Gilles wrote:
>I agree, but it [QM] is must be still considered as an incomplete
>theory, such
>as Newton's gravitation. So the point is that computing Schroedinger
>equation for a brain does not obviously insure that the computation is
>actually thinking. Only the use of a computable TOE would escape this
>issue.
You are absolutely right, although my feeling (through and
not-through comp) is that QM is essentially correct, as is
her classical part.
You are right. Only a TOE would escape the issue.
But with comp, alas, we can prove that there are no computable TOE.
>>To use the phenomenological quantum weirdness as a argument against
>>comp will not work with me because I take the QUANTUM as the most
>>convincing (a posteriori, I confess) confirmation of the DIGITAL ultimate
>>nature of reality.
>>Of course a confirmation is not a proof, and computerland would
>>be a sad country if all machines are betting comp :-)
>>
>>Bruno
>
>Sure! :-)
>I still have the impression that in the absence of a TOE, you are not
>allowed to identify any (practical or "theoretical") computation with any
>physical phenomenon, including the thought...and again even if it were
>true, the problem of the emergence of consciousness would not be easier.
But with comp there is a TOE ! I show that explicitly in my thesis.
The TOE is Arithmetical/informatical Truth.
That that is not computable follows from *Goedel* (or by typical
diagonalisations).
To paraphrase Kronecker:
God creates the natural numbers,
Everything else is dreamed by natural numbers.
What is a dream ? A ``collection" of relative computational states of a
sufficiently reflexive universal machine.
What is Physical Reality ? It is the sharable and inferable (provable
and consistent) part of the *dreams* of all self-referentially correct
sufficiently reflexive universal machine.
What is Geographical Reality ? The same as physical reality entangled
with a bunch of probably very long (deep) *stories*.
What is consciousness ? The proposition 'I am conscious" is, among
other propositions, a first-person perspective of an unconscious
(instinctive) inference of a true but unprovable proposition
concerning the concistency of a self-referentially correct
sufficiently reflexive universal machine.
You can see it as an inference of self-concistency.
It is always an interrogative "self-concistency", but by infering it
instinctively and continuously for a time, there is a tendency to be
a little blase about it.
You can also interpret the ``self-consistency proposition" as a
representation of our most immediate accessible possible *worlds*.
Bruno
