potentially means 
replication down to the elementary particles and possibly their quantum entanglements, 
then duplication becomes impossible, not merely technically but in principle. That seems 
against the whole point of functionalism - as the idea of function is reduced to 
something almost meaningless.


I think functionalism must be confined to the classical functions, discounting the quantum 
level effects.  But it must include some behavior that is almost entirely internal - e.g. 
planning, imagining.  Excluding quantum entanglements isn't arbitrary; there cannot have 
been any evolution of goals and values based on quantum entanglement (beyond the 
statistical effects that produce decoherence and quasi-classical behavior).


Brent

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Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-09-30 Thread Telmo Menezes
On Fri, Sep 27, 2013 at 7:49 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:


 On Friday, September 27, 2013 8:00:11 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote:

 On Thu, Sep 26, 2013 at 9:28 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com
 wrote:
 
 
  On Thursday, September 26, 2013 11:49:29 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote:
 
  On Thu, Sep 26, 2013 at 2:38 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com
  wrote:
  
  
   On Thursday, September 26, 2013 6:17:04 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes
   wrote:
  
   Hi Craig (and all),
  
   Now that I have a better understanding of your ideas, I would like
   to
   confront you with a thought experiment. Some of the stuff you say
   looks completely esoteric to me, so I imagine there are three
   possibilities: either you are significantly more intelligent than me
   or you're a bit crazy, or both. I'm not joking, I don't know.
  
   But I would like to focus on sensory participation as the
   fundamental
   stuff of reality and your claim that strong AI is impossible because
   the machines we build are just Frankensteins, in a sense. If I
   understand correctly, you still believe these machines have sensory
   participation just because they exist, but not in the sense that
   they
   could emulate our human experiences. They have the sensory
   participation level of the stuff they're made of and nothing else.
   Right?
  
  
   Not exactly. My view is that there is only sensory participation on
   the
   level of what has naturally evolved.
 
  This sounds a bit like vitalism. What's so special about natural
  evolution that can't be captured otherwise?
 
 
  It's not about life or nature being special, it's about recognizing that
  nature is an expression of experience, and that experience can't be
  substituted.

 Ok. How did you arrive at this belief? How can you believe this
 without proposing some mechanism by which it happens? Or do you
 propose such a thing?


 Mechanisms are functions of time, but experience would be more primitive
 than time in this view. To have a mechanism, there must already be some
 experience of events, memory, expectation, etc.

But we know that universal machines can be built with very little:
simple cellular automata, arithmetics, balls colliding and so on. You
can then argue that some substrate is necessary for this computation,
but it is quite clear that what is necessary to have the possibility
of a full blown human zombie is theoretically very little. This does
not refute your main thesis, of course, but I think it does refute
that experience of events, memory and expectations are necessary for
mechanism.

Think of the mechanism by
 which you change your attention or open your eyes. Sure, there are
 mechanisms that we can point to in the body, but what mechanism do *you* use
 to control yourself?

Ok, I know what you mean. Yes, I find this mysterious.

 I submit that there is no button to push or crank to
 turn. If there were, then you would already be controlling yourself to use
 them. No, at some point something has to directly control something by
 feeling and doing.

What if the thing that controls is being generated by the act of controlling?

 Whether we push it down to the microcosm or out to
 statistical laws makes no difference - somewhere something has to sense
 something directly or we cannot have experience.

 I wouldn't call it a belief, it's a hypothesis. I arrived at it by having a
 lot of conversations in my head about it over several years - writing things
 down, remembering them, dreaming about them, etc.

Ok. I have nothings against this but I would say you have to be very
cautious when relying on this type of approach. My position is that
there is a lot of value in doing this, but you cannot ever claim a
communicable discovery just by doing this. You can only find private
truth. When you try to communicate private truth, you risk sounding
like a lunatic. This is, in my view, what's so compelling about art.
Under the banner of art, you are allowed to try to communicate
private truth and get a free pass from being considered a nutjob.


  A player piano can be made to play the notes of a song, but no
  matter how many notes it plays, it will never know the significance of
  what
  notes or music is.
 
 
 
   Since the machine did not organize
   itself, there is no 'machine' any more than a book of Shakespeare's
   quotes
   is a machine that is gradually turning into Shakespeare.
 
  But the books are not machines. Shakespeare possibly was. If he was,
  why can't he be emulated by another machine?
 
 
  I was using the example of a book to show how different a symbol is from
  that which we imagine the symbol represents. If we want a more
  machine-like
  example, we can use a copy machine. The copier can reproduce the works
  of
  any author mechanically, but does it appreciate or participate in the
  content of what it is copying?

 Ok. Yes, of course. But consider this: when you read a book, your
 brain triggers in super-complex ways that 

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-09-30 Thread Pierz
Yes indeed, and it is compelling. Fading qualia and all that. It's the 
absurdity of philosophical zombies. Those arguments did have an influence 
on my thinking. On the other hand the idea that we *can* replicate all the 
brain's outputs remains an article of faith. I remember that almost the 
first thing I read in Dennett's book was his claim that rich, detailed 
hallucinations (perceptions in the absence of physical stimuli) are 
impossible. Dennett is either wrong on this - or a vast body of research 
into hallucinogens is. Not to mention NDEs and OBEs. Dennett may be right 
and these reports may all be mistakes and lies, but I doubt it. If he is 
wrong, the his arguments become a compelling case in quite the opposite 
sense to what he intended: the brain not as a manufacturer of consciousness 
but as something more like a receptor. My instinct tells me we don't know 
enough about the brain or consciousness to be certain of any conclusions 
derived from logic alone. We may be like Newtonians arguing cosmology 
without the benefit of QM and relativity.

On Monday, September 30, 2013 2:08:23 PM UTC+10, stathisp wrote:

 On 30 September 2013 11:36, Pierz pie...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: 
  If I might just butt in (said the barman)... 
  
  It seems to me that Craig's insistence that nothing is Turing emulable, 
  only the measurements are expresses a different ontological assumption 
 from 
  the one that computationalists take for granted. It's evident that if we 
  make a flight simulator, we will never leave the ground, regardless of 
 the 
  verisimilitude of the simulation. So why would a simulated consciousness 
 be 
  expected to actually be conscious? Because of different ontological 
  assumptions about matter and consciousness. Science has given up on the 
  notion of consciousness as having being the same way that matter is 
  assumed to. Because consciousness has no place in an objective 
 description 
  of the world (i.e., one which is defined purely in terms of the 
 measurable), 
  contemporary scientific thinking reduces consciousness to those apparent 
  behavioural outputs of consciousness which *can* be measured. This is 
  functionalism. Because we can't measure the presence or absence of 
  awareness, functionalism gives up on the attempt and presents the 
 functional 
  outputs as the only things that are really real. Hence we get the 
 Turing 
  test. If we can't tell the difference, the simulator is no longer a 
  simulator: it *is* the thing simulated. This conclusion is shored up by 
 the 
  apparently water-tight argument that the brain is made of atoms and 
  molecules which are Turing emulable (even if it would take the lifetime 
 of 
  the universe to simulate the behaviour of a protein in a complex 
 cellular 
  environment, but oh well, we can ignore quantum effects because it's too 
 hot 
  in there anyway and just fast forward to the neuronal level, right?). 
 It's 
  also supported by the objectifying mental habit of people conditioned 
  through years of scientific training. It becomes so natural to step into 
 the 
  god-level third person perspective that the elision of private 
 experience 
  starts seems like a small matter, and a step that one has no choice but 
 to 
  make. 
  
  Of course, the alternative does present problems of its own! Craig 
  frequently seems to slip into a kind of naturalism that would have it 
 that 
  brains possess soft, non-mechanical sense because they are soft and 
  non-mechanical seeming. They can't be machines because they don't have 
  cables and transistors. Wetware can't possibly be hardware. A lot of 
 his 
  arguments seem to be along those lines — the refusal to accept 
 abstractions 
  which others accept, as telmo aptly puts it. He claims to solve the 
 hard 
  problem of consciousness but the solution involves manoeuvres like 
 putting 
  the whole universe into the explanatory gap between objective and 
  subjective: hardly illuminating! I get irritated by neologisms like PIP 
  (whatever that stands for now - was multi-sense realism' not obscure 
  enough?), which to me seem to be about trying to add substance to vague 
 and 
  poetic intuitions about reality by attaching big, intellectual-sounding 
  labels to them. 
  
  However the same grain of sand that seems to get in Craig's eye does get 
 in 
  mine too. It's conceivable that some future incarnation of cleverbot 
  (cleverbot.com, in case you don't know it) could reach a point of 
 passing a 
  Turing test through a combination of a vast repertoire of recorded 
  conversation and some clever linguistic parsing to do a better job of 
  keeping track of a semantic thread to the conversation (where the 
 program 
  currently falls down). But in this case, what goes in inside the machine 
  seems to make all the difference, though the functionalists are 
 committed to 
  rejecting that position. Cleverly simulated conversation just doesn't 
 seem 
  to be real 

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-09-30 Thread Telmo Menezes
On Mon, Sep 30, 2013 at 3:36 AM, Pierz pier...@gmail.com wrote:
 If I might just butt in (said the barman)...

The more the merrier!

 It seems to me that Craig's insistence that nothing is Turing emulable,
 only the measurements are expresses a different ontological assumption from
 the one that computationalists take for granted. It's evident that if we
 make a flight simulator, we will never leave the ground, regardless of the
 verisimilitude of the simulation. So why would a simulated consciousness be
 expected to actually be conscious? Because of different ontological
 assumptions about matter and consciousness. Science has given up on the
 notion of consciousness as having being the same way that matter is
 assumed to. Because consciousness has no place in an objective description
 of the world (i.e., one which is defined purely in terms of the measurable),
 contemporary scientific thinking reduces consciousness to those apparent
 behavioural outputs of consciousness which *can* be measured. This is
 functionalism. Because we can't measure the presence or absence of
 awareness, functionalism gives up on the attempt and presents the functional
 outputs as the only things that are really real. Hence we get the Turing
 test. If we can't tell the difference, the simulator is no longer a
 simulator: it *is* the thing simulated.

Even under functionalist assumptions, I still find the Turing test to
be misguided because it require the machine to lie, while a human can
pass it by telling the truth. I propose an alternative: you converse
with the machine for a certain amount of time and then I offer you $10
to kill it.

 This conclusion is shored up by the
 apparently water-tight argument that the brain is made of atoms and
 molecules which are Turing emulable (even if it would take the lifetime of
 the universe to simulate the behaviour of a protein in a complex cellular
 environment, but oh well, we can ignore quantum effects because it's too hot
 in there anyway and just fast forward to the neuronal level, right?). It's
 also supported by the objectifying mental habit of people conditioned
 through years of scientific training. It becomes so natural to step into the
 god-level third person perspective that the elision of private experience
 starts seems like a small matter, and a step that one has no choice but to
 make.

 Of course, the alternative does present problems of its own! Craig
 frequently seems to slip into a kind of naturalism that would have it that
 brains possess soft, non-mechanical sense because they are soft and
 non-mechanical seeming. They can't be machines because they don't have
 cables and transistors. Wetware can't possibly be hardware. A lot of his
 arguments seem to be along those lines — the refusal to accept abstractions
 which others accept, as telmo aptly puts it. He claims to solve the hard
 problem of consciousness but the solution involves manoeuvres like putting
 the whole universe into the explanatory gap between objective and
 subjective: hardly illuminating! I get irritated by neologisms like PIP
 (whatever that stands for now - was multi-sense realism' not obscure
 enough?), which to me seem to be about trying to add substance to vague and
 poetic intuitions about reality by attaching big, intellectual-sounding
 labels to them.

 However the same grain of sand that seems to get in Craig's eye does get in
 mine too.

And mine.

 It's conceivable that some future incarnation of cleverbot
 (cleverbot.com, in case you don't know it) could reach a point of passing a
 Turing test through a combination of a vast repertoire of recorded
 conversation and some clever linguistic parsing to do a better job of
 keeping track of a semantic thread to the conversation (where the program
 currently falls down).

But then this approach is bound to fail if you extend the interaction
for long enough time, as Liz points out.

 But in this case, what goes in inside the machine
 seems to make all the difference, though the functionalists are committed to
 rejecting that position. Cleverly simulated conversation just doesn't seem
 to be real conversation if what is going on behind the scenes is just a
 bunch of rules for pulling lines out of a database. It's Craig's clever
 garbage lids. We can make a doll that screams and recoils from damaging
 inputs and learns to avoid them, but the functional outputs of pain are not
 the experience of pain. Imagine a being neurologically incapable of pain.
 Like Mary, the hypothetical woman who lives her life seeing the world
 through a black and white monitor and cannot imagine colour qualia until she
 is released, such an entity could not begin to comprehend the meaning of
 screams of pain - beyond possibly recognising a self-protective function.
 The elision of qualia from functional theories of mind has potentially very
 serious ethical consequences - for only a subject with access to those
 qualia truly understand them. Understanding the human 

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-09-30 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On 30 September 2013 22:00, Pierz pier...@gmail.com wrote:
 Yes indeed, and it is compelling. Fading qualia and all that. It's the
 absurdity of philosophical zombies.

The absurd thing is not philosophical zombies, which are at least
conceivable, it is partial zombies.

 Those arguments did have an influence on
 my thinking. On the other hand the idea that we *can* replicate all the
 brain's outputs remains an article of faith.

Although Chalmers doesn't point this out that I am aware, the argument
for functionalism is established merely with the *concept* of a
functionally equivalent brain component. That is, it is logically
impossible to make such a component that replicates behaviour but does
not replicate consciousness.

  I remember that almost the
 first thing I read in Dennett's book was his claim that rich, detailed
 hallucinations (perceptions in the absence of physical stimuli) are
 impossible. Dennett is either wrong on this - or a vast body of research
 into hallucinogens is. Not to mention NDEs and OBEs. Dennett may be right
 and these reports may all be mistakes and lies, but I doubt it. If he is
 wrong, the his arguments become a compelling case in quite the opposite
 sense to what he intended: the brain not as a manufacturer of consciousness
 but as something more like a receptor.  My instinct tells me we don't know
 enough about the brain or consciousness to be certain of any conclusions
 derived from logic alone. We may be like Newtonians arguing cosmology
 without the benefit of QM and relativity.

Remarkably, without knowing anything about how the brain actually
works, it is possible to prove that it is impossible to replicate its
observable behaviour without also replicating its consciousness. This
is a very profound result.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-09-30 Thread Richard Ruquist
Stathis

Could you provide the proof or a link to it?
Richard


On Mon, Sep 30, 2013 at 9:00 AM, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.comwrote:

 On 30 September 2013 22:00, Pierz pier...@gmail.com wrote:
  Yes indeed, and it is compelling. Fading qualia and all that. It's the
  absurdity of philosophical zombies.

 The absurd thing is not philosophical zombies, which are at least
 conceivable, it is partial zombies.

  Those arguments did have an influence on
  my thinking. On the other hand the idea that we *can* replicate all the
  brain's outputs remains an article of faith.

 Although Chalmers doesn't point this out that I am aware, the argument
 for functionalism is established merely with the *concept* of a
 functionally equivalent brain component. That is, it is logically
 impossible to make such a component that replicates behaviour but does
 not replicate consciousness.

   I remember that almost the
  first thing I read in Dennett's book was his claim that rich, detailed
  hallucinations (perceptions in the absence of physical stimuli) are
  impossible. Dennett is either wrong on this - or a vast body of research
  into hallucinogens is. Not to mention NDEs and OBEs. Dennett may be right
  and these reports may all be mistakes and lies, but I doubt it. If he is
  wrong, the his arguments become a compelling case in quite the opposite
  sense to what he intended: the brain not as a manufacturer of
 consciousness
  but as something more like a receptor.  My instinct tells me we don't
 know
  enough about the brain or consciousness to be certain of any conclusions
  derived from logic alone. We may be like Newtonians arguing cosmology
  without the benefit of QM and relativity.

 Remarkably, without knowing anything about how the brain actually
 works, it is possible to prove that it is impossible to replicate its
 observable behaviour without also replicating its consciousness. This
 is a very profound result.


 --
 Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-09-30 Thread Stathis Papaioannou


 On 30 Sep 2013, at 11:07 pm, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote:
 
 Stathis 
 
 Could you provide the proof or a link to it?
 Richard

It's the Chalmers Fading Qualia paper cited before. The paper refers to 
computer chips replacing neurons. The objection could be made that we do not 
know for sure that brain physics is computable, and if it isn't, the experiment 
is impossible. However, that would only show that computationalism was wrong, 
not the functionalism was wrong. Functionalism is established even if it turns 
out the neurons are animated by God.

 On Mon, Sep 30, 2013 at 9:00 AM, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com 
 wrote:
 On 30 September 2013 22:00, Pierz pier...@gmail.com wrote:
  Yes indeed, and it is compelling. Fading qualia and all that. It's the
  absurdity of philosophical zombies.
 
 The absurd thing is not philosophical zombies, which are at least
 conceivable, it is partial zombies.
 
  Those arguments did have an influence on
  my thinking. On the other hand the idea that we *can* replicate all the
  brain's outputs remains an article of faith.
 
 Although Chalmers doesn't point this out that I am aware, the argument
 for functionalism is established merely with the *concept* of a
 functionally equivalent brain component. That is, it is logically
 impossible to make such a component that replicates behaviour but does
 not replicate consciousness.
 
   I remember that almost the
  first thing I read in Dennett's book was his claim that rich, detailed
  hallucinations (perceptions in the absence of physical stimuli) are
  impossible. Dennett is either wrong on this - or a vast body of research
  into hallucinogens is. Not to mention NDEs and OBEs. Dennett may be right
  and these reports may all be mistakes and lies, but I doubt it. If he is
  wrong, the his arguments become a compelling case in quite the opposite
  sense to what he intended: the brain not as a manufacturer of consciousness
  but as something more like a receptor.  My instinct tells me we don't know
  enough about the brain or consciousness to be certain of any conclusions
  derived from logic alone. We may be like Newtonians arguing cosmology
  without the benefit of QM and relativity.
 
 Remarkably, without knowing anything about how the brain actually
 works, it is possible to prove that it is impossible to replicate its
 observable behaviour without also replicating its consciousness. This
 is a very profound result.
 
 
 --
 Stathis Papaioannou
 
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Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-09-30 Thread Craig Weinberg


On Sunday, September 29, 2013 9:36:28 PM UTC-4, Pierz wrote:

 If I might just butt in (said the barman)...

 It seems to me that Craig's insistence that nothing is Turing emulable, 
 only the measurements are expresses a different ontological assumption 
 from the one that computationalists take for granted. It's evident that if 
 we make a flight simulator, we will never leave the ground, regardless of 
 the verisimilitude of the simulation. So why would a simulated 
 consciousness be expected to actually be conscious? Because of different 
 ontological assumptions about matter and consciousness. Science has given 
 up on the notion of consciousness as having being the same way that 
 matter is assumed to. Because consciousness has no place in an objective 
 description of the world (i.e., one which is defined purely in terms of the 
 measurable), contemporary scientific thinking reduces consciousness to 
 those apparent behavioural outputs of consciousness which *can* be 
 measured. This is functionalism. Because we can't measure the presence or 
 absence of awareness, functionalism gives up on the attempt and presents 
 the functional outputs as the only things that are really real. Hence we 
 get the Turing test. If we can't tell the difference, the simulator is no 
 longer a simulator: it *is* the thing simulated. This conclusion is shored 
 up by the apparently water-tight argument that the brain is made of atoms 
 and molecules which are Turing emulable (even if it would take the lifetime 
 of the universe to simulate the behaviour of a protein in a complex 
 cellular environment, but oh well, we can ignore quantum effects because 
 it's too hot in there anyway and just fast forward to the neuronal level, 
 right?). It's also supported by the objectifying mental habit of people 
 conditioned through years of scientific training. It becomes so natural to 
 step into the god-level third person perspective that the elision of 
 private experience starts seems like a small matter, and a step that one 
 has no choice but to make. 

 Of course, the alternative does present problems of its own! Craig 
 frequently seems to slip into a kind of naturalism that would have it that 
 brains possess soft, non-mechanical sense because they are soft and 
 non-mechanical seeming.


Actually not. The aesthetic qualities of living organs do seem 
non-mechanical, and that may be a clue about their nature, but it doesn't 
have to be. We could make slippery, wet machines which were just as bad at 
feeling and experiencing deep qualia as a cell phone is. The naturalism 
that I appeal to arises not from the brain but from the nature of common 
experiences among humans, animals, and organisms and their apparent 
distance from inorganic systems. We can tell that a dog feels more like a 
person than a plant. Maybe it's not true. Maybe a Venus Flytrap feels like 
a dog? If I were going to recreate the universe from scratch however, and I 
had to bet on whether this intuitive hierarchy was important to include, I 
would bet that it was. It seems important, at least to living organisms. We 
need to know what we can eat and what we can impregnate with a high degree 
of veracity, and there seems to be a very natural understanding of that 
which does not require a Turing test.
 

 They can't be machines because they don't have cables and transistors. 
 Wetware can't possibly be hardware.


No, that's a Straw Man of my position - but an understandable and very 
common one. Wetware is hardware, but what is using the hardware is 
different than what uses the hardware of a silicon crystal.
 

 A lot of his arguments seem to be along those lines — the refusal to 
 accept abstractions which others accept, as telmo aptly puts it. He claims 
 to solve the hard problem of consciousness but the solution involves 
 manoeuvres like putting the whole universe into the explanatory gap 
 between objective and subjective: hardly illuminating!


It is illuminating to me. The universe becomes a continuum of aesthetic 
qualities modulated by physical-sense. There is no gap because there is 
nothing in the universe which does not bridge that gap. 
 

 I get irritated by neologisms like PIP (whatever that stands for now - was 
 multi-sense realism' not obscure enough?), which to me seem to be about 
 trying to add substance to vague and poetic intuitions about reality by 
 attaching big, intellectual-sounding labels to them. 


I'm going to be posting a glossary in the next day or so. I know it sounds 
pretentious, but that's the irony. Like legalese, the point is not to 
obscure but to make absolutely clear. Multisense Realism is about the 
overall picture of experience and reality, while PIP (Primordial Identity 
Pansensitivty) describes the particular way that this approach differs from 
other views, like panpsychism or panexperientialism. Philosophical jargon 
is our friend :)
 


 However the same grain of sand that seems to get in Craig's eye 

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-09-30 Thread Craig Weinberg


On Monday, September 30, 2013 8:00:11 AM UTC-4, Pierz wrote:

 Yes indeed, and it is compelling. Fading qualia and all that. It's the 
 absurdity of philosophical zombies. Those arguments did have an influence 
 on my thinking. On the other hand the idea that we *can* replicate all the 
 brain's outputs remains an article of faith. I remember that almost the 
 first thing I read in Dennett's book was his claim that rich, detailed 
 hallucinations (perceptions in the absence of physical stimuli) are 
 impossible. Dennett is either wrong on this - or a vast body of research 
 into hallucinogens is. Not to mention NDEs and OBEs. Dennett may be right 
 and these reports may all be mistakes and lies, but I doubt it. If he is 
 wrong, the his arguments become a compelling case in quite the opposite 
 sense to what he intended: the brain not as a manufacturer of consciousness 
 but as something more like a receptor. My instinct tells me we don't know 
 enough about the brain or consciousness to be certain of any conclusions 
 derived from logic alone. We may be like Newtonians arguing cosmology 
 without the benefit of QM and relativity.



The key, IMO, lies in drilling down on the fundamentals. What does it mean 
to 'receive'? What is a 'signal' and what is it doing in physics?

Also, (and this is the one Chalmers argument where I think that he missed 
it) we can turn the fading qualia argument around. Is it any less absurd to 
propose that qualia fades in, or suddenly appears due to complex wiring? 

Instead of building a brain which is like our own, couldn't we also build a 
brain that measures and analyzes social data to become a perfect sociopath? 
What if we intentionally want to suppress understanding and emotion and 
build a perfect actor, a p-Zelig, who uses chameleon-like algorithms to 
ingratiate itself in any context.

This paper from Chalmers http://consc.net/papers/combination.pdf does a 
good job of getting more into the different views on the combination 
problem, and how the micro and macro relate. I think that PIP exposes an 
assumption which all of the other approaches listed in the paper do not, 
which is that there is even a possibility of nonphenomenal phenomenal. Once 
we take that away, we can see that our personal awareness may not be 
created by microphysical states, rather our personal awareness is a 
particular range of a total awareness that has sub-personal, 
super-personal, and impersonal (public physical) facets. 

Thanks,
Craig

 


 On Monday, September 30, 2013 2:08:23 PM UTC+10, stathisp wrote:

 On 30 September 2013 11:36, Pierz pie...@gmail.com wrote: 
  If I might just butt in (said the barman)... 
  
  It seems to me that Craig's insistence that nothing is Turing 
 emulable, 
  only the measurements are expresses a different ontological assumption 
 from 
  the one that computationalists take for granted. It's evident that if 
 we 
  make a flight simulator, we will never leave the ground, regardless of 
 the 
  verisimilitude of the simulation. So why would a simulated 
 consciousness be 
  expected to actually be conscious? Because of different ontological 
  assumptions about matter and consciousness. Science has given up on the 
  notion of consciousness as having being the same way that matter is 
  assumed to. Because consciousness has no place in an objective 
 description 
  of the world (i.e., one which is defined purely in terms of the 
 measurable), 
  contemporary scientific thinking reduces consciousness to those 
 apparent 
  behavioural outputs of consciousness which *can* be measured. This is 
  functionalism. Because we can't measure the presence or absence of 
  awareness, functionalism gives up on the attempt and presents the 
 functional 
  outputs as the only things that are really real. Hence we get the 
 Turing 
  test. If we can't tell the difference, the simulator is no longer a 
  simulator: it *is* the thing simulated. This conclusion is shored up by 
 the 
  apparently water-tight argument that the brain is made of atoms and 
  molecules which are Turing emulable (even if it would take the lifetime 
 of 
  the universe to simulate the behaviour of a protein in a complex 
 cellular 
  environment, but oh well, we can ignore quantum effects because it's 
 too hot 
  in there anyway and just fast forward to the neuronal level, right?). 
 It's 
  also supported by the objectifying mental habit of people conditioned 
  through years of scientific training. It becomes so natural to step 
 into the 
  god-level third person perspective that the elision of private 
 experience 
  starts seems like a small matter, and a step that one has no choice but 
 to 
  make. 
  
  Of course, the alternative does present problems of its own! Craig 
  frequently seems to slip into a kind of naturalism that would have it 
 that 
  brains possess soft, non-mechanical sense because they are soft and 
  non-mechanical seeming. They can't be machines because they 

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-09-30 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 30 Sep 2013, at 03:36, Pierz wrote:


If I might just butt in (said the barman)...

It seems to me that Craig's insistence that nothing is Turing  
emulable, only the measurements are expresses a different  
ontological assumption from the one that computationalists take for  
granted. It's evident that if we make a flight simulator, we will  
never leave the ground, regardless of the verisimilitude of the  
simulation. So why would a simulated consciousness be expected to  
actually be conscious? Because of different ontological assumptions  
about matter and consciousness. Science has given up on the notion  
of consciousness as having being the same way that matter is  
assumed to. Because consciousness has no place in an objective  
description of the world (i.e., one which is defined purely in terms  
of the measurable), contemporary scientific thinking reduces  
consciousness to those apparent behavioural outputs of consciousness  
which *can* be measured. This is functionalism. Because we can't  
measure the presence or absence of awareness, functionalism gives up  
on the attempt and presents the functional outputs as the only  
things that are really real. Hence we get the Turing test. If we  
can't tell the difference, the simulator is no longer a simulator:  
it *is* the thing simulated. This conclusion is shored up by the  
apparently water-tight argument that the brain is made of atoms and  
molecules which are Turing emulable (even if it would take the  
lifetime of the universe to simulate the behaviour of a protein in a  
complex cellular environment, but oh well, we can ignore quantum  
effects because it's too hot in there anyway and just fast forward  
to the neuronal level, right?). It's also supported by the  
objectifying mental habit of people conditioned through years of  
scientific training. It becomes so natural to step into the god- 
level third person perspective that the elision of private  
experience starts seems like a small matter, and a step that one has  
no choice but to make.


Of course, the alternative does present problems of its own! Craig  
frequently seems to slip into a kind of naturalism that would have  
it that brains possess soft, non-mechanical sense because they are  
soft and non-mechanical seeming. They can't be machines because they  
don't have cables and transistors. Wetware can't possibly be  
hardware. A lot of his arguments seem to be along those lines — the  
refusal to accept abstractions which others accept, as telmo aptly  
puts it. He claims to solve the hard problem of consciousness but  
the solution involves manoeuvres like putting the whole universe  
into the explanatory gap between objective and subjective: hardly  
illuminating! I get irritated by neologisms like PIP (whatever that  
stands for now - was multi-sense realism' not obscure enough?),  
which to me seem to be about trying to add substance to vague and  
poetic intuitions about reality by attaching big, intellectual- 
sounding labels to them.


However the same grain of sand that seems to get in Craig's eye does  
get in mine too. It's conceivable that some future incarnation of  
cleverbot (cleverbot.com, in case you don't know it) could reach a  
point of passing a Turing test through a combination of a vast  
repertoire of recorded conversation and some clever linguistic  
parsing to do a better job of keeping track of a semantic thread to  
the conversation (where the program currently falls down). But in  
this case, what goes in inside the machine seems to make all the  
difference, though the functionalists are committed to rejecting  
that position. Cleverly simulated conversation just doesn't seem to  
be real conversation if what is going on behind the scenes is just a  
bunch of rules for pulling lines out of a database. It's Craig's  
clever garbage lids. We can make a doll that screams and recoils  
from damaging inputs and learns to avoid them, but the functional  
outputs of pain are not the experience of pain. Imagine a being  
neurologically incapable of pain. Like Mary, the hypothetical  
woman who lives her life seeing the world through a black and white  
monitor and cannot imagine colour qualia until she is released, such  
an entity could not begin to comprehend the meaning of screams of  
pain - beyond possibly recognising a self-protective function. The  
elision of qualia from functional theories of mind has potentially  
very serious ethical consequences - for only a subject with access  
to those qualia truly understand them. Understanding the human  
condition as it really is involves inhabiting human qualia.  
Otherwise you end up with Dr Mengele — humans as objects.


I've read Dennett's arguments against the qualophiles and I find  
them singularly unconvincing - though to say why is another long  
post. Dennett says we only seem to have qualia, but what can  
seem possibly mean in the absence of qualia? An illusion of a  
quality is an 

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-09-30 Thread meekerdb

On 9/30/2013 5:05 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:

Even under functionalist assumptions, I still find the Turing test to
be misguided because it require the machine to lie, while a human can
pass it by telling the truth.


Actually Turing already thought of this.  If you read his paper you find that the test is 
not as usually proposed.  Turing's test was whether an person communicating with a 
computer pretending to be a woman and a man pretending to be a woman, would be fooled as 
to which was which.


Brent

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Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-09-30 Thread LizR
On 1 October 2013 08:44, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 9/30/2013 5:05 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:

 Even under functionalist assumptions, I still find the Turing test to
 be misguided because it require the machine to lie, while a human can
 pass it by telling the truth.


 Actually Turing already thought of this.  If you read his paper you find
 that the test is not as usually proposed.  Turing's test was whether an
 person communicating with a computer pretending to be a woman and a man
 pretending to be a woman, would be fooled as to which was which.


I thought Turing mentioned The Imitation Game in which someone tried to
tell the other person's gender without any clues (like being able to hear
their voice, or discussing matters that only a man or woman might be *
expected* to know given the social norms at the time), and then extended
that to involve a computer as one of the participants?

That is, the TT as normally described involves someone trying to tell if
they're talking to a computer or a human being. Are you saying that isn't
how it was meant to be carried out?

I might also say that the above description of the TT (a computer has to
lie...) is also innaccurate, imho. The test is intended to indicate whether
a computer can be a *person*. For example if you were communicating with
HAL in 2001, you might easily mistake it for a man (as shown in the film)
and you would be right to do so, because HAL *is* a person in the story, by
any reasonable criterion. (In fact he's the most human like person in the
film! The astronauts act more like robots than he does most of the time!)

So a computer passing the TT (without hearing its voice or discussing
matters only a human being/computer is likely to know, of course - as
mentioned in the original paper, where the judge asks the testee to
multiply two numbers and it pauses a while, and then makes a mistake,
because the computer isn't allowed to invoke a calculator function just
as a human shouldn't use a calculator - not that such things existed at the
time!) shouldn't be considered to be lying. And it should be treated as a
person. I think that was Turing's point.

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Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-09-29 Thread Pierz
If I might just butt in (said the barman)...

It seems to me that Craig's insistence that nothing is Turing emulable, 
only the measurements are expresses a different ontological assumption 
from the one that computationalists take for granted. It's evident that if 
we make a flight simulator, we will never leave the ground, regardless of 
the verisimilitude of the simulation. So why would a simulated 
consciousness be expected to actually be conscious? Because of different 
ontological assumptions about matter and consciousness. Science has given 
up on the notion of consciousness as having being the same way that 
matter is assumed to. Because consciousness has no place in an objective 
description of the world (i.e., one which is defined purely in terms of the 
measurable), contemporary scientific thinking reduces consciousness to 
those apparent behavioural outputs of consciousness which *can* be 
measured. This is functionalism. Because we can't measure the presence or 
absence of awareness, functionalism gives up on the attempt and presents 
the functional outputs as the only things that are really real. Hence we 
get the Turing test. If we can't tell the difference, the simulator is no 
longer a simulator: it *is* the thing simulated. This conclusion is shored 
up by the apparently water-tight argument that the brain is made of atoms 
and molecules which are Turing emulable (even if it would take the lifetime 
of the universe to simulate the behaviour of a protein in a complex 
cellular environment, but oh well, we can ignore quantum effects because 
it's too hot in there anyway and just fast forward to the neuronal level, 
right?). It's also supported by the objectifying mental habit of people 
conditioned through years of scientific training. It becomes so natural to 
step into the god-level third person perspective that the elision of 
private experience starts seems like a small matter, and a step that one 
has no choice but to make. 

Of course, the alternative does present problems of its own! Craig 
frequently seems to slip into a kind of naturalism that would have it that 
brains possess soft, non-mechanical sense because they are soft and 
non-mechanical seeming. They can't be machines because they don't have 
cables and transistors. Wetware can't possibly be hardware. A lot of his 
arguments seem to be along those lines — the refusal to accept abstractions 
which others accept, as telmo aptly puts it. He claims to solve the hard 
problem of consciousness but the solution involves manoeuvres like 
putting the whole universe into the explanatory gap between objective and 
subjective: hardly illuminating! I get irritated by neologisms like PIP 
(whatever that stands for now - was multi-sense realism' not obscure 
enough?), which to me seem to be about trying to add substance to vague and 
poetic intuitions about reality by attaching big, intellectual-sounding 
labels to them. 

However the same grain of sand that seems to get in Craig's eye does get in 
mine too. It's conceivable that some future incarnation of cleverbot 
(cleverbot.com, in case you don't know it) could reach a point of passing a 
Turing test through a combination of a vast repertoire of recorded 
conversation and some clever linguistic parsing to do a better job of 
keeping track of a semantic thread to the conversation (where the program 
currently falls down). But in this case, what goes in inside the machine 
seems to make all the difference, though the functionalists are committed 
to rejecting that position. Cleverly simulated conversation just doesn't 
seem to be real conversation if what is going on behind the scenes is just 
a bunch of rules for pulling lines out of a database. It's Craig's clever 
garbage lids. We can make a doll that screams and recoils from damaging 
inputs and learns to avoid them, but the functional outputs of pain are not 
the experience of pain. Imagine a being neurologically incapable of pain. 
Like Mary, the hypothetical woman who lives her life seeing the world 
through a black and white monitor and cannot imagine colour qualia until 
she is released, such an entity could not begin to comprehend the meaning 
of screams of pain - beyond possibly recognising a self-protective 
function. The elision of qualia from functional theories of mind has 
potentially very serious ethical consequences - for only a subject with 
access to those qualia truly understand them. Understanding the human 
condition as it really is involves inhabiting human qualia. Otherwise you 
end up with Dr Mengele — humans as objects.

I've read Dennett's arguments against the qualophiles and I find them 
singularly unconvincing - though to say why is another long post. Dennett 
says we only seem to have qualia, but what can seem possibly mean in 
the absence of qualia? An illusion of a quality is an oxymoron, for the 
quality *is* only the way it seems. The comp assumption that computations 
have qualia hidden inside them 

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-09-29 Thread LizR
Fascinating post. The illusion of qualia is perhaps something like the
illusion of consciousness - who is being fooled? (Who is the Master who
makes the grass green?)

My 2c on the Turing Test is that ELIZA passed it, so if you're being
pernickety that was solved in the 60s (I think it was) - but the real test
is whether ELIZA or cleverbot or whatever would *continue* to pass it
for, say, the duration of a voyage to Saturn (or Jupiter in the movie
version).  People manage to pass it for a lot of their lives, though I
would say, sadly, not for all of them (people or lives).

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Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-09-29 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On 30 September 2013 11:36, Pierz pier...@gmail.com wrote:
 If I might just butt in (said the barman)...

 It seems to me that Craig's insistence that nothing is Turing emulable,
 only the measurements are expresses a different ontological assumption from
 the one that computationalists take for granted. It's evident that if we
 make a flight simulator, we will never leave the ground, regardless of the
 verisimilitude of the simulation. So why would a simulated consciousness be
 expected to actually be conscious? Because of different ontological
 assumptions about matter and consciousness. Science has given up on the
 notion of consciousness as having being the same way that matter is
 assumed to. Because consciousness has no place in an objective description
 of the world (i.e., one which is defined purely in terms of the measurable),
 contemporary scientific thinking reduces consciousness to those apparent
 behavioural outputs of consciousness which *can* be measured. This is
 functionalism. Because we can't measure the presence or absence of
 awareness, functionalism gives up on the attempt and presents the functional
 outputs as the only things that are really real. Hence we get the Turing
 test. If we can't tell the difference, the simulator is no longer a
 simulator: it *is* the thing simulated. This conclusion is shored up by the
 apparently water-tight argument that the brain is made of atoms and
 molecules which are Turing emulable (even if it would take the lifetime of
 the universe to simulate the behaviour of a protein in a complex cellular
 environment, but oh well, we can ignore quantum effects because it's too hot
 in there anyway and just fast forward to the neuronal level, right?). It's
 also supported by the objectifying mental habit of people conditioned
 through years of scientific training. It becomes so natural to step into the
 god-level third person perspective that the elision of private experience
 starts seems like a small matter, and a step that one has no choice but to
 make.

 Of course, the alternative does present problems of its own! Craig
 frequently seems to slip into a kind of naturalism that would have it that
 brains possess soft, non-mechanical sense because they are soft and
 non-mechanical seeming. They can't be machines because they don't have
 cables and transistors. Wetware can't possibly be hardware. A lot of his
 arguments seem to be along those lines — the refusal to accept abstractions
 which others accept, as telmo aptly puts it. He claims to solve the hard
 problem of consciousness but the solution involves manoeuvres like putting
 the whole universe into the explanatory gap between objective and
 subjective: hardly illuminating! I get irritated by neologisms like PIP
 (whatever that stands for now - was multi-sense realism' not obscure
 enough?), which to me seem to be about trying to add substance to vague and
 poetic intuitions about reality by attaching big, intellectual-sounding
 labels to them.

 However the same grain of sand that seems to get in Craig's eye does get in
 mine too. It's conceivable that some future incarnation of cleverbot
 (cleverbot.com, in case you don't know it) could reach a point of passing a
 Turing test through a combination of a vast repertoire of recorded
 conversation and some clever linguistic parsing to do a better job of
 keeping track of a semantic thread to the conversation (where the program
 currently falls down). But in this case, what goes in inside the machine
 seems to make all the difference, though the functionalists are committed to
 rejecting that position. Cleverly simulated conversation just doesn't seem
 to be real conversation if what is going on behind the scenes is just a
 bunch of rules for pulling lines out of a database. It's Craig's clever
 garbage lids. We can make a doll that screams and recoils from damaging
 inputs and learns to avoid them, but the functional outputs of pain are not
 the experience of pain. Imagine a being neurologically incapable of pain.
 Like Mary, the hypothetical woman who lives her life seeing the world
 through a black and white monitor and cannot imagine colour qualia until she
 is released, such an entity could not begin to comprehend the meaning of
 screams of pain - beyond possibly recognising a self-protective function.
 The elision of qualia from functional theories of mind has potentially very
 serious ethical consequences - for only a subject with access to those
 qualia truly understand them. Understanding the human condition as it really
 is involves inhabiting human qualia. Otherwise you end up with Dr Mengele —
 humans as objects.

 I've read Dennett's arguments against the qualophiles and I find them
 singularly unconvincing - though to say why is another long post. Dennett
 says we only seem to have qualia, but what can seem possibly mean in the
 absence of qualia? An illusion of a quality is an oxymoron, for the quality
 *is* only the way it seems. The 

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-09-27 Thread Telmo Menezes
On Thu, Sep 26, 2013 at 9:28 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:


 On Thursday, September 26, 2013 11:49:29 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote:

 On Thu, Sep 26, 2013 at 2:38 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com
 wrote:
 
 
  On Thursday, September 26, 2013 6:17:04 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote:
 
  Hi Craig (and all),
 
  Now that I have a better understanding of your ideas, I would like to
  confront you with a thought experiment. Some of the stuff you say
  looks completely esoteric to me, so I imagine there are three
  possibilities: either you are significantly more intelligent than me
  or you're a bit crazy, or both. I'm not joking, I don't know.
 
  But I would like to focus on sensory participation as the fundamental
  stuff of reality and your claim that strong AI is impossible because
  the machines we build are just Frankensteins, in a sense. If I
  understand correctly, you still believe these machines have sensory
  participation just because they exist, but not in the sense that they
  could emulate our human experiences. They have the sensory
  participation level of the stuff they're made of and nothing else.
  Right?
 
 
  Not exactly. My view is that there is only sensory participation on the
  level of what has naturally evolved.

 This sounds a bit like vitalism. What's so special about natural
 evolution that can't be captured otherwise?


 It's not about life or nature being special, it's about recognizing that
 nature is an expression of experience, and that experience can't be
 substituted.

Ok. How did you arrive at this belief? How can you believe this
without proposing some mechanism by which it happens? Or do you
propose such a thing?

 A player piano can be made to play the notes of a song, but no
 matter how many notes it plays, it will never know the significance of what
 notes or music is.



  Since the machine did not organize
  itself, there is no 'machine' any more than a book of Shakespeare's
  quotes
  is a machine that is gradually turning into Shakespeare.

 But the books are not machines. Shakespeare possibly was. If he was,
 why can't he be emulated by another machine?


 I was using the example of a book to show how different a symbol is from
 that which we imagine the symbol represents. If we want a more machine-like
 example, we can use a copy machine. The copier can reproduce the works of
 any author mechanically, but does it appreciate or participate in the
 content of what it is copying?

Ok. Yes, of course. But consider this: when you read a book, your
brain triggers in super-complex ways that constantly find patterns,
correlate with previous informations, trigger emotions and so on. This
clearly isn't happening with the copying machine. This would also not
happen if I was forced to copy a book in Japanese by hand. So I don't
think the comparison is fair. I'm not trying to argue that brain
complexity generates consciousness, but I am inclined to believe that
his complexity creates the necessary space for a human-like 1p. I
don't see why this couldn't be equally done in a computer.


  What we see as
  machines are assemblies of parts which we use to automate functions
  according to our own human sense and motives - like a puppet.
  There is sensation going on two levels: 1) the very local level, and 2)
  at
  the absolute level. On the 1) local level, all machines depend on local
  physical events. Whether they are driven by springs and gears, boiling
  water
  in pipes, or subatomic collisions, Turing emulation rides on the back of
  specific conditions which lock and unlock small parts of the machine.
  Those
  smallest of those parts would be associated with some sensory-motive
  interaction - the coherence of molecular surfaces, thermodynamics,
  electrodynamics, etc, have a very local, instantaneous, and presumably
  primitive sensory involvement. That could be very alien to us, as it is
  both
  very short term and very long term - maybe there is only a flash of
  feeling
  at the moment of change, who knows?

 This part I can somewhat agree with. I do tend to believe that 1p
 experience is possibly not limited to living organisms. I think about
 it like you describe: flashes of feeling and who knows :)

  On the 2) absolute level, there is the logical sensibility which all 1)
  local events share - the least common denominator of body interactions.
  This
  is the universal machine that Bruno champions. It's not sense which is
  necessarily experienced directly, rather all local sense touches on this
  universal measuring system *when it measures* something else.
 
  The problem with machines is that there is no sense in between the
  momentary, memoryless, sensation of lock/unlock and the timeless,
  placeless
  sensibility of read/write or +/*. In a human experience, the 1) has
  evolved
  over billions of years to occupy the continuum in between 1) and 2),
  with
  implicit memories of feelings and experiences anchored in unique local
  

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-09-26 Thread Craig Weinberg


On Thursday, September 26, 2013 6:17:04 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote:

 Hi Craig (and all), 

 Now that I have a better understanding of your ideas, I would like to 
 confront you with a thought experiment. Some of the stuff you say 
 looks completely esoteric to me, so I imagine there are three 
 possibilities: either you are significantly more intelligent than me 
 or you're a bit crazy, or both. I'm not joking, I don't know. 

 But I would like to focus on sensory participation as the fundamental 
 stuff of reality and your claim that strong AI is impossible because 
 the machines we build are just Frankensteins, in a sense. If I 
 understand correctly, you still believe these machines have sensory 
 participation just because they exist, but not in the sense that they 
 could emulate our human experiences. They have the sensory 
 participation level of the stuff they're made of and nothing else. 
 Right? 


Not exactly. My view is that there is only sensory participation on the 
level of what has naturally evolved. Since the machine did not organize 
itself, there is no 'machine' any more than a book of Shakespeare's quotes 
is a machine that is gradually turning into Shakespeare. What we see as 
machines are assemblies of parts which we use to automate functions 
according to our own human sense and motives - like a puppet. 

There is sensation going on two levels: 1) the very local level, and 2) at 
the absolute level. On the 1) local level, all machines depend on local 
physical events. Whether they are driven by springs and gears, boiling 
water in pipes, or subatomic collisions, Turing emulation rides on the back 
of specific conditions which lock and unlock small parts of the machine. 
Those smallest of those parts would be associated with some sensory-motive 
interaction - the coherence of molecular surfaces, thermodynamics, 
electrodynamics, etc, have a very local, instantaneous, and presumably 
primitive sensory involvement. That could be very alien to us, as it is 
both very short term and very long term - maybe there is only a flash of 
feeling at the moment of change, who knows?

On the 2) absolute level, there is the logical sensibility which all 1) 
local events share - the least common denominator of body interactions. 
This is the universal machine that Bruno champions. It's not sense which is 
necessarily experienced directly, rather all local sense touches on this 
universal measuring system *when it measures* something else.

The problem with machines is that there is no sense in between the 
momentary, memoryless, sensation of lock/unlock and the timeless, placeless 
sensibility of read/write or +/*. In a human experience, the 1) has evolved 
over billions of years to occupy the continuum in between 1) and 2), with 
implicit memories of feelings and experiences anchored in unique local 
contexts. Machines have no geography or ethnicity, no aesthetic presence.

 


 So let's talk about seeds. 

 We now know how a human being grows from a seed that we pretty much 
 understand. We might not be able to model all the complexity involved 
 in networks of gene expression, protein folding and so on, but we 
 understand the building blocks. We understand them to a point where we 
 can actually engineer the outcome to a degree. It is now 2013 and we 
 are, in a sense, living in the future. 

 So we can now take a fertilised egg and tweak it somehow. When done 
 successfully, a human being will grow out of it. Doing this with human 
 eggs is considered unethical, but I believe it is technically 
 possible. So a human being grows out of this egg. Is he/she normal? 


I don't know that there is normal. All that we can do is see whether people 
who have had various procedures done to their cell-bodies seem healthy to 
themselves and others.
 


 What if someone actually designs the entire DNA string and grows a 
 human being out of it? Still normal? 


Same thing. Probably, but it depends on how the mother's body responds to 
it as it develops.
 


 What if we simulate the growth of the organism from a string of 
 virtual DNA and then just assemble the outcome at some stage? Still 
 normal? 


Virtual DNA is a cartoon, with a recording of our expectations attached to 
it. Is a digital picture of a person 'normal'? If we photoshop it a little 
bit, is it still normal? The problem is the expectation that virtual 
anything is the same as real simply because it reminds us of something 
real. Of course it reminds us of what is real, we have designed it 
specifically to fool us in every way that we care about.
 


 What if now we do away with DNA altogether and use some other Turing 
 complete self-modifying system? 


Then we have a cool cartoon that reminds us of biology. That's if we have 
it rendered to a graphic display. If not then we have a warm box full of 
tiny switches that we can imagine are doing something other than switching 
on and off.
 


 What if we never build the outcome but 

Re: A challenge for Craig

2013-09-26 Thread Telmo Menezes
On Thu, Sep 26, 2013 at 2:38 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:


 On Thursday, September 26, 2013 6:17:04 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote:

 Hi Craig (and all),

 Now that I have a better understanding of your ideas, I would like to
 confront you with a thought experiment. Some of the stuff you say
 looks completely esoteric to me, so I imagine there are three
 possibilities: either you are significantly more intelligent than me
 or you're a bit crazy, or both. I'm not joking, I don't know.

 But I would like to focus on sensory participation as the fundamental
 stuff of reality and your claim that strong AI is impossible because
 the machines we build are just Frankensteins, in a sense. If I
 understand correctly, you still believe these machines have sensory
 participation just because they exist, but not in the sense that they
 could emulate our human experiences. They have the sensory
 participation level of the stuff they're made of and nothing else.
 Right?


 Not exactly. My view is that there is only sensory participation on the
 level of what has naturally evolved.

This sounds a bit like vitalism. What's so special about natural
evolution that can't be captured otherwise?

 Since the machine did not organize
 itself, there is no 'machine' any more than a book of Shakespeare's quotes
 is a machine that is gradually turning into Shakespeare.

But the books are not machines. Shakespeare possibly was. If he was,
why can't he be emulated by another machine?

 What we see as
 machines are assemblies of parts which we use to automate functions
 according to our own human sense and motives - like a puppet.
 There is sensation going on two levels: 1) the very local level, and 2) at
 the absolute level. On the 1) local level, all machines depend on local
 physical events. Whether they are driven by springs and gears, boiling water
 in pipes, or subatomic collisions, Turing emulation rides on the back of
 specific conditions which lock and unlock small parts of the machine. Those
 smallest of those parts would be associated with some sensory-motive
 interaction - the coherence of molecular surfaces, thermodynamics,
 electrodynamics, etc, have a very local, instantaneous, and presumably
 primitive sensory involvement. That could be very alien to us, as it is both
 very short term and very long term - maybe there is only a flash of feeling
 at the moment of change, who knows?

This part I can somewhat agree with. I do tend to believe that 1p
experience is possibly not limited to living organisms. I think about
it like you describe: flashes of feeling and who knows :)

 On the 2) absolute level, there is the logical sensibility which all 1)
 local events share - the least common denominator of body interactions. This
 is the universal machine that Bruno champions. It's not sense which is
 necessarily experienced directly, rather all local sense touches on this
 universal measuring system *when it measures* something else.

 The problem with machines is that there is no sense in between the
 momentary, memoryless, sensation of lock/unlock and the timeless, placeless
 sensibility of read/write or +/*. In a human experience, the 1) has evolved
 over billions of years to occupy the continuum in between 1) and 2), with
 implicit memories of feelings and experiences anchored in unique local
 contexts. Machines have no geography or ethnicity, no aesthetic presence.

Why do you believe we have evolved like that? What's the evolutionary
pressure for that? Whatever evolution did, why can't we recreate it?
Or do you. by evolution, mean something else/more than conventional
neo-Darwinism?




 So let's talk about seeds.

 We now know how a human being grows from a seed that we pretty much
 understand. We might not be able to model all the complexity involved
 in networks of gene expression, protein folding and so on, but we
 understand the building blocks. We understand them to a point where we
 can actually engineer the outcome to a degree. It is now 2013 and we
 are, in a sense, living in the future.

 So we can now take a fertilised egg and tweak it somehow. When done
 successfully, a human being will grow out of it. Doing this with human
 eggs is considered unethical, but I believe it is technically
 possible. So a human being grows out of this egg. Is he/she normal?


 I don't know that there is normal. All that we can do is see whether people
 who have had various procedures done to their cell-bodies seem healthy to
 themselves and others.

So it appears you're open to the possibility that this is fine, and
that a human being like you and me was produced.



 What if someone actually designs the entire DNA string and grows a
 human being out of it? Still normal?


 Same thing. Probably, but it depends on how the mother's body responds to it
 as it develops.

So you don't believe this is possible:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Artificial_uterus ?

If not, why?

 What if we simulate the growth of the 

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